Honey Pots

Seminar Report 03 Honeypots
ABSTRACT
Honeypot is an exciting new technology with
enormous potential for the security community.It is resource
which is intended to be attacked and compromised to gain
more information about the attacker and his attack
techniques.
They are a highly flexible tool that comes in many
shapes and sizes. This paper deals with understanding what a
honeypot actually is ,and how it works.
There are different varieties of honeypots. ased on
their category they have different applications. This paper
gives an insight into the use of honeypots in productive as
well as educative environments.
This paper also discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of honeypots , and what the future hold in
store for them.
Dept. of IT SeminarsTopics.com -1-
CONTENTS

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INTRODUCTION
The Internet is growing fast and doubling its number
of websites every 1/ days and the number of people using the
internet is also growing. Hence, global communication is
getting more important every day. -t the same time,
computer crimes are also increasing. 'ountermeasures are
developed to detect or prevent attacks ; most of these
measures are based on known facts, known attack patterns.
'ountermeasures such as firewalls and network intrusion
detection systems are based on prevention, detection and
reaction mechanism< but is there enough information about
the enemy=
-s in the military, it is important to know, who the
enemy is, what kind of strategy he uses, what tools he utilizes
and what he is aiming for. 9athering this kind of information is
not easy but important. y knowing attack strategies,
countermeasure scan be improved and vulnerabilities can be
fixed. To gather as much information as possible is one main
goal of a honeypot. 9enerally, such information gathering
should be done silently, without alarming an attacker. -ll the
gathered information leads to an advantage on the defending
side and can therefore be used on productive systems to
prevent attacks.
- honeypot is primarily an instrument for information
gathering and learning. Its primary purpose is not to be an
ambush for the blackhat community to catch them in action
and to press charges against them. The focus lies on a silent
collection of as much information as possible about their
attack patterns, used programs, purpose of attack and the
blackhat community itself. -ll this information is used to learn
more about the blackhat proceedings and motives, as well as
their technical knowledge and abilities. This is >ust a primary
purpose of a honeypot. There are a lot of other possibilities for
a honeypot ; divert hackers from productive systems or catch
a hacker while conducting an attack are >ust two possible
examples. They are not the perfect solution for solving or
preventing computer crimes.
Honeypots are hard to maintain and they need
operators with good knowledge about operating systems and
network security. In the right hands, a honeypot can be an
effective tool for information gathering. In the wrong,
unexperienced hands, a honeypot can become another
infiltrated machine and an instrument for the blackhat
community.
This paper will present the basic concepts behind
honeypots and also the legal aspects of honeypots.
HONEYPOT BASICS
Honeypots are an exciting new technology with
enormous potential for the security community. The concepts
were first introduced by several icons in computer security,
specifically 'liff .toll in the book ?The 'uckoo@s *ggA , and ill
'heswickBs paper C-n *vening with erferdA. .ince then,
honeypots have continued to evolve, developing into the
powerful security tools they are today.
Honeypots are neither like 0irewalls that are used to
limit or control the traffic coming into the network and to
deter attacks neither is it like I%. DIntrusion %etection
.ystemsE which is used to detect attacks. However it can be
used along with these. Honeypots does not solve a specific
problem as such, it can be used to deter attacks, to detect
attacks, to gather information, to act as an early warning or
indication systems etc. They can do everything from detecting
encrypted attacks in I,v7 networks to capturing the latest in
on;line credit card fraud. It is this flexibility that gives
honeypots their true power. It is also this flexibility that can
make them challenging to define and understand. The basic
definition of honeypots isF
A honeypot is an information system resource whose
value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource.
The main aim of the honeypot is to lure the hackers or
attacker so as to capture their activities. This information
proves to be very useful since information can be used to
study the vulnerabilities of the system or to study latest
techniques used by attackers etc. 0or this the honeypot will
contain enough information Dnot necessarily realE so that the
attackers get tempted. DHence the name Honeypot G a sweet
temptation for attackersETheir value lies in the bad guys
interacting with them. 'onceptually almost all honeypots work
they same. They are a resource that has no authorized
activity, they do not have any production value.
Theoretically, a honeypot should see no traffic because
it has no legitimate activity. This means any interaction with a
honeypot is most likely unauthorized or malicious activity. -ny
connection attempts to a honeypot are most likely a probe,
attack, or compromise. Hhile this concept sounds very simple
Dand it isE, it is this very simplicity that give honeypots their
tremendous advantages Dand disadvantagesE.
