Project Management Institute

Case Studies in Project Management

Springfield Interchange Improvement

Project

Edited by:

Frank T. Anbari, PhD, PMP

The George Washington University

Springfield Interchange Improvement Project

By:

Young Hoon Kwak, PhD

Jerry Doherty, MSPM
Antonia Mambelli, MSPM
Amin Mourad, MSPM, PMP
LCDR Joe Speranzo, USN, MSPM

Edited by:

Frank T. Anbari, PhD, PMP

The George Washington University

This case study was originally prepared as part of Project Management Applications, the
capstone course of the Master of Science in Project Management at The George Washington
University, by the graduating students listed above with the supervision of Professor Kwak,
during the Fall 2002 semester.
This case study was adapted to make it a learning resource and might not reflect all historical
facts related to this project.

Case Study

Springfield Interchange Improvement Project

Table of Contents
Introduction .....................................................................................................................................3
The Inception Phase ........................................................................................................................4
The Development Phase ..................................................................................................................9
The Implementation Phase ............................................................................................................13
The Closeout Phase........................................................................................................................16
Summary of Project Assessment and Analysis..............................................................................22
References .....................................................................................................................................23

Case Study

Springfield Interchange Improvement Project

Introduction
It is no secret that the number of megaprojects being undertaken in the United States is on the
rise. A quick Internet search using Google.com and the words mega and project returned
more than 40,000 results. Part of the reason is the rising cost of technology and inflation;
however, a renewed awareness of the interconnectedness of people, technology, and environment
is increasingly driving the complexity of projects. A look at the U.S. Department of
Transportation Priority Project List (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2004) confirms this
notion, with several projects being listed as groupings of smaller related projects, or critical
junctures between different technologies and the environment. Addressing only one aspect of a
complex system could throw the rest of the system off balance and may create new problems, but
not completely solve the old ones. Addressing all or most of the relevant aspects of a troubled
system often requires larger, more complex solutions that, in turn, require larger and more
complex projects.
With the stakes high and challenges common, it seems intuitive that good project management
principles would be employed in megaprojects as a matter of course. However, this may not
always be the case. Unfortunately, along with the increased number of megaprojects, the number
of challenges among megaprojects is also rising. The same Google.com search with the
additional word failure returned more than 3,000 results. Many are aware of the spectacular
challenges that faced major projects, but dozens of less challenged projects are available as
examples of the need for sound project management practices (Hull, 1992).
This case study analyzes the project management practices employed on the Springfield
Interchange Improvement Project (SIIP), a US$700 million transportation megaproject in the
part of the Washington, DC metropolitan area located in Northern Virginia. The analysis
considers the apparent project success as recognized by public stakeholders.
The case study demonstrates that modern project management practices are being used on the
SIIP, causing it to be largely successful. However, these efforts may have been initially affected
by the limited use of these practices within the parent organization, the Virginia Department of
Transportation (VDOT). In an interesting turn of events, the parent organization underwent
significant organizational change during the project. This provided the project team with the
unique opportunity to enforce project management practices within VDOT, which willingly
recognized past mistakes and responded with organizational and policy changes to improve the
future management of megaprojects.
The case study covers various Project Management Knowledge Areas (Project Management
Institute, 2004) within four project phases: inception, development, implementation, and
closeout. Within each project phase, the activities, accomplishments, and shortcomings of
performance in the processes of initiating, planning, executing, monitoring and controlling, and
closing are discussed. The case study is structured to allow an evaluation of the appropriate
processes of various Project Management Knowledge Areas at the end of each phase. The reader
can conduct an overall assessment of performance, resulting in a numeric evaluation of the
4

