Jones Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

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volume 13, no. 14

july 2013
Wisdom and Happiness

in Euthydemus 278282
1.Introduction
There is perhaps no philosophical thesis that has more often been
thought to be most central to or most distinctive of the philosophy of
Socrates in Platos dialogues1 than the thesis that wisdom is sufficient
for happiness. The sufficiency thesis amounts to the claim that no
matter how things go in your life, if you are wise, then you are happy,
either because being wise somehow infallibly gives you the resources
to become happy or because happiness just amounts to being wise.
Hence its centrality for Socrates: The sufficiency thesis explains why
Socrates is so interested in wisdom (which is the same as being interested in virtue, according to Socrates) and why he is always trying
to acquire it and always trying to persuade others to acquire it, too.
But the sufficiency thesis is a deeply counterintuitive one. Aristotle
famously wrote that no one would maintain it unless defending a
philosophers paradox.2 Hence its distinctiveness for Socrates: Few
others have been willing to go so far.
This common portrait of Socrates is appealing but false. The locus
classicus for attributing the sufficiency thesis to Socrates is Euthydemus
278282.3 The interpretation I will challenge is a long-standing one,
1. And this is the philosophy I am interested in in this paper, the philosophy
expressed by the character named Socrates who appears in Platos dialogues,
and particularly in the Euthydemus.
Russell E. Jones
Harvard University
2013 Russell E. Jones

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
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2. Nicomachean Ethics 1095b311096a2. I borrow philosophers paradox from

Terence Irwins translation of . Strictly speaking, what Aristotle says
no one would maintain is that a virtuous person who is completely inactive
throughout his life, or who suffers the worst misfortunes, is happy. This is not
the sufficiency thesis itself but something that the sufficiency thesis (at least
on certain natural construals of the thesis) plausibly might be thought to entail. Similarly, at 1153b1921, Aristotle denies what seems to be (or nearly to
be) the sufficiency thesis: Some maintain, on the contrary, that we are happy
when we are broken on the wheel, or fall into terrible misfortunes, provided
that we are good. Whether they mean to or not, these people are talking nonsense (Irwin trans.).
3. The passage is largely unfamiliar to non-specialists, but specialists have often
turned to it as crucial for understanding Platos ethics. For example, Irwin, in
one of the most influential and provocative works on Platonic ethics in recent
decades (Platos Ethics [Oxford: 1995] esp. ch. 45) relies centrally on Euthydemus 278282 to establish the following claims, each of which is both central
to his interpretation and a point of controversy among scholars: Every action
russell e. jones
Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282
stretching back at least to the Stoics, and common today.4 As I will
show, the so-called locus classicus for the sufficiency thesis, Euthydemus
278282, provides no evidence for, and even some evidence against,
Socrates commitment to the sufficiency thesis. It does, however, provide clear evidence for Socrates commitment to the necessity of wisdom for happiness and so explains the central importance of wisdom
for Socrates. If correct, my argument forces those who would attribute
the sufficiency thesis to Socrates to look elsewhere for their primary
evidence. But even more radically, since the passage actually gives
us some reasons to reject the sufficiency thesis, the interpretation I
offer suggests that such a hunt for evidence is misguided. If that is
correct, what we need is a thoroughgoing reevaluation of the nature
of and relationships between the most important concepts in Socratic
philosophy: wisdom and happiness. This paper is but the first step in
such a reevaluation.
performed by some person is aimed at promoting her own happiness (often

called psychological eudaimonism); wisdom is purely instrumental for, rather
than partially or wholly constitutive of, happiness; wisdom is necessary for
happiness; wisdom is sufficient for happiness.
For others who rely on the passage to establish the sufficiency thesis,
see, e.g., Julia Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Cornell: 1999) ch. 2; Panos Dimas, Happiness in the Euthydemus, Phronesis 47 (2002) 127; R.S.W.
Hawtrey, Commentary on Platos Euthydemus (American Philosophical Society: 1981); Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton: 1984) pp. 211212;
Mark McPherran, What Even a Child Would Know: Socrates, Luck, and
Providence at Euthydemus 277d282e, Ancient Philosophy 25 (2005) 4963;
Daniel Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford: 2005) ch. 1; Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cornell: 1991) pp. 227231.
For the view that Socrates in the Euthydemus is not concerned with the logical relations of necessity and sufficiency, see Naomi Reshotko, Socratic Virtue:
Making the Best of the Neither-Good-Nor-Bad (Cambridge: 2006) ch. 7. For the
view that in the so-called Socratic dialogues, Socrates rejects both the sufficiency and the necessity of wisdom for happiness, see Thomas Brickhouse
and Nicholas Smith, Platos Socrates (Oxford: 1994) ch. 4.
Among those who have taken the argument to aim at establishing the sufficiency thesis, some of these have thought the argument to fail qua argument. Most recently, Benjamin Rider (Wisdom, , and Happiness in
the Euthydemus, Ancient Philosophy 32 (2012) 114) has argued that Socrates
arguments are insufficient to establish his strong conclusions. This is not
to say that the passage is unimportant, for Rider argues that Socrates arguments nevertheless raise important questions for Clinias and for the reader
about the relationship between happiness and wisdom and set the stage for
later philosophical debates on the topic. Indeed, it seems that on Riders view,
Socrates recognizes the insufficiency of his arguments, but has protreptic reasons to offer them. To say that he has protreptic reasons is, in this context, to
say that he uses the arguments in order to turn or urge (protrepein) Clinias
toward philosophy. Though I will not engage such interpretations directly,
my analysis, if persuasive, gives us reason to reject them. This is because I
analyze Socrates arguments in a way that shows them to meet a reasonable
standard of plausibility. My approach crucially involves embracing the ideas
that Socrates has a protreptic purpose and defends a strong conclusion.
However, the precise nature of this conclusion proves somewhat different
from what other interpreters have supposed. Appreciating Socrates argument for it will require us to attend to details of the passage that have largely
gone underappreciated or misinterpreted by previous commentators.
2. Alleged arguments for the sufficiency thesis in Euthydemus 278282

On the standard reading, Socrates argues for the sufficiency thesis in
Euthydemus 278282. Irwin nicely illustrates this way of reading the
passage:
Socrates takes it to be generally agreed that we achieve
happiness by gaining many goods (279a14), but he argues that the only good we need is wisdom. He argues in
three stages: (1) Happiness does not require good fortune
added to wisdom (279c4280a8). (2) Wisdom is necessary and sufficient for the correct and successful use of
other goods (280b1281b4). (3) Wisdom is the only good
4. McPherran (2005, 49) reminds us just how far back the impressive pedigree
of the view stretches:
[T]he Euthydemus began to be seen as the locus classicus for the sufficiency of virtue thesis beginning no later than with the Stoics, for
in its key, initial protreptic section (277d282e) they found a Socratic
philosophers imprint
endorsement for their own central tenet that virtue is the only goodin-itself. Stoics were attracted, in particular, to the protreptics condensed and, consequently, intriguingly problematic argument for the
thesis that the possession of wisdom guarantees eudaimonia for its
possessor no matter how much apparent bad luck that person might
encounter (280a68).
On Stoic interpretation of the Euthydemus, see also Gisela Striker, Platos
Socrates and the Stoics, in The Socratic Movement, ed. Paul A. Vander Waerdt
(Cornell: 1994) pp. 241251.
vol. 13, no. 14 (july 2013)
russell e. jones
(281b4e5). From this Socrates concludes that if we want

to secure happiness, we need not acquire many goods;
we need only acquire wisdom (282a1d3).5
claims to show that wisdom is the only good, and it has been agreed
that happiness requires the presence of all the appropriate goods. Irwin reconstructs the argument as follows:
(1) Each recognized good [e.g., health, wealth] is a greater evil
than its contrary, if it is used without wisdom, and each
is a greater good than its contrary, if it is used by wisdom
(281d68).
In support of this reading, Irwin identifies three arguments, one for

each of the three stages. First, Socrates argues:
(1) In each case the wise person has better fortune than the unwise (280a45).
(2) Genuine wisdom can never go wrong but must always succeed (280a78).
(2) Therefore, each recognized good other than wisdom is, in

itself (auto kathhauto), neither good nor evil (281d35,
d8e1).6
(3) Therefore, wisdom always makes us fortunate (280a6).
(3) Therefore, each of them is neither good nor evil (281e34).

(4) Therefore, wisdom is the only good and folly the only evil.
So Socrates is arguing, as Irwin puts it, that wisdom guarantees success whatever the circumstances. But if wisdom alone is sufficient for
success no matter what ones situation, then wisdom must be sufficient for happiness no matter what ones situation.
In the second stage, Irwin reconstructs Socrates argument as
follows:
There are, then, no fewer than three arguments that purport to demonstrate the necessity and sufficiency of wisdom for happiness. Contrary
to Irwins interpretation, and others that may differ in detail but endorse the general point that Socrates argues for the sufficiency thesis,7 I
will argue that Socrates in no way demonstrates or attempts to demonstrate the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness.8 I agree with Irwin that
the passage divides naturally into three stages, and I will treat each in
turn, devoting the most space to the more problematic first stage.
(1) It is possible to use assets well or badly (280b7c3,

280d7281a1).
(2) Correct use of them is necessary and sufficient for happiness
(280d7281e1).
3. Stage 1: Wisdom is good fortune. (Euthydemus 279c280b)

At Euthydemus 279d67, Socrates makes a shocking claim: Wisdom
() surely is good fortune (); even a child would know
(3) Wisdom is necessary and sufficient for correct use (281a1b2).