TYPES OF HONEYPOTS
Honeypots come in many shapes and sizes, making
them difficult to get a grasp of. To better understand
honeypots and all the different types, they are broken down
into two general categories, low;interaction and high;
interaction honeypots. These categories helps to understand
what type of honeypot one is dealing with, its strengths, and
weaknesses. Interaction defines the level of activity a
honeypot allows an attacker.
Low-interaction honeypots have limited interaction,
they normally work by emulating services and operating
systems. -ttacker activity is limited to the level of emulation
by the honeypot. 0or example, an emulated 0T, service
listening on port )! may >ust emulate a 0T, login, or it may
support a variety of additional 0T, commands. The
advantages of a low;interaction honeypot is their simplicity.
These honeypots tend to be easier to deploy and maintain,
with minimal risk. &sually they involve installing software,
selecting the operating systems and services you want to
emulate and monitor, and letting the honeypot go from there.
This plug and play approach makes deploying them very easy
for most organizations. -lso, the emulated services mitigate
risk by containing the attackerBs activity, the attacker never
has access to an operating system to attack or harm others.
The main disadvantages with low interaction honeypots is that
they log only limited information and are designed to capture
known activity. The emulated services can only do so much.
-lso, its easier for an attacker to detect a low;interaction
honeypot, no matter how good the emulation is, skilled
attacker can eventually detect their presence. *xamples of
low;interaction honeypots include .pecter, Honeyd, and
I0.ensor.
High-interaction honeypots are different, they are
usually complex solutions as they involve real operating
systems and applications. "othing is emulated, the attackers
are given the real thing. If one wants a 4inux honeypot
running an 0T, server, they build a real 4inux system running
a real 0T, server. The advantages with such a solution are two
fold. 0irst, extensive amounts of information are captured. y
giving attackers real systems to interact with, one can learn
the full extent of the attackers behavior, everything from new
rootkits to international I#' sessions. The second advantage
is high;interaction honeypots make no assumptions on how an
attacker will behave. Instead, they provide an open
environment that captures all activity. This allows high;
interaction solutions to learn behavior one otherwise would
not expect. -n excellent example of this is how a Honeynet
captured encoded back door commands on a non;standard I,
protocol . However, this also increases the risk of the
honeypot as attackers can use these real operating system to
attack non;honeypot systems. -s result, additional
technologies have to be implemented that prevent the
attacker from harming other non;honeypot systems. In
general, high;interaction honeypots can do everything low;
interaction honeypots can do and much more. However, they
can be more complex to deploy and maintain. *xamples of
high;interaction honeypots include .ymantec %ecoy .erver
and Honeynets.
Low-interaction
.olution emulates operating
systems and services.
High-interaction
"o emulation, real $. and
services are provided.
*asy to install and
deploy.
'aptures limited amounts
of information.
6inimal risk, as the
emulated services
controls attackers .
'an capture far more
information
'an be complex to install or
deploy
Increased risk, as attackers
are provided real $. to
interact with.
.ome people also classify honeypots as low,mid and
high interaction honeypots< where mid;interaction honeypots
are those with their interaction level between that of low and
high interaction honeypots.
- few examples of honeypots and their varieties areF
BackOfficer Friendly
$0 Das it is commonly calledE is a very simple but
highly useful honeypot developed by 6arcus #anum and crew
at "0#. It is an excellent example of a low interaction
honeypot.
It is a great way to introduce a beginner to the
concepts and value of honeypots. $0 is a program that runs
on most Hindow based operating system. -ll it can do is
emulate some basic services, such as http, ftp, telnet, mail, or
ack$rrifice. Hhenever some attempts to connect to one of
the ports $0 is listening to, it will then log the attempt. $0
also has the option of Cfaking repliesC, which gives the
attacker something to connect to. This way one can log http
attacks, telnet brute force logins, or a variety of other activity
D.creenshotE. The value in $0 is in detection, similar to a
burglar alarm. It can monitor only a limited number of ports,
but these ports often represent the most commonly scanned
and targeted services.
Specter
.pecter is a commercial product and it is another Blow
interactionB production honeypot. It is similar to $0 in that it
emulates services, but it can emulate a far greater range of
services and functionality. In addition, not only can it emulate
services, but emulate a variety of operating systems. .imilar
to $0, it is easy to implement and low risk. .pecter works by
installing on a Hindows system. The risk is reduced as there
is no real operating system for the attacker to interact with.