management of this project, including areas of strength, opportunities for improvement, and
lessons learned.
In the inception phase, the discussion focuses on the historical background of the project, its
overall objectives, problem definition, concerns, political climate, and the selected solution. In
the development phase, the discussion addresses the overall planning, feasibility studies,
funding, and conceptual design. In the implementation phase, the discussion addresses detailed
design, construction, and commissioning. Finally, in the closeout phase, the discussion reflects
on overall performance, project status, and project evaluation.
The Inception Phase
The Springfield Interchange is one of the most complex and dangerous interchanges in the
United States (Sipress & Reid, 1999). Situated fifteen miles south of Washington, DC, where the
Capital Beltway intersects Interstate Highways I-95 and I-395, the interchange is aptly
nicknamed the Mixing Bowl, as four of the regions heaviest streams of traffic rush together in
a fury of bobbing and weaving and last-second lane changing in an effort to negotiate the
outdated traffic patterns. As many as 375,000 vehicles commute via this route every day, in
addition to the constant traffic of I-95, the primary East Coast commercial corridor. The
interchange held the distinction of having more accidents than any section of the Beltway or any
other area of road in Virginia. Although delays and driver confusion continually reinforced the
need to improve the interchange, it was traffic safety issues that finally moved the project off the
wish list and onto the drawing board (Behr, 1999).
Although overriding safety concerns drove the project, not everyone was excited about the
prospects of a multiyear construction project in the middle of the busiest area of the Washington,
DC Beltway. Local businesses were worried about losing customers because drivers would want
to avoid the area. Commercial carriers were concerned about the impact the delays would have
on their costs. Local residents were distressed that fixing the Mixing Bowl would solve only part
of the problem, leaving bottlenecks at the feeder points just outside the interchange. And the
VDOT was very concerned about how to execute a cost-effective megaproject at a site that
provided little or no lay-down area while keeping the traffic flowing (Sipress, 1999).
To address the community concerns, VDOT held a series of public hearings that helped define
the scope of the project. These hearings led to the formulation of a comprehensive Congestion
Management Plan (CMP), which set guidelines on how to move regular daily traffic through the
construction zone without causing undue stress and delay for motorists. The 12 initial design
options were narrowed to one, with the new interchange having separate roadways for express,
local and carpool traffic, and the project was divided into eight major stages, each of which could
be independently contracted:
1. Add a lane on I-95 South and an off-ramp on I-95 North to ease traffic flow during
construction.
2. Rebuild the I-95/Route 644 Interchange.
3. Widen the access road and overpass bridges to accommodate higher feeder traffic flow.
4. Provide a direct overpass for I-495 westbound traffic to southbound I-95.
5. Enlarge the ramp from I-395 South to westbound I-495.
6. Complete the I-95 northbound and local ramps.

7. Complete the I-395 southbound and high occupancy vehicles (HOV) roadway.
8. Improve the Capital Beltway (I-495) from the American Legion Bridge (Virginia-Maryland
Line) to the Springfield Interchange (I-95/I-395). This stage was later removed from the SIIP
and incorporated into the nearby Wilson Bridge Replacement Project, taking place at the
same time but under different management.
During the inception phase, more things in scope planning were done right than were done
wrong. The SIIP is one of the largest construction projects in the United States. Many citizens
and officials had the right idea of what needed to be done to fix the traffic problems with the
Springfield Interchange. Public interest groups and government committees knew that it would
be a large, long-term, and costly construction project. However, the problems with the
Springfield Interchange had existed for many years and were often deadly. Too many small-scale
fixes were attempted while politicians argued over funding and other priorities. While debating,
many motorists were killed in accidents related to the Springfield Interchange problems.
According to a federal study, a crash from a vehicle trying to maneuver through this complicated
Mixing Bowl resulted in death approximately once every three weeks. That is a large part of the
reason Virginia finally decided to undertake this project (Sipress, 1999).
The SIIP performed rather poorly in terms of cost in the early stages of the project. This is
primarily due to extreme challenges in cost estimating. VDOT had no previous experience with
such large-scale projects and used obviously flawed techniques in compiling its estimates (Shear
& Shaver, 2002). Prior to the SIIP (and other megaprojects, such as the Wilson Bridge Project
and Hampton Roads Third Crossing), VDOT had executed only projects under US$50 million.
Another problem was that VDOT started allowing construction projects to get under way before
all the funding was approved. A transportation bill passed by the U.S. Congress increased federal
money for Virginia, but that meant the state had to spend its own matching money first. This
started a spending frenzy. Department officials responsible for giving approval to contractors had
no idea whether there was enough money to pay them. Reports would later reveal that VDOT
exerted almost no control over cost (Shear, 2002).
This posed serious scheduling challenges to SIIP in the beginning of the project. The state of
Virginia waited too long to authorize and fund the official start of the project while motorists
battled congestion and dodged treacherous traffic situations.
The project planners performed well in contract inception for the basic reason that they realized,
despite misconceptions in other areas, that the magnitude of this endeavor would require more
expertise and experience than they had available internally. The decision was made to outsource
the heavy construction and much of the management consulting to large professional firms.
Risk management planning was not conducted in the early stages of the project. In fact, VDOT
policy does not even consider risk management in the planning phases of a project. Despite the
best efforts of project personnel, the early stages of the project were rife with political issues,
particularly with respect to scope, schedule, and cost, which affected the overall quality of the
project inception.

