Maximin Criterion - Rawls
Maximin Criterion - Rawls
Maximin Criterion - Rawls
.
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CONCEPTSOF DISTRIBUTIONALEQUITY
Some
Reasons
Maximin
for
the
Criterion
By JOHN RAWLS*
Recently the maximin criterion of distributive equity has received some attention from economists in connection with
the problem of optimal income taxation.1
Unhappily I am unable to examine the
merits of the criterion from the standpoint
of economic theory, although whether the
criterion is a reasonable distributive standard depends importantly on the sort of
examination that only economists can undertake.
What I shall do is to summarize briefly
some of the reasons for taking the maximin
criterion seriously. I should emphasize that
the maximin equity criterion and the socalled maximin rule for choice under uncertainty are two very different things. I
shall formulate the reasons for the equity
criterion so that they are completely independent from this rule.
In A Theory of Justice I have considered
the maximin criterion as part of a social
contract theory. Here I must assume a
certain familiarity with this conception.2
One feature of it might be put this way:
injustice exists because basic agreements
are made too late (Richard Zeckhauser).
People already know their social positions
and relative strength in bargaining, their
abilities and preferences, and these contingencies and knowledge of them cumulatively distort the social system. In an attempt to remedy this difficulty, contract
theory introduces the notion of the original
position. The most reasonable principles
of justice are defined as those that would
be unanimously agreed to in an appropriate initial situation that is fair between
individuals conceived as free and equal
moral persons.
In order to define the original position
as fair in this sense, we imagine that everyone is deprived of certain morally irrelevant information. They do not know their
place in society, their class position or
social status, their place in the distribution
of natural assets and abilities, their deeper
aims and interests, or their particular psychological makeup. Excluding this information insures that no one is advantaged
or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by natural chance or social contingencies. Since all are in this sense similarly
situated and no one knows how to frame
principles that favor his particular condition, each will reason in the same way.
Any agreement reached is unanimous and
there is no need to vote.
Thus the subject of the original agreement is a conception of social justice.
Also, this conception is understood to apply to the basic structure of society: that
is, to its major institutions-the
political
constitution and the principal economic
141
142
MAY 1974
VOL. 64 NO. 2
CONCEPTS OF DISTRIBUTIONALEQUITY
143
144
MAY 1974
VOL. 64 NO. 2
CONCEPTS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL
EQUITY
14S
A. B. Atkinson, "How Progressive Should Income Tax Be?" in J. M. Parkin, ed., Essays
in Modern Economics, London 1973.
J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of
Consent, Ann Arbor 1962.
6 See Zeckhauser for an illustration of the use of this
sort of framework.
146
MAY 1974