Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158239

January 25, 2012

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, Petitioner,

vs.
RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., Respondents.

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita

without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla,
being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply
with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the
Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by
dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the
parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.4 Faced with
Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997
an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her
in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), docketed as Civil
Case No. 79-M-97 entitled Ramon C. Javellana, represented by Atty.
Guillermo G. Blanco v. Priscilla Alma Jose.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the
defending partys motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final
order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles
definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial
court to do other than to execute the order.1Accordingly, the claiming
party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which
to appeal the denial.2
Antecedents
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold
for consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by
deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and
20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan.
They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of
the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the
parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration being
undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that
should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact,
Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M.
Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with
the application for registration.3

In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution of
the deed of conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00
and had taken possession of the parcels of land; that he had paid the
balance of the purchase price to Juvenal on different dates upon
Juvenals representation that Margarita had needed funds for the
expenses of registration and payment of real estate tax; and that in 1996,
Priscilla had called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on the
parcels of land; and that he had told her then that the parcels of land had
not been mortgaged but had been sold to him.5
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials
in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration
proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.6
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already
barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of
action.7
The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss on February 4,
1998.8 However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed
itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss, opining that
Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound
to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a
party thereto; that there was no evidence showing the payment of the

balance; that he had never demanded the registration of the land from
Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance against
Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the balance was not
credible.9
Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of
evidence of full payment was not necessary at that stage of the
proceedings; and that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint were
hypothetically admitted and only the allegations in the complaint should
be considered in resolving the motion.10 Nonetheless, he attached to the
motion for reconsideration the receipts showing the payments made to
Juvenal.11 Moreover, he maintained that Priscilla could no longer succeed
to any rights respecting the parcels of land because he had meanwhile
acquired absolute ownership of them; and that the only thing that she, as
sole heir, had inherited from Margarita was the obligation to register them
under the Torrens System.12
On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack
of any reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.13
Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000
order,14 which the RTC gave due course to, and the records were
elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In his appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the
following as errors of the RTC,15 to wit:

II
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING TWO
CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROVISION OF
THE CIVIL [CODE], PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 1911, IN THE
LIGHT OF THE TERMS OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF
SALE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTAPPELLEE BEING NOT A PARTY TO THE CONDITIONAL
DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY HER MOTHER IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTFFAPPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND CAN NOT BE
COMPELLED TO DO THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE SAID DEED
OF CONDITIONAL SALE;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITHOUT HEARING THE CASE ON THE
MERITS.
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; that
the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of
forum shopping.16

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF-APELLANT HAD
LONG COMPLIED WITH THE FULL PAYMENT OF THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY TAKEN ACTUAL AND
PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTY UPON THE
SIGNING OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;

It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders
dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455). On August 6, 2001,
however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari,17 finding that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and
holding that it only committed, at most, an error of judgment correctible
by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.

On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV

No. 68259,18 reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No.
79-M-97, and remanding the records to the RTC "for further proceedings
in accordance with law."19 The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the
rights and obligations of Margarita with respect to the parcels of land; that
Margaritas undertaking under the contract was not a purely personal
obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was consequently
bound to comply with the obligation; that the action had not yet
prescribed due to its being actually one for quieting of title that was
imprescriptible brought by Javellana who had actual possession of the
properties; and that based on the

On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by

Priscilla involved questions of fact not proper for the Court to review
through petition for review on certiorari; that the June 21, 2000 RTC
order, being a final order, was appealable; that his appeal was perfected
on time; and that he was not guilty of forum shopping because at the time
he filed the

complaint, Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and the
cloud on his title had come about only when Priscilla had started dumping
filling materials on the premises.20

Ruling

On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, 21 stating

that it decided to give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time
because Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact
he did not even seek an extension of time to file his appellants brief; that
current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present
their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such that even if an
appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was given the discretion
to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.

petition for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a decision in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 68259 was different from the issue of grave abuse of discretion
raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.

The petition for review has no merit.

I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable
Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper
subject of an appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration.

