From The History of Religions PDF

From The History of Religions to Biblical Hermeneutics
Antnio Barbosa da Silva & Douglas H. Jackson

1

SE HE
ME
Antnio Barbosa da Silva (ed.)
&
Douglas H. Jackson

FROM THE HISTORY OF
RELIGIONS TO BIBLICAL
HERMENEUTICS

PH
An analysis of some necessary conditions for a reasonable inter-
pretation of Mircea Eliades and Paul Ricoeurs works

2

From The history of Religions
to Biblical Hermeneutics


3

From the History of Religions to Biblical Hermeneutics

An analysis of some necessary conditions for a reasonable interpreta-
tion of Mircea Eliades and Paul Ricoeurs works

Meaning

Semantics Phenomenology Hermeneutics

The figure illustrates the relationship between semantics, her-
meneutics and phenomenology with regard to the phenome-
non of meaning.

Alpha Beta Sigma, Uppsala, Sweden 2007

4

Alpha Beta Sigma
C/o da Silva Racing AB
Postbox 255
S- 75 105 Uppsala
Sweden
Email Address: [email protected]

Alpha Beta Sigma and the authors

Alpha Beta Sigma Sweden 2007

ISBN 91 971120-4-6

5
Contents

Page
Acknowledgment 9
Biographical Notes .. 11
Introductory Remarks ... 13

Chapter 1:
Mircea Eliades Approach to Religious Phenomena .. 17
1.1 Introduction ....... 17
1.2 Background: Eliade as Religious Scholar ... 18
1.3 Refinement of some technical terms ... 20
1.4 Five Necessary Conditions for a Reasonable Interpretation of
Eliades Writings . 22
1.5 Eliades Continental Way of Doing Philosophy and
the history of religions. 24
1.6 The Difference Between What Eliade Says That He Does and
What He Does. 30
1.7 Eliades Contribution to the Anti-Reductionistic Debate . 36
1.7.1 Eliades Contribution to Religious Studies. . 41
1.8 Concluding Remarks .. 45

Chapter 2:
Paul Ricoeurs Phenomenological Hermeneutics.. 47
2.1 Introduction ....... 47
6
2.2 Background ..... 48
2.3 The purpose of this essay ......... 51
2.4 Methodological Considerations .. 52
2.4.1 Refinement and Definition of Some Technical Terms . 55
2.4.2 Four Levels of Interpretation .. 57
2.5 Ricoeurs Methodological Presuppositions ... 61
2.5.1 The General Philosophical Presuppositions of
Ricoeurs Approach ... 61
2.5.1.1 Ontological and Metaphysical Presuppositions .. 65
2.5.1.2 Epistemological Presuppositions 69
2.5.1.3 Semantic Presuppositions......... 80
2.5.2 Ricoeurs Specific Presupposition from
Existentialist Philosophy 82
2.5.2.1 The Main Themes of Existentialism... 82
2.5.2.2 Ricoeurs Existential-Ontological Presuppositions .. 84
2.5.2.3 Ricoeurs Relationship to Heidegger .. 86
2.5.2.4 The Fundamental Structures of Mans Existence or
Being (Existentialia)........... 86
2.5.2.5 Understanding as a Primary Existentiale .. 87
2.5.2.6 Man as a Linguistic Being .... 88
2.5.2.7 The Importance of Lived Experience.. 89
2.5.2.8 Mans Projected Possibilities ... 91
2.6 The Most Necessary Condition for Understanding Ricoeurs
Complex Approach ... 93
2.6.1 The Continental Way of Doing Philosophy .. 95

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2.6.2 The Anglo-Saxon Way of Doing Philosophy ... 96
2.7 A Critical Assessment of Ricoeurs Complex Methodology..... 97
2.8 Ricoeurs Way of Doing Philosophy Illustrated by His
Hermeneutical Approach ..... 100
2.8.1 Some Presuppositions that Illustrate Ricoeurs Way of
Doing Hermeneutics ......................... 102
2.8.1.1 The Way Ricoeur Uses His Presuppositions in His
Critique of Bultmann .... 104
2.8.1.1.a Ricoeurs Use of His Semantic Presuppositions in
His Critique of Bultmanns Hermeneutics . 104
2.8.1.1.b Ricoeurs Use of His Semantic Presuppositions in
His Critique of Bultmanns Exegesis .. 115
2.8.1.1.c Ricoeurs Use of His Semantic Presuppositions in His
Critique of Bultmanns Existential Theology..... 119
2.9 Concluding Remarks......... 132

Chapter 3:
Epilogue and Concluding Remarks on Eliades and
Ricoeurs Approach . 135
3.1 Introduction . 136
3.2 Eliades Distinctive Way of Doing Phenomenological
Hermeneutics 136
3.3 Ricoeurs Distinctive Way of Doing Phenomenological
Hermeneutics ............................. 137
3.4 Eliades Phenomenological Hermeneutics .. 137
8
3.5 Ricoeurs Phenomenological Hermeneutics..................... 138
3.6 The Relationship Between Eliades Approach to Religious
Texts and Ricoeurs Approach to BiblicalTexts in Light of
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 Above ...... 141
3.7 The Fruitfulness of the Works of Eliade and Ricoeur 147
3.8 Concluding Remarks.... 150
Selected Bibliography.... 153
Other Relevant Literature for Understanding Eliades Approach
to Religious Phenomena ... 166


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Acknowledgments
We want to thank Dr. Bryan Rennie at Westminster College,
Pennsylvania USA, for his edition of Chapter One which had
been intended to be included in an anthology, edited by him,
on Eliade's contribution to the religious studies.
Our thanks are also addressed to Dr. Helge Slotten, my col-
league in the Department of Psychology, Religion and Health
at Ansgar School of Theology and Mission, Kristiansand, Nor-
way, for his improvements of the English language in the In-
troduction, and to Thomas Freitag for proofreading the text.
Lastly we thank the pharmacist, Domingos Barbosa da Silva,
Oslo, Norway, for his technical assistance in the overall design
and printing of this book.

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11

Biographical Notes

Antnio Barbosa da Silva was born on Cape Verde Islands, a
former Portuguese colony in West Africa, which received its
independence in 1975. He did his academic studies in Portugal,
Norway and Sweden.
He is Theol. Dr. from The University of Uppsala 1982, with the
thesis: Phenomenology of Religion as a Philosophical Problem,
where he became Associate Professor in the Philosophy of Re-
ligion in 1983. From 1993 to 1995 he worked as an adjunct Pro-
fessor of Philosophy of Sciences and Health Care Ethics at The
Nordic School of Public Health, Gteborg, Sweden.
Since 1995 he has been Professor of Philosophy of Sciences,
Ethics and Systematic Theology (Stavanger) and Mental
Healthcare (Kristinasand) in Norway.
He is a highly esteemed lecturer within the Nordic countries
and internationally. He is the author of several works on the
philosophy of religion, inter-religious dialogue, Jewish-
Christian relations, cultural confrontation, Christian ethics,
healthcare ethics, the philosophy of healthcare sciences, and
the theoretical foundations of qualitative methods and ap-
proaches.
Douglas H. Jackson is from the United States of America. He is
Assistant Professor of the Old Testament at Wesley University
College, Dorchester, New York, USA. He has a Masters Degree
in Physics and a Masters Degree in Theology. He is now writing
his doctoral dissertation on the biblical hermeneutics of the
French philosopher of religion, Paul Ricoeur.
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13

Introductory Remarks

The purpose of this book is to present two essays on the pre-
eminent contemporary scholars, Mircea Eliade and Paul Ric-
oeur. Although Eliade and Ricoeur are from Romania and
France respectively, both are better known in The United States
than elsewhere. Why we regard them as globally relevant is
evident from the chapters that follow.
Chapter one, on Eliade, written by Antnio Barbosa da Silva,
was originally read in a conference in South Africa, entitled
MIRCEA ELIADE'S VISION AND THE GLOBAL UNDER-
STANDING OF RELIGION: The International Eliade. IAHR
DURBAN CONGRESS 2000; XVIII Quinquennial Congress:
Durban, 5-12 August 2000.
1

Chapter Two, on Ricoeur, written by Douglas H. Jackson and
Antnio Barbosa da Silva, was sent to the Romanian journal
Archvs Studies in History of religions in 2002 through its
editor Eugen Ciurtin. It was understood that it would be pub-
lished in the subsequent edition; though it was sent before the
publication deadline, nothing has been seen of the essay in the

1
Antnio Barbosa da Silvas essay (which constitutes now the content of chapter 1
in this book) was read at the conference by Dr Bryan Rennie, Westminster College,
PA [email protected]. It was supposed to be published in 2002 in Ren-
nie, Bryan S. (ed.), Vol. 2 on Mircea Eliade.
14
journal and all attempts to contact the editor regarding the sit-
uation have failed. The rest of this book is written by Antnio
Barbosa da Silva.
We have at least three related reasons for compiling the two
essays together at this time. First of all, it should be noted that
both Mircea Eliade and Paul Ricoeur use the same phenomeno-
logical and hermeneutical methods of description and analysis,
albeit on partly different materials for different purposes. Eli-
ade applies phenomenology and hermeneutics to religious ma-
terials in their historical and cultural contexts. The purpose of
Eliades approach is primarily to compare different religions in
order to find out their common perception and conception of
the sacred as, in his view, the core of all religious experienc-
es. He also analyses the individuals (Lat. homo religiosus) un-
derstanding of his existential situation (Fr. La situation human-
aine) in its encounter with the sacred or holy (Ger. Das Heilige)
Ricoeur uses both religious and non-religious materials from
inter alia, the history of philosophy. The aim of his phenomeno-
logical and hermeneutical approach is existential analysis la
Eliade as well as biblical hermeneutics in his individually dis-
tinctive way of doing philosophy.
2

The second reason for putting the two essays together is the
fact that Ricoeur acknowledges his dependence on Eliade in
building his own theory and interpretation of symbols.
3
There
is indeed a certain affinity in their methodological approach as
to how they apply the phenomenological and hermeneutical

2
See Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, pp. 3-24 and 47-157. Cf. Vikstrm, B. 2000. Ricoeurs
own biblical hermeneutics is done in polemics with inter alia, Rudolf Bultmann (cf.
Ricoeur, P. 1969.b, chapter V.)
3
Ricoeur, P. 1965.a, pp. 38-43; Ricoeur, P. Intellectual Autobiography, p. 17. See
also pages: 102, 153, 166, 454 and 569 (where Ricoeur calls Eliade a philosopher of
religion).

15
methods to their respective materials. (Cf. section 3.6 below.)
Thirdly, we shall use the same analytical method in both, in
our analysis of theyr works: the theory of argumentation in
which the definition, refinement of vague and ambiguous
words and the use of a reasonable interpretation as opposed to
intentional interpretation play a fundamental role in our critical
and philosophical analysis of Eliades approach and Ricoeurs
approach.
4
This analytical method was used, for example, in
Barbosa da Silvas doctoral dissertation in The Phenomenology of
Religion as a Philosophical Problem, 1982
5
and in his book: Is
There a New Imbalance in Jewish-Christian Relations?
6

Great scholars throughout history are known to be controver-
sial, Eliade and Ricoeur being no exceptions. As we have at-
tempted to show in the following chapters, there are various
interpretations of Eliade and Ricoeur's works, with some of the
interpretations being mutually exclusive. We do not claim that
we have made the most reasonable interpretation of their cor-
pus. What we do claim is that our interpretation of them is a
reasonable one, according to the criteria of interpretation that we
have utilized. However, those who reject our criteria will disa-
gree with us. We have attempted to present a reasonable inter-
pretation of the two scholars works in order to attain the ulti-
mate goal of this little book, which is in part to emphasize the
complexity of Elaides and Ricoeurs writings. We will also fo-
cus on their special contribution to the understanding and in-
terpretation of religious texts: their endeavour to demonstrate
that the human being is homo religious, whose self-
understanding presupposes the understanding and interpreta-
tion of religious symbols. Eliade calls these archaic religious

4
The meanings of these technical terms are clarified in both chapters of this book.
5
See Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 15-23; 68-73.
6
See Barbosa da Silva, A. 1992, pp. 35-40.
16
symbols hierophanies (from the Greek hieros + phania = the holy
shows or manifests stself), a term which Ricoeur copiously bor-
rows. For a more detailed description of the similarities and
dissimilarities between Eliades approach to religious texts and
Ricoeurs approach to biblical texts, see chapter 3 below.

Kristiansand, Norway, October 18
th
2006
Antnio Barbosa da Silva


17

Chapter

Mircea Eliades Approach to Religious Phenomena

Five Necessary Conditions for Understanding Mircea Eli-
ades Way of Doing the History of Religions

Antnio Barbosa da Silva

1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to state five necessary conditions
for understanding M. Eliades way of doing "the history of
religions", i.e., his approach to religious phenomena. The
overarching perspective here is the philosophy of social
sciences and the humanities. The five conditions are 1) One
should be aware of Eliade's special use of the term "the history
of religions." 2) One should also be aware of the difference
between the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon way of doing
philosophy and research. Eliade seems to be influenced by both
18
ways.
7
Therefore Eliade can also be regarded as a philosopher
of religion. 3) One should distinguish sharply between (a) an
intentional and (b) a reasonable type of interpretation. One
cause of the controversy between the interpreters of Eliade may
be the fact that some of them attempt to interpret him
exclusively according to (a), whereas others seem to restrict
themselves to (b). Therefore they usually achieve different
results, on which they base their categorical view of the
theoretical status of Eliade's research and his way doing "the
history of religions". 4) Closely related to 3) above, a distinction
should be made between what Eliade says that he does and
what he, de facto, does. The fact that some interpreters of Eliade
do not make this distinction might be another cause of the con-
troversy between them, concerning Eliades scholarly status. 5)
It is also relevant to be aware that in Eliade's writings there is
at least a mixture of the following levels: (i) concrete
phenomenology of religion (ii) essential phenomenology, (iii)
comparative study of religion, and (iv) "philosophical" and
philological speculations, e.g., la C. G. Jung and G.
Dumezil.
8
For each one of these levels Eliade approaches
religious phenomena with partly different methods and for
different purposes, despite his specification of his method.

1.2 Background: Eliade as a Religious Scholar
Mircea Eliade is a controversial scholar of religious studies. As
I have pointed out in my doctorial dissertation:

7
Quinton, A. Continental philosophy, 1995, pp. 161-163; For Analytic Philoso-
phy, see Honderich, T. (ed.), 1995, pp. 28-30.
8
Cf. Eliade, M. 1971, pp. 69 (the footnote), 76, 80f, 117f, 153, 186, 237f, 240, 398,
409, 424 (footnote) and 427 (footnote).

19
A debated question among Eliades critics is whether he should
be described as a historian of religions, or as a phenomenolo-
gist of religion. Attempts to give a correct answer to this ques-
tion have divided Eliades critics into two groups: (1) the nega-
tive critics (hereafter NC) who are highly critical of his work
and regard him a speculative and anti-historical, and (2) the
positive critics (hereafter PC) who regard him as a prototype
for future historians of religions. The view purposed in this
study is that neither the NC nor the PC are completely correct,
since they fail to take into consideration two important features
of Eliades research program, namely what we have called here
(a) Eliades discussions of the history of religions, taken in the
sense of Religionswissenschaft, and (b) Eliades particular way
of doing the history of religions, taken in the sense of the phe-
nomenology of religion (phR), or what Eliade prefers to call
creative hermeneutics (CH). We shall call the latter hermeneu-
tic phR.
9

The thesis of this essay is that Eliades application of the terms
the History of Religions to his approach and the historian of
religions to himself is to be understood in the following way:
Eliade studies religious phenomena as a comparativist and her-
meneut-phenomenologist of religion. To defend this thesis the in-
terpreter of Eliade should make a reasonable and not an inten-
tional interpretation of his writings.
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that to make reasonable
interpretation of Eliades writings or religious studies one
should fulfill the five necessary conditions stated above. In my
doctoral dissertation I have used this approach, borrowed from
the analytical philosophy, to demonstrate that neither Eliades
negative critics nor his positive critics or interpreters are right.
Their misunderstanding of Eliades writings may be explained

9
Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 13f.
20
as follows: they do not take into consideration the difference
between Eliades talks of the History of Religions and his
distinctive way of doing the History of Religions.
10

The use of intentional interpretation is suitable to correctly de-
scribe Eliades talks of the history of religions. However, to
explain what Eliade is, de facto, doing in his approach to reli-
gious phenomena, the use of reasonable interpretation is more
appropriate for the reasons given in what follows.
11

1.3 Refinement and Definition of Some Technical Terms
A reasonable interpretation requires the refinement of the fol-
lowing terms used here as tools of analysis.
Interpretation: To say that an expression U is an interpretation
of a different expression T is the same as to say that there is at
least one person P and a situation S such that U can express the
same assertion as T for P in S.
12

Reasonable Interpretation: U is a reasonable interpretation of T
when T occurs in S means the same as When T occurs in S, T
usually means the same as U (Barbosa da Silva, Imbalance, 31).
The criterion of a correct reasonable interpretation is the rules
of the language in which U and T are written or uttered. The
rules contribute to public consensus, for example, among
scholars of religion and those who are competent in the rele-
vant languag
Refinement: "An expression U is a refinement of an expression T
means here that all reasonable interpretations of U are reasona-
ble interpretations of T, and that there is at least one reasonable

10
Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, p. 13f.
11
Ibid., p. 19f.
12
Nss, A. 1966, p. 28, cf. Barbosa da Silva, A. 1992, 35f.

21
interpretation of T which is not a reasonable interpretation of
U."
13

Intentional Interpretation: That an expression U is an intentional
interpretation of another expression T means the same as that U
expresses the same meaning (intention) that the writer or
speaker intends to express by T. A writers intention may refer
to (a) the logical or objective (intersubjective) meaning what
a writer wishes to transmit in his/her writings or utterance,
which can be reconstructed through a reasonable interpretation
of his or her writings by appeal to the conventional or public
meanings of words. Intention may also refer to (b) as the psy-
chological processes and ideas which occur in the writers or
speakers mind during the process of writing or speaking (cf.
Schleiermacher). It is in sense (b) that intention is said to be the
sole criterion of a correct or valid intentional interpretation. In
Hirschs words: The interpreters primary task is to reproduce
in himself the authors logic, attitudes, his cultural givens, in
short his world. The ultimate principle of verification is very
simple the imaginative reconstruction of the speaking sub-
ject.
14
Intention in sense (a), but not in sense (b), is compatible
with a reasonable interpretation of a text or speech.
An intentional interpretation which attempts to capture the writ-
ers or speakers intention in sense (b) seems to be practically
impossible for the following reasons:
1). A writers or a speakers desire to communicate a par-
ticular meaning does not necessarily guarantee that
he/she will succeed in doing so. For example Jung prom-
ises to use the phenomenological method in his study of
religion, but he does not use it consistently. He goes be-

13
Ibid., p. 38.
14
Hirsch, Jr. E. D. 1973, p. 242.
22
yond phenomenological analysis and enters into meta-
physics and theology (Jung, Psychology and Religion, 1-
4). The same can be said about the relation between Eli-
ades and Ricouers explicit intentions and what they, de
facto, do.
2). A writer or speaker may convey a meaning of which
he/she is not aware. This may happen because (i) some-
times a person fails to utter (or write) the word sequence
he intends to, through a slip of tongue or pen, and (ii)
sometimes a person holds false beliefs about the meaning
of the words that he/she utters or writes or about the sub-
ject-matter he/she is writing or talking about.
15

Generous Interpretation: U is a generous interpretation of T
means that (i) U is a reasonable interpretation of T and that (ii)
U makes T consistent and coherent with the different types of
context in which T occurs.
Because it is practically impossible to make an intentional in-
terpretation of a writer in sense b) above, due to the reasons
stated under 1) and 2) above, it seems to be more fruitful to
attempt to make a reasonable interpretation of scholarly works.
Concerning Eliade, it is my conviction that in order to carry out
a reasonable interpretation of him, at least, the five following
necessary conditions should be fulfilled:

15
Cf. Wimsatt and Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 1970, 347-360. The au-
thors define intention as follows: Intention is design or plan in the authors mind.
Intention has obvious affinities with the authors attitude toward his work, the way
he felt, what made him write (Ibid., p. 347).

23

1.4 Five Necessary Conditions for a Reasonable Interpreta-
tion of Eliades Writings
1. One should be aware of Eliades special use of the term the
History of Religions.
2. One should also be aware of the difference between the Con-
tinental and the Anglo-Saxon way of doing philosophy and
research. Eliade seems to be influenced by both ways. There-
fore Eliade has also been regarded as a philosopher of reli-
gion.
16

3. In interpreting Eliades writings, one should distinguish
sharply between: 3.a) an intentional and 3.b) a reasonable
type of interpretation. One cause of the controversy between
the interpreters of Eliade may be the fact that some of them
attempt to interpret him exclusively according to 3.a),
whereas others seem to restrict themselves to 3.b). Therefore
they usually achieve different results on which they base
their categorical view of the scholarly status of Eliades re-
search and his way of doing the History of Religions.
4. Closely related to 3) above, a distinction should be made
between 4.a) what Eliade says that he does or intends to do,
and 4.b) what he, de facto, does. The fact that some interpret-
ers of Eliade do not make this distinction might be another
cause of the controversy between them regarding their un-
derstanding of Eliades approach. To account for the differ-
ence between 4.a) and 4.b) the reader of Eliade should make
a reasonable interpretation of his writings.

16
Ricoeur, P. Intellectual Autobiography, p. 17. See also pages: 102, 153, 166, 454
and 569 (where Ricoeur calls Eliade a philosopher of religion).
24
5. Interpreters of Eliade should also be aware that: in Eliades
writings there are a mixture or combination of, inter alia, the
following levels: 5.a) concrete, descriptive phenomenology
of religion, 5.b) essential phenomenology, 5.c) comparative
study of religion, 5.d) philosophical speculation, e.g., la
Carl Gustav Jung, and 5.e) hermeneutic-phenomenology la
Martin Heidegger and etymological analysis la George
Dumzil.
17
For each one of the levels 5a) to 5e), Eliade ap-
proaches religious phenomena with partly different method
and for a different purpose or goal, despite his specification
of his intended goal and method.
Without taking these five conditions into consideration we
Eliades critics can be compared with the men in the parable
of the blind men and the elephant each one describes one
part of the elephant (parts of Eliades writings) which we iden-
tify with the whole elephant (the entire corpus of Eliades writ-
ings) (cf. Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, 140).

1.5 Eliades Continental Way of Doing Philosophy and The
History of Religions
In this section I shall attempt to defend the view that Eliades
style of The History of Religions (Ger. Religionswissenschaft), is
basically Continental and not Anglo-Saxon, though he spent
many years as Professor of The History of Religions at The
University of Chicago. To defend this view I shall now give a
very short account of what seem to be the main differences be-

17
Cf. Eliade, M. 1971, pp. 69 (see footnote), 76, 80f, 117f, 153, 186, 237f, 240,
398, 409, 424 (see footnote) and 427 (see the footnote).

25
tween the Continental and the Anglo-Saxons way of doing
philosophy.
18

From about 1910 or 1912 and onward, Anglo-Saxon philosophy
has been predominantly the so-called analytic philosophy that
has been wrongly identified with empirical and positivist epis-
temology and the philosophy of 1920-1930s positivists. Analyt-
ic philosophy was found, first of all, by Moore, Russell and
Frege. It has been developed by, e.g., Wittgenstein, Ryle, Aus-
tin, Strawson and Dummett. It deals essentially with semantic
or conceptual and logical analysis of language, the purpose of
which is to enable philosophers to reason from a clear idea to
the next.
19
This purpose is thought to be achieved by means of,
inter alia, definitions of concepts, the refinement of vague or
ambiguous terms, and the analysis of logical relations among
statements to see whether they constitute a consistent and co-
herent whole, or not. In this way, analytic scholars also attempt
theoretical integration from the semantic, logical, epistemologi-
cal and ontological point of view. This method is illustrated by,
e.g., Moores Principia Ethica and Russells Problems of Philoso-
phy. In addition to conceptual analysis, Moore and Russell put
their trust in common sense as the starting point of all philo-
sophical reflection and analysis.
20

Another basic feature of analytic philosophy is logical strin-
gency in argumentation, i.e., consistency and coherence in the

18
Cf. Honderich, T. 1995 (ed.), p. 738f.)
19
The analytical philosophical style has its roots, for example, in Socrates, Augus-
tine, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant.
20
They do this as a critical stand against the absolute idealism of the British philos-
ophers McTaggart and Bradley, two followers of Hegels ontological and epistemo-
logical idealism. Moores and Russerls trust in common sense has its parallel in
Husserls and Heideggers affirmation that the life-world (Ger. Lebenwelt) should
be the basis on which philosophical reflection should be built. Cf. Critchley, S.
1999, p.13.
26
relation between statements or propositions that constitute dis-
courses which claim to express philosophical or scientific truth.
In summary we can say that the spirit of analytic philosophy
has respect for scientific knowledge, both as a paradigm of
rational belief and in conformity with its argumentative rigor,
its clarity, and its determination to be objective.
21

The characteristic Continental style of doing philosophy is, in
some ways, a continuation and critique of Hegels idealistic
philosophy. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy characterizes
the Continental philosophy as follows:
The phrase continental philosophy acquired its current
meaning only after the Second World War when a process of
increasing mutual exclusion of the English-speaking philo-
sophical world and that of the continent of Europe, which
had been going on since early in the century, was finally rec-
ognized to be as deep as it was. Since 1945 the originally mi-
nute group of English-speaking philosophers interested in
continental philosophy has slowly enlarged. There have
been a few French and German philosophers who have as-
sociated themselves with one or another brand of analytic
philosophy in the Anglo-American style. But there is really
no perceptible convergence between the two philosophical
worlds. Existentialism, structuralism, and critical theory are
very different from each other. Derridas deconstructionism,
for which everything is text, freely, endlessly interpretable,
seemed to analytic philosophers a reduction ad absurdum of
philosophy since it allowedfor no standards of truth, evi-

21
Quinton, A. In: Honderich (ed.) 1995, pp.28-30. The same striving for clarity
characterizes contemporary Anglo-American scholarship. Analytic philosophy is
sometimes called Oxford philosophy or linguistic philosophy. See more about this
in Audi, R. 1995, p.22.

27
dence, or logical consistency. It made philosophy not only a
game, but a game without rules.
22

The Continental style is said to be essentially synthetic and not
analytic.
23
It conceives of the function of philosophy as being
constructive or synthetic. David Basinger, Michael Peterson
et al. describe this function as follows:
[] an aspect of the philosophic task that involves attempt-
ing to build a comprehensive point of view. The synthetic
approach was taken to the extreme in the nineteenth and ear-
ly twentieth centuries by idealistic philosophers, who de-
duced very elaborate and highly speculative systems of
thought from a few principles that they took as certain. As a
reaction, the synthetic approach has been in disrepute for
many decades among narrowly analytic philosophers.
24

The Continental style is here characterized as an attempt to
elaborate a comprehensive system of thought. This attempt is ex-
emplified by the works of, e.g., Hegel, Heidegger, Gadamer, in
which there are certain recurrent fundamental terms such as
Being, Non-Being, Absolute Spirit, Existence, Dasein, Mit-Sein, and
Power, the meaning of which are not always clearly explained
but which are taken to be self-evident, at least, for a given cate-
gory of readers.
25
These technical terms seem to be used, by the

22
Quinton, A. 1995, pp. 161-163. For analytic philosophy, see Ibid., pp. 28-30.
23
It is especially the European philosophy developed after World War II that I want
to characterize as Continental. It comprises, inter alia, Husserls phenomenology;
Heideggers, Gadamers and Ricoeurs hermeneutic phenomenology; Sartres, de
Beauvoirs, Marcels existential phenomenology; and Merleau-Pontys phenome-
nology of perception; Lvi-Strauss structuralism; Habermass (Frankfurt School)
critical theory; and Derridas, Foucaults, Barthes, and Deleuzes deconstruction.
Here it is their main features that shall be emphasized. (Cf. Audi, R. 1995 p. 157.
24
Basinger, D. Peterson, M., et al. (eds.) 1991, p. 7f.
25
Cf. the illuminating comments on this issue by Rennie, Reconstructing Eliade, p.
22.
28
followers of the Continental style, in an analogous way that
axioms are used in mathematics.
Compared with the analytic style, Continental philosophers
works can be said to exhibit at times a complex interpretative
framework, eclecticism, a lack of clarity in analysis, a lack of
stringency in argumentation, a lack of theoretical integration,
and an attempt to build comprehensive explanatory theories
or systems.
26
The analytic philosophy style is regarded as more
argumentative, whereas the continental philosophy style as
more suggestive. The difference between the two styles can
be described as follows:
An argumentative mode of communication is characterized
by a clear and well-defined terminology, and carefully devel-
oped arguments for each problematical postulation made. A
suggestive mode of communication tries to direct attention to
something important by using images, associations, semantic
openness, poetical dimensions to professional terms, and so
on. A strictly argumentative mode of communication is one
of the features that have characterized the various forms of
English analytic philosophy, and it is also typical of main-
stream philosophy of religion in England [] Gadamer,
Heidegger, etc., have what I would call a suggestive mode of
communication. So does Ernst Bloch.
27

These differences between the analytic and Continental style
are relevant for understanding Eliades approach, in which
both styles are used. Two other very relevant features of the
Continental philosophy to be emphasized here are the centrali-
ty of tradition and history and the utopian demand that

26
Cf. the works of analytic philosophers such as George E. Moore, Bertrand Rus-
sell and Rudolf Carnap.
27
Jeffner, A. 1979, p. 254.

