Black Tiger Fire Case Study: of The

Bl ac k Ti ger Fi r e
Case St udy
Pr epar ed by t he
NFPA9
Nat i onal Fi r e Pr ot ec t i on Assoc i at i on
Sponsor ed by t he
Nat i onal Wi l dl and/Ur ban I nt er f ac e Fi r e Pr ot ec t i on I ni t i at i ve
Member s of t he I ni t i at i ve:
Uni t ed St at es Depar t ment of Agr i c ul t ur e
For est Ser vi c e
Nat i onal Assoc i at i on of
St at e For est er s
Uni t ed St at es Depar t ment of I nt er i or
Bur eau of Land Management
Nat i onal Fi r e Pr ot ec t i on
Assoc i at i on
For more information or to order additional copies of this report,
contact Fire Investigations Division, National Fire Protection Association
P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, Massachusetts, 02269
ABSTRACT
Ahuman-caused wildland fire starting on July 9, 1989 in a scenic part of the Rocky
Mountains near Boulder, Colorado, swept through residential areas nestled among the trees.
Within the first five to six hours after ignition, 44 homes and other structures were destroyed
and many others were damaged. The fire was not completely extinguished until four days
later, after burning almost 2,100 acres. Loss estimates of homes and natural resources
amounted to $10 million, and the cost to control the fire was another $1 million. More than
500 fire fighters from local, state and federal fire agencies worked to eventually contain the
fire and protect the numerous other homes built in the rustic surroundings. Some of the fire
fighters own homes were threatened or destroyed by the fire. Only a few minor fire fighter
injuries were reported and one resident was hospitalized from burns.
The result of this wildfire, especially the loss of the homes, represents an increasingly
common example of the risks of building homes in what is called the wildland/ urban
interface, the term for a border zone where structures-mainly residences-are built in
wildland areas that by nature are subject to fires. This fire, which soon outran the fire
defenses in difficult terrain, demonstrated the predictable effects of a combination of factors:
lack of rainfall; prolonged heat spell; wind; sloping topography; buildup of forest fuels;
construction factors affecting the susceptibility of the home to fire; use of combustible
construction materials; poor site access for emergency vehicles; and lack of a homes site
maintenance for fire protection. These factors plus the number of homes that were quickly
threatened compounded the problems for the fire fighters.
The Black Tiger Fire was the worst wildland fire loss in Colorado history, but the
conditions that led to it are still prevalent in many parts of Colorado as well as in other states.
The trend of building combustible homes in the flammable wildlands continues. In many
of these areas the potential for similar or worse disaster currently exists, needing only an
ignition source and the unfortunate development of hot, dry, windy weather conditions that
come with dangerous regularity every year.
For several years fire protection agencies have been attempting to warn affected home-
owners nationwide of the risks of these wildland areas, but most homeowners remain not
fully aware of, or insufficiently concerned about, the problem. Many publications also offer
guidance for homes in the wildland/ urban interface (see the Appendix for a sampling).
Proposed NFPA 299, Protection of Life and Property from Wildland Fire, will be a national
standard that will present fundamental planning and design criteria for fire agencies,
planners, architects, developers and government for the protection of life and property. It
includes information on procedures and practices for safe development in areas that may
be threatened by wildfire. To assure that it will be an acceptable document, it-as are all
standards developed by the National Fire Protection Association-is being prepared by a
committee of those who would be most affected: homeowners; interested individuals;
architects; urban planners; and fire officials from local, state and federal agencies.
3T
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This report has been prepared by the Na- This wildland fire is only one of many that
tional Fire Protection Association (NFPA) at occur throughout the world each year. Under
the request and in cooperation with the Boul- the sponsorship of the Initiative, the National
der County Sheriffs Department. The project Fire Protection Association will review, ana-
was sponsored by the National Wildland/ Urban lyze, and document additional wildland/ urban
Interface Fire Protection Initiative to further interface fires that cause destruction to homes
the goals of the Initiative established in 1986. and structures.
Those goals are to create general public The preparation of this report would
awareness of the wildland interface prob- not have been possible without the able
lems, to encourage the formation of partner- assistance of the following people: Sheriff
ships among problem-solvers and interest Brad Leach and Sgt. Larry Stern of the Boul-
groups, and to focus on the development of er County Sheriffs Office; Chief Ruth Rave-
local solutions to wildland/ urban interface el of the Sugarloaf Volunteer Fire Depart-
fire problems. The Initiative is sponsored ment; Ron Zeleny and Dave Parker of the
currently by the U.S. Department of Agricul- Colorado State Forest Service; Shelly Nolde
ture Forest Service, U.S. Department of the and Bob Wilmot of the Arapaho/ Roosevelt
Interior, the National Association of
State Foresters, and the National Fire
Protection Association. Contact in-
formation for each of these organi-
zations is provided in the Appendix.
As part of achieving the goals of
the Initiative, an analysis of the Black
Tiger Fire was undertaken. The
purpose of the analysis was to docu-
ment the fire, determine to the ex-
tent possible the variables causing
the destruction, and make recom-
mendations on how to prevent simi-
lar occurrences. Thomas Klem, Di-
rector of NFPAs Fire Investigations
National Forest; Brooke B. Smith,
Jr., Fire Protection Engineer, As-
pen Engineering, Inc.; and nu-
merous other people from the or-
ganizations listed above who con-
tributed to this report.
In addition, the on-site assis-
tance and technical guidance pro-
vided to NFPA personnel by Al
Roberts, U.S.D.A. Forest Service
Regional Office in Denver, greatly
enhanced our ability to prepare
this report. Next, technical assis-
tance and input to the fire growth
and intensity analysis of the re-
Division, served as project manager and tech-
nical advisor. William Baden, Senior Fire Serv-
ice Specialist, NFPA, served as the technical
advisor for the project. Dr. John R. Hall, Jr.,
Director, Fire Analysis and Research Division,
NFPA, specifically contributed the section Sta-
tistical Analysis of Factors in Damaged Homes.
The information from this report can be
used to assist planners, local officials, fire serv-
ice personnel and homeowners in Colorado
and in other parts of the country in developing
firesafe homes and communi ti es i n the
wildland/ urban interface, a term referring to
the geographical area where two diverse sys-
tems-in this case, wildland and residential-
join and affect each other.
port were provided by Dick Rothermel, U.S.D.A.
Forest Service Intermountain Forest Range Ex-
periment Station in Missoula, Montana. Each of
these individuals has made significant contri-
butions to the technical accuracy of the report.
The methodology used for the project and ap-
proach used in the analysis is described stan-
ing on page 37.
Laurie Ruszcyk, as project secretary, served
numerous functions throughout the project
including coordination of technical reviews,
procurement of photos, and arrangement of
the report for layout and printing.
Finally, Jerry Laughlin of Books On Fire
served as technical editor and prepared the
4
layout of the final document.
e officials across the nation are reporting
dramatic increases in the loss of homes to
wildfires. The 1980s have seen some of the
most severe wildfires in this century. In 1985,
for example, 1400 homes and other structures
were damaged or destroyed in fires reported to
the U.S. Forest Service. Every year since 1985,
more than 300 homes have been lost to such
wildfires, but the tragic losses are not just to
property-lives of homeowners and fire fight-
ers are also lost every year. In 1987, more fire
fighters died fighting wildland fires than any
other single type of fire.
The fire danger to homes in the wildland/
urban interface is affected by five major fac-
tors:
w People continue to move to the
scenic wildlands and build homes there.
This trend will continue to be influenced
by the less desirable factors of city and subur-
ban life, as compared to the desirable factors
OVERVI EW
A dr eam
homesi t e
c an bec ome
a ni ght mar e
f or t he
unpr epar ed.
associated with living in the wildlands.
The population density of most cities is ex-
tremely high. For example, Denver has ap-
proximately 4,200 residents per square mile;
Los Angeles and Miami both have some 6,400
per square mile; and New York City squeezes
in about 23,300 people per square mile. In ad-
dition, many city and suburban residents must
contend with soaring property and rental costs
coupled with reduced services. They say urban
areas feature excessive taxes, too-restrictive
regulations, and endless noise, crime and grime.
As a result, people are moving from cities to
the less-crowded wildlands because they offer
a scenic environment with generally lower
property costs, more privacy, fewer regula-
tions, less noise and less crime.
This new trend is made possible by the
availability of a combination of services previ-
ously obtainable only in the cities and suburbs.
Now good connecting highways allow people
to retain their jobs in the cities but escape to live
Photo by NFPA
in and enjoy the aesthetics of a home in the
woods. Extending outward with the highways,
generally good communications and other
utilities have provided important bridges be-
tween the urban world of work and the rural
world of new homes. Some other basic serv-
ices-education, for example-are also now
more readily accessible in rural wildland areas.
Indeed, one of the basic but erroneous as-
sumptions made by people relocating to
wildland residential areas is that seemingly
most of the services they enjoyed in the cities
and suburbs are equally available in the new
areas. But the shock comes when it is time to
pay for the relatively high level of services
desired, because the typical lower population
density in the wildlands means there are fewer
people to share the costs of the services. Thus,
per capita costs rise.
To keep costs lower, rural communities
may decide to provide minimal services, or
choose not to expand the current level of
services. The result is often that, in an emer-
gency, residents discover that critical services
taken for granted in city life may not be avail-
able in the new rural setting. If available, they
may not be quickly available.
But fire is one type of emergency that is
very likely to occur-and develop quickly-
when combustible homes are built in close
proximity to the combustible vegetation found
in forests and other
wildland areas. Unfortu-
nately, development of
these rural areas has eas-
ily outpaced wildfire
hazard awareness on the
part of homeowners and
governments.
0 BLACK TIGER FI RE
In Colorado an estimated
three million of the states
22 million acres of for-
ested land are dotted with
homes. Boulder County
has 18,000 people living
in the rural mountains in
6,000 buildings. Homes
found in the area of the
Black Tiger Fire ranged
from shacks for pan-time
use to large, expensive
homes on the most scenic
sites. One residential
structure was a remodeled
railroad caboose. One
was an old bunkhouse for
Fi r e i s a
f ac t of l i f e
i n t he f or est .
I t r emoves
l i t t er and
r ec yc l es
nut r i ent s.
a long-defunct mining company.
34 (thousands of acres)
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
ildfires
/v
GOING UP...
Colorado W
(State and Private Lands)
I
74 76 78 80 82 84
6
86 88
l Wildfires continue to ignite and
threaten homes in the wildlands.