0or example, .pecter can emulate a web server or telnet
server of the any operating system. Hhen an attacker
connects, it is then prompted with an http header or login
banner. The attacker can then attempt to gather web pages or
login to the system. This activity is captured and recorded by
.pecter, however there is little else the attacker can do. There
is no real application for the attacker to interact with, instead
>ust some limited, emulated functionality. .pecters value lies
in detection. It can quickly and easily determine who is
looking for what. -s a honeypot, it reduces both false
positives and false negatives, simplifying the detection
process. .pecter also supports a variety of alerting and
logging mechanisms. +ou can see an example of this
functionality in a screen shot of .pecter.
$ne of the unique features of .pecter is that it also
allows for information gathering, or the automated ability to
gather more information about the attacker. .ome of this
information gathering is relatively passive, such as Hhois or
%". lookups. However, some of this research is active, such
as port scanning the attacker.
Hoeade Honeypot!
-nother common honeypot is homemade. These
honeypots tend to be low interaction. Their purpose is usually
to capture specific activity, such as Horms or scanning
activity. These can be used as production or research
honeypots, depending on their purpose. $nce again, there is
not much for the attacker to interact with, however the risk is
reduced because there is less damage the attacker can do.
$ne common example is creating a service that listens on port
:( DhttpE capturing all traffic to and from the port. This is
commonly done to capture Horm attacks Homemade
honeypots can be modified to do Dand emulateE much more,
requiring a higher level of involvement, and incurring a higher
level of risk. 0or example, 0ree.% has a >ail functionality,
allowing an administrator to create a controlled environment
within the operating system. The attacker can then interact
with this controlled environment. The value here is the more
the attacker can do, the more can be potentially learned.
However, care must be taken, as the more functionality the
attacker can interact with, the more can go wrong, with the
honeypot potentially compromised.
Honeyd
'reated by "iels ,rovos, Honeyd is an extremely
powerful, $pen.ource honeypot. %esigned to run on &nix
systems, it can emulate over 2(( different operating systems
and thousands of different computers, all at the same time.
Honeyd introduces some exciting new features. 0irst, not only
does it emulate operating systems at the application level, like
.pecter, but it also emulates operating systems at the I, stack
level. This means when someone "maps the honeypot, both
the service and I, stack behave as the emulated operating
system. 'urrently no other honeypot has this capability
D'yber'op .ting did have this capability, but is no longer
availableE. .econd, Honeyd can emulate hundreds if not
thousands of different computers all at the same time. Hhile
most honeypots can only emulate one computer at any point
in time, Honeyd can assume the identity of thousands of
different I, addresses. Third, as an $pen.ource solution, not
only is it free to use, but it will expotentially grow as members
of the security community develop and contribute code.
Honeyd is primarily used for detecting attacks. It
works by monitoring I, addresses that are unused, that have
no system assigned to them. Hhenever an attacker attempts
to probe or attack an non;existant system, Honeyd, through
-rp spoofing, assumes the I, address of the victim and then
interacts with the attacker through emulated services. These
emulates services are nothing more then scripts that react to
predetermined actions. 0or example, a script can be
developed to behave like a Telnet service for a 'isco router,
with the 'isco I$. login interface. HoneydBs emulated services
are also $pen .ource, so anyone can develop and use their
own. The scripts can be written in almost any language, such
as shell or ,erl. $nce connected, the attacker believes they
are interacting with a real system. "ot only can Honeyd
dynamically interact with attackers, but it can detect activity
on any port. 6ost low interaction honeypots are limited to
detecting attacks only on the ports that have emulated
services listening on. Honeyd is different, it detects and logs
connections made to any port, regardless if there is a service
listening. The combined capabilities of assuming the identity
of non;existant systems, and the ability to detect activity on
any port, gives Honeyd incredible value as a tool to detect
unauthorized activity. I highly encourage people to check it
out, and if possible to contribute new emulated services.
"antrap
,roduced by #ecourse, 6antrap is a commercial
honeypot. Instead of emulating services, 6antrap creates up
to four sub;systems, often called B>ailsB. These B>ailsB are
logically discrete operating systems separated from a master
operating system Dsee %iagram.E .ecurity administrators can
modify these >ails >ust as they normally would with any
operating system, to include installing applications of their
choice, such as an $racle database or -pache web server. This
makes the honeypot far more flexible, as it can do much
more. The attacker has a full operating system to interact
with, and a variety of applications to attack. -ll of this activity
is then captured and recorded. "ot only can we detect port
scans and telnet logins, but we can capture rootkits,
application level attacks, I#' chat session, and a variety of
other threats. However, >ust as far more can be learned, so
can more go wrong. $nce compromised, the attacker can
used that fully functional operating system to attack others.