29
things be otherwise.
28
Both features characterize the Continen-
tal way of doing philosophy.
17

The analytic style is, to a certain extent, applied, e.g., in Eliades
Yoga, Immortality and Freedom, whereas the Continental one is
to be found in most of Eliades works. Eliade has also influ-
enced Continental scholars. Ricoeur, e.g., declares that he bor-
rows some of his fundamental ideas from Eliade (De
linterprtation. Essai sur Freud, 41). It is therefore not wrong to
regard Eliade as a Continental philosopher of religion on a par
with, for example, Ricoeur and Tillich. Both Eliade and Ricoeur
tend to elaborate comprehensive systems according to the Con-
tinental style of doing philosophy. As a matter of fact they be-
long to both the Continental and the Anglo-American worlds.
29

There are indeed strong reasons, based on the history of phi-
losophy, which support the view that philosophy should not
be done solely either in the analytic or the Continental style,
but in both styles as Eliade attempts to do.
30
(Cf. Ricoeur, P. and
Tillich, P.).
It is worth noting here that the distinction between the two
styles is of degree and not of art. The distinction here has the
only purpose of clarifying the presuppositions of Eliades writ-
ings and the complexity of his approach and not of evaluating
the two ways of doing philosophy. It is used as a tool of analy-
sis and not as having intrinsic value in itself, and it is therefore
intended here to have primarily a heuristic and descriptive
function and not a normative one.

28
Critchley, S. 1999, pp. 9-10.
29
See the Biographical Notes in the Introduction of this book.
30
For examples, in the works of Plato, Hobbes, Hume, John Stuart Mill, Kant, Hus-
serl, Ricoeur and Ernst Tugendhat there are features of both styles of philosophy.
(Cf. Williams, B. 1996, p. 27.)
30
As a parenthesis we want to point out the following: By and
large, we find three main streams of epistemological theory
in the history of Western philosophy from Socrates (c. 470-399
BC) until today, e.g., Willard van Orman Quine. First, we can
talk about those philosophers who, in one way or another,
follow Platos idealism and rationalism. Representatives for
this group are, e.g., Anselm of Canterbury, Ren Descartes,
Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz and Georg Hegel. Second, there is
the group of philosophers that follows Aristotles empirical
tradition in epistemology. To this group belong the British
empiricists like David Hume and John Locke, and modern
logical positivists of the Vienna circle, such as the early Lud-
wig Wittgenstein, Moritz Schlick, Rudolph Carnap, Karl
Popper, and Karl Hempel. Third, there is a group that does
not entirely belong either to Platos idealistic-rationalistic tra-
dition or to the empirical tradition. Thomas Aquinas, Im-
manuel Kant and the well known contemporary philosopher,
Willard Quine, seem to belong to the third group. Quines
holism can be summarized as follows: Most modern empiri-
cists had held that the meanings of everyday and scientific
propositions determine which experiences count as evidence
for or against them: there are analytic truths (truths which
hold by virtue of meanings) which record these links with
experience and guide us in forming our opinions. [Quines]
Two Dogmas of empiricism, 1953) rejected this picture: ex-
perience counts for or against our entire body of beliefs in a
holistic manner, and little that is systematic can be said about
the meanings of particular sentences.
31
Although Kants phi-
losophy is called critical idealism, whereas Quines philoso-
phy is called holism, both of them attempt to combine aspects
of rationalistic epistemology with aspects of empirical epis-
temology. For an overview on the history of epistemology see
Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Parts I and II. Almost all
the mentioned philosophers do philosophical analysis, albeit

31
Cf. Honderich, T. 1995 (ed.), 738f.

31
in different degree, compared with what is usually called the
Ango-Saxon or Anglo-American way of doing philosophy.

1.6 The Difference between What Eliade Says That He Does
and What He Does
Our distinction between what a writer explicitly promises to do
and what he/she, de facto, does, is closely related to the distinc-
tion between an intentional and a reasonable interpretation of a
text or speech. An intentional interpretation attempts to account
for the writers explicit intention to correctly deal with a given
issue, which is closely related to the writers own understand-
ing of what he/she writes, whereas a reasonable interpretation
attempts to answer the question: What does the writer, de facto,
write, or more specifically, what is written in his/her writings,
which the reader can understand by relying on the public rules
and meaning of language?
32

Eliade sometimes calls himself a historian of religions and
sometimes a historian and phenomenologist of religion.
33

Some scholars regard him as a comparativist.
34
He is also re-
garded as both a comparativist historian of religions in a broad
sense, and a hermeneut and a philosopher of religion.
35
I think,
however, that the most appropriate characterization of Eliade
is a comparativist and hermeneut-phenomenologist of reli-
gion la van der Leeuw. In the following passage Eliade calls
himself a historian of religion:

32
Cf. Public language and public knowledge in Wimsatt and Beardsley, 1989.
The Verbal Icon, p. 349.
33
Elade, M. 1973-1974 (1973), p. 101.
34
Ninian S. 1978, p. 171.
35
Ibid.
32
What we can see today is that man considers himself to have
nothing sacred, no god; but still his life has a meaning, because
without it he could not live; he would be a chaos. He looks for
being and does not immediately call it being, but meaning or
goals; he behaves in his existence as if he had a kind of center;
he is going somewhere [] We do not see anything religious
here; we just see man behaving as a human being. But as a his-
torian of religion, I am not certain that there is nothing religious
here.
36
(The italics are ours.)
In this and many other passages Eliade calls himself a histori-
an of religion (nota bene, the singular form of religion). But
what he is, de facto, doing in such passages is neither a descrip-
tion of the strict history of religions nor of the descriptive
phenomenology of religion. He is instead describing himself
as some kind of existential and hermeneutic-phenomenologist in a
manner similar to existentialists such as Heidegger, Jaspers and
Ricoeur, when he searches for the meaning of life in the legacy
of the history of religions.
37

Sometimes Eliade holds that the historian of religion must
carry out hermeneutic-phenomenological (i.e., existential)
analysis - without, however, mentioning these terms. This type
of analysis seems to be an integral part of his total or creative
hermeneutics,
38
the meaning of which he seems to regard as
self-evident to his readers. Thus he declares:
[] at some point the historian of religion must become a phe-
nomenologist of religion, because he tries to find meaning. With-
out hermeneutics, the history of religion is just another history -
bare facts []. With the problem of hermeneutics - meaning
we see that every manifestation of the sacred - symbol, myth,

36
Elade, M. 1973-1974 (1973), p. 103,
37
Cf. Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, pp. 3-24, 351-362.
38
Eliade, M. 1969, p. 57 and 60.

33
ritual - tells of something which is absolutely. Once the historian
of religion takes on the search for meaning, he can, following the
phenomenological principle of suspension of judgment [Epoch]
assume the structure of synchronicity, and, therefore, as I have
said before, bring together the meanings evident in many different
cultures and eras There will be many new openings to be con-
sidered by philosophy, because philosophy is interested in
knowing la situation humaine. This new philosophy will discov-
er all kinds of human situations []
39
40

In light of the Continental style of philosophy, especially as
exemplified by existentialist writings, this passage gives quite a
clear account of Eliades way of doing the history of reli-
gions. Eliade is saying here in a suggestive way that the
historian of religions as a hermeneut-phenomenologist, has to
search for meaning.
41
But it is not primarily the meaning of
religious phenomena, which the believers experience, which
they are usually able to describe on the level of concrete phe-
nomenology. It is instead the universal existential meaning given
in Mans as (Lat. homo religiosus) religiously existential situa-
tions (Fr. la situation humaine), which is said to be universal or
transhistorical, and not historical in the strict sense. There-
fore it is possible, according to Eliade, to grasp this type of
meaning by means of a synchronic (and not a diachronic) analy-
sis and comparison of religious phenomena detached from dif-

39
Eliade, M. 1973-1974 (1973) p. 106-07.
40
The Greek term Epoch (the phenomenological method) means suspension of
judgment. Cf. Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982 p. 36f. For Eliades reference to Husserls
phenomenology see Eliade, M. 1969, 34-36, 125.
41
Although Eliade says that he has no model, it can be shown that he has several
models. It is always necessary to distinguish between what Eliade says that he does
and what he actually does. Cf. Eliade, Journal IV, p. 41. Eliade seems to have many
models, for example, Nathan Sderblom, Rudolf Otto, Carl Jung, Martin
Heidegger, Paul Tillich, and Edmund Husserl.
34
ferent historical contexts.
42
To see that this account is a reason-
able interpretation of Eliades writings, one must relate a par-
ticular passage of Eliades writings (as the one quoted above)
to his writings as a whole (cf. the hermeneutical circle). This is
a way of making a reasonable interpretation of Eliades writ-
ings by consistently relating his seemingly mutually conflicting
assertions to one another, in the light of what is contextually
implied in non-literally related contexts, when read separately
and with the rigor of method and aims of analytic philosophy.
Eliades comparativistic approach seems to be implied in the
above quoted passage by the statement bring together the
meanings evident in many different cultures and eras. I take
the expression bring together in the same sense as com-
pare. If this is correct, then it allows us to say that, according
to Eliade, the historian of religion combines the phenomeno-
logical method (Epoch) with the comparative and hemeneuti-
cal method. This is a reasonable interpretation of the above and
similar passages. Let us now illustrate some of these features of
Eliades complex methodology.
In the following passage Eliade seems to state indirectly the
main feature of his comparative method which he describes in
metaphorical terms as follows:
I have the right to jump from the archaic Neolithic Near East to
India and Africa in examining the world of the agriculturist,
although it arose at different times in these places. That struc-

42
As a phenomenologist in Husserls sense, Eliade seems to use the term homo
religiosus in a way analogous to Husserls concept of the transcendental or pure
ego which grasps the universal meaning (intentionality), essence, or structure of
the phenomenon. As a hermeneut Eliade seems to assume or take on the role of an
actor who re-enacts in himself the original experience of homo religiosus and inter-
prets its existential-ontological or universal meaning for his contemporary. Cf.
Westphal, M. 1987, p. 11.

35
ture which I am grasping is based on intentionality; it is not the
historical present, nor is it a creation of the mind.
43

The term to jump here conveys the meaning of to compare,
whereas the term intentionality seems to be used as a syno-
nym of meaning in the phenome-nological and existential
sense. Eliades hermeneutic-phenomenology ( la Heidegger) is
implied by the following passage: From the Upanishads on-
wards, India has been seriously preoccupied with but one great
problem the structure of the human condition. (Hence it has
been said, and not without reason, that all Indian philosophy
has been, and still is, existentialist).
44

One must take into consideration the extra-linguistic context in
which Eliade lived and wrote his texts in order to understand-
ing this and similar passages. For this passage one should con-
sider the existentialist philosophy and its use of expressions
such as: La condition humaine, existential situation, Verstehen, existen-
tialia and existentale.
45
(Cf
.
section 2.5.2 below.)
This passage gives a quite clear account of Eliades way of do-
ing the hermeneutic-phenomenology of religion. By this type of
analysis of religious phenomena Eliade seems to mean the un-
veiling of the existential meaning (which is taken to be univer-

43
Eliade, M. 1973-1974 (173), p. 105.
44
Eliade, M. 1973, p. xvi).
45
Cf. Eliade, M. 1969, pp. 3 and 8 (notes 7 and 8), 10 (about human condition), 41
(note 2), 52 and 62 (about existential situations), 69f, 87, 125 and 157 (about human
condition). About this latter notion Eliade writes: Les textes indiens rptent
jusqu la satit cette thse, selon laquelle la cause de lesclavage de lme et, par
voie de consquence, la source des souffrances sans fin qui transforment la condi-
tion humaine en un drame permanent, rside dans la solidarisation de lhomme avec
le Cosmos [] De sorte que le yogin a russi se soustraire au Cosmos et se
retirer de lincessant et douloureux circuit cosmique, par le fait mme quil a aboli
sa condition humaine, obtient limmortalit, qui est libert, autonomie, batitude et
ternit (Eliade, M. 1962, pp. 30 and 280f).
36
sal) that religion (the sacred) has for human beings as such (Cf.
Bultmanns existential-ontological interpretation of the NT). This
means that while Eliades concrete or descriptive phenomenol-
ogy attempts to describe the existentiell meaning or signifi-
cance that religious phenomena have for the believers as the
latter experience them his hermeneutic understanding of
religion, on the contrary, is an attempt to unveil the existential-
ontological meaning that religion has for all human beings as
such.
46
By this type of meaning, Eliade, in the manner of, e.g.,
Heidegger, van der Leeuw, Ricouer and Tillich, seems to mean
that through the phenomenological analysis of religious expe-
riences, we might reach an authentic understanding of our-
selves,
47
in two different but closely related senses: (a) first,
existential ontological and (b) second, existentiell. Understanding
in the sense (a) is related to the question: what does it mean to
be human? Whereas in the sense (b) it related to the question:
what does it mean to be a human individual in a particular his-
torical context?
48
It is, according to Eliade, the task of the his-
torian of religions to answer both questions in the given or-

46
Heidegger uses this term to refer to what he calls existentialier, i.e., the basic
ontological structures of all human existence. Also the terms Verstehen, Sorge, or
Besorge, and Angst are used by Heidegger to refer to existentialier. Cf. Barbosa da
Silva, A. 1982, p. 54ff (about Heidegger) and 167f (about Eliades use of
Heideggers terminology). John Macquarrie shows how the terms existentiell
(individual or ontic) and existential (ontological) are used by Heidegger and
Bultmann. This way of distinguishing the two main different senses of the English
term existential is relevant for a reasonable interpretation of Eliades works. Cf.
Macquarrie, J. 1973, p. 34f.
47
Eliade, M. 1967 10f, 17f and 139f. Cf. Hedin, D. 1997, p. 69.
48
Hedin, D. 1997, p. 69 and cf. Macquarrie, J. 1973, p. 34. It is reasonable to as-
sume that the existentiell meaning belongs to the concrete, i.e., descriptive phenom-
enology of religion (the believers level), whereas the existential meaning belongs
to the essential, structural, morphological or typological phenomenology of religion
(the scholarly level of interpretation and description).

37
der.
49
In other words, one must know or understand the an-
swer to the existential-ontological question (a) before one can
apply the answer to ones existence, i.e., (b).
It should be emphasized again that in all the illustrations above
one should have in mind that a necessary condition for making
a reasonable interpretation of Eliades writings is the distinc-
tion between what Eliade says that he does, and what he, de
facto, does. The scholar who interprets Eliade should rely more
on the latter, because of Eliades inconsistency and eclecticism.

1.7 Eliades Contribution to the Anti-reductionistic Debate
When Eliade talks about religious phenomena as irreducible,
unique and sui generis, he means that they are, according to our
technical terminology, ontologically irreducible. Ontologically
speaking, one reduces x to y, if one claims that x is nothing else
but y.
50
That religious phenomena are ontologically irreduci-
ble is explained by Eliade as follows:
Modern science has restored a principle which was seri-
ously endangered by some of the confusions of the nine-
teenth century: It is the scale that makes the phenomenon.
Henri Poincar queried with some irony whether a natu-
ralist who had studied elephants only under the micro-
scope would think he knew enough about those animals?
The microscope shows the structure and mechanism of the
cells, a structure and mechanism which are the same in all
multicellular organisms. But is that all there is to know? At
the microscopic level one cannot be certain. At the level of
human eyesight, which does at least recognize the ele-
phant as a phenomenon of zoology, all uncertainty de-

49
Cf. Macquarrie, J. 1973, p. 34.
50
Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, p. 72.
38
parts. In the same way, a religious phenomenon will only
be recognized as such if it is grasped at its own level, that
is to say, if it is studied as something religious. To try to
grasp the essence of such a phenomenon by means of phys-
iology, psychology, sociology, or any other study is
false; it misses the one unique and irreducible element in it
the element of the sacred. Obviously there are no purely re-
ligious phenomena; no phenomenon can be solely and ex-
clusively religious.
51
By saying here that a religious phenomenon must be looked at
first of all in itself,
52
Eliade is tacitly referring to Husserls say-
ing that the phenomenologist should go to the phenomenon
itself, because the phenomenon shows itself to the human mind
or consciousness as it is in itself. This Husserlian way of talking
becomes apparent when Eliade asserts: Before making the
history of anything, one must have a proper understanding of
what it is, in and for itself (the italics are original).
53
By tacitly
alluding to phenomenology, Eliade is arguing against the onto-
logical reduction of religious phenomena. However, he accepts
what we shall call here methodological reduction defined as: x is
methodologically reduced to y if the method which is adequate for the
description of y is also adequate to describe x, without, however, ex-

51
Eliade, M. 1971, p. xi.
52
Ibid., 1971, p. xiii. One may define ontological reductionism in such a way
that it implies a monist view of reality. Cf. Kim, J. 1995, 751f.
53
Cf. Eliade, M. 1961, p. 29. Cf. Eliade, M. 1969, p. 36, where Eliade refers to
Husserl in his criticism of the historicists. To make a reasonable interpretation
of the quoted passage, one should be aware of the allusions Eliade seems to make to
Husserl. It is a commonplace that Husserls jargon to the things themselves
means to see the phenomena as they show themselves or appear to human con-
sciousness, i.e., without distortion or reducing them to something else. Given this
presupposition, and knowing Eliades phenomenological ambition and Continental
style, it is reasonable to associate what Husserl calls things in themselves with the
quoted passage from Patterns above.

39
cluding other possible ways of describing x.
54
Eliades acceptance
of methodological reductionism is implicit in the last sentence
in the long quotation from Patterns above, where he asserts:
Obviously there are no purely religious phenomena; no phe-
nomenon can be solely and exclusively religious.
Methodological reduction is not only permitted but also inevita-
ble in all kinds of scholarly or scientific works. That Eliade ac-
cepts this type of reduction by saying that:
Because religion is human it must for that very reason be
something social, something linguistic, something econom-
ic [] I do not mean to deny the usefulness to approaching
the religious phenomenon from various different angles;
but it must be looked at first of all in itself, in that which
belongs to it alone and can be explained in no other
terms.
55

For this reason, Eliade does not mean that religious study re-
quires a special methodology absolutely separated and distinct
from all other academic methodologies.
56

What Eliade can be criticized for is not his view of the unique or
non-reducible character of religious phenomena, but the fact
that he does not clearly show or explain to his readers how the
religious phenomenon shows itself, its uniqueness, to the
scholar of religion. Husserl can say that the phenomenon (noe-
ma as the content of consciousness or awareness) shows itself

54
55
Eliade, M. 1971, p. xiii. One may define ontological reductionism in such a
way that it implies a monist view of reality. Cf. The Oxford Companion to Phi-
losophy 1995.
56
Cf. Idinopulos and Yonan, 1994, p. 2. This useful book would be more fruitful if
it had explicitly made the distinction between ontological and other forms of reduc-
tion.
40
to consciousness because, in one sense, it is inherent in con-
sciousness.
Eliade seems to assume, without explanation, that Man is es-
sentially homo religiosus
57
and, as such, becomes aware of the
sacred through what he calls the transconscious
58
which des-
ignates both the capacity for numinous experience and a high
state of consciousness.
59
In Eliades works the concept of the
transconscious seems to have the same function that Jungs
concept of the numinous capacity of the collective uncon-
sciousness has.
60
It is not possible here to explain the relation-

57
Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 202-205.
58
Eliade, M. 1952 p. 37; and Eliade, M. 1971, p. 450. Otto talks about the faculty
of divination which seems to correspond to what Eliade calls the Transconscious.
See Otto, R. 1973, p. 144.
59
Cf. Eliade seems to use the transconscious in the way Otto uses the capacity
of divination (cf. Otto, R. 1973, p. 144).
60
Cf. Barbosa da Silva, A.1982, pp. 159-171. Although Matei Calinescu may be
correct in finding similarities between Eliades epistemology and Platos (the lat-
ters theory of anamnesis) I think that Eliades Platonism is a combination of Jungs
theory of archetypes as archaic symbols with something else. It should be noted that
Eliade, unlike Plato, is talking about religious experience in a way similar to
Schleiermacher and Otto. (Cf. Calinescu, M. Imagination and Meaning,, p. 4.) To
make a reasonable interpretation of what Eliade means by transconscious, one
should take into consideration, inter alia, the following: Transconscious may
have connotation with what Eliade calls transhistorical. The prefix trans can be
used in, at least, two different senses: (i) transcendent (God, the sacred is transcend-
ent) (ii) transcendental (the Kantean-Husserl philosophy) before (a priori) any ex-
perience and/or knowledge, contrary to a posteriori, i.e., after having had some
experience of the world. Furthermore, what is transcendental in Kants sense is a
necessary condition of all kinds of experience and knowledge (cf. Husserls asser-
tion that phenomenology as the foundation of all kinds of scientific knowledge). A
reasonable interpretation of Eliades writings allows me to say that most of the time
Eliades use of trans- is intended in the sense (i) above. This seems to be so as it
occurs in transconscious. My reasons for this are: First, Eliade seems to be de-
pendent on: a) Ottos concept of the faculty of divination (Otto, R. 1973, 144-
161, and b) Jungs view on the numinous (Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, chapters 4, 5,
and 6) and second, Eliades creative hermeneutics, which is similar to Freuds and
Jungs method of free association and to Husserls method of free variation.

41
ship between Eliades conceptual frameworks and Jungs (but
see Barbosa da Silva, A. Phenomenology as a Philosophical Prob-
lem, 1982, chapters 6 and 7).
For my purpose here it is sufficient to say that by introducing the
concept of transconscious (which perceives or produces the experi-
ence of the sacred), Eliade is enabled to use the phenomenological
language in the same analogous way that Husserl does. Both assert
that the consciousness perceives the phenomenon. But they use the
term phenomenon to refer to different things or entities. While for
Husserl the phenomenon (noema), i.e., the cognitive content of any
experience (Ger. Erlebnis) or thought shows itself to transcendental
ego or consciousness, for Eliade religious phenomenon (i.e., the con-
tent of the experience of the sacred) shows itself to the human trans-
conscious.
61

1.7.1 Eliades Contribution to Religious Studies
Despite many interpretative problems in Eliades works, it is
possible to indicate some of his contributions to the study of
religious phenomena from, at least, five points of view: (a) the
anti-reductionistic debate, (b) the non-normative study of reli-
gions, (c) the multidisciplinary approach to religion, (d) the
distinctive methodology of religious study, and (e) the mul-
tivalence of religious symbols.
With regard to (a), Eliades contribution consists not primarily
in the way he, de facto, does the history and phenomenology of

61
Eliade writes: The primitive mind did genuinely have the experience of seeing
each hierophany in the framework of the symbolism it implies We are justi-
fied in speaking of a logic of symbols, of a logic borne out not only by magico-
religious symbolism, but also in the symbolism expressed in the subconscious and
transconscious activity of man (Eliade, M. 1971, p. 450). This assertion allows us
to ask whether for Eliade the term the sacred has an ontological reference outside
Man, or only refers to the content of the transconscious (numinous noema). If the
latter is the case, the sacred may be seen as a purely anthropological term.
42
religion, but in his pointing out that the scholar who ontological-
ly reduces religion to something else is not taking it seriously.
62

Robert Segal holds that Eliade reduces religion to something
else, e.g., the sacred. But this special type of reduction is not
ontological. It is a sort of transcendental reduction la Hus-
serl.
63
And as a methodological reduction it is allowed, if it is
scientifically legitimate and academically fruitful.
Regarding (b) Eliades phenomenological study of religion can
be seen as an attempt to defend objectivity in the study of reli-
gion, since the phenomenological approach is used partly (i) to
preserve the uniqueness of religious phenomenon, and partly
(ii) to guarantee a non-normative, i.e., non-theological approach
to religion. (Cf. Sahape, E. J. 1975) In this way, the scholar of
religion attempts to do justice to religious phenomena or be-
liefs, as well as to those holding these beliefs, i.e., religious
people. Eliades recommendation of the use of the phenomeno-
logical method of Epoch (i.e., bracketing of prejudices) to attain
(i) is clear in the following passage:
If only we can get away from [i.e. bracket] the prejudices of the
lecture-room, can consider such beliefs not simply as panthe-
ism, fetishism, infantilism and so on, but as what they actually
meant to those who held them, we shall be better able to under-
stand the past and the present meaning of the sacred in primi-

62
[] a religious phenomenon will only be recognized as such if it is grasped at
its own level [] if it is studied as something religious. To try to grasp the essence
of such a phenomenon by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, economics,
linguistics, art or any other study is false; it misses the unique and irreducible ele-
ment in itthe element of the sacred (Eliade, M. 1971 p. xi, Cf. Stenmark, M.
1995, pp. 355-359).
63
Eliade, M. 1971, xi-xiii. The same type of reduction is made by, for example,
Otto in his definition of the Holy as the experience (Ger. Erlebnis) of the (Lat. tre-
mendum et fascinans) and by van der Leeuws definition of religion in terms of
power. And since the sacred is a religious concept, Eliade does not reduce religion
to non-religious phenomena.

43
tive cultures; and at the same time our chances of understand-
ing the modes and the history of religion will increase too.
64

Concerning (ii), a normative approach can be, e.g., theological,
and methodological. The former occurs when, e.g., the repre-
sentative of one religion uses his/her religious belief or doc-
trine as the criterion, the tendency is to take his/her religion as
the true one, while regarding the other religions as false or less
valuable. The phenomenological approach attempts to avoid
this tendency and aim at attaining objectivity in the sense of
neutrality, accuracy and precision in describing the beliefs of
the believers.
65
For the sake of clarity one can distinguish be-
tween methodological normativity in two different senses: (ii)
a) the use of one or more methods as superior to all others and
(ii) b) the use of a given overarching interpretative principle,
perspective or paradigm which can be borrowed from ones
own faith. To be methodologically normative in sense (ii) a) is
for example, to use the method of one academic discipline as
the only way of studying religion, i.e., to make an ontological
reduction of religious phenomena.
66
Eliade does not seem to be
normative in sense (ii) a). However, he may be regarded as
normative in sense (ii) b), to the extent that he uses, for exam-

64
Eliade, M. 1971, p. 11.
65
66
This reduction is what Feuerbach, Freud, Durkheim and Marx, among others,
have done. See Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 1963, 31-35. Cf. Eliade, M. 1969, p.
24f, where he criticizes Wilhelm Schmidt as follows: He asserts that primitive man
discovered the idea of God through a logical quest for cause. He neglects the obvi-
ous fact that religion is a very complex phenomenon [] first of all, an experience
sui generis, incited by mans encounter with the sacred. Here the sacred is con-
ceived as something other than Man himself, which exists independently of human
experience.
44
ple, the sacred, homo religiosus
67
and religious archaic
symbols as the ultimate or foundational theoretical or concep-
tual framework in interpreting religious phenomena.
68
This is,
however, the level of scholarly interpretation and theorization
on which methodological reduction is unavoidable and
not the level of concrete and descriptive phenomenology, on
which the scholar should be as neutral as possible in his/her
description of religious phenomena
69

(c) A Multidisciplinary approach is required in the study of reli-
gious phenomena because of their complexity. Eliade himself
uses methods borrowed from various disciplines. Whether he

67
As has already been said: at the structural level of his phenomenology Eliade
seems to use homo religiosus (the archetypal or ideal Man) in a way analogous with
Husserls use of the transcendental or pure ego, thus it is the subject of transcenden-
tal reduction. Cf. Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982 p. 37f.
68
The latter type of normativity is very difficult to avoid. Even the scholars who
naively believe that there is an objective reality out there, that can be objectively
described and explained by an objective method, are normative in the sense (ii)
b). To approach any aspect of reality, religious or non-religious, in this way is to
take the point of view of a nave realist and/or an empiricist-positivistic point of
view as it occurs in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of the early Wittgenstein
and the positivists of the 1920s and 1930s. Thomas Kuhn and other philosophers of
sciences, in line with what seems to be a perennial aspect of Kants epistemology,
have taught us to distinguish between reality or truth and Mans knowledge, percep-
tion or concept of reality or truth. This may make us more humble in our study of
religion, without however denying the existence of reality and truth. But it does not
free us totally from being normative in the sense (ii) b) above. (Cf. Kuhn, T.1974 If
for Eliade the term the sacred refers only to the content of Mans transconscious
a controversial interpretation then he is not only methodologically normative
but also ontological-reductionistic by reducing 1) all religions to anthropology and
2) all religious studies to some sort of philosophical anthropology la Heidegger,
Jung, Gadamer, and Bultmann. By being a reductionist in this sense, he is also
methodological reductionist (cf. Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, p. 72).
69
Cf. (Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, p.73). For this type of criticism, see Kristiansen,
Odd Kjell 1982. It is worth noting that it is not easy to demonstrate that the Sa-
cred and homo religiosus have the universal status, value and function that Eli-
ade attribute to them.