To a city resident, a forest may represent
only a beautiful environment, its quiet punctu-
ated by the soothing sounds of birds or rushing
streams or leaves rustling in the wind. But to a
fire, the forest represents tremendous fuel.
Fire is a fact of life in a forest. Taking a
naturalists view, fire serves a cleaning func-
tion and helps recycle nutrients. Frequent small
fires-started naturally by lightning, for ex-
ample-assure that fallen leaves and limbs are
periodically removed and recycled before the
fuel builds up to a quantity that, if ignited,
would threaten the forest itself. On a longer-
term period, as the forest ages and decays, fires
inevitably burn out large areas that are subse-
quently replaced by new forest stands.
Lightning is not a phenomenon control-
lable by humans. Thousands of lightning dis-
charges strike the earth each day with the
electrical characteristics needed to start a fire.
Although most will not find the necessary
combination of fuels and dryness for ignition,
weather conditions experienced every year do
provide dangerous combinations of prolonged
heat, wind and dryness. Then, any lightning
strike in the forest, brush or grasslands could
produce a rapidly spreading fire.
Where nature fails to
ignite a fire, humans are
capable of igniting fuels-
whether accidentally or
intentionally. Nation-
wide, a great majority of
wildfires are caused by
humans. And while some
areas of this country have
a greater fire problem than
others, no area is immune
to dangerous wildfires.
c BLACK TIGER FIRE
In the area of the Black
Tiger Fire, the U.S.D.A.
Forest Service has wild-
fire protection responsi-
bility on national forest
lands. The county sheriff
in Colorado is the official
agent responsible for sup-
pressing wildfires on pri-
vate and unincorporated
lands. No other state has a
similar organization. Lo-
cal volunteer fire depan-
ments provide the first line of response but on these roads can force them to leave some in-
transfer control to the sheriff on large fires. The dividual homes unprotected at critical times.
state forester can also assume the control duty Another problem occurs when roads are too
with concurrence of the sheriff. Radio commu- narrow to allow simultaneous evacuation of
nications are controlled at the county level in threatened residents while large emergency
Boulder County. vehicles move in the opposite direction.
l These wildfires continue to pres-
ent particular problems to affected fire
protection agencies.
Established procedures for controlling
wildland fires-sacrificing some acres by pre-
paring a perimeter firebreak and
backfiring to remove adjacent
fuels and starve the main fire, for
example--conflict with the neces-
sity for direct intervention to pro-
tect individual homes. At the same
time, committing available person-
nel to an intensive battle to protect
individual homes may result in not
being able to control the main wild-
fire itself.
Wildfires occurring during hot, dry and
windy conditions find fuels prepared for easier
burning and rapid fire spread. When moisture
levels for some typical fuel types are reduced
from 25 to 20 percent, the rate of spread factor
can double. A moisture reduction from 25 to 10
Fires threatening homes in the
wildland/ urban interface area
(defined in box at right) may gen-
erate initial emergency response
from either a wildland fire agency
or a structural fire department, de-
pending on which one is closer.
However, wildland fire fighters are
not always equipped or trained to
fight fires in structures, and struc-
tural fire fighters are not always
equipped or trained to fight
wildland fires. Therefore, the first-
responding fire fighters may not
Wildland/Urban Interface
percent in these same fuel types
can result in a rate-of-spread fac-
tor increasing seven times.
Fire intensity is perhaps even
more important. One fuel model-
ing system considers fuel types
and converts flame front energy
and rate of spread into a number
expressed in Btu (heat) per foot
(of fireline front) per second of
burning. A rating of 500 repre-
sents the theoretical, or rule of
thumb, limit of control by any
This describes the geographical areas where organized means. Beyond 1,000
formally urban structures--mainly resi- Btu/ ft/ sec, a fire can be expected
dence-are built in close proximity to the to feature dangerous spotting,
flammable fuels naturally found in wildland firewhirls, crowning and major
areas, including forests, prairies, hillsides runs with high rates of spread
and valleys. The results can be aesthetically and violent fire behavior. (These
desirable.. or disastrous. We can better numbers are useful for compari-
achieve the desirable aspects by better under- son purposes but they remain
standing thepotential danger and prevent- theoretical calculations based on
ing or preparing for them. best estimates usually made after
the fire from computer models.)
Spotting has particularly diffi-
be able to quickly handle the fire at hand. cult implications. Spotting occurs as wind-borne
Funding and manpower limitations faced by burning embers are carried far ahead of the
both types of agencies suggest that this prob- main fire front and land in receptive fuels. The
lem will not be quickly eliminated.
In addition, many wildland homes are built
along narrow roads and on cul-de-sacs that
present access difficulty for larger emergency
vehicles. The Black Tiger Fire area is character-
ized by many small private ownerships arising
from old gold-mining claims (Black Tiger was
the name of one of those early gold mines)
overlapping on federal lands. Most of the exist-
ing narrow and winding roads originaily served
the mining claims in the late 1800s. The
danger of fire crews becoming
trapped and unable to turn
embers can fall on the roofs of homes or
woodpiles and start new fires while
fire fighters are occupied else-
where with the main
Across the Black Tiger Fire area
For every 100 feet of distance, the land rises an average of 23 feet
To make matters worse, if the embers fall
on untreated wood shingle or shake roofs, the
new spot fires can develop even more rapidly.
Yet, building code regulations to prevent the
use of combustible roofing are not often in
place or enforced in wildland areas.
0BLACK TIGER FIRE State law in Colorado re-
quires a county to contact the Colorado State
Forest Service for comments on developments
in wildlands, but some counties dont bother.
Colorado fire officials are frustrated that some
mountain subdivision covenants actually re-
quire shake-shingle roofing to maintain the
perceived rustic charm of the community.
Boulder, however, became the first county
in Colorado to mandate fire-retardant roof
shingles, effective May 4, 1989. The greatest
limitation of this requirement-as well as simi-
lar ones elsewhere-is that it covers only new
construction. All existing homes are unaffected,
which means they may be quite vulnerable to
wildfire, Fire officials would like to see tougher
laws, but they will only be created and passed
if homeowners and local officials better under-
stand the problem.
l Lack of good vegetative manage-
ment predisposes areas to wildfiies.
Arrangement of natural fuels is an impor-
tant factor affecting the type of fire that could
occur in an area. This includes not only the
amount of forest litter and the density of the
trees, but also the heights of adjacent fuels.
Grass fires do not easily ignite tree canopies.
But so-called ladder fuels can allow flames to
escalate from grass to bushes to lower tree
limbs. Clearing ladder fuels is a prime objec-
tive of prescribed or controlled burning. This
term describes the knowledgeable application
of fire to a limited land area under controlled
conditions by forest management experts to
accomplish specific objectives. In addition to
removing litter, prescribed fires may also be
intended to thin out competing vegetation or
to prepare an area for the natural growth of
vegetation more resistant to ignition and fire
spread.
However, when people move to the for-
ests, land management officials often have
more difficulty conducting prescribed burning
because of the opposition of residents to the
smoke and possible risk of fire escaping con-
trol.
Other fuel management programs seek to
limit the quantity of highly flammable fuels.
On an individual basis, homeowners could re-
move fallen limbs and other flammable debris
A saf et y
zone of l ow
f uel densi t y
al l ar ound t he
home of f er s
i mpor t ant
pr ot ec t i on.
8
that builds up on the ground. Homeowners
could also manually thin out thick stands of
brush and trees to reduce the intensity of any
fire approaching a structure. Total clearing of
all vegetation from the ground is not preferred
because this could lead to erosion problems.
However, homeowners could plant greenbelts,
which are aesthetically pleasing zones of low
flammability vegetation that help protect a home
and also hold the soil. These irrigated, land-
scaped and regularly maintained areas act as a
fuel break.
0 BLACK TIGER FIRE The principal vegetation
across the Black Tiger Fire area was tall grass
under open ponderosa pine. Pockets of dense
lodgepole pine and Douglas fir were found on
shaded slopes and along riparian zones-ar-
eas of high-moisture vegetation around lakes,
streams or ponds that serve to reduce fire
intensity.
The fire danger in this part of Colorado was
made worse by the recent effects of tree-killing
insects such as budworms and beetles. The
spruce budworm larvae feed on the needles of
spruce trees, killing them slowly while build-
ing up a thick carpet of needles on the ground.
In the past ten years the Black Tiger area had
been ravaged by mountain pine beetles, which
left many of the pine trees dead. The Douglas
fir beetles were also in those remaining trees,
entering the bark and damaging the internal
water distribution system of the trees. In the
previous winter, a deep freeze followed by a
quick thaw weakened many trees and made
them even more vulnerable to the insect dam-
age. Dead and downed fuels had been re-
moved on some areas but remained on others.
W Unless specific preventive meas-
ures are taken by homeowners and local
governments, homes will continue to be
lost and peoples lives will continue to be
in danger.
When the owners and builders place their
primary emphasis on aesthetic values and
economic considerations without regard to fire
protection, the potential for catastrophic loss
increases. In the eyes of fire protection offi-
cials, these homes are built to burn. Homes in
the wildlands that are at special risk usually
share several dangerous traits:
Combusti bl e vegetati on
An approaching fire will ignite surrounding
vegetation in a step-by-step attack on a home.
A safety zone of low fuel density all around the
home offers important protection. So does
removing fallen leaves and limbs from roofs,
boxing eaves and screening vents. Landscap-
ing with fire-retardant plantings can actually
help protect homes by repelling fire or giving
it no place to burn.
Combusti bl e exteri or wal l s
Radiated heat from a nearby fire can ignite
wooden walls without actually touching them.
Wooden decks are also vulnerable. Similarly
dangerous is the placement of combustible
material such as woodpiles under decks, too
close to walls, or immediately downhill from
the home.
Unt r eat ed
w ood shi ngl e
r oof s ar e a
maj or f ac t or
f or w i l dl and
Home l ocated on a sl ope
Sloping hillsides provide for scenic views
and are some of the most desirable sites for
homes in the wildlands. Slopes, however, cre-
ate natural wind flows that increase the spread
of a wildfire. Slopes with gulleys can create
chimney effects that further increase a fires
rate of spread. Compared to level ground, a 30
percent slope will double fire spread rates
while often cutting fire control efforts in half,
The survivability of the home is further re-
duced when there are large glass windows or
a wooden deck or unprotected wooden sup-
port piers facing the downslope.