(4) Therefore, wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness
(281b24).
6. Irwins argument cites 281e34 as evidence for premise (2). I think he must
mean to refer to 281d35 or 281d8e1 instead, but if the reader has doubts
about this, she can judge for herself by examining Irwins text, the relevant
passages in the Euthydemus, and section 7 of this paper.
Socrates final argument is meant to secure Socrates previous

claim that wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness, for it
7. I have in mind those interpretations on which some part or all of Euthydemus

278282 is meant to support the sufficiency thesis. See note 3.
5. Irwin (1995) 55. The presentation of Irwins arguments that follows in this section, including all quotations, draws solely on Irwin (1995) 5557.
8. I agree, as will become clear, that in this passage Socrates does endorse the
necessity of wisdom for happiness.
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that. Two related interpretive issues immediately arise. First, are we to

take this as a serious identity claim, that wisdom and good fortune just
are the very same thing?9 This certainly does not seem like something
even a child would know, but it is a natural way to read Socrates claim.
And second, what exactly does good fortune mean? I deal with the
first issue in this section and the second in the following section.
Certainly one natural way to read the claim that wisdom is good fortune is, at least in isolation, as an identity claim. And Socrates makes
the claim in the context of giving a list of goods the possession of
which will make us happy. He lists various goods of the body (health,
wealth, good looks, and a sufficient supply of things the body needs),
then goods had in relation to others (noble birth, power, and honor
among ones countrymen), and finally goods of the soul (temperance,
justice, courage, and wisdom). But, just when it looks like they have
completed the list, Socrates exclaims that they have left off the most
important item, good fortune, which everyone, even the lowliest, says
is the greatest of the goods (270c78). Having put the last two goods,
wisdom and good fortune, on the list with his young interlocutor Clinias consent, Socrates reconsiders:
What do you mean?

Wisdom surely is good fortune, I said. Even a child
would know that.
And he was surprised, for he is still so young and nave.
(279c9d8)10
So, not only is it quite natural to read the claim that wisdom is good
fortune as an identity claim, the immediate context of the claim also
suggests that it is an identity claim. To add good fortune to a list
that already includes wisdom is to have said the same thing again
and to add again what was already mentioned, and to say the same
things twice.11
But the argument that follows shows decisively that Socrates does
not intend to put forward an identity claim. Here is the passage in full:
And recognizing that he was surprised, I said, Clinias,
dont you know, then, that flautists have the best fortune
( ) concerning playing flutes well?
He agreed.
And reconsidering the matter I said, You and I have

nearly become ridiculous in front of the strangers, son of
Axiochus.
And, I said, dont grammarians have the best fortune

concerning the writing and reading of letters?
Very much so.
How so? he asked.
Well then, with respect to the dangers of the sea, do you

think that anyone has better fortune ()
than the wise pilots, for the most part?
Because by putting good fortune in the previous list, we

have said the same thing again.
How is this?
It is most ridiculous to add again what was already mentioned, and to say the same things twice.
10. Translations are my own throughout, unless otherwise attributed (though

some will no doubt detect some influence from Spragues translation). I follow Burnets text.
9. Scholars who have given an affirmative answer to this question include

McPherran (2005, 53) and Russell (2005, ch.1 throughout but most explicitly
on pp. 30, 3637).
11. Furthermore, Eudemian Ethics 1247b1415 may be evidence that Aristotle took
this to be an identity claim: or even all the knowledgesas Socrates
saidwould have been cases of good fortune ( ,
, ).
vol. 13, no. 14 (july 2013)
russell e. jones

and says that wisdom is the source of good fortune.12 At 282c89
Socrates again says that wisdom is the only existing thing that makes
a person fortunate.
These summations of the conclusion of the argument for the claim
that wisdom is good fortune are not naturally read as identity claims.
Nevertheless, perhaps they are not flatly inconsistent with the claim
that wisdom is identical to good fortune. Assuming the identity of wisdom and good fortune, the conclusion at 280b13 seems to follow:
When wisdom [= good fortune] is present, in whom it is present, there
is no need of good fortune [= wisdom] in addition. But, of course, as
it is formulated in the text (without the bracketed bits), 280b13 does
not entail the identity claim.
Likewise, perhaps the other three formulations, which seem to
amount to variations of the claim that wisdom makes people fortunate,
are consistent with, but weaker than, the identity claim. Given the
identity claim, we should read the three later summations as claims
that wisdom makes people wise, or alternatively that fortune makes people
fortunate. This sounds like something we might find Socrates saying
in some dialogues; think of the famous passage at Phaedo 100d where
Socrates says that all beautiful things are beautiful by the beautiful.
But such a claim seems to miss the point in our passage. After all, at
281b24 and 282a45 Socrates says that wisdom is the source not only
Clearly not.
Well then, would you prefer when campaigning to share
the danger and the luck with a wise general or with an
ignorant one?
With the wise one.
Well then, with whom would you rather risk danger
when sick, with the wise physician or the ignorant one?
The wise.
So then, I said, you think that it is more fortunate
() to do things with a wise person than with
an ignorant person?
He agreed.
Then wisdom makes people altogether fortunate (
).
For surely wisdom, at least, would never err, but necessarily does rightly and succeeds (
); for otherwise it would no longer be wisdom.
In the end we agreed, though I dont know how, that in
sum things were like this: When wisdom is present, in
whom it is present, there is no need of good fortune
() in addition. (279d8280b3)
12. Strictly speaking, at 281b24 and 282a45 Socrates uses the term knowledge () rather than wisdom (). But it is plain that wisdom
and knowledge are being used equivalently. Socrates is clearly summing up
again the results of the argument at 279d280b, which concerns wisdom and
good fortune. Were wisdom and knowledge being used to refer to distinct
things, this summation would misrepresent the earlier argument. But there
is no hint in the text that any conflict arises. And at 282a16, Socrates easily
slides between wisdom and knowledge in summing up the results of the
entire passage:
When Socrates sums up the results of his argument at 280b13, he

puts it in a way that is not naturally read, at least in isolation, as an
identity claim: When wisdom is present, in whom it is present, there
is no need of good fortune in addition. A few lines earlier (280a6)
he had drawn the conclusion that wisdom makes people fortunate.
At 281b24 he recalls this conclusion and says that wisdom provides
men with good fortune. Again at 282a45 he recalls this conclusion
hen let us consider the consequence of this. Since we all want to be

T
happy, and since we appear to become happy by using things and
using them correctly, and since it is knowledge that provides the correctness and good fortune, it is necessary, it seems, for all men to
prepare themselves in every way for this: how they will become as
wise as possible.
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russell e. jones
of good fortune but also of correct use, but there is no hint that correct
use is identical to wisdom. Indeed, correct use and good fortune seem
to have the same relation to wisdom in this passage, and they seem
to be distinct from one another. But if wisdom were identical to good
fortune, we would expect it to be identical to correct use as well, and
so good fortune and correct use would be identical.
Moreover, the relation between wisdom and good fortune is explicitly causal, and the causal passages (280a6, 281b24, 282a45,
282c89) militate strongly against the identity reading. A causal analysis implies that there are two different things involved: the cause
(wisdom) and the effect (good fortune).13 But the identity reading
implies that there is only one thing involved. If causation requires
a cause that is not identical to its effect, then the identity reading is
inconsistent with Socrates explicit claims that the relation between
wisdom and good fortune is causal.
Even if we could force these various expressions of the conclusion
of the argument into the identity mold, there is another feature of the
argument that counts strongly against taking the claim that wisdom
is good fortune to be an identity claim. Socrates begins the argument
by claiming that various expertsflautists, grammarians, and pilotshave the best fortune when it comes to matters in their field of
expertise. He then generalizes from these examples to the claim that
experts quite generally have the best fortune concerning matters in
their field of expertise. Their expertise is clearly meant to count as a
kind of wisdom, and so some connection between wisdom and good
fortune is established.
But then Socrates adds to his list of examples that it is preferable to
act with a wise general or physician rather than an ignorant one. He
generalizes from the choice to act with the wise general and physician:
So then, you think that it is more fortunate to do things with a wise