'are must be taken to mitigate this risk. -s such, it can be
categorized this as a mid;high level of interaction. -lso, these
honeypots can be used as either a production honeypot Dused
both in detection and reactionE or a research honeypot to
learn more about threats. There are limitations to this
solution. The biggest one is that we are limited to only what
the vendor supplies us. 'urrently, 6antrap only exists on
.olaris operating system.
Honeynet!
Honeynets represent the extreme of research
honeypots. They are high interaction honeypots, one can learn
a great deal, however they also have the highest level of risk.
0igF - honeynet
Their primary value lies in research, gaining
information on threats that exist in the Internet community
today. - Honeynet is a network of production systems. &nlike
many of the honeypots discussed so far, nothing is emulated.
4ittle or no modifications are made to the honeypots. The idea
is to have an architecture that creates a highly controlled
network, one where all activity is controlled and captured.
Hithin this network we place our intended victims, real
computers running real applications. The bad guys find,
attack, and break into these systems on their own initiative.
Hhen they do, they do not realize they are within a Honeynet.
This gives the attackers a full range of systems, applications,
and functionality to attack. -ll of their activity, from encrypted
..H sessions to emails and files uploads, are captured without
them knowing it. This is done by inserting kernel modules on
the victim systems that capture all of the attackerBs actions.
0rom this we can learn a great deal, not only their tools and
tactics, but their methods of communication, group
organization, and motives. However, with this capability
comes a great deal of risk. - variety of measures must be
taken to ensure that once compromised, a Honeynet cannot
be used to attack others. Honeynets do this using a Honeywall
gateway. This gateway allows inbound traffic to the victim
systems, but controls the outbound traffic using intrusion
prevention technologies. This gives the attacker the flexibility
to interact with the victim systems, but prevents the attacker
from harming other non;Honeynet computers. Honeynets are
primarily research honeypots. They could be used as
production honeypots, specifically for detection or reaction,
however it is most likely not worth the time and effort
He have reviewed six different types of honeypots. "o
one honeypot is better than the other, each one has its
advantages and disadvantages, it all depends on what is to be
achieved. To more easily define the capabilities of honeypots,
we have categorized them based on their level of interaction.
The greater interaction an attacker has, the more we can
learn, but the greater the risk. 0or example, $0 and .pecter
represent low interactions honeypots. They are easy to deploy
and have minimal risk. However, they are limited to emulating
specific services and operating systems, used primarily for
detection. 6antrap and Honeynets represent mid;to;high
interaction honeypots. They can give far greater depth of
information, however more work and greater risk is involved
.ometimes, honeypots are also classified as Hardware
based and .oftware based honeypots.
Hardware-based honeypots are servers, switches or
routers that have been partially disabled and made attractive
with commonly known misconfigurations. They sit on the
internal network, serving no purpose but to look real to
outsiders. The operating system of each box, however, has
been subtly disabled with tweaks that prevent hackers from
really taking it over or using it to launch new attacks on other
servers.
Software emulation honeypots, on the other hand, are
elaborate deception programs that mimic real 4inux or other
servers and can run on machines as low;power as a )//;6Hz
,'. .ince an intruder is >ust dancing with a software decoy, at
no time does he come close to actually seizing control of the
hardware, no matter what the fake prompts seem to indicate.
*ven if the hacker figures out that itBs a software honeypot,
the box on which itBs running should be so secure or isolated
that he couldnBt do anything but leave anyway..oftware
emulation might be more useful for corporate environments
where business secrets are being safeguarded.
#A$UE OF HONEYPOTS
"ow that we have understanding of two general
categories of honeypots, we can focus on their value.
.pecifically, how we can use honeypots. $nce again, we have
two general categories, honeypots can be used for production
purposes or research. Hhen used for production purposes,
honeypots are protecting an organization. This would include
preventing, detecting, or helping organizations respond to an
attack. Hhen used for research purposes, honeypots are
being used to collect information. This information has
different value to different organizations. .ome may want to
be studying trends in attacker activity, while others are
interested in early warning and prediction, or law
enforcement. In general, low;interaction honeypots are often
used for production purposes, while high;interaction
honeypots are used for research purposes. However, either
type of honeypot can be used for either purpose. Hhen used
for production purposes, honeypots can protect organizations
in one of three ways< prevention, detection, and response. He
will take a more in;depth look at how a honeypot can work in
all three.
1. Prevention % Honeypots can help prevent
attacks in several ways. The first is against automated
attacks, such as worms or auto;rooters. These attacks are
based on tools that randomly scan entire networks looking
for vulnerable systems. If vulnerable systems are found,
these automated tools will then attack and take over the
system Dwith worms self;replicating, copying themselves
to the victimE. $ne way that honeypots can help defend
against such attacks is slowing their scanning down,
potentially even stopping them. 'alled sticky honeypots,
these solutions monitor unused I, space. Hhen probed by
such scanning activity, these honeypots interact with and
slow the attacker down. They do this using a variety of
T', tricks, such as a Hindows size of zero, putting the
attacker into a holding pattern. This is excellent for
slowing down or preventing the spread of a worm that has
penetrated the internal organization. $ne such example of
a sticky honeypot is 4area Tarpit. .ticky honeypots are
most often low;interaction solutions Done can almost call
them Bno;interaction solutionsB, as they slow the attacker
down to a crawl E.
Honeypots can also be used to protect the
organization from human attackers. The concept is
deception or deterrence. The idea is to confuse an
attacker, to make him waste his time and resources
interacting with honeypots. 6eanwhile, the organization
being attacked would detect the attackerBs activity and
have the time to respond and stop the attacker.
This can be even taken one step farther. If an
attacker knows an organization is using honeypots, but
does not know which systems are honeypots and which
systems are legitimate computers, they may be
concerned about being caught by honeypots and decided
not to attack your organizations. Thus the honeypot
deters the attacker. -n example of a honeypot designed
to do this is %eception Toolkit, a low;interaction
honeypot.
2. Detection : The second way honeypots can help protect
an organization is through detection. %etection is critical,
its purpose is to identify a failure or breakdown in
prevention. #egardless of how secure an organization is,
there will always be failures, if for no other reasons then
humans are involved in the process. y detecting an
attacker, you can quickly react to them, stopping or
mitigating the damage they do. Traditionally, detection
has proven extremely difficult to do. Technologies such as
I%. sensors and systems logs have proved ineffective for
several reasons. They generate far too much data, large
percentage of false positives Di.e. alerts that were
generated when the sensor recognized the configured
signature of an CattackC, but in reality was >ust valid
trafficE, inability to detect new attacks, and the inability to
work in encrypted or I,v7 environments. Honeypots excel
at detection, addressing many of these problems of
traditional detection. .ince honeypots have no production
activity, all connections to and from the honeypot are
suspect by nature. y definition, anytime a connection is
made to the honeypot, this is most likely an unauthorized
probe, scan, or attack. -nytime the honeypot initiates a
connection, this most likely means the system was
successfully compromised. This helps reduce both false
positives and false negatives greatly simplifying the
detection process by capturing small data sets of high
value, it also captures unknown attacks such as new
exploits or polymorphic shellcode, and works in encrypted
and I,v7 environments. In general, low;interaction
honeypots make the best solutions for detection. They are
easier to deploy and maintain then high;interaction
honeypots and have reduced risk.
. Response : The third and final way a honeypot can help
protect an organization is in reponse. $nce an
organization has detected a failure, how do they respond=
This can often be one of the greatest challenges an
organization faces. There is often little information on who
the attacker is, how they got in, or how much damage
they have done. In these situations detailed information
on the attackerBs activity are critical. There are two
problems compounding incidence response. 0irst, often
the very systems compromised cannot be taken offline to
analyze. ,roduction systems, such as an organizationBs
mail server, are so critical that even though its been
hacked, security professionals may not be able to take the
system down and do a proper forensic analysis. Instead,
they are limited to analyze the live system while still
providing production services. This cripples the ability to
analyze what happened, how much damage the attacker
has done, and even if the attacker has broken into other
systems. The other problem is even if the system is pulled
offline, there is so much data pollution it can be very
difficult to determine what the bad guy did. y data
pollution, I mean there has been so much activity DuserBs
logging in, mail accounts read, files written to databases,
etcE it can be difficult to determine what is normal day;to;
day activity, and what is the attacker. Honeypots can help
address both problems. Honeypots make an excellent
incident resonse tool, as they can quickly and easily be
taken offline for a full forensic analysis, without impacting
day;to;day business operations. -lso, the only activity a
honeypot captures is unauthorized or malicious activity.
This makes hacked honeypots much easier to analyze
then hacked production systems, as any data you retrieve
from a honeypot is most likely related to the attacker. The
value honeypots provide here is quickly giving
organizations the in;depth information they need to
rapidly and effectively respond to an incident. In general,
high;interaction honeypots make the best solution for
response. To respond to an intruder, you need in;depth
knowledge on what they did, how they broke in, and the
tools they used. 0or that type of data you most likely need
the capabilities of a high;interaction honeypot.
&p to this point we have been talking about how
honeypots can be used to protect an organization. He will
now talk about a different use for honeypots, research.
