FM 3-09 Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support
FM 3-09 Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support
FM 3-09 Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support
FIELD ARTILLERY
OPERATIONS AND FIRE
SUPPORT
APRIL 2014
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*FM 3-09
Headquarters,
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 4 April 2014
Field Manual
No. 3-09
PREFACE .............................................................................................................. v
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. vii
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
FM 3-09
Contents
Chapter 4
ii
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Contents
Figures
Figure P-1. FM 3-09 to ATP transition model ........................................................................... vi
Figure 1-1. Organization for combat movement to contact example .................................. 1-8
Figure 1-2. Organization for combat division attack example example .............................. 1-9
Figure 1-3. Organization for combat FAB as counterfire headquarters example ............. 1-18
Figure 1-4. Field artillery brigade organization example ...................................................... 1-35
Figure 1-5. MLRS/HIMARS battalion organization example................................................ 1-37
Figure 1-6. ABCT cannon battalion example ....................................................................... 1-37
Figure 1-7. SBCT cannon battalion example ....................................................................... 1-38
Figure 1-8. IBCT cannon battalion example ........................................................................ 1-38
Figure 1-9. FAB self-propelled cannon battalion example ................................................... 1-39
Figure 1-10. FAB towed cannon battalion example ............................................................. 1-39
Figure 4-1. Coordinated fire line example .............................................................................. 4-2
Figure 4-2. Fire support coordination line example ............................................................... 4-4
Figure 4-3. Free-fire area example ........................................................................................ 4-5
Figure 4-4. Kill box example .................................................................................................. 4-7
Figure 4-5. No-fire area example ........................................................................................... 4-8
Figure 4-6. Restrictive fire area example ............................................................................... 4-9
Figure 4-7. Restrictive fire line example............................................................................... 4-10
Figure 4-8. Fire support area and fire support station examples ......................................... 4-10
Figure 4-9. Zone of fire example .......................................................................................... 4-11
Figure 4-10. Final protective fire example............................................................................ 4-12
Figure 4-11. Phase line and trigger line examples .............................................................. 4-13
Figure 4-12. Position area for artillery example ................................................................... 4-14
Figure 4-13. Critical friendly zone example.......................................................................... 4-15
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
iii
Contents
Tables
Table I-1. Change in proponent manual ................................................................................. viii
Table I-2. New or revised army terms ..................................................................................... viii
Table I-3. Rescinded army terms ............................................................................................ viii
Table 1-1. Field artillery inherent responsibilities in army command relationships.............. 1-32
Table 1-2. Field artillery inherent responsibilities in army support relationships ................. 1-34
Table 2-1. Capabilities of field artillery weapons locating radar........................................... 2-19
Table 2-2. Cannon field artillery capabilities ........................................................................ 2-22
Table 2-3. MLRS/HIMARS munitions capabilities ............................................................... 2-24
Table 3-1. Synopsis of targeting ............................................................................................ 3-7
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Preface
Field manual (FM) 3-09 provides tactics for field artillery operations and fire support in unified land operations.
The principal audience for FM 3-09 is all commanders and staffs. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters
serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational
doctrine concerning the range of military operations and relationships with joint or multinational forces.
Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States
(U.S.), international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and established rules of engagement. See FM 27-10.
FM 3-09 implements standardization agreements (STANAG) 2484 and 3680.
FM 3-09 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-09 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk (*) in the glossary and are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is
italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
References to battalion and company organizations include units organized as squadrons and troops.
See Figure P-1 on page vi for an illustration of the FM 3-09 transition to Army training publications model.
FM 3-09 applies to the Regular Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States,
and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-09 is the United States Army Fires Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the
Directorate of Training and Doctrine, United States Army Fires Center of Excellence. Send comments and
recommendations
on
a
Department
of
the
Army
(DA)
Form
2028
(http://www.apd.army.mil/pub/eforms/pureedge/a2028.xfdl) (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) to Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 700 McNair Avenue, Suite 128, ATTN: ATSF-DD, Fort Sill,
OK 73503; by e-mail to: [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form
2028.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
Preface
vi
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Introduction
Army forces are employed with other Services as part of a joint force. Consequently, this field manual (FM) is
grounded in joint doctrine as found in joint publications (JP) 3-0, JP 3-09, and JP 3-60. FM 3-09 builds on the
fires principles outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP) 3-09 and nests with Army Doctrine
Publications (ADPs)/ADRPs 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0 in support of the maneuver commander.
This FM 3-09 is unlike any FM 6-20 or FM 3-09 you have seen before.
It is revised to encompass the tactics for field artillery operations and fire support
planning supporting maneuver force commanders in accomplishing their objectives.
The tactics from several sources are described in the chapters of this FM. Field
artillery techniques, to include fire support planning and execution, are found in
current FMs until they are superseded by Army techniques publications (ATPs).
This publication is intended to provide guidance for brigade, division, and corps for the employment of field
artillery, and for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of fire support. Higher echelon planners
may use it to assist in establishing fire support requirements. The manual begins by describing the capabilities
of the field artillery, how it is organized, and how field artillery supports the maneuver commander through the
integration of all forms of fires. Fires are the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal
effect on a target (JP 3-09). This publication also provides a comprehensive discussion of fire support. This
includes topics such as the role of fire support in Unified Land Operations, fire support coordination
organizations and key personnel, target acquisition for fire support, and fire support attack resources. This
publication also provides information on fire support in the operations process: fire support planning,
preparation, execution, and assessment. This manual is a must read for combined arms leaders especially
brigade and battalion commanders and staff, because it describes both field artillery and fire support as key
components of successful maneuver operations.
Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (Department of Defense
(DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 15 October 2013). Tactics are concerned with the
approach to combat, placement of troops, deployment and employment of weapons, and execution of
movements. For further discussion see ADRP 3-90 and FMs 3-90-1/2.
There have been four major changes in the organization and contents of this publication. First, this publication
is much broader in scope encompassing field artillery operations and fire support. Chapter 1, Field Artillery
Operations, is new. Second, fires function and its relationship to other warfighting functions and fire support to
the principles of joint operations, previously found in the context-setting Chapter 1 of this publications
predecessor, are now found in ADRP 3-09, Fires. Third, the content of Chapters 2 and 3 have been updated and
titled as Fire Support and Fire Support and the Operations Process, respectively. Fourth, this publication has
no appendices. The previous editions Appendix A, Maneuver Control and Fire Support Coordination
Measures has become Chapter 4. The discussion on command and support relationships, found in Appendix B
of the previous edition, is now a section in Chapter 1.
This manual describes field artillery and fire support as key components of successful maneuver operations. It
begins by describing the capabilities of the Field Artillery, how it is organized, and how field artillery supports
the maneuver commander through the integration of all forms of fires. The discussion provides a comprehensive
discussion of fire support coordination; target acquisition; fire support attack resources, and fire support
planning, preparation, execution and assessmentfire support in the operations process.
FM 3-09 becomes the proponent manual for, or adds, modifies, or rescinds terms listed in introductory tables 1
through 3 on page viii.
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FM 3-09
vii
Introduction
Remarks
Change proponent manual from FM 6-30 to FM 3-09
Change proponent manual from FM 6-20-30 to FM 3-09
Remarks
Modified the definition and changed the proponent
manual from FM 3-09.12 to FM 3-09.
Modified the definition and changed proponent manual
from FM 3-09.12 to FM 3-09.
Modified the definition and changed proponent manual
from FM 3-09.12 to FM 3-09.
Modified the definition.
Modified the definition and changed proponent manual
from FM 6-50 to FM 3-09.
Modified the definition and changed proponent manual
from FM 3-09.12 to FM 3-09.
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
New term and definition, formerly found in JP1-02
New term and definition.
New organization name, replaces fires brigade.
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
New term and definition.
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
New term and definition.
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
Modified the definition and changed the proponent
manual from FM 6-20-40 to FM 3-09.
Modified the definition.
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
New term and definition; formerly found in JP 1-02.
Adopts the joint definition.
viii
Remarks
No longer formally defined as an Army unique term.
Adopts common English language dictionary definition.
Renamed to field artillery brigade.
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Chapter 1
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FM 3-09
1-1
Chapter 1
1-7. Field artillery supports ground and air operations by attacking the enemy force throughout the depth of its
formations and provides specific target engagement such as suppression of enemy air defenses. Field artillery
fires can provide simultaneous precision strikes of targets at long ranges that other means cannot attack without
significant risk. Strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (JP 3-0). Field artillerys
ability to quickly attack enemy forces on key terrain, flanks, and in dead space, enables the maneuver
commander to economize and concentrate to exploit advantages that arise.
1-8. Target acquisition is key to field artillery effectively providing timely and accurate fires. Target
acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective
employment of weapons (JP 3-60). Field artillery target acquisition is accomplished by forward observers and
weapons locating radars. In addition, maneuver commanders must integrate maneuver, unmanned aircraft
systems, and other collection assets into the information collection plan.
DECEIVE
1-10. Military deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent
extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that
will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). Field artillery supports military
deception by misleading the enemy decision makers understanding. This greatly improves the chances the
enemy will take risks that can expose him to the effects of friendly fires and maneuver. Field artillery fires
contribute to the overall deception plan. For example preparation fire of a false landing zone may contribute to
the belief a friendly attack is about to occur in one place when in fact it is about to occur in another.
DEFEAT
1-11. Defeat is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the
physical means or the will to fight. The defeated forces commander is unwilling or unable to pursue that
individuals adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commanders will and can no longer
interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the
threat of its use (FM 3-90-1). Defeat manifests itself in some sort of physical action, such as mass surrenders,
abandonment of positions, equipment and supplies, or retrograde operations. A commander can create different
effects against an enemy to defeat that force. For example a commanders employment of field artillery fires to
attack an enemy force may result in the enemy no longer having sufficient personnel, weapons systems,
equipment, or supplies to carry out its mission. Likewise the delivery of massed, synchronized and intense fires
can cause enemy personnel to lose the will to continue to fight.
DELAY
1-12. To delay is to slow the time of arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or alter the ability of the
enemy or adversary to project forces or capabilities. When enemy forces are delayed, friendly forces gain
time. For delay to have a major impact the enemy must face urgent movement requirements or the delay must
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4 April 2014
enhance the effect(s) of friendly operations. When delayed enemy forces mass behind a damaged route segment
a more concentrated set of targets and a longer period of exposure to friendly fires results. Field artillery
delivered minefields to delay the movement of an enemy may be an effective use of field artillery fires.
DESTROY
1-13. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is
reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any
function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-90-1). Destruction results
from the use of force to cause massive damage to equipment and material and significant personnel casualties.
Field artillery fires are a major destructive element of combat power, and play a significant role in a units
ability to eliminate the enemys combat systems and affect his will to fight. Destruction 1. In the context of
the computed effects of field artillery fires, destruction renders a target out of action permanently, or
ineffective for a long period of time, producing at least 30-percent casualties or materiel damage. 2. A
type of adjustment for a given target.
Note: Field artillery systems use the computed effects of field artillery fires as their baseline for
tactical and technical fire direction computation purposes. Commanders may change the desired
computed level of effects for the computations. Any change will have a corresponding impact on the
number of rounds fired.
1-14. Destruction fire is 1. An element of the method of engagement portion of the call for fire requesting
destruction fire. 2. Fire delivered for the sole purpose of destroying materiel (FM 6-40).
1-15. The amount of damage needed to render a unit combat-ineffective depends on the type of unit, leadership,
training, discipline, and morale. Precision-guided munitions and, where appropriate, dual purpose improved
conventional munitions provide the ability to effectively destroy armored, dug-in, or point targets. A point
target is a target that is less than or equal to 200 meters in width and length. (ATP 3-09.30). The use of
precision-guided munitions also limits collateral damage and permits effective engagement of point targets. For
example, using precision munitions to destroy a high-payoff target during an attack on an urban objective (see
chapter 2). Collateral damage is the unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that
would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time (JP 3-60). Such damage is not
unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack.
DISRUPT
1-16. Disrupt is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and
obstacles to upset an enemys formation or tempo, interrupt the enemys timetable, or cause enemy forces to
commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion (FM 3-90-1) 2. An obstacle effect that focuses fire
planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy force to break up its formation and tempo, interrupt its
timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort. (FM 90-7). This affects the
enemys ability to effectively coordinate actions, sustain and exploit success, and increases vulnerability to
friendly maneuver and fires. For example, massed artillery fires on an enemy march formation disrupt his
ability to deploy to an attack formation.
DIVERT
1-17. A diversion is the act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal
operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention (JP 3-03). Diversion causes enemy forces to consume
resources or capabilities critical to enemy operations in a way that is advantageous to friendly operations.
Diversions draw the attention of enemy forces away from critical friendly operations and prevent enemy forces
and their support resources from being employed for their intended purpose. Diversions can also cause more
circuitous routing along lines of communication, resulting in delays for enemy forces. An option for field
artillery employment in support of a commanders diversion is to use high explosive fires to encourage an
enemy to adopt a different route.
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FM 3-09
1-3
Chapter 1
NEUTRALIZE
1-18. Neutralize is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of
interfering with a particular operation (FM 3-90-1). Neutralization in the context of the computed effects of
field artillery fires renders a target ineffective for a short period of time, producing at least 10-percent
casualties or materiel damage. The commander specifies the enemy force or materiel to neutralize and the
duration, which is time or event driven. The neutralized target may become effective again when casualties are
replaced, damage is repaired or the effect resulting in the neutralization is lifted. The assets required to
neutralize a target vary according to the type and size of the target, and the weapon and munitions combination
used. Neutralization fire is fire delivered to render the target ineffective or unusable. For example, firing a
battery 1 on an enemy platoon in the open may result in 10-percent casualties.
SUPPRESS
1-19. Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force or
weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission (FM 3-90-1). Suppression occurs when a
commander employs direct or indirect fires, such as artillery, electronic attack, or smoke on enemy personnel,
weapons, and equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires, sensors, and visual observation of friendly forces.
Suppressive fire is fires on or about a weapons system to degrade its performance below the level needed
to fulfill its mission objectives during the conduct of the fires. Unlike the neutralization task the original
target regains its effectiveness without needing to reconstitute once the effects of the systems involved in the
suppression effort lift or shift to another target. Suppression usually lasts only as long as the fires or their effects
continue. Suppression, in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, renders a target
ineffective for a short period of time producing at least 3-percent casualties or material damage.
Suppression of enemy air defenses is activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades
surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means (JP 3-01).
A joint air attack team is typically supported by field artillery and other fire support assets. See
chapter 2 for more information on joint air attack teams.
Offensive counterair is offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles,
launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, and as
close to their source as possible (JP 3-01).
1-21. The field artillery commander emphasizes the development of clear, concise, and rapidly integrated fire
support plans (see chapter 3). Planning ensures responsive fires are available when needed. A fire plan is a
tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated. A fire plan
typically includes the plan for direct fires and the fire support plan.
1-22. The field artillery commander positions field artillery assets forward within the attacking formation to
facilitate continuous and effective fire support. In order to be within supporting range of maneuver forces, the
field artillery commander must fully understand the supported commanders concept of the operation.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Successful massing of Army indirect and joint fires requires that the fire support planners (FSCOORD, chief of
fires, fire support officer, and fires cell) be proficient in the tracking of friendly indirect fire asset positions and
movements. Additionally the field artillery commander must be aware of the enemy situation and likely
reactions to friendly actions.
1-23. The fire support planners plan fires on known and likely enemy positions. A high-payoff target is a target
whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60).
High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success
of the friendly commanders mission. A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the
successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60). The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously
degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commanders area of interest. A high-payoff target
list is a prioritized list of high-payoff targets by phase of the operation.
1-24. As the attacking force moves forward, preparation fire and counterfire destroy, neutralize, or suppress
enemy positions and weapons systems. Preparation fire is normally a high volume of fires delivered over a
short period of time to maximize surprise and shock effect. Preparation fire can include electronic attack
and should be synchronized with other electronic warfare activities. Electronic attack is a division of
electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to
attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat
capability and is considered a form of fires (JP 3-13.1).
1-25. In planning fires the maneuver commander and fire support planners must weigh the probable effects of
preparation fire against the achievement of surprise and the creation of obstacles capable of impeding friendly
forces movements. Preparation fire can continue while ground maneuver elements are moving. If the
commander chooses to make the initial assault without preparation fire to achieve tactical surprise, fires are
planned to support each subordinate units maneuver throughout the operation.
1-26. Disrupting one or more parts of the enemys team weakens the entire enemy force. For example,
disrupting the enemys fire support system allows friendly forces to maneuver and mass against the enemy with
a reduction in the effects of the enemys indirect-fire weapons on friendly forces. Field artillery disrupts an
enemy indirect fire target sets capability through the attack of enemy forward observers, fire direction centers,
command posts, cannon and rocket artillery firing positions and ammunition stocks. The successful attack of
each target set requires a different mix of resources to locate and engage individual targets within the set. For
example, as the friendly force moves through the enemys security area and closes into the enemys main
defensive positions, fires can be concentrated on neutralizing enemy command and fire control nodes, target
acquisition, and intelligence-gathering systems. By doing so, the maneuver commander may prevent the enemy
from determining the location and objective of the main attack.
Continuously adjusting field artillery plans and responsibilities to meet the maneuver commanders
intent.
Identifying and planning the engagement of high-payoff targets with the appropriate mix of lethal
and nonlethal effects.
With the supported commands assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3)/battalion or brigade
operations staff officer (S-3) and assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2)/battalion or brigade
intelligence staff officer (S-2) identifying and coordinating the attack of high-payoff targets;
integrating information collection sources to identify potential targets and integrating such targets
into fire plans.
Identifying and tasking primary and alternate observers and sensors to support the attack of
targets; designating target/observer sensor-to-shooter communication links, and integrating radar
placement and zones into fire planning.
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FM 3-09
1-5
Chapter 1
Serving as the force field artillery headquarters, if designated by the maneuver commander.
1-6
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Movement to Contact
1-29. Movement to contact is an offensive task that is designed to develop the situation or regain contact
(ADRP 3-90). It is conducted when the information related to enemy positions, situation and deployment is not
clear. In a movement to contact the maneuver commander has lost contact with the enemy main body and
attempts to reestablish it, using all available sources of intelligence to develop the situation. He may know the
location of enemy reserve and follow-on forces. Since a movement to contact involves an unclear or uncertain
situation, the FAB maintains centralized control over organic and assigned assets, enabling a coordinated
response to a rapidly developing situation. See Figure 1-1 on page 1-8 for an example organization for combat
for a movement to contact.
1-30. Centralized control also gives the FAB the flexibility to provide effective support to BCTsallowing the
organic field artillery battalions to continue movement with their BCTs in anticipation of contact with the
enemy. Positioning of FAB units must facilitate responsive execution of fire support tasks. Additionally the
FAB may provide the necessary meteorological, survey, and radar coverage required to support the operation;
consequently the FAB may position units in the BCTs areas of operations. The positioning and movement of
FAB assets must be coordinated with the maneuver BCT S-3s. Given the uncertain enemy situation the assets
should move as far forward as practical to allow maximum flexibility once the enemy contact is made. Specific
FAB considerations include
Providing responsive cannon, rocket, and missile fires to the BCTs to enable their organic field
artillery battalions to continue to move during the movement to contact.
Integrating FAB radar, meteorological, and counterfire coverage in support of the BCTs to allow
BCT organic field artillery battalions to continue to maneuver with the BCT; coordinating handover
of support to BCTs once the situation is developed.
Integrating FAB radar coverage in support of the BCTs to allow the radars in the BCT organic field
artillery battalions to continue to maneuver with the BCT.
Integrating field artillery, joint fires, and radar target acquisition to assist in securing the unprotected
flanks of vulnerable division, corps, or other FAB supported command assets during advances.
Transitioning FAB cannon field artillery battalions from general support (GS) or general supportreinforcing (GSR) to reinforcing (R) once the situation is developed and the BCTs begin to conduct
follow-on offensive or defensive tasks.
Coordinating positioning of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS)/high mobility artillery rocket
system (HIMARS) battalions well forward to maximize range.
Positioning field artillery to best support air and ground operations deconflicting with airspace
coordinating measures.
Planning for 6400-mil/360-degree fires and support to units in the division and/or corps support area.
Attacking bridges and other mobility corridors with FAB strike and joint fires to limit enemy
mobility options and facilitate shaping the meeting engagement for the BCTs.
Executing strikes for the FAB-supported commands shaping operations against high-payoff targets.
Using unmanned aircraft systems to conduct reconnaissance of routes and target areas of interest.
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FM 3-09
1-7
Chapter 1
Attack
1-31. Attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both
(ADRP 3-90). Attacks are violent engagements incorporating movement supported by fires against an enemy
position with a force whose disposition is known and reasonably understood. However based on mission
variable analysis the commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires. Attacks may be either a
decisive or shaping operation and, depending on the time available for planning, are characterized as either
hasty or deliberate. An attack differs from a movement to contact because, in an attack, the commander knows
part of the enemys disposition. This knowledge enables the commander to better synchronize the attack and
employ combat power more effectively in an attack than in a movement to contact (FM 3-90-1). During the
attack, less centralized control of fires is used because the FAB-supported maneuver force will have the
initiative. Allocation of field artillery fires for the FAB-supported commands main effort helps control the
tempo of offensive tasks. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in
time is most critical to overall mission success (ADRP 3-0). The main effort must be weighted by providing
adequate field artillery fires. See Figure 1-2 on page 1-9 for an example organization for combat for a division
attack.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Attacking, in coordination with joint fires, enemy operational reserves and second echelon forces
outside the BCT area of operations to isolate first echelon forces.
Supporting combat aviation brigade attack operations by suppressing enemy air defense systems.
Conducting FAB strikes to slow and disorganize repositioning and withdrawing enemy forces.
Providing counterfire.
Executing FAB strikes and supporting joint strikes in support of division, corps, joint task force, or
other supported command shaping operations.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
1-9
Chapter 1
Positioning field artillery units to best support ground and air operations deconflicting airspace
coordinating measures.
Planning for 6400-mil/360-degree operations and to provide fires to division or corps sustainment
areas.
Considering positioning individual MLRS/HIMARS batteries to support battlefield surveillance
brigade targeting for shaping operations.
Providing radar/meteorological coverage for the BCTs to allow the uninterrupted movement of their
assets forward during the attack.
Providing preparation fires to shape the close fight.
Providing massed fires to the BCTs to support the penetration of enemy positions.
Responding to BCT requests for support against uncommitted and repositioning enemy forces in the
BCTs area of operations.
Recommending support relationships for a BCTs field artillery battalion when the BCT is held in
reserve.
Considering the requirements to support follow-on offensive tasks (pursuit/exploitation); ensuring
routes have sufficient mobility to move rapidly to support the division, corps, joint task force, or
other FAB supported command.
Positioning FAB weapon locating radars to fill gaps in the BCTs radar coverage.
Integrating air support into counterfire operations.
Establishing communications channels between surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition
assets and FAB field artillery battalions for immediate execution of counterfire missions.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
forces to strike the enemys most vulnerable areas. There are two options in conducting a pursuit; each involves
assigning a subordinate the mission of maintaining direct-pressure on the rearward moving enemy force. The
first is a frontal pursuit that employs only direct-pressure. The second is a combination that uses a subordinate
element to maintain direct-pressure and one or more other subordinate forces to encircle the enemy. In the
pursuit, the most decisive effects result from combining a direct pressure force and an encircling force (FM 390-1).
1-37. There is generally little time to establish and affect new task organizations or support relationships
between an attack and exploitation and/or pursuit. These operations transition very quickly from one to another.
1-38. During exploitation and pursuit it is important to have decentralized execution authority and support
relationships. For example a FAB MLRS/HIMARS battalion providing long-range rocket and missile fires to
the direct pressure force may have a GSR support relationship, and FAB cannon field artillery battalions may
have a reinforcing (R) support relationship to BCT field artillery battalions.
1-39. Specific FAB considerations for supporting a maneuver force during exploitation and pursuit include
Positioning forward to support the division, corps, joint task force, or other FAB supported
command.
Executing radar target acquisition, conducting counterfire, and strike operations in support of
division, corps, joint task force.
Supporting combat aviation brigade attack operations by suppressing enemy air defense systems.
Using available aviation assets and joint fires to facilitate continuous fires on fleeing enemy forces
while FAB MLRS/HIMARS units are repositioning or moving with the exploiting/pursuing force.
Positioning the majority (two-thirds or more) of the FAB assets with the direct pressure force.
Planning 6400-mil/360-degree fires to support the flanks and rear of pursuing/exploiting forces.
Providing massed FAB fires to the BCT to destroy enemy hasty defenses and allow the BCT to
continue the pursuit of the enemy main body.
Providing counterfire for the BCT to allow their organic and reinforcing field artillery battalions to
mass fires on fleeing maneuver forces.
Positioning FAB radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and provide maximum
flexibility as the division, corps, joint task force, or other FAB supported command rapidly moves to
destroy enemy formations.