person than with an ignorant person? The proposition is that it is
more fortunate for you to do things with a wise person. It is more fortunate for you to be under the command of a wise general or under
the care of a wise physician. That is why you should choose it. But it
is not you who is acting wisely in the situation; it is the general or the
physician. So your good fortune is a result of someone elses wisdom
being operative. The important point here is that the wisdom is the
physicians (but not yours) and the good fortune is yours (but not the
physicians).14 But this means that wisdom and good fortune are not
identical, for you can have one without the other. The point Socrates
is making is that the wise physician causes your good fortune, whereas
the ignorant physician will likely not bring you good fortune. But this
very point entails that the identity claim cannot be true.
Not only that, but even in the expert, wisdom and good fortune
sometimes come apart. Notice that Socrates qualifies his claims when
talking about pilots.15 Expert pilots have better fortune at sea than non14. Of course, the physician might be said to have good fortune, too. Nevertheless, it is not identical to your good fortune, and even if it were, that you
can possess good fortune without possessing wisdom is enough to make the
point.
15. On for the most part: Russell (2005, 42) is unusual in calling attention to
this qualification. But whereas he thinks the qualification highlights a significant gap in an argument for the very strong conclusion that success lies
entirely in the exercise of wisdoma gap, moreover, that cannot be filled in
from within the standard sort of craft analogy that Socrates here employsI
argue that the qualification plays a plausible and comprehensible role in a
relatively complete argument for a more modest conclusion. I take it that the
comparatively greater plausibility, completeness, and fit with the argumentative framework (the craft analogy) of the argument I attribute to Socrates are
advantages over Russells interpretation. Russell does reasonably call in as evidence Socrates curious narration of the conclusion he and Clinias reached:
In the end we agreed, though I dont know how, that . Russell takes Socrates
to be admitting a serious shortcoming in the argument itself, that Socrates
does not know how they reached that conclusion from those premises. I take
it to be admitting rather a narrative shortcoming. It is an admission that this
is a more or less rough retelling of the conversation, rather than a strict recitation. Calling into question the accuracy of the report is not the same thing as
calling into question the cogency of the argument. But calling into question
the accuracy of the report alone is no reason to think that the retelling has
13. Though it is a difficult passage, even in the Phaedo it does not seem that the
beautiful in particulars can be identical to the beautiful itself. Rather, there
must be two different things involved in the causal analysis: the beautiful in
things and the beautiful itself. Of course, even those who might disagree with
me on this point about the Phaedo are not in any way thereby committed to
disagreeing with me about the Euthydemus.
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experts, for the most part ( ).16 To say that experts
have better fortune than non-experts for the most part is to imply that
sometimes they do not. Success for a pilot consists in, roughly, getting
ones ship safely to the desired port. Skilled pilots will generally have
the most success at getting ships safely to their destinations. But in
the case of pilots, the possibility that a non-pilot might have greater
success than a pilot becomes more salient. In the case of flautists and
grammarians, there are not many obvious external influences on their
success.17 A good flautist plays her flute and beautiful music comes
out. A good grammarian reads accurately and writes effectively. But
for pilots, one external influence looms particularly large: the weather.
This is especially true in Platos time, when seafaring would be a paradigmatic case of a highly uncertain endeavor. Imagine that I, though
woefully unskilled, am to pilot a ship from Piraeus to Megara. At the
same time, a skilled pilot is to pilot a ship from Piraeus to Aegina. It is
easy to imagine a case where I have more success than the skilled pilot.
provided an argument that is as deficient as the one Russell finds. Indeed,

such a narrative shortcoming is of a piece with what we find elsewhere in
the dialogue. For example, at 290291, when Socrates attributes some rather
sophisticated statements to Clinias, Crito breaks into the narrative to call him
on it. Socrates admits that he may have gotten the speaker wrong but insists
that he got the content right. And then, oddly, through the rest of that argument, it is not reported as before, but Socrates and Crito actually engage in an
argument that is supposed to track the argument of the previous day. Socrates
strange phrase at 280b, though I dont know how, is, on my interpretation,
perfectly consistent with the overall narrative practice of the dialogue. Alternatively, though less likely, perhaps Socrates is not hedging about the accuracy of the report but is expressing uncertainty about why Clinias has agreed
to the conclusion, given Clinias own starting points.
16. The phrase is uncommon. Alternative translations might
include as a general rule, on the whole, or to speak generally. I have chosen a translation that especially highlights the basic function of any of these
versions of the qualification: to serve notice that the principle admits of exceptions. For a similar use in Plato, see Laws XI 917a45: Now the superiors
of bad men are the good, and of the young their elders (usually)which
means that parents are the superiors of their offspring (Saunders trans.).
The usually translates . For similar uses in Aristotle
see Meteorology 386b24, On Length and Shortness of Life 466b15, History of Animals 573a28, and Generation of Animals 732a201. In each of these Aristotle
passages, it is clear that he uses the phrase to indicate that the general rule
under consideration admits of exceptions. Less obviously, but probably with
the same sense, see Laws II 667d57: Generally speaking (
), I suppose, the correctness in such cases would depend not so much
on the pleasure given, as on the accurate representation of the size and qualities of the original? (Saunders trans.) (The only other occurrence of either
or I am aware of in classical Greek
is in Proclus and is simply a quotation of Laws 667d57.) These usages are
consistent with the more common () , often used to indicate a
general rule that admits of exceptions. (See, e.g., Theophrastus Historia plantarum 3.2.1.78 and 8.1.6.2.)
I take the linguistic evidence to be very strong for this understanding of
. But even if someone were to doubt that the phrase need
be taken to indicate exceptions, this is clearly an available and even prevalent
sense, and I submit that the plain sense of our passage in the Euthydemus indicates this reading. After all, it is simply obvious in the case of pilots that, for
the most part but not always, wise pilots will achieve their aims better than
ignorant pilots. On this reading, recognizably contributes
to the argument. But it is difficult to discern its function if it is not indicating
the possibility of exceptions.
A reader for this journal suggests, however, that the force of the qualification is almost wholly, and notes that it is only brought up with respect to
pilots, a particularly difficult case for the sufficiency thesis. The point, then,
may be that though the sufficiency thesis is not strictly speaking true, it applies for all practical purposes and in virtually every case, even the most
difficult. This is possible, though I am skeptical of restricting the force of the
qualification so much. In the ancient world, piloting (like medicine and generalship) was fraught with danger, even for the skilled. So if we read this as
saying that even pilots are pretty much always successful, we should wonder
why Socrates is permitted such an implausible premise. We face, again, a
slightly weaker version of Russells gap (see n. 15, above), and my aim is to
offer a plausible reading that closes the gap.
17. Though, of course, one can turn up such external influences with a bit of effort. Grammarians may have to deal with better or worse lighting, flautists
with higher- or lower-quality flutes, etc. Indeed, Ben Rider makes an interesting case that the example of the flute-player is meant to be highly subject to
external influences. He argues (i) that flute is a poor translation of ,
since the was a double-reed instrument; (ii) double-reed instruments,
even those produced with modern technologies and played in controlled environments, are notoriously finicky; and so, (iii) the skilled -player,
much like the skilled pilot or physician, would have been highly susceptible
to negative influences outside of her control (Rider 2012, 1213). Whether
this is correct or not hardly affects my main point here, which is that even
experts can fail to achieve success. Nor does it challenge the idea that experts are more susceptible to failure in some domains than in others. What it
challenges is the categorization of -players as less susceptible to failure
than most other experts.
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Suppose that I set sail from Piraeus with my crew, with fair skies and
friendly winds. This fair weather continues as I follow the coastline for
some days and finally dock successfully at Megara. The skilled pilot
leaves Piraeus at the same time, sailing toward Aegina with equally
fair skies and friendly winds. However, midway to Aegina, he encounters an unpredictable and fierce storm. Despite the best efforts of this
expert pilot and his crew, the ship is tossed around by the severe wind
and waves and finally capsizes. I, unskilled though I am, have successfully guided my ship to the desired port, while the skilled pilot has
failed to do so.
Socrates recognizes that these scenarios become salient in the case
of pilots,18 and he qualifies his question in their case: Well then, with
respect to the dangers of the sea, do you think that anyone has better
fortune than the wise pilots, for the most part ( )?
Socrates is not asking whether in every case pilots have better fortune
than non-pilots when it comes to sailing. Rather, he is asking whether,
taking all the cases together, pilots have the best fortune at sailing.
This allows that there could be infrequent cases of non-pilots having
better fortune than pilots, so long as pilots have the most fortune most
of the time. And this is a perfectly sensible position, to which Clinias
finds it easy to add his consent.
The consequence of the pilot example for the claim that wisdom is
good fortune is to add another reason it cannot be an identity claim,
for wise pilots retain their wisdom, even in cases where they fail to
have good fortune. Sometimes they possess wisdom but not good fortune, and so wisdom cannot be identical to good fortune. Add to this
fact about pilots the fact that I can be fortunate though it is not I, but
my physician, who is wise, and we see why Socrates repeatedlyat
280a6, 280b13, 281b24, 282a45, and 282c89expresses his conclusion in ways that do not at all look like identity claims. He is not
arguing that wisdom is identical to good fortune but rather that wisdom produces good fortune.
4. Good fortune and outcome-success
I now turn to the second interpretive issue concerning the claim that
wisdom is good fortune: the meaning of the term good fortune. Good
fortune is ambiguous between at least two senses: good things that
happen to us that are largely out of our control, and successes we
achieve.19 The former could be described as having favorable circumstances in which to live ones life. Being born into a wealthy family,
living in a stable political climate, and winning the lottery all fall into
this category. Call this sort of good fortune good luck, where luck is, not
too unnaturally, here restricted to what is outside of the agents control.
Good luck cannot be the sort of good fortune at issue in this passage, for two reasons.20 First, good luck is not the sort of thing one pursues, for it is, by definition, outside of ones control. It happens to one;
it constitutes the circumstances in which one has to act; but it is not
19. I do not mean to suggest that it is only the English good fortune that is ambiguous in this way. On the contrary, the Greek is ambiguous in the
same way. For the former sense (things that are largely out of our control),
see (in the Platonic corpus) Symposium 217a3, Meno 72a6, Laws 710c7 and
798b1, Seventh Letter 340a5; (in other philosophical texts) Aristotles Rhetoric 1361b391362a2 and Nicomachean Ethics 1100b2324. For the latter sense
(things we achieve), see (in the Platonic corpus) Laws 754d4, Epinomis 986c7,
Demodocus 382e4; (in other philosophical texts) Aristotles Eudemian Ethics
1235b1112, Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus 10.135.13 (from Diogenes Laertius).
For a nicely ambiguous caseinvolving, as in piloting, a journeysee Phaedo 117c13, where, in one of his final utterances, Socrates offers a prayer to
the gods that his journey into the afterlife will be fortunate (). For a
close parallel to our passage, which, given the context, fairly clearly has the
former sense of in mind, see Eudemian Ethics 1214a2425 (
).
20. That is not to say that Clinias might not hear Socrates initial claim that wisdom is good fortune as the claim that wisdom is good luck. Perhaps that partially explains his surprise at the claim. If Aristotle is right that many say that
happiness and good fortune are the same (Eudemian Ethics 1214a2425, quoted in previous note), where Aristotle pretty clearly means something more
akin to good luck, that might help explain why Clinias might understand the
claim as one about good luck. But the argument that follows makes clear that
Socrates does not have good luck in mind when he makes the claim.
18. Aristotle recognizes this point for both pilots and generals (Eudemian Ethics
1247a57). It seems to me that in the present passage the qualification applies
at least to generals and physicians, in addition to pilots.
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itself an object of pursuit. One does not try to be born into a wealthy
family or a stable political climate or try to make ones lottery numbers come up. Insofar as one could make ones family wealthy, ones
city politically stable, and ones lottery ticket a winner, this would
amount to the other kind of good fortune; it would be an achievement or success rather than something outside of ones control. But
Socrates makes this claim in the context of a protreptic argument, or
an argument aimed at persuasion to action. Socrates is attempting to
persuade Clinias that he ought to pursue wisdom. A primary reason
to pursue wisdom is that it enables its possessor reliably to have good
fortune. But then good fortune is something largely within the control
of the wise person.
A second reason to think that good luck is not the sort of good fortune at issue is Socrates heavy reliance on the idea that experts have
better fortune (for the most part) than non-experts. It would be strange
to think that experts generally have better luck than non-experts. Wise
and ignorant pilots sail the same seas in the same types of ships. Wise
and ignorant physicians treat the same sorts of diseases with the same
sorts of medicine at their disposal. What distinguishes them is not the
circumstances in which they act but their level of success when they
act in those circumstances.21 If we are to make sense of Socrates points
about the fortune of the experts, we must take him to be talking about
a kind of achievement or success.
But concluding that Socrates is talking about a kind of success does
not yet settle the matter. Some scholars have argued that good fortune
is a sort of success that amounts to acting well, rather than achieving
a certain result.22 This sort of success is different from, say, breaking
80 in a round of golf or saving enough to retire; these are cases of
achieving a certain successful result. Playing golf with a high degree of
focus, an adequate understanding of the game, and a practiced swing,

