United States v. Romero, 10th Cir. (2004)
United States v. Romero, 10th Cir. (2004)
United States v. Romero, 10th Cir. (2004)
JAN 8 2004
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
No. 02-2161
(D. New Mexico)
(D.Ct. No. CR-00-1235-JP)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and OBRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
On October 10, 2001, Joe Renaldo Romero was indicted on five counts for
various crimes relating to the possession and distribution of methamphetamine.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Romero pled guilty to one count of possession with
the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of a substance containing
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). In
exchange, the Government agreed, inter alia, to dismiss the remaining counts in
the indictment. The district court sentenced Romero to the statutory minimum of
120 months imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. In his pro
se appeal, Romero contends for the first time that the Government manipulated
his sentence through entrapment. He also claims ineffective assistance of trial
counsel because his appointed attorney failed to raise this issue to the district
court. Further, in his reply brief, he alleges two new claims: failure to apply the
safety valve provision, 1 and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to
abandonment. We affirm the sentence of the district court and decline to
consider the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
In his reply brief, Romero attempts for the first time to challenge the
district courts determination that he did not qualify for the safety valve exception
to the application of the statutory minimum at sentencing. He claims his appellate
counsel abandoned him and that is why the issue was not raised earlier. (Reply
Br. at 14.) We do not consider, even under a plain error standard, issues raised
for the first time in a reply brief. See United States v. Murray, 82 F.3d 361, 363
n.3 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1495 (10th Cir.
1996). Even were we to do so, the transcript of the sentencing hearing contains
sufficient facts to support the district courts conclusions. In addition, this is an
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim which should be pursued in a
different manner. See infra, Galloway, 56 F.3d at 1240.
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conduct. United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d 1270, 1276 n.3 (10th Cir.) ("Other
courts have addressed this issue under the rubric sentencing entrapment or
sentencing factor manipulation. This court addresses the same concept under
the appellation of outrageous governmental conduct.") (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 175 (2003). The parameters of this concept are described in
Scull:
In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d
366 (1973), the Supreme Court acknowledged that the conduct of law
enforcement agents in the course of investigating an offense might be
so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.
Id. at 431-32, 93 S. Ct. 1637. In determining whether the
government has committed outrageous conduct, the relevant inquiry
is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances in any given
case, the government's conduct is so shocking, outrageous and
intolerable that it offends the universal sense of justice. United
States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotations
omitted). [T]his is an extraordinary defense reserved for only the
most egregious circumstances. United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d
906, 910 (10th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1277.
Moreover, when a party fails to raise an issue in the district court, we
review for plain error. United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1555 (10th Cir.
by pleading guilty. United States v. Riles, 928 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1991)
(Once a defendant has plead guilty, there will not be a further trial of any kind,
so that by pleading guilty . . . the defendant waives the right to a trial. By
waiving the right to trial, a defendant waives non-jurisdictional defenses,
including entrapment . . . . He likewise admits that he was predisposed to commit
the offense, since predisposition is the crux of the entrapment defense.)
(internal citations omitted).
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1992) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 953 (1993). Plain error review,
however, is not appropriate when the alleged error involves the resolution of
factual disputes. Id. at 1556. In such a case, we deem the issue waived. Id.
Romeros contention that the Government's continued investigation was purely for
the purpose of increasing his sentence is a fact-intensive inquiry into the
Governments motives. Accordingly, plain error review is inappropriate and
Romeros claim is waived. Even were we to address this claim, we find no merit
to his contention. In the limited record provided on appeal, there is no indication
the Government stepped outside the bounds of a legitimate criminal investigation.
Finally, Romero claims he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
but concedes in his reply brief that the factual record is insufficient to determine
the issue. In addition, in his reply brief, he claims his counsel abandoned him
on appeal. Except in rare cases, a defendant must raise ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in a collateral proceeding, not on direct appeal. See United States
v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims . . . brought on direct appeal are presumptively
dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed.). We follow this practice even
when the record below is sufficiently developed for us to pass judgment. Id.
This rule allows the district court to provide an opinion in the fist instance, which
is a valuable aid to appellate review. Id. Accordingly, we decline to address
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