Movement to Contact
1-41. The MLRS/HIMARS can provide support during both movement to contact and attack operations. With
its long range and tactical mobility, MLRS/HIMARS is suited to augment other artillery fires to protect the
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force, ensure freedom of maneuver, and prevent enemy reinforcement. Considerations for an MLRS/HIMARS
battalion supporting a maneuver unit during movement to contact include
Planning artillery movement to maintain force momentum and provide adequate immediately
responsive support.
Using unmanned aircraft systems searching forward of advancing MLRS and HIMARS batteries as
an aid to reconnoiter routes and position areasparticularly to identify by-passed enemy forces.
Anticipating/planning for hasty attack contingencies where enemy activity could significantly impact
operations of the supported unit.
Planning on-order fire support coordination measures throughout the supported unit area of
operations.
Attack
1-42. Considerations for an MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting a maneuver unit conducting an attack
include
Planning for and providing preparation fires to facilitate attacks by the supported unit.
Massing effects of fires against high-payoff targets to meet criteria established by the force
commander to set conditions for crossing the line of departure.
Positioning MLRS/HIMARS unit close to the line of departure or forward line of own troops.
Continually requesting, monitoring, and updating fire support coordination measures throughout the
supported unit area of operations.
Conducting counterfire.
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or attacking forces are counterattacked, terrain may be restricted. General considerations for the cannon field
artillery battalion during offensive tasks include
Positioning firing units to effectively support the maneuver commanders fire support requirements.
Planning for rapid movement along multiple routes using all available resources.
Ensuring ammunition plans address security, movement, and recovery of unused ammunition.
Movement to Contact
1-46. Considerations for a cannon field artillery battalion supporting a maneuver force movement to contact
include
Positioning fire support assets well forward to facilitate communications, allow for massing of fires,
preclude untimely displacements, and exploit weapons ranges.
Planning fires on critical points along the axis of advance, to include the flanks.
Refining all targeting data based on the reconnaissance effort and operational changes as the situation
develops.
Synchronizing the positioning and movement of cannon field artillery batteries and platoons with the
tempo of the BCT or other supported unit and its fire support requirements.
Ensuring that firing batteries are positioned to support the BCT at points of vulnerability such as
obstacles, canalizing terrain, bridges, or gap crossings.
Positioning a cannon field artillery battery or platoon to follow close behind the advance guard to
provide responsive fires to lead elements.
Attack
1-47. Considerations for a cannon field artillery battalion supporting an attacking maneuver force include
Providing counterfire.
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Positioning and sustaining field artillery assets to ensure continuous fire support.
Planning for increased use of Class III and Class V supplies; air transportation of supplies may be
required.
Positioning observers and radars to support the observation and collection plans.
Using call for fire zones to provide target acquisition coverage on suspected enemy firing positions.
Coordinating radar employment across the supported commands area of operations to ensure there
are no gaps in coverage.
Positioning radars to cover critical point targets that are vulnerable to indirect fire.
Movement to Contact
1-53. Target acquisition assets focus on locating enemy indirect fire systems throughout the movement to
contact. Not only must the FAB support the BCTs with radar coverage to allow the BCTs organic radars to
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continue to maneuver with the BCT, but also coverage must be provided to protect vulnerable assets. As the
situation develops surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition assets will transition to support shaping
and counterfire missions. Considerations for target acquisition during movement to contact include
Positioning observers, including manned and unmanned aircraft forward and along the supported
units flanks to detect enemy forces.
Positioning radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and provide maximum flexibility.
Positioning radars to cover critical friendly assets that are vulnerable to enemy indirect fire from
bypassed regular or irregular forces.
Attack
1-54. During the attack, target acquisition assets focus on identifying enemy systems that can interdict the
supported maneuver unit as it moves toward the objective. Radars and observers linked to fire support systems
enable the supported units attack. Specific considerations for target acquisition during the attack include
Ensuring radars are in position in time to support the assault on the objective and subsequent
consolidation.
Coordinating radar employment across the supported commands area of operations to ensure there
are no gaps in coverage.
Planning call for fire zones on suspected and known enemy indirect fire systems.
Planning for critical friendly zones over breaching sites and gap crossings.
Coordinating FAB radar coverage across the supported commands area of operations to ensure there
are no gaps in coverage.
Using echeloned movement to provide continuous radar coverage to the supported force.
Providing FAB radar coverage for the BCTs or other supported units to allow movement of these
subordinate unit assets forward during the attack.
Coordinating surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition requirements with the battlefield
surveillance brigade and division, corps, joint task force, or other supported command G-2/S-2.
Positioning radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and provide maximum flexibility.
Using unmanned aircraft to help provide timely and accurate information about enemy locations and
activities.
Positioning radars to cover critical friendly assets that are vulnerable to indirect fire from bypassed
regular or irregular forces.
Monitoring radar acquisitions for indications of scatterable mine emplacement by the enemy.
Positioning radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and provide maximum flexibility.
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In front of the position on all confirmed and suspected enemy locations, on likely avenues of
approach, and on prominent terrain features that can be used by enemy overwatch elements.
In front of friendly barriers and obstacles, these fires are often critical to the defense. Any obstacle
not covered by both direct and indirect fires can be obscured and breached.
On the position, so that if an enemy penetrates friendly defenses, effective fire can be delivered on
them immediately.
Behind friendly positions to provide flexibility to the defense if an enemy surprises the defender by
attacking from an unexpected direction. This also aids the defender in blunting enemy penetration,
making the counterattack decisive.
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1-62. The commander employs fires to support the security force, using precision and other munitions to
destroy enemy reconnaissance and identified high-payoff targets. This also helps to deceive the enemy about the
location of the main battle area. The FSCOORD supports the security force by planning the delivery of fires at
appropriate times and places throughout the area of operations to slow and canalize the enemy force as it
approaches the security area. This allows the security force to engage the enemy on more favorable terms
without becoming decisively engaged. To prevent fratricide, the commander designates no-fire areas over
security force elements. Finally, the commander uses fires to support the withdrawal of the security force once
the shaping mission is complete and the defending unit is prepared to conduct main battle area operations.
1-63. In addition to long range cannon, rocket and missile fires, commanders use air interdiction to disrupt an
enemy advance. The commander also incorporates artillery fires with electronic attack and joint systems to
suppress enemy air defenses while close air support attacks a target. Air interdiction can delay, destroy, or
neutralize enemy attackers and follow-on forces before they can be brought to bear effectively against friendly
forces, thereby providing the commander with additional time to defeat the enemy in detail and prepare
defensive positions for subsequent attacks.
1-64. Field artillery assets target enemy combat units to force them to deploy, inflict casualties, disrupt the
cohesion of the enemys attack, and impede the enemys ability to mass combat power or reinforce successes.
Field artillery assets continue to extend the battle to attack enemy follow-on forces before they can be
committed to the main battle area. Field artillery systems attack command facilities and logistics sites in depth
to disrupt and deplete the attacking enemy.
1-65. Field artillery systems are deployed to cover obstacles, barriers, and lightly defended areas. The
defending commander takes advantage of the range and flexibility of field artillery weapons to quickly shift and
mass fires to engage targets at critical times and points in the battle. The defending commander assigns tasks to
field artillery systems that include closing obstacle gaps, or reseeding mines in previously breached obstacles.
1-66. In response to shallow enemy penetrations of the defense, artillery commanders normally reposition their
systems laterally, away from the point(s) of enemy penetration. This allows the defenders artillery systems to
provide fire support throughout the area of penetration.
1-67. Final protective fire is an immediately available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy
movement across defensive lines or areas (JP 1-02). Final protective fires are the highest type of priority targets
and take precedence over all other fire requests. Final protective fires differ from standard priority targets in that
they are fired at the maximum rate of fire until ordered to stop or until all ammunition is expended. They are
designed to create a final barrier of steel. The risk estimate distance for a given delivery system is a factor in
how close the final protective fires can be placed in front of friendly front lines. Closer final protective fires are
easier to integrate into direct fire final protective lines. Danger close in close air support, artillery, mortar, and
naval gunfire support fires, is the term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire which
indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of the target. The close proximity distance is
determined by the weapon and munition fired (JP 3-09.3).
1-68. Artillery final protective fires are allocated to companies in the most critical defensive positions. Mortar
final protective fires may be allocated to cover less critical avenues of approach. Once allocated to a company,
that commander designates the precise final protective fire location where they can best augment the direct fire
weapons.
Providing field artillery fires in support of close combat and in depth to support maneuver operations.
Relocating field artillery units after identifying the enemys main effort.
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is positioned to execute its missions but will not interfere with BCT movement or repositioning. The FAB may
be given its own assignment for positioning and some security assets to respond to localized threats.
1-72. The general tasks of the FAB in the defense are
Providing adequate support to the division covering force. A large portion of the FAB may occupy
the covering force operational area and it is possible that the FAB will serve as the force field
artillery headquarters for the BCT executing the covering force mission.
Supporting joint air and combat aviation brigade attacks by suppressing enemy air defenses.
Providing massed fires to assist BCTs in breaking the momentum of attacking enemy maneuver
forces.
Area Defense
1-73. The area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated
terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADRP 3-90). The focus of the area defense
is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting prepared
positions. During an area defense, FAB fires assist in shaping operations that constrain the enemy into a specific
course of action or fix him in a given location. These actions limit the enemys options. Fires may be used to
attrit enemy follow-on and reserve forces to keep them from entering the main battle area. The commander
covers obstacles with fires that turn, block, or disrupt to limit the options available to the enemy. The decisive
operation focuses fires into engagement areas, possibly supplemented by a counterattack. Additional
considerations for the FAB in supporting an area defense include
Engaging enemy long-range indirect fire systems prior to the enemy executing preparation fires.
Providing counterfire support to BCTs as the enemy enters the engagement areas allowing the BCTs
organic field artillery battalions to execute close support fires for maneuver.
Planning for 6400-mil/360-degree fires and support to sustainment area operations and units.
Mobile Defense
1-74. The mobile defense is a defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through
a decisive attack by a striking force (ADRP 3-90). During a mobile defense the defender withholds a large
portion of available forces for use as a striking force in a counterattack. Effective mobile defense requires
retaining the ability to maneuver freely and quickly to strike and defeat the enemy. Defending forces combine
offensive, defensive, and delaying actions to lure the attacking enemy into positions where they are vulnerable
to counterattack. In a mobile defense, commanders take advantage of terrain in depth, military deception,
obstacles and mines while employing fires and maneuver to seize initiative from the attacking enemy force.
Planning of all fires and identifying and defeating targets to delay, disrupt and disorganize the enemy attack is a
critical enabling factor of the mobile defense. The defending force positions itself to conduct decisive
engagements that destroy the enemy maneuver forces. The operations require continuous and concentrated fire
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support. The commander weights the striking force, through the allocation of field artillery and other fire
support resources available.
1-75. The defending forces planned maneuver must incorporate the movement of fire support assets to
locations where they can provide continuous support. Fire support assets, especially when employing precisionguided munitions, can enhance the combat capability of committed maneuver forces and enable the quick defeat
of the enemy force.
1-76. The defending commander takes precautions to prevent fratricide by establishing restrictive fire lines and
other fire support coordination measures. He positions fire support assets to support screen and guard forces and
allocates additional artillery to support a covering force. If the security force is assigned a large operational
area, the commander may have to position fire support assets to provide effective coverage of only the most
likely enemy avenues of approach. This is particularly important for a screen because often the screen force
relies on indirect fire to delay or disrupt the enemy. Providing adequate indirect fire support to the security force
may require the main body to position its artillery well forward in its formation.
1-77. Additional considerations for FAB fires in support of a mobile defense include
Positioning two-thirds of the FAB firing units with the fixing force during a mobile defense and onethird with the striking force.
Moving one-third of the FAB firing units with the striking force during a mobile defense.
Positioning FAB radars as far forward as possible to maximize range and acquire enemy indirect fire
systems.
Retrograde
1-78. The retrograde is a defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADRP 390). This includes delays, withdrawals and retirements. Retrograde operations are conducted to gain time,
preserve forces, place the enemy in unfavorable positions or avoid combat under undesirable conditions.
Movement of FAB units during retrograde operations is closely tied to the movement of the ground maneuver
forces. The FAB must balance the requirement to execute strike missions with the need to maneuver with the
force away from the enemy. Close coordination between the FAB and the terrain managers is necessary to
ensure the FAB positioning and movement is synchronized with the retrograde of the BCTs.
1-79. The considerations for establishing command and support relationships for retrograde operations are
similar to those for the mobile and area defenses. The ground forces in contact with the enemy need responsive
fires to support breaking contact with the enemy. For a withdrawal not under pressure, there is no enemy
contact, however the supported force and the FAB move tactically and retain the readiness to respond should
the enemy attack. The FAB continues to centrally control fires to support the force as a whole. Additionally, the
FAB must retain the flexibility to mass fires in support of individual BCTs to facilitate disengagement and
repositioning.
1-80. Additional considerations for the FAB in support of a retrograde include
Providing FAB strike to delay, disrupt, and attrit attacking enemy forces.
Designation as the force field artillery headquarters for the BCT executing the covering force
mission.
Providing fires to disrupt out of contact enemy echelons within the BCT area of operations.
Positioning FAB radars to provide coverage while BCT radars are displacing.
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Providing rocket and missile fires on enemy targets arrayed in depth and high-payoff targets.
Providing long-range rocket and missile fires to suppress enemy air defenses in support of air
operations.
Area Defense
1-82. Specific considerations for the MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting an area defense include
Providing long-range rocket and missile fires to delay, disrupt, and attrit attacking enemy forces.
Providing rocket and missile fires to break the momentum of an enemy attack.
Providing rocket and missile fires to destroy enemy indirect fire and target acquisition systems.
Providing rocket and missile fires to disrupt the arrival of enemy follow-on echelons.
Mobile Defense
1-83. Specific considerations for the MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting a mobile defense include
Planning positions that allow two-thirds of the MLRS/HIMARS firing units to be ready to fire at any
one time.
Positioning MLRS/HIMARS firing units with both the fixing and striking forces.
Retrograde
1-84. Specific considerations for the MLRS/HIMARS battalion supporting a retrograde include
Echeloning MLRS/HIMARS units to keep two-thirds of firing units in position ready to fire to
enable the supported command retrograde.
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1-86. During defensive tasks, the cannon field artillery battalion should coordinate for engineer support and
Class IV materials to harden positions and reduce the effectiveness of enemy fires. Plan for the use of direct fire
in support of battery/platoon defenses. Critical friendly zones may be used to increase protection of key friendly
units. Anticipate the need for survivability moves after firing units have provided extended and/or intense fires
(planned or unplanned). Review emergency destruction procedures.
1-87. Additional considerations for cannon battalions during defensive tasks include
Unmanned aircraft systems can be used to recon routes and field artillery position areas.
Engaging approaching enemy formations at maximum range with field artillery fires.
Providing counterfire.
Coordinating with the supported commands fires cell to ensure that the obstacle plan integrates
cannon fires to reinforce obstacles.
Developing the fire support plan to include priorities of fires, targets on point obstacles, obstacle
belts and groups.
Coordinating with the supported commands fires cell for close air support and Army aviation close
combat attacks.
Coordinating with the supported commands fire support officer and fires cell to plan for and mass
all available fires to support disengagements.
Providing field artillery illumination to assist friendly force night operations, to mark locations or
targets, to provide friendly direction orientation, or to degrade enemy night vision equipment.
Area Defense
1-88. Specific considerations for the cannon field artillery battalion supporting an area defense include
Ensuring adequate cannon field artillery fires are available for the battle handover and withdrawal of
the security forces.
Planning to forward position cannon field artillery firing units in support of security area operations.
Coordinating the movement of field artillery batteries to support fire support tasks; ensuring
movements are coordinated with the scheme of maneuver to avoid confusion and possible
interference with planned maneuver actions.
Mobile Defense
1-89. Specific considerations for a cannon field artillery battalion supporting a mobile defense include
Providing timely cannon field artillery fires to suppress enemy air defenses.
Planning for the use of obscuration or screening smoke to support both the fixing and striking force.
Synchronizing the positioning and movement of the cannon field artillery battalion subordinate firing
units and radars with the scheme of maneuver.
Providing counterfire.
Retrograde
1-90. Considerations for a cannon field artillery battalion supporting a retrograde are the same as those for a
mobile defense.
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Employing target acquisition assets to provide coverage of named areas of interest, target areas of
interest, and critical assets.
Assisting the supported commands fires cell in the development of an observation plan that:
Ensures that responsibility for related fire support tasks are identified and coordinated.
Is objective oriented.
Rehearsing the observation plan to ensure that all targets are adequately observed, that triggers are
effectively coordinated, and that backup plans are adequate.
Linking unmanned aircraft systems with MLRS/HIMARS units to rapidly respond to acquired enemy
indirect fires units.
Using echeloned movement to provide continuous radar coverage to the supported force.
Coordinating surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition requirements with the supported
command G-2/S-2.
Coordinating radar employment across the supported commands area of operations to ensure there
are no gaps in coverage.
Area Defense
1-92. During area defense the commander directs reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition assets to
determine the locations, strengths and probable intentions of the attacking enemy force before and throughout
the defense; placing a high priority on early identification of the enemys main effort. Target acquisition assets
are focused on locating enemy identified high-payoff targets that may include enemy fire support systems.
Specific considerations for target acquisition systems area defense include
Positioning radars to maximize range and acquire enemy indirect fire systems.
Employing allocated unmanned aircraft systems to conduct reconnaissance, detect enemy indirect
fire systems, and other enemy forces.
Mobile Defense
1-93. Specific considerations for target acquisition supporting a mobile defense include
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Planning for frequent repositioning of target acquisition assets based on movement of the forward
line of own troops.
Positioning observers forward and along the flanks of both the fixing and striking force to observe
and execute priority targets.
Positioning radars as far forward as possible in the fixing force to maximize range and provide
maximum flexibility as the striking force maneuvers to destroy enemy formations.
Positioning radars to cover critical point targets.
Employing unmanned aircraft systems forward of advancing maneuver units to detect enemy forces.
Using unmanned aircraft systems to conduct reconnaissance of target areas of interest that include
enemy indirect fires assets.
Continually reviewing timelines and coordination requirements necessary to maintain
synchronization of observers/triggers, shooters, and decision makers for successive priority targets
during for both fixing and striking forces.
Monitoring radar acquisitions for indications of scatterable mine emplacement by the enemy.
Integrating reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting acquisition with the fixing force to slow and
disorganize repositioning and withdrawing enemy forces.
Retrograde
1-94. During a retrograde, target acquisition-specific considerations may include
Positioning long-range radars rearward to provide extended coverage for the supported command
during the retrograde.
Planning call for fire zones on probable enemy field artillery locations.
ARTILLERY RAID
1-97. An artillery raid is a type of attack that uses field artillery as its primary attack mechanism. An artillery
raid is frequently conducted by a platoon or battery sized field artillery unit. Artillery raid missions are
conducted to achieve tactical or operational objectives and involve the rapid movement of artillery assets by air
or ground into a position to attack a high-payoff target with artillery fires. They entail sending firing elements
forwardgenerally beyond the security areato engage enemy targets beyond the maximum range of
positioned field artillery weapons. Normally the raid is extremely short and should not involve sustained
operations. Detailed planning, surprise, and speed in execution are the key factors in the successful conduct of
an artillery raid. Because the target is likely to be perishable, the raid is planned and executed in a compressed
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timeline. For more information on raids in which specific types of field artillery units participate, see the Army
techniques publication (ATP) specific to that type of unit.
ENCIRCLEMENT OPERATIONS
1-98. Encirclement operations are operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an
opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement (ADRP
3-90). Encirclement operations occur because combat operations involving modernized forces are likely to be
chaotic, intense, and highly destructive, extending across large areas containing relatively few units as each side
maneuvers against the other to obtain positional advantage (ADRP 3-90).
1-99. If there is an encircled enemy force, and the friendly commander decides to destroy it, that enemy force is
reduced as rapidly as possible to free resources for use elsewhere. The reduction of an encircled enemy force
continues without interruption, using the maximum concentration of forces and fires, until the encircled enemy
force is destroyed or surrenders. A commander may destroy encircled enemy forces by fires alone or by a
combination of fire and movement.
BREAKOUT OPERATIONS
1-100. A breakout is an operation conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of movement or contact
with friendly units. It differs from other attacks only in that a simultaneous defense in other areas of the
perimeter must be maintained (ADRP 3-90). The field artillery may support the breakout of friendly encircled
forces as part of the encircled force or from outside the encirclement. Considerations for field artillery as part of
the encircled force may include
Reorganizing and consolidating, as necessary, field artillery units within the encirclement.
Ensuring centralized control where possible and establishing a force field artillery headquarters, as
required.
Coordinating with field artillery units outside the encirclement that can provide supporting fires.
PASSAGE OF LINES
1-102. A passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another forces
combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18). A commander
conducts a passage of lines to continue an attack or conduct a counterattack, retrograde security or main battle
forces, and any time one unit cannot bypass another units position (ADRP 3-90).
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field artillery force may be attached to the passing field artillery force or it may be ordered to reinforce the
passing field artillery force from its present positions, until the passing force has moved out of range. During a
forward passage of lines, the field artillery commander considers
Establishing liaison and communications with the stationary force field artillery headquarters.
Obtaining available target lists and fire plans from the stationary force.
Exchanging survey data with the stationary force field artillery headquarters.
Exchanging data for radar zones; particularly call for fire zones and artillery target intelligence zones.
Exchanging survey data with the stationary force field artillery headquarters.
RELIEF IN PLACE
1-105. A commander conducts a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat
effectiveness of committed units. A relief in place is an operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all
or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for
the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). The incoming
unit continues the operation as ordered.
1-106. The higher headquarters directs when and where to conduct the relief and establishes the appropriate
control measures. Normally, during the conduct of major combat operations, the unit relieved is defending.
However, a relief may set the stage for resuming offensive operations (ADRP 3-90). During a relief in place,
the field artillery battalion commander should consider
Providing existing fire plans to the incoming field artillery unit and exchange liaison officers.
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MOBILITY OPERATIONS
1-108. Mobility is a quality or capability of military forces, which permits them to move from place to place
while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-17). Field artillery must be positioned to provide
continuous fires for the supported force.
1-109. Mobility operations are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of natural and manmade obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver (Army tactics, techniques and procedures
[ATTP] 3-90.4). When attacking, the commander concentrates the effects of combat power at selected
locations. This may require the unit to improve or construct combat trails through areas where routes do not
exist. The surprise achieved by attacking through an area believed to be impassable may justify the effort and
time expended in constructing these trails. The force bypasses existing obstacles and minefields before starting
the offensive task instead of breaching them whenever possible. Units mark bypassed minefields whenever the
mission variables of METT-TC allow (FM 3-90-1).
Breaching Operations
1-110. Breach is a tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available means to break through or
establish a passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield or fortification (FM 3-90-1). Breaching is a
synchronized combined-arms operation conducted under the control of a maneuver commander. Breaching
operations begin when friendly forces encounter an obstacle and begin to pass around or through it, and they
end when the obstacle has been penetrated. At this point battle handover may occur with a follow-on force
assuming the lead role. The primary task for the supporting field artillery elements is to protect the breaching
force from direct and indirect enemy fires positioned to reinforce the obstacle. Unplanned breaching operations
may require that the field artillery battalion S-3 quickly review ammunition status for impact on other tasks.
1-111. Considerations for field artillery during breaching operations, may include
Organizing, positioning, and synchronizing indirect suppressive fires. Anticipate high volumes of
suppressive fires to include high explosive/variable time and smoke ammunition.
Creating backup plans which are especially critical to maintaining suppressive and obscuration fires
while the breaching team is exposed.
Anticipating suppression of enemy air defenses fires if air assets participate in the operation.
Establishing quick fire channels to aerial observers to provide surveillance beyond the gap.
Planning for critical friendly zones, on the gap-crossing site, associated assembly areas, and air
defenses.
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URBAN OPERATIONS
1-114. Urban operations are operations across the range of military operations planned and conducted on, or
against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where man-made construction or
the density of population are the dominant features (FM 3-06). Commanders conducting major urban operations
use their ability to visualize how doctrine and military capabilities are applied within the context of the urban
environment (ADRP 3-90). For example during urban operations the supported commands G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2,
chief of fires, fire support officer and FSCOORD should identify size and location of dead space where indirect
fires cannot reach. Indirect fire dead space is that area along either the observer-target line or the gun-target line
beyond an object such as a crest or building where the rounds either cannot be observed or cannot impact. Dead
space is generally five times the height of buildings for low-angle fire and one-half the height of buildings for
high-angle fire for area munitions. Because of its steep angle of descent, high-angle fire can achieve greater
effects and is usually the preferred method in urban operations. High-angle fire is fire delivered at elevations
greater than the elevation of maximum range of the gun and ammunition concerned. Range decreases as the
angle of elevation increases (FM 6-40). High-angle fire is achieved by a weapon system firing at an elevation
(angle) greater than is required for its maximum range.