The project performed somewhat poorly in terms of teamwork during inception, due to problems
between government officials, appointed committee members, and VDOT staff personnel. To be
fair, the problem was much greater than just this project. VDOT is staffed with good people, but
politics, leadership, and other issues resulted in delayed projects and large cost overruns. The
politicians may be at least equally to blame for much of the mess. The record indicates that
VDOT staff professionals provided sound advice about this project and others, but the politicians
ignored that advice because adopting those policies was not politically expedient (Goolrick,
2002).
During the inception phase, VDOT had to contend with many political difficulties. Despite
antiquated computer and information technologies, VDOT seems to have done an excellent job
of communicating with all stakeholders of the SIIP during this phase. The transportation
department made a concerted effort to get all parties involved in the process early, with the
express purpose of identifying and avoiding difficulties later in the project. Public hearings,
neighborhood committees, and an aggressive public awareness and community relations
campaign were very successful parts of this project.
Assessment and Analysis
1.
Please complete your evaluation of project management during this phase, using the
following grid:
Rating Scale: 5Excellent, 4Very Good, 3Good, 2Poor, 1Very Poor
Project Management Area

Inception Phase

Scope Management
Time Management
Cost Management
Quality Management
Human Resource Management
Communications Management
Risk Management
Procurement Management
Integration Management
2. Please highlight the major areas of strength in the management of this phase of the project:

3. Please highlight the major opportunities for improvement in the management of this phase of
the project:

The Development Phase

Once the SIIP was commissioned, many public hearings were held to gather information on the
concerns and needs of the community. Transportation committees were designated and studies
were conducted to determine the appropriate scope of the project. These measures helped the
project team effectively forecast an adequate, yet realistic scope for the project. To keep traffic
moving during construction, the VDOT planning committee decided to include many creative
and aggressive programs as part of the overall project scope, including a Congestion
Management Program (CMP), a public Information Center (IC), and equipment and financial
support to local law enforcement and rescue agencies. The CMP provided programs that were
developed to enhance commuter options during construction, including improving alternate
routes, additional park-and-ride lots, and increased public transit services. The SIIP IC is the
central location for the projects extensive public awareness program, and was developed to meet
the needs of motorists, residents, and business owners concerned about the impact of the project.
Although not initially included in the inception plan and original estimates, these initiatives
allowed the project to perform well in this area (VDOT Springfield Interchange Improvement
Project, [2003a]).
When officials tried to model the project costs based on historical information, estimates were
way off because of the lack of data on large-scale projects within Virginia. There were many
aspects that were grossly underestimated and others that were not even included. Projected
overhead rates were especially inadequate because VDOTs method for calculating overhead
was flawed. VDOT policy also precluded incorporating inflation into the estimate. Even the
internal VDOT tax rate on the project had to be recalculated.
In 1992, VDOT planners said the project would cost US$220 million. The 1994 plan estimated
the total cost at US$350 million; however, VDOT officials emphasized that only 40% of the
design work was completed at that point. These were not realistic cost estimates, but politically
motivated announcements that hampered management of the project (Jones, 2002, March 13).
In spite of the late authorization to proceed with the project, project managers recognized the
value of involving the public in the detailed planning and development of the project. The
parallel development of stages 2 through 8 while stage 1 was being completed was a smart tactic
to speed implementation without compromising development.
The transportation department performed well in the contracting area during the development
phase, particularly in view of VDOTs inexperience in large projects. Although VDOT is to be
commended for using contracting incentives to motivate the construction companies, there were
problems with the way such incentives were written into contracts for the individual stages.
VDOT had the right idea to limit the impact of construction on the citizens and merchants who
work and live in the area, but the incentives were poorly planned, especially in stage 1, and did
not always produce the desired effects.
Whereas there were no formal VDOT procedures in place for risk management, informal
procedures were at least considered at the project level. However, without support from the
organization, risk mitigation strategies, such as incorporating inflation into the cost estimates,
were not recognized as valuable approaches and were disallowed.

Astoundingly, the SIIP was not developed with any kind of a formal quality assurance program.
Were it not for internal programs used by design contractors, the project would have had serious
challenges in this area.
The project also had its challenges in teamwork development for various political reasons.
VDOT professionals had anticipated the transportation needs for the congested areas of Northern
Virginia far in advance, but development stalled because of those reasons. Construction under
way at the Springfield Interchange could have been done a dozen or more years earlier, but the
politicians were not willing to make decisions because of the risk of public controversy
(Goolrick, 2002).
VDOT continued its excellent campaign of information exchange with the community and public
officials during the development phase. Input was collected and evaluated for consideration in
the project and a significant amount of money was set aside specifically to address community
concerns. However, as the SIIP project team was taking formal shape, VDOT made a tactical
error in the project organization and set up the project with multiple managers, unrelated
organizationally, each with responsibility in different areas, such as design, construction,
congestion management, and information operations. This organization, though perhaps effective
for smaller projects, hampered effective communications during the development phase of this
megaproject, and was responsible for several developmental mistakes.
As noted earlier, several policy and organizational issues within VDOT wreaked havoc on this
project in the early phases. Until the subsequent organizational changes, VDOT did not advocate
formal project management techniques, or offer project management training or guidance.