or being disciplined at saving money and investing with an adequate
understanding of various investment vehicles, are cases of achieving
success at acting well: acting as the skilled golfer or investor would
act. One may act well in these ways without achieving the desired result: the ball may take an unexpected bounce off an ill-placed sprinkler head, or the stock market may crash and the local bank fail. Call
this sort of successthe success that is a matter of how one plays the
game rather than what the final score isinternal-success. Call the sort
of success that amounts to achieving certain results outcome-success.
The appeal of taking Socrates to be talking about internal-success
rather than outcome-success results mainly from taking Socrates claim
that wisdom is good fortune to be an identity claim. Given that wisdom is neither omniscience nor omnipotence, the wise will not always
achieve the results at which they aim. But, plausibly, they can always
act well in the pursuit of these results.23 And so Socrates is taken to be
arguing that wisdom guarantees internal-success, and that internalsuccess is the important kind to achieve.
Insofar as this line of interpretation depends on taking Socrates
claim that wisdom is good fortune to be an identity claim, it is undermined by the argument of the previous section. Additionally, and
relatedly, it fails to make sense of Socrates qualification that the wise
have better fortune than the ignorant for the most part. To say that experts have better fortune than non-experts for the most part is to imply
23. As David Bronstein has suggested to me, perhaps it is not really plausible
that the wise can always achieve internal-success. To revive the golf analogy: even Tiger Woods may sometimes fail to play golf well in the internal
sense, perhaps because he is distracted by other concerns or because he is
simply having a bad day. Likewise, perhaps the wise pilot sometimes fails
to achieve internal-success. Given Socrates claim that wisdom never errs,
though, either Socrates fails to admit this possibility (perhaps in keeping
with the Aristotelian phronimos who does not act akratically or the Stoic sage
who never fails to act in accordance with wisdom), or there is some implicit
qua-operator at work: Insofar as the wise person fails to achieve internalsuccess with respect to his domain of wisdom, he is failing to act qua wise
personthat is, failing to act out of his wisdomand so counts as no exception to the rule that wisdom never errs.
21. Suppose, though, that wise pilots encounter fewer serious storms per trip
than ignorant pilots encounter. Even this would not show that wise pilots
have better luck than ignorant pilots, for the different rates of storms encountered can be attributed to the skill of the wise pilots.
22. See Russell (2005) ch. 1 for an especially clear articulation of the view, as well
as Dimas (2002).
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that sometimes they do not. But internal-success is always available to

the wise. They can always control the way they act when they act. It is
the outcomes of their actions that they may not be able to control. And
non-experts will never act well in this internal sense to the degree that
the wise do, for they will never act out of understanding. They may try
hard; they may choose correctly; they may achieve their aims. But they
will not act well in the same internal sense as the wise. For the most
part makes no sense if good fortune is internal-success.
Taking good fortune to be outcome-success, however, allows us to
make excellent sense of this qualification. Socrates recognizes that external factors may hinder success, preventing even the wise pilot from
reaching port safely. The wise pilot is neither omniscient nor omnipotent and must deal with the circumstances in which he finds himself.
Sometimes these circumstances include unpredictable weather patterns or unexpected problems with crew or ship. Even while never
failing to act wisely, the wise pilot may fail to achieve the result of
getting to port safely. But in general, wise pilots do get to port safely
more often than ignorant pilots, for the wise are best able to deal with
the circumstances in which they find themselves.24
To sum up the results so far, when Socrates uses the term good
fortune, he has in mind outcome-success, rather than good luck or
internal-success, but he does not mean to identify wisdom and good
fortune. We are now in a position to see exactly what he is arguing:
Wisdom produces good fortune. This claim is established by appeal
to the examples of the experts, who produce better fortune than nonexperts. But the wise do not infallibly produce good fortune, for external factors (luck, both good and bad) influence the degree of success agents have. Both wisdom and luck affect outcome-success. Even
the wise pilot may encounter storms that cannot be weathered. But
the wise pilot will handle each situation as well as it can be handled.
The wise pilot will have the best outcomes possible given the conditions in which he has to act. And this is due entirely to his wisdom,
the only thing that differentiates him from the ignorant pilot who
will have worse outcomes, on the whole, given the same conditions.
Socrates claims that wisdom would never err (280a7). In every
circumstance, wisdom produces the greatest outcome-success possible given that circumstance. So, to put good fortune, understood as
outcome-success, on the list below wisdom is to add something that
is already there implicitly. Socrates sums up the argument by making
just this point: We agreed finallyI dont know howthat in sum
things were like this: When wisdom is present, in whom it is present,
there is no need of good fortune in addition. Wisdom is good fortune
in the sense that it provides whatever good fortune is possible given
the circumstances. But it is not identical to good fortune, nor can it
provide good fortune that goes beyond what is practically possible
given the circumstances. Here is a reconstruction of the basic argument that wisdom produces good fortune (WPF):
(WPF-1) Experts usually have the best fortune when it
comes to matters in their fields of expertise.
(WPF-2) The only difference between experts and nonexperts is the greater wisdom of the experts.
So, (WPF-3) It must be wisdom that produces the greater
fortune.
(WPF-4) Nevertheless, experts can fail to have good fortune, and non-experts can accidentally have good fortune.
So, (WPF-5) Wisdom is neither necessary nor sufficient
for good fortune.
(WPF-6) Wisdom never errs.
24. Note, then, that while my argument is that Socrates must be talking about
as outcome-success, this does not entail that the notion of internalsuccess is unimportant. Indeed, it is because wisdom produces internal-success and internal-success leads to outcome-success that the wise have greater
outcome-success.
So, (WPF-7) Wisdom produces whatever good fortune is