1-115. Fires in urban areas must be closely coordinated and planned in detail to include considerations of
munitions effects, psychological effects on the populace, and potential collateral damage. During urban
operations expect more detailed and restrictive rules of engagement and a greater number of protected or
restricted sites with associated restrictive fire support coordination measures. Effective airspace coordinating
measures can ensure that other missions (for example air reconnaissance, strike) can transit or operate in the
airspace above and around the urban area. For air-delivered munitions, terminal control and guidance can help
ensure the delivering platform has acquired the correct target, thus reducing the risk of fratricide.
1-116. Target coordinates and associated target location error need to be of sufficient accuracy to enable
desired effects on the target. For more on target location error and its significance, see the discussion in chapter
2, FM 3-09.12, ATP 3-09.32, and JP 3-09.3.
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1-118. Field artillery tasks conducted in support of stability are essentially the same as those for offensive and
defensive tasks. Restraint is vital in the employment of fires during stability tasks. Such restraint typically
concerns the munitions employed and the targets engaged to obtain desired effects. Having the ability to employ
a weapon does not mean it should be employed. In addition to collateral damage considerations, the
employment of fires could have second and third order negative effects. Collateral damage could adversely
affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. The
use of nonlethal capabilities should be considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force to
avoid unnecessarily raising the level of conflict. Excessive force antagonizes those friendly and neutral parties
involved. Restraint increases the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially damaging the
legitimacy of an opponent.
1-119. The actions of field artillery personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force
including specific rules of engagement. Successful employment of field artillery weapons and munitions
requires a common understanding by commanders and their field artillery personnel. Commanders must limit
collateral damage and apply force precisely to accomplish the mission without causing unnecessary loss of life,
suffering, or damage to infrastructure. Field artillery units must be properly trained in the rules of engagement
and quickly informed of any changes. Rules of engagement may vary, but should always be consistent with the
inherent right of self-defense. Given timely and accurate intelligence to determine targets and their locations,
precision munitions may achieve the desired effects while mitigating adverse effects. Key considerations for
employment of field artillery fires during stability operations include
Stability operations are often conducted in noncontiguous areas of operation. This can complicate the
use of fire support coordination measures, the ability to mass and shift fires, and clearance of fires
procedures.
What constitutes key terrain may be based more on political, cultural and/or social considerations
than physical features of the landscape; fires may be used more frequently to defend key sites than to
seize them.
Rules of engagement are often more restrictive than in major combat operations; commander
guidance for fires requires careful consideration during development and wide dissemination to all
levels.
Planning for the use of precision-guided munitions and/or employment of nonlethal capabilities may
be necessary to limit collateral damage.
Planning the use of field artillery fires to demonstrate capabilities, show of force or area denial.
1-120. As during offensive and defensive tasks, fire support coordination measures are established for stability
tasks to facilitate the attack of high-payoff targets throughout the area of operations. Restrictive fire support
coordination measures are those that provide safeguards for friendly forces and noncombatants, facilities, or
terrain. For example, no-fire areas and restrictive fire areas may be used not only to protect forces, but also to
protect populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance.
4 April 2014
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Chapter 1
Field artillery units can be positioned and assigned directions of fire to concentrate their fires in the
appropriate operational area. In this manner, units in GS can add weight to the main attack or
strength to the most vulnerable area.
Ammunition may be allocated to provide for more support in the affected area.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
1-130. Support relationships from GS to direct support (DS) provide increasing responsiveness to the main
efforts commander. Minimal essential fire support can be allocated to shaping operations. Consider weighting
the main effort with close air support sortie distribution. Consider suppression of enemy air defenses to enable
friendly close air support and attack helicopter operations supporting the main effort.
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Chapter 1
1-141. Field artillery cannon, rocket, and missile systems that are organic, assigned, attached to, or under the
OPCON of FABs and BCTs provide commanders with continuously available, adjustable, and tailored fires
under all weather conditions and in all types of terrain. These organizations can be task-organized with
maneuver to provide the right combination of indirect fires capabilities for a given situation. Task-organizing is
the act of designing an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to
meet a unique task or mission (ADRP 3-0).
1-142. The 4 Army field artillery inherent responsibilities (see table 1-1) supplement the inherent
responsibilities of an Army command relationship.
Table 1-1. Field artillery inherent responsibilities in army command relationships
If Army Command
Relationship isOrganic
1. Parent unit.
Area of
1
Organic
2. Own observers.
operations of
Parent unit.
headquarters
3. Force field artillery
parent unit.
2
headquarters
1. Parent unit.
Area of
1
Assigned
operations of
Parent unit.
Assigned 2. Own observers.
headquarters
3. Force field artillery
parent unit.
2
headquarters.
1. Gaining unit.
Area of
1
operations of
Gaining unit
Gaining unit.
Attached 2. Own observers.
3. Force field artillery
gaining unit.
2
headquarters.
1. Gaining unit.
1. Supported unit
1. Supported unit
Area of
1
2.
Own
observers.
2.
Force
field
2. Force field
operations
of
OPCON
artillery
artillery
3. Force field artillery
supported unit.
2
2
2
headquarters
headquarters
headquarters.
1. Gaining unit.
1. Supported unit
1. Supported unit
Area of
1
2. Own observers.
2. Force field
2. Force field
operations of
TACON
artillery
artillery
3. Force field artillery
supported
unit.
2
2
2
headquarters
headquarters
headquarters.
Note: (1) Includes all target acquisition means not deployed with the supported unit (such as radars or unmanned aircraft
systems), vehicles, air observers, survey parties. In the NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational unit
(see TACON).
Note: (2) If designated by the supported commander.
OPCON operational control NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization TACON tactical control
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
control. Support relationships are used to task-organize for a mission. Field artillery units may be assigned a
support relationship of DS, R, GSR, or GS.
1-146. The 4 Army field artillery inherent responsibilities (see table 1-2 on page 1-34) supplement the inherent
responsibilities of an Army support relationship.
Direct Support
1-147. Direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and
authorizing it to answer directly to the supported forces request for assistance (ADRP 5-0). A field artillery unit
in DS of a maneuver unit is concerned primarily with the fire support needs of only that unit. The fires cell of
the supported maneuver unit plans and coordinates fires to support the maneuver commanders intent. The
commander of a unit in DS recommends position areas and coordinates for movement clearances where his unit
can best support the maneuver commanders concept of the operation. When field artillery units are able to
habitually support the same maneuver force, coordination and training are enhanced. DS is the most
decentralized support relationship.
Reinforcing
1-148. Reinforcing is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit (ADRP 5-0).
Only like units (for example artillery to artillery) can be given a reinforcing mission. An R support relationship
requires one field artillery unit to augment the fires of another field artillery unit. When an organic or DS field
artillery battalion requires more fires to meet maneuver force requirements, another field artillery battalion may
be directed to reinforce it. An organic or DS field artillery battalion may be supported by up to 2 reinforcing
battalions. A field artillery unit assigned an R support relationship retains its command relationship with its
parent unit, but is positioned by the reinforced field artillery unit and has priorities of support established by the
reinforced field artillery unit, then the parent unit.
General Support-Reinforcing
1-149. General support-reinforcing is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole
and to reinforce another similar-type unit (ADRP 5-0). The first priority of a field artillery unit assigned a GSR
support relationship is to furnish artillery fires for the maneuver force as a whole; the second priority is to
reinforce the fires of another field artillery unit. A GSR unit remains under the control of the supported
maneuver commander or his force field artillery headquarters. The GSR support relationship offers the
commander the flexibility to meet the requirements of a variety of tactical tasks.
General Support
1-150. General support is that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any
particular subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3). A field artillery unit assigned in GS of a force has all of its fires under
the immediate control of the supported commander or his designated force field artillery headquarters. Among
Army support relationships, GS provides the highest degree of centralized control of fires.
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Chapter 1
Has as Its
Zone of Fire:
Is Positioned
By:
Supported unit.
Supported unit.
1. Supported unit.
Area of
2. Own
operations of
1
observers.
supported unit.
Direct Support
3. Force field
artillery
2
headquarters.
1. Reinforced field
Zone of fire of
Reinforced field
Reinforced field
artillery.
reinforced field
artillery unit HQ.
artillery unit HQ.
2. Own
artillery unit.
1
observers.
Reinforcing
3. Force field
artillery
2
headquarters.
1. Supported unit.
1. Supported unit.
1. Supported unit.
Area of
2. Force field
2. Force field
2. Force field
operations of
General
artillery
artillery
artillery
supported unit to
2
2
2
headquarters.
headquarters.
headquarters.
include zone of
Supportfire of reinforced
3. Reinforced unit.
Reinforcing
field artillery unit.
4. Own
1
observers.
1. Supported unit.
Area of
1. Supported unit.
1. Supported unit.
2. Force field
operations of
2. Force field
2. Force field
General
artillery
supported unit.
artillery
artillery
2
2
2
headquarters.
headquarters.
headquarters.
Support
3. Own
1
observers.
Note: (1). Includes all target acquisition means not deployed with the supported unit (radar, unmanned aircraft systems),
vehicles, air observers, survey parties. In the NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize.
Note: (2). If designated by the supported commander.
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Note: When working with United States (U.S.) Marine Corps and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) units see Marine Corps warfighting publication (MCWP) 3-16/STANAG
2484 for inherent responsibilities for artillery tactical tasks.
110 FAB: GSR 7 FAB; do not exceed 25 percent of the controlled supply rate in support of 7 FAB.
1-89 Field Artillery (MLRS, M270A1): GS; provide liaison officer to the corps fires cell.
1-152. Commanders should not place artillery in reserve but may give a change to its support relationship
ensuring artillery is not held in reserve and adequate support is provided to the main effort. These changes in
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4 April 2014
support relationships can be identified by an on-order mission. An example of an on-order mission is 1-52 FA:
GSR 1-50 Field Artillery; on-order R 1-50 Field Artillery.
The FAB BSB is organized to provide sustainment support (supply, maintenance, field services, and
transportation) to the organic units of the FAB.
The signal network support company deploys, installs, operates and maintains the mission command
information systems networks that support FAB operations and integrate with the division or corps
networks.
The target acquisition battery is organized with meteorological, survey, and target acquisition
capabilities including the Army/Navy (Marine) transportable radar special purpose (multipurpose)
(AN/TPQ)-37 (being replaced by the AN/TPQ-53) and AN/TPQ-50-series radars.
1-154. The FAB headquarters and headquarters battery and its assigned staff provide expertise across a broad
range of functional areas. The FAB and each of the subordinate elements can be task-organized as required.
This may include a combination of one to five rocket/missile (MLRS or HIMARS) and/or cannon field artillery
battalions, as well as other enablers. See figure 1-4. For example, executing strike may require placing
surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic attack assets under the OPCON or TACON of the FAB commander.
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Chapter 1
1-157. FABs are task-organized to accomplish assigned tasks. Strike is an optimal task for the FAB. The
FABs supported maneuver commander assigns the FAB its mission and provides guidance for coordinating the
FABs actions with BCTs and other supporting brigades. The supported commander also provides supporting
units to the FAB as necessary. Subordinate units may include augmenting surveillance, reconnaissance, target
acquisition, and/or other fire support assets. The FABs supporting assets also may include ground
reconnaissance and surveillance, manned aviation, and unmanned aircraft assets from division or higher
echelons. These assets augment the FAB based on the higher headquarters or supported commanders mission
analysis task organization and the requirements of a particular mission. The BCT, battlefield surveillance
brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade, combat aviation brigade, and sustainment brigade can all support FAB
operations. The FAB might be required to detach some of its subordinate elements to BCTs or other supporting
brigades of the command.
1-158. Training and readiness authority is the authority for matters affecting the training and readiness of
specified units. This authority is inherent in command authority and may be delegated in whole or in part to
subordinate commanders. Unless specified otherwise by the senior commander, it includes authority to give
direction to an assigned or attached unit concerning unit readiness and organizational training. For example,
when a FAB is attached to a division, the FAB participates in the training events, readiness exercises, and the
deployments of the division. The division commander may also direct the FAB commander to assist BCT
commanders training and preparing their organic field artillery battalions. These functions, in conjunction with
the BCT commander, may include
Providing guidance and oversight for training standardization and certification including
development of the mission training brief.
Assessing the state of training and provide training direction for the 13-series military occupational
specialty, including advising on the management and leader development of career military field 13
personnel and management of artillery/fire support equipment, including the cross-leveling between
attached units on the same installation.
Assisting the division commander in planning, preparing and executing cannon field artillery
battalion external evaluations and major training exercises.
Note: Units organic to the FAB may control other augmenting units based on task organization for a
specific contingency or operation.
1-159. A force field artillery headquarters, if designated by the supported commander, is normally the senior
field artillery headquarters organic, assigned, attached, or placed under the operational control of that command.
The supported commander specifies the commensurate responsibilities of the force field artillery headquarters
and the duration of those responsibilities (ADRP 3-09). When designated as the force field artillery
headquarters by a supported division, corps joint task force, or Joint Force Land Component Command
commander, the FAB commander is the FSCOORD for the supported command. The division, corps or joint
task force chief of fires serves as the deputy FSCOORD and takes direction and guidance from the FSCOORD.
If the FAB is designated as force field artillery headquarters, the FABs fires cell may require augmentation.
1-160. The FAB staff performs mission planning, determines what assets can best fulfill the supported
commanders fire support requirements, and tasks its subordinate units. The FAB staff can plan for and employ
those fire support assets it receives as assigned, attached, or which are placed under its OPCON or tactical
control (TACON). It may provide these units a mission, tasks, and establish support relationships as part of field
artillery organization for combat and provides tasks to subordinate units in FAB plans and orders.
MLRS/HIMARS BATTALION
1-161. The MLRS/HIMARS battalion (see figure 1-5 on page 1-37) is composed of a headquarters and
headquarters battery, and 2 or 3 MLRS/HIMARS firing batteries with 8 or 6 launchers each. A forward support
company from the BSB is typically given an augmenting command or support relationship
The headquarters and headquarters battery is organic to the MLRS/HIMARS battalion and is
organized and equipped to coordinate administrative, logistical, maintenance and communications
support for the battalion headquarters and the firing batteries.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
The MLRS/HIMARS firing battery consists of a battery headquarters, a battery operations center, a
support platoon, and 2 firing platoons. The battery headquarters has personnel and equipment to
perform administration and limited sustainment for the firing platoons.
1-162. MLRS/HIMARS units are employed to provide field artillery medium-range rocket and long-range
missile fires in support of the BCT, division, corps, joint or multinational forces. The battalion can operate as a
single unit or it can detach batteries or platoons to operate for limited periods.
1-163. For more on the MLRS/HIMARS field artillery battalion see ATP 3-09.60.
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FM 3-09
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Chapter 1
The self-propelled cannon field artillery battalion is 3 batteries of 4 howitzers each. See figure 1-9 on
page 1-39.
1-38
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
The towed cannon field artillery battalion has 3 batteries composed of 4 M777-series 155-mm towed
howitzer each. See figure 1-10.
The BCT field artillery battalion typically includes a target acquisition platoon headquarters team,
weapons locating radar sections (radar types and numbers vary), a meteorological team, 2 survey
teams, a counterfire operations section, 1 or more fire support platoons, and a lightweight counter
mortar radar section. The number and composition of fire support platoons and fires cells vary based
upon the type of unit supported.
The FAB field artillery battalion has the same basic organization as the BCT field artillery battalion
less the target acquisition platoons and the fire support platoons. Target acquisition support for the
FAB field artillery typically comes from the FAB target acquisition battery.
The headquarters and headquarters battery typically consists of a battery headquarters, battalion
command section, S-1 personnel, S-2 intelligence, S-3 operations, S-4 supply, S-6 communications, a
medical platoon and unit ministry team.
The cannon field artillery batteries typically consist of a battery headquarters, supply section, 2 fire
platoon headquarters with fire direction center, 6 firing sections, and 2 ammunition sections (1 per
platoon)
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Chapter 1
The firing platoon is the basic firing unit of the cannon field artillery battery and has personnel
and equipment to determine firing data and conduct fire missions. Each fire platoon consists of a
platoon headquarters, a fire direction center, 3 howitzer sections, and an ammunition section.
The battery headquarters has personnel and equipment to perform administration, sustainment,
and limited chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functionsthe supply section provides
limited sustainment support; each ammunition section has personnel and equipment to provide
limited ammunition support.
The forward support company is organized to provide subsistence, field maintenance, subsistence,
and supply distribution for the battalion; the company consists of a company headquarters, a field
feeding section, a distribution platoon, and a field maintenance platoon.
1-169. The cannon field artillery battalion provides responsive and accurate field artillery fires to the
supported command and its subordinate units according to the commanders priority of fires. Cannon field
artillery battalions typically have a command or support relationship with a BCT or a FAB. The BCTs field
artillery battalion has an organic command relationship, but the BCT commander may assign a support
relationship directly to subordinate units of the BCT. A FAB, U.S. Marine Corps, or multinational artillery units
may reinforce a BCT field artillery battalion. A cannon field artillery battalion assigned or attached to a FAB is
typically given a command or support relationship to support the whole force or to augment the fires of a
specified field artillery unit.
1-170. The BCTs field artillery battalion coordinates with fires cells at BCT and battalion level; and fire
support teams and forward observers at company level. This cannon field artillery battalion is also able to
operate over a widely dispersed area due to its communications capability, organic radars, and support from the
BCTs sustainment and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The cannon field artillery batterys fire
direction center controls the batterys firing and is required to maintain the current tactical situation and respond
to the supported unit and higher headquarters. Each firing platoon has personnel and equipment to determine
firing data and conduct fire missions. A fire mission is 1. The specific assignment given to a fire unit as part of a
definite plan. 2. An order used to alert the weapon/battery area and indicate that the message following is a call
for fire (FM 6-40). The primary control facility for the cannon field artillery battery is the fire direction center.
1-171. Platoon operations are normally 2 firing platoons operating independently in separate platoon locations
with a fire direction center controlling the howitzers. The platoon fire direction centers are equipped with the
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) computer as the primary digital interface between
the battalion command post and the howitzers. In a platoon-based unit, the platoon leader and platoon
operations center execute mission command. The functions of the platoon operations center include technical
and tactical fire direction. The platoon operations center is a fire direction center with added responsibilities.
The platoon operations center is not a separate element and does not require a separate vehicle. Additional
functions of the platoon operations center are executing orders from higher headquarters, coordinating logistics,
and all the other operational functions normally performed by a headquarters based on guidance from the
battery commander/platoon leader. The numbers of howitzers in each platoon and employment method may
vary based on the tactical situation or mission requirements. Howitzers normally position individually and work
together under the lead of the senior section chief. If the platoon divides into pairs or groups, a designated
senior section chief acts as team leader.
1-172. Section operations are the least preferred method because the section is isolated and must provide for
its own defense. This method requires the highest degree of crew training and does not provide for mutual
support against air or ground threats.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
surprise, nuclear, or nonnuclear fire on any known target in any direction from any weapon limited only by the
characteristics of the weapon and ammunition used (FM 6-40).
1-174. Providing responsive fires in support of maneuver is dependent on the ability to achieve accurate firstround fire for effect on targets. Fire for effect is 1. A command to indicate that fire for effect is desired. 2. Fire
that is intended to achieve the desired result on target (FM 6-40). To achieve responsive fires, field artillery and
other units providing indirect fires must conduct thorough and effective fire planning, and maximize the
capabilities and the versatility of automated systems used for tactical and technical fire control. To achieve
accurate first-round fire for effect on a target, an artillery unit or other unit providing indirect fires must
compensate for nonstandard conditions as completely as time and the tactical situation permit. If these
requirements are met, the firing unit will be able to deliver accurate and timely fires. If the requirements for
accurate fire cannot be met completely, the firing unit may be required to use adjust-fire missions to engage
targets. Adjust-fire missions, because the target is alerted by rounds that miss, can result in less effect on the
target, increased ammunition expenditure, increased possibility the firing unit will be detected by hostile target
acquisition assets, and collateral damage. There are 5 requirements for accurate fire
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
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Chapter 1
sections. Field artillery observers are assigned to the field artillery battalion in infantry, armor, and Stryker
BCTs. These fire support personnel have a habitual relationship with the supported maneuver unit. Field
artillery radars and target processing sections are found in both the target acquisition battery of the FAB and the
target acquisition platoon of the BCTs organic field artillery battalion. Other potential target acquisition assets
include
Other ground sources (maneuver units, support brigades, civil affairs units).
National systems.
Accuracies required if other than tactical standard operating procedures. Modified survey techniques
may be needed as the result of the mission variables of METT-TC.
Future plans.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
1-183. When survey control is not immediately available, efforts should be directed toward establishing
common directional control in the position area. When using an azimuth, the point from which the azimuth
originates is the center of an imaginary circle.
1-184. In order for two locations to be considered on common grid they must be referenced to the same datum
(for example the World Geodetic System of 1984) ellipsoid (there are more than five ellipsoids used around the
world), and grid system (for example, the military grid reference system), and must meet the prescribed survey
accuracies or be converted to them. Common grid facilitates all fire support assets being oriented the same with
respect to azimuth, position, and elevation to a prescribed accuracy. Common grid/map datum is essential for
accurate navigation, target acquisition, target engagement, and for the prevention of fratricide.
1-185. Establishment of the map datum to be used and common grid is a critical command responsibility.
Common grid for a field artillery-supported command is provided by the FABs target acquisition battery
and/or the target acquisition platoon found in the BCTs organic cannon field artillery battalion using the
improved position and azimuth determining system or improved position and azimuth determining systemglobal positioning system. Survey planning begins with understanding the field artillery-supported commander's
intent and concept of the operation and the FSCOORD/chief of fires/brigade fire support officer's guidance for
survey. During planning, full consideration must be given to the field artillery-supported commander's concept
of the operation, priorities, tactical situation, survey control available, desired accuracy, and mission variables
of METT-TC. This information can be translated into survey requirements for the target acquisition sensors and
the designated attack systems, which must be on a common grid by the time required. Aggressive survey
planning is essential to ensure mission success.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
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Chapter 1
meteorological data that in turn are used to generate meteorological messages for the field artillery. Profiler
measures and transmits meteorological conditions to indirect fire direction centers, such as wind direction,
temperature, pressure and humidity, rate of precipitation, visibility, cloud height and cloud ceiling. Profiler uses
this information to create a 4-dimensional meteorological model (height, width, depth, and time) that includes
terrain effects. The Air Force Weather Agency transmits large scale global or regional model output to both
versions via the Global Broadcast System, which is used to initialize the on board Meteorological Model Fifth
Generation. Those systems were designed to use the Navy Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction System
for initialization, which was relayed to the field via the Air Force Weather Agency.
FIRE DIRECTION
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1-192. Fire direction is 1. The tactical employment of firepower exercising the tactical command of one or
more units in the selection of targets, the concentration and distribution of fire, and the allocation of
ammunition for each mission. 2. The methods and techniques used to convert target information into the
appropriate fire commands (FM 6-40).
1-193. A fire direction center is that element of a command post, consisting of gunnery and communications
personnel and equipment, by means of which the commander exercises fire direction and/or fire control. The
fire direction center receives target intelligence and requests for fire, and translates them into appropriate fire
direction. The fire direction center provides timely and effective tactical and technical fire control in support of
current operations (JP 3-09.3). Fire control is all operations connected with the planning, preparation, and
actual application of fire on a target (FM 6-40). The fire direction center is the control center for the gunnery
team. The fire direction center personnel receive calls for fire through the AFATDS, or by voice. The fire
direction center will then process that information by using tactical and technical fire direction procedures.
Maintaining the flexibility to engage various target types over wide frontages.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
target. Field artillery firing data are determined by use of various firing tables and equipment. These tables
contain the fire control information under standard conditions and data correcting for nonstandard conditions.
1-196. Firing data provided to both cannon and MLRS units includes the number and type of munitions/shell,
fuze setting and aim point(s), allowing the platform to compute its own firing data (deflection and quadrant
elevation). Deflection is the setting on the weapon sight to place the line of fire in the desired direction. The
azimuth of fire is the direction, expressed in mils, that a fire unit is laid (oriented) on when it occupies a position
(FM 6-50). Cannon units are usually also provided the charge and type of fuze, although this too can be
calculated at the firing platform. For firing units without an on-board technical computation capability, or
operating in a degraded mode, the fire direction center transmits firing data to the firing unit as fire commands.
1-197. Fire commands are commands used by the fire direction center to give firing units all the information
needed to conduct a fire mission. Initial fire commands include all elements needed for orienting, loading, and
firing the weapon. Subsequent fire commands include only those elements that have changed from the previous
commands, except quadrant elevation. Quadrant elevation is announced in every set of fire commands and
allows the firing unit to fire in a weapons release status. FM 6-40 provides details on fire commands.
1-198. The surface-to-surface attack by field artillery depends on a number of factors including
Initiating a call for fire into the fire support system (the fire request).
Coordinating airspace.
Transmitting the call for fire to the selected fire direction center(s) or firing element(s).
Delivering the required ordnance on the target to create the desired effect on target (deliver fires).
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
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Chapter 1
priority targets. Lay is 1. To direct or adjust the aim of a weapon. 2. The setting of a weapon for a given range,
deflection, or both (FM 6-40).
1-202. Field artillery battalions normally do not perform airspace deconfliction; instead, the brigade fires cell
with its air defense airspace management element (ADAM) in coordination with the brigade aviation element
(BAE) executes this process for the maneuver commander. Airspace control is a mission command function.