Untreated wood roofs Remote l ocati on
Homes a greater distance away from fire
protection equipment will obviously take longer
to reach. Homes with poor access for larger
emergency vehicles are in greater danger, as
are those hidden by vegetation and with poor
or no markings to help fire fighters locate the
home. Steep, narrow
trunk roads also slow
Black Tiger Fire Time Line: Sunday, July 9,1989
12:35 pm Approximate time of fire origin
12:35 - 12:40 First structure (mobile home) involved (approx.)
12:40 Fire discovered by residents and extinguishment
attempted
12:43
12:55
This is a major risk factor for wildland
homes. Wind-carried burning embers can ignite
these roofs far ahead of the main flame front. A
test has been developed to measure the rela-
tive ability of roof coverings to withstand igni-
tion from different size brands. A Class A roof
protects against larger
brands (wei ghi ng
over 4 pounds) than a
Class C roof (with-
standi ng brands
wei ghi ng onl y I/ 3
ounce). Untreated
wood shi ngl e and
wood shake roofing
wi l l not wi thstand
Class C brands. This
means that a brand
half the size of a
ki tchen match wi l l
i gni te a weathered
wood roof under the
wi nd and weather
conditions accompa-
nying most conflagra-
tions. Burning wood
roofing then gives off
more burning brands.
New treatments can
successfully improve
the ignition resistance
of wood roofing, but
only if the treatment
allows the roofing to
be certified as passing
fire tests for at least a
Class C rating.
12:59
12:59
1:00
1:00
1:04
1:05
1:30
1:00 -1:39
1:59
1:39 - 2:10
2:10 - 2:30
2:30
Fire alarm received by Sugarloaf Volunteer FD.
Estimated size: 40 x 10 feet
First fire fighters arrive on scene. Estimated size:
40 x 100 feet
Crown fire
Fire fighters on scene request equipment assistance
Estimated time of steady state burning.
Fire fighters on scene request mutual aid departments
First request aerial tanker support
Additional mutual aid departments requested
First evacuations begun (approx.)
Fire spread 78 ft/ min average
Radio confirmation of second structure
Type 1 interagency fire management team ordered
mobilized
2:30 - 3:30
3:30 - 6:00
6:00
6:30
Overnight
July 10
July 13
Last home lost
Fire area: 1,500 acres
Bulldozers cut 120-ft line
Greater state and federal fire fighting assistance arrived
Final control announced
9
emergency response
and evacuation for resi-
dents.
Lack of water
Piped water sys-
tems wi th suffi ci ent
pressure and hydrants
for fire fighting are
usually a product of
hi gher popul ati on
densities and may not
be available in wildland
areas. Ponds and cis-
terns can provide addi-
tional options for fire
departments, but they
may be dry in the worst
conditions; fire tanker
trucks are sel dom
enough. In the Black
Tiger Fire area, homes
were usually served by
individual wells with
small pressure tanks
that stopped function-
ing during the fire when
burned poles and fall-
ing wires cut off the
electricity.
THE FI RE
Weather Conditions and Topography
The conditions on Sunday, July 9 in that
part of Colorado had all the elements in place
for a dangerous fire, lacking only an ignition
source.
Rain had not fallen for at least 30 days
during an extended period of high tempera-
tures. The dry conditions were long term; snow
pack the previous winter was only 25-75 per-
cent of normal On Sunday, July 9, the tem-
perature was again near 100 degrees. Humid-
ity in the previous week was reported to be in
the single digits, although at the nearest official
weather station three miles east of the fire the
reading at 1:00 p.m. on July 9 was 24 percent.
Dry winds were blowing up the Black
Tiger Gulch with greater force than usual. Fire
fighters on the scene estimated the upslope
wi nd speeds i n the
early stages of the fire
to have been varying
between 15 and 25
miles per hour. At the
weather station men-
tioned above, observa-
tions at 1:00 p.m. indi-
cated a wind speed of
8 miles per hour.
The distance from
the point of origin to
the northwest terminus
of the fire at Sugarloaf
Mountain is 2.5 miles.
Along the first 3,000
feet northward from
the point of fire origin,
Black Tiger Gulch rises
720 feet, for an aver-
age slope of 24 per-
cent. Parts of this area
slope as much as 35
percent.
At the top of Black
Tiger Gulch the slope
becomes less steep fur-
ther northward for ap-
proximately one addi-
Weat her
Repor t :
Hot , Dr y
Wi ndy
tional mile approaching the Sugarloaf commu-
nity. Then the slope increases to about 34
percent from the base to the top of Sugarloaf
Mountain, with an elevation of 8,917 feet above
sea level. The slope over the total distance of
the fire averages 23 percent.
Fire Origin
The Black Tiger Fire began on private
property along Highway 119 in the Sunnyside
area about seven miles west of Boulder, Colo-
rado, around 12:35 p.m. on Sunday, July 9,
1989.
The county sheriff determined that the fire
was accidentally set-probably by a carelessly
discarded cigarette, The fire was first reported
as a small grass fire, 40 feet by 10 feet, by an
area resident who, with the aid of other resi-
dents, unsuccessfully
attempted t o extin-
guish the fire.
Sliced Coffee Cup
Black Tiger Gulch can be visualized by comparing it to a sugar bowl or
coffee cup sliced down the middle. The result is a side that slopes upward and
outward toward the top and also curves around. Heated air at the bottom
naturally funnels up the slope and accelerates over the ridge.
11
Sugarloaf Volun-
teer Fire Department
personnel were avail-
able at the station pre-
paring for a commu-
nity picnic when the
first radio alarm from
the county was re-
cei ved at 12:43. The
alarm notification also
included the U.S. For-
est Servi ce and the
Colorado State Forest
Service. This message
i ndi cated that there
was a possible Wailer
endangered at that lo-
cation.
Arri vi ng on the
scene at 12:55, Sugar-
loaf VFD personnel re-
ported, The fire is
spreading and looks
like it is covering about
40 by 100 (feet).
By 12:59 fire per-
sonnel on the scene had requested more tank-
ers, a portable pump and as many portable
containers as possible for collecting tanker
water in the field, adding that they had some
structures that were exposed. A storage trailer
adjacent to where the fire started was the first
structure to be lost to the fire. (Figure 1 shows
the approximate distribution of structures in
the affected area.) The fire burned through the
grass into the forest and spread up the steep
hillside.
One minute later-at 1:00 p.m.-the first
requests began for mutual aid from nearby fire
departments. This is also the time estimated for
a condition of steady-state burning used in fire
spread calculations. At 1:04 the requests for
assistance escalated to inquiries about needed
response from air tankers to drop fire retardant
chemicals, and helicopters for aerial recon-
naissance and water drops. Aerial support was
not immediately available. The nearest air
tanker base was 16 air miles away, but the air
tanker stationed there was already working
another fire that threatened structures in south-
western Colorado. (As the number of homes
threatened by the Black Tiger Fire grew,
however, the air tanker was diverted to Black
Tiger, a distance of 260 air
miles.)
Additional fire depart-
ments were requested at
1:05. A nearby department
preparing to respond with
mutual aid asked for clarifi-
cation at 1:09 about which
t ype of apparatus was
needed: Would you ask
Sugarloaf whether they
want forest fire-brush fire
equi pment or structure
protection, or both?
The answer was clear:
Respond all the equipment
you can."
Fire Intensity and
Growth
Fireline intensity is the
best indicator of the fires
destructive force and resis-
tance to control. The inten-
sity is computed by multi-
plying the rate of spread by
the energy density for the
particular fuel type found
in the area.
To determine rates of
Why one
home i s l ost
and anot her
sur vi ves:
many var i abl e
f ac t or s.
spread in different areas, the timed progress of
the fire was noted from aerial observation, as
shown in Figure 2. Measurements were taken
of the distance of fire spread and this was
divided by the minutes of travel.
Energy density is a number describing the
energy released by a square foot of a particular
fuel. Ponderosa pine had an energy density of
slightly more than 1,000 Btu/ ft2. Mixed conifer
fuels had an energy density near 2,000 Btu/ ft2.
Dry meadow areas had energy densities be-
tween 100 and 200 Btu/ ft2.
Calculation of fireline intensity for specific
areas of this fire demonstrates that two differ-
ent types of fire can have the same resistance to
control:
- a fire spreading rapidly through fuels
with low energy density, and
-
a fire spreading more slowly but
through fuels with higher energy densities.
If either calculation exceeds a fireline in-
tensity 500 Btu/ ft/ sec, control is not consid-
ered possible by normal organized means.
Figure 3 shows the different fireline inten-
sities at the Black Tiger Fire, The fire started
and made an initial rapid run up Black Tiger
Gulch, shown as area A. The heat from the
burning brush and fallen
tree debris served to ignite
ladder fuels until this be-
came a crown fire among
the predominate ponderosa
pine. Radio confirmation of
the crown fire came at 1:10
when the fire commander
reported: We need all the
help we can get as quick as
you got it. Were crowning
out rapidly here. At that
time nothing in the terrain
offered a major obstacle to
slow the fire and help pro-
tect the homes uphill in the
path of the fire.
Crowning generally is a
two-step process. Accumu-
lated ground material, in-
cluding downed limbs and
trees, burned and created
intense heat to further dry
out and ignite tree cano-
pies. Where the fire burned
into timber stands with tree
canopies touching or inter-
mingled, crowning oc-
curred. Crowning could not
be sustained if the ground
fires ran out of heavy ladder fuels. Where cano-
pies were not touching, the crowns generally
did not burn although they were usually
scorched to the top. In general, however,
crowning occurred in all map reference areas
except I, J, L, P, Sand R. (Areas D, E and Uwere
not as completely documented with timelines.
Due to the generally lower intensities in these
areas it is probable that the areas were burned
by either flanking, backing or originating spot
fires.)
The steep terrain and rate of spread upslope
made direct fire attack on the fires head from
the point of origin impossible. No roads pro-
vided access to the area immediately above the
point of origin. The fire simply outran the fire
fighters who were on foot in difficult terrain,
putting them into a defensive mode from the
earliest minutes. Indirect attack on the flanks
was not an option due to the speed of the fire
and structural threats ahead of the fire.
Areas B and F were of different fuel cover
type (mixed conifer), but they burned rapidly
and with similar intensity to area A.
As the fire burned into more ponderosa
pine-but in different topography-at areas C
and G, it slowed somewhat. At a calculated
fireline intensity usually above 500 Btu/ ft/ sec,
these areas were still impossible to control.