45
succeeds or not is another story. It is of course his Continental
style that allows him to combine a deep-psychological concep-
tual framework with, inter alia, that of the hermeneutic-
phenomenology, existentialism and history of religions in a
broad sense.
70

(d) Eliades contribution to a methodology or philosophy of
social sciences and/or humanities is related to the question of
whether Eliade introduce a new paradigm or a comprehen-
sive theory in the study of religion, or follows the accepted
normal paradigm of his contemporary scholars. This is a con-
troversial question among the interpreters of Eliade.
71

Concerning (e), the multivalence of religious symbols, I refer to
Ricoeur who says the following about Eliade: What I retain
from Eliade was not primarily his distinction between the sa-
cred and the profane, but his conception of the symbol as the
fundamental structure of religious language (Ricoeur, Intel-
lectual Autobiography, 39-41). Eliade does not only affirm
this, but he also tries to demonstrate it, in a way similar to Til-
lich and Ricoeur.

1.8 Concluding Remarks
I have argued that in order to understand Eliades writings one
has to observe five necessary conditions, one of them being the
distinction between what Eliade declares that he does, and what
he in fact does. This distinction and the fulfilment of the other
conditions allow the interpreter of Eliade to make a reasonable
interpretation of his writings, a type of interpretation that is

70
Eliade, M. 1967, pp. 13f and 238-245. Cf. Barbosa da Silva, A.1982, chapters 4,
5, and 6, where Eliades methodological relation to the phenomenologists of reli-
gion, to Otto, Jung and Heidegger is discussed.
71
Smart, N. 1978, pp. 171-174.
46
primarily based on the public use of language. But sometimes
one has to rely on contextual implication, using context both in
a linguistic and an extra-linguistic sense. I have also attempted
to show that: Eliade does not ontologically reduce religious phe-
nomena to something else as, for example, Freud, Durkheim
and Marx do; is not theologically normative as some of his crit-
ics assert; and he is not a strict historian of religion. He is, first
of all, a hermeneutic-phenomenologist of religion, who uses
the results or findings of various scholarly works in his attempt
to understand the human condition (in terms of the existential
meaning of the experience of the sacred) and to formulate some
kind of a comprehensive theory or a new paradigm in the
study of religious phenomena.


47

Chapter

Paul Ricoeurs Phenomenological
Hermeneutics

Some Necessary Conditions for Understanding P. Ricoeurs
Philosophy of Religion, and a Constructive Analysis of Paul Ricoeurs
Way of Doing Biblical Hermeneutics

Douglas H. Jackson and Antnio Barbosa da Silva

2.1 Introduction
This essay describes some difficulties encountered in
understanding the works of so-called Continental philosophers.
Its purpose is to pinpoint some necessary conditions for
understanding Continental philosophy, in general, and Paul
Ricoeurs philosophical approach, in particular. It offers the
example of a tool of analysis used in the analytical philosophical
tradition, which is regarded as fruitful in the analysis of
Continental philosophers. In the essay these two approaches are
briefly differentiated. The tool illustrated is a conceptual
framework or a meta-language with which to analyze the object
language of the philosophical text under investigation. Some
48
selections from Paul Ricoeurs work are the chosen material for
the application of this tool of analysis. Ricoeurs highly regarded
work holds the promise of fruitful results. The analysis of
Ricoeurs work includes: an assessment of his existential
phenomenological hermeneutics, his relation to some primary
existentialist themes, and some necessary conditions for
understanding Ricoeurs way of doing philosophy. These latter
include some of his philosophical presuppositions (ontological,
epistemological semantic, existential). His existential
presuppositions include: the concepts of the fundamental
structures of Mans (existential) being, i.e., existentialia, the
phenomenon of understanding being one of them, Man as a
linguistic being, the importance of lived experience (Ger.
Lebenswelt), and the importance of Mans projected possibilities.
A critical assessment is made of the fruitfulness of his work at the
end of the article, with regard to biblical hermeneutics.

2.2 Background: Ricouer as a Philosopher
In a day when information technology is developing at light-
ning speed and many academic users of information resources
are looking to process substantial quantities of data quickly
and effectively, encountering the thought of philosophers
standing in the Continental tradition can be as welcome and as
damaging to well sorted data as a hard disk crash. If youve
had the experience you know the frustration that accompanies
it as well as the need to act rationally. One has to accept the
loss of good data, rebuild and get on with the task at hand,
hopefully making up for lost time. At least some feel the same
frustration and need to get on with productive work, when
they have encountered the leading figures of Continental phi-
losophy.

49
This metaphor from the world of personal computing may
overstate the case for many others, but still the contributions of
these philosophers are not easy to process. Their names are
often well known and their contributions are generally consid-
ered to be substantial; but when it comes to gaining a clear un-
derstanding of their works, significant problems arise.
72
Initial-
ly at least, the problems might be related to the language in
which the author has produced his work, but good, reliable
translations have lessened this aspect of the problem. More
than likely one of the following factors may be a source of
trouble:
(1) Vocabularies that are full of new technical terms, whose use
seem to be very diffuse and inconsistent
(2) Terms that are superficially familiar, but used in strange
and ambiguous ways
(3) Familiar concepts are approached from unfamiliar perspec-
tives
(4) The unproblematic is made problematic
(5) Logical sequence and argument appear to be exchanged for
convoluted narratives that make allusion to far too many un-
familiar names, works and disciplines
(6) They never seem to get to the point
(7) Conclusions are few or unresolved tensions are left in their
place
(8) Dogmatic assertions are made that seem to subvert the ac-
cumulated wisdom of philosophy and common sense!
This is certainly a bit of a caricature, but it reflects the kinds of
problems many experience in reading modern Continental phi-

72
Among the many philosophers that could be named here are found those like, G.
W. F. Hegel, E. Husserl, K. Jaspers, M. Heidegger, M. Foucault, J. Derrida, et al.
50
losophers such as Heidegger and Derrida. They seem to have
deviated from the analytical tradition of, e.g., Socrates, Thomas
Aquinas, R. Descartes, D. Hume and I. Kant. For the reader to
gain insights from these sources requires perseverance, deter-
mination and generosity from him or her. But they are not the
only methodologyical tools that will help in discovering the
fruitful results of these philosophers labors; effective tools of
analysis are also required.
In this essay we want to offer a methodological tool that arises
from the analytical tradition and which, if applied with pa-
tience and parsimony, can give good results. In order to illus-
trate this approach, we are going to consider the work of Paul
Ricoeur. For those working in the European (and some areas of
the American) context, Ricoeurs ongoing work stands as one
of the leading contributions to philosophy over the last 50
years. He has written widely and his work has gained scholarly
recognition for its contributions in a number of different disci-
plines.
73
Our task then is to approach his work in a way that
will help us to understand some of his methods and his conclu-
sions.
For those working in theology and biblical hermeneutics Ric-
oeurs work will have additional interest. Ricoeur insists that
his work with biblical texts is not that of a theologian rather
that he does the work of a philosopher, personally situated in a
Reformed tradition.
74
However his most fundamental presup-
positions seem to be theological, for example, they seem to in-

73
His works are not characterized of all the difficulties mentioned above, but at
least some of the tendencies mentioned there will be encountered in them.
74
The tradition is traced from his birth into a Protestant context (the small French
Reformed context) and his affirmation of belonging to that tradition at a number
of points in his writings. He also points out the impact on his own place in that
tradition by modern theological figures like Barth and Bultmann.

51
clude a commitment of faith in the God of the Judeo-Christian
tradition, a respect for the authority of the Bible as a Holy
Scripture and the authoritative role it plays in doing theology,
etc.
75
Even as a non-theologian, as he regards himself in his
own understanding, he does work with exegesis and biblical
hermeneutics. He has also engaged regularly in criticizing
works of philosophers of religion, including dialogue and cri-
tique of theologians like Rudolf Bultmann. He has actively par-
ticipated in activities that he relates to an ethical stance found-
ed on Christian tradition, etc.
76
These factors and others seem
to indicate that Ricoeurs work will be fruitful field for analysis
from the viewpoint of the philosophy of religion.

2.3 The Purpose of This Essay
The specific purpose of this essay is to present some necessary
conditions for understanding Ricoeurs philosophy of religion
and biblical hermeneutics, by giving a reasonable and construc-
tive interpretation of his philosophical hermeneutics as applied
to philosophy of religion.
77
These areas are central to his work
and are regarded by many to yield some of his most fruitful
results. As to the purpose of this essay, we consider Ricoeurs
existential and biblical hermeneutics as founded upon his more

75
An exact specification of the content of these commitments lies beyond the limits
of this investigation, but see the presuppositions of Ricoeurs Hermeneutics of Rec-
ollection. We prefer the use the term HR rather than the term Hermeneutics of Re-
trieval used by some of Ricoeurs critics. At least for our purposes here our term
seems to be better reflecting Ricoeurs own terminology. See Ricoeur, P., 1965a.
See for example, pp. 38-42. (In French: Linterprtation comme rcollection du
sens).
76
See, for example, Ruicoeurs view on the Golden Rule, in: Ricoeur, P. & Blamey,
K. 1992.b, pp. 219-229; Ricoeur, P. 1998, pp. 105-109.
77
See for example, the assessments made in Hahn, Lewis E., 1995; Ricoeur, P.
1965.a, ibid.
52
or less implicit philosophy of religion. In our attempt to specify
some necessary conditions for a reasonable interpretation of
Ricoeurs writings, we shall also attempt to clarify the ontolog-
ical, epistemological, and semantic foundations of his philo-
sophical method.

2.4 Methodological Considerations
In this essay we shall attempt to follow the ideal of clarity held
by analytical philosophy but not its ontological and epistemo-
logical presuppositions as they appear in philosophers influ-
enced by logical positivism.
78
Within the analytical tradition,
the use of a conceptual analysis is considered foundational for
developing the second order discourse of the philosophy of
religion, as it explicates the object language of the subject mat-
ter under study. Therefore the careful construction of a concep-
tual framework (meta-language) precedes the analysis, which
includes a careful consideration of the argumentation and
structure of the subject matter. This forms the immediate
methodological background of this essay.
In approaching the work of a philosopher like Ricoeur with the
purpose of this essay in mind, we assume that it is important to
have a precise terminology as a tool of analysis. Ideally this
would include at least the following:
a) A clear presentation of the purpose, presuppositions and
main questions of our analysis as it is to be carried out.

78
Analytical philosophers have been associated with logical or empirical positivism
with regard to the latters ontological and epistemological presuppositions. But
there are analytical philosophers who are not positivist, for example, Bertrand Rus-
sell and George Moore.

53
b) A precise conceptual framework (meta-language) to be used
as an instrument of our analysis. This includes precisely de-
fined concepts.
c) A relevant selection of materials for study with supporting
contextual descriptions.
d) An analysis and presentation of the presuppositions, central
questions and central terms and concepts found in the selected
Ricoeur materials.
e) An analysis of the logical structure and argumentation found
in the selected materials. This includes a presentation of the
authors declared purpose (intended) and strategy as well as an
analysis of whether the author, in fact, is consistent in carrying
out this purpose and strategy.
Both d) and e) should be the result of a reasonable interpretation
of the authors work (cf. section 1.3 above).
f) A critical assessment of the results from a meta-perspective,
which includes the use of a meta-language, i.e., a conceptual
framework used as interpretive tools.
An exhaustive approach, which takes into full consideration
the points a) to f), exceeds the limits of what can be achieved
here; however, we can present at least a partial but constructive
analysis of Ricoeurs writings based on this ideal model. We
will begin by briefly differentiating the Continental and the An-
glo-Saxon ways of doing philosophy.
79
For a more comprehen-
sive account of these two types of philosophy we refer to sec-
tion 2.6.1 below. This will establish one of the most fundamen-
tal presuppositions or necessary conditions for a reasonable in-
terpretation of Ricoeurs work.
80
Our approach is based on the

79
This distinction is not unproblematic, but it is useful as a rough approximation of
these two general ways of doing philosophy. Note that some scholars also call An-
glo-Saxon Anglo-American.
80
See our definition of reasonable interpretation in the section 1.3 above.
54
assumption of the fruitfulness of the analytical method in doing
philosophy and therefore we will apply some methodological
insights found within the analytical tradition, which allows us
to fulfill the ideals expressed in points a) to f) above. Specifical-
ly we will use a conceptual analysis on some passages from
Ricoeurs work, in an attempt to articulate some of his presup-
positions. We do so because being aware of these presupposi-
tions is another necessary condition for understanding his way
of doing philosophy in general, and his existential-
phenomenological hermeneutics in particular. Thus, in order to
achieve these purposes we will attempt to go through the fol-
lowing specific steps:
1) We will establish a meta-language to apply in our analysis of
Ricoeur. This will require the following:
a) The refinement of some technical/analytical terms used by
Ricoeur
b) The introduction of some new technical terms to supplement
a) in due course, where it is may be pedagogically advisable.
These two sets of technical terms will constitute our tools of
analysis, i.e., our meta-language.
2) We will give some examples of Ricoeurs presuppositions,
the identification and understanding of which constitute a nec-
essary condition for understanding his philosophy of religion
and hermeneutics. These will include: (i) selected general pre-
suppositions, (ii) selected epistemological presuppositions, (iii)
selected semantic presuppositions, and (iv) selected ontological
presuppositions, (v) selected existential presuppositions.
3) We will also give a summary, critical assessment, of what we have
found to be fruitful in terms of our meta-perspective with regard to
the purpose of this essay.


55
2.4.1 Refinement and Definition of Some Technical Terms
In addition to the technical terms defined in Chapter One, we
shall define the following terms as an integral part of our analyti-
cal concepts or meta-language. For practical and pedagogical rea-
sons we shall present some of the technical terms defined in sec-
tion 1.3 here in a footnote.
81

Linguistic Meaning (sense or interpretation): the linguistic mean-
ing is the meaning given in
82
the language of the text, as opposed
to extra-linguistic meanings (e.g. the performative meaning, sig-

81
Interpretation: "To say that an expression U is an interpretation of a different expres-
sion T is the same as to say that there is at least one person P and a situation S such that
U can express the same assertion as T for P in S. (Nss, Arne, 1966, p. 28 and Bar-
bosa da Silva, A. 1992, pp. 35f.
Reasonable interpretation: "U is a reasonable interpretation of T when T occurs in S"
means the same as "When T occurs in S, T usually means the same as U" (ibib., p. 31).
Generous interpretation: U is a generous interpretation of T means that (a) U is a rea-
sonable interpretation of T and that (b) U makes T coherent with different types of
context in which T occurs.
Refinement: "An expression U is a refinement of an expression T means here that all
reasonable interpretations of U are reasonable interpretations of T, and that there is at
least one reasonable interpretation of T which is not a reasonable interpretation of U"
(ibid., p. 38).
Linguistic context (textual, literary context or co-text): the parts of a text or a written
statement that precede and/or follow a specific word or passage.
Extra-linguistic (extra-textual) context: The set of circumstances, cultural milieu,
historical epoch and other factors which influence a writer in the period during which
he/she writes or produces a given text.
A writer's intention: (a) Logical or objective (inter-subjective) sense - what a
writer wishes to transmit in his or her writings and which can be reconstructed
through a reasonable interpretation of his or her writings by appeal to the conven-
tional or public meanings of words. (Cf. Barbosa da Silva, 1982, p. 19ff. See also
Wimsatt, William and Monroe Beardsley, 1970, p. 346f. ) (b) Psychological or
subjective sense - the psychological processes and ideas which occur in the writer's
mind during the process of writing. (Cf. Diltheys view of interpretation in:
Makkreel, Rudolf A. 1995, p. 203f.)
82
We use the expression given in here while recognizing that a more precise
delineation of the concepts involved will be useful in some contexts. For our pur-
poses in the present context this expression appears to be adequate.
56
nificance and also the symbolic meaning) of a text. For example,
if we see a flashing red text that says fire in a building, the lin-
guistic meaning of flashing red text is related to the concept of
rapid oxidation for which combustible material; oxygen and ad-
equate heat are together the necessary and sufficient conditions.
The extra-linguistic meaning here might be to frighten people, to
get them to leave the building, or something else. Linguistic mean-
ing is often further divided into literal meaning and figurative
meaning, though this is held by some to be problematic. Literal
meaning refers to the meaning conveyed by the public or conven-
tional meaning of words; that is, the lexical definitions. Figurative
meaning is defined as the linguistic meaning that is not literal and
is produced through the use of figures of speech, symbols, alle-
gory, etc.
Hermeneutics. The term hermeneutics has a long history of us-
age in Western culture, reaching back to the ancient Greek idea
of bringing a thing or situation from unintelligibility to under-
standing, e.g., to express aloud, to explain or translate the mes-
sages of the gods or oracles.
83
Palmer offers 6 basic uses for the
term from the Protestant Reformation to our own time. The six
are: (1) The theory of biblical exegesis; (2) general philological
methodology; (3) the science of all linguistic understanding; (4)
the methodological foundation of Geisteswissenschaften; (5) phe-
nomenology of existence and of existential understanding; and
(6) the systems of interpretation, both recollective and iconoclas-
tic, used by man to reach the meaning behind myths and sym-
bols.
84

83
See Palmer, R. E. 1969, p. 13ff. This basic analysis of the term hermeneutics in
the early period up to the modern period is pretty much the same in the standard
references. When the usage in the modern period is discussed, the analysis tends to
be more varied. We have chosen to follow Palmer here.
84
Ibid., p. 33f.

57
Hermeneutical Circle and Hermeneutical Spiral. In modern hermeneu-
tics, the terms the hermeneutical circle and hermeneutical spiral
are often used to designate the interaction between interpreter
and text under interpretation in the context of increased under-
standing as the result of interpretation. We will use the term
hermeneutical circle to designate the following: (1) the relation
between part of a text and the whole, a text and its context (and
vice-versa) in the interpretative process, (2) the movement back
and forth between the interpreter and the text being interpreted.
We will use the term hermeneutical spiral to designate the increase in
understanding that can be attained by the interpreter as a result of
the application of the hermeneutical circle.
85
The hermeneutical
circle is a necessary condition for the hermeneutical spiral and
together they seem to be necessary and sufficient conditions for
the understanding of a text.
In our analysis of Ricoeurs work, we will be working from a rea-
sonable and generous interpretation of his texts and not an intentional
interpretation (in the subjective sense of attempting to reproduce
the intended meaning conceived in the authors mind at the time
the text was composed, see below).
86

2.4.2 Four Levels of Interpretation
In what follows we shall distinguish among four levels of inter-
pretation of philosophical discourse and experience, in relation
to the three different uses of the term reference. For the purpose of
analyzing Ricoeurs philosophical method, it is relevant to dis-
tinguish among the ontological, phenomenological, existential

85
See Barbosa da Silva, A. 1996, p. 189; Barbosa da Silva, A. and Andersson, M.
1993/1996, p. 161 ff.
86
For our argument against this sense of interpretation, see Barbosa da Silva, A.,
1982, Introduction. Cf. Wimsatt and Bearsley 1970, p. 246f.
58
and psychological levels of interpretation in philosophical dis-
course and experience.
(a) The ontological level of interpretation: an assertion, description
or statement belongs to this level if it can be true or false, inde-
pendently of human experience or existence. In other words, by
an ontologically objective level of interpretation we mean a de-
scription of something that exists or can exist without human
perception or experience of it. For example, if a person P asserts
that he/she has experienced union with God, this assertion can
be interpreted in at least two different senses: ontological and
phenomenological. To interpret it ontologically means that there is
an entity God that exists independently of person P's perception
or experience of God, and that P, de facto, perceived or experi-
enced God and not had a purely subjective experience of some-
thing he experienced as God, which may be interpreted as an
illusion or a hallucination.
87

(b) The phenomenological level of interpretation: a phenomenologi-
cal interpretation of the above assertion would be: there was a
time t at which P experienced him- or herself as if he/she was
united with God.
88
Described in this way, it is an experience of
something P calls God, the existence of which may not be known
by P or anyone else in the traditional sense of to "know some-
thing." And what P calls God may not exist in the external
world, i.e., outside Ps mind or consciousness. We shall return to
the differences between (a) and (b) below.
(c) The existential level of interpretation: an assertion, description
or a statement belongs to this level if it is used to refer to typical
human experiences, such as freedom, evil, anxiety, finitude guilt,
despair, dread of death and of non-being, doubt, meaninglessness,

87
Hick, J. 1988, pp. 36-61.
88
Ibid.

59
loneliness, self-estrangement.
89
That which distinguishes existen-
tial experiences from purely subjective ones, (e.g., I like coffee
with sugar, whereas John likes coffee without sugar), is that the
former but not the latter are inter-subjectively communicable and
have universal features. (See section below.) And that which dis-
tinguishes existential statements from ontological ones is that the
former refer to human experiences and their truth or falsity is
entirely dependent on human existence, whereas the truth or
falsity of the latter is not. Having a), b) and c) above in mind, we
shall distinguish in what follows between ontological, phenome-
nological (noemetic) and existential reference, respectively.
(d) The psychological level of interpretation
90
: an assertion, descrip-
tion or a statement belongs to this level if it deals with the purely
subjective or personal (existentiell) aspect of understanding some-
thing, e.g., the meaning or content of a text. This includes the ex-
istentiell affect or significance a text may have for a given person,
which he/she may not share with anyone else and need not do
so.
91

89
Cf. the list in Hick, J. 1963, p. 2.
90
Against the background of the debates on the distinction between philosophy and
psychology in relation to the philosophy of mind, it is important to make this
distinction.
91
Concerning the difference between ontological, phenomenological and purely psy-
chological statements, Keith E. Yandell attempts to find a more refined term to deal
with religious experience, than the generic term experience. He suggests that we use
the expression someone has an experience of something
91
as determined by the
statement and conditions given below. This is useful for distinguishing four different
levels of description: ontological, phenomenological, existential and purely psycholog-
ical (or purely subjective). Lets begin with the statement: Person P experiences the
phenomenon F as something real. In order for this statement not to be a purely phe-
nomenological or purely psychological description, P and F should meet the following
conditions:
(1). F is something which is not P and not Ps experience as such
(2). F exists independently of Ps experience of F. That is to say, that F exists even if
no one experiences F
60
The above-refined terminology will be used together with two
fundamental methodological distinctions to be taken into
consideration during our analysis of Ricoeur:
i) What Ricoeur says that he does (or is doing)
ii) What he, de facto, does, i.e., what can reasonably be stated from
his writings (without necessarily taken into consideration i).
When i) and ii) contradict each other, we shall give preference
to ii) by given reasons based on a reasonable interpretation of
Ricoeur's texts, assuming that Ricoeur does not consciously
follow the style of Alice in the Wonderland semantics, that is, "a
word means what I intend it to mean". We assume instead that
words and linguistic expressions, especially when used in
scientific discourses, have (or should have) public meaning
available in dictionaries and lexica.
92
This is a necessary
condition for inter-subjective communication, without which
the truth or falsity of statements cannot be assessed by others
than the person who makes them.

(3). Given that (1) and (2) are true, the statement P experiences F must entail F
exists in reality (Yandell, Keith E. 1974, p. 173.).
(4). P experiences F entails F influences P in some regard
(5). P experiences F entails P makes some assessment of or judgment concerning F
(Yandell, Keith E. 1974:173f.)
The application of these five conditions seems to be necessary and sufficient to distin-
guish between the four levels of interpretation above, (a)-(d). However, it seems to be
practically impossible to apply the conditions (1) - (5) successfully to, for example,
religious statements. For example, in order to test to what extent the statement: P
experiences F (where F = God) meets these 5 conditions, it is required that P or some-
one else has access to God, independent of Ps experience of God. This is impossible
in every study of religious experience, in that there is no objective method for the
observation of God (or Nirvana, Ultimate Reality, Absolute Nothingness) or whatever
it may be that the religious person experiences as the real (true) transcendent ground of
religious experience (religion).
92
In this regard, see Wimsatt, W. & M. Beardsley, M. C. 1970, pp. 346f.

61
2.5 Ricoeurs Methodological Presuppositions
With regard to Ricoeurs methodological presuppositions
we shall distinguish between: a) general philosophical
presuppositions and b) special presuppositions from
Existentialist Philosophy.

2.5.1 The General Philosophical Presuppositions of Ricoeurs
Approach
In this section of the essay we will use our analytical
conceptual framework to uncover some necessary conditions
for the understanding of Paul Ricoeurs way of doing
philosophy. By necessary conditions we mean propositions or
statements used as assumptions without the knowledge of
which it is not possible to accurately understand Ricoeurs
work. These assumptions are implicit in Ricouers works. And
these conditions together may be sufficient to establishing a
reasonable interpretation of Ricoeurs work.
It is our thesis that the ultimate goal of Ricoeur's hermeneutics
can be considered to be, according to a reasonable interpretation,
is to give an accurate account of Man's self-understanding. When
we use the word Man it is intended to refer to the human be-
ing, i.e., male and female human beings. As we shall see later on,
Ricoeurs main concern seems to be to answer the philosophical
anthropological question: What does it mean to be a human being?
93

In his attempt to answer this and other closely related questions,
Ricoeur uses different methods borrowed from various philo-

93
Heideggers work stands out most prominently as a background for Ricoeur here,
but other influences from modern philosophical anthropology should be considered,
for example, M. Scheler, H. Plessner, A. Gehlen, E. Cassirer, and J.-P.Sartre. See
Inwood, M. J. 1995, p. 38f; Schacht, R. 1995, p. 580f; Papp, H. O. 1967, pp. 159-
166.
62
sophical contexts throughout the history of Western philoso-
phy.
94
Ricoeur's way of doing philosophy in general and phe-
nomenological-existential hermeneutical philosophy in particu-
lar is clearly illustrated in his essay "Phenomenology of Free-
dom".
95
Ricoeur can be considered, to some extent, to be an exis-
tentialist philosopher, and in light of that, his main concern with
phenomenological-existential hermeneutics should be seen
against the background of the development of Existentialism as a
European philosophical movement after World War II.
96

Hermeneutics makes the fundamental claim that every text is
approached with a pre-understanding.
97
We define a pre-
understanding as a set of assumptions as to what a text is about
(i.e., a priori understanding). The hermeneutical circle
98
is as-
sumed. Ricoeurs view on the role of presuppositions in inter-
preting texts can be illustrated from his book The Symbolism of
Evil where he cites Bultmanns view on the role of presupposi-
tions as pre-understanding:

94
See for example: Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas of Aquinas, Augustine, Descartes,
Kant, Fichte, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty,
Sartre, Marcel, Jaspers, et al., in Copleston, F. 1962, Vol. 1-8.
95
This article is included in Pivcevic, I. (ed.), 1975, p, 173 ff.; cf. Ricoeur, P. 1969.a,
pp. 3-24.
96
See for example, Stenstrm, Thure, 1966. It is also useful to consult Spiegelberg,
H. 1982.
97
This view is held by Heiodegger and Gadamer.
98
We have defined the hermeneutical circle in our terminological section. In rela-
tion to interpreting texts it means that one approaches a text with a pre-
understanding and then one interprets it. By following the interpretation ones un-
derstanding of the text is refined. With this refined understanding, one may return
to the text to better interpret and understand it. Mats Furberg refers to Ricoeurs
view, we interpret to better understand (Furberg, Mats, 1982, p. 19-20). The process
of going from pre-understanding to text to understanding and back to text, etc.,
forms the hermeneutical circle. Some prefer to call it the hermeneutical spiral in
that it is assumed that ones understanding and interpretation become progressively
better, i.e., it increases, so to say, in the manner of a spiral.