1-203. The field artillery battalion primarily uses digital means to plan and execute fires. However, the
battalion may receive planned and immediate fire missions from a wide variety of sources, in both voice and
digital formats. These requests may have been generated by lower or higher echelon maneuver fires cells and by
trained field artillery observers and untrained observers. Unmanned aircraft systems may send calls for fire
directly to the brigade fires cell as the aircraft may be considered a brigade asset.
COUNTERFIRE
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1-206. Counterfire is fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons. Includes counterbattery and
countermortar fire (JP 3-09). The counterfire battle is not a separate battle, but one aspect of the overall
combined arms fight. Counterfire contributes by providing fires against the enemy indirect fire system; it
protects friendly forces, combat functions, and facilities from enemy indirect fires by suppressing, neutralizing,
or destroying enemy indirect fire weapons systems. Counterfire gains freedom of maneuver for all friendly
forces. Counterfire is inseparably tied to current and future operations and is part of the overall combined arms
fight to achieve fire superiority. Counterfire is both proactive and reactive.
Proactive Counterfire
1-207. Proactive counterfire is the specific targeting of enemy indirect fire systems including their command
and control, sensors, platforms, and logistics before they engage friendly forces. The proactive measures
consists of zone management, site analysis, and position survivability considerations. Proactive counterfire
process begins with targeting during the military decision making process and continues throughout the
operation. The brigade combat team intelligence officer and the targeting officer develop named areas of
interest and target areas of interest where the enemy indirect fire assets are expected. The objective of proactive
counterfire is to identify, locate, and attack to eliminate the enemys strike capability before it can impact
friendly operations. The FAB normally performs the bulk of proactive counterfire in support of division
operations, using organic target acquisition and fires as well as allocated division, corps, joint or multinational
assets to acquire and disable attack components of the enemys strike capability. Examples of target sets
include: cannon, rocket, and missile delivery units, prepared launch sites, artillery ammunition storage facilities,
fire direction centers, counterfire radars, forward observers, fixed or rotary wing airfields and fire support
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
communication infrastructure. Intelligence assets must be synchronized and integrated to accurately locate
targets; and attack assets (such as artillery, mortars, close air support, attack helicopters, naval surface fire
support, and electronic attack) must be dedicated against the threat total fire support system. Considerations for
conducting proactive counterfire include
Requires augmentation by Army and joint intelligence assets to locate and accurately target the
enemy indirect fire systems.
The G-2/S-2 typically has a leading role in managing this effort; intelligence feeds into common
ground station and cross-cueing radars and unmanned aircraft systems are critical.
Establishing digital interface between the MLRS/HIMARS and cannon field artillery battalion S-2s
and the S-2/liaisons is critical.
Making maximum use of permissive fire support coordination measures to facilitate the clearance of
fires; for example, in defense the coordinated fire line may be positioned close to friendly troops to
facilitate quick engagements.
Managing no-fire areas that protect special operations forces, long-range surveillance detachments,
reconnaissance troops, and scouts is critical.
Reactive Counterfire
1-208. Reactive counterfire provides immediate indirect fires to neutralize, destroy, and suppress enemy
indirect fire weapons once acquired. The fire support systems respond primarily to enemy mortar and artillery
fires during or immediately following enemy engagement of friendly forces. Reactive counterfire usually
requires quick response capabilities for optimum effectiveness and can benefit from the establishment of quick
fire channels. The FAB or the BCT organic field artillery battalion serve as the counterfire headquarters for the
supported maneuver command: planning, coordinating, and delivering fires in reaction to enemy indirect fire
activity. FAB MLRS/HIMARS and cannon field artillery battalions and BCT organic cannon field artillery
battalions employ a variety of counterfire acquisition assets to accurately locate enemy indirect fire assets as
they are engaging friendly forces and establish necessary sensor-to-shooter links to rapidly attack the enemy
systems. Ensure that the mission fired report and artillery target intelligence is sent to the analysis and control
element. Other key considerations for conducting reactive counterfire include airspace clearance, the use of both
permissive fire support coordination measures that facilitate quick engagements and restrictive measures such
as no-fire areas to protect critical assets, establishing quick-fire channels with sensor-to-shooter links, and
designating radar zone managers.
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Chapter 1
Enemy counterfire tacticsto include use of lethal and nonlethal ground and air assets against
friendly field artillery.
1-213. Information feeds from the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, unmanned aircraft
systems, and electronic, communications, and human intelligence sources populate the Distributed Common
Ground System-Army database in the supported maneuver commanders intelligence cell. The Distributed
Common Ground System-Army generates target nominations that are digitally transmitted to the AFATDS in
the fires cell for mission processing. Sensors providing information on targets not meeting the target selection
standards are used to cue other sensors to validate the target.
1-214. The flexibility of unmanned aircraft systems makes them a key resource to be cross-cued to locate
enemy indirect fire targets. Once located, field artillery, close air support, or maneuver assets may engage the
targets. Unmanned aircraft systems may provide near real time battle damage assessment.
1-215. The fire support planners must coordinate the use of the terrain for the radar and recommend radar
zones. Radar positioning is coordinated between the FABs operations and counterfire officers and the
supported units S-3. Likewise, the BCT field artillery battalion S-3 coordinates positioning of the battalion
target acquisition platoons radars with both its higher headquarters or other supported fires cell, S-3, and the
FAB (if one has been designated as force field artillery headquarters). The targeting officer or radar section
leader recommends radar positioning based on the mission variables of METT-TC and the radars accumulated
cueing times. When possible, the FAB target acquisition batterys target acquisition platoon leader and/or radar
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4 April 2014
section leader should reconnoiter the sites. If the radar moves or becomes inoperable, the radar coverage area
should be tasked to another target acquisition asset. The radar section chief selects the final radar site based on
the Radar Position Analysis System and visual sighting. Often, radars require a position that permits 6400mil/360-degree coverage.
1-216. The supported unit commander should indicate the assets that are deemed essential to ensure mission
accomplishment. If the commander does not identify these assets, the targeting officer must query the
commander for the necessary guidance. Once the guidance is obtained, the information is passed to the fires cell
for designation as radar critical friendly zones.
1-217. Radar zones are a means of prioritizing radar sectors of search into areas of greater or lesser
importance. Zones focus radar coverage on the combined arms commanders battlefield priorities. A radar zone
is a geometric figure placed on a tactical graphic around an area that designates the area as more, or less,
important. Four types of zones can be entered into radars: critical friendly, call for fire, artillery target
intelligence and censor zones. A common sensor boundary is useful in reducing duplication of acquired targets
among radars. Activities essential for successful radar zone management planning include
Prioritizing operational sector and scheme of maneuver events for zone planning based on the
commanders intent/guidance.
Developing zones during the course of action development and the wargaming process.
Approving and allocating zones to subordinate fires cells that support the scheme of maneuver and
facilitate the engagement of high-payoff targets.
Incorporating triggers for planned zones and radar movement into the appropriate decision support
template, synchronization/execution matrices, and information collection plan.
Rehearsing planned zones during combined arms, field artillery technical, and fire support rehearsals.
Refining zones during execution as the intelligence preparation of the battlefield develops or the
scheme of maneuver changes.
Developing positioning guidance for the radar that optimizes the probability of acquisition and
supports the coverage of planned zones.
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Chapter 1
1-222. Acquired counterfire targets may be fired by the designated field artillery battalion or forwarded
through field artillery and fire support channels for attack by other assets. When a field artillery battalion is
assigned a reinforcing support relationship, the supported field artillery battalion commander has additional
options for executing counterfire operations
The supported maneuver commanders fires cell passes all counterfire missions to the reinforcing
field artillery battalion; this allows the BCTs field artillery battalion to concentrate on providing
close fires.
The radars send all acquisitions directly to the reinforcing field artillery battalion; this normally
lowers mission-processing time.
Centralized Control
1-224. When directed by the supported maneuver commander, the FAB may assume control of all weapons
locating radars in the supported force. Centralized control optimizes coverage to support the commander's
intent. The FABs S-2, S-3, counterfire, target processing, and fire control elements work with both FABsubordinate and BCT organic field artillery battalion counterfire personnel by
Designating a general position area, sector of search, and zones for each of the radars.
Decentralized Control
1-227. Decentralized control can be accomplished by establishing a command or support relationship for the
radar. Under decentralized control, target acquisition assets are provided to subordinate units for their direct
control and employment. To facilitate autonomous operations, radar sections may be attached to battalions or
even batteries. Units with attached radars plan the employment of attached radars. The battalion S-3 controls the
radar, based on recommendations from the battalion S-2 and targeting officer, to meet the commanders
guidance. Weapons locating radar sections are responsible for covering the supported maneuver battalion or
reconnaissance squadron zone of responsibility or area of operations. The FSCOORD, brigade fire support
officer and fires cell direct requirements and priorities based on the BCT commanders guidance and tactical
situation. The field artillery battalion S-3 directs radar employment to execute those requirements. Weapons
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4 April 2014
locating radars may be placed under the control of a FAB MLRS/HIMARS battalion or other field artillery unit
from the division or corps based on METT-TC.
Commanders guidance for counterfire, to include required search azimuth, zones, and cueing
guidance.
Coordinate terrain, to include position areas for augmenting field artillery and acquisition assets.
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Chapter 1
1-233. The positioning of field artillery in the security area to maximize range is appropriate and must be
carefully considered and planned. Positioning considerations include security risks, communications
requirements and logistical support.
1-234. During an area defense, field artillery units may have to move more often than maneuver forces,
particularly where there is significant enemy counterfire. Field artillery should position well forward in the
supported commands defensive formation; coordination for subsequent positions is essential. Terrain analysis
includes its effects on not only weapons systems but also for ammunition carriers and towed-artillery prime
movers as well. During airborne or air assault tasks, conduct initial reconnaissance by map or air. Plan for air or
ground displacement.
1-235. When in urban areas, identify position areas with dirt surfaces that will support emplacement of spades
and firing platforms. Anticipate the possibility that street rubble may hamper movement. Anticipate increased
movements to overcome obstruction/dead space. Ensure howitzer positions allow for high-angle firing. Position
fire units on the edge of the urban area, if possible. Provide multiple exits from the position. Consider the need
for multiple survey control points. Anticipate survey difficulties due to obstructions, collateral damage, and
electro-magnetic interference, for example, metal, power lines, and transformers.
1-236. FAB/field artillery battalion sustainment organizations should be located so that support can be
maintained, but does not interfere with the tactical movement of FAB/field artillery battalion units, or with units
that must pass through the area. The size of the area dedicated to sustainment activity varies with terrain; that
for a FAB may be up to 4 to 7 kilometers in diameter with that for a field artillery battalion proportionately
smaller. Usually the FAB/field artillery battalion sustainment organizations are on a main supply route located
in the brigade, division, corps, joint task force, or other supported commands sustainment area. Ideally the
areas are out of the range of the enemys medium artillery.
Positioning units to protect them from potential enemy indirect and direct fire:
Positioning on reverse slopes.
Positioning away from high speed avenues of approach.
Establishing a track plan within the position area.
Using terrain-gun positioning.
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1-241. Planning and requesting fire support, situational understanding, appropriate positioning, and movement
all contribute to self-defense. The key to acquiring external protection is to work with the force commander to
reach an agreement that matches the threat level of the operational environment. Procedures for using such a
package should be included in all battalion and battery tactical standard operating procedures. The supported
commander may consider including forces to provide security and protection for field artillery elements as
specified tasks in OPLANs/OPORDs. FAB/field artillery battalion sustainment elements must organize and
prepare to defend themselves against ground or air attacks. Often, they occupy areas that have been secured by
maneuver units. The security of the trains at each echelon is the responsibility of the individual in charge of the
trains.
SUSTAINMENT
THE ROLE OF ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE SUSTAINMENT ORGANIZATIONS
1-242. Sustainment brigades are subordinate commands of the theater sustainment command which
consolidate selected functions. The theater sustainment command uses sustainment brigades to provide support
to the joint task force, corps, divisions BCTs and other support brigades (for example FAB, battlefield
surveillance brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade). The sustainment brigades are assigned multifunctional
and/or single function battalions, and companies tailored and task organized to the specific mission. All
sustainment brigades provide area support, although the specific tasks they are assigned may differ.
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Chapter 1
headquarters battery to provide health service support Role 1 medical care. The area support medical company
from the multifunctional medical battalion provides Role 2 health service support and force health protection
support for the FAB. The BSB provides a material carrying capability that enables the brigades to conduct
sustained operations for a finite period of time. For example the BCT and the FAB are organized with selfsustainment capability for up to 48 hours of combat. Beyond 48 hours, echelons above brigade sustainment
organizations, such as the sustainment brigade, are required to conduct replenishment of BCT and FAB combat
loads.
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1-250. The firing platoon can provide fires without its parent battery or battalion. Logistical support of the
detached platoon can be a significant challenge. Split operations must be carefully planned and specific
resources identified and allocated to support the platoon during mission execution. The extensive requirement
for artillery ammunition resupply may require supplemental transport to be provided by the supported
commander. Support considerations may include
Stockpiling ammunition.
Throughput deliveries.
Aerial resupply.
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Chapter 1
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Chapter 2
Fire Support
Field artillery operations are actually two distinct functions; field artillery, and fire
support (Army doctrine reference publication [ADRP] 3-09). Fire support is fires that
directly support land, maritime, amphibious and special operations forces to engage
enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in support of tactical and operational
objectives (joint publication [JP] 3-09). Section I begins this chapter by describing the
role of fire support in unified land operations Section II describes fire support
coordination organizations and key personnel. Section III describes information
collection and target acquisition for fire support. Section IV concludes the chapter with a
discussion of fire support attack resources.
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2-1
Chapter 2
Training.
Rehearsals.
Massed Fires
2-9.
Massed fire is 1. The fire of the batteries of two or more ships directed against a single target. 2. Fire
from a number of weapons directed at a single point or small area (JP 3-02). Massed fires seek to maximize
effectiveness of the initial volley on the intended target. For example massed fires can be anything from a
battalion 1 high explosive on the target to a platoon firing precision munitions on separate aim points. Massing all
available fires enables the maneuver commander to maximize the effects of fires on a target or targets. Fires can
also be massed in time (striking multiple targets at the same time) to overwhelm the enemys ability to react. The
desired effect is achieved through fires delivered in an instant; since these fires limit the enemys time to react and
seek protection. Massed fires ensure maximum effect in attacking targets that can easily change their posture; for
example, a soft target (personnel in the open) can easily become a hard target (personnel with overhead cover).
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Fire Support
echelon common operational picture. Due to the urbanization of the combat zones our enemies operate in, this
requirement is unlikely to change any time soon.
2-11. Army fires combine with joint and multinational assets via an integrated fire control capability to
recommend the best weapon to counter evolving threats from land, sea, air and space. Advanced target location
tools assist in reducing target location error. A range of capabilities in our munitions and task-organized
composite units assist to achieve the desired effects.
2-12. Electronic attack capabilities provide discrete effects to minimize collateral damage and prevent
disruption of friendly force operations. Electronic attack provides commanders with another option to engage
targets in environments with the high potential for fratricide and/or collateral damage.
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2-3
Chapter 2
Exchanging operational and intelligence data between the joint forces air component commander and
Army forces.
Relaying and clarifying the actions of the land battle for the air component commander.
Submitting the commanders air interdiction targets and advocating for their support.
Coordinating requirements for airspace coordinating measures, fire support coordination measures,
and theater airlift.
2-18.
For additional information on the battlefield coordination detachment see ATTP 3-09.13.
Serving as an information conduit between the Army and supporting Air Force Wing.
Providing Air Force Wing flight crews with scheme of ground component maneuver, ground fires
integration considerations, special munitions instructions and ground component desired effects.
Providing situational understanding and battle damage assessment to the battlefield coordination
detachment ensuring information flow between the battlefield coordination detachment and the Air
Force Wing.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
select targets for attack, and coordinate, integrate and assign allocated joint, interagency and multinational fires to
specific targets/target systems.
2-21. Corps and division fires cells synchronize all fire support for the command to include Army, joint and
unified action partners. Through targeting, cyber electromagnetic activities are integrated and synchronized by the
electronic warfare officer. Corps and division fires cells also participate in assessment (battle damage, munitions
effectiveness, re-attack recommendations); develop planning guidance; provide target intelligence for planning
and execution and coordinate with the battlefield coordination detachment collocated with the respective air
support operations center.
2-22. At the division level, air support operations centers are aligned with the division headquarters. Integrating
air support operations centers and tactical air control parties with division fires cell personnel, Army airspace
personnel give the division a powerful joint collaborative team maximizing the use of fires with airspace. This
team comes together within the division current operations integrating cell referred to as the Joint Air-Ground
Integration Center (JAGIC). Although the JAGIC takes direction from the G-3 or chief of current operations, the
division chief of fires maintains executive oversight of the JAGIC. The assistant FSCOORD serves as the senior
Army representative in the JAGIC and works closely with the senior air director for the air support operations
center.
2-23.
Planning, integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing Army indirect fires, air and missile defense,
and joint fires.
Interfacing with the battlefield coordination detachment, joint air operations centers, and lower and
adjacent fires cells.
Providing input to the air tasking order, airspace control plan, and airspace control order which
includes fire support coordination measures and airspace coordinating measures.
Reviewing target nominations for inclusion into the joint integrated prioritized target list.
Providing input to the joint force air component commanders apportionment recommendation.
Leading the targeting working group and participating in the targeting board.
Providing input to the information collection plan to synchronize surveillance and reconnaissance
assets with named areas of interest and designated targets in coordination with the analysis and
control element.
Coordinating position areas for fires units under corps control with maneuver and airspace control
agencies.
2-24. The fires cell works closely with the force field artillery headquarters if one is established. The fire cells
responsibilities are based on the situation and may include coordination and technical oversight. The force field
artillery headquarters may provide the corps or division fires cell with operational control of all corps or division
fires.
2-25. When the corps serves as the headquarters for a joint task force or joint land component commander, the
fires cell performs additional functions (see JP 3-09 and JP 3-31). To further facilitate fires when the corps is
serving as the senior Army tactical headquarters, the air support operations center collocates with the fires cell.
The fires cell provides representatives to the current operations integration cell.
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Chapter 2
planning, coordinating, deconflicting, and integrating the air support elements with ground elements. Air mobility
liaison officers advise ground commanders and staffs on the capabilities and limitations of air mobility assets.
2-27. The air support operations center is the principal air control agency of the theater air control system
responsible for the direction and control of air operations directly supporting the ground forces. It processes and
coordinates requests for immediate air support and coordinates air, space, and cyberspace missions requiring
integration with other supporting arms and ground forces. The air support operations center normally collocates
with the Army senior tactical headquarters, normally at corps or division level. When employed, the air support
operations center and tactical air control party merge to form one combat organization, under the command of a
single leader, but they remain equipped and manned to perform distinct functions in support of brigade combat
teams (BCTs).
Planning, integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing fire support for brigade operations.
Coordinating the tasking of sensors during development of the information collection plan with the
BCT S-2, the military intelligence company commander, and the reconnaissance squadron to acquire
targets.
Disseminating the approved fire support plan to subordinate and supporting fire support
organizations.
Preparing the fires portion to include annex D of the brigade operation plan (OPLAN)/operation
order (OPORD).
Working with the S-7, S-9, public affairs officer, electronic warfare officer, ADAM officer, air
liaison officer, and brigade judge advocate to integrate fires and appropriate aspects of inform and
influence activities into the brigade targeting process.
Coordinating position areas for fires units with maneuver and airspace control agencies.
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4 April 2014
Fire Support
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
2-7
Chapter 2
Navy/U.S. Marine Corps air support. In the absence of an observer from the firepower control team, U.S. Navy
and/or U.S. Marine Corps aircraft may be controlled in the same manner as U.S. Air Force aircraft (typically by a
joint terminal attack controller or the company fire support teams joint fires observer).
Army Space Support Team
2-38. Army space operations personnel provide space-related tactical planning and support, expertise, advice,
and liaison regarding available space capabilities. Space operations personnel are available to
Determine space support requirements and request, plan, and integrate space capabilities into
operations (See JP 3-14).
Coordinate space support with national, service, joint, and theater resources.
Provide estimates on the status, capabilities, and limitations of space-based intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance, weather, navigation and timing, and communication satellites for friendly,
threat, and commercial systems
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
based on the commanders mission priorities and risk guidance. Pilots, unmanned aircraft system operators, and
weapon system controllers (fires cell, fire direction center) still maintain the responsibility to make the directed
changes to their flight path or trajectory. See FM 3-52.
2-44. The fires cell coordinates and deconflicts fire support coordination measures with airspace coordinating
measures through close interface with airspace elements and the tactical air control party. The airspace element
works with the fires cell to integrate fire support coordination measures with the airspace plan. The airspace
element reviews and integrates the fire support overlay with other airspace requirements for inclusion into the
airspace control plan. Fire support coordination measures are normally sent to higher, lower, and adjacent
headquarters through fire support channels. In some cases, both the fires cell and the airspace element send related
control or coordination measures through their respective channels. The airspace element and the fires cell ensure
the standard operating procedures and the airspace control annexes address the procedures for forwarding fire
support coordination measures and associated airspace coordinating measures through appropriate coordination
channels. The airspace element and the fires cell review the airspace control orders to ensure that airspace
coordinating measures avoid unnecessarily interfering with fires. If a conflict exists between the fire support plan
and the airspace control order, the airspace element coordinates with the higher airspace elements to correct or
modify the appropriate airspace coordinating measure.
Conducting risk management to minimize the potential for fratricide (air/ground positive/procedural
identification).
Developing, displaying, and disseminating the common operational picture/single integrated air
picture to provide and facilitate situational understanding.
Advising and updating the commander on defended assets, adjacent air and missile defense unit
locations, plans and intent.
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2-9
Chapter 2
Facilitate establishing standard operating procedures across the brigade (to save time and ensure a
single standard).
Ensure efficiently resourced training packages (limit requirements for unit tasking(s) and reduce
coordination requirements between units).
Oversee the professional development of the 13-series career management field Soldiers.
2-50. The fire support coordinator is assisted in these duties by the brigade fire support officer and the other fire
support personnel organic to the BCT. The fire support coordinator is responsible for the training and certification
of all fire support personnel in the BCT.
CHIEF OF FIRES
2-51. The chief of fires is the senior fires officer at division and higher headquarters level who is responsible for
advising the commander on the best use of available fire support resources, providing input to necessary orders,
developing and implementing the fire support plan (ADRP 3-09). The duties and responsibilities of the chief of
fires should be fully delineated by the commander. The chief of fires may be given authority by the commander
to
Provide for consolidated and focused fire support-specific training, readiness, and oversight
(personnel management, equipment issue, and training).
Facilitate establishing standard operating procedures across the force (to save time and ensure a
single standard).
Ensure efficiently resourced training packages (limit requirements for force taskings and reduce
coordination requirements between units).
Developing a scheme of fires to support the operation with the commander and G-3.
Developing a proposed high-payoff target list, target selection standards, and an attack guidance matrix.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing all aspects of fire support and addressing them in
rehearsals.
Developing a scheme of fires to support the operation with the commander and S-3.
Planning and coordinating fire support tasks in close coordination with the brigade/battalion S-3 to
support timely development of the field artillery operation order or field artillery support plan.
Developing a proposed high-payoff target list, target selection standards, and an attack guidance matrix.
Providing information on the status of fire support attack assets, target acquisition assets, and field
artillery ammunition.
Recommending fire support coordination measures to support current and future operations and
addressing them in rehearsals.
Recommending and implementing the commanders counterfire (including radar zones) and other target
engagement priorities.
Recommending to the commander the establishment, responsibilities, authorities, and duties of a force
field artillery headquarters as necessary.
Integrating and synchronizing Army indirect fires, joint fires, and multinational fires with the other
warfighting functions.
Directing and supervising the fires cell in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing all fire support
for operations and the development of respective products to support the OPLAN/OPORD development.
Advising the commander and staff of available fire support capabilities and limitations.
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2-11
Chapter 2
Working with the chief of staff/executive officer, and S-3 to integrate all types of fire support into the
commanders concept of operations.
TARGETING OFFICER
2-55. Fires cells from corps to battalion may have one or more targeting officers who collect analyze and
process information for required target attack guidance and instructions. The targeting officer assists in providing
targeting and counterfire guidance, including radar deployment instructions. They use the information provided by
information collection systems and target acquisition radars, as well as those assets available to locate high-payoff
targets for attack. The targeting officer provides recommendations and advice to the G-3/S-3, plans battle captain
and the targeting working group/board (see FM 3-60) during the MDMP. They contribute to the development of
targeting and assessment guidance to be entered into the AFATDS as well as to be distributed within mission
orders. The targeting officer with the G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3 develops the high-payoff target list, attack guidance
matrix, target selection standards and the targeting synchronization matrix. Target selection standards are criteria
applied to enemy activity (acquisitions and battlefield information) used in deciding whether the activity is a
target (FM 3-60).
2-56. During operations, the targeting officers provide recommendations to the targeting working group on
updating targeting priorities. The targeting officers prepare products for the targeting working group. They direct
updating and purging of targeting files. The targeting officers ensure that interoperability is maintained with
information collection assets. Targeting officers provide information to the G-2/S-2 and develop the guidance to
be entered into the AFATDS so that the fires cell receives targeting information from intelligence automations
systems. Targeting officer duties and responsibilities include
Assisting the information collection planner to ensure that the information collection plan is
synchronized with the fires warfighting function.
Developing and managing the high-payoff target list, target selection standards, attack guidance
matrix, and targeting synchronization matrix.
Coordinating radar cueing schedules to ensure they are deconflicted with the pattern analysis of
enemy indirect fires.
Advising and assisting the fires cell and electronic warfare officer in coordinating and integrating
indirect and joint fires including electronic attacks and facilitating electronic warfare support
operations.
Recommending and implementing with the counterfire officer the commanders counterfire guidance
(including radar zones) and other target engagement priorities.
Integrating the fire support plan with the company operation order/operation plan and addressing fire
support tasks during rehearsals.
Planning, directing, and managing the employment of observer platforms and laser equipment where
they will best support the commanders concept of operations.
Integrating fire support assets into the company commanders scheme of maneuver.
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FM 3-09
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Fire Support
Acting as the senior enlisted supervisor for the fires cell/fire support team.
Supervising the establishment and operation of team equipment in the fires cell/fire support team
headquarters.
Supervising the establishment of fires cell/fire support team digital and voice communications.
Assisting in the setup, operation, and maintenance of all equipment assigned to the fire support team
headquarters.
2-60.
For a complete list of fire support team personnel duties, see ATP 3-09.30.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
2-13
Chapter 2
air, space, and cyberspace. This is in addition to the space integration support provided by Army space forces
assigned and attached to the corps.
2-65. The air support operations center is the principal air control agency of the theater air control system
responsible for the direction and control of air operations directly supporting the ground forces. It processes and
coordinates requests for immediate air support and coordinates air, space, and cyberspace missions requiring
integration with other supporting arms and ground forces. The air support operations center normally collocates
with the Army senior tactical headquarters, normally at corps or division level. When employed, the air support
operations center and tactical air control party merge to form one combat organization, under the command of a
single leader, but they remain equipped and manned to perform distinct functions in support of ground operations.
Supporting arms coordination center (SACC). The SACC functions as a fires cell for the naval forces,
and is supervised by the supporting arms coordinator. The designated (supported) commander may
choose either the amphibious task forces supporting arms coordinator or the landing forces force fires
coordinator to supervise the SACC. The force fires coordinator is responsible to the Marine air-ground
task force (MAGTF) commander for planning, coordination, and conduct of fire support operations in the
MAGTF and for coordinating major subordinate command fire support operations. During amphibious
operations, the SACC works from the ship and is the primary agency which coordinates and controls all
supporting fires for the commander, amphibious task force in order to establish the landing force ashore.
If designated as the force fires coordinator, the Army landing force chief of fires/fire support coordinator
advises the supporting arms coordinator to ensure effective integration of the fire support plan that
supports naval operations and the landing force scheme of maneuver. Fire support personnel from the
landing force may augment the SACC while embarked on amphibious shipping.
Navy tactical air control center (TACC). The Navy TACC controls all air operations within the
amphibious operating area or the amphibious objective area until control of these operations is phased to
the landing force's Marine Corps TACC. The TACC, although usually in close physical proximity to the
SACC, is a distinct entity. Once a land-based air control agency can control landing force air operations,
the Navy TACC becomes a supporting tactical air direction center. The TACC and SACC personnel work
closely together in planning, controlling, and coordinating offensive air support and assault support.
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Fire Support
Tactical air command center. The Marine tactical air command center is the senior Marine air
command and control system agency. The tactical air command centers primary external interfaces
are with the U.S. Armys main command post, the U.S. Navys TACC, and the U.S. Air Forces air
operations center. The tactical air command center integrates aviation operations with the MAGTF
command element through linkage with the MAGTF FFCC and combat operations center. Note: both
the Navy TACC and the Marine tactical air command center use the same acronym to identify
themselves.
Direct air support center (DASC). The DASC is the principal MACCS air control agency responsible
for the direction of air operations directly supporting ground forces. It processes and coordinates
requests for immediate air support and coordinates air missions requiring integration with ground
forces and other supporting arms. The DASC is the first principal MACCS agency ashore. It
functions in a decentralized mode, but is subordinate to and directly supervised by the tactical air
command center. The DASC will normally be collocated or electronically linked with the senior
FSCC within the ground combat element.
Marine Corps tactical air control party (TACP). The Marine Corps TACP establishes and maintains
facilities for liaison and communications between supported units and appropriate control agencies.
The tactical air control party is also a terminal control agency. The air officer, who informs and
advises the supported ground unit commander on the employment of supporting aircraft and requests
and coordinates air support missions, leads the tactical air control party. TACPs are organic to
Marine divisions, infantry regiments, and infantry battalions. The TACP is one of the many air
control organizations through which the DASC operates.
2-72. For more information on Marine Corps force fires coordination within the MAGTF command element
see Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-43.3. For more information on fire support coordination at
the ground combat element, see MCWP 3-16. For more information on Marine Corps aviation see MCWP 3-2.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
2-15
Chapter 2
INFORMATION COLLECTION
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-73. The G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3 and chief of fires/brigade fire support officer (and other staff as needed) integrate
and synchronize information collection and target acquisition to capitalize on their different capabilities to support
the commanders intent.
2-74. An information collection capability is any human or automated sensor, asset, or processing, exploitation,
and dissemination system that can be directed to collect information that enables better decision making, expands
understanding of the operational environment, and supports warfighting functions in decisive action. Factors such
as a units primary mission, typical size area of operations, number of personnel, and communications and
network limitations significantly impact what sensors, platforms, and systems are fielded. Information collection
assets provide data and information.
TARGET ACQUISITION
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-75. Target Acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the
effective employment of weapons (JP 3-60). Target acquisition sources provide the means to successfully detect,
locate, identify, track, and classify targets.
2-76. The intelligence officer provides the fires cell and members of the targeting working group and targeting
board with information and intelligence for targeting the threats forces and systems with direct and indirect fires
(see FM 3-60). The intelligence officer ensures the information collection plan supports targeting (see FM 3-55).
Sensors and assets useful for target acquisition include
Fire support teams that provide maneuver companies and reconnaissance troops with fire support
coordination, targeting, and assessment capabilities (see ATP 3-09.30).
Forward observers, who provide target refinement, execute planned fires, and request fires for their
supported units.
Tactical human intelligence from a military intelligence company and maneuver units down through
the squad level operating in the supported commanders area of operations.
Signal intercept support from electronic intelligence sources such as the Prophet radio frequency
intercept system.
Weapons locating radar and a target processing section found in the FABs target acquisition battery;
and weapons locating radar found in the brigade combat teams field artillery battalion (see FMs 309.12, FMs 6-20-40 and -50, and ATP 3-09.24).
Manned and unmanned aircraft found in aviation brigades and attack reconnaissance squadrons (see
FM 3-04.111 and FM 3-04.126).
2-16
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
Forward Observer
2-79. Effective field artillery fires require qualified observers to locate targets call for, and adjust fires. Forward
observers are assigned to the fire support team supporting each infantry company or reconnaissance/cavalry troop
in the brigade combat team, and battlefield surveillance brigade. A forward observer is an observer operating with
front line troops and trained to adjust ground or naval gunfire and pass battlefield information. In the absence of a
forward air controller, the observer may control close air support strikes (JP 3-09).
Know the enemy situation, selected targets, and location of friendly units.
Untrained Observers
2-83.
Occasionally the field artillery battalion may need to process fire missions from untrained observers. An
untrained observer is anyone not military occupational specialty qualified in requesting and adjusting indirect fire.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
2-17
Chapter 2
Often these are critical requests where the requestor is under fire. Field artillery battalion and field artillery battery
fire direction centers should be identified as the primary handlers of untrained observer missions. For more
information on untrained observer procedures, see FM 6-40.
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
2-84. Commanders should consider augmenting the target acquisition assets of the supporting field artillery
organizations with unmanned aircraft systems when possible to provide the sensor-to-shooter linkage to facilitate
engagement of high-payoff targets at maximum range.
2-85. For detail on unmanned aircraft system organization, capabilities, and employment see ATTP 3-04.15
and FM 3-04.155.
The radar platoon is organized and equipped to detect, locate, classify, report, and communicate the
point of origin, predicted point of impact, radar cross-section, and velocity of indirect fire systems; it
can also confirm the actual burst/impact location of friendly fires.
The target processing section recommends and coordinates radar sectors of search, monitors
operations, develops targets, requests battle damage assessment and acts as net control station for the
target acquisition command and intelligence net.
The combined meteorology and survey teams provide the meteorological support and common
survey needed to ensure the accuracy of indirect fires; survey data can be provided to other systems
(such as signal) when assets are available.
2-87. Each BCT cannon field artillery battalion has an organic target acquisition platoon that includes a radar
section and a survey section. These radar and survey sections are organized and equipped to perform the same
functions for the cannon field artillery battalion as their counterpart organizations in the target acquisition battery
of the FAB.
2-88. Table 2-1 on page 2-19 provides a summary description of the capabilities of field artillery weapons
locating radars.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
Unplanned
Search Sector
Range
Optimized to
Detect
Organic to
2-89. Both the target acquisition battery organic to the FAB and the target acquisition platoon organic to each
brigade combat teams field artillery battalion are organized and equipped to detect, locate, classify, report, and
communicate the point of origin, predicted point of impact, radar cross section, and velocity of indirect fire from
enemy mortars, artillery, and rockets quickly and accurately enough to permit their immediate engagement with
counterfire. To increase counterfire responsiveness, radars can establish a digital and/or voice quick-fire channel
to a dedicated firing unit.
2-90. Additionally, radars in friendly fire mode can assist in registering friendly indirect fires by providing
accurate actual burst, datum-plane, or predicted-impact location data; enabling friendly firing elements to
determine registration corrections for nonstandard conditions. This secondary mission is performed only when the
commander deems it absolutely necessary since it takes the radar away from its primary mission and exposes its
locationany time the radar is radiating it is vulnerable to hostile acquisition. This determination is made based
on mission variables of METT-TC, availability of observers, and the ability of the supported unit to meet the
requirements for accurate fire.
2-91. For detail on field artillery weapons locating radar organization, capabilities and employment see FM 309.12.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
2-19
Chapter 2
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-93. The commander determines the desired effects for each target. Lethal and nonlethal effects can be
achieved by selection of the appropriate weapon system, number and type of munitions fired and the method used
to engage a target. Finding ways to accomplish the mission with an appropriate mix of lethal and nonlethal effects
is a paramount consideration for every commander. Commanders analyze mission variables to achieve a balance
of lethal and nonlethal effects via a range of capabilities. Offensive and defensive tasks place a premium on fires
to destroy, disrupt, neutralize, interdict, and suppress enemy forces.
2-94. Lethal effects from fires are at the heart of offensive and defensive tasks and their application is critical to
success in these operations. There are times when a lethal weapon may be employed in a nonlethal manner, for
example, in a demonstration of force. A precision munition might be fired at a well-located target in an urban area
rather than firing numerous rounds of area munitions against the same target, possibly causing collateral damage.
Even lethal area munitions such as high explosive rounds may be used to achieve a nonlethal effect. For example,
a field artillery battalion or battery might mass its fires on a location in view of an opponent and then follow those
rounds with a near surface burst illuminating round on the opponents position. This demonstration may cause a
less determined opponent to surrender or cease hostile actions.
2-95. Nonlethal effects typically neutralize or incapacitate a target or modify adversarial behavior without
causing permanent injury, death, or gross physical destruction. At times a target may return to pre-engagement
functionality as part of the desired effect. Assessment of this effect is usually measured by time and level of effort
required for recovery of the target.
ILLUMINATION FIRES
2-97. Illumination fires (visible or infrared) are useful in exposing an opponent at night. Illumination fires may
give friendly forces an advantage by reducing the enemy forces ability to operate at night without being targeted
and attacked with minimal collateral damage. Infrared illumination enhances the Soldiers use of some night
vision devices to more easily locate targets and enable surprise fires on enemy forces not equipped with night
vision devices. Illumination fires may also be used for its deterrent effect through its use as a show of force or for
area denial.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
FIELD ARTILLERY
ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY
2-99. Field artillery cannon, rocket, and missile systems organic, assigned, attached, or OPCON to FABs and
BCT field artillery battalions provide continuously available fires under all weather conditions and in all types of
terrain.
2-100. Field artillery can shift and mass fires rapidly without having to displace. Field artillery units are
positioned to provide continuous fires. Field artillerymen at every maneuver echelon man the fires cells, act as
forward observers, and are employed as fire support teams and observer parties to integrate all means of fire
support for the commander and synchronize fire support with the concept of operations.
Cannon Munitions
2-103. Cannon munitions include area fire high explosive, antipersonnel conventional munitions, dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions, scatterable mines, white phosphorus used for incendiary effects and marking,
and precision munitions. Other cannon munitions include white phosphorous smoke wedges or hexachloroethane
smoke and illumination rounds. Cannon fires are effective against targets from within direct fire range out to more
than 30 kilometers. Table 2-2 on page 2-22 provides a summary description of cannon field artillery weapons and
munitions capabilities.
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FM 3-09
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Chapter 2
Ammunition
Projectile
105-mm
M119series
Fuze
Maximum
11,500 with
charge 7
14,000 with
charge 8
18,000 or 22,000
with M795 HE;
M825 Smoke
155-mm
1
M109A5
155-mm
M109
A5/A6
Range (meters)
PD, VT,
MT, ET,
MTSQ,
Delay
155-mm
M777series
18,000 or 21,700
with M795 HE;
M825 Smoke;
*M982 Excalibur:
Block Ia-1 24
km
Block Ia-2 37+
km
Block Ib 40+
km
DPICM
Sustained
Maximum
12,100
19,500
3 for 30
minutes
8 every 3
minutes
18,000 or
28,200 with
M864 base
bleed
30.100
17,900 or
28,100 with
M864 base
bleed
Zones 3-7: 1
round per
minute; zone
8: 1 round
per minute
until limited
by tube
temperature
sensor
30,000
22,200
w/M201A1
Modular Charge
2 in
8S or 22,500
accordance
with M232,
N/A
with thermal
Modular Charge
warning
Zone 5; 24,500
device
with M982
Excalibur Block
1-1a
See Appendix I, ATP 3-09.32 for detailed discussion of danger close.
4 every 3
minutes
4 every 2
minutes
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
command posts, and artillery. The M31 guided-MLRS unitary warhead munitions offer a significant destructive
capability while reducing the possibility of collateral damage. However, the MLRS/HIMARS M26/M26A2 rocket
has a large footprint caused by the dispersion of submunitions in the target area and requires detailed coordination
when delivered close to friendly troops. Planners should also be aware of the likelihood of dud submunitions. The
same planning factors used for cannon field artillery battalion 155-mm artillery or Air Force-delivered dualpurpose improved conventional munitions should be used for MLRS/HIMARS. Planners must consider the risk
when firing dual-purpose improved conventional munitions MLRS/HIMARS rockets into areas that friendly units
could occupy or pass through during future operations.
MISSILE FIRES
2-106. The MLRS/HIMARS can support the commander's operations with rockets and Army Tactical Missile
System (ATACMS) fires. ATACMS munitions include the M39 Block I and M39A1 Block IA with M74
antipersonnel, anti-materiel munitions, and the M48 and M57 Unitary high explosive warheads. These missiles
are effective against targets such as enemy command posts and control nodes, sustainment areas, and artillery,
missile and air defense systems at ranges from 25-300 kilometers. The MLRS/HIMARS can support the
commander's operations with rockets and ATACMS missile fires and is well suited for attack of long-range highpayoff targets, including those with extremely short dwell times where minimizing the time from acquisition to
firing is critical. The range capability also allows engagement across the supported headquarters area of operations
laterally. Long-range fires are normally planned and scheduled as opposed to immediate, unscheduled fires on
targets of opportunity. In the planning process, the following must be considered
Clearance of airspace.
Management and delivery of munitions depend heavily on fire planning decisions made early in the
planning process (warhead description and capabilities of the ATACMS missile are addressed in FM
3-09.60).
Target acquisition and sensor system availability and cueing to detect and/or track targets.
Communications between the MLRS/HIMARS firing unit, and target acquisition and sensor systems.
2-107. Use of MLRS fires in support of units may be limited if M31 guided-MLRS/HIMARS rounds are not
available. The unguided MLRS munitions are best suited for area rather than point targets. Unguided
MLRS/HIMARS rockets, because of the nature of these munitions (for example dual-purpose improved
conventional munitions) and because of the high dud rate can be dangerous to friendly follow-on forces, may not
be the fire support munitions of choice. However, special circumstances may dictate that MLRS/HIMARS be
used. For example, the risk of friendly troops in the vicinity of MLRS/HIMARS targets may be acceptable in light
of the overall situation. Additionally, targets may be out of range for mortars and cannon artillery. Other means of
fire support, such as Army aviation and close air support may be unavailable due to other mission commitments.
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FM 3-09
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Chapter 2
Guided
Rockets
Variant
M26
M26A2
ERMLRS
M30
M31
Block 1
M39
ATACMS
Payload
Accuracy
Block 1A
M39A1
Quick
Reaction
Unitary
M48/M57
ATACMS
Unitary
Unguided
10+ mils
Classified
Range
10-32
km
13-45
km
15-84+*
km
25165*+
km
70300+*
km
70270+*
km
Target Type
Personnel, light armor, soft vehicles, area
targets
2-109. For more on MLRS and ATACMS capabilities and munitions, see ATP 3-09.60.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
2-112. Dispensed submunitions from even precision-guided munitions may be subject to ballistic conditions for
which a correction may not have been applied. Accurate target location is one of the five requirements of accurate
fire. Because precision munitions are more accurate, their effective employment requires target location error to
be minimized: strive for target location error to be well within the effects radius of the munitions being employed
to attack the target. The Precision Guidance Kit corrects the ballistic path of a projectile based on pre-determined
way-points through algorithmic comparison of the computed ballistic path versus the physical ballistic path. The
Precision Guidance Kit is capable of guiding a projectile to a circular error probability of 30-50 meters of a
specified target coordinate. Even at the munitions largest anticipated delivery error, the aimpoint is within the
munitions anticipated radius of direct effects.
2-113. Precision fire is not to be confused with the employment of precision munitions. In precision fire (for
example, a registration or destruction mission using area munitions), the target must also be accurately located. At
a minimum, the observer should send at least an 8-digit grid for precision fire missions using area munitions. If
the observer is equipped with a device capable of an accurate 10-digit grid or better, then he should send that grid.
The observer should always send the most accurate target location possible, subject to the tactical situation,
regardless of the ammunition fired. This is especially true when employing coordinate-seeking precision
munitions. For additional information on desired target location accuracies see ATP 3-09.30.
Note: The artillery computer system determines a predicted ballistic impact point for every Excalibur
mission fired. The ballistic impact point is the projected impact location of a round following an
unguided ballistic path (ATP 3-09.30). The predicted ballistic impact point is a calculated impact
point that may drift away from the gun-target line due to the meteorological conditions. It is also
important to understand that ballistic dispersion error can cause the round to impact as much as 500
meters from the predicted ballistic impact point. If this location does not lie beyond the coordinated
fire line/fire support coordination line then this location must be cleared with the maneuver
commander as if it were a target location. The supported maneuver commander, however, may be
willing to accept risk in clearing these ballistic impact point locations given the fact that if an
Excalibur round does fly a ballistic flight path to one of these locations it should impact as a dud,
thus causing minimal collateral damage and posing little risk to friendly troops. The munition flight
path trajectories are displayed on the same artillery computer system that computed the ballistics.
This information may be passed up the organizational chain, particularly for airspace coordination.
ELECTRONIC ATTACK
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-114. Electronic attack includes both offensive and defensive tasks. These activities differ in their purpose.
Defensive electronic attack protects friendly personnel and equipment or platforms. Offensive electronic attack
denies, disrupts, or destroys enemy capabilities. In either case, certain considerations are involved in planning for
employing electronic attack, such as friendly communications, information collection, electromagnetic spectrum
use by local neutral parties, hostile intelligence collection and persistency of effects.
2-115. Electronic attack is especially well suited for targets that cannot be located with the accuracy needed for
destructive fires or that require only temporary disruption. Electronic attack can be used against computers, but it
is not a computer network attack since a computer network attack relies on the data stream to execute the attack.
Electronic attack can play a role in suppressing enemy air defenses and in countering some guided weapons. The
electronic warfare officer, the G-2/S-2, the G-3/S-3, the G-6/S-6, the spectrum manager, and the G-7/S-7
coordinate closely to avoid friendly communications interference that can occur when using electronic warfare
systems on the battlefield. Coordination ensures that electronic attack system frequencies are properly
deconflicted with friendly communications and intelligence systems.
2-116. If not properly coordinated with the G-2/S-2 staff, electronic attack operations could inadvertently
interrupt information collection by jamming or interfering with a frequency used to collect data on the threat or by
jamming an enemy frequency or system that friendly forces are using as a means of collecting data. These
conflicts must be avoided, as either type of interruption could significantly deter information collection efforts and
their ability to answer critical information requirements. Coordination between the electronic warfare officer, the
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
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Chapter 2
chief of fires/fire support officer and fires cell, and the G-2/S-2 prevents this interference. The electronic working
group brings known conflicts between information collection and electronic attack efforts to the G-3/S-3 for
resolution.
2-117. The effects of jamming only persist as long as the jammer itself is emitting and is in range to affect the
target. Normally these effects last a matter of seconds or minutes, which makes the timing of such missions
critical. This is particularly true when units use jamming in support of aviation platforms. For example, in a
mission that supports suppression of enemy air defenses, the time on target and duration of the jamming must
account for the speed of attack of the aviation platform. They must also account for the potential reaction time of
enemy air defense countermeasures. Aside from anti-radiation missiles, the effects of jamming are less persistent
than effects achieved by other means. The development of directed-energy weapons may change this dynamic in
the future. Electronic attack is especially well suited for targets that cannot be located with the accuracy needed
for destructive fires or that require only temporary disruption. For more on the duties of the electronic warfare
officer see ATTP 5-0.1.
MORTARS
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-118. Organic mortars are organized as platoons in maneuver and Ranger battalions and as sections in Stryker
BCT and infantry BCT rifle companies.
2-119. Mortars are high-angle, relatively short-range, high rate-of-fire, area fire weapons. Their mobility makes
them well suited for close support of maneuver. They are ideal weapons for attacking targets on reverse slopes, in
narrow gullies, in ditches, and in other areas that are difficult to reach with low-angle fire. The proliferation of
handheld global positioning system devices and the fielding of the new mortar fire control system partially
compensate for the fact that mortar positions are seldom surveyed. The observer must still adjust the impact of
mortar rounds. Maneuver unit mortars provide close, immediately responsive fire support for committed
battalions and companies. These fires neutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy attack formations and defenses, help
(in combination with engineer obstacles and terrain) to block, canalize, fix, or turn enemy forces; obscure the
enemys vision, or otherwise inhibit his ability to acquire friendly targets.
2-120. Mortars can also be used for final protective fire, obscuration, and illumination. The U.S. mortar
munitions include a 120-mm precision munition; some multinational mortar units also have precision-guided
munitions of different calibers. The maneuver commander decides how and when mortars, as a key fire support
asset, will be integrated into his concept of operations. However, since mortars are fire support assets, the
battalion or company fire support officer should give advice and make recommendations to the commander on the
employment of his mortars. The commander may specify mortar support for subordinate units by changing the
command or support relationship, by assigning priority of fires or by assigning priority targets such as final
protective fires.
Is the principal advisor to the battalion/company commander and battalion/company fire support
officer on the tactical employment of mortars.
Works closely with the battalion/company fire support officer to ensure mortar fires are planned on
appropriate targets and delivered at the correct times.
Informs the battalion/company fire support officer of anything that affects the mortar
platoon/sections ability to execute the commanders fire support plan.
2-122. The high rate of fire achievable by mortars creates effective barriers of fire. The normal allocation of final
protective fires is identical to the allocation of priority targets. While firing final protective fires, mortar sections
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
are not normally allowed to cease-fire and displace due to countermortar fire. They must take precautions to avoid
or withstand countermortar fire.
2-123. Mortar units normally have a single final protective fire. A battalion heavy mortar platoon normally has a
single 4-mortar final protective fire, but a battalion commander may direct the heavy mortar platoon to prepare 2,
2-mortar final protective fires. This should be done only if terrain dictates the need for more final protective fires
than he has been allocated and only after seeking additional artillery allocations.
2-124. A company commander assigned final protective fires is responsible for the precise location of the mortar
final protective fire and final protective fire integration into the direct fire final protective lines. A fire direction
center plots, computes, and saves all firing data for the final protective fires as early as possible.
2-125. For more on mortar capabilities and employment, to include an expanded discussion of mortar tactical
missions and inherent responsibilities, see ATTP 3-21.90.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
2-27
Chapter 2
AIR SUPPORT
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-129. Fixed-wing air missions may be provided by the Air Force, Navy, Marine, or multinational aircraft. The
joint force commanders apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected air effort by
percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic operations for a
given period of time. Apportionment is in the general sense, distribution of forces and capabilities as the starting
point for planning (JP 5-0).
2-130. The joint force commander normally apportions by priority or percentage into geographic area, against
mission-type orders, and/or by categories significant for the campaign. These categories can include strategic
attack, interdiction, counterair, maritime support, and close air support. Following the joint force commanders
apportionment decision, the joint forces air component commander allocates the apportioned air sorties to the
functions, areas, and/or missions they support, translating them into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type for
each operational task. Allocation is distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing
requirements (JP 5-0). The joint force air component commander ensures that the best-suited aircraft are used to
support each task.
2-131. Fixed-wing aircraft perform numerous roles ranging from bringing air power to bear against surface
targets through strategic attack, counterair, interdiction, and close air support; to providing enhanced capabilities
for ground forces through surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and airlift. These roles define the broad
purposes or functions of fixed-wing forces and are determined by objectives, not by the platform or weapons
system used.
2-132. A tactical air coordinator (airborne) is an officer who coordinates, from an aircraft, the actions of other
aircraft engaged in air support of ground or sea forces (JP 3-09.3). The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System performs tactical air coordination (airborne). In the absence of a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System, a forward air controller (airborne) provides communications relay between the Air Force tactical air
control party and attack aircraft as well as other agencies of the tactical air control system. Tactical air
coordination (airborne) also expedites close air support aircraft-to-forward air controller hand-off during heavy
traffic close air support operations. Air Force two-ship forward air controller (airborne) flights, especially in
higher threat environments, may divide responsibilities so one aircraft fills the normal forward air controller
(airborne) role while the second becomes a tactical air coordinator (airborne).
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Fire Support
Air Interdiction
2-135. Air interdiction is air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemys military
surface capabilities before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve
objectives that are conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission
with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required (JP 3-03).
Counterair
2-136. Counterair is a mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired
degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both
before and after launch (JP 3-01). Field artillery may conduct counterair missions by striking enemy aircraft bases,
helicopter forward arming and refuel points and missile storage and launch sites.
COMMANDERS OVERVIEW
2-138. The joint air attack team provides the commander with a flexible force that can engage the enemy in his
area of operations. Each Service component involved retains OPCON of its respective units during a joint air
attack team operation. A joint air attack team can engage enemy penetrations in the friendly sustainment area or
strike targets in enemy territory in conjunction with the shaping operations of the maneuver force. The supported
commander is responsible for the synchronization of maneuver and fires. The role of commanders involved with a
joint air attack team include
The supported commander determines when to employ a joint air attack team, requests the assets and
integrates the joint air attack team, other combat units, and supporting fires into his plan.
Upon receipt of a joint air attack team request, the aviation commander assumes responsibility for the
coordination and execution of the joint air attack team mission. He should be keenly aware of the
ground and air tactical plan.
The air mission commander controls the joint air attack team engagement (the aviation commander
and the air mission commander may be the same person).
2-139. Indirect fire assets augment the fires of joint air attack team operations. Fires cells develop supporting
joint suppression of enemy air defenses plans that support aircraft ingress and egress and necessary fire support
coordination measures to allow the simultaneous attack by aircraft and indirect fires.
2-140. For more on joint air attack team operations see ATP 3-09.32.
ARMY AVIATION
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-141. Army aviation assets are in combat aviation brigades found throughout the Army and at every echelon
from division to corps command. The combat aviation brigade is the supported commanders primary integrator
of aviation assets. Each combat aviation brigade is tailored for specific missions.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
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Chapter 2
order to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. Army attack/reconnaissance helicopters conduct both interdiction
attack and close combat attack.
2-143. FM 3-04.126 discusses close combat attack as a hasty or deliberate attack by Army aircraft providing airto-ground fires for friendly units engaged in close combat. Due to the close proximity of friendly forces, detailed
integration is required. During close combat attack, Army helicopters engage enemy units in close contact with
friendly forces with direct fire. Close combat attack is coordinated and directed by a team, platoon or company
level ground unit using standardized close combat attack procedures in unit standard operating procedures.
2-144. FM 3-04.126 discusses interdiction attack as a hasty or deliberate attack by Army aircraft to divert,
disrupt, delay, degrade, or destroy the enemy before they can be used effectively against friendly forces.
Interdiction attack is conducted at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration with ground forces
is not required.
2-145. Attack helicopters are capable of pinpoint destruction using antitank missiles or providing suppressive
area fires with rockets and cannons. Reconnaissance operations are conducted to obtain information about the
enemy and/or terrain to assist in building and sharing the common operational picture and to focus combat power
at the decisive point and time. Reconnaissance helicopters provide near-real-time intelligence and terminal
guidance for a variety of weapon systemsincluding Hellfire and air delivered precision-guided munitions.
Security operations provide reaction time, maneuver space and protection to air-ground maneuver.
2-146.
2-30
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Chapter 3
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
3-1
Chapter 3
should include his priority of fires. Priority of fires is the commanders guidance to his staff, subordinate
commanders, fire support planners, and supporting agencies to organize and employ fire support in accordance
with the relative importance of the units mission (ADRP 3-09). Mission orders for supporting field artillery
brigades and field artillery battalions should include the supported commanders intent, concept of operations,
priority of fires, fire support tasks, and coordinating instructions.
3-2
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Clear and concise articulation of fire support tasks by identifying the task, purpose, and effect of each
task.
Allocation of all fire support assets.
Projected changes to the allocation of fire support assets based on tactical contingencies in the
concept of operations.
Coordination and synchronization instructions for the timely detection and attack of high-payoff
targets.
Requirements for positioning of assets, the makeup of basic loads, and the controlled supply rate.
Restrictions on ammunition expenditures, types of fires, areas of employment, and creation of
obstacles.
Establishment and changes in fire support coordination measures.
3-9. In developing situations where time is critical, having a quick-fire plan can enable a unit to quickly
execute fire support for an impending operation. Brigade, battalion or company fire support officers develop
quick-fire plans to support their respective organizations. Like all fire support plans, the maneuver commander
approves the quick-fire plan. In quick-fire planning the fire support officer assigns targets (and possibly a
schedule of fires) to the most appropriate fire support means available to support the operation. In this type of
fire support planning the available time usually does not permit evaluation of targets on the target list and
consolidation with targets from related fire support agencies.
Plan Early and Continuously. To effectively integrate fire support with the commanders concept of
the operation, planning must begin when the commander states his mission and provides his
commanders guidance. Whenever commander's guidance is needed during the planning of an
operation, fire support planners should solicit that guidance from the commander. Planning is
continuous and keeps pace with the dynamics of the operation.
Ensure the Continuous Flow of Targeting Information. The fire support planners should ensure that
target acquisition requirements for fire support are identified and focused on detecting high-payoff
targets. Fire support planners also ensure that target information from all sources are evaluated and
routed to the appropriate attack means. This includes information from all echelons and from
adjacent and supporting elements.
Consider the Use of All Capabilities. The fire support planners consider the full range of fires and
other capabilities available at all levels. This includes fires and other assets from available joint and
multinational forces.
Use the Lowest Echelon Capable of Furnishing Effective Support. The lowest echelon that has the
necessary means to accomplish the mission should furnish the fire support. The fire support planners
decide what is needed and, if their assets are inadequate, request additional support.
Furnish the Type of Support Requested. The fire support requester is usually in the best position to
determine his fire support requirements. However, the fire support planners are in a position to weigh
the request against the commander's guidance and the current and future needs for fire support. If a
request for fire support is disapproved, the fire support planner stops the request and notifies all
concerned. When possible and necessary, he substitutes a new fire support means and alerts the
agencies that are to provide and receive the support.
Use the Most Effective Fire Support Means. Requests for fire support are transmitted to the force
capable of delivering the most effective fires within the required time. In making his decision, the
FSCOORD, and chief of fires/fire support officer consider the nature and importance of the target,
the engagement time window, the availability of attack assets, and the effects desired. In some
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circumstances, it may be necessary to sequence the attack by fixing the enemy with immediately
available fire support assets while coordinating a subsequent, more detailed attack by more effective
assets.
Avoid Unnecessary Duplication. A key task for the chief of fires/fire support officer is to ensure that
duplications of fire support requests are resolved.
Coordinate Airspace. All commanders must have the freedom to use airspace to achieve the
commanders objectives and must have maximum flexibility to use assets (organic, supporting and
joint) within that airspace. Effective airspace management requires a responsive airspace control
system, standardization, minimal restrictions, and continuous coordination among all airspace users.
The chief of fires/fire support officer provides input concerning fire support use of airspace to those
agencies (battlefield coordination detachment, air support operations center tactical air control party,
ADAM/BAE) and personnel engaged in airspace management to ensure that conflicts between
surface-based indirect fire and air operations are minimized. Using fire support coordination and
airspace coordinating measures correctly can prevent fratricide and duplication of effort while
increasing the effectiveness of air-to-ground and ground-to-ground ordnance. Planning and
coordination are necessary to minimize conflicts between surface-based indirect fire and air
operations.
Provide Adequate Support. The mission and the commander's guidance determine the amount and
type of fire support needed for success. The FSCOORD or chief of fires/fire support officer must
inform the supported commander when fire support requirements exceed capabilities.
Provide for Rapid Coordination. Commanders must establish procedures and responsibilities for the
rapid coordination of fire support. In some circumstances, coordination of fire support will be
detailed and done in advance. In other instances, due to operational circumstances, coordination will
be rapid and less detailed. Rigid coordination procedures may delay the delivery of fires and
jeopardize the force. The FSCOORD, and chief of fires/fire support officer must know the
availability of assets, the concept of operations, the commander's intent, fire support coordination
measures in effect, rules of engagement, and any other restrictions.
Protect the Force. The FSCOORD and chief of fires/fire support officer must be aware of those
situations that increase the risk of fratricide. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are
command emphasis, restrictive fire support coordination measures, disciplined operations, close
coordination among commands at all levels, and detailed situational understanding.
Provide for Flexibility. The FSCOORD and chief of fires/fire support officer must anticipate and
provide for future contingencies. On-order missions and careful positioning of assets give the
commander the flexibility to respond to changing battlefield conditions.
Use of Fire Support Coordination Measures. While planning is done regardless of boundaries and
friendly locations, the execution and coordination of fire support must always account for these
realities. To ensure responsive and safe fire support, the FSCOORD, and chief of fires/fire support
officer must continuously use and update all types of fire support coordination measures.
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resources together in a common effort so that the employment of each fire support asset is synchronized with
the commander's intent and concept of operations. Effective coordination during both planning and execution is
required to ensure that a suitable weapon system(s) adequately attacks the desired targets at the correct time and
place. Effective coordination among the various organizations is necessary for the effective delivery of fire
support. Fundamental requirements of fire support coordination are that fire support must: operate as a cohesive
entity, be responsive to the needs of the supported commander, and be fully integrated into the supported
commanders concept of operations. The supported commander should direct his FSCOORD and chief of
fires/brigade fire support officer to ensure that all available means of fire support are fully synchronized with
his concept of the operation. The supported commander retains the authority to direct target priorities, levels of
effort, and the sequence of those efforts to his subordinates.
If acting as force field artillery headquarters, provide common grid and meteorological data for units
attached to or under its operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON).
Coordinating with the brigade combat teams (BCTs) fires cell and field artillery battalion command
post to develop the attack guidance matrix using the munitions effects database in the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).
Computing ammunition requirements needed for generating desired effects via the attack of expected
enemy target categories with field artillery. Providing this assessment to the commander so that he
can formulate his attack guidance.
Identifying issues that require the field artillery commanders attention or additional guidance.
Stating the FAB and supported higher headquarters commanders attack guidance by defining
how, and when, and with what restrictions the commander wants to attack different targets and
identify the targeting priorities.
Recommending the risk the FAB and the supported higher headquarters commander should be
willing to accept concerning delivery of indirect fires for maneuver units in close combat.
Using the fire support execution matrix to brief the fire support portion of the OPORD during
rehearsal. Rehearse the fire support portion of the OPORD directly from the fire support execution
matrix.
Conducting rehearsals with the actual units and Soldiers who will execute field artillery tasks.
Verifying the area of coverage of radars of the units who have a command or support relationship
with the FAB.
Prioritizing requirements for radars and allocate radar zones to reflect the developed situation
template, protection priorities, and the scheme of maneuver.
Explaining fire support-related combat power in terms of the required effects to be generated for the
operation.
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sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. Finally, this
coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant attacks.
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Detect
Based on
Determine
Based on
Receipt of Mission
Commanders intent.
Concept of operations.
Initial planning guidance.
Guidance for fires.
Who/Where: Focused on
detection. Assets are
deployed to detect highpayoff targets.
Mission analysis:
Specified & implied tasks
IPB
Target Value Analysis.
High-value targets.
COA Development.
Scheme of Fires.
High-payoff targets.
Target selection standards.
Attack Guidance Matrix.
Fire support tasks.
Electronic attack tasks.
inform and influence tasks.
Measures of performance.
Measures of effectiveness.
COA Analysis
Refine above products.
High-payoff Target List.
Target Synch Matrix.
Airspace control request.
Information requirements.
Orders Production
Finalize above products.
Fire Support Plan.
Information Collection Plan.
Airspace Control Plan.
OPLAN/OPORD.
Fires Paragraph 2e.
Annex D Fires, with tabs.
Determine
Deliver
Based on
Who/When: Focused on
deliver. Addresses the who
and when portion of the
task (such as the attack of a
specified target, duration of
attack and effects desired.
COA development
Scheme of Fires
Wargaming.
COA decision
OPLAN/OPORD
High-payoff Target List
Attack Guidance Matrix.
Target Synch Matrix.
Information Collection Plan
Airspace Control Plan
Determine
Assess
Based on
OPLAN/OPORD
Task execution.
Effects of fire support.
Effects of electronic attack.
Effects of IIA.
Combat assessment
Measures of performance.
Measures of effectiveness.
DECIDE
3-16. Decide is the first step in the targeting process. It begins with the military decision-making process
(MDMP). It does not end when the plan is completed; the decide function continues throughout the operation.
The staff develops decide information to address
What targets should be acquired and attacked? Target selection standards are criteria applied to
enemy activity (acquisitions and battlefield information) used in deciding whether the activity
is a target.
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What are the priorities for surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition objectives and asset
allocation?
What intelligence requirements are essential to the targeting effort and how and by when must the
information be collected, processed, and disseminated?
When, where, how, and in what priority should the targets be attacked?
What are the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness that determine whether the
target has been successfully attacked and whether the commanders desired effects have been
generated by doing so?
Who or what can attack the targets, and how should the attack be conducted (for example,
number/type of attack assets, ammunition to be used) to generate desired effects and what are the
required assets/resources based on commanders guidance?
What or who will obtain assessment or other information required for determining the success or
failure of each attack? Who must receive and process that information, how rapidly, and in what
format?
Who has the decision making authority to determine success or failure, and how rapidly must the
decision be made and disseminated?
What actions will be required if an attack is unsuccessful and who has the authority to direct those
actions?
3-17. The joint force commander may prohibit or restrict attacks on specific targets or objects without specific
approval based on military risk, the law of war, rules of engagement, or other considerations. Targeting
restrictions are typically identified on two lists; the no-strike list and the restricted target list.
3-18. A no-strike list is a list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military
operations under international law and/or the rules of engagement (JP 3-60). Attacking these may violate the
law of armed conflict or interfere with friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments. The nostrike list is compiled independently of and in parallel to the candidate target list. It is important to note,
however, that entities from the candidate target list may be moved to the no-strike list if, as a result of additional
target development, it is determined that attacking them may violate the Law of War. Conversely, targets placed
on a no-strike list may be removed from that list and become subject to military action if their status as a
protected object or entity has changed.
3-19. A restricted target list is a list of restricted targets nominated by elements of the joint force and approved
by the joint force commander. This list also includes restricted targets directed by higher authorities (JP 3-60).
Actions against targets on the restricted target list that exceed specified restrictions are prohibited until
coordinated and approved by the establishing headquarters. A restricted target is a valid target that has specific
restrictions placed on the actions authorized against it due to operational considerations (JP 3-60).
3-20. Attacking restricted targets may interfere with projected friendly operations. Targets may have certain
specific restrictions associated with them that should be clearly documented in the restricted target list (for
example, do not strike during daytime, strike only with a certain weapon). Some targets may require special
precautions (for example, chemical, biological, or nuclear facilities, or proximity to no-strike facilities) due to
possible collateral effects of using artillery on the target. When targets are restricted from lethal attacks,
commanders should consider nonlethal capabilities as a means to achieve or support the commanders desired
objectives. For more on the no-strike list, restricted targets, and legal considerations for targeting see JP 3-60.
DETECT
3-21. The second step of the targeting process, detect, directs how and which target acquisition assets find the
specified targets to the requisite level of accuracy. It focuses specific platforms or assets to search for a specific
target in time and space. Typically, the staff closely coordinates with the G-2/S-2 in developing the information
collection plan. Identified targets are tracked and engaged by appropriate means. For example target acquisition
radars may focus on threat mortars firing at friendly forces, unmanned aircraft may track enemy forces
preparing to attack a friendly fire base. The guidance, direction and synchronization provided for information
collection and target acquisition enables assets to find specific targets or develop information required to meet
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the commanders requirements. Named areas of interest and target areas of interest are used to focus the
surveillance effort and are integrated into the information collection plan.
A named area of interest is the geospatial area or systems node or link against which information
that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. Named areas of interest are
usually selected to capture indications of adversary courses of action, but may be related to
conditions of the operational environment (JP 2-01.3).
A target area of interest is the geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and
engaged by friendly forces. Not all target areas of interest will form part of the friendly course of
action; only target areas of interest associated with high priority targets are of interest to the staff.
These are identified during staff planning and wargaming. Target areas of interest differ from
engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons; target areas
of interest might be engaged by a single weapon (JP 2-01.3).
DELIVER
3-22. Attacks must meet the success criteria developed during the decide step. Close coordination is required
between those engaged in detecting targets and those conducting the attack. Close coordination is required
between the entities engaged in detecting targets and those conducting the attack. Normally the G-3/S-3 and
chief of fires/fire support officer provides guidance for this coordination and synchronization in the attack
guidance matrix, information collection plan and fires, electronic warfare and inform and influences activities
input to the OPLAN/OPORD.
ASSESS
3-23. Assess occurs throughout the operations process. Targeting is continuously refined and adjusted between
the commander and staff as the operation unfolds. Combat assessment measures how effectively attack systems
and munitions functioned, effects on the target, and a recommendation as to whether the target should be reattacked. A reattack recommendation is an assessment, derived from the results of battle damage assessment and
munitions effectiveness assessment, providing the commander systematic advice on reattack of targets and further
target selection to achieve objectives (JP 3-60). The reattack recommendation considers objective achievement,
target, and aimpoint selection, attack timing, tactics, and weapon system and munitions selection. The reattack
recommendation is a combined operations and intelligence function.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-24. Fire support preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces chances for success. It facilitates
and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels. Preparation requires action by fire support
personnel at every echelon. Mission success depends as much on fire support preparation as on fire support
planning. Fire support rehearsals help staffs, units, and individual fire support personnel to better understand
their specific role in upcoming operations, synchronize execution of the fire support plan, practice complicated
tasks before execution, and ensure equipment and weapons are properly functioning.
3-25. Fire support preparation activities begin before deployment and continue during planning, and throughout
an operation. Uncommitted forces prepare for identified contingencies and look to the operations next phase or
branch. Committed units revert to preparation when they reach their objectives, occupy defensive positions, or
pass into reserve.
REHEARSALS
3-26. The supported unit headquarters normally conducts the combined arms rehearsal after subordinate units
have issued their OPORD. This rehearsal ensures that the subordinate units plans are synchronized with those
of other units in the organization and that those plans will achieve the intent of the higher commander. A fire
support rehearsal in coordination with the field artillery technical rehearsal should be conducted prior to the
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combined arms rehearsal and if possible include members of the operations and intelligence staff and other
members of the targeting working group.
Validation of the supporting communications architecture. Mobile digital platforms that are spread
over a geographic area present unique challenges difficult to replicate with static platforms in an
assembly area.
Verification of the maneuver terrain management plan and time-space relationships between field
artillery targets and field artillery movement plans. The intent is to ensure units are in place to
provide fires during critical periods.
Rehearsal of triggers (on the ground if possible), both for movement and for the initiation of fires by
primary and backup sensors/observers.
Enemy situation (unit or force field artillery G-2/S-2). For Level I and Level III rehearsals, the G2/S-2 directs the movement of enemy icons on the AFATDS current situation screen and sends the
status either to selected units or to a distribution list to update all AFATDS operational facilities.
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Primary and alternate triggers to include periods of limited visibility and description of how
triggers are related in time and space to the scheme of maneuver.
Delivery unit(s).
Time-space relationship between the unit response time, duration of fires, and scheme of
maneuver.
After review of each fire support task, missions should be processed from the sensor/observer to the
delivery system level. In particular, validate the following
Mission value.
Movements required during the phase, their triggers, and relationship in time and space with fire
support tasks. For Level I and Level III rehearsals, displacing firing units change their grid location
and send status to selected units or a distribution list to update AFATDS operational facilities.
Logistic requirements in the phase to include ammunition resupply triggers and special munition
distribution.
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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-35. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 5-0).
Execution involves the performance of task necessary to effectively deliver fires. Success requires detailed
situational understanding necessary to assess progress and adapt the plan as necessary.
3-36. Strikes by fire support assets support maneuver forces in contact with the enemy and ensure the freedom
of other forces to maneuver throughout the supported commanders area of operations. Fire support planners
must also retain sufficient assets to mass the effects of fires at critical times and places.
3-37. Fires typically produce destructive effects but nonlethal capabilities such as electronic attack can be
employed with little or no associated physical destruction. Electronic attack performs several functions to
support the commanders operation. For example, during offensive tasks electronic attack resources may
concentrate on neutralizing enemy fire control, target acquisition, and intelligence-gathering systems.
CLEARANCE OF FIRES
3-38. The supported ground commander is responsible for the clearance of fires in his area of operations,
including the integration of fires with other airspace users. The commander establishes, or requests higher
headquarters establishment of control measures (such as graphic control measures, direct fire control measures,
airspace coordinating measures, and fire support coordination measures) that serve as a means of separating
units, synchronizing fires and maneuver, facilitating clearance of fires, and preventing fratricide. A graphic
control measure is a symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions (ADRP 60). The commander may not employ indirect fires across boundaries without receiving clearance from the unit
into whose area of operations the fires will impact. He may employ direct fires across boundaries without
clearance at specific point targets that are clearly and positively identified as enemy. Commanders may consider
early coordination to also grant clearance for indirect fires against targets that are clearly and positively
identified as enemy. Airspace clearance remains necessary in any situation.
SURPRISE
3-40. Commanders can use fire support to achieve surprise by
Rapidly and discreetly shifting fire support assets and/or shifting and massing the effects of fire
support. Shifting fire is fire delivered at constant range at varying deflections; used to cover the width
of a target that is too great to be covered by an open sheaf (JP 1-02).
Using fires to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main effort.
Using short duration, intense fires against key enemy functions at critical times.
Using military deception techniques to deceive the enemy as to the types, numbers, locations, and
capabilities of friendly fire support and target acquisition assets.
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CONCENTRATION
3-41. Commanders can use fire support to support achieve concentration by
Allocating fire support assets to support the decisive operation. This includes weapon systems, target
acquisition assets, observers, liaison teams, priority targets, and munitions.
Concentrating fire support assets in support of one aspect of supported unit decisive or shaping
operations for brief periods.
Massing fires on choke points and key terrain to canalize, slow, and block the enemys movements.
TEMPO
3-42. Commanders can use fire support to support enhance/maintain the tempo of the offense
Using a decentralized organization for combat and decentralized fire support planning and fire
control methods to facilitate rapid, flexible execution of fires and immediately available dedicated
fires to a designated ground force.
Using on-order missions to facilitate transition to subsequent phases and branches or a new
operation.
Providing fires in support of shaping operations that complement the decisive operation, set the stage
for rapid transition to the next phase or new operation, and create new opportunities for maneuver.
Developing a thorough sustainment plan that properly anticipates potential culminating points for the
fire support structure.
Ensuring fire support coordination measures are planned to enhance the speed of the operation.
Providing fires to stop reinforcements; use smoke to delay and disrupt the enemy retreat.
AUDACITY
3-43. Commanders can use fire support to support the concept of audacity by
Making well thought-out, risk-taking decisions in the use of fire support assets.
Planning fires on the flanks of the supported units advance to prevent counterattack; consider use of
scatterable mines to seal flank avenues of approach.
Limiting the firepower allocated to shaping operations to weight the decisive operation.
Placing fire support assets well forward and moving them closely behind lead maneuver units.
PREPARATION
3-45. The defender often has the opportunity to select the defensive terrain, and has time to prepare his
defenses. Fire support planners must make maximum use of any preparation time available to plan and
coordinate supporting fires by
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Planning targets, observer positioning, triggers, and fires in support of all engagement areas for
all phases of the defensive operation, to include each counterattack option of the striking force.
Recommending fire support coordination measures to support each phase of the defensive
operation, to include all planned counterattack options.
Planning targets on avenues of approach to disrupt enemy attacks by striking the enemy on his
approach and during his assault.
Coordinating with the supported commands fires cell for close air support and Army aviation
close combat attacks.
Preparing observation posts, marking triggers, and studying the terrain on which the battle will be
fought by forward observers and fire support teams.
Ensuring that forward positioned observers are resourced with adequate security, mobility, and
situational understanding.
Integrating information sources to identify potential targets.
Preparing engagement areas to facilitate fires.
Preparing and hardening artillery and target acquisition positions.
Conducting rehearsals on the actual terrain.
SECURITY
3-46. Fire support must complement and support all security forces and unit protection plans by
Fires to:
DISRUPTION
3-47. Fire support plays a key role in disrupting an attackers tempo and synchronization by
Planning, identifying, defining, and engaging high-payoff targets as they are located.
Employing fires to neutralize and destroy enemy artillery and mortar, target acquisition, command
and control nodes, and logistics systems.
Assisting in defeating enemy reconnaissance forces, separating enemy forces, isolating enemy units,
and attacking or disrupting enemy systems.
Employing indirect fires and obscurants in support of counterattacks designed to defeat the enemy
before he can consolidate any gains.
Conducting integrated fire support (including electronic attack) in synchronization with maneuver.
Employing indirect fires and coordinating for electronic attack to disrupt enemys ability to control
his forces such as to reorganize for another attack or prepare a coordinated defense.
MASSING EFFECTS
3-48. Fire support plays an essential role in a units ability to mass overwhelming combat power at critical
places and times. Massed fires
Gain maximum efficiency and effectiveness including fires to suppress enemy direct and indirect fire
systems.
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FLEXIBILITY
3-49. Fire support planning and execution must address the need for flexibility in defensive operations by
Allocating initial priority of cannon field artillery fires to forward security forces.
Shifting fires from support of the defense to support the counterattack and offense.
Coordinating and synchronizing air support on known, suspected, and likely enemy locations.
MANEUVER
3-50. Fire support planning and execution supports maneuver in defensive operations by
Coordinating all means of available fire support to delay, destroy, or limit the enemys advance, and
to weight the attack(s) of the striking force in a mobile defense.
Supporting the obstacle plan by placing fires in front of, on top of, to the side of, and behind
obstacles to maximize their effect as combat multipliers.
Providing fires to support disengagement of maneuver elements and their repositioning to subsequent
battle positions.
OPERATIONS IN DEPTH
3-51. Fires attack the enemy before he enters close combat. These fires are planned to
Impair the enemy vision by causing him to button up in his armored vehicles.
Support scouts by screening their movement with smoke and suppressing enemy units engaging the
scouts.
Coordinate for electronic attack to degrade the enemys ability to control forces.
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3-53. Though highly effective for their intended purpose, lethal capabilities may not always be suitable. For
example, during stability tasks, the application of lethal fires is normally greatly restricted, making the use of
nonlethal capabilities the dominant feasible option. The considerations for use of nonlethal capabilities in
targeting should not pertain to only specific phases or missions, but should be integrated throughout the
operation. Escalation of force measures can be established in order to identify hostile intent and deter potential
threats at checkpoints, entry control points and in convoys. Such measures remain distinct from other use of
force guidance such as fire support coordination measures and are intended to protect the force, minimize the
use of force against civilians while not interfering with self-defense if attacked by adversaries.
3-54. For more on stability tasks see FM 3-07 and ADP/ADRP 3-07/3-09.
SYNCHRONIZATION
3-58. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum
relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). It is the ability to execute multiple related and
mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing each
in isolation. For example, synchronization of information collection, obstacles, direct fires, and indirect fires
results in the destruction of an enemy formation. When conducting offensive tasks, synchronizing forces along
multiple lines of operations temporarily disrupts the enemy organization and allows for exploitation.
3-59. Mission command networks greatly enhance the potential for synchronization. They do this by allowing
commanders to quickly understand an operational environment and communicate their commanders intent.
Subordinate and adjacent units use that common understanding to synchronize their actions with those of other
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units without direct control from the higher headquarters. Mission command networks do not guarantee
synchronization; however, they provide a powerful tool for leaders to use in synchronizing their efforts.
3-60. Commanders determine the degree of control necessary to synchronize their operations. They balance
synchronization with agility and initiative, never surrendering the initiative for the sake of synchronization.
Rather, they synchronize activities to best facilitate mission accomplishment. Too much control can limit the
initiative of subordinates and undermine mission command.
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supported forces engaged in close combat receive an appropriate share of available fire support. Plans must also
include provision of fire support for security forces and reserves upon commitment.
Army aviation or close air support may be the most responsive fire support asset for use in
sustainment areas when units are widely separated and range to target is a factor.
When a BCT is committed against Level III threats, fire support will usually consist of that brigades
field artillery battalion.
Target acquisition and sensor management assets should be an integral part of the fire support plan
for sustainment area defense.
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3-71. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or
operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or
creation of an effect (JP 3-0). Measures of effectiveness focus on the results or consequences of friendly fire
support action taken. For the commander, FSCOORD, and chief of fires, they answer the question: Is the fire
support structure doing the right things? Or are additional or alternative actions required? The primary purpose
of a measure of effectiveness is to assess progress. For instance a measure of effectiveness might ask, Did the
expected physical or functional damage to the target occur or did the enemy change his behavior?
The status of field artillery resources, including cannons and MLRS launchers, ammunition, and
target acquisition assets.
The availability of other fire support resources, including mortars, naval gunfire, and tactical air
support.
In the attack, the enemy dispositions, the degree of protection afforded the enemy, and the number of
phases. These will affect the allocation of fire support resources to subordinate units.
In the defense, the mission of the covering force, the location of the main battle area, the plans for a
counterattack.
Courses open to the enemy artillery commander, especially his most probable course of action. These
are derived from the intelligence estimate and knowledge of enemy artillery doctrine. Consideration
of this factor results in
Any information requirements on enemy artillery that may have significant influence on the
tasking of weapons locating sensors.
The availability and condition of roads, trails, and likely position areas. This leads to the
coordination of movement and position areas with the operations staff.
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coordination measure locations and associated positive control measures are being followed, thus reducing the
risk of fratricide.
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not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for close
air support. The fire support coordination line applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems
using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond a fire support coordination line must inform all
affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements
attacking targets beyond the fire support coordination line must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse
effects on, or to the rear of, the line. The appropriate land or amphibious force commander controls all air-toground and surface-to-surface attack operations short of a fire support coordination line. This control is
exercised through the operations staff or with pre-designated procedures. The fire support coordination line
should follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the fire support coordination line is
especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the
inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the fire support coordination
line. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources (JP 3-09).
4-7. By establishing a fire support coordination line close-in, yet at sufficient depth so as to not limit hightempo maneuver, commanders ease the coordination requirements for engagement of targets within their areas
of operations by forces that may not be under their direct control such as during the conduct of Army aviation
interdiction attack by rotary-wing aircraft, or air interdiction by fixed wing aircraft. The commander adjusts the
location of the fire support coordination line as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver
operations, the fire support coordination line may change frequently. Current technology and collaboration tools
between the elements of the joint force determine the times required for changing the fire support coordination
line. The joint force commander should establish a time standard in his guidance for shifting fire support
coordination lines.
4-8. The fire support coordination line is a term oriented to air-land operations and is normally located only on
land, however in certain situations, such as littoral areas, the fire support coordination line may affect both land
and sea areas. If possible, the fire support coordination line should follow well-defined terrain features to assist
identification from the air. The commander, landing force after coordination with the commander, amphibious
task force normally establishes the fire support coordination line for amphibious operations. Changes to the fire
support coordination line require notification of all affected forces within the area of operations and must allow
sufficient time for these forces and/or components to incorporate the fire support coordination line change.
Current technology and collaboration tools between the elements of the joint force determine the times required
for changing the fire support coordination line. The joint force commander should establish a time standard in
his guidance for shifting fire support coordination lines. Whenever possible; restrictive measures are employed
by commanders to enhance the protection of friendly forces operating beyond the fire support coordination
linemeasures such as restrictive fire areas and no-fire areas.
4-9. A solid black line extending across the assigned areas of the establishing headquarters provides the
graphic portrayal of the fire support coordination line (see figure 4-2 on page 4-4). The letters FSCL followed
by the establishing headquarters are annotated above the line, and the effective date-time-group below the line.
Fire support coordination lines do not have to follow traditional straight-line paths. Positioning the fire support
coordination line on terrain identifiable from the air is a technique that may further assist in fratricide
prevention. Curved and/or enclosed fire support coordination lines have applications in joint operations
conducted in non-contiguous areas of operation.
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4 April 2014
FREE-FIRE AREA
4-14. A free-fire area is a specific area into which any weapon system may fire without additional
coordination with the establishing headquarters (JP 3-09). Where both surface-to-surface fires and aircraft
emergency munitions jettison share a free-fire area, consider establishing an airspace coordination area to assist
in deconfliction. Only the military commander with jurisdiction over the area (usually, a division or higher
commander) may establish a free-fire area. Preferably, the free-fire area should be located on identifiable
terrain; however, grid coordinates or the Global Area Reference System may be used to designate the free-fire
area.
4-15. The free-fire area is graphically portrayed (figure 4-3) by a solid black line defining the area and the
letters FFA within, followed by the establishing headquarters and the effective date-time-group (ADRP 1-02).
KILL BOX
4-16. A kill box is a three-dimensional area used to facilitate the integration of joint fires. (JP 3-09).
4-17. When established, the primary purpose of a kill box is to allow lethal attack against surface targets
without further coordination with the establishing commander and without terminal attack control. When used
to integrate air-to-surface and surface-to-surface indirect fires, the kill box will have appropriate restrictions.
The goal is to reduce the coordination required to fulfill support requirements with maximum flexibility, while
preventing fratricide. A kill box will not be established for close air support missions. If a close air support
mission is required within an established kill box, the portion of the kill box requiring detailed integration
should be closed.
4-18. A kill box facilitates the expeditious air-to-surface lethal attack of targets (such attacks can be augmented
with surface-to-surface indirect fires). A blue kill box permits air-to-surface fires within its boundaries and
typically extends from the ground to a maximum altitude; a purple kill box within its boundaries typically
specifies a minimum and maximum altitude. The purple kill box allows indirect fire trajectories to pass above
the maximum altitude or below the minimum altitude. Altitude is the vertical distance of a level, a point or an
object considered as a point, measured from mean sea level (ATP 3-09.30).
4-19. Kill boxes can augment traditional fire support coordination measures such as fire support coordination
lines and coordinated fire lines. They help the commander focus the effort of air interdiction and indirect fire
assets. Fire support coordination measures are not mutually exclusive, so a kill box could contain other
measures within its boundaries to include no-fire areas, restriction operations areas, or airspace coordination
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Chapter 4
areas. Restrictive fire support coordination measures and airspace coordinating measures will always have
priority when established in a kill box.
4-20. Optimally, there should be no friendly ground forces within or maneuvering into an established kill box.
If circumstances require otherwise, then no-fire areas must be established to cover those forces or the kill box
must be cancelled. The establishing commander must maintain awareness on locations of friendly ground forces
and the status of kill boxes within the area of operations and maintain timely kill box management to prevent
fratricide. All aircraft not assigned to an active kill box are restricted from flying through or delivering air-tosurface munitions into the kill box unless coordinated with the kill box coordinator. Effects and trajectories of
surface-to-surface indirect fires also are not allowed, without coordination, to pass through the airspace of an
active kill box.
4-21. Commanders facilitate coordination through their appropriate fire support personnel and airspace
organization to deliver surface-to-surface indirect fires into or through an established kill box. Authority to
engage is not automatically granted by the establishment of a kill box; the kill box reduces coordination with the
establishing headquarters for mission accomplishment because all requirements for targeting guidance,
clearance of fires, and deconfliction with other ground assets are accomplished in the process of establishing the
kill box.
4-22. Engagement authority is granted through standard mission orders but does not relieve aircrew of the
responsibility for complying with mission requirements such as designated target priority, effects, and timing of
fires; positive identification, collateral damage estimation and rules of engagement. Integration of air-to-surface
fires and surface-to-surface fires requires application of appropriate restrictions: altitude, time, or lateral
separation. The establishing commander will determine which restrictions are appropriate for the mission and
ensure dissemination through appropriate control nodes. Although the establishment of a kill box does not
restrict surface-to-surface direct fires, it is important to recognize that in certain terrain, Army direct fire guns,
missiles, and rockets may be employed from high terrain and the gun-target line of these weapons should be
considered by aircraft operating in the kill box.
4-23. A kill box is established and adjusted by supported component commanders in consultation with superior,
subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders, and is an extension of an existing support relationship
established by the joint force commander. Requirements for kill boxes and other control measures are
determined using normal component targeting and planning processes and are established and approved by
commanders or their designated staff. The location and size of the kill box are determined by the expected or
known location of targets in a specified area. Both blue and purple kill boxes permit air interdiction in the kill
box without further coordination with the establishing headquarters; however the purple kill box also allows
land and maritime component commanders to employ surface-to-surface indirect firesenabling maximum use
of joint fires within the kill box to achieve synergistic effects with maximum potential for engaging targets.
4-24. The dimensions of a kill box are normally defined using an area reference system such as the Global Area
Reference System but could follow well defined terrain features or be located by grid coordinates or by a radius
from a center point. The airspace block located above the kill box target area is protected and extends from the
surface (or coordinating altitude if established) up to a ceiling established by the airspace control authority. The
airspace for a purple kill box includes a floor and a ceiling to enable separation between aircraft delivering airto-surface fires, trajectories of surface-to-surface fires, and other aircraft. The height of the ceiling should be
established in the airspace control plan, airspace control order and special instructions for air interdiction. These
parameters are developed by coordination between fire support and airspace organizations.
4-25. Graphically portray a kill box (figure 4-4) by the use of a solid black line defining the area borders. The
kill box will be listed as either a BKB (blue kill box) or a PKB (purple kill box) and the commander will
assign a measure number (001-999), establishing headquarters, and affected altitudes. In addition to the kill box
name, a date-time group depicting the established and cancelled times for the kill box must be included.
The established and cancelled times by be written as on-order. The unit identifier for the establishing
headquarters will be consistent with designations in operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders
(OPORDs). Units and/or automation systems may add color to the boxes for visual recognition; however, the
basic graphic follows the standards of a fire support coordination measure. Kill box names will not be used
more than once (FM 3-09.34).
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4 April 2014
4-26. Depiction of a kill box may vary among automation systems. Until the system displays are synchronized,
fire support personnel must be aware of the meanings of the systems visual display. Figure 4-4 depicts an
example kill box depiction on a paper map. For more information on establishment and employment of the kill
box, see JP 3-09 and FM 3-09.34. For a more detailed description of the Global Area Reference System, see JP
2-03.
NO-FIRE AREA
4-28. A no-fire area is an area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their effects are
prohibited (JP 3-09.3). There are two exceptions
When the establishing headquarters approves joint fires within the no-fire area on a mission-bymission basis.
When an enemy force within the no-fire area engages a friendly force and the engaged commander
determines there is a requirement for immediate protection and responds with the minimal force
needed to defend the force.
4-29. Any size unit may establish no-fire areas. If possible, the no-fire area is established on identifiable
terrain. It may also be located by a series of grids or by a radius from a center point.
4-30. The no-fire area is graphically portrayed (see figure 4-5 on page 4-8) as an area outlined with a solid
black line with black diagonal lines inside. The letters NFA are within, followed by the establishing
headquarters and the effective date-time group.
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4-8
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Figure 4-8. Fire support area and fire support station examples
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4 April 2014
ZONE OF FIRE
4-40. A zone of fire is an area within which a designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or is
prepared to deliver, fire support. Fire may or may not be observed (JP 3-09). Gunfire support ships and units are
assigned land divided into zones of fire as a means to coordinate their efforts with each other and with the
scheme of maneuver of the supported ground unit. Units and ships assigned zones of fire are responsible for
engaging known targets and targets of opportunity according to their mission and the guidance of the supported
commander.
4-41. Graphically portray a zone of fire (figure 4-9) by the use of broken lines (solid lines if unit boundaries are
used as depicted), with designating Arabic numerals, for example ZF3 (JP 3-09).
Boundaries. In order to permit ready identification by the spotter and the individual fire support ship,
the boundaries of the zones of fire should be recognizable both on the terrain and on a map. It may be
necessary to divide a large zone of fire into two or more smaller zones due to considerations
discussed in subsequent paragraphs. The boundaries of zones of fire of DS ships should correspond
to the zones of action of the landing force units supported.
Size. The size of each zone of fire should be such that the fire support ships, or ships assigned to
observe and/or destroy targets, will be able to accomplish the mission in the time allocated. When
zones of fire are delineated, known or suspected targets scheduled for destruction in each zone are
plotted, and then the number and type of targets are compared to the capability of the ship.
Visibility. Observation from seaward is a desirable feature for zones of fire, since it permits a ship to
deliver more accurate and rapid fire.
Accessibility to Fire. The zones of fire must be accessible to the trajectory of the fire support ship(s)
assigned to the zone.
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4-43. A field artillery units higher headquarters may also assign a field artillery unit a zone of fire. The zone of
fire for artillery units assigned to a maneuver unit or assigned the DS support relationship corresponds to the
area of operations of the parent or supported unit. The zone of fire for an artillery unit assigned the reinforcing
(R) support relationship corresponds to the zone of fire of the reinforced artillery unit. The zone of fire for an
artillery unit assigned the general support-reinforcing (GSR) support relationship corresponds to the area of
operations of the supported unit including the zones of fire of the reinforced artillery unit. The zone of fire for
an artillery unit assigned the GS relationship corresponds to the area of operations of the supported unit.
4-44. See JP 3-02 for more information on amphibious operations.
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4 April 2014
BOUNDARIES
4-48. A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and
deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas (JP 3-0). Boundaries divide up areas of
operation and define responsibility for clearance of fires. Boundaries are both permissive and restrictive in
nature
They are permissive in that a maneuver commander, unless otherwise restricted, enjoys complete
freedom of fire and maneuver within his own boundaries. Thus units may execute joint fires without
close coordination with neighboring units unless otherwise restricted.
They are restrictive in that normally units do not fire across boundaries unless the fires are
coordinated with the adjacent unit or the fires are allowed by a permissive fire support coordination
measure, such as a coordinated fire line. These restrictions apply to conventional and special
munitions and their effects. When fires such as obscuration and illumination affect an adjacent unit,
coordination with that unit is normally required. A commander may employ direct fires without
clearance at specific point targets that are clearly and positively identified as enemy. Targets and
their triggers should be kept within the same units boundary without overriding other tactical or
doctrinal considerations.
4-49. For more on boundaries, see FM 3-90-1.
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Chapter 4
4-52. The commander can establish another trigger line for his most accurate long-range weapon system in the
vicinity of the area where the fire support impacts to capitalize on the asymmetric attack. However, dust and
debris resulting from the artillery fire may prevent his direct fire systems from engaging the enemy. He
establishes other trigger lines for shorter-range systems. He may give guidance to extremely proficient crews to
engage the enemy at longer than normal ranges or give them different engagement priorities than the rest of the
force, such as giving priority to engaging air defense or engineer-breaching systems. This could result in losing
the effect that the sudden application of massed fires has on an enemy.
4-53. When the enemy reaches these closer trigger lines, the commander establishes a decision point to help
him determine if he wants his longer-range systems to continue to fire in depth or to concentrate his fires on a
single point. Many factors impact his decision, most of which concern the enemy and how he maneuvers and
the effects of the defending forces fires.
4-54. The purpose of each phase line and any actions required by forces affected by the phase line will be
specified on the OPORD of the establishing headquarters. Any commander given an area of operations can
establish a phase line. For more on phase lines see FM 3-90-1.
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4 April 2014
occupying artillery unit. The artillery unit occupying a position area for artillery establishes liaison with the unit
with authority for the area of operations where the position area for artillery is located. The echelon fire support
officer is usually responsible for liaison in accordance with standard command and support relationships.
4-58. The decision to establish a position area for artillery affects airspace control and coordination for rotary-,
fixed-wing, and tilt-rotor aircraft integration. A position area for artillery is a base upon which to establish
future gun-target lines for lateral deconfliction and areas for rotary-, fixed-wing, and tilt rotor aircraft to avoid,
depending on high- or low-angle artillery fires. For more on position areas for artillery see FM 3-90-1.
RADAR ZONES
4-59. The designation of radar zones provides a means of prioritizing radar sectors of search into areas of
greater or lesser importance. Zones focus radar coverage on the combined arms commanders battlefield
priorities. A radar zone is a geometric figure placed around an area that designates the area as more, or less,
important. Four types of zones can be entered into radars. Radars can store up to nine different zones. There are
four different types of zones used with the radar.
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4-63. Designation of a critical friendly zone requires radar coverage of the designated area and weapons
platforms to provide counterfire. The supporting field artillery units automated fire support system places any
radar-located enemy weapon system firing into a critical friendly zone in priority ahead of all other counterfire
targets with an immediate call for fire generated unless the system operator manually overrides the automated
call for fire.
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4 April 2014
CENSOR ZONE
4-70. A censor zone is an area from which radar is prohibited from reporting acquisitions. Normally
placed around friendly weapon systems to prevent them from being acquired by friendly radars (FM 309.12). The censor zone can be used to prevent radars from reporting acquisitions from other sensitive areas as
well.
4-71. A censor zone is graphically portrayed (figure 4-16) by a solid black line defining the area and the words
CENSOR ZONE, followed by the defining characteristic within, plus the effective date-time-group. The artillery
target intelligence zone requires a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 6 anchor points to define the boundary of
the area. The size and shape of the call for fire zone is determined by the anchor points and may be circular,
rectangular, or irregular. When possible, the effective date-time-group (moveable and scalable) should be
placed within the graphic boundary but it may be placed outside the graphic if necessary.
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Chapter 4
An airspace control order is an order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details
of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures. It is published either as part of the air
tasking order or as a separate document (JP 3-52).
An air tasking order is a method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and
command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces to targets and specific
missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies,
etc., as well as general instructions (JP 3-30).
4-77. See JP 3-52 and JP 3-30 for further information on the conduct and control of air operations.
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FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Note: Altitude typically refers to the height above sea level of a given point. Personnel must ensure
the altitude is correctly displayed in accordance with their system requirements. Some systems may
require altitude to be expressed as height above ellipsoid while others may require expression in
relation to mean sea level. Some systems may require conversion from feet to meters to permit
system entry. Fire support personnel must also be aware that altitude is sometimes expressed as
measured from ground level rather than mean sea level.
4-78. Army commanders use airspace coordinating measures to facilitate the efficient use of airspace and
simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Procedural control airspace coordinating measures are
used to delineate an airspace boundary or define airspace dimensions for enabling other systems (such as fire
support systems) to discriminate friendly coordination joint engagement measures from enemy, employ fires
across boundaries, and coordinate joint attack of targets for a particular operation. Restricted operations zones
denote airspace reserved for specific activities in which the operation of one or more airspace uses is restricted.
The airspace coordinating measures that frequently affect fire support include the airspace coordination area,
the coordinating altitude, and the restricted operations zone. Those are discussed here. See FM 3-52 and JP 3-52
for other airspace coordinating measures.
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Chapter 4
Note: In North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) field artillery tactical doctrine the airspace
coordination area is a fire support coordination measure and is defined as a restricted area or route
of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and established for the purpose of preventing friendly
aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces (Allied Artillery Publication-5).
Coordinating altitude
4-84. The coordinating altitude is an airspace coordinating measure that uses altitude to separate users and as
the transition between different airspace coordinating entities (JP 3-52). It uses altitude to separate users and as
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4 April 2014
the transition between different airspace coordinating entities. Examples of Army airspace coordinating entities
include air defense artillery and Army corps/division airspace control elements. Army echelons incorporate
airspace control plan guidance and integrate the airspace control order, area air defense plan, special
instructions, and the air tasking order via operation orders. All airspace users should coordinate with the
appropriate airspace coordinating entities when transitioning through or firing through the coordinating altitude.
4-85. The requirement to integrate airspace use in support of ground fire missions requires the determination of
the firing locations, the impact location, and the airspace that will be transited by the projectile during flight.
Those projectile parameters are integrated with other airspace users. Service liaisons and airspace control
agencies work closely to ensure that appropriate ACMs and FSCMs integrate surface operations and airspace
operations.
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4 April 2014
Glossary
SECTION I ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADAM
ADP
ADRP
AN/TPQ
ATACMS
ATP
ATTP
BAE
BCT
BSB
CEP
DA
DASC
DOD
Department of Defense
DPPDB
DS
FFCC
FAB
FM
FSCC
FSCOORD
G-2
G-3
GS
general support
GSR
general support-reinforcing
HIMARS
JAGIC
JP
joint publication
MACCS
MAGTF
MCWP
MDMP
METT-TC
MIL-STD
MK
MLRS
4 April 2014
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations (mission variables)
military standard
Mark (naval gunfire mount platform or munition designator)
multiple launch rocket system
FM 3-09
Glossary-1
Glossary
NATO
OPCON
operational control
OPLAN
operation plan
OPORD
operation order
reinforcing
S-2
S-3
SACC
STANAG
TACC
TACON
TACP
U.S.
SECTION II TERMS
air interdiction
(joint) Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemys military surface
capabilities before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve
objectives that are conducted at such distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air
mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 3-03)
air tasking order
(joint) A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control
agencies projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides
specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. (JP
3-30)
airspace control authority
(joint) The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control
system in the airspace control area. (JP 3-52)
airspace control order
(joint) An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests
for airspace coordinating measures. It is published either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate
document. (JP 3-52)
airspace coordinating measures
(joint) Measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and
simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 3-52)
airspace coordination area
(joint) A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by the appropriate ground
commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace
coordination area may be formal or informal. (JP 3-09.3)
allocation
(joint) Distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing requirements. (JP 50)
Glossary-2
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4 April 2014
Glossary
altitude
(joint) The vertical distance of a level, a point or an object considered as a point, measured from mean sea
level. (ATP 3-09.30)
apportionment
(joint) In the general sense, distribution of forces and capabilities as the starting point for planning (JP 5-0)
area defense
A defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time
rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADRP 3-90)
artillery target intelligence zone
An area in enemy territory that the commander wishes to monitor closely. (FM 3-09.12)
assign
(joint) To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or
where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater
portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. (JP 3-0)
attach
(joint) The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
temporary. (JP 3-0)
attack
An offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. (ADRP 3-90)
azimuth of fire
The direction, expressed in mils, that a fire unit is laid (oriented) on when it occupies a position. (FM 6-50)
ballistic impact point
The projected impact location of a round following an unguided ballistic path. (ATP 3-09.30)
boundary
(joint) A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of
operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP 3-0)
breach
A tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available means to break through or establish a
passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield or fortification. (FM 3-90-1)
breakout
An operation conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of movement or contact with friendly
units. It differs from other attacks only in that a simultaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter must
be maintained. (ADRP 3-90)
*call for fire
A request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target.
*call for fire zone
A radar search area from which the commander wants to attack hostile firing systems.
*censor zone
An area from which radar is prohibited from reporting acquisitions. Normally placed around friendly
weapon systems to prevent them from being acquired by friendly radars.
chief of fires
The senior fires officer at division and higher headquarters level who is responsible for advising the
commander on the best use of available fire support resources, providing input to necessary orders,
developing and implementing the fire support plan. (ADRP 3-09.)
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FM 3-09
Glossary-3
Glossary
*clearance of fires
The process by which the supported commander ensures that fires or their effects will have no unintended
consequences on friendly units or the scheme of maneuver.
close air support
(joint) Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to
friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those
forces. (JP 3-0)
close combat
Warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets.
(ADRP 3-0)
close support
(joint) That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the
supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire,
movement, or other actions of the supported force. (JP 3-31)
collateral damage
(joint) Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military
targets in the circumstances ruling at the time (JP 3-60).
commanders intent
A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that
supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders
act to achieve the commanders desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not
unfold as planned (JP 3-0).
*common grid
Refers to all firing and target-locating elements within a unified command located and oriented, to
prescribed accuracies, with respect to a single three-dimensional datum.
*common sensor boundary
A line (depicted by a series of grid coordinates, grid line, phase line or major terrain feature) established by
the force counterfire headquarters that divides target acquisition search areas into radar acquisition
management areas.
concept of operations
A statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and
establish the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. (ADRP 5-0)
coordinated fire line
(joint) A line beyond which conventional and indirect surface fire support means may fire at any time
within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. The purpose of the
coordinated fire line is to expedite the surface-to-surface attack of targets beyond the coordinated fire line
without coordination with the ground commander in whose area the targets are located. (JP 3-09)
coordinating altitude
An airspace coordinating measure that uses altitude to separate users and as the transition between different
airspace coordinating entities. (JP 3-52)
counterair
(joint) A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree
of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both
before and after launch. (JP 3-01)
counterfire
(joint) Counterfire is fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons. Includes counterbattery and
countermortar fire. (JP 3-09)
Glossary-4
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4 April 2014
Glossary
*counterpreparation fire
Intensive prearranged fire delivered when the imminence of the enemy attack is discovered.
danger close
(joint) In close air support, artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, is the term included in the
method of engagement segment of a call for fire which indicates that friendly forces are within close
proximity of the target. The close proximity distance is determined by the weapon and munition fired. (JP
3-09.3)
decisive operation
The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. (ADRP 3-0)
defeat
A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical
means or the will to fight. The defeated forces commander is unwilling or unable to pursue that
individuals adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commanders will and can no longer
interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force
or the threat of its use. (FM 3-90-1)
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DOD) Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of
Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected States, elects and requests to
use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil
authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from
qualifying entities for special events. Also called DSCA. Also known as civil support. (DOD Directive
3025.18))
*delay
To slow the time of arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or alter the ability of the enemy or adversary to
project forces or capabilities.
destroy
A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted.
Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be
restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90-1)
*destruction
1. In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, destruction renders a target out of action
permanently or ineffective for a long period of time, producing at least 30-percent casualties or materiel
damage. 2. A type of adjustment for destroying a given target.
destruction fire
1. An element of the method of engagement portion of the call for fire requesting destruction fire. 2. Fire
delivered for the sole purpose of destroying materiel. (FM 6-40)
direct support
(Army) A support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to
answer directly to the supported forces request for assistance. (ADRP 5-0)
disrupt
A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to
upset an enemys formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause enemy forces to commit prematurely
or attack in a piecemeal fashion (FM 3-90-1) 2. An obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle
effort to cause the enemy force to break up its formation and tempo, interrupt its timetable, commit
breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort. (FM 90-7)
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
Glossary-5
Glossary
diversion
(joint) The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an
attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention.. (JP 3-03).
electronic attack
(joint) Division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or
antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading,
neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. (JP 3-13.1)
electronic warfare
(joint) Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the
electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. (JP 3-13.1)
encirclement operations
Operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by
controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement. (ADRP 3-90)
execution
Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission. (ADP 5-0)
exploitation
An offensive task that usually follows the conduct of a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the
enemy in depth. (ADRP 3-90)
field artillery
(Army) The equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of indirect fire cannon,
rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers. (ADRP 3-09) (joint adds) Field artillery cannons are
classified according to caliber as:
Glossary-6
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Glossary
fire mission
1. The specific assignment given to a fire unit as part of a definite plan. 2. An order used to alert the
weapon/battery area and indicate that the message following is a call for fire. (FM 6-40)
*fire plan
A tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated.
fires
(joint) The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (JP 3-09)
fire support
(joint) Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage
enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. (JP 3-09)
fire support area
(joint) An appropriate maneuver area assigned to fire support ships by the naval force commander from
which they can deliver gunfire support to an amphibious operation. (JP 3-09)
fire support coordination
(joint) The planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or
group of weapons. (JP 3-09)
fire support coordination measure
(joint) A measure employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and
simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 3-0)
fire support coordination line
(joint) A fire support coordination measure that is established and adjusted by appropriate land or
amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate,
supporting, and affected commanders. Fire support coordination lines facilitate the expeditious attack of
surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. A fire support coordination line does not
divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for close
air support. The fire support coordination line applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems
using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond a fire support coordination line must inform
all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting
elements attacking targets beyond the fire support coordination line must ensure that the attack will not
produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of a fire support coordination line, all air-toground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force
commander. The fire support coordination line should follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of
attacks beyond the fire support coordination line is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and
special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not
preclude the attack of targets beyond the fire support coordination line. However, failure to do so may
increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. (JP 3-09)
fire support coordinator
The brigade combat teams organic field artillery battalion commander; if a FIB is designated as the
division force field artillery headquarters, the FIB commander is the divisions fire support coordinator and
is assisted by the chief of fires who then serves as the deputy fire support coordinator during the period the
force field artillery headquarters is in effect. (ADRP 3-09)
fire support officer
The field artillery officer from the operational to tactical level responsible for advising the supported
commander and assisting the senior fires officer of the organization on fires functions and fire support.
(ADRP 3-09)
*fire support plan
A plan that that addresses each means of fire support available and describes how Army indirect fires, joint
fires, and target acquisition are integrated with maneuver to facilitate operational success.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
Glossary-7
Glossary
Glossary-8
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Glossary
indirect fire
1. Fire delivered at a target not visible to the firing unit. 2. Fire delivered to a target that is not itself used as
a point of aim for the weapons or the director. (FM 6-40)
joint air attack team
(joint) A combination of attack and/or scout rotary-wing aircraft and fixed-wing close air support aircraft
operating together to locate and attack highpriority targets and other targets of opportunity. The joint air
attack team normally operates as a coordinated effort supported by fire support, air defense artillery, naval
surface fire support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, electronic warfare systems, and
ground maneuver forces against enemy forces. Joint terminal attack controllers may perform duties as
directed by the air mission commander in support of the ground commanders scheme of maneuver. (JP 309.3)
joint fires
(joint) Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action
to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (JP 3-0)
joint fires observer
(joint) A trained Service member who can request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide
targeting information in support of Type 2 and 3 close air support terminal attack control, and perform
autonomous terminal guidance operations. (JP 3-09.3)
joint fire support
(joint) Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and
control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. (JP 3-0)
joint terminal attack controller
(joint) A qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat
aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations. A qualified and current joint
terminal attack controller will be recognized across the Department of Defense as capable and authorized to
perform terminal attack control. (JP 3-09.3)
kill box
A three-dimensional area used to facilitate the integration of joint fires. (JP 3-09)
lay
1. To direct or adjust the aim of a weapon. 2. The setting of a weapon for a given range, deflection, or both.
(FM 6-40)
main effort
A designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission
success. (ADRP 3-0)
massed fire
1. The fire of the batteries of two or more ships directed against a single target. 2. Fire from a number of
weapons directed at a single point or small area. (JP 3-02)
measure of effectiveness
(joint) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is
tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 30)
measure of performance
(joint) A criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)
mensuration
(joint) The process of measurement of a feature or location on the earth to determine an absolute latitude,
longitude, and elevation. (JP 3-60)
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
Glossary-9
Glossary
military deception
(joint) Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist
organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will
contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (JP 3-13.4)
mobile defense
A defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a
striking force. (ADRP 3-90)
mobility
(joint) A quality or capability of military forces, which permits them to move from place to place while
retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. (JP 3-17)
mobility operations
Those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to enable
freedom of movement and maneuver. (ATTP 3-90.4)
movement to contact
An offensive task that is designed to develop the situation or regain contact. (ADRP 3-90)
multinational operations
(joint) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually
undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16)
mutual support
(joint) That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their
position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 3-31)
named area of interest
(joint) The geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific
information requirement can be collected. Named areas of interest are usually selected to capture
indications of adversary courses of action, but may be related to conditions of the operational environment.
(JP 2-01.3)
naval surface fire support
(joint) Fire provided by Navy surface gun and missile systems in support of a unit or units. (JP 3-09.3)
*neutralization
In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires renders a target ineffective for a short period of
time, producing at least 10-percent casualties or materiel damage.
*neutralization fire
Fire delivered to render the target ineffective or unusable.
neutralize
A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a
particular operation. (FM 3-90-1)
no-fire area
(joint) An area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their effects are prohibited. (JP
3-09.3)
no-strike list
(joint)A list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under
international law and/or the rules of engagement. (JP 3-60)
offensive counterair
(joint) Offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and
their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, and as close to their source as
possible. (JP 3-01)
Glossary-10
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Glossary
offensive task
A task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers.
(ADRP 3-0)
operation
(joint) 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military
action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military
mission. (JP 3-0).
operational control
(joint) The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing
and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1)
organic
(joint) Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in its table of
organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the operating forces for the
Navy. (JP 1)
passage of lines
(joint) An operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another forces combat positions
with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. (JP 3-18)
phase line
(joint) A line utilized for control and coordination of military operations, usually an easily identified feature
in the operational area. (JP 3-09)
planned target
(joint) Target that is known to exist in the operational environment, upon which actions are planned using
deliberate targeting, creating effects which support the commanders objectives. There are two types of
planned targets: scheduled and on-call. (JP 3-60)
point target
A target that is less than or equal to 200 meters in width and length. (ATP 3-09.30)
position area for artillery
An area assigned to an artillery unit where individual artillery systems can maneuver to increase their
survivability. A position area for artillery is not an area of operations for the field artillery unit occupying
it. (FM 3-90-1)
precision-guided munition
(joint) A guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage. (JP 3-03)
*precision munition
A munition that corrects for ballistic conditions using guidance and control up to the aimpoint or
submunitions dispense with terminal accuracy less than the lethal radius of effects.
predicted fire
The delivery technique of applying accurately computed corrections (not determined by firing) to standard
firing data for all nonstandard conditions (weather, weapon, ammunition, rotation of the earth) to deliver
accurate surprise, nuclear, or nonnuclear fire on any known target in any direction from any weapon limited
only by the characteristics of the weapon and ammunition used. (FM 6-40)
*preparation fire
Normally a high volume of fires delivered over a short period of time to maximize surprise and shock
effect. Preparation fire include electronic attack and should be synchronized with other electronic warfare
activities.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
Glossary-11
Glossary
priority of fires
The commanders guidance to his staff, subordinate commanders, fire support planners, and supporting
agencies to organize and employ fires in accordance with the relative importance of the units mission.
(ADRP 3-09)
*priority target
A target, based on either time or importance, on which the delivery of fires takes precedence over all the
fires for the designated firing unit or element.
pursuit
An offensive task designed to catch or cut of a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of
destroying it. (ADRP 3-90)
rearward passage of lines
Occurs when a unit passes through another units positions while moving away from the enemy. (ADRP 390)
reattack recommendation
(joint) An assessment, derived from the results of battle damage assessment and munitions effectiveness
assessment, providing the commander systematic advice on reattack of a target. (JP 3-60)
reinforcing
A support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit. (ADRP 5-0)
restricted operations area
(joint) Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace control authority, in response to specific
operational situations/requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted.
(JP 3-52)
restricted target
(joint) A valid target that has specific restrictions placed on the actions authorized against it due to
operational considerations. (JP 3-60)
restricted target list
(joint) A list of restricted targets nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the joint force
commander. This list also includes restricted targets directed by higher authorities. (JP 3-60)
restrictive fire area
(joint) An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that exceed those restrictions
will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. (JP 3-09)
restrictive fire line
(joint) A line established between converging friendly surface forces that prohibits fires or their effects
across that line. (JP 3-09)
retrograde
A defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (ADRP 3-90)
running estimate
The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding
according to the commanders intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0).
*scheme of fires
The detailed, logical sequence of targets and fire support events to find and engage targets to accomplish
the supported commanders intent.
security operations
Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations,
to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and
to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. (ADRP 3-90)
Glossary-12
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Glossary
shaping operation
An operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for the success of the decisive operation
through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. (ADRP 3-0)
shifting fire
(joint) Fire delivered at constant range at varying deflections; used to cover the width of a target that is too
great to be covered by an open sheaf. (JP 1-02)
stability tasks
Tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of
national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-07)
strike
(joint) An attack to damage or destroy an objective or capability. (JP 3-0)
supporting range
The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum
range of the second units weapons systems. (ADRP 3-0)
suppress
A tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapons
system below the level needed to accomplish the mission. (FM 3-90-1)
*suppression
In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, renders a target ineffective for a short period
of time producing at least 3-percent casualties or materiel damage.
suppression of enemy air defenses
(joint) Activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by
destructive and/or disruptive means. (JP 3-01)
*suppressive fire
Fires on or about a weapons system to degrade its performance below the level needed to fulfill its mission
objectives during the conduct of the fires.
sustaining operation
An operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating or
maintaining combat power. (ADRP 3-0)
synchronization
The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat
power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)
tactical air control party
(joint) A subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison
to land forces and for the control of aircraft. (JP 3-09.3)
tactical air coordinator (airborne)
(joint) An officer who coordinates, from an aircraft, the actions of other aircraft engaged in air support of
ground or sea forces. (JP 3-09.3)
tactical control
(joint) The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP 1)
tactics
(joint) The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. (Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff manual 5120.01)
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
Glossary-13
Glossary
target
(joint) 1. An entity or object that performs a function for the adversary considered for possible engagement
or other action. 2. An area designated and numbered for future firing. (JP 3-60)
target acquisition
The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment
of weapons. (JP 3-60)
target area of interest
(joint) The geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not
all target areas of interest will form part of the friendly course of action; only target areas of interest
associated with high priority targets are of interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning
and wargaming. Target areas of interest differ from engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for
the use of all available weapons; target areas of interest might be engaged by a single weapon. (JP 2-01.3)
target coordinate mensuration
(joint) The process of measurement of a feature or location on Earth to determine an absolute latitude,
longitude, and height. For targeting applications, the errors inherent in both the source for measurement and
the measurement processes must be understood and reported. Mensuration tools can employ a variety of
techniques to derive coordinates. These may include, but are not limited to, direct read from DPPDB
[Digital Point Positioning Database] stereo-pairs in stereo or dual mono mode, multi-image geopositioning,
or indirect imagery correlation to DPPDB. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 3505.01B)
target selection standards
Criteria applied to enemy activity (acquisitions and battlefield information) used in deciding whether the
activity is a target. (FM 3-60)
targeting
(joint) The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them,
considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)
task organizing
The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and
composition to meet a unique task or mission. (ADRP 3-0)
terminal attack control
(joint) The authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft.
(JP 3-09.3)
terminal guidance operations
(joint) Those actions that provide electronic, mechanical, voice or visual communications that provide
approaching aircraft and/or weapons additional information regarding a specific target location. (JP 3-09)
trigger line
A phase line located on identifiable terrain that crosses the engagement areaused to initiate and mass
fires into an engagement area at a predetermined range for all or like weapon systems. (ADRP 1-02)
urban operations
Operations across the range of military operations planned and conducted on, or against objectives on a
topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where man-made construction or the density of
population are the dominant features. (FM 3-06)
weaponeering
(joint) The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons required to
achieve a specific level of damage to a given target considering target vulnerability, weapons
characteristics and effects, and delivery parameters. (JP 3-60)
Glossary-14
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
Glossary
zone of fire
(joint) An area within which a designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or is prepared to deliver,
fire support. Fire may or may not be observed. (JP 3-09)
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
Glossary-15
References
Reference military publications are listed by title. When a field manual has been
published under a new number for the first time, the old number is provided in
parenthesis after the new number. Most joint publications are available at the Joint
Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System web portal. Most Army
doctrinal publications are online through Army Knowledge Online.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2.
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013.
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013.
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 16 June 2009.
JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations, 31 October 2012.
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.
JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 23 March 2012.
JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, 10 August 2009.
JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, 14 October 2011.
JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 01 August 2012.
JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 30 June 2010.
JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 08 July 2009.
JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 08 February 2012.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
References-1
References
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: www.apd.army.mil.
ADP 3-07, Stability, 31 August 2012 (with Change 1).
ADP 3-09, Fires, 31 August 2012.
ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.
ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-07, Stability, 31 August 2012 (with Change 1).
ADRP 3-09, Fires, 31 August 2012 (with Change 1).
ADRP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 14 June 2013.
ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.
ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.
ATP 3-01.50, Air Defense and Airspace Management (ADAM) Cell Operation, 05 April 2013
ATP 3-09.24, Techniques for The Fires Brigade, 21 November 2012.
ATP 3-09.30, Techniques for Observed Fire, 02 August 2013.
ATP 3-09.32, JFIRE Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of
Firepower, 30 November 2012.
ATP 3-09.60, Techniques For Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) And High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System (HIMARS) Operations, 10 January 2014.
ATP 3-28.1, Defense Support Of Civil Authorities And Integrating With National Guard Civil Support, 11
February 2013.
ATTP 3-04.15, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 20
September 2011.
ATTP 3-09.13, The Battlefield Coordination Detachment, 21 July 2010.
ATTP 3-21.90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, 04 April 2011.
ATTP 3-90.4, Combined Arms Mobility Operations, 10 August 2011.
ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, 14 September 2011.
FM 3-04.126, Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Operations, 16 February 2007.
FM 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades, 07 December 2007.
FM 3-04.155, Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 29 July 2009.
FM 3-07, Stability Operations, 06 October 2008 (with Change 1).
References-2
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
References
FM 3-09.12, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition, 21 June 2002.
FM 3-09.34, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment, 04 August 2009.
FM 3-52, Airspace Control, 08 February 2013.
FM 3-52.1, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control, 22 May 2009.
FM 3-52.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System, 10 April
2007.
FM 3-55, Information Collection, 03 May 2013.
FM 3-60, The Targeting Process, 26 November 2010.
FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense: Volume 1, 22 March 2013 (with Change 1).
FM 6-20-30, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations, 18
October 1989.
FM 6-20-40, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy), 5
January 1990.
FM 6-40, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery, 23 April 1996
(with Change 1).
FM 6-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery, 23 December 1996.
FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 18 July 1956 (with Change 1).
FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, 29 September 1994 (with Change 1).
TC 1-400, Brigade Aviation Element Handbook, 27 April 2006.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
NONE
REFERENCED FORMS
Forms are available online: www.apd.army.mil.
DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes To Publications And Blank Forms, February 1974.
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
References-3
Index
A
airspace coordinating
measures
airspace coordination area,
4-19
restricted operations area,
4-21
Army command relationships
field artillery inherent
responsibilities, 1-32
Army support relationships
field artillery inherent
responsibilities, 1-33
nonstandard, 1-34
task-organizing, 1-30
attack guidance matrix, 3-5
B
boundary and phase lines
phase lines, 4-13
position area for artillery, 414
trigger line, 4-13
C
cannon field artillery battalion
defensive tasks, 1-21
offensive tasks, 1-12
command post cells
air support operations
center, 2-6
Army space operations
support team, 2-8
battalion/squadron fires
cells, 2-7
battlefield coordination
detachment, 2-4
brigade fires cell, 2-6
corps and division fires
cells, 2-5
electronic warfare element,
2-8
fires cell functions, 2-4
ground liaison officer, 2-4
naval surface fire support
liaison, 2-7
tactical air control party, 2-7
U.S. Marine Corps liaison,
2-8
counterfire, 1-46
combination of centralized
and decentralized
control, 1-51
4 April 2014
decentralized control of
radar, 1-50
key personnel, 1-49
planning, 1-48
proactive, 1-46
radar, 1-49
radar zones, 1-49
reactive, 1-47
staff responsibility, 1-48
unmanned aircraft systems,
1-48
E
effects of fires
defeat, 1-2
destroy, 1-3
disrupt, 1-3
divert, 1-3
neutralize, 1-4
suppress, 1-4
F
field artillery
Defense Support of Civil
Authorities, 1-29
defensive tasks, 1-16, 1-17
offensive tasks, 1-4, 1-5
role and mission, 1-1
stability tasks, 1-28
survivability and security, 152
tactical movement and
positioning, 1-51
fire direction, 1-44
call for fire, 1-45
digital fire missions, 1-46
fire commands, 1-45
fire direction center, 1-44
fire mission, 1-45
firing data, 1-45
priority targets, 1-45
tactical, 1-44
technical, 1-45
voice fire requests, 1-46
fire support
requirements for effective,
2-2
fire support assessment
fire support running
estimate, 3-19
measure of effectiveness,
3-19
measure of performance, 318
fire support attack resource
Marine Corps artillery, 2-21
FM 3-09
Index-1
Index
Index-2
K
key fire support personnel, 210
brigade fire support officer,
2-11
chief of fires, 2-10
company/troop fire support
officer, 2-12
fire support coordinator, 210
fire support sergeant, 2-13
fire support specialist, 2-13
M
MLRS/HIMARS battalion
offensive tasks, 1-11
organization and
capabilities, 1-36
T
tactical enabling tasks
artillery raid, 1-24
FM 3-09
breakout, 1-25
encirclement operations, 125
mobility operations, 1-27
passage of lines, 1-25
security operations, 1-24
urban operations, 1-28
target acquisition
cannon field artillery
battalion target
acquisition platoon, 2-18
defensive tasks, 1-23
FIB target acquisition
battery role and
capabilities, 2-18
fire support team, 2-17
joint fires observer, 2-17
joint terminal attack
controller, 2-17
offensive tasks, 1-14
role of observers, 2-17
sensors and assets, 2-16
untrained observers, 2-18
target acquisition control
measures
artillery target intelligence
zone, 4-16
call-for-fire zone, 4-16
censor zone, 4-17
common sensor boundary,
4-17
critical friendly zone, 4-15
targeting
assess, 3-9
decide, 3-7
deliver, 3-9
detect, 3-8
Targeting, 3-6
U
unmanned aircraft systems, 218
4 April 2014
FM 3-09
4 April 2014
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. OKEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1405007
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance
with the initial distribution number (IDN) 116022, requirements for FM 3-09.
PIN: 102420-000