Honeypots are extremely powerful, not only can they
be used to protect your organization, but they can be used to
gain extensive information on threats, information few other
technologies are capable of gathering. $ne of the greatest
problems security professionals face is a lack of information or
intelligence on cyber threats. How can we defend against an
enemy when we donBt even know who that enemy is= 0or
centuries military organizations have depended on information
to better understand who their enemy is and how to defend
against them. Hhy should information security be any
different=
#esearch honeypots address this by collecting
information on threats. This information can then be used for
a variety of purposes, including trend analysis, identifying new
tools or methods, identifying attackers and their communities,
early warning and prediction, or motivations. $ne of the most
well known examples of using honeypots for research is the
work done by the Honeynet ,ro>ect, an all volunteer, non;
profit security research organization. -ll of the data they
collect is with Honeynet distributed around the world. -s
threats are constantly changing, this information is proving
more and more critical.
I"P$E"ENTATION
Honeypot Location
A &oneypot doe! not need a certain !'rro'ndin(
en)ironent a! it i! a !tandard !er)er *it& no !pecial
need!+A &oneypot can ,e placed any*&ere a !er)er co'ld ,e
placed+ B't certainly- !oe place! are ,etter for certain
approac&e! a! ot&er!+
A &oneypot can ,e '!ed on t&e Internet a! *ell a!
t&e intranet- ,a!ed on t&e needed !er)ice+ Placin( a
&oneypot on t&e intranet can ,e '!ef'l if t&e detection of
!oe ,ad ('y! in!ide a pri)ate net*ork i! *i!&ed+ It i!
e!pecially iportant to !et t&e internal t&r'!t for a &oneypot
a! lo* a! po!!i,le a! t&i! !y!te co'ld ,e coproi!ed-
probably without immediate knowledge.
If the main concern is the Internet, a honeypot can be
placed at two locationsF
J In front of the firewall DInternetE
J %6K
J ehind the firewall DintranetE
*ach approach has its advantages as well as
disadvantages. .ometimes it is even impossible to choose
freely as placing a server in front of a firewall is simply not
possible or not wished.
y placing the honeypot in front of a firewall , the risk
for the internal network does not increase. The danger of
having a compromised system behind the firewall is
eliminated. - honeypot will attract and generate a lot of
unwished traffic like portscans or attack patterns. y placing a
honeypot outside the firewall, such events do not get logged
by the firewall and an internal I%. system will not generate
alerts. $therwise, a lot of alerts would be generated on the
firewall or I%..,robably the biggest advantage is that the
firewall or I%., as well as any other resources, have not to be
ad>usted as the honeypot is outside the firewall and viewed as
any other machine on the external network. The disadvantage
of placing a honeypot in front of the firewall is that internal
attackers cannot be located or trapped that easy, especially if
the firewall limits outbound traffic and therefore limits the
traffic to the honeypot.
,lacing a honeypot inside a %6K seems a good
solution as long as the other systems inside the %6K can be
secured against the honeypot. 6ost %6Ks are not fully
accessible as only needed services are allowed to pass the
firewall. In such a case,placing the honeypot in front of the
firewall should be favored as opening all corresponding ports
on the firewall is too time consuming and risky.
- honeypot behind a firewall can introduce new
security risks to the internal network, especially if the internal
network is not secured against the honeypot through
additional firewalls. This could be a special problem if the I,@s
are used for authentication. It is important to distinguish
between a setup where the firewall enables access to the
honeypot or where access from the Internet is denied. y
placing the honeypot behind a firewall, it is inevitable to
ad>ust the firewall rules if access from the Internet should be
permitted. The biggest problem arises as soon as the internal
honeypot is compromised by an external attacker. He gains
the possibility to access the internal network through the
honeypot. This traffic will be unstopped by the firewall as it is
regarded as traffic to the honeypot only, which in turn is
granted. .ecuring an internal honeypot is therefore
mandatory, especially if it is a high;involvement honeypot.
Hith an internal honeypot it is also possible to detect a
misconfigured firewall which forwards unwanted traffic from
the Internet to the internal network. The main reason for
placing a honeypot behind a firewall could be to detect
internal attackers.
The best solution would be to run a honeypot in its
own %6K, therefore with a preliminary firewall. The firewall
could be connected directly to the Internet or intranet,
depending on the goal. This attempt enables tight control as
well as a flexible environment with maximal security.
How does a Honeypot Gather Information
$bviously a honeypot must capture data in an area that
is not accessible to an attacker. %ata capture happens on a
number of levels.