The next defensive position was deter-
mined by the next available roadway crossing
the area that would provide some ready break
in the fuel and allow access by the fire equip-
ment. Fire fighters began to race around the
fire and up to Waterline Road (see Figure 1),
following a ridge, which also gave them access
to the first homes to be threatened by the fire.
Running along the ridge top, Waterline Road
connects with Lost Angel Road.
Waterline Road, however, was too narrow
to allow two fire trucks to pass side by side, and
it featured close-in trees and brush on both
sides Although smoke obscured the size of the
fire, fire fighters could hear its roaring and
determined that the fire intensity approaching
them was high.
These fire fighters made a quick decision
that Waterline Road was not a defensible posi-
tion, due to the size of the approaching fire and
the danger of having fire crews and equipment
caught and overrun by the fire before they
could maneuver to escape. One fire officer
was almost trapped near where Waterline Road
meets Lost Angel Road; he had to drive to
safety through fire burning on both sides of the
road.
The narrowness of Waterline Road meant
Fuel t ypes
and t hei r
pr ox i mi t y t o
st r uc t ur es
det er mi ned
w her e de-
f enses mi ght
be possi bl e.
15
that its effectiveness as a fire break would be
inadequate. Fire crews fell back to the next
road, Sugarloaf Road. Evacuation of home-
owners began, affecting about 100 homes.
All homes along Waterline Road were ulti-
mately lost. The first radio confirmation of a
destroyed home came at 1:59, the victim of fire
spotting ahead of the main conflagration Mean-
while, valuable time was gained to set up de-
fenses for the homes along portions of Lost
Angel Road and Sugarloaf Road.
Fuel types and their proximity to structures
determined in large part where defenses might
be possible. In areas of highest fireline inten-
sity the fire break would have to be so wide as
to be impractical with limited numbers of fire
fighters. Figure 4 shows fire characteristics for
fuels in areas that would be controllable by
hand crews, controllable by bulldozers clear-
ing wider breaks, and areas not controllable by
any immediate means. Table 1 presents fire
behavior information in a matrix form.
Reaching the eastern crest of the gulch, the
fire slowed further at area H, and the fireline
intensity decreased.
Area L represents a riparian zone of either
no burning or reduced energy density, Fire
extension to areas I and P beyond this riparian
zone occurred from spotting over area L.
A wind shift at the top of the ridge sent the
fire in a northwesterly direction, This helped
lower the fireline intensity at area 0 and al-
lowed fire fighters to protect some of the homes
in the area.
More mutual-aid fire equipment arrived
and was set up to fight the fire. Communi-
cations became more complex as additional
units began operations. A third major stand
was attempted on the east flank of the fire
along Sugarloaf Road; if the fire extended far
past the road, another hundred homes would
have been at risk in other residential areas. Fire
fighters had a chance to hold here because the
area was out of the main path of the high
intensity fire up Black Tiger Gulch and on up to
Sugarloaf Mountain. Some homes were saved
and some were lost. The outcome was often
influenced by a homes location, whether
construction features aided or resisted the
spread of the fire, and whether human inter-
vention was available at the critical moment.
Homes farther from Sugarloaf Road and those
at the end of long dead-end driveways were at
a greater disadvantage and many were de-
stroyed.
Back in the center of the main fire front,
area J shows a decreased fireline intensity due
to the lighter, dry meadow fuels found there.
However, the rate of spread was increased by
wind in the flashy grass fuels.
Moving again into ponderosa pine fuels
with high energy density and higher rates of
spread, area M shows increased fireline inten-
sity equal to the level of area A up Black Tiger
Gulch. These areas were not controllable.
For the third time, fire crews had to pull
back and re-group, but the news at 2:18 was
that the ETA for the closest aerial tanker was
only another 10 minutes. Then at 2:21 one unit
reported: Ive been advised by the [spotter]
aircraft that weve got erratic fire behavior.
Weve got a crown fire making a run on Sugar-
loaf Road at this point. If you could have Ned-
any other area, but again spotting from areas N
and K allowed the fire further to spread into
ponderosa pine at area T (Sugarloaf Mountain)
at an uncontrollable fireline intensity. Areas W
and V showed similar intensities but were in
mixed conifer fuels.
By now some 40 fire departments had re-
sponded, some from other counties. The rapid
growth of the fire and the numerous mutual-
aid departments made coordination and com-
munications especially difficult. Some depart-
ments in the Boulder County Fire Association
had trained together, but this fire was larger
than anyone had anticipated. One result was
that many fire companies were operating inde-
pendently.
erland [Fire Department] send After 6:00 no more homes
up their gear were going to need were burned. The last two homes
it for structural protection. Narrow escape
lost were obscured by vegeta-
Area N was similar to areas B tion, and mutual-aid fire crews
and F, with mixed conifer fuel
The timing of this fire provided for the
unfamiliar with the area did not
cover but continuing high fire
greatest possible number of available volun-
see the homes until it was too late
intensity beyond control by
teer fire fighters on the scene in the shortest
or feared that the excessive vege-
available fire agencies.
In area K the fuel was again
possible time. But a Sunday afternoon meant
tation would compromise the
safety of fire personnel as it began
ponderosa pine but the topogra-
that morepeople were at home and at risk from
a fast-spreading fire. The evacuation load was
to burn. By 6:30 the fire had cov-
phy and wind shift toward the ered 1,500 acres.
west slowed the rate of spread.
higher. One resident was burned enough to
require hospitalization when be delayed his
At nightfall the fire was at the
As in similar areas C and G, the
escape too long. Several others experienced the
base of Sugarloaf Mountain. Three
intensity here was beyond pos-
sible control.
terror of a wildfirefrom unexpected close range.
bulldozers cut one line 120 feet
wide along the back side of Sug-
Area R was more dry mead-
"I barelygot my - - - out of there, said one
arloaf, and nighttime weather
ow grasses with a high rate of
resident quoted in the newspaper. "First I
conditions contributed to a slow-
spread but lower energy den-
smelled smoke, and then I saw flames. When I
ing of the fires spread.
sity.
left, there were flames on both sides of the road.
Although no more homes
Meanwhile, a Rocky Moun-
I was choked with smoke, and once I bad to
were lost after Sunday, the fire
tain Interagency Type 1 fire
wait for a wind to blow the smoke away be-
continued to burn hot on Mon-
management team was ordered
mobilized by 2:30 along with
cause I couldnt see the road. I cried like a baby
day, advancing very little. Greater
when I got to the end of the road. "
state and federal fire fighting as-
seven 20-person fire fighting sistance on Monday helped ef-
crews. An additional five crews forts to contain the fire, as did
came later, and more bulldozers rainshowers on Tuesday. Final
were brought in to cut an additional fire line. control was announced on Thursday, July 13.
Help also came in the form of contract planes Figure 5 shows the location of saved and
dropping fire retardant and helicopters drop- destroyed structures in relation to the areas of
ping water. similar fireline intensity. Figure 6 shows the
Another riparian zone was at area s, where location of saved and destroyed structures in
a higher proportion of homes survived than relation to the timeline of fire spread.
17
23
ANALYSI S
This wildfire resulted in the loss of more predominates. When the fire reached the next
homes and other structures than at any other fuel type it was mixed conifer, which contin-
time in Colorado wildfire history. The signifi- ued to feed fire intensities impossible to con-
cance of this fire is that similar conditions exist trol. Table 1 and Figure 4 describe areas of fuel
elsewhere in Colorado and in other states. types and resulting fireline intensities.
One of the most frequent comments of-
fered by homeowners in explanation for not
preparing for a wildfire is that the fire depart-
ment will handle the fire. Once ignited and
without immediate attack, however, a fire under
the conditions found in Black Tiger Gulch on
this July day would have been unstoppable by
any available fire fighting forces.
The major factors contributing to this fire
and the loss of structures are numerous:
Weather conditions. The hot, dry,
windy weather lowered fuel moistures and
prepared the area vegetation for easy ignition
and rapid fire spread. These conditions occur
seasonally in Colorado and elsewhere. Fire
protection agencies can predict when these
conditions present the greatest fire danger but
cannot otherwise control them. Homeowners
who wait for an announcement of high fire
danger to prepare their properties have lost the
time for appropriate and thorough prepara-
tion.
Aer i al
r ec onn-
ai ssanc e
i ndi c at ed
bur ni ng r oof s
Fuel arrangement. Fuel arrangement
facilitated the conversion of a surface fire to a
crown fire, The lack of small, natural, or con-
trolled fires or vegetative management meas-
ures in the area resulted in a heavy forest litter
buildup of dead trees, limbs and brush. These
fuels, in conjunction with remaining low
branches of live trees, formed ladder fuels. The
dead forest litter was also more susceptible to
drying out from decreased atmospheric hu-
midity than live fuels. If this surface litter had
been replaced with vegetation of low energy
density, crowning would not have been sus-
tained, (Note: Extremely dry live fuels could
sustain a crown fire despite removal of com-
bustible litter. Also, complete removal of
needles and other vegetation could contribute
to soil erosion.).
a quar t er -mi l e
or mor e
Topography. The steep topography
of Black Tiger Gulch created a chimney effect
that funnelled the fire toward homes at the top
of the canyon. The direction of the prevailing
winds, the direction of the slope, and the
normal rise of heated air combined to increase
strong upslope winds that pushed heat closer
to unburned fuels ahead of the flames, pre-
heating the fuels and accelerating the combus-
tion process.
ahead of t he
mai n f i r e
f r ont .
Fuel types and densities. Fuel types
in the area contributed to the unmanageable
intensity of the fire. Fuel types have been rated
according to their relative wildfire hazard.
Ponderosa pine, Douglas fir and mixed conifer
are rated in the highest hazard category. The
fire stated in an area where ponderosa pine
Fire spotting. Crown fires in dried
fuels under windy conditions caused fire spot-
ting ahead of the main fire front and further ac-
celerated fire spread, as well as expanded the
affected area. This exposed more homes to the
fire while reducing the time available for fire
fighters to respond to each new outbreak. The
additional fires diluted the number of available
fire fighters for each particular burning area.
Fire conditions leading to spotting also re-
duced the effectiveness of firelines, roads and
other fuel-free areas normally expected to help
slow or stop a spreading wildfire. Aerial obser-
vation indicated that fire spotting occurred as
far as one-third of a mile ahead of the main fire
front.