possible in the circumstances.
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Notice that this account requires that we read two lines in a way
that may initially have seemed implausible. The easier case is Socrates
summation: When wisdom is present, in whom it is present, there is
no need of good fortune in addition. We might have been tempted
to read this as the claim that wisdom entails good fortune, but the
argument that leads to this summation does not warrant that reading. Instead, we must read this summation in its protreptic context.
Socrates is trying to show Clinias what he should pursue, and what
he has argued is that the only thing under Clinias control that will
contribute reliably to good fortune is wisdom. Good fortune is not
something separate to be pursued, some additional item to be put
on the list behind wisdom, for good fortune is properly pursued only
through the pursuit of wisdom. This is not to say that luck plays no
role, but only that luck is not something to be pursued.
The more difficult line is the surprising statement that started the
argument: Wisdom surely is good fortune; even a child would know
that. This may look like an identity claim when read in isolation. But
the argument that follows does not allow that reading, and so we must
conclude that it is an attention-grabbing and as yet unqualified claim
to the effect that good fortune duplicates something already on the
listwisdomin the sense that pursuing wisdom amounts to doing
everything one can properly do to pursue good fortune. So, wisdom
is not identical to good fortune, nor does wisdom entail good fortune
simpliciter,25 but the pursuit of wisdom exhausts the ways one can
properly pursue good fortune.
or entails good fortune, wisdom suffices for happiness. Good fortune

might even itself entail the other goods, like health and wealth, provided it is not simply internal-success. Second, the highest sort of good
fortune might be thought to be the achievement of success in ones life
as a whole. But achieving success in ones life as a whole just is happiness. So, if wisdom is identical to or entails good fortune, then wisdom
suffices for happiness.
The problem with both of these lines of argument, if my interpretation of the passage is correct, is that Socrates is not committed to the
crucial premise, in each version, that wisdom is identical to or entails
good fortune. He is committed only to the much weaker claim that
wisdom entails whatever good fortune is possible given the circumstances. So, we are left without an argument that wisdom suffices for
happiness. Indeed, though Socrates does not give it, and so I offer it
tentatively, there are resources to construct an argument that wisdom
does not suffice for happiness. For surely some success at achieving
ones aims is necessary for happiness. Success at achieving ones aims
is identified as the greatest of the goods, and one of the main reasons
Socrates gives Clinias for pursuing wisdom is that wisdom is conducive to achieving ones aims. But wisdom is not sufficient for success
at achieving ones aims. Even the wise may be frustrated in their endeavors. But if wisdom is not sufficient for a necessary condition of
happiness, then it is not sufficient for happiness.
6. Stage 2: Wisdom and correct use (Euthydemus 280b281d)
The first stage of the argument fails to demonstrate, or even to attempt
to demonstrate, that wisdom is sufficient for happiness. Indeed, the
first stage gives us reason to doubt the sufficiency thesis. But what of
the second stage? Does it justify the standard view that the passage as
a whole constitutes a ringing endorsement of the sufficiency thesis? I
will argue that it does not, but rather provides an argument only for
the necessity of wisdom for happiness.
Initially, Socrates and Clinias agreed on some basic assumptions:
Everyone wants to be happy; happiness comes from having many
5. Stage 1 and the sufficiency thesis

I emphasized above that it is common to read Euthydemus 279c280b
as an argument for the sufficiency thesis. I see two different lines such
an argument might take. First, if good fortune is, as Socrates calls it,
the greatest of the goods, then good fortune might be good enough
to suffice for happiness all by itself. But then, if wisdom is identical to
25. Wisdom does entail whatever good fortune is possible in the circumstances.
Sometimes, though, the circumstances may allow no good fortune at all.
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good things; things like health, honor, courage, wisdom, and good fortune are good things. Having already reconsidered the last of these
assumptions by arguing that good fortune need not be added to a
list that already includes wisdom, Socrates now revisits the second
of these assumptions, that happiness comes from having many good
things. He argues that happiness requires not only the possession of
good things but that these goods be used as well.
Clearly not, Socrates.

Then it seems, I said, that the one who is going to be
happy must not only possess such goods, but also use
them. Otherwise, there is no benefit from the possession.
Thats true. (280b5d7)
The passage licenses two principles. First, things contribute to our
happiness just in case they provide some benefit to us. That this is a
biconditional is a fairly clear implication of 280b78: If things benefit
us, they make us happy, and if they do not benefit us, they do not
make us happy. Second, things provide some benefit to us only if we
not only possess them but also use them. From these two principles
we can infer a necessary condition for things that contribute to our
happiness: Things contribute to our happiness only if we not only possess them but also use them. But this condition is still too weak, and
Socrates strengthens it.
We agreed, I said, that if we possessed many good things,

we would be happy and do well.
He agreed.
Then would we be happy through possessing good
things if they didnt benefit us, or if they did benefit us?
If they benefitted us, he said.
Then would they provide some benefit, if we only had
them, but did not use them? For example, if we had much
food, but didnt eat any, or drink, but didnt drink any,
would we benefit from these things?
So then, Clinias, is this now sufficient to make someone

happy, to possess good things and to use them?
Clearly not, he said.
It seems so to me.
Well then, if every craftsman had all the requisite provisions for his own work, but never used them, would they
do well through the possession, because they possessed
everything which a craftsman needs to possess? For example, if a carpenter were provided with all the tools and
enough wood, but never built anything, would he benefit
from the possession?
If, I said, he uses them correctly, or if not?
In no way, he said.
He agreed. (280d7281a1)
If he uses them correctly.

Well said. For I think it is a greater harm if someone uses
something incorrectly than if he leaves it alone. For in the
former case there is evil, but in the latter case there is neither evil nor good. Or dont we say this?
Well then, if someone possessed wealth and all the good

things we just said, but did not use them, would he be
happy through the possession of these good things?
Now our second principle has been modified: Things provide some
benefit to us only if we not only possess them but also use them correctly. That correctness is necessary is demonstrated by considering
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the consequences when correctness is lacking. When correctness is

lacking, harm results rather than benefit. So, correctness is required
for benefit. And the necessary condition for things that contribute to
happiness has thereby been strengthened: Things contribute to our
happiness only if we not only possess them but also use them correctly.
Two other advances are made at 280d7281a1. Socrates introduces
the idea that in cases where something is used incorrectly, it would
have been better had it not been used at all. This claim will become a
key point in the argument momentarily, and we can set it aside until
then. More importantly, up until 280d7 we had no explicit indication
that Socrates was looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for
somethings contributing to our happiness. Indeed, to this point we
had arrived only at severally necessary conditions. But here he makes
it clear that he is after jointly sufficient () conditions as well. So,
our strengthened necessary condition for things that contribute to our
happiness can now be strengthened even further, this time by making
it a biconditional: Things contribute to our happiness just in case we
not only possess them but also use them correctly.
Socrates goes on to consider what provides for correct use. Just as
he argued that wisdom provides good fortune, he now argues that wisdom provides correct use.26
Then, I said, also concerning the use of the first of the

goods we spoke ofwealth and health and beautywas
it knowledge which directed and made our action correct
with respect to using all such things correctly, or something else?
Knowledge, he said.
It seems then that knowledge provides men not only
with good fortune but also with well-doing, in all possession and action.
He agreed. (281a1b4)
Socrates again begins by considering craftsmen and proceeds by induction to a general conclusion. When it comes to correctly using the
materials of carpentry, it is the expertise of the carpenter that produces
correct use. The carpenters expertise allows him to make proper use
of each tool and material. A non-expert, one who does not understand
the carpenters craft, will not be able to make correct use of each tool
and material. Likewise, the same is true for the expert maker of utensils. The point is parallel to the argument that wisdom provides good
fortune, and so we should still have in mind that it is the expert pilot
(or general, or physician) who makes correct use of ships (or troops,
or medicine). In each of these domains, it is knowledge that provides
both success and correct use.
Socrates then generalizes the claim for all the goods on the initial
list. It is knowledge that provides for the correct use of goods such
as wealth and health and beautyand so, too, we should infer, with
goods like power and honor and bravery. Knowledge provides people
with correct use in all possession and action. It is difficult to determine strictly from the passage at 281a1b4 whether this is meant to
be a necessary condition, a sufficient condition, or both. But if we recall from 280a78 the principle that wisdom would never err, but
necessarily does rightly we can see that it must at least be a sufficient
Well then, in working and using things concerning wood,

surely there is nothing else that produces correct use than
knowledge of carpentry?
Clearly not, he said.
And also in work concerning utensils the producer of the
correctness is knowledge.
He agreed.
26. The shift from speaking of wisdom () to speaking of knowledge

() is unproblematic; see note 12.
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condition. Knowledge, whenever present, guarantees correct use of

whatever falls under its domain. The next part of the argument confirms that this is also meant to be a necessary condition:27 Correct use
is provided for just in case knowledge is present.28
And if weak or strong?