Issues
Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in
not outrightly dismissing Javellanas appeal because: (a) the June 21,
2000 RTC order was not appealable; (b) the notice of appeal had been
filed belatedly by three days; and (c) Javellana was guilty of forum
shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of
the RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending in the CA.
She posited that, even if the CAs decision to entertain the appeal was
affirmed, the RTCs dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless be
upheld because the complaint stated no cause of action, and the action
had already prescribed.

First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing
more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.
The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in
Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,22 thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well
known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be

done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but
the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something
else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the
order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines
whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable,
to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable;"23 but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal
but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the
differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily
suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the
pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time,
and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for
one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or
issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an
appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an
appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified
that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of
an interlocutory order.24
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She
points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9,
1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after
the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration
through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July
13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16,
2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of
appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for
being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary
period.
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial
or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for
new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July
13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to
the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration interrupting the running

of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on
July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however,
considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 by which an aggrieved party desirous of
appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from
receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration, to wit:

any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,

inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure."27 According
to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:28
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice.
Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues they may be
given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has
the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a
more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of
cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time,
based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period

of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the
motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule
on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be
applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal
in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will
amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment
and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as
compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were
issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving
notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the
benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower
courts such as in the instant case, will not.29

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule
42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.26
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has
already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to "actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate

Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed

pursuant to the fresh period rule.
III
No forum shopping was committed
Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a
notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari against the same orders. As
earlier noted, he denies that his doing so violated the policy against
forum shopping.

The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In

Re: Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and
303169 and Issuance of Owners Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu of
Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:30
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens
when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties,
identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where
the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping.
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there
must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity
in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not
exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of
action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.
Should Javellanas present appeal now be held barred by his filing of the
petition for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was yet
pending?

We are aware that in Young v. Sy,31 in which the petitioner filed a notice of
appeal to elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to
non-suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the
same orders four months later, the Court ruled that the successive filings
of the notice of appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain the same
objective of nullifying the trial courts dismissal orders constituted forum
shopping that warranted the dismissal of both cases. The Court said:
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for
certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner
commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing
with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually
came up to this Court by way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The
elements of litis pendentia are present between the two suits. As the CA,
through its Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on
exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject matterthe RTC
Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for
failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal
of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues
professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that
the judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.
1wphi1

xxxx
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy.
The petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two or more appeals,
and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the
others, she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as a
demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been speedy or adequate
enough, in order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if
adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits in multiple fora, where
each one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a "precautionary
measure" for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a favorable
decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping
seeks to put right. In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated
that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum

shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and

contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of
a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several
different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping,
and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of the case.32

an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger,
i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to
ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal,
would not arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No.
68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.

The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,33 which likewise

involved the successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for
certiorari to challenge the same orders, with the Court upholding the CAs
dismissals of the appeal and the petition for certiorari through separate
decisions.

Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial

approaches to be the result of the tactical misjudgment by Javellanas
counsel on the efficacy of the appeal to stave off his caretakers eviction
from the parcels of land and to prevent the development of them into a
residential or commercial subdivision pending the appeal. In the petition
for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred that his appeal was "inadequate
and not speedy to prevent private respondent Alma Jose and her
transferee/assignee xxx from developing and disposing of the subject
property to other parties to the total deprivation of petitioners rights of
possession and ownership over the subject property," and that the
dismissal by the RTC had "emboldened private respondents to fully
develop the property and for respondent Alma Jose to file an ejectment
case against petitioners overseer xxx."35 Thereby, it became far-fetched
that Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the policy
against forum shopping.

Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here even if
the orders of the RTC being challenged through appeal and the petition
for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists because the appeal
and the petition for certiorari actually sought different objectives. In his
appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs
erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his
judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in
due course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible
objective "to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property and
from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally
resolved," as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 60455.34
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against
forum shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first
danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of
action, would not materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity
of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;

AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 20, 2002; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice