CASE TITLE: LAMBERTO CASALLA V.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

AND MILAGROS ESTEVANES, G.R. NO. 138855, October 29, 2022
FACTS OF THE CASE:

• Lamberto Casalla issued two Bank of Commerce checks to

pay off his wife’s obligation to Milagros Santos-Estevanes,
aiming to avoid court litigation.

• Unfortunately, both checks were dishonored due to

insufficient funds.

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS:
• The Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasig City convicted
Casalla of violating the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22).

• Casalla appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig

City, which affirmed the MTC’s judgment with modifications.

• Unsatisfied, Casalla filed a motion for reconsideration, which

was denied.

• The RTC also granted a motion for the issuance of a writ of

execution.

• Casalla then appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the appeal

was denied for lack of merit.

• Finally, Casalla filed a petition for review with the

Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the

petition for review and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

RULING OF THE COURT:

The supreme court held that the notice of hearing requirement

is mandatory and that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma.
The court also ruled that the petitioner should have filed a petition
for certiorari instead of a petition for review to challenge the RTC’s
issuance of the writ of execution. Therefore, the supreme court
denied the petition for lack of merit.

DOCTRINE:

The requirements laid down in the Rules of Court, including

the notice of hearing, are mandatory. Failure to comply with these
requirements renders the motion pro forma and does not toll the

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running of the prescriptive period. The notice of hearing is a
requirement for all courts, including the Regional Trial Courts, even
when acting in their appellate jurisdiction. Additionally, when a
judgement or final order may not be appealed, the appropriate
recourse is a special civil action under Rule 65, not a petition for
review.

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CASANGOAN, MOBINA A.
CASE TITLE: SURIGAO MINE EXPLORATION CO., INC. V. C.
HARRIS, G.R. NO. 45543, May 17, 1939
FACTS OF THE CASE:

On October 24, 1935, the original complaint in this case was

filed in the Court of First Instance of Surigao in which the plaintiff,
a domestic private corporation domiciled in Cebu, sought a judicial
pronouncement.

(a) adjudging the plaintiff to be the owner and possessor of the

fourteen placer mining claims mentioned in the complaint and located
in the barrio of Tubod, municipality of Mainit, Province of Surigao;

(b) annulling the forty-three lode mining claims of the defendants, C.

Harris, Surigao-Mainit Mining Syndicate, Surigao Consolidated Mining
Co., Inc., and Otto Weber, and cancelling the registration of said lode
claims in the records of the mining recorder of Surigao and in all
other official records;

(c) prohibiting the defendants and their agents, employees and

laborers from interfering with plaintiff’s ownership and possession of
its placer claims;

(d) sentencing the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the

plaintiff the sum of P47,000 by way of damages;

(e) assessing the costs of the action against the defendants; and

(f) awarding the plaintiff such other proper, just and equitable relief.
The theory of the plaintiff, under the complaint, is that it is the owner
by the purchase of the aforesaid placer claims and that the lode
claims complained of were staked and located by the defendants on
the plaintiff's placer claims after the latter had been validly and duly
staked and located by the plaintiff or its grantors and predecessors in
interest.

After a few amendments to the complaint, with the third

and last one being on June 11, 1936, demurrer, and answers were
filed, the evidence was presented. During the hearing of the
plaintiff's evidence in the Court of First Instance of Surigao, Exhibits
O and O-1 to O-9 were presented. Except for

Exhibit O-7, all said exhibits are deeds of sale in favor of the
plaintiff covering, among others, the placer claims in question and
bear dates before October 24, 1935, the date of the filing of the
original complaint. Exhibit 0-7 is a deed of sale executed by Pablo S.
Atillo in favor of Maximo Borromeo on January 23, 1935. A perusal of

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this Exhibit O-7 in connection with Exhibit O-9 reveals the fact that
the mining claims conveyed by Maximo Borromeo to the plaintiff
under said Exhibit O-9, dated December 21, 1935, were the same
claims acquired by Maximo Borromeo under Exhibit O-7. The
defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that, when the action was commenced, the plaintiff's right of action
had not yet accrued, since, under its Exhibits O and O-1 to O-9, the
plaintiff did not become the owner of the claims in dispute until after
the original complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Surigao on October 24, 1935. The Court of First Instance of Surigao
dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of First Instance of Surigao erred in

dismissing the complaint.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Subject to certain qualifications, and except as otherwise

provided by law, an action commenced before the cause of action
has accrued is prematurely brought and should be dismissed,
provided an objection on this ground is properly and seasonably
interposed.

The date when a civil action is deemed commenced is

determined by section 389 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Without
the need of commenting on this section about allied sections of the
same Code, it is sufficient to observe that here summons was issued
by the Court of First Instance of Surigao on October 25, 1935, and
was served on the defendants C. Harris, Surigao-Mainit Mining
Syndicate and Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., Inc., on October 28,
1935, and on the defendant Otto Weber on November 11, 1935.
Under section 389, which was taken from section 405 of the Code of
Civil Procedure of California, the action is deemed commenced upon
the "filing of a complaint in the office of the clerk of the court in
which the action is to be instituted."

The original complaint was filed on October 24, 1935. But

although it is assumed that, under said section 389, the date or dates
of the issuance and service of the summons might affect the true
date of the commencement of the action, the point is of no legal
consequence because whether the date of the filing of the original
complaint, or the date of the issuance of the summons, or the
date of the service of said summons, is considered as the time

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CASANGOAN, MOBINA A.
of the commencement of the suit, it is clear that any of said dates is
before to those of Exhibits O and O-1 to O-9.

The cause of action must exist at the time the action has
begun, and the plaintiff will not be all ed by an amendment to
introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action
was commenced. The court held that unless the plaintiff has a valid
and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced,
the defect could not be cured or remedied by the acquisition or
accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental
complaint or an amendment setting up such after the accrued cause
of action is not permissible.

DOCTRINE:

An action must be commenced when the cause of action

exists, and a plaintiff cannot create a cause of action by filing an
amended complaint after the original complaint was filed.
Amendments to a complaint are allowed to promote the completion
of the action and to introduce necessary parties, matters, and things,
but they cannot introduce a cause of action that did not exist when
the action was commenced.

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CASE TITLE: HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON V. GAUDIOSO
PONTERAS RICAFORTE, G.R. NO. 198680, July 8, 2013
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Magdaleno Ypon died intestate, leaving behind lots

covered by two TCTs. Respondent, Gaudioso Ricaforte (aka
Gaudioso Ypon), claimed to be the sole heir of Magdaleno and
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. After which caused the
cancellation of the TCTs and had the lots transferred to his name.

The transfer led to Petitioners filing a case for

Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance, alleging that
Magdaleno died childless; and that Gaudioso’s transfer of
property is prejudicial to their rights as successors-in-interests.

The RTC held in favor of Gaudioso, being able to

prove through his Birth Certificate that he is the son of
Magdaleno. Petitioners also failed to show they had a cause of action
against Gaudiso, Petitioners not having proved that they are
Magdaleno’s compulsory heirs; albeit being able to prove their
relationship to Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding
for the issuance of letters of administration.

After the motion for reconsideration of Petitioners was

denied, they sought direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioners had a proper cause of action

against Respondent

RULING OF THE COURT:

No, Petition DENIED.

Petitioners allege that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno, and if
proven to be true, would warrant the cancellation and
reconveyance they seek. However, jurisprudence dictates that
the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.

The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the

trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action
for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997Revised
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
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CASANGOAN, MOBINA A.
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding in as
much as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special

proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with
for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC
had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened. In this case, none of
the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.

DOCTRINE:

A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to

establish a status, aright, or a particular fact; a declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

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CASANGOAN, MOBINA A.
CASE TITLE: SOLOIL, INC. V. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY,
G.R. NO. 174806, August 11, 20210
FACTS OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for review of the Decision and Resolution

of the Court of Appeals. The Decision vacated the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 84) of Quezon City. The Resolution
denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Soloil, Inc. (Soloil) is a domestic corporation

engaged in the exportation of copra, crude coconut oil, and other
coconut products. Respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) is a
government-owned and controlled corporation created under
Presidential Decree No. 232, otherwise known as the Law Creating a
Philippine Coconut Authority, mandated to promote the rapid
development of the coconut and palm oil industry in the country.