10

Assessment and Analysis

1. Please complete your evaluation of project management during this phase, using the
following grid:
Rating Scale: 5Excellent, 4Very Good, 3Good, 2Poor, 1Very Poor
Project Management Area

Development Phase

Scope Management
Time Management
Cost Management
Quality Management
Human Resource Management
Communications Management
Risk Management
Procurement Management
Integration Management
2. Please highlight the major areas of strength in the management of this phase of the project:

3. Please highlight the major opportunities for improvement in the management of this phase of
the project:

11

The Implementation Phase

The SIIP continued to move forward with the planned large-scale project approach. The project
scope has changed little and the management of that change has been exceptional. One example
of prudent scope management was the decision to eliminate exit and entrance ramps for carpool
lanes due to the uncertainty of the planned expansion of the Washington, DC Beltway, which
may not include carpool lanes (Timberg, 2000).
The project performed well in the cost management area, despite the early mistakes, primarily
because VDOT was willing to listen to the project management team and change its procedures
to accommodate megaprojects. Two areas of mistaken cost estimates that became especially
evident in the implementation phase were the increased expenditures for raw materials and
skilled labor. This was due to the lack of inflationary factors in the original estimates. Project
planners had a good idea of initial costs; however, due to the size and length of the schedule,
estimates did not reflect actual costs for labor, raw materials, and other commodities. In addition,
people who own land that VDOT needed to acquire for right-of-way have disagreed with the
state on its value, resulting in court cases and attorneys fees. By the middle of 1998, VDOTs
estimate for SIIP had risen to US$394 million. However, this figure was still based on inaccurate
and incomplete forecasting. With a change in administration at VDOT, the project management
team incorporated lessons learned from the previous mistakes and recalculated the cost estimate
for the entire project. The new estimates considered inflation, a more complete understanding of
the VDOT overhead, and the latest changes in scope. These estimates predicted the project to
cost about US$700 million, which appears to accurately reflect the project management team
estimate for the first time (Shear, 2002).
Although there have been several scope changes that have impacted the schedule, time
management has generally been excellent. The project schedule was well planned for such a
large undertaking and has generally progressed as intended (VDOT Springfield Interchange
Improvement Project, 2003b). One impact to the schedule that should have been foreseen was
the interference that arose during the construction of a rail bridge for a busy (60 trains a day) rail
corridor. Heavy traffic and stringent safety requirements combined to limit available work hours
and cause a significant increase in task duration. This delay and others caused by scope changes
increased construction time for two stages by eight months, but with the creative planning of the
phased implementation, there were no significant delays in the overall project schedule.
Whereas the contract incentives were a failure in stage 1, they were extremely successful in
stages 2 and 3, which were completed six months ahead of schedule. One contracting company
received a US$10 million bonus check from VDOT for the early completion of these key stages
(Jones, 2002, March 6).
Project performance improved for risk implementation because the new SIIP project team
recognized the importance of a formal risk management program and implemented specific
procedures at the project level. The SIIP project team recognized quality and safety as important
assets that require constant attention. They created a strong quality-assurance program that
captured lessons learned for future incorporation into the project. Although the teams
implementation was effective, the disconnect between their project system and the VDOT
quality index, which admittedly is an inaccurate measure, prevented the project from benefiting

12

fully from these efforts.

The project performed very well in teamwork implementation, partly because of the hard work
and dedication of the project leadership team, but also because of recent significant changes and
reforms within VDOT. These included sweeping fiscal changes within VDOT, the
implementation of important organizational reforms, new methods for estimating the cost of
projects, strict financial controls, and a major reorganization for the management of
megaprojects, putting the leadership of the entire project under one individual. This new
organizational relationship, though implemented more than two-thirds of the way through the
project, has significantly benefited the SIIPs current and planned project stages.
These major organizational changes within VDOT had many positive effects on project
communications. In particular, having a single project manager enabled the project team to
correct problems initiated in the development phase that were still plaguing stages 6 and 7 of the
project. A new computer system installed at VDOT to help monitor the progress of road
construction projects has already demonstrated its value on this and other projects (Shear, 2002).
The team has also taken advantage of cell phones, e-mail, and official correspondence to
communicate, and has kept a vast library of all project correspondence.
The new organization has been moving toward a project management framework and
implementing project management processes and best practices. This trend is very positive, well
received by the professional staff, and long overdue; indeed, these changes should have been
implemented earlier to enhance the likelihood of success for the project.

