(i) Yu vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

154115, 29 November 2005

 Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her husband, Philip Sy Yu (petitioner),
an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of
marital infidelity and physical abuse.
 Subject of this case is the Order issued by the trial court denying the motion of Viveca for
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to certain officers of Insular
Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production of the insurance policy and application of a
person suspected to be petitioner’s illegitimate child.
 It ruled that the insurance contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No.
11-2000, issued by the Insurance Commission which presumably prevents insurance
companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining to
insurance policies and would violate Article 280 of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil
Registry Law, both of which prohibit the unauthorized identification of the parents of an
illegitimate child.
 Her Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Thus, private respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA which ruled that petitioner’s objection to the admission of the
documents was premature, and the trial court’s pronouncement that the documents are
inadmissible, precipitate, because private respondent was merely seeking the production of
the insurance application and contract, and was not yet offering the same as part of her
evidence.
 Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a
party’s privilege to tender excluded evidence, as this privilege allows said party to raise on
appeal the exclusion of such evidence.
 Hence, this petition. One of the arguments of the petitioner is that private respondent has
rendered moot her petition before the Court of Appeals since her motion to tender excluded
evidence evinced that she had another speedy and adequate remedy under the law
ISSUE: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the order declaring the insurance contract inadmissible.
RULING: Yes. While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is
exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be presented in
court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent was merely asking for the
issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued the
assailed Order. Even assuming that the documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the
trial court was not then in a position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it
barred the production of the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth.
The Court further ruled that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence must have
been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is made, the evidence
must have been identified and presented before the court. While private respondent made a
"Tender of Excluded Evidence," such is not the tender contemplated by the above-quoted rule, for
obviously, the insurance policy and application were not formally offered much less presented
before the trial court. At most, said "Tender of Excluded Evidence" was manifestation of an
undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible by the trial court even
before these were presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate remedy
which private respondent could have resorted to instead of the petition for certiorari she filed
before the Court of Appeals. It did not in any way render the said petition moot.

(ii) Dizon vs. CTA, 553 SCRA 111 (2008)

 Jose Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a petition for probate of his will was filed.
 Atty. Gonzales then signed and filed on behalf of the Estate of Jose the required estate tax
return and represented the same in securing a Certificate of Tax Clearance.
 Subsequently, the BIR Regional Director of San Pablo City issued certifications stating that
the taxes due on the transfer of real and personal properties of Jose had been fully paid and
may now be transferred to his heirs.
 Petitioner requested the probate court’s authority to sell several properties forming part of
the Estate for the purpose of paying creditors. However, the Assistant Commissioner for
Collection of the BIR issued an Estate Tax Assessment Notice demanding the payment of
deficiency estate tax.
 Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review before respondent CTA. In the hearing
conducted, petitioner did not present testimonial evidence but merely documentary
evidence while BIR’s counsel presented Alberto Enriquez who was one of the Revenue
Examiners who conducted the investigation on the estate tax case of the late Jose.
 CTA: Denied the petition and admitted BIR’s pieces of evidence.
 CA: Affirmed.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of the pieces of
evidence which were not formally offered by the BIR.

RULING: Yes. Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As
cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their
cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as
the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before
the CTA. Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The reliance of CTA and CA on the case of Vda. de Oñ ate is misplaced. In Vda. de Oñ ate case, it
reiterated the ruling in People v. Napat-a that there are two requisites which must concur for the
admission of the evidence not formally offered, i.e., the same must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the
case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Vda. de Oñ ate is merely an exception to the general rule. Being an
exception, it may be applied only when there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned
therein; otherwise, the general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should prevail.

In this case, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. The assailed pieces of
evidence were presented and marked during the trial particularly when Alberto took the witness
stand. Alberto identified these pieces of evidence in his direct testimony. He was also subjected to
cross-examination and re-cross examination by petitioner. But Alberto’s account and the exchanges
between Alberto and petitioner did not sufficiently describe the contents of the said pieces of
evidence presented by the BIR. In fact, petitioner sought that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc, be summoned to testify, inasmuch as Alberto was incompetent to answer questions relative
to the working papers. The lead examiner never testified. Moreover, while Alberto's testimony
identifying the BIR's evidence was duly recorded, the BIR documents themselves were not
incorporated in the records of the case.

(iii) People vs. Vargas, G.R. No. 122765, 13 October 2003

FACTS:

 Appellant Edgardo Vargas y Lucero was found guilty of murder by the trial court.
 In convicting appellant, the trial court admitted the testimony of one Job Bieren, who
testified that he saw Vargas shot SPO1 Cocjin.
 Appellant now argues that the prosecution failed to formally offer Job’s testimony in
evidence; hence, must not be considered by the court.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution failed to formally offer Job’s testimony in evidence; thus, the trial
court likewise erred when the said testimony was considered and given credence and probative
weight.

RULING: No. The appellant’s contention that the public prosecutor failed to offer Job’s testimony as
mandated by Section 35, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court is belied by the records. The rule
adverted to reads:

SEC. 35. When to make offer. – As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the
time the witness is called to testify…

The party calling a witness must give a gist of the proposed testimony to enable the court and the
adverse party to determine its relevancy to the issues at hand. The transcript of the stenographic
notes taken when Job testified show that the public prosecutor indeed offered Job’s testimony.

The appellant did not object to Job’s testimony when the public prosecutor offered it. Instead, the
appellant cross-examined the witness. The appellant did not protest when the prosecutor faultily
offered its documentary and physical evidence and rested its case. The appellant even offered
testimonial evidence to controvert Job’s testimony. It is now too late in the day for the appellant to
assail, for the first time in this Court, the public prosecutor’s failure to offer the testimony of a
witness before direct examination.