63
The circle can be stated bluntly: We must understand in order
to believe, but we must believe in order to understand. The
circle is not a vicious circle, still less a mortal one; it is a living
and stimulating circle. We must believe in order to under-
stand
99
: never, in fact, does the interpreter get near to what his
text says unless he lives in the aura of the meaning he is inquir-
ing after. As Bultmann very well says in his famous article on
the problem of hermeneutics in Glauben und Verstehen: All
understanding, like all interpretation, is [...] continually orient-
ed by the manner of posing the question and by what it aims at
[by its Woraufhin]. Consequently, it is never without presuppo-
sitions; that is to say, it is always directed by a prior under-
standing of the thing about which it interrogates the text. It is
only on the basis of that prior understanding that it can, in gen-
eral, interrogate and interpret. And again: The presupposi-
tion of all understanding is the vital relation of the interpreter
to the thing about which the text speaks directly or indirect-
ly.
100

This quote serves to illustrate Ricoeurs general views on pre-
suppositions (pre-understanding). The material that follows
deals with presuppositions in three specific areas of philoso-
phy, namely ontology (metaphysics), epistemology, and exis-
tential analysis, which are to be identified in Ricoeurs works.
In our analysis we have stipulated that presuppositions are those
statements or propositions one holds to be true, often left un-
stated and without attempt at demonstration. They are often
used as the starting point as one develops ones philosophical
position and they constitute a necessary condition for under-

99
The reader should consider here the theological method espoused by Augustine
and followed by the medieval theologians.
100
See Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, p. 351.
64
standing the position.
101
It should be noted that presupposi-
tions could be of two kinds. First there are presuppositions that
are held consciously. These may be openly declared and often
assumed as self-evident and therefore without demonstration.
Second there are presuppositions that are held unconsciously
in a specific context. The individual holding such a presupposi-
tion may never have consciously analyzed the dependence of
his statements or opinion on the presupposition, or having
done so, he may not be presently conscious of that dependence
and its implications. The interpreter and critic can, and some-
times has to, make explicit or uncover the implicit presupposi-
tions of a text in order to make a reasonable interpretation of it.
When an implicit presupposition is made explicit, its function
as an argument is uncovered.
102
And then it can be assessed as
tenable or not.
The necessary conditions indicated here would be put forward
as presuppositions below. As indicated above, it should be
emphasized here that by presupposition in this context we
mean a statement or proposition, the truth of which is regarded
as a necessary condition for the truth of other statements or
propositions. It is important to note that Ricoeur holds that a
presuppositionless philosophy is not possible. He holds that all
philosophy begins with presuppositions.
103

101
Hospers states it this way, a presupposition is A statement whose truth is as-
sumed in what one says. If q could not be true unless p were true, q presupposes p.
See Hospers, J. 1973, p. 408f; Ibid. 1995, pp. 11-14 and 202f
102
Some have tried to maintain that it is possible to develop a philosophical dis-
course without presuppositions (cf. Husserls phenomenology), but this is not the
case with Ricoeur and many others, who maintain that presuppositions and pre-
understanding (which may be considered a type of presupposition) always enter in
at several points in philosophical discourse.
103
See for example, Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, p. 348f and page 357; Cf. Barbosa da Sil-
va, A. 1982, pp. 28ff.

65

2.5.1.1 Ontological and Metaphysical Presuppositions
Ricoeur appears to be an ontological realist, while sustaining a
form of critical epistemological idealism.
104
With regard to the
former concept, his work points to the assumption of the exist-
ence of an objective reality external to the conscious-self. With
regard to the latter concept, see section 2.5.1.2 below. The per-
spective of the conscious-self stands at the center of philosophy
in the reflective tradition (the subjects self-reflection), which
began with Descartes and to which Ricoeur repeatedly declares
his association. His ontological stance may be seen, for exam-
ple, in his work with language (e.g. metaphor theory), text and
reference/referent.
105
He holds that language, even metaphori-
cal language, points, among other things, to an external reference
in a real external world, the knowledge of which is inter-
subjectively testable and which may be the external or the exis-
tential world, i.e., Mans experience of freedom, guilt, angst, and
meaninglessness. This is true whether the reference is to objects,
others (people) or God. One can see this diversity of reference
clearly, for example, in the final two studies of Ricoeurs The
Rule of Metaphor where he articulates his theory of the ontologi-
cal status of extra-linguistic reference.
106
In such passages Ric-

104
One should of course begin by considering Kants position in this regard, both
because of his foundational role here and for the aspects of Kants analysis that
Ricoeur has incorporated into his own thought. His epistemological stance provides
an alternative to the polar opposites of realism and idealism as normally discussed
in the history of philosophy. See the following note.
105
In reading Ricoeurs work it is important to keep clear the notions of reference
as the action of referring, reference as the object of referring, and referent as the
object of referring. At times Ricoeurs shifting terminology may lead to lack of
clarity in some texts.
106
In regard to metaphorical language, Ricoeurs insistence on reference to external
reality is clear, but his philosophical description of it is complex, cf. Ricoeur, P.
66
oeurs uses of the term reference (sometimes referent or
others equivalents) in the sense of an entity in the real world.
The material we present here will not only address the issue of
the ontological status of reference, but will also prepare us for
the discussion on truth which follows in the next section. A
survey of Ricoeurs work on reference seems to indicate that he
holds that there is one type of reference that is found at each of
the three levels of discourse, word, sentence and text (work).
Each type has its own character and all three works together in
a text, which is interpreted by a reader.
To shed some light on Ricoeurs view on the issue of reference,
we will use two quotes from his book The Rule of Metaphor. The
following quote is from chapter 7, which together with chapter
8 comprises one long discussion of the problems of metaphori-
cal discourse and reality. This particular quote expresses Ric-
oeurs assessment of Nelson Goodmans approach to reference.
Ricoeur states:
In this way, Languages of Art solidly links verbal metaphor
and non-verbal metaphorical expression to the plane of refer-
ence. Goodman succeeds in arranging the governing categories
of reference in orderly fashion: denotation and exemplification
(label and sample), description and representation (verbal and
non-verbal symbols), possession and expression (literal and
metaphorical).
I suggest the following assessment of Goodmans categories in
application to the poetics of discourse:

1977: Studies 7 & 8 in The Rules of Metaphor. His description builds on a double
reference concept (one intra-textual and one ontological) and a concept of meta-
phorical truth. A thorough analysis of these concepts lies outside the scope of this
work.

67
(1) The distinction between denotation and connotation is not a
fruitful principle of differentiation with respect to the poetic
function, if connotation is understood as a set of associative and
emotional effects without referential value. As a symbolic sys-
tem, poetry has a referential function just as much as do de-
scriptive discourses. (The italics are ours.)
(2) The sensa - sounds, images, and feelings - that adhere to the
sense are to be treated on the model of expression in Good-
mans sense. These are representations and not descriptions,
which exemplify instead of denoting and which transfer pos-
session instead of retaining it by primordial right. Qualities in
this sense are no less real than the descriptive traits that scien-
tific discourse articulates; they belong to things over and above
effects subjectively experienced by the lover of poetry.
(3) Poetic qualities through their status as transferred, add to
the shaping of the world. They are true to the extent that they
are appropriate, that is, to the extent that they join fittingness
to novelty, obviousness to surprise.
On these three points, however, the analysis of Goodman calls
for complements that will progressively turn into far-reaching
alterations, in that they will affect his foundations in pragma-
tism and nominalism.
107
From this passage, we can already see Ricoeurs strong insist-
ence on the fact that, generally speaking, discourse (even po-
etic discourse), and its constituent parts have clear refer-
ence to an external reality, that is an ontologically objective,
inter-subjectively testable, world apart from the readers ex-
perience of it (observing subject). It is true that Ricoeurs own
semantic view/theory on discourse constrains him to reject
Goodmans overall view of the language of art and to make

107
See Ricur, P. 1977, p. 238, where he refers to Goodmans book Languages of
Art.
68
significant modifications to Goodmans categories and de-
scriptions, although these changes do not undermine his
basic stance as given above. This can be seen in the following
quote, taken from the same context.
(1) Insufficient account is given of the strategy proper to poet-
ic discourse, that of the epoch of descriptive reference. [...] It
seems to me that one must go further, up to the eclipse of one
referential mode as the condition for the emergence of another
referential mode. It is this eclipse of primary denotation that
the theory of connotation had in view, with realizing that
what it called connotation was still referential in its fashion.
(2) Poetic discourse faces reality by putting into play heuris-
tic fictions whose constitutive value is proportional to their
power of denial. Here again, Goodman offers a first step
with his concept of null denotation, but he is too concerned
to show that the object of null denotation serves to classify
labels to see that precisely in this way, it helps redescribe re-
ality. The theory of models will allow us to tighten the link
between fiction and redescription.
(3) The appropriateness of metaphorical as well as literal
application of a predicate is not fully justified within a
purely nominalist conception of language. [...] Does not the
fittingness, the appropriateness of certain verbal and non-
verbal predicates, indicate that language not only has orga-
nized reality in a different way, but also made manifest a
way of being of things, which is brought to language thanks
to semantic innovation? It would seem that the enigma of
metaphorical discourse is that it invents in both senses of the
word: what it creates, it discovers; and what it finds, it in-
vents.
What must be understood, therefore, is the interconnection
of three themes. In the metaphorical discourse of poetry referen-
tial power is linked to the eclipse of ordinary reference; the

69
creation of heuristic fiction is the road to redescription; and
reality brought to language unites manifestation and crea-
tion.
108
It takes Ricoeur two full chapters of discourse in this style to
present for the reader what he means by such terms as eclipse
of ordinary reference, emergence of another referential mode,
redescription, etc. Each term deserves a thorough analysis as
does the argumentation surrounding their development and
use, but the point we want to make concerning Ricoeurs onto-
logical presuppositions and reference can already be stated.
However complex and convoluted his terminology and reason-
ing may be, he repeatedly insists that there is an ontological
reference (not only existential and phenomenological or noetic
reference) in language and that it is ultimately to a real external
world.

2.5.1.2 Epistemological Presuppositions
Ricoeur appears in his epistemology to be oriented, at least in
part, toward critical idealism.
109
According to his concept of
knowledge, knowledge is partly founded or grounded in the
subject and partly on the object (reality). With respect to the
conscious reflection of the subject, Ricoeur has declared himself

108
Ibid., p. 239.
109
Kant is a critical idealist in that he regards the acquisition of knowledge as a
complex process, consisting of in part (a) phenomena (objects of consciousness),
(b) the consciousness processing of the impressions especially in relation to time
and to space, and (c) the a priori categories of understanding. Note that (b) and (c)
are necessary conditions for knowledge and internal to consciousness. Here is the
basis of Kants Copernican revolution in epistemology. It is relevant to consider
Kants position here in relation to his realist ontology. He states that pure reason is
limited in its knowledge in such a way that it can never know the thing in itself
(Ger. Ding an sich) the objective ontological entity in the real world. He does not
deny that the thing in itself exists; only that reason cannot know it as it is in itself.
70
to be in the tradition of reflective philosophy descending from
Descartes
110
, through Fichte, etc., as mediated by his teacher
Jean Nabert.
111
This approach places the reflective subject at the
center of knowledge, and as joined with Ricoeurs existential
approach, it presupposes the consciousness and knowledge of
the self as prior to that of the world. Besides the specific state-
ments found in Ricoeurs work attesting to this position, we
find direct evidence of it in his sharing with Heidegger a re-
sistance to what some writers call an ontotheology.
112
That is a
theology founded upon the concept of Being an ontological
concept.
In conjunction with an analysis of Ricoeurs epistemological
presuppositions, it is important to say something about his
view of experience, life expressions and texts as a source of
knowledge. In works like Freedom and Nature (The Voluntary and
the Involuntary) and Fallible Man, Ricoeur claims to use what he
calls the pure reflection as a direct exercise of rationality.

110
Christina Runquist develops an interesting perspective on the characterization of
the tradition in which Ricoeur stands in her doctoral dissertation (Runquist, Christi-
na 1998). She relates Plato, Descartes, Kant, Shelling Fichte, Hegel and others to a
monological tradition in which knowledge centers on the knowing subject. The
modern center of this tradition is located in German transcendental-philosophy. She
identifies a second tradition, the dialogical tradition, from her studies of Buber.
This tradition develops knowledge from the vantage point of the I-thou relation-
ship (a communications relationship between two persons), what we would call an
inter-subjective dialogue. The egos self-reflection is replaced by an analysis that
builds on the self-knowledge gained from the inherent inter-subjectivity in lan-
guage. She sees this as being developed after World War I by F. Ebner, F.
Rosenzweig, G. Marcel and others in reaction to the monological tradition. One
may refer here to Israel, J. 1992, pp. 103-124. In Runquists analysis, Ricoeur has
strong affinities with the second tradition.
111
Ricoeur mentions this general background to his thought on a number of occa-
sions. In the biographical introduction to The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, edited by
Hahn, he specifically mentions the matter of the reflexive tradition and his in-
debtedness to Jean Nabert in part.
112
Cf. Westphal, M. 2001.

71
Lived experience (Ger. Lebenswelt, Fr. La experience vcue) is ana-
lyzed in part this way, though he normally insists on the need
for a hermeneutics and his later work on Freud, et al. seems to
add a demand for a critical hermeneutic (in this context, a
hermeneutic of suspicion)
113
. The term suspicion refers to
Ricoeurs view, according to which, texts (or other expressions
of Mans existence), whether general literary texts or biblical
texts, require careful interpretation, if they are to give true (as
opposed to illusion or falsehood) knowledge or understanding.
The defenders of the hermeneutics of suspicion assume that a
text may contain both truth and distortion of truth. (See the
discussion in footnotes 101-102 below.) This is, in Ricoeurs
view, especially true if they are characterized by metaphorical
language. If we take as an example his use of the Adamic myth
in the Symbolism of Evil, we may note the following. First Ric-
oeur assumes that the myth must be subjected to historical crit-
icism
114
in order to be useful for knowledge and philosophical

113
See Ricoeur, P. 1970 as well as his other articles where he develops what he
calls a hermeneutics of suspicion from a study of Freud, Nietzsche and Marx.
Basically Ricoeur acknowledges that the apparent meaning of a text (given in a
literal interpretation) may need to be subjected to a critical hermeneutics that re-
veals the latent meaning. This assumes that the apparent meaning having been dis-
torted in the process of formation by unconscious factors. One may think of the
unconscious presuppositions of an author, as they influence his text. In other words,
texts cannot always be taken to mean what they appear to mean from a first naive
reading.
114
Historical criticism, as it is used in its broad sense, is a technical term that
indicates the application of disciplinary criticism, founded on modern scientific
presuppositions, to the text. Theoretically this should give secure testable results,
just like the disciplines of modern science in the natural sciences. Thus the perspec-
tive of modern scientific historiography, modern scientific archeology, mod-
ern scientific sociology, modern scientific psychology, etc., have come to be
applied to the text. Each discipline could be said to subject its texts to a critique that
removes that which is not acceptable to the understanding of modern Man, as he
perceives his world. This would include in Ricoeurs terms a first application of a
hermeneutics of suspicion inherent in these disciplines. In practice there has
72
reflection/discourse for modern Man. Second, he assumes that
the myth must be demythologized (including being subjected to a
hermeneutics of suspicion in Ricoeurs later terminology) so that
the first naive (i.e., pre-critical and literal) reading of it is re-
placed by an interpreted, i.e., reflective reading. Third, he as-
sumes that the subject must stand before the text and allow it
to speak. In this latter moment, he holds that Being (Ger. das
Sein), the Sacred, or Truth reveals itself through the text. (Cf.
Eliade on the concept of hierophany.) At this point we need to
clarify the term truth as it is used here, and as it is encoun-
tered elsewhere in Ricoeurs work.
115

Ricoeurs use of the concept of truth in contexts like those de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph, may be related to one of
the definitions below or perhaps in the Augustinian ontological
sense of the truth, i.e., God.
116
Truth, in scholarly contexts, is
normally defined in one of the following two ways. Truth (em-
pirical) according to the correspondence theory of truth
117
can

never been a unified understanding of just what must be included here, or just how
it is to be carried out to secure testable results.
115
For the moment we will not deal with what Ricoeur calls metaphorical truth in
the Rule of Metaphor. The concepts elaborated above are adequate for our present
purposes. The position Ricoeur takes on truth can also be illuminated by examining
the position of others, with whom he stands in explicit or implicit dialogue. (See,
for example, Comstock, G. 1986.) This is especially important in relation to the
theological foundation and interpretation of biblical texts upon which Ricoeurs
approach depends. See Comstock, G. 1986. One will also profit in this context by
recalling the early Heideggers approach to truth as unconcealment, which in
typical Heideggerian fashion is said to relate to the meaning of Greek word althe-
ia. Truth is primarily the disclosure of the world to and by Dasein, unmediated by
concepts, propositions, or inner mental states... Inwood, M. J. 1995, p. 347.
116
For a very brief overview of truth theories see truth in: Hossfeld, Paul 1995,
pp. 812 ff. A short but more extended overview may be found in Walker, Ralph C.
S. 1999, p. 326f.
117
One could consider the positions of Aristotle, Wittgenstein (Tractatus), Tarski,
Austin for example. In relation to Ricoeurs view, cf. Eberhard H. 1995, p. 41ff.

73
roughly be stated as follows: a proposition is true if and only if
it corresponds to the facts, thus truth is contingent (dependent)
on external realities. Though fact has been held to be problem-
atic, it is clear that according to this theory, the truth of a prop-
osition is contingent upon how the world is. Truth according to
the coherence theory of truth (logical truth) is the relation or sys-
tematic coherence among the propositional members of a de-
fined system as follows: A body of beliefs is said to be coher-
ent when (1) none of them is inconsistent with any others [...]
(2) when they mutually support one another - that is, each be-
lief adds some probability to the other.
118
In these definitions
truth is taken in a substantive way, which is regarded as a real
and important property of the entities to which it ascribed, ra-
ther than as the foundation (ground) of being.
119

In relation to the two concepts of truth above, Ricoeur seems to
acknowledge the first to be the primary concept in many con-
texts, but places his emphasis, at least in certain other contexts,

118
Hospers, J. 1995, p. 183-184. Depending on how strong one wants to define the
concept of coherence it might be paraphrased, as mutual logical consistency or
mutual entailment. This latter case of entailment is disputed as problematic in that it
involves mutual logical necessity among the propositions. Apart from these two
primary theories of truth, some have held what is called a pragmatic theory of truth,
where the truth of a proposition is judged by its function or usefulness. (See for
example C. Pierce, J. Dewey and W. James.) According to this theory what is true
is what is useful. One could also mention Tarskis semantic theory of truth, but
since he holds that it does not apply to natural languages like English, but technical
languages of scientific or mathematical discourse, it seems to be of little relevance
here. For a brief treatment of Tarskis view see Walker, Ralph C. S. 1999, pp. 326-
328. See also C. Pierce, J. Dewey and W. James.
119
For a succinct summary of these points see the Oxford Companion to Philosophy
or similar work. Hospers, J. 1995 is also very helpful in this regard, as are other
introductory texts in the analytical philosophical tradition. In any event, the coher-
ence concept of truth is only wholly applicable in logic and mathematics.
74
on the second.
120
For example, he recognizes truth as coher-
ence in a system. To see this, we must consider both Ricoeurs
method and his stance (see below). In The Symbolism of Evil,
Ricoeur reviews the method he has applied in the study of the
symbolism of evil in Mans experience and remarks on the lim-
it in relation to truth that is reached when the method includes
only the understanding of symbols within the mutual system
of symbols as described by the comparative phenomenological
method in religious studies. Regarding the truth arrived at
through this method he says:
This mode of understanding, of which Eliades works provide a
very good example, tends to place the symbols in a whole which is
homogeneous with the symbols, but vaster, and which forms a
system in the plane of the symbols themselves. Our analysis of the
symbols and myths of human evil belongs to that sort of un-
derstanding, insofar as it is a life of thought devoted to sym-
bols. But it has not been possible to limit ourselves to such un-
derstanding of symbols in symbols. There the question of truth
is unceasingly eluded. Although the phenomenologist may give the
name of truth to the internal coherence, the systematicity, of the
world of symbols, such truth is truth without belief, truth at a dis-
tance, reduced, from which one has expelled the question: do I
believe that? [...]. That level can only be an intermediate stage,
the stage of understanding in extension, panoramic under-
stands, and curious but not concerned. It has been necessary to
enter into a passionate, though critical, relation with the truth-
value of each symbol.
121
Here Ricoeur seems to describe the concept of truth that is de-
fined according to the coherence theory of truth as we have

120
It is important to recall that the first, or correspondence theory of truth is about
the relationship between propositions and reality.
121
Ricur, P. 1969.a, p. 353f. Cf. Eliade, M. 1971, p. 450.

75
stated it.
122
Ricoeur seems also to use the correspondence con-
cept of truth, i.e., one that requires belief in the existence of ob-
jective knowledge and is oriented by a choice (choice of a dif-
ferent and better epistemological ground) and is ultimately
grounded in reality outside of Mans experience. In Ricoeurs
case, this choice also helps to clarify why the biblical texts are
so integral to his epistemological stance.
In the context from which the citation below is borrowed, we
can also see two of Ricoeurs presuppositions for the under-
standing of mythological/symbolic texts: a) a specific vantage
point, b) the choice of a primary myth or primary symbols. The
following quote from The Symbolism of Evil serves to illustrate
these two points:
[...] we have left the plane of truth without belief and come to
the circle of hermeneutics, to the believing for the sake of un-
derstanding which is also understanding for the sake of believ-
ing. I entered that circle as soon as I admitted that I read the en-
semble of myths from a certain point of view, that the mythical
space was for me an oriented space, and that my perspective angle
was the pre-eminence of the Jewish confession of sins, its symbolism,
and its mythology. By that adoption of one myth, the appropriation
of all of them became possible, at least up to a certain point.
123
(The
italics are ours.)
Here Ricoeur appears to allude to the concept of truth that is
defined within the coherence theory of truth. From the context
of his discussion in The Symbolism of Evil, it is quite clear that he
holds this to be epistemologically different from the first men-
tioned type of truth. The final sentence in the quotation above,
seems to presuppose that one myth, i.e., the Jewish confession
of sins is final, in the sense that it gives a correct, authentic, or

122
See Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 101-104.
123
See Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, 354.
76
authoritative account of reality (human reality), from the per-
spective of the philosophical discourse on the place of evil in
Man (Dasein), based on the avowal of evil in the Western tradi-
tion. If Ricoeur believes that there is a correct, authentic, or au-
thoritative account of reality, then he cannot adhere solely to
the coherence theory of truth. From such a view of reality the
truth of a proposition is contingent upon its correspondence to
an external point of view, authority or evidence which pre-
sumably articulates how the world is. But Ricoeur is not clear
how he combines the two theories of truth, the coherence theo-
ry and the correspondence theory.
Ricoeur seems to be convinced that there is the possibility of
gaining true, authentic (hermeneutical) understanding of
Mans being and his being in the world. This truth within the
hermeneutical circle must be transcended. That is to say, this
phenomenological truth is only a necessary condition for an
existential and an empirical truth, which has its test in Mans
existential experience or in the experience of the real world
outside of Man, respectively. Ricoeur calls this latter objective
truth. By this Ricoeur seems to mean an understanding
grounded in external reality, an understanding that can be
brought to philosophical description and that is inter-
subjectively testable. This is clearly truth as understood by the
correspondence theory of truth. He begins to explain his posi-
tion by referring to another presupposition (he calls it a wa-
ger
124
). Ricoeur declares that for him, the understanding gained
from work within the hermeneutical process can be made the
beginning point of the development of an objective type of
knowledge (which presupposes objective truth), which can be

124
One naturally thinks of Pascals wager in this context, but Ricoeurs use is quite
different.

77
presented in philosophical discourse.
125
He states the following in
the final chapter of The Symbolism of Evil:
Then there opens before me the field of philosophical herme-
neutics properly so-called: ... a philosophy that starts from the
symbols and endeavors to promote the meaning, to form it, by a
creative interpretation. I shall venture to call that endeavor, at
least provisionally, a transcendental deduction of symbols. Tran-
scendental deduction, in the Kantian sense, consists in justifying a
concept by showing that it makes possible the construction of a
domain of objectivity. ... In fact, the symbol, used as a means of
detecting and deciphering human reality, will have been veri-
fied by its power to raise up, to illuminate, to give order to that
region of human experience, that region of confession, which we
were to ready to reduce to error, habit, emotion, passivity - in
short, to one or another of the dimensions of finitude that have
no need of the symbols of evil to open them up and discover
them.
126
127

It is important to note that Ricoeur does not consider that he
has just entered another hermeneutical circle
128
centered on
increased self-understanding on the part of the knowing sub-
ject. He insists on establishing a clear ontological ground for this

125
By philosophical discourse Ricoeur means a presentation of the description of a
field of inquiry according to its fundamental structures and implications, based on a
rigorous and patient application of his philosophical method. In theory he declares
that his description will abstract the structures of the intended object of study and
thus focus on universals and not particulars. In practice his works are full of his
dialectical/dialogical way of doing philosophy that appears to leave a wealth of
particulars as remainders in the text of his philosophical discourse. In addition, he
has addressed specific and concrete concerns without a drive to abstractions on
numerous occasions.
126
Ricur, P. 1969.a, p. 355.
127
In regard to the term creative interpretation (hermeneutics), cf. Eliade, Mircea
1969, pp. 2-11. See also the discussion in Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, and p. 130ff.
In regard to the notion of transcendental deduction cf. Eliade, Mircea as discussed
in Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982: chapters 4-5.
128
See the section on hermeneutics above.
78
understanding. In our terminology this ground appears to be
God (cf. the allusion to the Apostle Pauls usage of God in Acts
17 below), the Sacred. He states it this way:
But the expression, transcendental deduction of symbols, is
not absolutely satisfactory; it orients us toward the idea that the
justification of the symbol by its power to reveal constitutes a
simple augmentation of self-awareness, a simple extension of
reflexive circumscription, whereas a philosophy instructed by
the symbols has for its task a qualitative transformation of re-
flexive consciousness. Every symbol is finally a hierophany, a
manifestation of the bond between man and the sacred. Now in
treating the symbol as a simple revealer of self-awareness, we cut it
off from its ontological function; we pretend to believe that
know thyself is purely reflexive, whereas it is first of all an
appeal by which each man is invited to situate himself better in
being. [...] Finally, then, it is as an index of the situation of man at
the heart of being in which he moves, exists, and wills, that the
symbol speaks to us. [C f.Acts 17:28f]. Consequently, the task of
the philosopher guided by symbols would be to break out of
the enchanted enclosure of consciousness of oneself, to end the
prerogative of self-reflection ... All the symbols of guilt ... speak
of the situation of the being of man in the being of the world. The
task then is starting from the symbols, to elaborate existential
concepts - that is to say, not only structures of reflection but
structures of existence, insofar as existence is the being of
man.
129
In this passage, Ricoeur seems to say that the symbols express
not only a purely psychological experience, but also universal
human experiences (existentials in Heideggers sense) and ex-
perience of the Sacred or God. This passage illustrates not only
Ricoeurs theological or metaphysical presupposition, but also
the dependence of his analysis on presuppositions borrowed

129
Ricur, P. 1969.a, pp. 356f.

79
from existential philosophy, which we will deal with in the
next section. However, in order to understand this passage
properly, it is at least important to note here that Ricoeur is
talking about three different beings in this passage: (1) the
being of man (Dasein), (2) the being of the world (cf. Sein,
Seiende), (3) Being, i.e., God, the Sacred as the ontological
foundation of (1) and (2). The Being of God is described in the
quote above as the heart of being in which he moves.
130

When this passage is compared with similar passages in Ric-
oeurs writings, it becomes clear that Ricoeur is using (1) in
Heideggers sense, (2) in theistic/theological sense, and (3) in
Mircea Eliades sense of the Sacred. Regarding (3) there is in
the passage the nearly connected term hierophany that is
copiously used by Eliade to refer to certain types of religious
symbols. The term means, that which reveals the Sacred, as its
etymology indicates (from the Greek hieros = the holy, sacred
and the Greek phania (manifestation), see the Greek verb phain-
estai = to reveal, show itself).
131

Two additional points need to be made here. First, Ricoeur de-
velops his metaphor theory in an attempt to explain how sym-
bols (double meaning expressions) can be interpreted and re-
tain both an internal structural reference to a symbol system
and an external (objective) ontological reference (see the dis-
cussion of reference in the section 2.5.1.1 below). Thus, accord-
ing to this context symbols function like hierophanies, which
reveal/express the Sacred, i.e., the ontological foundation of
Mans and the worlds being. Second, against this background,

130
Cf. Acts 17: 28.
131
See Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, p. 197. See the use of the term in Eliade, Mircea,
Patterns in Comparative Religion (19719, first published 1949), p. xii (cf. Mac-
quarrie, J. 1977, pp. 24ff). See also the use in others: Otto, R. 1973, van der Leuuw
1948, etc.
80
we are made aware, once again, of the need to analyze Ric-
oeurs complex philosophical method, which is illustrated by
the last two citations above and may be seen to contain ele-
ments of existential analysis, phenomenology of religion, Kant-
ian thought, theology (biblical), linguistic/semantic analysis,
etc. (See our analysis of his method below).
By saying that Ricoeur is a critical realist in epistemological
sense, we mean that he attempts, by means of philosophical
analysis, to show that the epistemological object of human
knowledge is not created by the human mind, but given in the
external world. However, he seems to recognize that in the
knowing process the human mind or cognitive structure is not
completely passive but active in interpreting and perceiving
the world or reality. Taken into consideration the active roll of
the mind, he must be seen as a critical and not a nave realist.
In our attempt to throw some light on Ricoeurs complex
method, we shall proceed by making explicit two other types
of presuppositions in the method.