!irewall LogsL- ,acket .niffer Dor similar I%. sensorE
LThe I%. should be configured to passively monitor network
traffic Dfor an added level of invisibility, one might set the
system up to have no I, address or, in some instances, the
sniffer could be configured to completely lack an I, stackE.
This will capture all cleartext communication, and can read
keystrokes.
Local and "emote LogsLThese should be set up >ust as
it would on any other system, and will possibly be disabled,
deleted, or modified by an experienced hacker, but plenty of
useful information will still be available from all the previous
capture methods.
"emotely !orwarded LogsLHill capture data on a
remote log and then instantly forward the data to a system
even further out of the range of the attacker,so that the
attacker cannot be warned that all his activities are watched
or try to modify the captured data.
Limiting Outbound ttac!s
To protect oneself from any sort of third party
liabilities, an individual deploying a honeypot will likely want
some kind of safeguard. 0irewalls can be configured to let an
unlimited number of inbound connections, while limiting
outbound connections to a specific number Dbe it !( outbound
connections, or 1(E. This method lacks flexibility, and could
shut an attacker out at a critical point Din the middle of an I#'
session, or before they have retrieved all of their toolsE. -
more flexible option is as followsF a system configured as a
layer ) bridge Dwhich will lack all T', activity, thus being
harder to detectE. The system can be configured to monitor all
activity and can utilize a signature database to distinguish a
known attack from any non;aggressive activity Dand instead of
blocking the attack, it can simply add some data to the packet
to render it ineffectualE. It can also throttle bandwidth Dto
quench a %%o. attackE. This is a very effective way to protect
other systems< however, it will not block unknown or new
attacks.
Putting the Honey into the Pot
-n advanced honeypot is a fully functional $., and
therefore can be filled with financial information, e;mails with
passwords for other honeypots, databases of fake customers
Lanything that might motivate an attacker to compromise the
system. -n individual could set up a web server that explains
that the law services of so and so and so and so from .an
0rancisco are currently setting up their systems to do online
consultation for big banks and other big businesses. - whole
network of honeypots sits in a secure environment behind a
firewall that an attacker would need to break through. The
network might have loads of fake data and e;mail< a large
playing field for an advanced hacker to wander through.
"ERITS AND DE"ERITS
"erits # Honeypots have a large number of merits in its
favour. They are F
Small data sets of high value# Honeypots collect small
amounts of information. Instead of logging a one 9 of
data a day, they can log only one 6 of data a day.
Instead of generating !(,((( alerts a day, they can
generate only !( alerts a day. #emember, honeypots
only capture bad activity, any interaction with a
honeypot is most likely unauthorized or malicious
activity. -s such, honeypots reduce BnoiseB by collectin
only small data sets, but information of high value, as it
is only the bad guys. This means its much easier Dand
cheaperE to analyze the data a honeypot collects and
derive value from it.
$ew tools and tactics# Honeypots are designed to
capture anything thrown at them, including tools or
tactics never seen before.
%inimal resources# Honeypots require minimal
resources, they only capture bad activity. This means an
old ,entium computer with !):6 of #-6 can easily
handle an entire class network sitting off an $';!)
network.
&ncryption or '(v)# &nlike most security technologies
Dsuch as I%. systemsE honeypots work fine in encrypted
or I,v7 environments. It does not matter what the bad
guys throw at a honeypot, the honeypot will detect and
capture it.
'nformation# Honeypots can collect in;depth information
that few, if any other technologies can match.
Simplicty# 0inally, honeypots are conceptually very
simple. There are no fancy algorithms to develop, state
tables to maintain, or signatures to update. The simpler
a technology, the less likely there will be mistakes or
misconfigurations.
Demerits% 4ike any technology, honeyopts also have their
weaknesses. It is because of this they do not replace any
current technology, but work with existing technologies.
Limited view# Honeypots can only track and capture
activity that directly interacts with them. Honeypots will
not capture attacks against other systems, unless the
attacker or threat interacts with the honeypots also.
"is*# -ll security technologies have risk. 0irewalls have
risk of being penetrated, encryption has the risk of being
broken, I%. sensors have the risk of failing to detect
attacks. Honeypots are no different, they have risk also.
.pecifically, honeypots have the risk of being taken over
by the bad guy and being used to harm other systems.
This risk various for different honeypots. %epending on
the type of honeypot, it can have no more risk then an
I%. sensor, while some honeypots have a great deal of
risk.