Weak.
And if honored or without honor?
Then, by Zeus, I said, is there any benefit from other

possessions without intelligence and wisdom? Would
a man benefit more from possessing many things and
doing many things without sense, or from possessing
and doing little with sense? Examine it this way: Doing
less, wouldnt he err less? And erring less, wouldnt he
do less badly? And doing less badly, wouldnt he be less
miserable?
Without honor.
Certainly, he said.
And if slow rather than fast, and dull of sight and hearing
rather than sharp?
And would he do less if courageous and temperate or

cowardly?
Cowardly.
So then also if he were lazy rather than hard-working?
He agreed.
Then would someone do less if he were poor, or wealthy?
With all such things we agreed with one another.

(281b4d2)
Poor, he said.
27. It is also possible to read the passage as supporting only a general rule: For
the most part, correct use does not come about except by knowledge. In that
case, the argument below (AWC) would require adjustment in two places as
follows:

( AWC-4*) Correct use of possessions is provided for if knowledge is

present and, as a general rule, is not provided for if knowledge is not
present.
( AWC-6*) Wisdom guarantees that ones possessions contribute to

ones happiness, and ignorance, as a general rule, makes it the case
that ones possessions fail to contribute (and, if used, even detract
from) ones happiness.
Even so adjusted, the argument will support my general interpretation. Insofar as one who is ignorant does, against the odds, use one of her possessions
correctly, this will be a matter of luck and so, again, not something that is an
appropriate object of pursuit.
For the person without knowledge, doing less means erring less. In
other words, without knowledge, a person will not correctly use her
possessions. The main point of this passage is that there is no benefit
in possessions apart from knowledge. Knowledge, then, is both necessary and sufficient for correct use. Indeed, one who lacks wisdom
would be better off the fewer possessions he has, and the wise will
always be better off than the ignorant. Having reached this conclusion,
we are now in a position to sum up the argument of this second stage
of 278282the argument that wisdom provides correct use (AWC).
(AWC-1) Our possessions (broadly construed to include
all such things as those on the initial list of goods) contribute to our happiness just in case they provide some
benefit to us. (280b78)
28. Again, I emphasize that the words I am translating as wisdom (),

knowledge (), intelligence (), and sense () are being used interchangeably throughout. Otherwise, Socrates would be giving a
bizarre argument. Outside of the translation, I shall use them interchangeably.
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possession of the things on our list of goods.29 Given that we possess
them, wisdom guarantees their correct use. But there is no evidence
that wisdom guarantees their possession. And if wisdom does not
guarantee their possession, then for all this passage tells us, wisdom
does not even guarantee contributions to happiness.
Whereas the first stage of Socrates protreptic argument supported
neither the necessity nor the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness, the
second stage supports the necessity of wisdom for happiness. If wisdom is necessary for correct use, and correct use is necessary for benefit, and benefit is necessary for happiness, then wisdom is necessary
for happiness.30 However, as in the first stage, nowhere in the second
stage do we find support for the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness.
To be sure, we do not find an explicit argument against the sufficiency
thesis, but we do not find support for the sufficiency thesis either.
(AWC-2) Our possessions provide some benefit to us just

in case they are used correctly. (280b5281a1)
So, (AWC-3) Our possessions contribute to our happiness just in case they are used correctly.
(AWC-4) Correct use of possessions is provided for just
in case knowledge is present. (281a1d2)
(AWC-5) If possessions are used incorrectly, positive
harm (and not simply lack of benefit) results. (281b4d2)
So, (AWC-6) Wisdom guarantees that ones possessions
contribute to ones happiness, and ignorance guarantees
that ones possessions fail to contribute to (and, if used,
even detract from) ones happiness.
29. One exception is discussed above in sections 3 and 4: Socrates claims that
wisdom produces good fortune, and good fortune is on the list of goods. But
even in the case of good fortune, wisdom does not guarantee good fortune
simpliciter but only whatever good fortune is possible given the circumstances.
A reader for this journal rightly notes that in the second protreptic section
of the Euthydemus, at 288292, Socrates considers whether the wisdom Clinias should seek has to do with making things (which includes acquisition), or
using them. The puzzling answer he gives is that this wisdom must know how
to use what it makes (289a47). This making and using requirement is puzzling for at least two reasons. One is that it seems to be unanticipated by anything that comes before it. In particular, the craft analogy, which is in play in
278282, suggests that wisdom will both make and use, but typically not the
same things. The housebuilder, for example, will use lumber, hammer, and
nails (to oversimplify)the products of lumberjacks and smithsto make a
house. He thus both makes and uses, but not the same thing (for even if he
were to use the house, it would not be qua housebuilder). Another reason the
answer is puzzling is that it leads directly to the apparently intractable aporia
of the second protreptic. I cannot make a full case for this here, but it will
suffice to note that in the case of every craft of the many mentioned in this
passage, including the ruling craft, its failure to meet the making and using
requirement is the explicit ground for rejecting it as a candidate for the wisdom we must seek. That is to say, in every case, the making of a product and
the using of that product belong to two different crafts. Given the apparent
disconnect of the making and using principle from the first protreptic, as well
as its central role in producing the aporia, it is not readily apparent how this
passage should affect our interpretation of the first protreptic.
AWC-6 remains implicit at this stage, but it is entailed by the explicit

claims that are defended. But notice that AWC-6 does not entail that
wisdom suffices for happiness. Rather, it entails that any possessions
(broadly construed to include all such things as those on the initial list
of goods) a wise person has will contribute to his happiness. But this is
just a conditional statement: For anything on our list of goods, if a wise
person possesses it, then it will contribute to his happiness. There are
two problems with thinking that this conditional expresses the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness. First, there is little reason to think that,
if something contributes to my happiness, it follows that I am happy.
For example, I have a one-dollar bill on my desk. It seems true to say
that this one-dollar bill contributes to my wealth. But it does not follow
that I am wealthy. Its contribution hardly suffices to make me wealthy.
Likewise, even if something contributes to my happiness, it may leave
me far short of being happy. So, even if wisdom did guarantee contributions to happiness, it would not follow that it guarantees happiness.
Second, there is no claim anywhere in the first protreptic that
wisdom guarantees the satisfaction of the antecedent of this conditional. That is, nowhere is it suggested that wisdom guarantees the
30. But see note 27, above.
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is either good or evil, of these two, wisdom is good, and
ignorance is evil?
7. Stage 3: Wisdom as the sole good (Euthydemus 281de)

We have seen that the first and second stages of Euthydemus 278282
do not constitute an argument for the sufficiency thesis, though the
second stage is meant to secure the necessity thesis. But the third and
final stage has sometimes been taken to be a nearly explicit endorsement of the sufficiency thesis. For happiness requires good things, and
Socrates says at 281e35 that wisdom is the sole good and ignorance
the sole bad. From this it appears to follow that wisdom is necessary
and sufficient for happiness. Here is this short but important passage
in its entirety:
He agreed. (281d2e5)
Irwin reconstructs the argument as follows:
(281d68).
(2) Therefore, each recognized good other than wisdom is just
by itself (auto kathhauto) neither good nor evil (281d35,
d8e1).
In sum, Clinias, I said, it is likely that concerning all the

things that we first called goods, the account of them is not
that they are by nature goods just by themselves31 (
), but rather it seems to be
this: If ignorance leads them, they are greater evils than
their opposites, insofar as they are better able to serve
the evil master; but if intelligence and wisdom lead them,
they are greater goods, though just by themselves neither
sort is of any value.
(3) Therefore, each of them is neither good nor evil (281e34).

(4) Therefore, wisdom is the only good and folly the only evil
(281e45).32
Irwin distinguishes two views we might attribute to Socrates from this
passage:
He said, Apparently, it seems to be just as you say.
The Moderate View: When Socrates says that the recognized goods are not goods just by themselves, he means
that they are not goods when they are divorced from wisdom. When he concludes that wisdom is the only good,
he means simply that only wisdom is good all by itself,
apart from any combination with other things.
Then what follows from the things weve said? Is it anything other than that, whereas none of the other things
31. Following Vlastos (1991) 305306. Irwin has in itself in premise (2), below,
and in themselves in the opening clauses describing The Moderate View
and The Extreme View. I have taken the liberty of changing these to just by
itself and just by themselves to simplify the discussion to follow, as I do not
think the difference affects Irwins point. (Note how, in describing The Moderate View, Irwin writes, only wisdom is good all by itself. This language
seems a better fit with just by itself than with in itself.) The difference is
important, however: In itself may misleadingly suggest that the distinction
is between intrinsic and extrinsic value, whereas the passage itself is inconclusive about this. The point is rather about whether the recognized goods
are goods by themselves, that is, regardless of the presence of some further
thingwisdom.
The Extreme View: When Socrates says that the recognized goods are not goods just by themselves, he means
that they are not goods; any goodness belongs to the
wise use of them, not to the recognized goods themselves.
32. Irwin (1995) 57.
16
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russell e. jones
When Socrates concludes that wisdom is the only good,

he means that nothing else is good.33
The Extreme View, if correct, makes the argument an ugly thing.