2.5.1.3 Semantic Presuppositions
We define semantics here as the philosophical study of the re-
lationship between language and reality. Semantics deals with
the meaning and reference or referent of words, sentences, ex-
pressions or statements. Ricoeur uses the term meaning in
different senses and sometimes in an ambiguous way.
132
He
distinguishes at least two main senses of the term meaning,
the sense of literal (apparent) meaning and the sense of sym-

132
We have treated the different senses of the term meaning elsewhere, see for
example Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, p.18. Compare the work by Ogden, C. K. &
Richards, I. A. 1972.

81
bolic (latent) meaning. He holds that when interpreting sym-
bolic language one must apply a hermeneutics that distin-
guishes and affirms both the latent meaning and the apparent
meaning. It should be noted that Ricoeur insists that this is not
the same thing as allegorical interpretation that substitutes the
latent meaning for the apparent one.
133

Ricoeur uses the term reference in at least four different ways:
(a) He uses reference to point out elements or concepts in a lan-
guage structure (hereafter structural reference). (b) He uses it to
point out what he calls the world of the text. By world of the text
Ricoeur means, so to say, the world projected before (in front
of) the text as the reader interprets it and understands it. He
considers it to be a world that the reader could possibly inhab-
it, the world of existential possibilities for the reader. Ricoeur
seem to use the espression existential possibility as follows:
An existential possibility is one which is revealed by existential
analysis and which belongs to all human existence in virtue of
the way this existence is constituted. An existentiell possibility is
one which is open to me in a particular situation so that I can de-
cide for it. All existentiell possibilities must lie within the hori-
zon of existential possibility; but there may be existential possi-
bilities which are not existentiell possibilities or a given individ-
ual at a given time.
134

The world of existential possibilities might in fact be fictional
or ideal (on the ontological level of ideas, not the ethical sense)
or the existential-ontological world of what he calls Mans ex-
istence (in Heideggers sense). When this is the case, we shall
talk about existential reference. (c) He also uses it to point out the
real entities in the world, the ontological objective status of
which differs considerably from that of (a) and (b). When he

133
Cf. the analysis of Ricoeur in Barbosa da Silva, A.1982, pp. 85-88.
134
Macquarrie, J. 1960, 149.
82
uses the term reference in the sense according to (c) we call it
ontological reference. (d) Further, he also uses reference in the
sense of referring (the act of referring). Thus, Ricoeur uses the
term reference to point out or indicate at least four different
kinds of phenomena. This should be taken into consideration if
one wishes to make a reasonable interpretation of Ricoeurs
works as a whole. For example, in his theory of metaphor and
in his discussion of the two above mentioned theories of truth
all the four senses of reference may occur.

2.5.2 Ricoeurs Specific Presupposition from Existentialist
Philosophy
Having indicated the general presuppositions of Ricoeurs
hermeneutics, we will now turn to its specific presuppositions
in what follows. We will then relate these presuppositions to
one another. Since Ricoeur borrows most of his specific
presuppositions from Existentialism, we shall first give a brief
account of this type of Continental philosophy.
135
(Cf. section
2.8 below.)

2.5.2.1 The Main Themes of Existentialism
One of the main themes of Existentialism
136
is human freedom
and correlated concepts such as responsibility, angst (anguish,
despair), guilt, authentic existence, inauthentic existence, and feeling of
meaninglessness, care (Ger. Sorge), concern (Ger. Besorge) and

135
Other types of Continental philosophy are for example: Phenomenology, Philo-
sophical Hermeneutics, Structuralism, Marxism and New-Thomism.
136
There is any number of introductions to Existentialism available today. See for
example: Macquarrie, J. Copleston, F., Warnock, M., etc. listed in the bibliography.

83
experience of the fact that one is mortal.
137
The freedom of choice
seems to play a prominent role within Existentialism. Mary
Warnock, an outstanding expositor of Existentialism, confirms
this in what follows:
Broadly speaking, we can say that the common interest, which
unites Existentialist philosophers, is the interest in human
freedom. They are all of them interested in the world considered
as the environment of man, who is treated as a unique object of
attention, because of his power to choose his own courses of action.
What his freedom of choice amounts to and how it is to be
described [...] these are topics of central concern to all
Existentialists. But many philosophers have been concerned with
human freedom, with the problem of the freedom of the will,
who have not been Existentialists. So, it is necessary to add that
for Existentialists, uniquely, the problem of freedom is in a sense
a practical problem.
138
This broad characterization of existentialist philosophers fits
relatively well with Ricoeur, who deals with some practical
aspect of the problem of human freedom in almost all his works,
and not the least of which are those where he discusses ethical
issues and the problem of the relationship between the existence
of evil, moral evil and the ultimate cause of innocent human
suffering. However, Ricoeur, contrary to many existentialists,
e.g., like J-P. Sartre and A. Camus, is not only interested in
human freedom as a practical problem as Warnock emphasizes,
but also in the theoretical, metaphysical aspect of freedom,
namely the problem of the freedom of the will.
139
Ricoeur, in

137
John Hick lists the following as typical concepts under existential analysis:
anxiety, finitude, guilt, despair, dread of death and of non-being, doubt, meaning-
lessness, loneliness and self-estrangement (Hick, J. 1963, p. 2).
138
Warnock, M. 1970, p. 1. See also Coplestons discussion in Copleston, Fredrick,
1973.
139
See Ricoeur, P. 1966, The Voluntary and the Involuntary.
84
accordance with some other existentialist philosophers, is also
interested in the following issues: Man's self-understanding, the
question of Being, despair and Man's existential situation in the
world. All these issues are interwoven in Ricoeur's effort to
clarify what the problem of existential hermeneutics is and in the
way he uses a "combination" of different methods in his
distinctive way of doing phenomenological, existential
hermeneutic philosophy.

2.5.2.2 Ricoeurs Existential-Ontological Presuppositions
By existential presuppositions we mean statements about hu-
man nature and certain basic experiences which according to Ex-
istentialism, reveal Mans uniqueness, as expressed in experi-
ences such as freedom of choice, guilt, meaninglessness, care
(Ger. Sorge), conscience, concern (Ger. Besorge), despair, angst,
etc. Ricoeurs way of doing philosophy appears to build on
these fundamental concepts as found in existential thought.
His close relationship with G. Marcel and his affinity with the
thought of M. Heidegger may be seen as possible primary
sources for this aspect or orientation in his thought. Some of
the existential presuppositions found here include: (1) the fun-
damental structures of Mans existential being (Lat. existenti-
alia), including understanding as a primary structure (Lat. exis-
tentiale), (2) Man as a linguistic being, (3) the importance of
lived experience, (4) the importance of Mans projected possi-
bilities, etc. We will give a short account of these presuposi-
tions, using the terminological distinctions made above (being,
world, Being) and some additional ones here. Before we do this,
it is relevant to note one aspect of Ricoeurs approach. His ap-
proach is to be identified with what we may call a theistic exis-

85
tentialist approach.
140
By this we mean that he assumes, along
with the so-called theistic existential philosophers, that the ul-
timate ground of being and meaning for Man is external to
Man, The Sacred or God conceived as an agent, a personal and
transcendet being.
141
This is to be contrasted to the atheistic ap-
proach, which is anthropocentric and nihilistic and places the
ultimate ground of Mans existence, dignity and worth within
Man himself and denies that human life has a given objective
meaning (e.g., Sartre and Camus). These two approaches to
human existence share common subjects, concerns and meth-
ods (the phenomenological one), but are differentiated by the
two separate ultimate foundations for Mans existence that
they chose to build on, the latter is anthropocentric, whereas
the former is theocentric. Ricoeurs own position is to be identi-
fied with the theistic approach, as stated above, while he also
utilizes insights from the atheistic approach gained through his
dialogue with its leading proponents, for example, Sartre.
As a further refinement of our terminology, we want to make
the following distinctions. The terms existential and existentiell
refer respectively to that which is universal (ontological) in the
structure of Mans existence (i.e. anxiety/anguish, fear, death,
etc.) and that which is individual (ontic). This is somewhat sim-
ilar to Kants transcendental-empirical distinction.
142
Under-
standing is used in two different senses. (i) Understanding may
be regarded as a mode of knowledge (primarily epistemologi-

140
F. Coplestons discussion in Contemporary Philosophy exemplifies this type of
distinction. His discussion of modern existentialism is divided into theistic existen-
tialism and atheistic existentialism. See the discussion in Copleston 1973, chapters
9-11 and pp. 125ff.
141
Compare Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Marcel, Bultmann, Tillich (cf. Tillich, P.
1972, pp. 11-18; 63f and 73f). Cf. existential philosophers in: Copleston, F. 1973,
pp. 125ff.
142
See Kant, Immanuel, 1981, pp. 52-55.
86
cal) or (ii) understanding may be regarded as one of Mans
basic modes of being (primarily ontological). For example,
Kant and Husserl are to be associated with the first sense,
Heidegger and Gadamer with the second. Against this back-
ground we will now seek to account for the use of these con-
cepts in Ricoeurs work.

2.5.2.3 Ricoeurs Relationship to Heidegger
In terms of existential analysis, the subject already thrown into
the world carries out every analysis of what it is to be a human
being. Existential analysis is the philosophical analysis of the
fundamental features or structures of Mans being, being in the
world and Mans relation to beings and Being. For Heidegger
Mans situatedness (Dasein) in the world is given. Many phi-
losophers have noted this, especially the existentialists like M.
Heidegger, G. Marcel, M. Merleau-Ponty, et al. Heidegger, for
one, has made it explicitly clear that as one analyses the fun-
damental nature of human existence, one cannot begin with an
abstract ideal somewhere in intellectual space. Instead, every
analysis must begin with Man already inserted into the world.
Therefore, Man must be seen as Dasein, being-there, in
Heideggers terminology.

2.5.2.4 The Fundamental Structures of Mans Existence or Be-
ing (Existentialia)
Ricoeurs existential presuppositions include the view that
Mans existence is, in part, constituted by certain fundamental
structures (Lat. existentialia, the singular existentiale) expressed
in some basic and universal human experiences.
143
Here his

143
See Barbosa da Silva A, 1982, pp. 58ff.

87
concepts and terminology appear to coincide with M.
Heideggers. These structures (existentialia) are universal fea-
tures of human existence and are fundamental to such experi-
ences as fear, despair, anguish/anxiety (Ger. Angst), love, un-
derstanding, care (Ger. Sorge), concern (Ger. Besorge), anticipa-
tion of (fear of) ones own death, etc.
144
In other words, these
kinds of experience are essentially human and therefore they
express the fundamental structures or features of human being
or existence (Lat. existentialier in Heideggers sense)

2.5.2.5 Understanding as a Primary Existentiale
In light of the importance of the concept of understanding in
the context of this essay, i.e., its relevance for hermeneutics, we
want to underscore that Ricoeurs existential presuppositions
include the Heideggerian view that the phenomenon of under-
standing (Ger. Verstehen) is one primary structure of Mans ex-
istence (an existentiale). This means that one of Mans funda-
mental ways of being (relating himself) to the world is through
understanding and interpretation. Mans being in relation to
Being, World and self-understanding of his own being, is essen-
tially characterized by understanding as an existentiale. Man
does not have consciousness of his existence outside of or apart
from understanding in this sense. Thus, existentialists philoso-
phers do not talk about understanding only from an epistemo-
logical perspective like, for example, Descartes and the insist-
ence of Kant on a priori cognitive structures prior and neces-
sary to all human knowledge. For Existentialists, understand-
ing is an existential (existentiale) or a philosophical anthropolog-
ical-ontological concept, i.e., they conceive of it as one of the
fundamental ways of Mans existence and relationship to the

144
See Hick, J. 1963, p. 2.
88
world and to himself. In other words, according to philosophi-
cal anthropology, Man has the capacity of asking not only
What is to be a human being?, but also what is it to be an un-
derstanding being? This also seems to carry over in Ricoeur (as
with Heidegger) to the idea that the concept of world is consti-
tuted in some extent in Mans being, i.e., the way things are or
are perceived, is in some way dependent on our way of relat-
ing to (i.e., understanding) them. From this specific point of
view, both Heidegger and Ricoeur adhere to Kants transcen-
dental critical idealism.
145

2.5.2.6 Man as a Linguistic Being
It also appears to be the case that Ricoeur holds the presupposi-
tion that Mans being is, at least in part linguistic.
146
Although
this is held to be problematic, some hold that Mans conscious-
ness of Being, World and his own being is created or formed by
language, the means through which Man knows about himself
and the world. If we consider his discussion of symbol and
metaphor, Ricoeur seems to accept that Being reveals itself in
language.
147
Consider, for example, his statement that Man
must let the symbols speak in his discussion of The Symbolism
of Evil, though one must be careful in assessing the meaning of
this and similar statements, in that it seems as if Ricoeur ulti-

145
Haslett, D.W. Idealism, philosophical. In: Honderich, T. 1995, pp. 386-388.
146
Heidegger is emphatic on this point. Man is a linguistic being. In examining the
context of existential thought, it should be recalled that it is the later work of
Heidegger, which primarily reflects this concept, especially after the so-called die
Kehre.
147
This idea seems to have an affinity to the idea of the linguistic nature of being in
Heidegger.

89
mately sees Being as speaking through certain privileged sym-
bols to human beings.
148

2.5.2.7 The Importance of Lived Experience (Marcel)
Lived experience (Fr. lexperience vcue) is a term used by
some existentialists to refer to the view that human experience
is embodied and cannot be initially and authentically consid-
ered in some purely abstract way.
149
They hold that the con-
sciousness of Man, which can reflect upon itself, is irreducibly
situated in a particular body and in the world. Part of F.
Coplestons description of G. Marcels philosophical anthro-
pology in relation to the question: what am I? or What does
it mean to be a person? seems to bring together the relevant
ideas involved in this concept. Ricoeur gives the following ac-
count of Marcels answer to these questions:
The fundamental human condition is to be in a situation,
not in this or that particular situation, but in the world.
I am from the start in the world, participating in Being
and open to Being. The subject-object relation arises on the
level of reflection; but the primary datum is not myself as a
self-enclosed ego but myself in the world, present in a
situation.

148
Ricur, P. 1969.a, pp. 353ff.
149
It will be relevant to distinguish the epistemological and ontological aspects of
this discussion. In regard to knowledge it may be possible to develop a description
of human experience that is abstracted from the individual instance and communi-
cate it for the purpose of others understanding. The origin of such knowledge re-
mains in embodied experience of course. Looking at the ontological aspect, human
experience is always embodied, situated, lived experience, it is always someones
experience, for example someone being in pain. We recall too that things that have
mere existence (without consciousness), like a rock, cannot have the experience of
pain, angst, love, etc. as human beings can.
90
My insertion into the spatio-temporal synthesis, the cos-
mos, is through my body. I am present in the world as in-
carnated. This does not mean that my body is simply an in-
strument whereby I receive messages (sensations) from a
world, which is alien to me. My body is not an instrument,
which I possess... True, I can say I have a body, but my re-
lation to my body is not adequately expressed by the word
having. Nor is it adequately expressed by saying that I
am my body. Neither expression is adequate. My relation
to my body is mysterious.
150
The relation is irreducible, sui
generis: it does not lend itself to description in terms like
having which are taken from the world of objects. But in
any case through incarnation I participate in Being, pri-
marily in the spatio-temporal world.
151
(The italics are
ours.)
To give another illustration, we may note that using a method
like phenomenological analysis, it is possible to abstract from
human experience a concept like pain, of which we can be con-
scious and which can be discussed as a common human experi-
ence. Such an experience does not have its origin in abstraction
however, the experience of pain, is always the experience of
somebody being in pain, even if the concept of pain can be
discussed inter-subjectively. Ricoeur holds the fundamental
presupposition that Mans experience is embodied or incar-
nate in Marcels sense, thus Mans existence and his self-
understanding cannot be properly described from the perspec-
tive of a radical subject-object dichotomy, in which only the
object of knowledge has to enter into or be in the description or

150
The distinction between problem and mystery is fundamental to Marcels
thought. For him, problem belongs to the level of abstract, objective description,
while mystery belongs to the level of description rooted in the perspective of subjec-
tive, lived experience.
151
See Copleston F. 1973, p. 169.

91
explanation.
152
This may be seen as a part of the conception
that Mans existence is always inserted (situated) in Being or
world. This is expressed in Heideggers terms for the existence
of objects that are always ready to hand (Ger. zuhanden) and
the relation to others (note the negative implications of the im-
personal they, das Man
153
), which is being together (Ger.
Mitsein, personal Mitdasein). In the context of Ricoeurs early
philosophical anthropology, e.g., his discussion of the struc-
tures of human freedom and will, the situatedness of the indi-
vidual is described in the way Heidegger does. It is possible to
relate this aspect of the idea of lived experience to the concept
of existentiell as articulated by Heidegger, i.e., the experience of
the individual of the actual instantiation of Man as being, for
example the individual persons experience of his pain, free-
dom, angst and hope.

2.5.2.8 Mans Projected Possibilities
Ricoeurs position incorporates the presupposition that Mans
existence, in its fundamental structure, is related to time
154
and
what he calls Mans projected existential possibilities.
155
By the

152
Consult especially here the work of Marcel and Merleau-Ponty in relation to
Ricoeurs position.
153
In Heidegger, what he calls das Man (the impersonal they) is related particularly
to the problem of inauthentic existence (fallenness, in a non-moral, non-ethical,
non-spatial sense). In Ricoeurs work the other has a different nuance.
154
It is important to see this as related to Heideggers concept of time as the horizon
for Mans understanding of himself as Dasein, as well as the more common notion
of time as found in Augustines discussion of time for example. See Ricoeurs dis-
cussion in Time and Narrative, Vol. I-III (1984) in this regard.
155
Mcquarrie, J. 1960, 149. This perspective is found in a number of philosophers
throughout history (cf. Augustine), but is articulated in the context of modern exis-
tential thought by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit (1927). Though Heideggers ambi-
tious project was never brought to completion according to his own proposed sketch
of it, it still stands articulates a fundamental position that has been very influential.
92
latter he means that Man has the freedom to act now and in the
time that lies before him (i.e., for the individual person this is
in the time remaining in his or her life), that is to act in a way
such that he enters into authentic existence. As long as an indi-
vidual lives, he/she may exercise free will and act responsibly
and hereby lives the authentic way. This point should be relat-
ed to the problem of the ontological priority of existence over
essence as discussed in existential philosophers like M.
Heidegger, J-P. Sartre, G. Marcel, etc.
156
By this expression is
meant that Mans essence is not given and fixed from the be-
ginning, but starts at conception in the womb. Man through
exercise of the will increases in his/her essence until death
brings a conclusion to this ontogenetic process (see Heidegger
below). At death, one becomes what he/she potentially was
during the various steps of his/her development.
157
In Sartres
view, when one dies one becomes a being-in-itself (Fr. tre-en-
soi). The primary source of Ricoeurs concept certainly lies in
Heideggers idea of Man (Ger. Dasein as Ger. Existenz), rather
than existence (in the sense of occurring in the universe, i.e.
having mere existence, as, e.g. a stones existence). In this re-
gard, the human being is characterized by possibilities for
existence and not attributes (properties, essences) like things
are. Ricoeurs presupposition is not only that Man understands
himself as in time (there is a past, present and future in Mans
self-understanding), but also that Mans being is characterized
by projection into possible ways of being
158
, which may in fact

156
See the words existence and essence in: Sartre, J.-P. 1966, p. 802.
157
Sartre, J-P. 1966, pp. 119-158 and 802.
158
See the standard material on Heidegger as reviewed for example in Thiseltons
discussion in: Thiselton, Anthony, 1980. If this observation is accurate, it is im-
portant to discern Ricoeurs relation to each of these two ideas in his use of the term
possibilities. This is also important for understanding Bultmanns view of man in

93
be realized in the future. Ricoeur has described how this can be
seen in the will, decisions, and actions of Man.
159
He acknowl-
edges the historical situatedness and determination of Man,
but he affirms that Mans decision-making and subsequent ac-
tion in the present is authentic (in the sense of being affirma-
tive of his true being) only if it is related to projected possibili-
ties for authentic existence.
160

Ricoeur seems to hold other existential presuppositions not
discussed here, but we consider the ones described in points (a)
- (e) to be necessary and sufficient for a reasonable interpretation
of his work in this context.

2.6 The Most Necessary Condition for Understanding Ric-
oeurs Complex Approach
Ricoeurs philosophical method is complex, as is attested by
the discussion above. The reader of his works encounters
everywhere what he calls a dialectical method that
encompasses insights and methods from several other
disciplines. Ricoeurs texts are full of allusions to numerous
scholarly and literary works, scholarly disciplines, concepts,
technical terms (including newly formed ones) and theories. A
reasonable interpretation of Ricoeurs work depends upon
understanding of how he adapts borrowed materials to his text
and utilizes all of this material, as well as the structure and
degree of logical stringency in his argumentation. Thus, in

the New Testament as Macquarrie J. (1973) states, and it is thus important for Ric-
oeurs critique also.
159
See Ricur P. 1965.b, 1966, 1970, etc.
160
Existentialist philosophers hold that an individual lives an authentic life only if
he/she uses his/her freedom to make appropriate choices and take responsibility for
what he/she does. It is relevant and useful to consider Ricoeurs perspective on
possibilities and hope in this context.
94
order to understand and utilize the results of his many works
(research projects) it is necessary at least to understand two of
the main ways of doing philosophy with which he affiliates
himself.
Ricoeurs philosophical method strongly reflects the Continental
way
161
of doing philosophy, but it also incorporates methodological
insights and procedures from the Anglo-Saxon (Anglo-American)
way of doing philosophy. As is the case with other
philosophers, he has developed his own combination of
elements from these approaches and, in addition, he has
incorporated a number of methodological insights and
procedures gained from disciplines other than philosophy.
Thus an analysis of his method must take into consideration a
distinction between the Continental and Anglo-Saxon ways of
doing philosophy, as well as identification of other methods,
which he incorporates in his unique style of doing
philosophy.
162
The result is a unique combination, which is
crystallized into his personal methodological style. We call this
combination of styles in doing philosophy the most necessary

161
The distinctions made here, in regard to the main streams of epistemological
theory, can be traced back to tendencies found in the early history of Western phi-
losophy. Continental philosophers way of doing philosophy can be said to stand
somewhere in the tradition following from Platos idealism and rationalism. The
Anglo-Saxon way of doing philosophy stands somewhere in the tradition stemming
from Aristotles empiricism and emphasizes methodological clarity. Philosophers
like Thomas Aquinas, Ren Descartes, David Hume and Immanuel Kant subse-
quently furthered this approach. In addition, a number of philosophers like Ricoeur
have their own approach placed somewhere between the two. Consider Kants criti-
cal idealism or Quines holism as further examples. Discussions of the distinction
are found in the literature; see Basinger, Jeffner, e al. Basinger, D., Peterson, M., et
al. 1991, pp. 7ff.
162
This apparently eclectic style belongs to the Continental way of doing philoso-
phy. See for example his use of methodological insights from Structuralism, psy-
choanalysis, literary analysis, modern linguistics and semantics, social-critical theo-
ry, et al.

95
condition for understanding Ricoeurs works

2.6.1 The Continental Way of Doing Philosophy
In addition to what we have already said about the Continental
philosophy (cf. section 1.5 above) we shall now emphasize
some relevant features of it. Generally speaking, the Continental
way of doing philosophy is characterized by at least the following
three tendencies:
(1) It tends to build large scale and comprehensive systems of
thought, i.e., it is synthetic or constructive.
163
In its most radical
forms, the systems may be very complex and speculative (cf. e.g.,
Hegel, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida).
(2) It tends to use terms in a suggestive manner and often develops
new terminology that is held almost axiomatically, i.e., it is held to be
so intuitive or self-evident (at least for specialists in Continental phi-
losophy) that it is not defined clearly. The suggestive use of terms
comprises the use of images, metaphors, associations, allusions, se-
mantic openness, etc.
164
This sometimes leads to problems in con-
sistency, coherence, systematization and clarity, etc. (See Heidegger
in this regard for a typical example of this.)
(3) At least some philosophers associated with this way of doing phi-
losophy, seem to combine diverse disciplinary methods and levels of
analysis, without due consideration of the logical consistence and
coherence of such methodological eclecticism. (Consider Jaspers,
Tillich and Eliades use of philosophy and psychology in their re-
search.)
Generally speaking, the Continental way of doing philosophy some-
times seems to exhibit a complex interpretative framework, eclecti-
cism and sometimes it seems to exhibit a lack of clarity in analysis,

163
Cf. Basinger, D., Peterson, M., et al. 1991, pp.7ff.
164
See Jeffner, A. 1979, pp. 247-256, especially p. 254.
96
lack of stringency in logical argumentation, and lack of theoretical
systematization and integration vis--vis the analytical way of doing
philosophy as characterized below.
165

2.6.2 The Anglo-Saxon Way of Doing Philosophy a brief
account
As we have pointed out in chapter 1, section 1.5, by contrast to
the Continental style, and generally speaking, the Anglo-Saxon
or Anglo-American way of doing philosophy, which is found
in the work of Frege, Moore, and B. Russell
166
, among others, is
characterized by the following features:
(1) It attempts to build on a semantic analysis of language, striv-
ing for a rigorous definition of concepts and maintaining care-
ful distinctions among technical-terms as analytical tools. The
terminology developed is attempted to be used in a well-
defined, consistent manner.
(2) It aims at using concepts and terms in a coherent, systematic
way in the analysis of the subject
167
matter under study (what
Quine calls object language in relation to a meta-language). In
other words, a careful conceptual analysis is carried out, for the
sake of clarity.
(3) It attempts to carefully apply the rules of argumentation
and logic, so that one can move from clearly defined concepts
applied to soundly reasoned statements (propositions) to fur-

165
See the Five necessary conditions for understanding Mircea Eliades way of
doing the history of religions in chapter one above.
166
The developments in Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Strawson, Dummett, et al.,
should also be considered. This approach should not be equated with the empirical
and positivist epistemology identified with the logical positivism of the Vienna
circle, i.e., the early Wittgenstein, Schilick, Carnap, Popper, Hempel, et al.
167
Jeffner, A. 1979, p. 254.

97
ther statements that are also well reasoned.
168
This is done in
an attempt to maintain objectivity, stringency and respect for
the universal character of scientific knowledge and rules of
sound communication.
(4) It strives for theoretical integration from the logical and
epistemological point of view.
In general, the analytical endeavor is characterized by an at-
tempt to progress systematically in the construction of a body
of coherent knowledge, formed from clear well defined state-
ments leading to further statements of the same logical type.
169

This will facilitate understanding and rational criticisms, which
in the philosopher Karl Poppers view, at least, is the way sci-
ence, and makes progress.
170

As we shall see in the following, Ricoeur attempts to combine the
Continental style with the Anglo-Saxon or Ango-American way of
doing philosophy.