13

Assessment and Analysis

1. Please complete your evaluation of project management during this phase, using the
following grid:
Rating Scale: 5Excellent, 4Very Good, 3Good, 2Poor, 1Very Poor
Project Management Area

Implementation Phase

Scope Management
Time Management
Cost Management
Quality Management
Human Resource Management
Communications Management
Risk Management
Procurement Management
Integration Management
2. Please highlight the major areas of strength in the management of this phase of the project:

3. Please highlight the major opportunities for improvement in the management of this phase of
the project:

14

The Closeout Phase

The project team, as well as VDOT, continued to learn from its past mistakes by incorporating
lessons learned from previous stages into subsequent stages.
The project performed well in scope closeout, again because of the teams willingness to
incorporate lessons learned from mistakes made in previous phases into the planning for future
phases. For example, contractual incentives that were ineffective and caused cost increases in the
first stage were changed for stages 2 and 3, resulting in those stages finishing six months ahead
of schedule.
The project also performed well in cost closeout, because not only did the team use the mistakes
of previous stages of the project to improve cost estimating and forecasts, but it also convinced
VDOT to change its estimating procedures in the process. Not only have estimates on future
work for the SIIP been more accurate, but also estimates for projects of all sizes throughout the
state of Virginia will now reflect actual costs more accurately.
The project performed well in contract closeout because of the teams and VDOTs willingness
to learn from past mistakes and incorporate those lessons into plans for the future, as discussed in
other areas. In addition, the project team maintained an automated list of closeout requirements,
often called a punchlist, which the team used to ensure that even minute details were completed
before a contract is declared finished (Jones, 2002, March 6).
The project performed very well in risk closeout, because not only did the team incorporate risk
management into future project stages, but they also convinced VDOT of the value of risk
management and statewide procedures that have been modified to incorporate risk planning and
risk management in the early stages of all projects, not just megaprojects.
The project team applied its efforts to create a quality system that can be used by future stages
and projects. Using tools that VDOT already had in place, such as the pre-constructability review
of a design before it is released for bids, the project team applied lessons learned to ensure that
project stages under review will not be plagued by past mistakes. However, some disconnects
between the project system and the VDOT system provided additional challenges in this area.
Although the project team had developed sound plans for maintaining teamwork and positive
relationships as current and subsequent project stages come to a close, there have not been
sufficient opportunities to demonstrate the effectiveness of these plans since the organizational
changes occurred within VDOT. Despite organizational barriers to good communications that
were present during most of the first three stages of the project, the team performed well in the
closeout phase because of the significant effort put into learning from past mistakes and
communicating them to those responsible for developing future stages. The schedule design with
several overlapping stages -- and the project correspondence files -- facilitated this process.
The lack of a modern computerized knowledge management system to easily share lessons
learned throughout the organization caused challenges to better performance in this area.
However, SIIP has successfully utilized lessons learned information from ongoing and previous
stages and projects, and has succeeded at getting these practices incorporated into new VDOT

15

processes. This demonstrates that VDOT is learning well as an organization, which should
facilitate further improvements in this and other projects.
Overall, the project has done a fair job of satisfying stakeholders. The delay in initiating the
project and the numerous small attempts to quick fix the problem cost a lot of goodwill, as
well as dozens of lives. However, once the project was initiated, scope was managed extremely
well. Commuters and businesses have been quite complimentary of the correlation between what
they were told the schedule would be and how the schedule has actually evolved. Nonetheless,
an outrageous gap remained between the initial political cost estimate and the actual cost of the
project.
Public stakeholders are largely unaware of the overall impact of contracting issues on the project.
The blunders in the development of contractual incentives early in the project were remedied
later, thereby helping to improve project performance.
Despite the impact the project has had on risk management throughout VDOT, the overall
performance for risk management remained weak for the project as a whole, primarily because
risk management is most effective if considered in the early stages of project planning. Despite
the near-heroic efforts of the project team to institute a quality management program for the
project, the lack of VDOT support, particularly in the early stages, resulted in challenges to the
project.
There is great potential in VDOTs new organizational responsibility plan for megaprojects.
However, the fix was offered so late into this project that it had limited impact on its overall
performance. Overall, the project performed well in communications, partly because of the
ingenuity and conscientious work of the project team leaders, and partly because of the sweeping
organizational changes within VDOT that allowed the team to overcome early deficiencies.
Despite serious challenges in the early stages of the project, management of the SIIP improved
steadily as the project moved forward through its various stages. Stages 1 through 3 of the SIIP
were completed in 2001. Work is in progress on the final stages of the project which is planned
for completion by late 2007.