$E.A$ ISSUES
In the past there has been some confusion on what
are the legal issues with honeypots. There are several reasons
for this. 0irst, honeypots are relatively new. .econd,
honeypots come in many different shapes and sizes and
accomplish different goals. ased on the different uses of
honeypots different legal issues apply. 4ast, there are no
precedents for honeypots. There are no legal cases recorded
on the issues. The law is developed through cases. Hithout
cases directly on point, we are left trying to predict, based on
cases in other contexts, how courts will treat honeypots. &ntil
a >udge gives a court order, we will really never know.
Hith honeypots, there are three main issues that are
commonly discussedF entrapment, privacy, and liability.
4iabilityF +ou can potentially be held liable if your
honepyot is used to attack or harm other systems or
organizations. This risk is the greatest with #esearch
honeypots.
,rivacyF Honeypots can capture extensive amounts of
information about attackers, which can potentially violate
their privacy. $nce again, this risk is primarily with
#esearch honeypots. However in case of honeypot there
is exemption. It means that security technologies can
collect information on people Dand attackersE, as long as
that technology is being used to protect or secure your
environment. In other words, these technologies are now
exempt from privacy restrictions. 0or example, an I%.
sensor that is used for detection and captures network
activity is doing so to detect Dand thus enable
organizations to respond toE unauthorized activity. .uch
a technology is most likely not considered a violation of
privacy.
*ntrapmentF 0or some odd reason, many people are
concerned with the issue of entrapment. *ntrapment, by
definition is Ca law;enforcement officerBs or government
agentBs inducement of a person to commit a crime, by
means of fraud or undue persuasion, in an attempt to
later bring a criminal prosecution against that person.C
Think about it, entrapment is when you coerce or induce
someone to do something they would not normally do.
Honeypots do not induce anyone. -ttackers find and
break into honeypots on their own initiative. ,eople often
question the idea of creating targets of high value, for
example honeypots that are ecommerce sites or
advertised as having government secrets. *ven then,
such honeypots are most likely not a form of entrapment
as you are not coercing them into breaking into the
honeypot. The bad guy has already decided to commit
unauthorized activity, one is merely providing a different
target for the blackhat to attack. Therefore, in most
cases involving honeypots, entrapment is not an issue.
FUTURE OF HONEYPOTS
6r. 4ance spitzner who has played a ma>or role in the
development of honeypots has made certain predictions about
the future of honeypots. They are as followsF
+overnment pro,ectsF 'urrently honeypots are mainly
used by organizations, to detect intruders within the
organization as well as against external threats and to
protect the organization. In future, honeypots will play a
ma>or role in the government pro>ects, especially by the
military, to gain information about the enemy, and those
trying to get the government secrets.
&ase of useF In future honeypots will most probably
appear in prepackaged solutions, which will be easier to
administer and maintain. ,eople will be able to install and
develop honeypots at home and without difficulty.
-loser integrationF 'urrently honeypots are used along
with other technologies such as firewall, tripwire, I%. etc.
-s technologies are developing, in future honeypots will
be used in closer integration with them. 0or example
honeypots are being developed for HI;0I or wireless
computers. However the development is still under
research.
Specific purposeF -lready certain features such as
honeytokens are under development to target honeypots
only for a specific purpose. *gF catching only those
attempting credit card fraud etc.
Honeypots will be used widely for expanding research
applications in future.
CONC$USION
This paper has given an in depth knowledge about
honeypots and their contributions to the security community.
- honeypot is >ust a tool. How one uses this tool is upto them.
Honeypots are in their infancy and new ideas and
technologies will surface in the next time. -t the same time as
honeypots are getting more advanced, hackers will also
develop methods to detect such systems. - regular arms race
could start between the good guys and the blackhat
community.

4et@s hope that such a technology will be used to
restore the peace and prosperity of the world and not to give
the world a devastating end.


REFERENCES
.pitzner, 4ance.
?Honeypots Tracking HackersA. Addison-Wesley:
Boston,00
.pitzner, 4ance.
AThe value of Honeypots, ,art TwoFHoneypot .olutions
and legal IssuesA !0"o#.00
MhttpFNNonline.securityfocus.comNinfocusN!28:O
.pitzner, 4ance.
?Inow +our *nemyF HoneynetsA. !$ Sep. 00.
MhttpFNNpro>ect.honeynet.orgNpapersNhoneynetNO.
?Honeypots;Turn the table on hackersA %&ne 30,003
Mwww.itmanagement.earthweb.comNsecuNarticle.phpN!2/
7)8!O
Mwww.tracking;hackers.com O
,osted yF Brian Hatc&
?HoneypotsLHhat the Hell are They=A '&(lis)ed By:
NewOrder ,!*+*003 !!:3+
Mwww.linuxsecurity.comO

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