The problem is that if we suppose that in (3) and (4) Socrates is telling us that the recognized goods are in no way goods at all, then he
directly contradicts what he has just said in (1), that the recognized
goods can be greater good[s] than their opposites. But if Socrates
is telling us in the same argument that the same things are both
greater goods and not goods at all, then the argument appears to
be incoherent.
The Moderate View is much more sensible and contextually sensitive. We can easily reinterpret the troubling phrases in (3) and (4)
in a way that avoids Irwins charge that the inference is illicit, while
allowing us to see the sense in which (3) and (4) are a description
of what has been achieved in the conversation. The key is to recognize that in (3), Socrates is not drawing an inference but rather
restating (2). [N]either good nor evil in (3) is then to be read, in
light of (2), as a contraction of just by itself neither good nor evil.36
(4), in turn, should be read as, Wisdom is the only good just by
itself and folly the only evil just by itself. Not only does this avoid
the apparent contradiction that The Extreme View foists on the argument, but it prevents us from being confronted with a claim for
which the argument to this point has not prepared us, that the recognized goods are neither good nor evil in any way. This claim, the
extreme one, does not follow at all from what has come before. But
if (3) is a restatement of (2), and (4) just takes the conclusion a step
further, then we have a perfectly reasonable explication of the text
on which Socrates holds The Moderate View. The argument, following Irwin but modifying (3) and (4) to make the moderate reading
explicit, would go as follows:
Commentators have divided over these two readings. Recent commentators who accept The Moderate View include Brickhouse and
Smith, Parry, Reshotko, and Vlastos. Recent commentators who accept
The Extreme View include Annas, Dimas, McPherran, and Russell.34
Irwin argues for The Extreme View on the grounds that The Moderate
View cannot explain the inference to (3) and (4). After all, The Moderate View licenses calling the recognized goods goods when they are
conjoined with wisdom. But (3) and (4) rule out calling the recognized
goods goods. So, Socrates must have in mind The Extreme View rather than The Moderate View.35
33. Ibid.
34. See Brickhouse and Smith, Making Things Good and Making Good Things
in Socratic Philosophy, in T. Robinson and L. Brisson, eds., Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides: Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum: Selected Papers
(Academia Verlag: 2000) 7687; Richard Parry, The Craft of Ruling in Platos
Euthydemus and Republic, Phronesis 48 (2003) 128; Reshotko (2006) 98103;
Vlastos (1991) 227231; Annas (1999) ch. 2; Dimas (2002); McPherran (2005);
and Russell (2005) ch. 1.
35. The Stoics also interpreted Socrates as expressing The Extreme View and so
took this passage to be evidence for the Socratic origin of their view that wisdom is the only good. Even within the Stoic school, however, there was room
for disagreement about what the passage implies. Orthodox Stoics would
have found in the passage room for a doctrine of preferred indifferents, according to which the conventional goods (health, wealth, etc.) are valuables
but not goods. Aristo, on the other hand, would have found support for the
view that nothing but wisdom is good or valuable at all and nothing but ignorance is bad or disvaluable at all. For a useful discussion, see A.A. Long,
Hellenistic Philosophy (Duckworth: 1986) esp. 164ff.
Diogenes Laertius (2.31) clearly has this passage in mind when he attributes The Extreme View to Socrates: There is, [Socrates] said, only one good,
that is, knowledge, and only one evil, that is, ignorance. It is, of course, a
point of debate whether this is the correct view to attribute to Socrates. But
Diogenes Laertius plainly misinterprets Socrates when he immediately goes
on to write, Wealth and good birth bring their possessor no dignity, but on
the contrary evil (Hicks trans.) ( ,
, ,
).

36. See Vlastos (1991) 229230 for a defense of reading neither good nor evil as
a contracted form of just by itself neither good nor evil.
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russell e. jones

time.38 The Moderate View makes sense of the entire passage, while
The Extreme View cannot.
If The Moderate View provides the most plausible reading of the
text, then we can see that it reinforces the necessity thesis. If the goodness of all other things requires wisdom, and if happiness requires
goodness, then happiness requires wisdom. But the sufficiency thesis
does not seem to be in view here.39 Again, wisdom confers goodness

(281d68).
(2) Therefore, each recognized good other than wisdom is just
by itself (auto kathhauto) neither good nor evil (281d35,
d8e1).
(3*) Therefore, each of them is just by itself neither good nor
evil (281e34).
38. Ravi Sharma has noted in correspondence to me that the grammatical structure of the sentence supports this point. The first conjunct is expressed by
means of a dependent clause (governed by the participle ), while the second is the main, and novel, thought (governed by the implicit indicative ).
(4*) Therefore, wisdom is the only good just by itself and folly
the only evil just by itself (281e45).
39. Contra Donald Zeyl, Socratic Virtue and Happiness, Archiv fr Geschichte der
Philosophie 64 (1982) p. 231, who takes Socrates to be expressing The Moderate Viewall of the candidate goods but wisdom are demoted from the
status of being goods in their own right to being neither good nor bad in
themselves, but good, bad or indifferent only under the direction of knowledge, ignorance or the absence of any such directionyet concludes, Wisdom alone survives as the only good whose mere possession guarantees its
usefulness: it is thus the possession of wisdom which constitutes happiness.
But this is a non sequitur for at least two reasons. First, nothing in the passage
decides the issue whether wisdom constitutes happiness or contributes to it
in some other way. Second, by it is thus the possession of wisdom which
constitutes happiness, Zeyl clearly means to express the sufficiency thesis.
But, for the reasons expressed above, the sufficiency thesis does not follow
from The Moderate View endorsed by Zeyl. Were Socrates expressing The
Extreme View, the sufficiency thesis would seem to be in play, for happiness
consists in having (or correctly using) good things, and wisdom would be the
only good thing. Thus, to have wisdom would be to have everything required
for happiness. We should, then, for the reasons I have given in the main text,
go along with Zeyl in endorsing The Moderate View, though we should not
follow him in drawing conclusions that can at best be drawn only from The
Extreme View.
Like Zeyl, Parry starts out correctly but concludes too strongly. Parry
rightly notes that Stage 2 does not make a clear case that the recognized
goods are not needed for happiness (2003, p. 6), and rightly endorses The
Moderate View of Stage 3, but goes too far in taking these passages to imply
that if wisdom determines the goodness of the recognized goods, then it
guarantees happiness:
Perhaps someone would object that (3)/(3*) and (4)/(4*) are introduced with an inference-term, , and so must be inferences
rather than restatements.37 This is a fair observation, but it should be
noted that what follows is, strictly speaking, not two inferences given
separately but a conjunction in which the conjuncts are being contrasted with one another by use of a construction. If someone insists that we read (3*) and (4*) as inferences, defenders of The
Moderate View can insist back that (3*) and (4*) must be read rather
as an inference. That is, (3*) and (4*) are an inference from what precedes. On this understanding, the conclusion of the argument is a conjunction: None of the other things is [just by itself] either good or
bad, but of these two, wisdom is good [just by itself], and ignorance is
bad [just by itself]. Granted, the first conjunct has already been made
explicit in its uncontracted form, but it is restated in order to contrast
it with the second conjunct, which is here made explicit for the first
37. Long (1986, 167 n. 62) objects on similar grounds: In 281d35, Socrates has
already asserted that the things we first said were good are not good just by
themselves. If this is all that he is asserting in the first part of his conclusion,
none of these other things is either good or bad, his ostensible conclusion is
reduced to a summary, which contributes nothing new.
18
rom the context, it is clear that [Socrates] means that the things left
F
alone are indeterminate with respect to the good. Wisdom, on the other hand, is the determining principle. As the determining principle, it
is also determinate with respect to happiness. Being determinate with
respect to happiness does not mean that wisdom by itself is happiness.
vol. 13, no. 14 (july 2013)
russell e. jones
on whatever so-called recognized goods, like health and honor, we

possess. But nowhere in this third stage is it suggested that wisdom
guarantees the possession of the recognized goods. The focus is entirely on necessity rather than sufficiency.40
We are now in a position to sum up the argument that wisdom is
the only good (WOG):
So, (WOG-3) Wisdom is the only good just by itself and

folly the only evil just by itself.41 42
8.Conclusion
Together, the arguments in the first stage that wisdom provides good
fortune, in the second stage that wisdom provides correct use, and in
the third stage that wisdom is the only good present a potent protreptic for wisdom. Clinias should pursue wisdom because with it he will
have a good chance of being happy, while without it he will have no
chance at all. Since Clinias shares with all of us the single dominant
goal in life of attaining happiness, this conclusion is all Socrates requires to accomplish his protreptic aim.43 Contrary to a long and dominant interpretive tradition, I have argued that this conclusion is all
that Socrates aims to establish. Specifically, I have argued that Socrates
is not making the case for the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness.
Wisdom is necessary for and conducive to happiness, but nowhere
in this passage does Socrates claim or reveal that he is committed to
the sufficiency of wisdom for happiness. Indeed, what he says about
wisdom and good fortune provides evidence against the sufficiency
(WOG-1) Each recognized good other than wisdom [e.g.,