In January 1995, the Office of the Government Corporate

Counsel sent by registered mail a final demand letter addressed to
Soloil for the payment of the latter’s overdue fees to PCA for the
domestic sale of coconut products. Soloil still did not pay the fees.
PCA further claimed that as of 31 December 1994, Soloil’s overdue
account had reached PHP 403,543.29.

In its answer, Soloil raised the defense that PCA’s demand

for the payment of PCA fees based on domestic sales had no factual
basis as Soloil never engaged in the domestic sale of coconut
products.

PCA presented itemized schedules of Soloil’s outstanding

PCA fee obligations as well certified reports of the marine cargo
surveyor showing that Soloil made export shipments without paying
the requisite PCA fees.

On the other hand, Soloil presented its sole witness,

Assistant Vice-President for Trading and Administration Fernando Uy.
Uy testified that Soloil had no record of any domestic sale of coconut
products.

In their respective memoranda, the parties raised the

following issues: (1) whether e complaint stated a cause of action;
and (2) if so, whether Soloil was liable to pay ₱403,543.29 PCA fees.

In its 29 September 2000 Decision, the RTC ruled PCA failed

to prove that the claimed amount of unpaid CA fees was from Soleil’s
domestic sale of coconut products.

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CASANGOAN, MOBINA A.
The RTC held that only the amount of ₱509.66 with the interest of
₱147.23 was duly proven to be from Soloil’s domestic sale of coconut
products. PCA appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that Soloil
was liable to pay PCA fee on its purchases of copra for both domestic
and export sales of coconut products.

The appellate court held that PCA fees are attached upon
purchase of copra-by-copra exporters. The Court of Appeals pointed
out that there was no distinction between whether the purchase was
for domestic or for export sale of coconut products. In its 12 May
2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted PCA’s appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint, alleging non-payment of PCA

fees due on Soloil’s domestic sale of coconut products, sufficiently
stated a cause of action when the evidence adduced during trial
consisted of Soloil’s export sale of coconut products.

Ans if so, whether Soloil was liable for the amount of

P403,543.29 representing PCS fees as of 31 December 1994.

RULING OF THE COURT:

NO. Petitioner Soloil belabors the fact that the complaint

alleged non-payment of PCA fees on Soloil’s domestic sale of coconut
products while the attached annexes showing Soloil's unpaid PCA
fees did not indicate whether the amounts due were from domestic
or from the export sale of coconut products. Soloil maintains it never
had any domestic sale of coconut products as its sales were all for
export. Soleil argues that the complaint should have been dismissed
for lack of cause of action and the RTC should not have allowed PCA,
despite Soloil's vehement objection, to adduce evidence about export
sales.

Respondent PCA counters that the complaint sufficiently

established that PCA was mandated by law to impose and collect PCA
fees for every kilo of copra purchased by copra exporters such as
Soloil. PCA insists that PCA fees are attached upon Soloil's purchase
of copra whether such purchase was for domestic or for export sale
of coconut products.

Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action a:

Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined. - A cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential
elements of a cause of action are(1)a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2)

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an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.

This portion of the complaint together with the attached

annexes showing Soloil's up d PCA fees sufficiently constituted a
cause of action in this case, namely (1) under P.D. 1854, PCA has a
right to collect PCA fees in the amount of three centavos for every
kilo of copra purchased by copra exporters; (2) Soloil, as a copra
exporter, is legally bound to pay PCA fees; and (3) Soloil's non-
payment of PCA fees violates PCA's right to collect the same.

In determining whether a complaint states a cause of

action, the trial court can consider the leadings filed, including
annexes, motions, and the evidence on record. The focus is on the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. Moreover,
the complaint does not have to establish facts proving the existence
of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the
trial on the merits of the case. The fact that the complaint specifically
mentioned assessed PCA fees due on Soloil's domestic.

Sale of coconut products did not preclude a cause of

action for PCA fees due on Soloil's export sale of coconut products.
PCA sufficiently alleged in paragraph 4 of the complaint that PCA fees
are attached upon purchase of copra-by-copra exporters, such as
Soloil, whether for domestic or for export sale of coconut products.