16

Assessment and Analysis

1. Please complete your evaluation of project management during this phase, using the
following grid:
Rating Scale: 5Excellent, 4Very Good, 3Good, 2Poor, 1Very Poor
Project Management Area

Closeout Phase

Scope Management
Time Management
Cost Management
Quality Management
Human Resource Management
Communications Management
Risk Management
Procurement Management
Integration Management
2. Please highlight the major areas of strength in the management of this phase of the project:

3. Please highlight the major opportunities for improvement in the management of this phase of
the project:

Summary of Project Assessment and Analysis

1. Please complete your evaluation of project management for this project and calculate the
average rating, using the following grid:
Rating Scale: 5Excellent, 4Very Good, 3Good, 2Poor, 1Very Poor
Project Management Area
Scope Management
Time Management

Inception Development Implementation Closeout

Phase
Phase
Phase
Phase

Average

17

Cost Management
Quality Management
Human Resource Management
Communications Management
Risk Management
Procurement Management
Integration Management
Average
2. Please highlight the major areas of strength in the management of this project:

3. Please highlight the major opportunities for improvement in the management of this project:

4. Please highlight the major project management lessons learned from this project:

18

References
Behr, P. (1999, January 3). Springfield businesses brace for bad time. The Washington Post, p.
A21.
U.S. Department of Transportation (2004, October 26). Environmental stewardship and
transportation infrastructure project reviews: Department of Transportation priority project
list. Retrieved on April 4, 2005 from http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/stewardshipeo/pplist.htm
Goolrick, J. (2002, January 29). Can Warner tame the VDOT tiger to better transportation?
TimesCommunity.com.
Retrieved
on
April
4,
2005
from
http://www.timescommunity.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=3125951&BRD=2553&PAG=461
&dept_id=507243&rfi=8
Hull, C. W. (1992). Mega-project issues and outlook. Paper presented at the Global Super
Projects Conference, Honolulu, HI. Norcross, GA: World Development Federation.
Jones, S. B. (2002, March 6). VDOT mixes in big check. TimesCommunity.com. Retrieved on
April
4,
2005
from
http://www.timescommunity.com/site/news.cfm?
newsid=3480353&BRD=2553&PAG=461&dept_id=507243&rfi=8
Jones, S. B. (2002, March 13). Mixing Bowl estimate skyrockets to $700 million.
TimesCommunity.com
Retrieved
on
April
4,
2005
from
http://www.timescommunity.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=3556025&BRD=2553&PAG=461
&dept_id=507243&rfi=8
Project Management Institute. (2004). A guide to the project management body of knowledge
(3rd ed.). Newtown Square, PA: Author.
Sipress, A., & Reid, A. (1999, January 3). Drivers face a long road as Va. fixes Mixing Bowl
series: roadwork ahead: Untangling Washington's worst interchange. The Washington Post,
p. A1.
Sipress, A. (1999, January 3). An engineering feat in 15-minute pieces series: Road work ahead:
untangling Washington's worst interchange. The Washington Post, p. A21.
Shear, M. D. (2002, October 20). VDOT crisis worsened even as Gilmore boasted. The
Washington Post, p. A1.
Shear, M. D., & Shaver, K. (2002, November 23). Mixing Bowl's cost has tripled, U.S. audit
says. The Washington Post, p. A1.
Timberg, C. (2000, August 17). Va. to drop Mixing Bowl ramps. The Washington Post, p. B2.
VDOT Springfield Interchange Improvement Project. (2003a). Fact Sheet. Retrieved on April 4,
2005 from http://www.springfieldinterchange.com/pdf/fs02.pdf
VDOT Springfield Interchange Improvement Project. (2003b). Project Schedule. Retrieved on
April 4, 2005 from http://www.springfieldinterchange.com/ps.asp
The following works, although not cited, were also consulted while preparing this document:
Roberts, M. J. (2001). Developing a teaching case (Abridged). Boston: Harvard Business School
Publishing.
Swiercz, P. M. (2003). SWIF learning: A guide to student written- instructor facilitated case
writing. Unpublished manuscript, Washington, DC: The George Washington University.

19

Project Management Institute

Case Studies in Project Management

Springfield Interchange Improvement

Project
Teaching Note

Edited by:

Frank T. Anbari, PhD, PMP

The George Washington University

20

Springfield Interchange Improvement Project

Teaching Note

By:

Young Hoon Kwak, PhD

Jerry Doherty, MSPM
Antonia Mambelli, MSPM
Amin Mourad, MSPM, PMP
LCDR Joe Speranzo, USN, MSPM

Edited by:

Frank T. Anbari, PhD, PMP

The George Washington University

This case study was originally prepared as part of Project Management Applications, the
capstone course of the Master of Science in Project Management at The George Washington
University, by the graduating students listed above with the supervision of Professor Kwak,
during the Fall 2002 semester.
This case study was adapted to make it a learning resource and might not reflect all historical
facts related to this project.

21

Case Study

Springfield Interchange Improvement Project

Teaching Note
This case study is structured to allow the reader to evaluate the project management methods and
processes used in this project. It covers a wide range of project management areas within four
project phases: inception, development, implementation, and closeout. Discussion is provided
within each project phase of specific activities, accomplishments, and performance shortcomings
in applicable processes of the five Project Management Process Groups (Initiating, Planning,
Executing, Monitoring and Controlling, and Closing). The reader is asked to perform an
assessment of performance in terms of the appropriate processes of various Project Management
Knowledge Areas at the end of each phase. At the end of the case, the reader is asked to
summarize his or her assessments and to provide a list of lessons learned from the case study.
In this teaching note, the following is provided:
1. Assessment of appropriate project management processes in terms of the Project
Management Knowledge Areas. Suggested assessments are provided for each phase, and an
average is calculated for each Knowledge Area.
2. A discussion of major areas of strength, opportunities for improvement, and lessons learned
from the evaluation of the case study.
3. A brief description of project life-cycle phases, project management process groups, and
Project Management Knowledge Areas, based on A Guide to the Project Management Body
of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide)Third Edition (Project Management Institute, 2004).
It is expected that the reader will reach somewhat similar conclusions to those provided in this
teaching note. However, it is very possible that readers may conduct additional research, develop
further insights, and reach other conclusions.

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Assessment of Project Management

The following table summarizes the assessment of appropriate project management processes, in
terms of the nine Project Management Knowledge Areas, by phase:
Rating Scale: 5Excellent, 4Very Good, 3Good, 2Poor, 1Very Poor
Project Management Area

Inception Development Implementation Closeout

Phase
Phase
Phase
Phase
Scope Management
3.00
4.00
5.00
3.00
Time Management
2.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
Cost Management
1.00
1.00
4.00
5.00
Quality Management
1.00
1.00
4.00
4.00
Human Resource Management
2.00
2.00
4.00
3.00
Communications Management
4.00
4.00
5.00
4.00
Risk Management
1.00
1.00
3.00
4.00
Procurement Management
4.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
Integration Management
2.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Average

2.11

2.44

4.00

4.00

Average
3.75
3.50
2.75
2.50
2.75
4.25
2.25
3.75
2.75
3.14

Major Areas of Strength, Opportunities for Improvement, and Lessons Learned

As noted in the table, the overall scoring suggests the Springfield Interchange Improvement
Project (SIIP) is a modest success, but there is room for improvement in applying modern project
management principles. The major strengths in the management of this project are in the areas of
communications, scope, and procurement management. The major opportunities for
improvement in this project are in risk and quality management.
As the then-governor of Virginia noted on August 2, 2001, when he stood atop the newly
constructed overpass at the Springfield Interchange and cut the ribbon, officially opening that
section to traffic, This is one of the great works of the modern world. There is no doubt that
the SIIP is indeed a marvel, and one of the largest and most complex highway projects in the
United States (Shear, 2002). But is the project successful, and to what extent is the success
attributable to modern project management techniques?
Judging by the sentiments of the primary stakeholders, the daily commuters, and the Virginia
taxpayers, the project has been extremely successful. However, the summary of the preceding
analysis indicates that the SIIP progressed steadily in terms of the application of modern project
management practices. The score reflects performance challenges in the early stages of the
project on the part of VDOT, which served as both the project sponsor and overall manager.
Although the press continually reports that the project costs are skyrocketing and the scope is
forever changing, the reality is that the project has remained largely unchanged since inception,
and what has changed is the accuracy with which estimates are calculated and reported.
The analysis shows that the early phases of the project generally received lower scores for most
of the Project Management Knowledge Areas, and the later phases generally received higher
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scores for most Knowledge Areas. This could be explained by the fact that the early phases
required a great deal of input and support from VDOT, which served as both the overall manager
and project sponsor. (VDOT was clearly having problems during the years in which the early
phases of this project were being conducted.) Eventual organizational changes within VDOT
improved its ability to manage the project using modern project management principles, and
holds promise for further improvements in the future. The biggest successes for the project may
be that VDOT would continue to incorporate the lessons learned from the implementation of this
megaproject and alloweven requiremore modern project management practices to be used
throughout the organization.
Overall, the key lessons learned from this project include:
Recognition by VDOT of existing problems and adoption of appropriate changes allowed the
team to work through these problems and improve project management throughout the
organization
The use of modern techniques by the project management team allowed the team to lead the
way for VDOT, as demonstrated in estimating procedures, calculating overhead, and
managing risk
Application of modern project management tools and techniques allowed drastic
improvements to take place, particularly in the areas of Quality Management and Risk
Management. These techniques allowed more accurate cost estimates to be calculated and
reported
The SIIP could set the example for the rest of VDOT to follow in incorporating modern
project management practices as a normal way of doing business to enhance its overall
effectiveness.

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Project Life-Cycle Phases, Project Management Process Groups, and Knowledge Areas
Project Life-Cycle Phases
Project managers or the organization can divide projects into phases to provide better
management control with appropriate links to the ongoing operations of the performing
organization. Collectively, these phases are known as the project life cycle. The project life cycle
defines the phases that connect the beginning of a project to its end. Phases are generally
sequential and are usually defined by some form of technical information transfer or technical
component handoff. Although many project life cycles have similar phase names with similar
deliverables, few life cycles are identical. Some can have four or five phases, but others may
have nine or more. (Project Management Institute, 2004, pp. 1922). In this case study, the
following phase descriptions are used:
Inception
This phase may also be called initiation, conception, or preparation. It deals with project
proposal, selection, and initiation. It considers alignment of the project within the organizations
overall strategy, architecture, and priorities. It explores linkages of the project to other projects,
initiatives, and operations. It addresses methods of identification of the opportunity or definition
of the problem leading to the need for the project, and clarification of the projects general
premises and basic assumptions. It considers the project concept, feasibility issues, and possible
alternative solutions.
Development
This phase may also be called detailed planning, definition and design, formulation, the formal
approach, preliminary engineering, and preliminary design. It covers project organizing,
planning, scheduling, estimating, and budgeting. It addresses development of plans for various
project parameters, such as risk, quality, resources, and so forth, as well as plan audits (possibly
pre-execution). It considers development of a project baseline and establishment of the detailed
project work breakdown structure and master plan. It discusses finalizing the project charter and
obtaining approval to proceed with the project.
Execution
This phase may also be called implementation, implementing and controlling, adaptive
implementation, and deployment. It examines directing, monitoring, forecasting, reporting, and
controlling various project parameters, such as scope, time, cost, quality, risk, and resources. It
considers appropriate methods for change management and configuration control in evolving
conditions. It addresses resource assignment, problem solving, communications, leadership, and
conflict resolution. It also looks at documentation, training, and planning for operations.
Closeout
This phase may also be called closing, termination, finish, conversion, cutover, conclusion,
results, and final documentation. This last phase advises on finalizing and accepting the project,
product, system, or facility. It addresses transferring the responsibility for operations,
maintenance, and support to the appropriate organizational unit or individual. With reassignment
or release of project resources, this phase considers closing and settling any open project items. It
addresses post-project evaluation (audit), and preparation of lessons learned. It covers

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documentation of areas of strength and opportunities for improvement. It frames the

development of recommendations to support success in future projects.
Project Management Process Groups
Project management is accomplished through processes, using project management knowledge,
skills, and tools and techniques that receive inputs and generate outputs. These processes are
divided into five groups, defined as the Project Management Process Groups: Initiating Process
Group, Planning Process Group, Executing Process Group, Monitoring and Controlling Process
Group, and Closing Process Group. Process Groups are seldom either discrete or one-time
events; they are overlapping activities that occur at varying levels of intensity throughout the
project. The Process Groups are not project phases. Where large or complex projects may be
separated into distinct phases or sub-projects, all of the Process Group processes would normally
be repeated for each phase or subproject. The project manager and the project team are
responsible for determining what processes from the Process Groups will be employed, by
whom, and the degree of rigor that will be applied to the execution of those processes to achieve
the desired project objective. (Project Management Institute, 2004, pp. 3767). In this case study,
the Project Management Process Group processes are imbedded within each phase, as
appropriate.
Project Management Knowledge Areas
The Project Management Knowledge Areas organize the project management processes from the
Project Management Process Groups into nine Knowledge Areas. These areas are: Project
Integration Management, Project Scope Management, Project Time Management, Project Cost
Management, Project Quality Management, Project Human Resource Management, Project
Communications Management, Project Risk Management, and Project Procurement
Management (Project Management Institute, 2004, pp. 910). In this case study, the Project
Management Knowledge Areas are considered within each phase and are used for performance
assessment, as appropriate.

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