2.7 A Critical Assessment of Ricoeurs Complex Methodology
In this section we shall attempt to make a critical assessment of
Ricoeurs complex methodology. Let us summerise the most
fundamental features of his methodology.
As has already been pointed out, Ricoeurs way of doing phi-
losophy seems to have incorporated many of the characteristics
of the Continental way of doing philosophy. He does incorpo-
rate some of the aspects of the Anglo-Saxon way of doing phi-
losophy however, especially when dealing with the problems

168
Ibid.
169
See Bertrand Russell on logical type (cf. Set Theory. In: Honderich, T. (ed.)
1995, p. 823f.
170
See for example Popper, Karl R. 1974, p. 34.
98
of language and the philosophy of religious language in his
research. In addition, Ricoeurs own unique style of doing phi-
losophy includes at least the following personal elements.
(a) He has developed what he calls a dialectic method, that he
believes enables him to establish a dialogue between differing
viewpoints, which are held in tension. From this dialogue he
often develops what he calls a third term.
171
Ricoeur holds this
to be a new perspective that brings insight to what he considers as
the contributions and limitations of the first two perspectives,
and a way of making his own unique contribution. This leads
to a result that he regards as being neither synthetic nor eclec-
tic. It is an attempt to integrate the fruitful insights of both po-
sitions within his own perspective without collapsing them
into one viewpoint. This feature of his method is illustrated, for
example, by his discussion of the relationship between under-
standing (Ger. Verstehen) and explanation (Ger. Erklaren).
172
It
should be noted that while Dilthey, for example, makes a di-
chotomy between causal explanation and hermeneutical under-
standing, Ricoeur sees them as complementary. He follows
Heideggers standpoint in this controversial issue.
173

b) He has developed a method that demands that the long way,
as he calls it, should be followed as one pursues understanding
(self-understanding) and the development of the accompany-
ing philosophical discourse. As a general philosophical meth-

171
One might consider Hegels synthesis in comparison here. Ricoeurs approach is
different in that he does not attempt to ultimately resolve or reduce the tension or
conflict in the opposing positions. In Hegels synthesis, the tension between free-
dom and nature in Man might be resolved in the new ideal Man, which belongs to
the future, to the end of universal history. In Ricoeur, Mans situation is best under-
stood as being constituted by the unresolved (or reduced) implications of freedom
and nature, and it is in this situation Man must appropriate his possibilities.
172
Ricoeur, P. 1992, pp. 65-95.
173
Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 62-63

99
od, this amounts to an exploration of (in the sense of requiring
great effort and perseverance) and illumination of as many as-
pects of a problem as possible. In the particular case of existen-
tial self-understanding, it requires resisting the temptation to
assume or believe that ones self is directly available to ones
own consciousness and that therefore the hard work of under-
standing through the products of consciousness and the other
(e.g., culture) is not the primary path to self-understanding. He
seems to hold, in principle that final conclusions should be
held in abeyance, until as many aspects of a problem (object of
analysis) as are methodologically possible, can be thoroughly
pursued without however accomplishing this task himself. In
this regard, a problem is often viewed from the perspective of
differing disciplines. This means that Ricoeurs philosophical
discourse may include illumination of the subject matter under
consideration under different descriptions.
174
In practice of
course, it is not possible to carry out an exhaustive investiga-
tion from every possible perspective, even for Ricoeur. He
seems to hold to the principle, however, that an unwarranted
methodological short cut has been taken if all the major impli-
cations of the problematic he is addressing are not pursued.
175

In what follows we shall attempt to illustrate how Ricoeur
deals with a) and b) above.

174
Ricoeur himself criticizes Freud for allowing his physical and economic meta-
phors for psychological states, to become true physical descriptions of the states of
the mind. Thus for example, psychological description may be mixed with a de-
scription relevant to material objects in the physical world, including explanation in
terms of cause and effect relationships.
175
This has been offered as an explanation as to why the projected third volume of
Ricoeurs work on the philosophy of the will has never appeared (the poetics of the
will). His own statements seem to indicate that it never will as a separate entity. He
appears to hold that most all of his research, since The Symbolism of Evil, is part of
the required work necessary to arrive at the production of such a third volume.
100

2.8 Ricoeurs Way of Doing Philosophy Illustrated by His
Hermeneutical Approach
The purpose of this section is primarily to analyze a few select-
ed paragraphs from one of Ricoeurs articles dealing with reli-
gious language. Through a critical but constructive analysis we
want to indicate the fruitfulness of the method of analysis pro-
posed in this essay.
The text (quotes) selected comes from an article called Preface
to Bultmann, which in the English version is divided into
three main parts:
1) The hermeneutical question
2) Demythologization
3) The task of interpretation
The selected text to be analyzed below is taken from the final
pages of Ricoeurs critique of Bultmann (i.e., point 2 above),
and includes ample examples of his method and the presuppo-
sitions that undergird his hermeneutics. The purpose of the
original text was to prepare the reader of Bultmanns works;
especially Jesus and Jesus Christ and Mythology 1958, to better
understand his questions, his hermeneutics and such concepts
as demythologizing. Ricoeur appears to have in mind the
presentation of a clarifying essay that brings order and under-
standing to the difficult texts of Bultmann, which are subject to
misinterpretation and misunderstanding by the unprepared
reader.
The analysis that is presented below is carried out with a par-
ticular interest in illustrating how Ricoeur uses his various
methodological presuppositions, e.g., the aforementioned ones,
in his approach to clarifying modern Biblical hermeneutics. The

101
citations below are taken from the third part of Ricoeurs cri-
tique of Bultmann, in which we can see how he uses both his
semantic and existentialist presuppositions clearly. The cita-
tions also demonstrate clearly, from Ricoeurs perspective,
which points in Bultmanns work are considered to be those of
strength and which are those of weakness based on his method
and working assumptions. Thus in the article Ricoeur intends
to go beyond the limits of Bultmann and bring a contribution
of his own as part of his constructive critique.
It is important to remember at least two points here. First, in the
context of this essay, the approach used is not intended to merely
repeat or paraphrase what Ricoeur has said within a different
framework. Rather the approach is intended to help the reader of
Ricoeur to see his presuppositions, his distinctive way of doing
philosophy, his style of philosophical discourse, etc., so that the
reader may better understand what is being encountered in the
analysis of an important text by Ricoeur, a text that deals specifically
with religious language. Thus in this section we apply to the text what
we call some necessary conditions (presuppositions) for
understanding Ricoeurs complex hermeneutical method with a view
to promoting a better understanding of his work by the reader.
Second, the purpose of this approach is not to put forward a value
judgment on the worth of Ricoeurs content or unique Continental
way of doing philosophy. The purpose instead is to help the reader,
especially the English speaking reader familiar with the Anglo-
American analytical approach to philosophy, to become a better
informed reader of Ricoeurs texts. The pre-under-standings and ex-
pectations, that such a reader has, may thus be attuned to the style of
the philosophical text that is being read and brought under critical
assessment.
For an illustration and for our critical assessment of Ricoeurs way of
doing hermeneutics we find it helpful to indicate some of the presup-
positions and their implications that one may expect to find in Ric-
oeurs works.
102

2.8.1 Some Presuppositions that Illustrate Ricoeurs Way of
Doing Hermeneutics
The following methodological presuppositions are among
those that may be observed in the lengthy quotations in this
section and in the following sections:
a) Both the continental and analytic tendencies in Ricoeurs
method are present.
b) The dialogical approach in which Ricoeur seeks to con-
struct his own perspective in relation to two other perspectives
held in tension may be seen.
c) Ricoeur seems to operate with a set of basic assumptions,
basic beliefs in his hermeneutics (on the side of the hermeneu-
tic of belief). Some of his basic assumptions that function as
axioms are apparent:
c).1. Being, God, the ultimate reality exists in the real world
c).2. Being manifests itself (e.g., in a sacred text)
c).3. Values exist in the real world, i.e., they are ontologically
objective.
While holding this type of assumption, he often appears not to
explain the relationship between them in a systematic manner,
for example between Being (God) and the manifestation of
Being (God) in a linguistic text (sacred text).
d) There is an inconsistency between what Ricoeur, de facto,
does and what he says he does at times. This is a criticism that
he applies to Bultmann but which is also applicable to his own
way of doing philosophy. Hence, he is not self-consistent in
his critique of Bultmann and in his way of doing hermeneutics.
e) Experience (human being) comes to language, e.g., a

103
linguistic text. There are privileged forms of language for
expressing certain experiences. Both a general analysis of
language and an analysis of privileged forms of language are
necessary for understanding.
f) Different tasks approach a text in different ways (different
hermeneutics) to bring out the appropriate meaning for the
task. Different tasks will be related to different discourses,
i.e., appropriately structured and systematically developed
descriptions of a field of inquiry.
g) Philosophical discourse must be correlated to the type of
object in view.
h) Truth concepts must be correlated to the type of
philosophical discourse (description) and object in view.
i) Ricoeur holds that the functions of explanation and
understanding may be differentiated. Explanation has to do,
inter alia, with the critical, empirical, scientific analysis of the
object of study. Understanding has to do with the relation of
the object of study to human being, and existential
appropriation (acting to actualize authentic existence). But in
some contexts he holds that understand and explanation are
complementary concepts.
176

j) In relation to the immediately preceding point, language, for
example, texts can be approached from the point of view of a
critical (scientific) analysis and/or from the point of view of an
existential analysis.
k) The lack of a well-organized meta-language (conceptual
framework as tool of analysis) and consistent use of
suggestive terminology appears to lead to a lack of clarity that

176
See the term Expliquer et comprende in: Ricur, P. 1986, pp. 65-89.
104
might be expected in a rigorous philosophical discourse.

2.8.1.1 The Way Ricoeur Uses His Presuppositions in His
Critique of Bultmann
In the following sections we will illustrate how Ricoeur uses
his presuppositions in his critique of Bultmann. We will
mention specially the one described under a) to k) in section
2.8.1 above.

2.8.1.1.a Ricoeurs Use of His Semantic Presuppositions in
His Critique of Bultmanns Hermeneutics
We will begin this analysis of Ricoeurs article on Bultmann, by
looking at a section of an article in which Ricoeur considers
Bultmann in his role as an exegete and a theologian. His criti-
cism of Bultmanns hermeneutics as inadequate for the full task
of the exegete emerges clearly in what follows.
I am not formulating these questions against Bultmann but
with the aim of thinking more adequately what remains un-
thought in Bultmann. And I am doing this for two reasons.
First of all, his work as a New Testament exegete has an inade-
quate basis in his hermeneutic philosophy. Yet Bultmann - who
is too little known in France - is above all the author of the am-
ple and solid Theology of the New Testament and the admirable
Commentary on the Gospel of John. (Here a task remains that of
confronting Bultmanns actual exegesis with the representation
he gives of it in his theoretical writings.)
177
His exegesis, it
seems to me, is more opposed to Dilthey than his hermeneutics.

177
This suggested procedure is exactly the procedure that needs to be applied to the
work of Ricoeur. That is to say, an analysis of what he claims to do in his theoreti-
cal statements needs to be put in relation to what he actually does in the execution
of his analysis and writing of his texts.

105
His exegesis breaks with Dilthey on the essential point. The
task of interpretation, when applied to a specific text, is not to
understand its author better than he understood himself, ac-
cording to a phrase which goes back to Schleiermacher. Rather,
the task is to submit oneself to what the text says, to what it in-
tends, and to what it means. But this independence, this suffi-
ciency, this objectivity of the text presupposes a conception of mean-
ing which borrows more from Husserl than from Dilthey. Even if it
is true, finally, that the text accomplishes its meaning only in
personal appropriation, in the historical decision (and this I be-
lieve strongly with Bultmann against all the current philosophies of a
discourse without the subject), this appropriation is only the final
stage, the last threshold of an understanding which has first
been uprooted and moved into another meaning. The moment
of exegesis is not that of existential decision but that of mean-
ing which, as Frege and Husserl have said, is an objective and
even an ideal moment (ideal in that meaning has no place in
reality, not even in psychic reality). Two thresholds of under-
standing then must be distinguished, the threshold of mean-
ing, which is the moment when the reader grasps the mean-
ing, the moment when the meaning is actualized in existence.
The entire route of comprehension goes from the ideality of mean-
ing to existential signification. A theory of interpretation which
at the outset runs straight to the moment of decision moves too
fast. It leaps over the moment of meaning, which is the objec-
tive stage, in the non-worldly sense of objective. There is no
exegesis without a bearer [teneur] of meaning, which belongs
to the text and not to the author of the text.
178
(The italics are
ours.)
This citation allows us to assert that the task of exegesis is the
focal point of discussion. Ricoeur criticizes Bultmann here for
not clearly distinguishing between the objective meaning

178
Preface to Bultmann in Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 396-398. This book is originally
published in French (see Ricoeur, P. 1965a, Editions du Seuil).
106
and the subjective meaning of the biblical texts. He declares
that the former belongs to the text itself, whereas the latter is
existential and is grasped in personal appropriation of the
former, which happens at the moment of decision. Ricoeur
affirms in the quotation that Bultmann neglects the objective
meaning of the text and therefore Ricoeur characterizes his the-
ory of interpretation as the one, which at the outset runs
straight to the moment of decision one that moves too
fast.
179

It is immediately apparent from reading the quotation above
that it presupposes that the readers adequate preparation or
pre-understanding for interpreting Ricoeurs writings should
include a substantial and comprehensive knowledge of certain
aspects of modern philosophy and modern hermeneutics. That
the reader of scholarly works should be expected to be pre-
pared in the foundations of the discipline is not unusual. It is
indeed a reasonable requirement. But two questions to be
asked here relate to the extent and purpose of that preparation.
Is there a body of clearly delineated knowledge, generally ac-
cepted in the discipline, upon which the concepts and argu-
ments of Ricoeurs article are constructed and therefore de-
pendent? Do the allusions in the accepted body of knowledge
in the text, work to bring precision, clarity and logical struc-
ture to the content and cogent arguments? As was stated earli-
er, the methods of Anglo-American and Continental philoso-
phy appear to choose different strategies in presumed
knowledge and its relation to these questions.
In the opening sentence of the above quotation it is clear that
Ricoeur intends his method to include critical dialogue and
addition of his own contribution. As he states, his method

179
Ibid.

107
seeks to affirm (not remove) the approach of Bultmann, while
going beyond the limitations of the method and the structures
of Bultmanns thought. For Ricoeur, the term thinking in this
context takes on the technical sense here of carefully constructing
a philosophical discourse. This is one of those terms that the read-
er should be alert too as it occurs in both this technical sense
and its ordinary senses in Ricoeurs work.
It is relevant to recall at the outset that Bultmann distinguishes
sharply between the concept of exegesis and that of hermeneu-
tics. The former is a task primarily related to the text and the
latter is related to the existential analysis of human being, an
analysis that is characteristic of for example Heideggers philo-
sophical method.
180
On the contrary, Ricoeur does not make a
sharp distinction between exegesis and hermeneutics. In what
follows he regards hermeneutics as the theoretical foundation
of exegesis. As regards Bultmanns work as exegete, Ricoeur
notes at least three things:
1) That his exegesis is not adequately supported by the theoretical
base of the hermeneutics that Bultmann constructs as an existen-
tial philosopher and philosopher of religion.
2) The inadequate foundation undermines Bultmanns work as
a theologian.
3) Ricoeur criticizes Bultmann for not doing what he promis-
es to do or says that one should do, meaning in practice what
he says he must do in his theoretical writings in order to be
consistent and coherent.
These are methodological criticisms that are relevant and valu-
able to point out. Therefore the reader of this critique may ex-
pect here at least two things. First, that Ricoeur will carefully

180
This is a well-known distinction that the reader should most likely be familiar
with. See the distinction as presented by Persson, P. E., 1979, pp. 60f and 76f.
108
explicate and illustrate these problems, and suggest a solution
for them. Second, that Ricoeur will himself model consistency
between what he says he will do and what he actually does, cf.
3) above.
Instead of realizing these three tasks, Ricoeurs explication im-
mediately presents us with a number of allusions to central
figures in the history of modern hermeneutics and logic, e.g.,
Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Husserl and Frege.
181
If this infor-
mation is to be clear and useful to the reader, it would seem
that a good understanding of biblical hermeneutics, Diltheys
general hermeneutics, Husserls phenomenology, the founda-
tions of exegetical and theological methods, and Ricoeurs par-
ticular view of these things is presumed. Otherwise an ex-
planatory passage like the following becomes very difficult to
understand:
His exegesis, it seems to me, is more opposed to Dilthey than
his hermeneutics. His exegesis breaks with Dilthey on the es-
sential point. The task of interpretation, when applied to a
specific text, is not to understand its author better than he
understood himself, according to a phrase which goes back
to Schleiermacher [].
182

The risk in writing in the way Ricoeur does is that the text
functions as a type of short-hand, the full text and context
of which is not readily available to the reader. If this is the case,
the explication risks not being understood correctly by the
reader or not being as helpful as it might otherwise be. This
danger is perhaps most obvious when the views or ideas of
those thinkers Ricoeur refers to are not specified. He for exam-
ple sides strongly with Bultmann against all the current philos-

181
For the similarity between Husserls and Freges concept of meaning see
Fllesdal, D. 1974, pp.25ff.
182
Ricur, P. 1974, pp. 397ff. Cf. Ricur, P. 1965a.

109
ophies of a discourse without the subject.
183
The reader may be-
lieve that the allusion is transparent and that the intended au-
thors (that Ricoeur has in mind) of all the current philosophies of
a discourse without the subject
184
are just those assumed by the
reader, but there may be a risk for misunderstanding of the
concepts and the sources, if the allusion is too indirect and un-
specified. Ricoeur himself emphasizes the importance of the
linguistic text and its construction in this article, so we may
presume (and be entitled to expect) that his texts should be
carefully constructed and lucid to convey the fullness of his
meaning.
As can be seen from this initial discussion, a methodological
approach which includes a well developed meta-language is in a
position to contextualize the terms taken from various views
for example of hermeneutics. By contextualize (or re-
contextualize) here we mean to clarify the meaning of the
terms use in its original philosophical context and clarify its
insertion into the new philosophical context. But Ricoeurs dia-
logical or dialectical approach does not appear to contextualize
his borrowed technical terms as fully as might be expected.
The following quote may be used to illustrate two additional
points here. Ricoeur declares: Rather, the task is to submit oneself
to what the text says, to what it intends, and to what it means. But
this independence, this sufficiency, this objectivity of the text presup-
poses a conception of meaning which borrows more from Husserl
than from Dilthey.
185
(The italics are ours.) The first point is
perhaps minor, but worth mentioning. The vantage point or
voice may change subtly in Ricoeurs texts and requires atten-
tion, especially when the text is pregnant with allusions and

183
Ibid.
184
Ibid.
185
Ibid.
110
perspectives. It is at times difficult to determine whose view-
point is being put forward in Ricoeurs dialectical approach,
which he uses so profusely and productively. He at times
adopts the position of the dialogue partner and appears to
voice that position as his own. He may then at a later point
bring a corrective to that position, speaking again from his own
position. The reader must be alert to the whole context to avoid
confusion when reading Ricouers texts. The second point con-
cerns the proliferation of terms. In this short context, in which
Ricoeur assesses Bultmanns approach, the following terms are
put forward without any explication: what the text says,
what the text means, what the text intends, independence of
the text, sufficiency of the text, and objectivity of the text. If
these terms were intended to indicate distinct concepts or to
allude to different views, one would expect a refinement of
terminology or a reference to the standard definitions of the
terms or a clear account of the alluded views. It is possible that
there is a degree of conceptual differentiation and a degree of
literary variation combined in this context. Exactly how the
reader should determine which is which may not be easily seen
from the context.
It may be of value to insert in the analysis here a reminder of
Ricoeurs own perspective, as it is understood by at least some
of his interpreters.
186
In considering Ricoeurs work, it seems
apparent that he has attempted to construct a regional herme-
neutics for religious texts under the broader perspective of a
general hermeneutic. By regional hermeneutics for religious
texts we mean here a special hermeneutic that operates on
rules that are conditioned by the unique nature and language
of religious texts, i.e., that contain the privileged symbols of

186
See Harvey, van A. 1987, p. 282.

111
religious experience in language.
187
If this understanding of
Ricoeur is indeed correct, then the relation of his general her-
meneutics and regional hermeneutics to the specific hermeneu-
tical conceptions of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Husserl, Gada-
mer, Bultmann, et al., should be clearly kept in mind as he dia-
logues with and incorporates their thought into his texts.
The text we are commenting on also illustrates another aspect
of Ricoeurs work to which the reader must be alert. At times,
even relatively simple, non-technical, language appears to
make an important point, a point, which upon reflection, may
not be as transparent as Ricoeur seems to admit. In addition,
this type of language is often mixed with technical expressions
and what may be technical expression, but are left undefined.
Take for example the following statement: this appropriation
is only the final stage, the last threshold of an understanding which
has been uprooted and moved into another meaning. (The italics
are ours.) The term appropriation may be considered a tech-
nical term in Ricoeurs work and therefore is relatively easy to
interpret here. The expression last threshold of an understand-
ing appears to be meaningful, but upon reflection it is not
clear what thresholds are in relation to understanding. He
identifies two examples of what he considers them to be later
in the paragraph, but this does not define the term. In fact if he
holds a view of discrete stages of understanding with identifi-
able thresholds, it might be quite controversial. He may be us-
ing the expression metaphorically, but again he does not then
identify the reality (ontological reference or referent) that he
intends to specify by this usage. Finally, the predicate used to
explicate understanding appears to be metaphorical (spacial

187
In this regard, one should consider the full impact of the work of M. Eliade, R.
Otto, van der Lueew, et al. on Ricoeurs work with religious texts. We have includ-
ed this as one of our necessary presuppositions for interpreting him.
112
metaphor) and may not be clear to the reader as to its exact
meaning. A careful analysis of the context and the analysis of
Ricoeurs concept or view of understanding may yield a mean-
ing here, but the reader must work for this analysis and not
assume that the relatively simple meaning of change of place is
adequate to Ricoeurs fully intended meaning.
There are passages in Ricoeurs work when complex issues,
which call for explanation, are passed over in the text and the
appearance is given that a clear statement or delineation of
concepts has been achieved. Consider the following passage:
The moment of exegesis is not that of existential decision but that of
meaning which, as Frege and Husserl have said, is an objective and
even and ideal moment (ideal in that meaning has no place in reali-
ty, not even in psychic reality). (The italics are ours.)
The initial part of the quote is not so difficult to understand as
it identifies the task of exegesis and delimits its scope so that it
does not include existential decision which in Bultmanns ter-
minology belongs to the task of biblical hermeneutics.
188
The
process of setting limits or exclusion is a useful part of the
elaboration, refinement and definition of concepts. The inclu-
sion of that which follows within the scope of exegesis is less
clear. The inclusion of meaning is correct, but meaning in
philosophical contexts is a complex and ambiguous term, and
Ricoeur does not effectively specify what kind or aspect of
meaning he intends here. His reference to Frege and Husserl
serves to open the analysis of meaning in two different and
important philosophical contexts as he attempts to relate it to
the discussion of the objective and the ideal. The challenge
here for the reader is to keep in mind the complex discussion of

188
Bultmann conceives of hermeneutics, to a great extent, in Heideggers existential
manner. See Macquarrie, J. 1973, pp. 181-191; Macquarie, J. 1977, p.37 (cf. pp. 34-
36).

113
meaning in both of the context of Frege and Husserl and to
keep the distinct differences between them in mind, while con-
sidering the commonalities that might contribute to clarify Ric-
oeurs point. It is, however, difficult for the reader to identify
Ricoeurs assumed commonalities between Freges and Hus-
serls concept of meaning. Especially the work of Husserl in
this regard presents some challenges and some points that are
controversial. Husserls empirical ego, transcendental ego,
noema-noesis distinction, intended object as qua intended and
proper intended object distinction, his strong tendency to tran-
scendental idealism, etc., all contribute to what probably
should be well understood by the reader in this context to fol-
low Ricoeurs analysis. This certainly is to be done in relation
to the standard analysis of the thought of Husserl (which is not
by any means univocal) and in relation to what is unique in
Ricoeur. His own interpretation of meaning in the context of
Freges and Husserls works certainly calls for a closer explana-
tion as his explanatory parenthesis ideal in that meaning has no
place in reality, not even in psychic reality raises serious ques-
tions for the reader in regards to his epistemological and onto-
logical analysis of meaning here. Thus, even a brief passage
from Ricoeur works, like the one above, seems to require a ra-
ther elaborate analysis on the part of the reader to bring Ric-
oeurs point with this passage under control. In other words,
we hold that Ricoeur sometimes requires too much of his read-
ers. In other words, he requires of his readers what he, as a
writer, is expected to do for them.
As Ricoeur approaches the end of the long quote above, he in-
troduces at least two new terms and problems into the context.
He first speaks of an entire route of comprehension which
seems to combine a metaphor of spacial movement with com-
prehension. The metaphor is not perhaps so problematic, but
114
the introduction of the term comprehension into the discus-
sion, without relating it to his previous technical terms such as
exegesis, interpretation, appropriation, understand-
ing, etc., is problematic. In the kind of context in which the
word comprehension now appears, it seems as if it could be
meant to make allusion to a large area of discussion in the phi-
losophy of language and philosophy of mind, for example. If it
is only a stylistic variation of a previous expression or a non-
technical expression it is not so marked in the text. Thus the
problem of what is intended allusion and what is not intended
allusion and even the scope of allusion appears to be a difficul-
ty that must be faced in Ricoeurs texts.
At the very end of the above quoted text which deals with
Bultmanns way of doing exegesis and hermeneutics Ricoeur
does return to the question of hermeneutics and the location of
meaning (linguistic meaning) in the text and not in the mind of
the author, i.e., meaning conceived as the intention of the au-
thor. Here Ricoeur seems to allude to the concept of intentional
fallacy and it appears that, in this case, Ricoeur presupposes
that the reader should be prepared to follow his conclusion
quite easily. In other words, Ricoeur seems to reject Diltheys
hermeneutics, because he thinks that Dilthey commits the in-
tentional fallacy. One commits this type of fallacy when one
identifies or confuses the meaning of a text with the intention
of its author.
189
By intention is meant here the meaning of a
text as conceived in the authors mind during the process of
writing the text.
190

Reflecting over the whole section in which the above long
quote occurs, one wonders if the bulk of this text here has clari-

189
Wimsatt, W. K. & Beardsley, M. C. 1970, pp. 347ff.
190
Cf. Diltheys view of interpretation in: Makkreel, Rudolf A. 1995, pp. 203ff.

115
fied key terms and concepts, structured the discussion, argued
cogently so that the concluding remarks are arrived at logically
and effectively from the opening discussion of hermeneutical
options. According to our reasonable interpretation of the long
quotation above and of Ricoeurs writings as a whole, it does
not.

2.8.1.1.b Ricoeurs Use of His Semantic Presuppositions in
His Critique of Bultmanns Exegesis
The following long quote from Ricoeurs article continues
where the previous quote left off. We will use this section to
identify at least three additional areas where the reader may
find difficulties in understanding Ricoeurs texts. Ricoeur con-
tinues by saying:
Therefore, far from the objective and the existential being con-
traries as happens when there is too exclusive an attach-
ment to the opposition between myth and kerygma it must
be said that the meaning of the text holds these two moments
closely together. It is the objectivity of the text, understood as
content bearer of meaning and demand for meaning that
begins the existential movement of appropriation. Without
such a conception of meaning, of its objectivity and even of
its ideality, no textual criticism is possible. Therefore, the se-
mantic moment, the moment of objective meaning, must pre-
cede the existential moment, the moment of personal decision, in a
hermeneutics concerned with doing justice to both the objec-
tivity of meaning and the historicity of personal decision. In
this respect the problem Bultmann posed is the exact inverse
of the problem, which contemporary structuralist theories
pose. The structuralist theories have taken the language side,
whereas Bultmann has taken the speaking side. But we now need
an instrument of thought for apprehending the connection
between languages and speaking, the conversion of system
116
into event. More than any other discipline that deals with
signs, exegesis requires such an instrument of thought. If
there is no objective meaning, then the text no longer says
anything at all; without existential appropriation, what the
text says is no longer living speech. The task of a theory of in-
terpretation is to combine in a single process these two mo-
ments of comprehension.
191
It should be noted initially that the problem of delineating the
concept of objectivity/objective in the previous section carries
over into this one. This is a situation not at all uncommon in
Ricoeurs texts, i.e., in his way of doing hermeneutics. Setting this
concern aside, at least for the moment, it is to be noted that this
text begins with a discussion and a distinction, which concerns
terms typical for the phenomenology of religion (e.g., Eliade,
Otto, van der Lueew, et al.), as transported into Bultmanns
system of thought (cf. Bultmanns Kerygma and Myth).
192
Both
myth and kerygma must be treated as technical terms in this
context. In numerous texts it is apparent that Ricoeur accepts the
results of this approach to religion, its symbols and its texts.
These results are thus held as something like a working
assumption as they are not apparently argued for rigorously in
the texts where they appear.
The importance of this observation may be seen against the
background of the role of myth, symbol, and sign in language
in this above-mentioned context. Ricoeurs analysis of the reli-
gious language in The Symbolism of Evil, for example, is directly
related to this discussion. At the same time, however, he intro-
duces Structuralism into the discussion, which presents a new

191
Bultmann, R. New Testament and Mythology. In : Bartsch, H. H. (ed.). 1957,
Vol. 1, pp. 1-44 ; Ricur, P. 1974, pp. 397-398. Cf. Ricur, P. 1965a, Editions du
Seuil.
192
See in this regard such works as The Symbolism of Evil (Ricoeur, P. 1969.a,
Chapter 2) and Figuring the Sacred (Ricoeur, P. 1995, pp. 48-534).