24
Construction features. Homes in the
path of the highest fire intensity were often not
savable regardless of total fire suppression
efforts. Given the quantity and type of fuels in
the fire zone, the amount of radiant energy
generated could ignite combustible homes
across normally recommended firebreaks. In
most cases the survival or destruction of a
home was affected not by a single factor but by
the combined effects of multiple factors. For a
more in-depth examination, refer to the fol-
lowing section, Statistical Analysis of Factors
in Damaged Homes. "
Figure 7 shows the location of 28 structures
selected for detailed study of multiple con-
struction features and loss factors.
Table 2 shows the features of the 28 homes
selected for detailed comparison. The most
consistent factor associated with structure loss
of the studied homes in this fire was the dis-
tance of the homes from adjacent combustible
vegetation. In every case except one, the prox-
imity of homes to wildland fuels was 20 feet or
less. One structure (map refer-
ence number 171 had the ad-
vantage of an adjacent moist ri-
parian zone, but combustible
vegetation was allowed to grow
to within 5 feet of the structure.
Table 2 also shows a high
occurrence of wood exterior
construction and open wood
decks, porches or balconies,
which can provide a ready
source of easily ignitable fuel.
Decks, porches and balconies
can serve as an easy path for
burning vegetation to reach
structures, and they are vulner-
able to wind-carried brands
from the main fire front. Such
decks become even more haz-
ardous when the areas under-
neath them are used to store
combustibles such as firewood.
Editorial
the studied structures, this property owner had
a cleared fuel break of 75 feet in front of the
approaching fire. The roof was asphalt and
was wetted down by the owner before he
evacuated. Although radiant heat caused heavy
damage, the structure survived.
Structures 17 and 28 were saved by fire
department action along Lost Angel Road,
where a stand was attempted after waterline
Road had to be abandoned. Number 17 had a
wood shingle roof but stucco exterior and no
open deck. Although adjacent vegetation came
to within 5 feet of the home, the fuel bed was
a riparian zone and the approaching fire was
on the ground, not in the crowns. The resulting
fireline intensity was a manageable 100 Btu/ ft/
sec and good access allowed fire fighters to
save the home with damage to the roof. Only
one studied home faced fire-
line intensities lower than 100
Btu/ ft/ sec. Number 7 shows a
low fireline intensity of 60 with
a rate of spread of only 3 feet
per minute, but fire department
action was at a disadvantage
because the fire reached the
area before full mobilization
was possible and the long dead-
end driveway discouraged en-
try by emergency vehicles.
Furthermore, vegetation clear-
ance was only 5 feet from a
combustible exterior on a slope
of 20 percent. As a result, the
home was lost.
Our foothills and canyons are a beautiful
and often perilous place to live. Many people who
choose to do so take prudent steps to protect their
property. Others, as officials working the Sugarloaf
fire pointed out, have not done so, making efforts
to save their homes futile.
"As we have stated here before, the City of
Boulder has devoted countless hours and resources
to preparing for a flood that may come this year or
in a century from now. Asimilareffortbas not been
made to anticipate and mitigate the results of the
fires that flare up in the bills every year. "
-Boulder Daily Camera,
July 11, 1989
Number 27 showed the
benefit of fire department and
owner action. Its location meant
that the fire did not reach it for
several hours, giving time for fire fighters to
The multiple-factor effect can be seen in
several examples. Structures 5 and 6 in Table 2
had metal roofs, which provide an extra meas-
ure of protection compared to combustible
roofing. However, in both cases combustible
vegetation was only 5 feet away when the fire
front moved through. Structure 5 was adjacent
to dry meadow fuels that produced a relatively
low fireline intensity, but the home had an
open pier foundation that allowed rapid igni-
tion.
On the other hand, map reference 3 was on
a 10 percent slope adjacent to mixed conifer
fuels that produced some of the highest inten-
sity flame of the entire incident. The rate of
spread was a rapid 45 feet per minute, and
flame length was at 11 feet. Yet, unique among
26
-continued on page 30
better organize defenses and bring in bulldoz-
ers to build firebreaks. A fireline was cleared
200 feet from this home and the owner stayed
to extinguish spot fires. The owner had also
prepared the site by removing trees and limbs
killed by beetle damage, although some vege-
tation remained as close as 10 feet.
Fire department intervention was attempted
at number 26, where another bulldozer began
to clear a fireline. However, this was an area of
the highest intensity of the fire (1500 Btu/ ft/
sec) and vegetation was as close as 5 feet from
the structure, which also had open wood decks
on two levels. The bulldozer had to abandon
the line due to the high intensity and rapid
spread of the fire. The home was destroyed.
eat ures and L o s s Fac t
Fire Type Flame Rate of Fireline N
Length Spread Intensity
(ft) (ft/min) (Btu/ft/sec)
1 heading surface 6-8 25 40 total -limited defensible space, open wood deck
2 heading crown 9-11 45 800 total -high intensity fire, limited def. space
3 heading crown 11 45 1500 saved -hvy. damage, large def. space, owner wet roof
4 flanking surface 4 80 140 total -rap. spread thru grassy slope, open wood porch
heading surface 4 60 120 total -limited def. space, open pier foundation
heading crown 8 30 600 total -high intensity fire, limited def. space, deck
7 flanking crown 2-4 3 60
8 heading crown 4-6 15 300
9 heading crown 4-6 15 300
10 heading crown 11 45 1500
11 flanking surface 4 15 250
12 heading surface 68 25 450
total -steep slope, limited def. space, long driveway
total -wood roof, limited def. space, gone in 15min.
total -wood roof, slope, little def. space, poor access
total-intense fire,
total-fire spotting, limited def. space,
total-limited defensible space,
total-owner action too late, limited space, balcony
total-intense fire,
total-3 bldgs, limited def.
total-garage only, more def. space saved home
saved, wood roof damage-FD exting., access good
total-fire spotting to wood roof, open deck
total-spotting, open deck, long dead-end driveway
total-spotting, steep slope, open deck, wood exterior
total-wood foundation, limited def. space, grassy slope
total-intense fire, limited def. space, comb. constr.
total-limited def. space, open wood decks, intense fire
total-heavy surr. vegetation, intense fire, wood constr.
1
total-intense fire, limited def. space, open wood deck
total-fire line unsucc., intense fire, limited def. space 1
-
saved-successful owner & FD dozer line intervention
saved-garage damage only, FD used hot tub water
29
Map reference 28 denotes a home saved With radio communications strained, many
with damage to the garage only. Lost Angel mutual-aid departments were left to operate
Road helped slow the fire in this area, which independently after being assigned a general
had an intensity of only 180. However, total area. Local coordination of ground and aerial
loss would have resulted without fire depart- water tankers, evacuation, and awareness of
ment intervention, due to the close proximity the fires overall progress were hampered.
of combustible vegetation and the wood roof Mutual-aid departments were not as familiar
and exterior. Combustible materials were also with the area as the home department. Another
stored adjacent to the garage. Although fire recommendation from the local critique of the
department personnel were available here, fire suppression activities was in the future for
water tankers werenot, so fire fighters extin- each fire district to prepare maps of their own
guished the garage fire with water from the areato present to arriving mutual-aid depart-
owners hot tub.
w Command and con-
trol. The rapid growth of the
fi re requi red a multijuris-
dictional fire attack that compli-
cated the command structure
and strained communications
capabilities.
After the firemade its first
rapid run across a broad front
where fire intensities were espe-
cially devastating, fire fighting
forces were still not available in
sufficient time and number to
simultaneously protect all re-
maining homes and continue
the broad attempt to stop the
wildfire. Mutual aid fire depart-
ments can provide critical assis-
tance when a major fire threat-
as a single jurisdiction. In this
case several fire departments
had trained together to handle
a major fire, but the unprece-
dented size of this fire caused
unexpected problems.
The radio command chan-
nel was occasionally over-
whelmed due to the quantity of
messages attempted. On sev-
r
Mountain Residents Must Take Care
"The recent fire on SugarloafMountain and
the continuing concern for the residents who lost
homes or who bad severe fire damage has both-
ered me.
While I feel deeply for those who lost their
homes, there does not seem to be any assignment
of blame on those who build in a wooded area
and take no precautions to protect their invest-
ment.
Gov. Romer is proposing small business loans
and other relief for tbose people who had no in-
surance or were underinsured. I believe this type
of concern dilutes the responsibility homeowners
must take to protect tbeir property..
People who choose to build in flood plains, at
or near the end of runways, or in wooded areas
must assume the consequences o f the risks they
take. "
-Dave Haughey
JuIy 20, Fort Collins
eraI occasions the communications center tried
to remind personnel to reserve the command
channel for critical communications and to use
other channels for local coordination. One of
the recommendations from local critiques of
the fire suppression activities was to acquire a
repeater radio channel for better penetration
and coverage in mountainous areas.
ments So that mutual-aid per-
sonnel could be tracked better,
it was suggested that a check-
in sheet listing all responding
personnel be carried on each
apparatus for collection at the
staging area.
Some requested mutual-aid
departments could provide
only limited assistance to this
fire area because of a concern
that the fire would extend into
their own areas.
w Emergency access.
Roadways and restricted drive-
ways to homes limited re-
sponse and operational choices
of fire fighters. The mountain-
ous terrain featured roads that
twisted to follow the hillsides
and ridges. Old mining activity
influenced the Iocation of many
roads, which in some cases
followed the same paths used
by horse-drawn wagons. Al-
though paved, these roads
typically were not widened suf-
ficiently for easy use by large
emergency vehicles.
Fire command officials
reported making some decisions to defend or
sacrifice individual homes based on their ac-
cessibility. If there was a danger of fire crews or
apparatus becoming trapped from rapid fire
blowup - or the structure was prone to espe-
cially easy and rapid ignition, such as with
wood shingle roofs-then z+ structure would
more likely he abandoned,
30
Statistical Analysis of Factors
in Damaged Homes
Table 2 provided a two-part matrix over-
view of home features and loss factors for the
28 houses that were badly damaged or de-
stroyed and for which detailed information
was available. It may be seen from the fireline
intensity column that these homes include some
where the fire was so severe that no combina-
tion of home features and fire department
response could be expected to prevent de-
struction. The other homes, where the fire was
less severe, are likely to have suffered losses
that were more sensitive to their home features
and fire department response, because the
lesser fire severity left the outcome more in
doubt.
The deciding line for these two groups may
be drawn at 500 Btu/ feet/ second, because,
according to Richard Rothermel of the U.S.
Forest Service, fires of this severity are usually
beyond control by any manual means. Tables
3 and 4 therefore divide the 28 homes into a
group of 17 that encountered fireline intensi-
ties of at least 500 Btu/ feet/ second and 11 that
encountered lesser intensities.