health, wealth] is a greater evil than its contrary, if it is
used without wisdom, and each is a greater good than its
contrary, if it is used by wisdom.
So, (WOG-2) Each recognized good other than wisdom is
just by itself neither good nor evil.
Rather, it means that whenever wisdom is at work one is invariably
happy. (2003, p. 12)
40. A reader for this journal wonders whether just by themselves neither sort
[i.e., neither the recognized goods nor their opposites] is of any value at
281d89 implies that the opposites of the recognized goods have some positive value when conjoined with wisdom. If they do, would that then imply
that wisdom can make good use of even the recognized bads, and would
that then establish the sufficiency thesis? First, it need not imply that the recognized bads have positive value when conjoined with wisdom. The point
could simply be that there is no determinate answer to the question whether
it is more valuable for someone to be rich rather than poor until it is determined whether she is wise or ignorant. But I think a more nuanced answer is
available, too: poverty, weakness, slowness, and dullness of sight and hearing
can be used by wisdom so long as they are not complete poverty, etc. (Cowardice and laziness present different problems with respect to how they could
be conjoined with wisdom, and dishonor seems a difficult case to make out,
so I leave those three aside.) Poverty (like the others) comes in degrees, and
wisdom can use whatever money is available to it. Complete poverty, then, is
not susceptible to use by wisdom; 281b68 suggests that this just is having
nothing (monetary) available for use. But insofar as a wise person is poor but
not penniless, what little money she has is of some little good to her. And
the greater the money available to her, the better. This, of course, still fails to
settle anything about the sufficiency thesis, since it is still an open question
how many resources, and of what quality and variety, one needs to be able to
achieve happiness. The text underdetermines the matter. (On the last point,
see the discussion at the end of section 6.)
41. The position I am attributing to Socrates in the Euthydemus resembles the

position Aristotle expresses at Eudemian Ethics 1248b2634:

good man, then, is one for whom the natural goods are good. For the
A
goods men fight for and think the greatesthonour, wealth, bodily
excellences, good fortune, and powerare naturally good, but may
be to some hurtful because of their dispositions. For neither the foolish nor the unjust nor the intemperate would get any good from the
employment of them, any more than an invalid from the food of a
healthy man, or one weak and maimed from the equipment of one in
health and sound in all limbs. (Solomon trans.)
42. There must be the further tacit premise that there are no goods other than
the so-called recognized goods: those, that is, on the initial list of goods (or,
more liberally, those on the list plus others of the same sort). This is true of
the earlier reconstructions of the argument, as well.
43. Or, at least, it is all the rational argument he requires. The question whether
Clinias acceptance of this conclusion is sufficient, in Socrates view, to cause
him to pursue wisdom goes beyond the scope of this essay.
19
vol. 13, no. 14 (july 2013)
russell e. jones
thesis. The summation of the passage reinforces this interpretation, as

it appeals only to the necessity, but not to the sufficiency, of wisdom
for happiness:
References
Annas, J. 1999. Platonic Ethics, Old and New. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Brickhouse, T.C., and N.D. Smith. 1994. Platos Socrates. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
. 2000. Making Things Good and Making Good Things in Socratic Philosophy. In Robinson and Brisson 2000: 7687.
Dimas, P. 2002. Happiness in the Euthydemus. Phronesis 47: 127.
Hawtrey, R.S.W. 1981. Commentary on Platos Euthydemus. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
Irwin, T. 1995. Platos Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kraut, R. 1984. Socrates and the State. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Long, A.A. 1986. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 2nd ed.
London: Duckworth.
McPherran, M. 2005. What Even a Child Would Know: Socrates,
Luck, and Providence at Euthydemus 277d282e. Ancient Philosophy
25: 4963.
Parry, R.D. 2003. The Craft of Ruling in Platos Euthydemus and Republic. Phronesis 48: 128.
Reshotko, N. 2006. Socratic Virtue: Making the Best of the Neither-GoodNor-Bad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rider, B. 2012. Wisdom, E, and Happiness in the Euthydemus.
Ancient Philosophy 32: 114.
Robinson, T.M., and L. Brisson, eds. 2000. Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis,
Charmides: Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum: Selected Papers. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Russell, D. 2005. Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Then let us consider the consequence of this. Since we all

want to be happy, and since we appear to become happy
by using things and using them correctly, and since it is
knowledge that provides the correctness and good fortune, it is necessary, it seems, for all men to prepare themselves in every way for this: how they will become as wise
as possible. (282a16)
So much for what I take myself to have established. It is equally
important to be clear about what I do not take myself to have established. While Euthydemus 278282 does not provide evidence that
Socrates endorses the sufficiency thesis, I do not take myself to have
demonstrated that what Socrates says in this passage is flatly inconsistent with the sufficiency thesis. Certainly, though, some of what he
says here will be difficult to reconcile with the sufficiency thesis. Furthermore, I do not take myself to have shown that Socrates nowhere
endorses the sufficiency thesis. Indeed, I have hardly considered any
passages outside of our focal text. My claim, strictly, is only that a case
for the sufficiency thesis will have to find its impetus in passages other
than Euthydemus 278282. Champions of the sufficiency thesis will
need a new locus classicus, for the old one will no longer serve. But
by showing that the supposed locus classicus for the sufficiency thesis
not only fails to support the thesis but is in fact quite unfriendly to
it, I hope to have sown in the reader a seed of doubt about whether
the sufficiency thesis deserves its dominant status in interpretations of
Platos thought.44
44. Many people have had a beneficial impact on this paper. Among them are
members of audiences at the Academy of Athens, the American Philosophical Association (2010 Eastern Division meeting), Brandeis University, Cornell
University, the Humboldt-Universitt zu Berlin, the University of Alaska Anchorage, the University of Oxford, and my 2012 Harvard graduate seminar
Plato on the Value of Knowledge. I can detect in the final draft the influence
of conversations with or comments from the following individuals: Hugh
Benson, Matt Boyle, Eric Brown, David Charles, David Ebrey, Matt Evans, Gail
Fine, Devin Henry, Brad Inwood, Terry Irwin, Bryan Reece, Ravi Sharma, Alison Simmons, Nick Smith, Roslyn Weiss, and two anonymous referees.
20
vol. 13, no. 14 (july 2013)
russell e. jones
Striker, G. 1994. Platos Socrates and the Stoics. In Vander Waerdt

1994: 241251.
Vander Waerdt, P.A., ed. 1994. The Socratic Movement. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Vlastos, G. 1991. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Zeyl, D. 1982. Socratic Virtue and Happiness. Archiv fr Geschichte der
Philosophie 64: 225238.
21
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volume 13, no. 14

Wisdom and Happiness

2013 Russell E. Jones

2. Nicomachean Ethics 1095b311096a2. I borrow philosophers paradox from

Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

stretching back at least to the Stoics, and common today.4 As I will

performed by some person is aimed at promoting her own happiness (often

2. Alleged arguments for the sufficiency thesis in Euthydemus 278282

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Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

(281b4e5). From this Socrates concludes that if we want

In support of this reading, Irwin identifies three arguments, one for

(2) Therefore, each recognized good other than wisdom is, in

(3) Therefore, wisdom always makes us fortunate (280a6).

(3) Therefore, each of them is neither good nor evil (281e34).

(1) It is possible to use assets well or badly (280b7c3,

3. Stage 1: Wisdom is good fortune. (Euthydemus 279c280b)

(3) Wisdom is necessary and sufficient for correct use (281a1b2).

Socrates final argument is meant to secure Socrates previous

7. I have in mind those interpretations on which some part or all of Euthydemus

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Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

that. Two related interpretive issues immediately arise. First, are we to

What do you mean?

And reconsidering the matter I said, You and I have

And, I said, dont grammarians have the best fortune

How so? he asked.

Well then, with respect to the dangers of the sea, do you

Because by putting good fortune in the previous list, we

10. Translations are my own throughout, unless otherwise attributed (though

9. Scholars who have given an affirmative answer to this question include

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Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

When Socrates sums up the results of his argument at 280b13, he

 hen let us consider the consequence of this. Since we all want to be

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Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

So then, you think that it is more fortunate to do things with a wise

vol. 13, no. 14 (july 2013)

Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

experts, for the most part ( ).16 To say that experts

provided an argument that is as deficient as the one Russell finds. Indeed,

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Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

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Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

focus, an adequate understanding of the game, and a practiced swing,

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Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

that sometimes they do not. But internal-success is always available to

So, (WPF-7) Wisdom produces whatever good fortune is

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Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

or entails good fortune, wisdom suffices for happiness. Good fortune

5. Stage 1 and the sufficiency thesis

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Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

Clearly not, Socrates.

We agreed, I said, that if we possessed many good things,

hen let us consider the consequence of this. Since we all want to be

( AWC-4*) Correct use of possessions is provided for if knowledge is

( AWC-6*) Wisdom guarantees that ones possessions contribute to