117
perspective for the reader to incorporate into the discussion.
Once again Ricoeur is triangulating his discussion as he often
does. The contribution of Structuralism here may bring insight
in regard to the concept sign in the context of semiotic sys-
tems and structural linguistics and semantics (cf. the long quo-
tation above). There may be some confusion however, for some
approaches to Structuralism in the field of anthropology (Levi
Strauss, et al.) also discuss the matters of sign, symbol, myth,
etc., mentioned above. Again the intended scope of the allu-
sion, in this case to Structuralism becomes important. Ricoeurs
reference to language side and speaking side, presupposes
the readers acquaintance with the structuralist distinction be-
tween la langue (the language as a system) and la parole
(the use of language, i.e., the spoken language, speech).
For Ricoeur a full interpretation analyses and connects both as-
pects above and a full hermeneutics is methodologically able to
work with both. It is evident here that Ricoeurs use of the term
hermeneutics is substantially different than that of Bult-
mann. The application of a meta-language in the context will
help the reader to clarify the distinctions made between the
concepts and to hold the use of these terms in proper relation
to each other. Otherwise the reader may not understand Ric-
oeurs critique of Bultmann.
Ricoeur makes it clear in his view that the meaning of the text
is directly related to the linguistic text and this is central in his
critique of Bultmanns exegesis and hermeneutics. The reader
may understand this in a general sense, but it is important to
note that Ricoeur relates it to objectivity.
193
This is objectivity
in a specific sense that he has identified, a sense that may be

193
At this point the complex discussion on Frege, Husserl, meaning and objectivity
plays a decisive role.
118
held to be controversial. He holds that the biblical (or religious)
text should be subjected to critical analysis and its objective or
literal meaning should be established by exegesis, according to
the meaning Bultmann gives to this term. He holds further that
the identification or perception of the objective meaning pre-
cedes and is necessary for the existential appropriation (which is
subjective). It should also be recalled here that for Bultmann
application (appropriation) is part of hermeneutics contra exe-
gesis, while for Ricoeur hermeneutics appears to have a larger
scope. His concept of hermeneutics seems to incorporate the
concept of exegesis, which means that for Ricoeur hermeneu-
tics deals with both the analysis of the meaning of the text and
with the application or appropriation of it.
194

It will be recalled that in our discussion of Ricoeurs dialogi-
cal/dialectical method, that the role of the third term (third
perspective as represented by a new term often) was presented.
The quoted passage above illustrates how Ricoeur assumes the
perspective of offering a third (mediating) perspective, which
identifies the weaknesses and contributions of two, in his view,
lesser (reductive) perspectives. In this case Ricoeurs herme-
neutics assumes the mediating position between structural
hermeneutics and Bultmannian (Heideggerian) hermeneutics.
It may be a problem for the reader to analyze on what basis
Ricoeur mediates the two viewpoints, that is to say, how he
methodologically can regard the integrity of both viewpoints
and at the same time mediate them through his own. A clearer
meta-perspective and meta-language would seem to be re-

194
Ricoeur holds that hermeneutics should interpret the objective meaning of the
text. Critical analysis is necessary for a hermeneutics of religious texts; the existen-
tial appropriation is necessary for a hermeneutics of religious texts, and also the
objective meaning of text connected to existential appropriation is necessary for a
hermeneutics of religious (biblical) texts.

119
quired to carry out this mediation clearly. Once again, the
above quoted passage shows how the utilization of the lan-
guage of a perspective with which he is in dialogue for the sake
of analysis, without integrating this language into a critical
conceptual framework (meta-language). (See the language (Fr.
la langue) speech (Fr. la parole) distinction above, as well as the
concept of sign below). Contextualization seems to be impera-
tive here.
The reader of Ricoeurs works will also need to recall that Ric-
oeur uses key words in his texts to associate to whole areas of
discussion not explicitly addressed in the text. The aspects of
that discussion that are referenced and the particular perspec-
tive/interpretation assumed are not often clearly signaled
through the key word. Take for example sign above. He ap-
pears to not only allude to his discussions on semiotics (sign
systems) semantics and structuralism, but perhaps also alludes
to and anticipates the discussion of privileged signs in lan-
guage in the context of religious texts (phenomenology of reli-
gion Eliade). [See also the terms myth and kerygma in the
quote above.]

2.8.1.1.c Ricoeurs Use of His Semantic Presuppositions in
His Critique of Bultmanns Existential Theology
In this section, the task of theology comes into focus. An ini-
tial question, though perhaps not so important, that may be
asked here, relates to the way in which the paragraph is cast. Is
it Bultmann who demands, or is it Ricoeurs reconstruction of
Bultmann - the inadequate hermeneutics of Bultmann - which
he seeks to improve upon by compensating for its failure to
carry through its full implications? To some extent this may be
120
a matter of stylistic choice in presentation, but in a philosophi-
cal discourse style may need to recede for the sake of clarity.
In the passage below an important and clearly articulated point
made by Ricoeur is that the theological task also requires the
connection between the objective meaning of the text and what
Bultmann calls the existential appropriation or existential decision
of the person who accept the message of the Gospel. Ricoeur is
positive to Bultmanns Lutheran theology that he thinks sup-
port his critique of Bultmanns biblical exegesis. Therefore he
declares:
This first theme brings us to a second. It is not only the exegete
in Bultmann but also the theologian in him who demands that
the relation between the meaning of the text and existential
decision be more adequately conceived and stated. In effect
only the ideal meaning of the text, its nonphysical and non-
psychological meaning, can be the vehicle of the coming of the word
toward us, or, in Bultmanns own language, of the decisive
act of God in Jesus Christ. I do not say that this act of God,
this word of God, find their sufficient condition in the objec-
tivity of meaning; but they find their necessary condition
there. The act of God has its first transcendence in the objec-
tivity of meaning, which it announces for us. The idea itself of
announcement, of proclamation, of kerygma, presupposes, if I may
say so, an initiative on the part of meaning, a coming to us of
meaning, which makes speech a partner or correlate of exis-
tential decision. If the meaning of the text does not already
confront the reader, how shall the act it announces not be re-
duced to a simple symbol of inner conversion, of the passage
from the old man to the new? To be sure, there is no authori-
zation for saying that God for Bultmann is only another name
for authentic existence. Nothing in Bultmann seems to au-
thorize any kind of a Christian atheism, in which Christ
would be the symbol of an existence devoted to others. For
Bultmann as for Luther, justification by faith comes from an other

121
(sic.) than the self, from an other who grants me what he commands
of me. Otherwise, authenticity would again become a work
whereby I would be determining my own existence. What
lays claim to me comes to man and does not proceed from
him.
195
The introduction of Ricoeurs second theme here requires that
the reader recall the exegesis hermeneutics, myth kerygma
distinctions in Bultmanns work, in the present case in relation
to his work as a theologian. Ricoeurs explanation and reason-
ing in the quote above assumes not only a knowledge of the
meaning-ideal-objectivity discussion in its fuller context men-
tioned above, but also assumes that the position held by Ric-
oeur himself is clear for and accepted by the reader. However,
if this foundation or presupposition has not been clearly estab-
lished, then the superstructure erected upon it will not be sta-
ble for the reader. In fact the locus of what Ricoeur calls the
ideal meaning, as mentioned earlier, is not clear and in the
context of philosophical discussion may be held to be contro-
versial. Note the introduction of what may be taken as relative-
ly unclear terms: ideal meaning, non-physical and non-
psychological meaning. The words are familiar, but there is no
explicit presentation of the precise concepts that he is working
with, either in the earlier context or here. It is what might be
called a suggestive use of the terms rather than a precise and
clear semantic use we encounter here. (Cf. our discussion of the
Continental way of doing philosophy in section 1.4 and 2.2.1.)
Does Ricoeur mean by ideal meaning only what he calls the
objective or literal meaning of the biblical text but not the
existential meaning that is to be appropriated? How do an-
nouncement, proclamation, kerygma, the coming of meaning
to us, relate to each other conceptually or logically? Are they

195
Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 398ff.
122
just linguistic variations of expression for one central concept?
The larger context in which these terms occur does not answer
our questions. It is therefore difficult to fully assess Ricoeurs
critique of Bultmann.
In terms of linguistic analysis in line of Wittgensteins ap-
proach, we might ask if Ricoeur has borrowed part of Bult-
manns language game into his own language game without any
clear conceptual analysis or terminological clarification, i.e.,
without contextualization or adaptation of the borrowed terms
and notions. If this is the case, it would appear to be an indica-
tion of lack of philosophical rigor or stringency with a view to
clear communication of his meaning. Whatever the status of
the text is in this regard, what is seen here seems to be typical
of the Continental way of doing philosophy.
196

The reader may possibly consider that Ricoeur moves from a
more general hermeneutics to his regional hermeneutics for
religious texts and therewith the special rules of this regional
hermeneutics are assumed to come into play. The discussion of
text, ideal meaning, act of God, word of God, etc., seem to
strongly indicate this. If this were true, one would like to see
the justification of the special rules of Ricoeurs regional her-
meneutics. This would be relevant for better understanding
Ricoeurs critique of Bultmanns exegesis and hermeneutics.
Ricoeurs discussion in the above quotation appears to deal not
only with hermeneutics in general, but also with the problem
of understanding revelation as it has been identified in tradi-
tional discussions of Christian exegesis and theology. As a phi-
losopher Ricouer does not adopt the approach of traditional
theology, but for the sake of situating his discussion in a well-
known context (anticipated by the reader perhaps), he might

196
Basinger, D., Peterson, M., et al. (eds.). 1991, pp. 7ff.

123
well address the common conceptions of revelation in relation
to his own view. His own view uses suggestive terminology
but does not produce a clear conceptual description. It appears
that the specific relationships of God to language (word, not
Word
197
), language to text, text to meaning, meaning to under-
standing is not made clear. In the latter part of the paragraph in
the quoted passage, an other (the Other = God?) is intro-
duced as a new term, but again it is left unclear as to what this
concept means and its relationship to the earlier concepts. For
those familiar with Luthers theology, the term another
means God (who exists as an entity extra nos).
Particularly interesting in this context is the apparent transfer-
ence of agency to the meaning associated with the text. Is Ric-
oeur attempting to articulate a new concept here or clarify one
of his central concepts in the hermeneutics of religious texts?
Having distanced the agency of a texts author from a text once
it has been inscribed, Ricoeurs regional hermeneutics seems to
allow for some kind of action on the part of the meaning of the
text. Note for example how he discusses the agency of God
(acts of God) and then moves to the apparent agency of mean-
ing (meaning coming to us, speaking to us, etc.). The relevant
question that arises here is: What for example is an initiative
on the part of meaning? This may be nothing more than fig-
urative language, personification, but in the context it appears
to leave unclear the relationships noted above. The reader
might also consider that it may indicate something of such con-
ceptions as a transcendental ego, absolute spirit, the Other,
Das ganz Andere
198
(= God), etc., which may be evoked by earli-
er philosophical allusions in the text. The exact conceptualiza-
tion appears to remain unclear in the text and should probably

197
Cf. The Gospel and John 1:1ff.
198
Cf. Otto, R. 1973, pp. 25-30.
124
be interpreted in light of the presuppositions we have articu-
lated earlier in this essay.
As a minor point here, the reader should note that the text
gives the appearance of having a stringent logical structure (cf.
Ricoeurs use of the concepts of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions in the quoted text) but if the concepts and propositions
are not clear, the logic will be more apparent than substantial.
Whatever the status of the logical structure of the text, in the
discussion it seems to be the case that Ricoeur is saying that the
linguistic text (objective text) and its linguistic, literal meaning
are necessary, but not sufficient for full interpretation (full
hermeneutics). Existential understanding and appropriation
are also necessary. Taken together they are necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. This is a clear and well-taken point.
One needs to have in mind Christian theology and modern Ex-
istentialism while this section of Ricoeur is read through. For
example, in the context where Ricoeur addresses the reduction
of act to simple symbol he apparently assumes that the read-
er is well informed concerning such things as Pauline theology,
Ricoeurs distinctions between onto-theology and existential-
ontological theology, as well as several aspects of Bultmanns
perspective, e.g., the relationship between Bultmanns concept
of God and his concept of authentic existence.
199
Ricoeurs
claim in relationship to the latter is merely stated, not justified.
In this context, one needs to be aware of the complexities of
Luthers theological system in order for the analogy with
Bultmann to be understood correctly and scrutinized. It may
also be necessary to consider the difference between Ricoeurs
view of the appropriation of the meaning that causes or

199
Cf. Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 58-63; Macquarrie, J. 1973, pp. 29f, 65ff and
76ff.

125
prompts authentic existence and that of the existentialist phi-
losopher Sartre for example. There may in other words be
some allusion to the distinction Ricoeur holds between a
Christian existentialism (cf. S. Kierkegaard and G. Marcel)
and the anthropocentric or atheistic existentialism of Sartre.
Reflecting on this and the previous citations, it seems that
throughout the article Preface to Bultmann - it is the case that
the reader is expected to have an encyclopedic knowledge as
part of his/her pre-understanding. The question arises as to
whether this is more a stylistic matter in relation to Ricoeurs
philosophical discourse or whether it is, in fact, necessary to
have such knowledge to understand a rigorous philosophical
discourse that Ricoeur intends to construct on the foundation
of this large knowledge base. Even if one is writing advanced
texts for well informed readers in a discipline, it would appear
to be relevant to ask whether the scope of the necessary pre-
understanding for reading the text is in line with the degree of
stringency and rigor in the development of the concepts in the
text. The question may also be formulated in regard to a) the
responsibility that an author may have to contextualize the
ideas and b) associations he mines from abundant sources for
incorporation into his text. As far as our reasonable interpretation
allows we maintain that Ricoeur does b) but not a).
There remain two additional sections of Ricoeurs article to be
analyzed with regard to the presuppositions to be taken into
consideration with regard to the task of interpreting Ricoeurs
texts. Once again it is the application of our specified presup-
positions for understanding Ricoeur that attracts attention here
(cf. a) to k) in section 2.8.1 above). Ricoeur goes on, in his cri-
tique of Bultmann, and points out that Bultmann does not take
the ontological question - the question of being - seriously:
126
Here a Husserlian theory of meaning is insufficient. The
claim (Anspruch) which Gods word addresses to our existence,
if it is to be thought, presupposes not only that the meaning
of the text is constituted as an ideal correlate of my existence.
It presupposes also that the word itself belongs to the being
who addresses himself to my existence. A complete meditation on
the word, on the claim of the word by being, and hence a
complete ontology of language is essential here if the expres-
sion word of God is to be meaningful or, in Bultmanns
terms, if this statement is to have a nonmythological significa-
tion. But, in Bultmanns work, this remains to be thought. In
this regard the help he has looked for from Heidegger is not
completely satisfying. What Bultmann asks of Heidegger is
essentially a philosophical anthropology capable of furnishing
the proper conceptuality at the moment of entering upon a
biblical anthropology and of interpreting the cosmological
and mythological statements of the Bible in terms of human
existence. The recourse to Heidegger and to the preunder-
standing that he offers does not seem commendable in prin-
ciple. What Bultmann says about the impossibility of an in-
terpretation without presuppositions seems convincing to
me. But I would reproach Bultmann for not having sufficient-
ly followed the Heideggerian path. In order to avail himself
of Heideggers existentials he has taken a short cut, without
having made the long detour of the question of being without which
these existentials - being-in-the-world, fallenness, care, being-
toward-death, and so on - are nothing more than abstractions
of lived experience, of a formalized existentiell. It must not be
forgotten that in Heidegger the existential description does
not concern man but the place - the Da-sein - of the question of
being. This aim is not preeminently anthropological, human-
istic, or personalist. Consequently, meaningful statements
about man and the person and, a fortiori, the analogies con-
cerning God as a person can be thought and grounded only
ulteriorly. This inquiry about being, which is part of the being
that we are and which makes of us the there of being, the Da

127
of Dasein, is in some sense short-circuited in Bultmann. At the
same time the labor of thought connected with this inquiry is
also lacking.
200
This long citation demonstrates many of the characteristics that
have already been mentioned above. It also illustrates some of
the presuppositions needed for a reasonable interpretation of
Ricoeurs writings. A few additional presuppositions and
comments on them will indicate the additional insights into
understanding Ricoeur that may emerge here.
In this context, as above, it is necessary to have a good grasp of
such things as, Husserls theory of meaning (as described in his
phenomenology, hermeneutics and idealism), Heideggers
hermeneutic-phenomenology, the phenomenology of religion
of Eliade, et al. (cosmological and mythological statements), etc.
In particular, the details of Heideggers existential analysis and
attempt at a fundamental ontology as distinct from a philo-
sophical anthropology must be kept in mind.
201

A sentence like the following seems to reflect Ricoeurs basic
assumptions that we have earlier identified well. It presupposes
also that the word itself belongs to the being who addresses himself to
my existence
202
(the italics are ours). Here we see the assump-
tion of 1) a being (Being according to Heidegger, God?), 2) a
linguistic expression related to being (a human act?), 3) being
that reveals himself, and 4) existential understand-
ing/appropriation. A clear understanding of 1), 2), 3) and 4) is
presupposed in the context.

200
See Preface to Bultmann in Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 398-400.
201
Cf. Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 58-63; Macquarrie, J. 1963, pp. 270-273;
Macquarrie, J. 1977, pp. 268-274.
202
See Preface to Bultmann in Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 398-400.
128
Note the scope of the claim made here: [] a complete ontology
of language is essential here if the expression word of God is to be
meaningful or, in Bultmanns terms, if this statement is to have a
non-mythological signification
203
(the italics are ours). The rele-
vant question is then: does Ricoeur provide the reader with this
complete ontology of language as he seeks to explicate the
expression? His apparent claim is that Bultmann (and
Heidegger from whom Bultmann draws) does not do this, but
that his critique of Bultmann may compensate for this inade-
quacy. This tacit or implicit promise gives the reader the right
to expect that Ricoeur has the obligation to contribute to a con-
structive critique or improvement of Bultmanns way of doing
biblical hermeneutics. Ricoeur is clear when he indicates what
he finds unsatisfactory in Bultmanns interpretation of the Bi-
ble. But the alternative he proposes is not clearly stated and
therefore it is not easy to see whether he improves Bultmanns
approach or not.
The reader will certainly be aware of the fact that Ricoeur has
some valuable points to make here, but one wonders if it could
not be done with clarity of expression and an economy of
words that would benefit the readers understanding. It seems,
for example, that one of his major points could be condensed
into the following. Being communicates insight into self-
understanding for Man through linguistic texts, the meaning of
which a person may understand and then appropriate into his/her
own existential self-understanding resulting in more authentic exist-
ence. Bultmanns approach is ontologically reductionistic in the sense
that it tends to minimize the role of the linguistic text (its literal
meaning or sense) and to minimize the fruitfulness of thinking
through the role of the linguistic text in his system of thought. The
question here is as to whether Ricoeurs style of discourse ef-

203
Ibid.

129
fectively communicates such valuable insights or if it tends to
obfuscate the points. If the latter is the case, then his critique of
Bultmanns way of doing biblical hermeneutics misses its
point, its raison dtre.
The reader cultivated in the Anglo-American tradition of ana-
lytical philosophy, may well expect that economy of expression
often aids in clarity of expression. Anyhow, generally speak-
ing, Ricoeurs critique of Bultmann seems to be reasonable. As
John Macquarrie has shown, Bultmanns biblical hermeneutics
stands and falls with Heideggers existential anthropology.
204

This standpoint supports Ricoeurs critique of Bultmann. How-
ever, his critique does not lead him to a more adequate biblical
hermeneutics than Bultmannss.
The final section of text below adds a few additional insights to
what we have already considered. In the nest passage Ricoeur
analyses the relationship between Bultmanns biblical herme-
neutics and Heideggers existential analysis (his existential,
philosophical anthropology). He wants to emphasize two im-
portant things: one is a metaphysical issue and the other is
linguistic-theological one. Ricoeur writes:
But two important things - important even to Bultmanns en-
terprise- are bound to this labor of thought, which has been
economized on. First is the examination of a kind of death of
metaphysics as the site of the forgetfulness of the question of being.
This examination, which extends also to the metaphysics of
the I-Thou relation, belongs today in an organic way to the
entire return to the foundation of metaphysics itself. Every-
thing that we have said about limit and foundation, even with
respect to myth, has something in common with this return
and with the crisis of metaphysics connected with it. The second
implication of the labor of thought proposed by Heidegger

204
Macquarrie, J. 1977, pp. 270-273.
130
concerns language and consequently our effort to think the
expression word of God. If one runs too quickly to the fun-
damental anthropology of Heidegger, and if one lacks the ques-
tioning of being to which this anthropology is attached, then
one also lacks the radical revision of the question of language,
which it allows. The theologian is directly concerned by the
attempt to bring language into language. Let us understand
this as bringing the language we speak to the language, which
is the saying of being, the coming of being into language.
205
(The
italics are ours.)
The first thing to be noted here is the introduction of new terms
and concepts in what appears to be a brief two point exten-
sion/summary of his analysis. Ricoeur is interested in making
a statement about the loss that comes by not taking time to ad-
dress the question of the role of the linguistic text as mentioned
above. He begins as follows: First is the examination of a kind of
death of metaphysics as the site of the forgetfulness of the question of
being. This concatenation of expressions may be meaningful to
the reader who has a good mastery of the problem of the
place of metaphysics, particularly in the clash of modern and
existential philosophy as well as the varieties of existential the-
ology that are related to it.
206
But it may be asked if this formu-
lation here adds clarity to the simple point to be made. The
reader may be expecting a succinct summary rather than the
evocation of the two complex fields of enquiry, which are Met-
aphysics and Heideggers fundamental anthropology. That is
not to say that the making explicit of relations between micro-
regions of philosophical discourse and macro-regions of philo-
sophical discourse is not valuable. The question is rather

205
See Preface to Bultmann in Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 398-400. Cf. Macquarrie, J.
1977, pp. 270-273; Cf. Westphal, M. 2001, pp. 51-67
206
For instance, those theologies of M. Buber, P. Tillich et al., can be mentioned.

131
whether it effectively serves the interest of Ricoeurs argument
here.
Ricoeurs first point appears to be related to this complex area
of debate, but what exactly is the point he wishes to make? His
allusion to the debate, his reference to his earlier terms (limit
and foundation)
207
, and his suggestion of a connection be-
tween them, does not explicate exactly what his concepts and
his logical structure of argument are here for the reader.
To understand Ricoeurs second point presupposes a good un-
derstanding of the work of Heidegger and his difficult lan-
guage game. It seems to be fair to say that such ideas as the
linguistic being of Man and the associated change of accepted
concepts of language as found in Heidegger are controversial
and held often as unclear. In this context it appears that Ric-
oeur sets these concepts as the background for the clarification
of the philosophical conceptualization and explanation of the
term word of God (i.e., to think the expression word of
God). He seems to be interested in clarifying the task of the
theologian in the context, but with the above mentioned back-
ground in mind (controversial, unclear), one may ask if an ex-
pression such as bring language into language actually
makes a contribution to rigorous conceptual clarification as
might be expected in a philosophical discourse used in a de-
bate, as is the case here.

207
It is important to recall the ideas of limit and foundation in the immediate
context and in relation to Ricoeurs wider discussions of K. Jaspers, G. Marcel, M.
Eliade, et al. His intention with the use of these terms often becomes clearer when
these wider contexts are taken into consideration. This may be problematic of
course for the reader of an isolated text of Ricoeur, and it might be asked in this
regard, how much can be expected of the reader who seeks to develop a reasonable
interpretation?
132
Reflecting on the whole of these selected citations from the ar-
ticle Preface to Bultmann by Ricoeur, it seems apparent that they
present many challenges to the reader, who is seeking to de-
velop a reasonable interpretation of the text (cf. section 1.2). This
is not unique of course to this article; it is characteristic of Ric-
oeurs work in general. Some of the problems facing the reader
can be addressed by developing a meta-perspective (meta-
language) as an analytical tool, by delineating a set of neces-
sary presuppositions for understanding Ricoeurs complex
hermeneutical method, and by being aware of the scope of
knowledge the reader is expected to bring to the text. The
reader who is prepared in this way is more likely to be able to
develop a reasonable interpretation of a Ricoeur text, even if
there are problems that remain unresolved in this approach.

To specify some necessary conditions for understanding Ricoeurs
philosophy of religion and biblical hermeneutics, we have at-
tempted to make a constructive interpretation of his philosophical
hermeneutics as he himself seems to apply it to his distinctive way
of doing philosophy of religion and biblical hermeneutics. (See
section 2.8.)
Our methodological strategy has been to make a reasonable in-
terpretation of Ricoeurs works (cf. section 1.3). This approach
allows us to distinguish between what Ricoeur promises to do
and what he seems to do or in fact does (cf. section 1.6). This
distinction and the consistent application of it is also one of the
necessary conditions for understanding Ricoeurs philosophy

133
and hermeneutics and for making the critical assessment we
have attempted to do in this essay.
208

We believe that the readers or interpreters of Ricoeur who ac-
cept both our definition of the concept of reasonable interpreta-
tion and our application of it - as we have done in this chapter -
to reconstruct some fundamental presuppositions of Ricoeurs
philosophical hermeneutics, will accept the analysis made, the
arguments used and the result achieved in the various sections
of this chapter. (Cf. sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.1.1)
Some clarifications made in the footnotes could be presented in
greater detail in the main text, if the space had allowed it.
However, we can excuse ourselves by affirming that we are
making a more comprehensive constructive interpretation of
Ricoeurs works in terms of a reasonable interpretation of his
writings as a whole. This work will be published subsequently.
In it the fruitfulness of Ricoeurs biblical hermeneutics
209
will
be emphasized.

208
Cf. Section 2.5.2 above and Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, p. 355.

209
Concerning Ricoeurs contribution to biblical hermeneutics see, for example
Vikstrm, B. 2000; Klemm, David E. 1983 and 1993; Jeanrond, Werner G. 1998
and Tracy, D. 1987.
134


135

Chapter

Epilogue and Concluding Remarks on Eli-
ades and Ricoeurs Approach
Antnio Barbosa da silva

3.1 Introduction
Owing to the fact that the two chapters of this book were writ-
ten six, and four years ago, respectively, and and taking into
account the relevance of Eliades and Ricoeurs works for our
present-day readers, we find it important, to very briefly, point
out both some of the features of their distinctive approaches
and as well as some of the similarities and differences between
them. Most of the arguments for our affirmations here are pre-
sented in the footnotes.
For our purpose the following points are the most relevant:
1) Eliades distinctive way of doing phenomenological herme-
neutics
2) Ricoeurs distinctive way of doing phenomenological her-
meneutics
3) Eliades phenomenological hermeneutics, its fundamental
presuppositions and ultimate justification with respect to
136
the sacred value of religious texts and the irreducibility of
religious phenomena
4) Ricoeurs phenomenological hermeneutics, its fundamental
presuppositions and ultimate justification with respect to
the truth of biblical texts
5) The relationship between Eliades approach to religious text
and Ricoeurs approach to biblical texts, in the light of
numbers 3) and 4) above.
6) The fruitfulness of Eliades works regarding the value and
function of the Sacred or Holy, and of Ricoeurs works re-
garding the specific hermeneutics of biblical texts.

3.2 Eliades Distinctive Way of Doing Phenomenological
Hermeneutics
Eliades view of and approach to religious phenomena is, first
of all, what marks the distinctiveness of his way of doing phe-
nomenological hermeneutics, i.e., meaning his interpretation of
religious phenomena and religious texts.
From the phenomenological point of view, Eliade proposes to
describe religious phenomena from the perspective of the reli-
gious persons so that they can acknowledge the description as
accurate and objective. From the hermeneutical point of view
Eliade attempts first to describe the meaning that religious ex-
periences or phenomena have for religious people. To achieve
this goal he uses the descriptive or concrete phenomenological
method la Brede Kristiansen, which is sometimes called the
phenomenological perspective.
210
Secondly, Eliade endeavours to
uncover the universal meaning of religious phenomena, that is,

210
Cf. the two perspectives: the etic perspetive contra the emic perspetive according
to the anthropological approach. See also Kristiansen, B. 1960, pp. 3ff and Barbosa
da Silva and Ore, K. 1996, pp. 23ff.