To further support an explanatory statisti-
cal analysis, the major factors also have been
divided into "good" and bad groups. For roof
materials and exterior construction, wood is
bad and anything else is good. For eaves, open
is bad and closed or none is good. For decks,
porches and balconies, having one is bad and
not having one is good. All of these reflect
significant differences in the vulnerability of
exposed exterior features to ignition by an
established hostile fire.
The lead investigator detemined 200 feet is
the maximum dead-end road access distance
that could be called good under these severe
burning conditions. A slope of 20% or more
was categorized as bad, and a good rating on
clearance from vegetation required at least 30
feet distance.
With this scheme, it may be seen that the 17
homes facing the more severe fire averaged 3.1
good ratings out of seven possible, while the 11
homes facing the less severe fire averaged 2.5
good ratings out of seven. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that a very severe fire will
overpower even a "good" home, while a less
severe fire will be more likely to need some
flaws in the home design and/ or maintenance
to support spread to the home.
Because only 28 homes were in the study
A l ess sever e
f i r e w i l l be
mor e l i k el y t o
need some
Roof Material
f l aw s i n t he
home desi gn
and/or mai nt e-
nanc e t o sup-
port spr ead t o
t he home.
31
and someof the factors do not divide sharply
into good and "bad" categories, a statistical
analysis has to be considered tentative, ex-
ploratory and illustrative. Nevertheless, the
results of this exercise are plausible and should
provide food for thought. Some factors (e.g.,
dead-end distance, clearance from vegetation)
can be seen as potentially important because
they were rated as bad in nearly all cases. Other
factors (e.g., wood roofs, slope) often were not
bad in homes when the fireline intensity made
severe or total damage a nearly foregone con-
clusion but often were bad in homes where the
fire intensity left the outcome more in doubt.
Specific findings and comments on each factor
are as follows:
For more severe fires, 15 of 17 homes (88%)
had good roofs, while for less severe fires, only
6 of 11 homes (55%) had good roofs. This 33
percentage point spread was the largest spread
for any factors (although slope showed the
same spread).
Put simply, in a very severe fire area, homes
didnt need to have untreated wood shingle
roofs to succumb to fire. In a less severe fire
area, it was much more likely that an untreated
wood shingle roof was there to facilitate the
entry of the fire into the house. The 33 percent-
age point spread is evidence that this was one
of the most important factors in the damage to
those homes where the outcome was most
sensitive to home features.
Important as it was, there is reason to be-
lieve that the potential hazard created by un-
treated wood shingle roofs did not more fully
emerge in this fire, as it has in previous fires,
because ofthe happenstance ofprevailing wind
velocity. In the most serious wildfires of recent
decades where untreated wood shingle roofs
were a major spread factor, wind velocity had
been much higher than the roughly 10 to 15
mile per hour rate in the Black Tiger fire. For
example, the $50 million Anaheim, California,
fire in 1982 featured gusts up to 60 miles per
hour. In such conditions, not only the flamma-
bility of untreated wood shingles but also their
suitability as a source of flying brands create a
role as vector of extensive fire spread that can
be even clearer and more unmistakable than
was the case in the Black Tiger fire.
NFPA maintains records of a distressing
number of large-loss multiple structure fires
where untreated wood shingle and shake roof-
ing was a contributing factor. More recent ex-
ample include fires at Davis, California, March
Tabl e 3
Home Feat ur es Rat ed (Fi r el i ne I nt ensi t y At Least 500 Bt u/f eet /sec ond)
Map Degree Roof Eaves Deck/Porch Exterior Dead End Slope Clearance
Ref. of Loss Material Open/ Closed / Balcony Construction Distance % from Veg.
1
Total Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Good (150) Good (5%) Bad (10)
2
Total Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Good (No) Bad (Wood) Bad (1100) Good (15%) Bad (10)
3
Saved Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Good (No) Good (Con/ Wd) Bad (1000) Good (10%) Good (75)
6
Total Good (Metal) Good (None) Bad (Yes) Good (Metal) Bad (2000) Good (0%) Bad (5'')
10
Total Bad (Wood) Bad (Open) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Bad (4200) Good (15%) Bad (10)
12
Total Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Bad (900) Good (10%) Bad (10)
13
Total Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Bad (Yes) Good (Metal) Bad (1200) Good (10%) Bad (20)
14
Total Good (Asphalt) Bad (Open) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Good (100) Good (10%) Bad (10)
15
Total Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Bad (600) Bad (25%) Bad (15%)
16
Total Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Bad (850) Good ( 15%) Bad (20)
20
Total Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Good (200) Bad (35%) Bad (20)
21
Total Good (Asphalt) Bad (Open) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Bad (900) Good (10%) Bad (5)
23
Total Bad (Wood) Good (Closed) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Bad (600) Good ( 15%) Bad (5)
24 Total Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Good (No) Bad (Wood) Bad (300) Good (0-5%) Bad (10')
25
Total Good (Asphalt) Good (Closed) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Bad (300) Good (0-5%) Bad (20)
26
Total Good (Asphalt) Bad (Open) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood) Good (200) Good (15%) Bad (5)
27
Saved Good (Asphalt) Bad (Open) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wd logs) Bad (900) Good(l5%) Bad(l0)
Tabl e 4
Home Feat ur es Rat ed (Fi r el i ne i nt ensi t y Less Than 500 Bt u/f eet /sec ond)
Roof
Material
4
Total Good (Asphalt)
5 Total Good (Metal)
7 Total Good (Asphalt)
8
Total Bad (Wood)
Eaves Deck/Porch Exterior Dead End
Open/ Closed / Balcony Construction Distance
Bad (Open) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood)
Good (None) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood)
Bad (Open) Good (No) Bad (Wood)
Good (Closed) Bad (Yes) Bad (Wood)
Good (Closed) Good (No) Good (Stucco)
Good (None) Good (No) Bad (Wd logs)
32
Good (150)
Bad (1200)
Bad (1800)
Bad (2000)
Bad( 1200')
Bad( 1200')
Bad (250)
Bad (800)
Bad (800)
Bad (400)
Good (200)
Slope
%
Good (15%)
Good (5%)
Bad (20%)
Good (5%)
Bad (20%)
Good (10%)
Good (15%)
Bad (20%)
Bad (20%)
Good (10%;
Bad (20%)
Clearance
from Veg.
Bad (5)
Bad (5)
Bad (5)
Bad (5)
Bad (10)
Bad(l5)
Bad (5)
Bad (20)
Bad (15)
Bad (5)
Bad (10')
14, 1988; Dallas, Texas, March 21, 1983;
Anaheim, California, April 21, 1982; Tulsa,
Oklahoma, April 5, 1980; Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, November 16,1980. Each large loss fire in
the record has reported damages of $500,000
or higher. Brush fires involving wood-shingle
roofing in San Bernardino, California, destroyed
290 homes in 1980 and destroyed 239 homes in
Santa Barbara, California, in 1977.
Other Exterior Features
The presence of decks, porches or balco-
nies, and the use of wood in exterior construc-
tion were problems for the overwhelming
majority of homes, regardless of fire severity,
so the differences between more-severe and
less-severe fires were modest and not always
in the expected direction. Open eaves were
rare in both cases. A statistical analysis alone
would find little evidence to focus attention on
any one of these features,
not because they were
not important in fire
development, but be-
cause they tend to vary
together. Among the
less-severe fire intensity
cases, for exampl e,
seven of 11 had used
exterior wood construc-
tion; a deck, porch, or
balcony; and open or no
eaves. Seven of the 17
more-severe fire cases
had the same combina-
tion. This fairly standard
construction approach
was sufficiently popular
and the alternatives to it
were sufficiently varied
that it proved too diffi-
cult to get a clear statis-
tical reading on differ-
ences in importance of
With wood roofs, slope was the other fac-
tor that clearly discriminated between more-
severe and less-severe fire intensities. In more-
severe fire intensity areas, I5 of I7 homes
(88%) had good slopes of 15% or less, while
only six of 11 homes (55%) in less-severe fire
intensity areas had these lower slopes. A large
percentage point difference (17 percentage
points) also exists if slopes of 15% and higher
are regarded as bad. Therefore, it appears that
more-severe fire intensity areas were able to
overpower homes even when slopes were
mild, while less-severe
fire intensity areas were
more likely to need, or at
least to benefit from, the
steeper slopes to in-
volved homes.
Your Chance to Become Involved in the Process
NFPA 299, Protection of Life and Property from Wildland Fire, when
completed and when adopted by a local jurisdiction will be an
important foundation for a majority of the factors discussed above
and for the recommendations listed on tbe following pages. Its stated
purpose is to provide criteria for fire agencies, land use planners,
architects, developers, and local government for fire safe develop-
ment in areas which may be threatened by wildfire. Its continuing
development mirrors the first recommendation from this section:
namely, that the best way to solve a complexproblem is to apply the
combined efforts of representatives from all affected groups. Indeed,
the particulars of NFPA 299 are still being considered prior to final
issuance in 1991, and the NFPA standards-making system is de-
signed to facilitate input from all the interested parties listed.
To learn more about the current status of NFPA 299 or about how you
could provide input to theproposed standard, contact the Public Fire
Protection Division of NFPA at 1 Batteymarcb Park, P.O. Box 9101,
Quincy, MA 02269-9101.
these three features. severe fire. In fact, the fireline intensity for that
where fire department access was likely to be
impaired. Only four of the 17 more-severe fires
(24%) and two of the less-severe fires (18%)
showed acceptable distances, and half of these
had distances right at the assumed upper limit
of 200 feet.
Slope
Clearance from
Vegetation
Nothing could be
said statistically about
this factor because only
one home in 18 had an
acceptable clearance
factor. It is worth noting
that the one home,
which also was the only
home to rate good on all
four exterior features,
was also one of only two
homes to be saved from
serious or total destruc-
tion in the face of a more-
Their collective importance in fires of this type
is not an issue, of course, and is apparent in the
descriptions of fire development in the indi-
vidual homes.
Access Road Dead End Distance
Little emerged statistically on this factor
because nearly all the homes were at a distance
fire was the highest recorded; only three homes
were faced with that severe a fire intensity. This
case - Figure 7, map reference 3 - can be
counted as a partial success story, illustrating
the potential impact of good fire protection
design and practices to help defend homes in
an urban/ wildland interface.