Presidential Decree No. 1468, otherwise known as the

Revised Coconut Industry Code, granted PCA the power to impose
and collect PCA fees to defray its operating expenses, thus:

Sec. 3. Power. - In the implementation of the declared

national policy, the Authority [PCA] shall have the following powers
and functions:) To impose and collect, under such rules t it may
promulgate, a fee of ten centavos for every one hundred kilos of
desiccated coconut, to be paid by the desiccating factory, coconut oil
to be paid by the oil mills, and copra to be paid by the exporters,
which shall be used exclusively to defray its operating expenses.

Presidential Decree No. 1854, otherwise known as the

Law Authorizing an Adjustment Funding Support of the Philippine
Coconut Authority and Instituting a Procedure for the Management of
such Fund, increased such PCA fees to three centavos per kilo of

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copra or husked nuts or their equivalent in other coconut products
delivered to and/or purchased by copra exporters, oil millers,
desiccators, and other end-users of coconut products.

Under P.D. 1854, PCA fees automatically attach upon

purchase of copra-by-copra e or orders such as Soloil in this case.
The law does not distinguish whether the purchase of copra is for
domestic or for export sale of coconut products. When the law does
not distinguish, neither should we. However, the law expressly
requires that the PCA fee "shall be paid by said copra exporters" for
copra "purchased by copra exporters."

Soloil, as a copra exporter, cannot evade its legal obligation

to pay PCA fees on the pretext that it never engaged in the domestic
sale of coconut products or worse than the complaint about the
collection of PCA fees failed to state a cause of action.

DOCTRINE:

The case establishes that PCA fees upon purchase of copra-

by-copra exporters, regardless of whether the purchase is for
domestic or export sale of coconut products. The court held that he
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action, as it alleged non-
payment of PCA fees od Soloil’s domestic sale of coconut products,
and the attached annexes showing Soloil’s unpaid fees constituted
evidence of a violation of PCA's right to collect fees.

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CASANGOAN, MOBINA A.
CASE TITLE: NORLINDA S. MARILAG V. MARCELINO B. MARTINIEZ,
G.R. NO. 201892, July 22, 2015
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Rafael Martinez (Rafael), the respondent's father, obtained-

from the petitioner a loan for PHP 160,000.00, with a stipulated
monthly interest of five percent (5%), payable within a period of six
(6) months. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
208400. Rafael failed' to settle his obligation upon maturity and
despite repeated demands, prompted the petitioner to file a
Complaint about Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before
the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Rafael failed to file his answer and upon
the petitioner’s motion, it was declared in default. RTC Imus declared
a decision in the foreclose case, but the record does not show that
this Decision had already attained finality.

Meanwhile, prior to Rafael’s notice of the above decision,

respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to the petitioner, which
was pegged at PHP 689,000.00. After making a total payment of PHP
400,000.00, he executed a promissory note dated February 20, 1998
(subject PN), binding himself to pay on or before March 31, 1998, the
amount of PHP 289,000.00, "representing the balance of the agreed
financial obligation of his father to petitioner." After learning the
decision, the respondent refuse to pay the amount stated in PN. The
petitioner filed a case for the sum of money and damages and the
respondent contends that the petitioner has no cause of action
against him.

ISSUE:

Whether litis pendentia applies in the present case.

RULLING OF THE COURT:

YES. Litis pendentia applies in the present case. Litis

pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to
that situation wherein another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, such that the second act
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia
to be invoked, the following requisites must concur:

(a) identity of parties or at least such parties as representing the

same interests in both actions;

(b) identity of rights asserted, and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and
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(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful would amount to res judicata in the other. Splitting a
cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where
the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia or res judicata, as the case
may be. In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule
is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against
the debtor mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a
personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a
real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.

DOCTRINE:

The doctrine of res judicata applies when a judgement is final,

rendered by a court with jurisdiction, a judgment on the merits, and
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Litis
pendentia, on the other hand, applies when there is another pending
action between the same parties for the same cause of action. The
principle of Litis Pendentia aims to avoid multiple suits and conflicting
judgments. In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the
creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor, which
consists of the recovery of the debt and the foreclosure of the
mortgage. The remedies of foreclosure and collection are alternative,
not cumulative, or successive.

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CASANGOAN, MOBINA A.
CASE TITLE: PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. V. STANDARD
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., G.R. NO. 140746, March 16, 2005
FACTS OF THE CASE:

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