137
their structure or essence, regardless of the historical-cultural
contexts in which they occur. To attain this goal, he uses Hus-
serls structural or essential phenomenological analysis which
has transcendental reduction as its basic method.
211

3.3 Ricoeurs Distinctive Way of Doing Phenomenological
Hermeneutics
As shown in chapter 2 above, Ricoeur combines elements from
different approaches belonging to different academic disci-
plines. For example, he combines phenomenological herme-
neutics (from Husserl and Heidegger) with aspects of structur-
alism and philosophical hermeneutics (Heidegger and Gada-
mer). His distinctive way of doing hermeneutics is best illus-
trated by his critique of Bultmann, as we have attempted to
demonstrate earlier in this book (se chapter 2). We shall further
illustrate Ricoeurs distinctive way of doing hermeneutics in
section six below.

3.4 Eliades Phenomenological Hermeneutics
Here we shall point out the most important and relevant fea-
tures of Eliades phenomenological hermeneutics, its funda-
mental presuppositions and ultimate justification with respect
to the value of the Sacred, the meaning of religious texts and
the irreducibility of religious phenomena. Eliades phenomeno-
logical hermeneutics of religious phenomena, as we have de-
scribed it in chapter 1 of this book, is based, inter alia, on the
following assumptions:

211
See Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 89-94f and Kristiansen, B. 1960, pp. 3ff.
138
a).Religious phenomena are ontologically non-reducible to
something else (lat.sui generis)
b).The fundamental character or nature, function and value of
the Sacred or Holy, characterised as intrinsic, unchangeable
transcultural and universally relevant for all people.
c).The human being as religious par excellence (Lat. homo religi-
osus)
d).The genuine religious experience is that of the archaic Man
who lived in the beginning of mankind, what Eliade calls the
mythical time (Lat. in illo tempore or illud tempus
212
)
e).Archaic and natural religious symbols are hierophanies (Gk.
Hierophania), i.e., manifefestations of the Sacred or Holy.
f).The religious experience of the archaic Man is the paradigm,
the prototype or model for all genuine religious experiences.

3.5 Ricoeurs Phenomenological Hermeneutics
In what follows we shall give a short account of the most im-
portant and relevant features of Ricoeurs phenomenological
hermeneutics, its fundamental presuppositions and ultimate
justification, with special reference to the truth of biblical texts.
Ricoeur holds that the task of hermeneutics has always been
to read a text and to distinguish the true sense from the appar-
ent sense, to search for the sense under the sense uncovering
what was covered, unveiling what was veiled, removing the
mask.
213
Ricoeur distinguishes, at least, between three differ-
ent types of hermeneutics: The hermeneutics of recollection or
retrieval, the hermeneutics or of suspicion, and creative her-

212
In Eliades writings illo tempore means in the Beginning, the Great time, the
Eternity as the experience of transcending time. See Eliade, M. 1967, pp. 59ff.;
213
From Ricoeur, P. 1978 in: Kearney; R. 1999, p. 449.

139
meneutics.
214
According to Sanford Schwartz, Ricoeurs her-
meneutics of suspicion in the 1960s, which aimed at the discov-
ery of meaning in religious symbolism, matured through its
dialogue with the hermeneutics of suspicion encouraged by
Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.
215
Ricoeur claims to apply these
different types of hermeneutics to different types of texts and
phenomena such as symbols, particularly religious ones. He
seems to hold that it is the hermeneutics of recollection or retrieval
that is appropriate to the interpretation of biblical texts. Owing
to both the relevance of the latter for our purposes here and as
well as to understand the complexity of Ricoeurs approach, we
shall indicate here only the presuppositions of the hermeneu-
tics of recollection or retrieval. John E. Smith describes Ricoeurs
concept of the hermeneutics of restoration or recollections as fol-
lows:
Based on faith as the opposite of suspicion, restorative interpretation
moves from an initial nave faith to a second faith that is attained by
a postcritical phenomenology. Ricoeur notes the affinity of this meth-
od with the believe in order to understand formula of Augustine, but
for him the formula is reversible, understand in order to believe and
the two together is said to form the hermeneutical circle. Augustine,
of course, would not allow the reversal even though he appeals to
something like it when he claims that understanding enhances faith by
removing it from an immediate and nave form.
216

The most fundamental of the presuppositions of the hermeneu-
tics of recollection or retrieval is that biblical texts are different
from other religious text, because due in part to the following
reasons:

214
Vikstrm, B. 2000, p. 290 and p. 321: Ricoeur, P. 1970, Ricoeur, P. 1965a, pp.
38-42. Smith, E. J. (1995) 1996, p. 154ff. Schwartz, S. 1983, p. 290.
215
Schwartz, S. 1983, p. 290.
216
Smith, E. J. (1995) 1996, p. 154ff. Schwartz, S. 1983, p. 290.
140
a). Religious myths are constituted by religious symbols
217
which are multivalent or multivocal.
b). The Adamic myth and the Judeo-Christian tradition are
unique, in that both the first Adam and the Second Adam (Je-
sus Christ) are prototypes of human beings.
218

c). Biblical texts contain an objective, linguistic or literal mean-
ing which can engender an existential or subjective meaning
(Fr. signification).The existence of the latter presupposes exist-
ence of the former,
219
i.e., the literal meaning is the necessary
condition for the existential meaning.
220

d). God is an objective transcendent, reality, entity or Being
which has an objectively ontological existence (Lat. Deus extra
nos).
221

e). God expresses and reveals his message to human beings
through the objective meaning of the biblical texts.
d). The Bible contains the proclamation of God, whereas other
religious texts and symbols (both religious and non-religious)

217
Ricoeur, P. 1965a, p. 353.
218
Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, pp. 254-278. (For Eliade, Adam is homo religiosus par ex-
cellence. Ricoeur seems to endorse this view.) About the first Adam Ricoeur writes:
Eve [] does not stand for Woman in the sense of second sex. Every woman
and every man are Adam; every man and every woman are Eve; every woman sins
in Adam, every man is seduced in Eve. (Ibid., p. 255.) About the relationship
between the symbol of the first Adam and the symbol of the second Adam (Jesus
Christ) Ricoeur declares: The dominant symbols of eschatology are the symbols of
the Son of Man and the second Adam []; extraordinarily striking symbols,
since they answer, term for term, to the Adamic symbol and permit us to discover at
a single stroke the mutual agreement between the symbols of the fall that happened
at the Beginning and the symbols of the salvation that will come at the End of
time. (Ibid., p. 261.)
219
Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 397f. (Cf. Ricoeurs critique of Bultmann.)
220
Ibid.
221
Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 398f.

141
contain or express only manifestations of God, the Sacred or
the Holy.
222

3.6 The Relationship Between Eliades Approach to Religious
Texts and Ricoeurs Approach to Biblical Texts in Light of
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 Above
The kind of relationship to be discussed here is not a strict logi-
cal one. In other words, we are not going to argue for whether
Ricoeurs phenomenological hermeneutics is logically deduci-
ble from Eliades phenomenological hermeneutics or vice-
versa. What we intend to call attention to is, first of all, that:
a) There is an analogy between Eliades phenomenological
hermeneutics of religious texts and Ricoeurs phenomenologi-
cal hermeneutics of biblical tests.
b) Ricoeurs acknowledgment of Eliades influence in his inter-
pretation of religious symbols
223
or hierophanies (Gk. hieropha-
nia in Eliades use of the term) sheds considerable light on Ric-
oeurs biblical hermeneutics. The Greek word hierophany is de-
rived from (Gk. hiero =, meaning holy, + plus phania, from the
Greek verb phainestai meaning to show or, manifest itself (or
oneself). The plural of hierophany is hierophania.
224

222
Ricoeur seems to use the distinction between the concept of manifestation of
God and proclamation of God, according to the Reformed Tradition.The latter
teaches that God manifests himself in nature and in different ways, but that he
proclaims himself in the Bible. They seem to assume that proclamation conveys
or reveals a better knowledge of God than manifestation does. Cf. Reagan and
Stewart, Manifestation and Proclamation, in: Ricoeur, P. 1978, pp. 13ff. Cf. Ric-
oeur, P. 1984, pp. 501-511; Ricoeur, P. 1995, pp. 48-53.
223
Ibid., p. 48.
224
The correct view is that religious symbols or hierophania express manifestations
of God (Eliade and Ricoeur), whereas biblical symbols express the proclamation
of God (Ricoeur). See Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 197ff.
142
The following should be emphasized concerning a) above:
a).1 Eliade assumes that the genuine religious experience, the
experience of the Sacred or Holy, occurred in the past (Lat. in illo
tempore or illud tempus), in the beginning of mankind or in the
mythical time.
225
Ricoeu appears to endorse this assumption.
226

a).2 Eliade claims that the archaic Man, of the mythical time, is
homo religiosus par excellence, which means that the archaic Mans
religious experience should be taken as the model, prototype or
paradigm of all religious experience.
227
Ricoeur declares his
tribute to Eliade in what concerns this belief.
228

As to a).1 above Eliade distinguishes between genuine reli-
gious symbols (hierophanies), which are archaic and natural
such as the symbolism of: light, sun, moon, life, height, salt, tree,
sky, water, serpent, lion, Sky-God and Mother-Earth, which he
classifies as hierophania, that is, meaning symbols that reveal or
manifest the Sacred.
229
He holds that other religious symbols
should be understood in light of the genuine ones, which also
are archetypal and paradigmatic, to the extent that they are
closely related to these genuine religious, archetypal symbols.
230

In analogy with Eliades view of the Sacred or Holy as norma-
tive, Ricoeur assumes that the Judeo-Christian religious experi-
ence is the genuine and the true one, and therefore it should be
normative or paradigmatic in understanding all other religious

225
Eliade, M. 1967, p. 59ff.
226
Ricoeur, P. 1995, pp. 48-53.
227
Ibid., p. 54; Eliade, M. 1974, pp. 1-48.
228
Ricoeur, P. 1995, pp. 48-53.
229
Eliade, M. 1971, pp. 388-408. For the expressions illo temopre and illud tempus,
see pp. 395-398); Ricoeur, P. 1965.a, p. 24.
230
Cf. Carl G. Jungs explanation of different archetypal symbols and their interre-
lationship. See Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, p.354, where he describes Judeo-Christian
confession of sin as archetypal.

143
experiences.
231
And he assumes the existence of Yahweh as a
personal God who has revealed himself in the biblical texts.
232

Regarding a).2 above, in the manner of Eliade, Ricoeur as-
sumes that the paradigm of true religious experience is in the
past (in the beginning, taken this term in the biblical sense,
i.e., according to Genesis chapter one). Thus, when Eliade talks
about the genuine religious experience in illo tempore, Ricoeur
can be said to talk about to go ad fontem, i.e., to the true Gods
revelation or proclamation in the Bible) to find the true reli-
gious experience.
233

For Ricoeur the hermeneutics of biblical texts must be different
from that of other texts. It should be the hermeneutics of recol-
lection or retrieval.
234
It implies, so to say, that one must listen to
the biblical texts in order to hear what it says.
235
This type of
hermeneutics or theory of interpretation presupposes that we
must believe in order to understand, as Ricoeur declares in the
following passage:
What we have just called a knot the knot where the symbol
gives and criticism interprets appears in hermeneutics as a
circle. The circle can be stated bluntly: We must understand in
order to believe, but we must believe in order to understand.
The circle is not a vicious circle, still less a mortal one; it is a liv-
ing and stimulating circle. We must believe in order to under-
stand:
236
never, in fact, does the interpreter get near to what his text

231
Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, p. 354.
232
Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 398ff.
233
Cf. Reagan, C. E. & Stewart, D. R. 1978, pp. 13ff. Ricoeur, P. 1984, pp. 501-
511.
234
In French: Linterprtation comme rcollection du sens, in Ricoeur, P. 1965.a,
pp. 38-42.
235
Vikstrm, B. 2000, pp. 280 and 323.
236
The reader should consider here the theological method espoused by Augustine
and followed by the medieval theologians.
144
says unless he lives in the aura of the meaning he is inquiring after.
As Bultmann very well says in his famous article on the prob-
lem of hermeneutics in Glauben und Verstehen: All under-
standing, like all interpretation, is ... continually oriented by the
manner of posing the question and by what it aims at [by its
Woraufhin]. Consequently, it is never without presuppositions;
that is to say, it is always directed by a prior understanding of
the thing about which it interrogates the text. It is only on the
basis of that prior understanding that it can, in general, interro-
gate and interpret. And again: The presupposition of all under-
standing is the vital relation of the interpreter to the thing about
which the text speaks directly or indirectly.
237
(The italics are
ours.)
Ricoeurs assumption that the Judeo-Christian tradition con-
tains or gives the necessary criterion for understanding the re-
ligious experiences of other religious traditions is expressed as
follows in the same context as the latest quotation:
[...] we have left the plane of truth without belief and come to
the circle of hermeneutics, to the believing for the sake of under-
standing which is also understanding for the sake of believing. I
entered that circle as soon as I admitted that I read the ensemble of
myths from a certain point of view, that the mythical space was for
me an oriented space, and that my perspective angle was the pre-
eminence of the Jewish confession of sins, its symbolism, and its
mythology. By that adoption of one myth, the appropriation of all of
them became possible, at least up to a certain point.
238
(The italics
are ours.)
As stated in this quotation, Ricoeur declares that to understand
the myths that express the Jewish confession of sins is a nec-
essary condition for the understanding of non-biblical myths

237
See Ricoeur, P.1969.a, p. 351.
238
See Ricoeur, p. 1969.a, p. 354. See also how M. Eliade and C. G. Jung interpret
myths and dreams, according to Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 153ff., and 220-226.

145
that also express confession of sin. We interpret the above
statement the pre-eminence of the Jewish confession of sins as
equivalent to the statement: the archetypal character of the
Jewish confession of sins. [Cf. point a).2 above]. Here we have
a clear analogy between Eliades approach to religious texts
and Ricoeurs approach to biblical texts.
Another analogy between Eliades approach and Ricoeurs ap-
proach is that Ricoeur regards what he calls the biblical proc-
lamation as normative in his biblical hermeneutics in the
analogous way that Eliade regards the concept of Sacred or
Holy to be normative in his phenomenological hermeneutics of
religious phenomena or experiences.
239
He makes this clear,
inter alia, in his Figuring the Sacred, where he first recognizes his
methodological reliance on Eliades phenomenology of religion
and then declares that he: wis[hes] to oppose the phenome-
nology of the sacred [i.e., its manifestation] to such a herme-
neutic of proclamation.
240

b). Ricoeurs acknowledgment of Eliades influence in his in-
terpretation of religious symbols
Ricoeur, like Eliade, regards the so-called cosmic symbols as
primary in relation to other symbols. By cosmic symbols Ric-
oeur means the same as what Eliade calls hieropanies (primary
symbols according to Ricoeurs terminology).
241

Ricoeur acknowledges Eliades influence in the way he con-
ceives the primary symbols. For example, he declares:

239
Cf. Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp.318f.
240
Ricoeur, P. 1995, pp. 48-53 and his article: Manifestation and Proclamation,
in: 1978, pt. 5).
241
Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp.13, 64, 289-291. As previously mentioned, examples of
cosmic symbols are: light, sun, moon, life, height, salt, tree, sky, water, serpent,
lion, Sky-God and Mother-Earth.
146
The second characteristic of the phenomenology of religion is
that there is a truth of symbols, a truth in the sense of which
Husserl gives to this word in the Logical Investigations, a truth
which signifies the fulfillment die Einfllung of the signify-
ing intention.
What does this mean in relation to the symbols of the sacred?
[] To take an example from the work of Mircea Eliade, the force
of the cosmic symbolism lies in the non-arbitrary relationship be-
tween the visible sky and the invisible order which it manifests:
the sky speaks of wisdom and justice, of immensity and order,
by virtue of the analogical power of its primary significa-
tion.
242
In his book De linterprtation Ricoeur is even more explicit
about his debt to Eliade. He writes:
Nous prennons nos exemples dans la phnomnologie de la re-
ligion au sens large: jy englobe Leenhardt, van der Leeuw,
Eliade et jy rattache ma propre recherche sur la Symbolique du
mal.
243
In another context Ricoeur refers to the affinity between his
phenomenological approach and Eliades approach as follows:
It was in this way that I formulated, at the end of the Symbolism of
Evil, the adage I have returned to so often ever since: the symbol
sets us thinking [Fr. le symbole donne penser]. This conception
of the symbol as an expression containing a double meaning owed
a great deal to the phenomenology of religion, a striking example
of which was to be found in Mircea Eliades work, Patterns in
comparative Religion.
244

242
Ricoeur, P. 1974, p. 318f.
243
Ricoeur, P. 1965, p. 38 (We take our examples from the phenomenology of
religion in a broad sense: in which I include Leenhardt, van der Leeuw, Eliade, and
on which I base my own research on the Symbolism of evil, the translation is our).
244
Ricoeur, P. 1996 [Ricoeurs Autobibliography], p. 17. See also p. 102, 118, note
19, pp. 153, 166 and 454. (Cf. Ricoeur, P. 1995, pp. 48-53.)

147

3.7 The Fruitfulness of the Works of Eliade and Ricoeur
The purpose of this section is to highlight the fruitfulness of
Eliades works (regarding the value and function of the Sacred
or Holy) and Ricoeurs works (regarding the specific herme-
neutics of biblical texts).
As for Eliade, the experience of the Sacred or Holy, which is
central to all religion, has intrinsic and supreme value and it
has the function of given meaning to the world and give secu-
rity, meaning, guidance and goals to human existence and
suffering.
245

The methodological fruitfulness of Eliades approach can be
said to be the fact that Eliade, using a single concept, the Sacred
or Holy (cf. Rudolf Ottos book The Idea of the Holy), seems to be
able to show the relationship among all religious experiences,
in the past and present. Therefore he holds that, even though
we are living in a secularized world, people everywhere are
searching for the Sacred albeit in an indirect way through
pseudo myths.
246

Ricoeurs biblical hermeneutics can be apologetical instruments
for the believers Jews and Christians. The presuppositions of
Ricoeurs biblical hermeneutics have the function of guarantee-
ing the universal and exclusive claim that the Bible makes
about its truth or teaching.
247
But for non-Christians, Ricoeurs
biblical hermeneutics is not convincing. Therefore his biblical
hermeneutics is fruitful primarily for Christians and believing

245
Eliade, M. 1968, p. 145; Meadow, M. J. 1992, p. 193, Eliade, M. 1967, pp.
231ff., and 394. Barbosa da Silva, A. 1982, pp. 167ff.
246
See chapter The Myths of the Moderen World. In: Eliade, M. 1967, pp. 23-38.
247
Cf. Basinger, D. 2002, pp. vii and 7ff.
148
Jews. The theologically normative presuppositions of Ricoeurs
biblical hermeneutics are reflected in what follows.
We maintain that Ricoeurs biblical hermeneutics is most clear-
ly exposed in his critique of Bultmanns exegesis and theologi-
cal hermeneutics. Thus the distinctiveness of Ricoeurs biblical
hermeneutics can be seen in the following assertions implicitly
or explicitly in his critique of Bultmann.
According to Ricoeur the meaning of the biblical texts is neither
in the authors (prophets, evangelists and apostles) minds,
nor is produced by the readers (cf. the readers response theory
of meaning
248
). The meaning is contained in the texts as Gods
proclamation, he declares.
249
By affirming this standpoint,
Ricoeur rejects both Wilhelm Diltheys and Karl Barths view of
meaning.
250
Ricoeur agrees with Bultmann, however, that the
reader must, through interpretation, appropriate the biblical
message, that is, apply it to his or her life so that he/she can
experience a new self-understanding.
251
Ricoeur also recogniz-
es that The text is not an untouched toucher in relation to the
reader since the different readings that may arise in different
reading situations affect the text by increasing the potential
number of interpretations.
252

For Ricoeur the active role of the reader of the biblical texts is,
first of all, to appropriate the given and objective meaning in the
biblical texts, that is, to apply the biblical meaning to his or her
life so that he/she may experience a new self-understanding.
The act or process of appropriation gives rise to the subjective
or existential meaning [readers meaning], i.e., the meaning or

248
Schwartz, S. 1983, pp. 298ff.
249
Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 396ff; Vikstrm, B. pp. 85, 280f and 223.
250
Cf. Vikstrm, B. 2000, pp. 280f and 318f.
251
Ibid., p. 320.
252
Ibid., p. 321.

149
effect that the texts objective meaning has for the reader. From
this point of view, Ricoeur accuses Bultmann for ontologically
reducing the objective and given meaning of the biblical texts
(expressing Gods proclamation through Jesus Christ) to the
existentiell (subjective) meaning experienced by the reader in in-
terpreting them.
253
Ricoeur seems to be right in making this
affirmation because, as we hold, what makes the biblical texts
unique is, foremost, the unique meaning they claim to contain.
As Bjrn Vikstrm asserts, in his interpretation of Ricoeur, the
Bible names God and opens up new existential possibilities
for us men and women.
254
This affirmation reflects one of the
phenomenological aspect of Ricoeurs complex hermeneutics,
namely that the researcher should take the object of research
seriously, and should not ontologically reduce it to something
else, as for example E. Durkheim, S. Freud and K. Marx do
with religious experiences and phenomena.
255
Here we can see
an analogy between the phenomenological aspect or character
of Eliades approach to religious phenomena, and Ricoeurs
phenomenological approach to biblical texts.
256
Both claim to
be ontologically non-reducible. (Cf. section 1.7 above on: Eli-
ades Contribution to the Anti-Reductionistic Debate.)
Another fruitful contribution to biblical hermeneutics may be
seen in Ricoeurs mediating role between opposite standpoints
on biblical interpretation. This is a basic feature of his theory of
the text, in which he attempts to mediate between the inter-

253
Ibid., Ricoeur, P. 1974, pp. 234,237, 260-278, 393f., and 398-401, and Ricoeur,
P. 1984, pp. 501-511.
254
Vikstrm, B. 2000, p. 327.
255
Hick, J. 1963, pp. 31-35.
256
Ricoeur deals also with other religious texts. But he declares to be more interest-
ed in Judeo-Christian tradition, to which he adheres and better acquainted with (cf.
Ricoeur, P. 1969.a, p. 354. Here Ricoeur writes about the pre-eminence of the
Jewish confession of sins).
150
preters or hermeneutists who, like Dilthey, locate the meaning
of a text in its authors mind, and those who locate the meaning
of a text in the readers (readers response standpoint). Applied
to biblical interpretation, Schwartz states:
In his theory of the text, Ricoeur attempts to avoid both the in-
tentional fallacy [meaning conceived as as the authors inten-
tion] and the affective fallacy [meaning conceived as the read-
ers response to the text] and, similarly, in his approach to bib-
lical texts, he steers a course between conflicting extremes.
257

As Schwartz emphasizes, Ricoeur also attempts to mediate be-
tween conflicting theological standpoints:
By emphasizing the variety of literary forms and the multidimen-
sionality of Scripture, Ricoeur takes a step toward mediating the
conflict between opposing theological tendencies. He asks liberals
to take account of the cosmological as well the existential dimen-
sion of the text, and conservatives to acknowledge that part of the
text which justifies the drive for social justice in this world as well
as that which encourages hope for personal deliverance beyond it.
The recognition that the biblical world is both singular and plural
should make us pause before we grant an exclusive privilege to
any one literary genre or interpretative stance.
258
(The italics are
ours.)

To summarize we can say that there are both similarities and
differences between Eliades approach and Ricoeurs approach.
Both aspects of their approach are described in the two first
chapters of this book. The Epilogue has given additional fea-
tures of these similarities and differences. Recoeur recognizes

257
Schwartz, S. 1983, p. 299. Cf. Ricoeur, P. 1975, pp. 29ff.
258
Ibid., pp. 299f.

151
his methodological debts to Eliade and this may explain the
similarities between his approach and Eliades.
There are, however, many other aspects of Eliades and Ric-
oeurs approach that are not dealt with in this book. We hope,
however, that what has been discussed here may shed some
light on these two interesting and relevant scholars. We hope,
above all, that the methodological similarity or analogy be-
tween them will shed light on the relationship between Eliades
phenomenological hermeneutics of religious texts and phe-
nomena, and Ricoeurs biblical hermeneutics.

152


153

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Other Relevant Literature for Understanding Eliades Ap-
proach to Religious Phenomena:
Beane, Wendell Charles. Methodological, pedagogical, and
philosophical reflections on Mircea Eliade as historian of reli-
gions. In: Rennie, Bryan S. (ed.). Changing religious worlds: the
meaning and end of Mircea Eliade. SUNY series, issues in the
study of religion. Albany, New York: State University of New
York Press, 2001, pp. 165-190.
Cave, David. Mircea Eliades vision for a new humanism. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Eliade, Mircea. Conversation with an Indian nationalist and
intermezzo: fragments from a civil revolt; translated by Mac
Linscott Ricketts. In: Rennie, Bryan S. (ed.). Changing religious
worlds: the meaning and end of Mircea Eliade. SUNY series, issues
in the study of religion. N.Y. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2001, pp. 191-206.
Eliade, Mircea, Culianu, Ioan P. & Wiesner, Hillary S. The Eliade
guide to world religions. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco,
1991.
Eliade, Mircea and Ricketts, Mac Linscott. Autobiography
[Mircea Eliade; translated from the Romanian by Mac Linscott Rick-
etts]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988-1990.
Eliade, Mircea. Tales of the sacred and the supernatural. Philadel-
phia: Westminster Press, 1981.
Eliade, Mircea and Tracy, David. What is religion?: an inquiry for
Christian theology. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1980.
168
Ellwood, Robert S. The politics of myth: a study of C. G. Jung,
Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell. Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1999.
Farace, Dominic Hohn, Durkheim, Emile and Eliade, Mircea.
The sacred-profane dichotomy: a comparative analysis of its use in the
work of Emile Durkheim and Mircea Eliade, as far as published in
English. Utrecht: De Rijksuniversiteit, 1982.
Girardot, N. J. & Ricketts, Mac Linscott. Imagination and mean-
ing: the scholarly and literary worlds of Mircea Eliade. New York:
Seabury Press, 1982.
Kristiansen, Odd Kjell. The Orthodox Church Self-understanding
and Mircea Eliades View of Religion. [in Norwegian: Den
ortodokse kirkens selvforstelse og Mircea Eliades religionssyn]. Os-
lo: O. K. Kristiansen, 1982.
Larsen, Allan W. The phenomenology of Mircea Eliade. In:
Rennie, Bryan S. (ed.). Changing religious worlds: the meaning and
end of Mircea Eliade. SUNY series, issues in the study of religion.
Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2001, pp. 49-
58.
Murphy, Tim. Eliade, subjectivity, and hermeneutics. In:
Rennie Bryan S. (ed.). Changing religious world: the meaning and
end of Mircea Eliade. Part 2: Philosophy. Albany: Newe Yorks
State University Press, 2001, pp. 35-48.
Olson, Carl. Eliade, the comparative method, historical, and
difference. In: Rennie Bryan S. (ed.). Changing religious world:
the meaning and end of Mircea Eliade. Part 2: Philosophy. Albany:
New Yorks State University Press, 2001, pp. 59-78.
Olson, Carl. The theology and philosophy of Eliade. London: Mac-
millan, 1992.

169
Ore, Katrine Lund. Mircea Eliade and Flight from the Modern.[In
Norwegian: Mircea Eliade og flukten fra det moderne]. Bergen: K.
Lund, 1992.
Permenter, Rachela. Romantic postmodernism and the liter-
ary Eliade. In: Rennie, Bryan S.(ed.). Changing religious worlds:
the meaning and end of Mircea Eliade. SUNY series, issues in the
study of religion. Albany: State University of New York Press,
2001, pp. 95-116.
Rennie, Bryan S.(ed.). Changing religious worlds: the meaning and
end of Mircea Eliade. SUNY series, issues in the study of religion.
N.Y. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.
Ricketts, Mac Linscott. Mircea Eliade: the Romanian roots, 1907-
1945. Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1988.
Strenski, Ivan. Four theories of myth in twentieth-century history:
Cassirer, Eliade, Lvi-Strauss and Malinowski. Iowa City: Iowa
University Press, 1987.
Tacou, Constantin, George Banu and Guy Chalvon-Demersay
(eds.). Les Cahiers de lHerne. Paris: L'Herne, 1978.
Turcanu, Florin. Mircea Eliade. Le prisonnier de lhistoire; prface
de Jacques Julliard. Serie: Lespace de lhistoire. Paris: Dcouverte,
2003.
Wasserstrom, Steven M. Religion after religion: Gersshom Scho-
lem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin at Eranos. Princetion, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1999.

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