33
RECOMMENDATI ONS
Ttzgic losses of homes in the wildlands are preventable. However, combi ned effotts of the
community organizations; fire services; federal, state and local governments; and individual home-
owners are necessary to minimize kxses,
The Black Tiger Fire has resulted in a greater local and statewide awareness of the problems
associated with the wildland/ urban interface Nevertheless, a continuing and expanded effort must be
undataken to inform the public nationwide of the potential hazards involved in interface areas, to
inform them of how they can assess the hazards in their area, and to assist them in alleviating the
hazards. Ckezuly, this effort cannot be accomplished by just the i ndi ui dual efforts of one of the listed
grops.
FIR Protection Agc?ncies
Fire protection agencies are the groups
d If wildland fire agencies may be called
upon to fight structure fires within wildland
with the greatest knowledge of and
experi ence wi th the current
wildland/ urban interface fire prob-
lem. Actions need to be taken by
these agencies to fwther prepare
themselves, as well as the people
they protect, from the identified fire
hazards associ ated wi th the
wildland/ urban interface. The pub-
lic and lawmakers also rely on the
fire service of the community to in-
form them of fire protection risk and
mitigation strategies.
d Fire protection agen-
cies need to conduct an assess-
ment of the risks present in their
jurisdictions and prepare a stra-
tegic plan to attack those risks.
fl Fire protection agencies
need to conduct an assesstnent of the pa&w
lar risks present in their jurisdictions and pre-
pare a strategic plan to reduce those risks, The
plan should answer these questions: Are there
measures currently within their jurisdiction to
prevent construction of easily ignitable homes
or that provide adequate access to them for fire
suppression purposes? Which homes can be
defended during a wildland fire without jeep-
ardizing the safety of fire crews? Also, as part of
this assessmat, a baseline study to determine
the level of squareness of the public concern-
ing these issues should be accomplished.
ered in the early minutes of the Black Tiger
Fire, conditions may be present that make itvir-
/
bully impossible for available forces to quickly
As the fire fighters discov-
control a wildfire. Therefore, fire agencies
should concurrentlytmin the public to prevent
fires and to react properly when a fire occurs.
/ A fire prevention and public educa-
tion effort should combine direct-contact train-
ing with the distribution of additional informa-
tional materials to those individuals who tray
not initially respond to the offer of direct train-
ing, Libraries are also willing to retain or dis-
tribute provided materials. The details of this
public education effoa will depend on the
results of the local assessment of the wildland/
urban interface risks present.
ti Once the prospects for local wildland/
urban interface fire disaster is known, specific
training should b-z conducted to prepare fire
suppression agencies for the fires that can be
expected,
34
areas, they should arrange for the
necessary cross-training and equip-
rnent (including communication
equipment) to deal effectively with
that type of fire fighting.
/ Conversely, if structural fire
agencies maybe called upon to fight
wildland fires that threaten strut-
tures, they should arrange for the
necessary cross-training and equip-
menttodeal effectivelywithwildland
fire fighting.
fl Fire agencies should determine what
interagency cooperative agreements are
needed to improve multijurisdictional coordi-
nation in both fire prevention efforts and fire
suppression. Major fires will require this com-
bined attack, and when the fire occurs it is too
late to begin the preparations for different or-
ganizations to work together effectively.
/ Fire agency personnel should become
better aware of the political process that influ-
ences items varying from agency funding to
fire safety and building code regulations. Agen-
cies should seek out information from other
organizations on how best to work with law-
makers to prepare and justify proper regula-
tions to help prevent unsafe development and
lack of maintenance of fire safety features in
the wildlands.
The Public/Homeowners
quired for structures built on steep slopes,
above canyons, combustible materials and
exposures.
d When homeowners become aware of
the wildfire risk of their own areas, they should
join forces with other interested individuals
and groups to urge lawmakers to respond with
legislative assistance to require appropriate
fire safety measures by all of those who live in
the affected areas.
Community Planners and Officials
A communitys planning and building offi-
cials are often the first individuals who com-
municate local practices and standards to those
who want to buy or build in the wildlands.
Their understanding of the potential hazards of
building in these areas is therefore vitally im-
The people who choose to live in the portant.
scenic wildlands have the basic responsibility
to take necessary precautions when
facing predictable hazards. Informed
homeowners would be better pre-
pared for surviving a wildfire, but
dIt is the responsibility
some homeowners in the area of the
Black Tiger Fire admitted to a lack of
of the individualproperty owner
knowledge about the wildfire risks
where they lived.
to provide a defensible space
around structures to help pro-
tect them.
ti Potenti al homeowners
should determine the wildfire haz-
ard potential of the immediate area
before buying or moving into any
home. This information can be ob-
tained from the local fire depart-
merit. NFPA 299 will provide guidelines for rat-
ing the wildfire potential of an area,
/ Homeowners should contact federal,
state and local fire and forestry agencies for
educational programs and materials to address
the fire hazard in general. Information should
also be shared with children. Information and
publications covering numerous wildland
home fire safety details are available free from
many sources, but until individual apathy is
overcome the homeowner may not be moti-
vated to take proper precautions. (Here, the
fire services can function as fire protection re-
source centers for the public.)
d It is the responsibility of the individual
property owner to provide a defensible space
around structures to help protect them. Extra
measures to provide additional space are re-
/ A wildland fire behavior po-
tential map should be created for
existing and planned structures. The
features specified for the map would
include several topography-related
factors: elevation, slope percent,
drainages, prevailing wind direction,
worst-case wind direction (toward
structures), and broken topography
features.
d The wildland fire behavior
potential map should also include
fuel types. Zones of possible high-
intensity fire must be identified and
communicated to property owners. Fuel modi-
fication-the removal, spacing or volume re-
duction of fuel types to accomplish a reduction
in fuel loading-is a primary mitigation meas-
ure.
/ Areas with abnormal accumulations
of forest litter should be identified, and a re-
view made of past fire history in each area fuel
bed.
35
/ The Authority Having Jurisdiction (de-
termined locally) should evaluate all existing
or planned housing developments to deter-
mine relative wildland fire protection ratings.
In doing this, jurisdictions must review fire
danger weather records to determine patterns
of rain, heat, humidity and fuel moisture. Then
property owners must be advised of conditions
and their responsibilities.
Developers
This event has also focused on the need to
have construction standards for homes in the
wildlands. The published version of NFPA 299
will provide important guidance in this area,
but it becomes fully effective only when
adopted by local lawmakers.
In the absence of clear and meaningful
regulations for the common good, the prac-
tices of uninformed developers may create
potential hazards. Fire protection features, or
their costs, may not be appreciated by unin-
formed buyers. However, decisions made at
the early stages of a development will affect a
homes fire safety for many years in the future.
/ All developments should have more
than one ingress-egress route and employ
looped road networks. Roads should be wide
enough for simultaneous access for emergency
vehicles and the evacuation of residents. In
consideration ofthe lane, wheelbase of tankers
/ Developers can provide a valuable
service to new buyers, who may initially be
distracted by other moving details, by creating
appropriate fuel breaks or greenbelt areas.
Lawmakers
Although the public determines acceptable
levels of risk from fire in wildland areas, law-
makers react to the perceived needs of con-
stituents and enact the regulations controlling
that level of risk. Therefore, it is generally up to
homeowners and fire protection agencies to
articulate and justify acceptable and unaccept-
able levels of risk. When tragic losses occur,
they usually focus attention on the risks, but
preventive actions are preferable.
ti Lawmakers should take the initiative
to examine existing laws, regulations and stan-
dards from other jurisdictions that are available
for local use in mitigating fire hazards associ-
and other emergency vehicles, roads ated with wildland fires.
should be constructed with an ade-
quate curve radius. Homes along ti Lawmakers are encouraged
deadend roads and long driveways to adopt NFPA 299, when it becomes
provide extra privacy for residents
d Decisions made at the
available, as one part of the protec-
but also provide the potential for
early stages of a development
tion provided for new construction
fire apparatus to become trapped in the wildlands.
by spreading fire. These roads and
driveways should not prevent easy
will affect a homes firesafety
ti Authorities should provide
access by large emergency vehicles. for many years in the future.
other strong building regulations to
restrict non-treated wood shingle
ti Developers should recon- roofs and other practices known to
sider their frequent use of combus- decrease the fire-safety of a structure
tible exterior building materials, or in the wildlands. In the past, untreated
at least offer options for more firewood shingle roofs have repeatedly
safe materials for potential buyers who may been shown to be a major contributing factor in
not yet understand the differences. the loss of structures to wildfires, yet some resi-
dential subdivisions in Colorado and elsewhere
fl Developers should also consider the still encourage and even require wood shingle
long-range implications of siting unprotected roofs for aesthetic reasons.
homes on slopes or where water supplies for
fire fighting are weak or non-existent.
36
Met hodol ogy of t he St udy of t he Bl ac k Ti ger Fi r e
Uoon after the Black Tiger Fire, represen-
tatives from the National Fire Protection Asso-
ciation, U.S. Forest Service, Boulder County
Sheriffs Office, Colorado State Forest Service,
and Sugarloaf Volunteer Fire Department met
to discuss a study of the fire to be conducted
by the NFPAs Fire Investigations Division. A
one-day meeting of the participants was held,
resulting in the discussion of various ap-
proaches to the analysis. Participants identi-
fied the available data and how it might be col-
lected and discussed. In general terms, the
wildland/ urban interface fire problem was
also discussed and how those factors may or
may not be applicable to the Black Tiger Fire.
(Participants included: U.S.Forest Service:
Bob Swinford, Michelle Nolde, Bob Willmot,
Chad DeVore, Dick Chase, Dick Rothermel, Al
Roberts; Boulder County Sberiss' s Office: Ernst
Little, Al Staehle, Larry Stern; Colorado State
Forest Service: Dave Farmer, Ron Zeleny; Sug-
arloaf Fire Protection District: Ruth Ravenel;
NFPA: Tom Klem, Bill Baden, Jim Smalley,
Heather Hintz.)
In addition to the meeting, an on-site sur-
vey of the fire area was arranged through the
Boulder Sheriffs Office so that participants
could examine the factors that might have led
to the destruction of homes and how to miti-
gate other severe fires from causing such ex-
tensive damage. A thorough one-day survey of
the burn site including examination of those
homes destroyed/ survived was undertaken.
A complete drive/ walk through the fire
area was conducted by the representatives.
During the tour, the representatives spoke to
several residents to supplement previous ob-
servations and determinations. Researchers
from the U.S. Forest Service and other wildland
fire experts relayed their observations/ deter-
minations with other representatives. Details
of the rapid development and spread of the fire
were provided and physical evidence shown
to corroborate determinations. Further, the
effects that such rapid growth and spread might
APPENDI X
The sur vey
t eam began t o
under st and
t he f ul l i m-
pac t of t he
ef f ec t s of
f uel s, t em-
per at ur e,
sl ope, and
w i nd t hat ex -
i st ed on t he
day of t he
f i r e.
37
have had on the ignition/ survival of the homes
was discussed. Again, these technical observa-
tions were corroborated with physical evidence.
The survey began at the base of the Black
Tiger Gulch where the origin of the fire was
pinpointed by local authorities. Coupled with
observations of the available videotapes of the
fire, interviews conducted with local fire au-
thorities and other eyewitnesses, and upon
examination of the physical evidence, the group
began to piece together a scenario of how the
fire developed and spread. These determina-
tions were then coupled with the fire spread
scenario that was documented during the fire
suppression effort by the incident command-
ers. These fire spread observations plotted the
head of the fire as it varied over time,
The survey team also examined the fuels in
the immediate area of origin and found that
they were typical of many grass-type fires.
However, beyond several acres an extreme
uphill slope began to affect the terrain and this
area was the beginning of forest fuels consist-
ing of ponderosa pine and mixed conifer. From
this vantage point, the survey team observed
evidence of a crowning fire that began within
sight of the area of origin. The survey team
began to understand the full impact of the
effects of fuels, temperature, slope, and the up-
slope wind that existed on the day of the fire.
The survey team moved to Waterline Road
to view conditions of fire growth. The survey
team was able to view several of the homes
destroyed in the initial run of the fire. The team
observed that the homes were located near the
rim of the extreme uphill slope and that com-
bustible vegetation was in close proximity to
their foundations. The remains of the homes
were examined to attempt to identify other
variables that might also have resulted in the
ignition of the homes. However, these other
suspected variables, i.e. combustibility of
construction, roof, etc., were more difficult to
identify from the remains because of their de-
struction
Other factors also began to emerge, such as
what role fire department access to the homes
might have played. The long, narrow-approach
driveways were assessed by the team as dan-
gerous for fire department use, and consider-
ing the intensity and speed of the fire, these
homes likely had no fire department interven-
tion.
Summary comments regarding the homes
at the rim of the canyon along Waterline Road
were that the position of the homes, the inten-
sity of the fire, the proximity of combustible
vegetation, the lack of access for fire fighting,
and the short interval of time between the
awareness and the threat of the property were
extremely important variables in determining
why these homes were destroyed. Variables,
such as combustibility of the home, that may
have been important variables could not be
confirmed. Similar analytic methods were used
by the survey team the remainder of the day as
they moved through the burn area. The signifi-
cance of the variables, it was felt, varied from
location to location.
Several members of the survey team, in-
cluding Tom Klem, NFPA, and Al Roberts, U.S.
Forest Service, Denver, continued an in-depth
survey of the burn area for two additional days.
This in-depth survey also included detailed
interviews with numerous occupants in an
attempt to corroborate the technical determi-
nations being made of the fire spread and
intervention by the homeowner, if any.
This survey team conducted an on-site
analysis of every home that burned or survived
in Black Tiger Gulch. The team began to hy-
pothesize that the homes that did not burn:
probably survived due to fire department in-
tervention; had noncombustible vegetation
around the homes or had combustible vegeta-
tion cleared from the proximity of the homes;
were constructed of noncombustible con-
struction materials; and/ or were more distant
from the main intensity of the fire. It was felt
that some of the homes that survived could
well have burned had it not been for fortunate
circumstances. One such home observed had
hay stored under its wooden porch, yet it was
not ignited despite enough heat near the com-
bustible hay pile to scorch the paint on a
window frame. The survey team also decided
to conduct a survey of unaffected home sites
within the same general area with similar to-
pography, home construction and other fac-
tors. This thorough survey of homes lead to a
number of additional variables, if representa-
tive of the homes in the Black Tiger Gulch, that
would have contributed to the ignition of the
homes. They were: 1) inaccessibility for fire
fighting during a severe wildland fire; 2) lack of
water supply; 3) close proximity of combus-
tible vegetation to the home; 4) combustibility
of roof and structure; and 5) storage of com-
bustible materials beneath wooden porches.
Based on the assessment of the similar area,
the survey team then decided to examine local
records of the homes in the fire area to deter-
mine the construction and arrangement of the
homes. As a result, the team visited the City of
Boulder Assessors Office and determined that
information was available from the assessors
records that include photos of the homes from
the affected area. Records were examined and
it was determined that they contained informa-
tion regarding construction arrangements of
the homes and adjacent combustible vegeta-
tion as depicted by a photograph attached to
each record. It was felt that the vital informa-
tion regarding the construction of a home,
proximity to combustible vegetation, and other
factors could be overlayed with the other vari-
ables to gain insight into the behavior of the
home under assault.
The team decided that a more thorough
analysis of the assessors records, coupled with
an overview of the location of a home and its
proximity to the intensity of the fire, might
yield important data regarding the variables
that contributed to the loss or survival of the
homes of the Black Tiger Fire.
As a result, NFPA contracted with Aspen
Engineering, Inc., to conduct this thorough
analysis of the assessors records. The Aspen
Engineering representative met with the repre-
sentative of the U.S. Forest Service Denver Of-
fice for input regarding the intensity of the fire
and background information. The contractor
also visited the Boulder Tax Assessors Office
to acquire the necessarydata for such a rigor-
ous analysis. The tasks also included a thor-
ough survey of the burn site by the contractor
and the U.S. Forest Service representative
Provided with the fire intensity map and
having been briefed on the factors that may
have affected the burning or survival of the
homes, the contractor began the in-depth
analysis. The findings from this analysis are
contained in the Black Tiger Fire report and in
the contractors submittal to the NFPA.
In addition to this task, a statistical analysis
of the data from affected homes was con-
ducted by Dr. John Hall, NFPA Fire Analysis
and Research Division, to further verify the
implications of the study.
The 28 homes
st udi ed w er e
sel ec t ed on
t he basi s of
t he best avai l -
abl e dat a and
t he l oc at i on
of t he homes
r el at i ve t o
f our i dent i f i ed
f i r e i nt ensi t y
ar eas.
38
NFPA State and Local Agencies
- Wildfire Strikes Home, 2nd Edition.
- Wildfire Strikes Home video.
- Protecting Your Home From Wildfire video
and booklet.
- NFPA 224, Homes and Camps in Forest
Areas, 1985.
- California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection: Fire Safe Guides for Residen-
tial Development in California.
- Colorado State Forest Service: Wildfire
Safety Guidelines for Subdivisions and
Developments.
- The Los Angeles Conflagration of 1961:
The Devil Wind and Wood Shingles,NFPA
Quarterly, January 1962 (reprints avail-
able).
- Statement of the National Fire Protection
Association on the subject of prohibiting
untreated wood shingles and shakes as a
roof covering material, February 13, 1979
- Houston Conflagration Spreads Across
Rooftops, Fire Journal, January 1980.
- The Sycamore Canyon Fire Fire Com-
mand, March 1978.
- Colorado State University: The Role of
Private Individuals and Firms, States, and
the Federal Government in Protection of
State and Private Lands from the Hazards
of Wildfire, A. A. Dyer.
- East Bay (California] Regional Park Dis-
trict: Report of the Blue Ribbon Urban
Interface Fire Prevention Committee.
- Fire Research Institute(FRI) (California):
Urban/Wildland Bibliography. Contact
FRI, 1129 Western Drive, Santa Cruz, CA
95060.
- Apartment Complex Fire: Wood Shingles - Florida Interagency Fire Group: Proceed-
Ignited by Cigarette, Fire Journal, May ings of the Florida Wildland/Urban Fire
1982. Protection Initiative.
U.S. Forest Service
- Fire Safety Considerations for Develop-
ments in Forested Areas.
- A Guide for Homeowners, Lawmakers,
and Planners, Howard E. Moore, General
Technical Report PSW-50, Pacific South-
west Forest & Range Experiment Station.
- Wildfire Protection: A Guide for Home-
owners and Developers, Mark Hummel,
Toiyabe National Forest.
- A Study of the Impacts of Severe Wildland
Fires and Disaster Relief Programs on
Homeowners Residing Along the Wildland
Urban Interface, P. D. Gardner and Linda
Pies El-Abd, Pacific Southwest Forest and
Range Experiment Station.
- Forest Wildlands and Their Neighbor:
Interactions, Issues, Opportunities; Wil-
liam E. Shands. Copies available from State
and Private Forestry, P.O. Box 96090,
Washington, DC 20090-6090.
- People and Fire at the Wildland/Urban
Interface: A Sourcebook, Robert Gale and
Hanna Cortner, editors. Proceedings of
the wildland/ urban fire interface work-
shop for social scientists.
Boise Interagency Fire Center
- Wildland/Urban Interface Resource
Materials, PMS-050.
- Montana Department of State Lands: Fire
Safe Guidelines for Residential Develop-
ment in Montana.
- New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection: Development in the Pine Bar-
rens, A Design for Disaster, Joseph R.
Hughes.
- Northwest Interagency Fire Prevention
Group (Portland, Oregon): Fire Safety Con-
siderations for Developments in Forested
Areas: A Guide for Homeowners and
Buyers, Copies available from USDA For-
est Service, P.O. Box 3623, Portland OR
97208.
- Ohio State University Press: New Deal in
the Suburbs; a history of the greenbelt
town program, Joseph L. Arnold.
- Oregon State Department of Forestry:
Planning for Survival: How to Protect Your
Home from Wildfire.
- University of Washington Press: Land Use
and Forest Resources in a Changing Envi-
ronment; the urban/ forest interface, Gor-
don A. Bradley, editor.
- Utah Department of Natural Resources:
Protect Your Summer Home.
- Wi sconsi n Department of Natural
Resources: Forest Fires Burn More Than
Trees.
39
Sour c e Li st of Or gani zat i ons
For additional information, contact your local fire department or forestry agency, or contact the following organizations:
National Fire Protection Association
Public Fire Protection Division
1 Batterymarch Park
P.O. Box 9101
Quincy, MA 02269-9101
617-770-3000
United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service
Fire &Aviation Management
P.O. Box 96090
Washington, DC 20090.6090
703-235-3220
National Association of State Foresters
444 N. Capitol Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
202-624-5415
Boise Interagency Fire Center
Publications Management System
3905 Vista Avenue
Boise, ID 83705
208-389-2512

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