SEARCCT Selection of Articles Vol. 1-2013

SEARCCTS SELECTION OF ARTICLES VOLUME 1/2013
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
DATIN PADUKA RASHIDAH RAMLI
MANAGING EDITOR
DATO HIDAYAT ABDUL HAMID
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
THOMAS KORUTH SAMUEL
JASMINE JAWHAR
KENNIMROD SARIBURAJA
DR. REKHA NAIR
PUBLISHER
SOUTHEAST ASIA REGIONAL CENTRE FOR
COUNTER-TERRORISM (SEARCCT)
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MALAYSIA
No. 516, Persiaran Mahameru
50480 Kuala Lumpur
MALAYSIA
Tel : (603) 2261 1900
Fax : (603) 2274 9487
Email : [email protected]
Website : www.searcct.gov.my
First Published in 2013
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD i
Datin Paduka Rashidah Ramli
Director General, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism
(SEARCCT)
Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Malaysia
ARTICLES
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING 1
RADICALIZATION INTO VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Kumar Ramakhrisna
BATTENING DOWN THE HATCHES: SOME REFLECTIONS ON 17
PROTECTING THE MARITIME SUPPLY CHAIN FROM
MARITIME TERRORISM
Nazery Khalid
POST 2006 NEPAL: AN OBJECTIVE OVERVIEW 31
Nishchal N. Pandey
VERNACULAR PRESS AND REPORTING CONFLICTS 43
Ranga Kalansooriya
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN COUNTERING 53
EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM
Rohan Gunaratna
DEFINITION AND FRAMEWORK OF CYBER TERRORISM 67
Zahri Yunos, Rabiah Ahmad and Noor Azwa Azreen Abd Aziz
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 80
VISION
TO BE A REGIONAL CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE IN
RESEARCH AND TRAINING ON COUNTER-TERRORISM
FOREWORD
Twelve years following one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in the history
of mankind, followed by rigorous and amplifed security cooperation at
the local, regional and international levels, the world is still struggling to
eradicate the threats posed by terrorist groups. But, what is more staggering
is the fact that despite such intensifed cooperation, these groups have shown
a shrewd ability to adapt to the retaliatory actions against them and remain
a grave threat to society.
Terrorists today are operating in much smaller networks and cells. Criminals
housed in prisons are becoming more susceptible to radical ideologies while
more individuals, especially youth, are being radicalised and recruited through
the internet. Terrorists have also learned to adopt other non-conventional
means of executing their activities including travelling via sea and the
acquisition of dangerous chemicals such as cyanide and sarin. Terefore,
counter-terrorism measures must also be designed to accommodate the
changing nature of terrorism.
In light of this, it gives me great pleasure to put in your hands the frst edition
of the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorisms (SEARCCT)
Selection of Articles for the year 2013.
Tis edition is specifcally designed to enhance the knowledge of enforcement,
security and government ofcials on the current issues of terrorism and
counter-terrorism that spans across the Asian continent. It attempts to discuss
several existing issues from the current state of Nepal, following the Nepali
Civil War, to what motivates the disadvantaged population of Pakistan to
engage in suicide attacks. In addition, it also explores the issues of terrorism
in the Southeast Asian region, the growing exploitation of the media and the
internet as well as the roles of relevant agencies in combating terrorism.

i SEARCCT
I would like to convey my heartfelt appreciation to our dedicated writers who
have shown their unwavering support for SEARCCT and their willingness
to share their knowledge and experience with our readers, to the Research
and Publication Division of SEARCCT for overseeing the completion of
this piece and to Dr. Rekha Nair who did an exceptional job in editing the
monograph.

My sincere gratitude also goes to the Honourable Dato Sri Anifah Hj.
Aman, Minsiter of Foreign Afairs, Malaysia and Tan Sri Mohd. Radzi Abdul
Rahman, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Malaysia for
their unstinting support and encouragement for this endeavor.
Lastly, to the readers of this monograph, it is my sincere hope that the
collection of articles presented in this edition will stimulate your enthusiasm
and help nurture creative yet practical ways to counter the evolving threats of
terrorism. As stated so succinctly by the famous 19th century writer, Anton
Chekov, knowledge is of no value until you put it into practise.

Tank you.
DATIN PADUKA RASHIDAH RAMLI
Director-General
Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT)
Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Malaysia.
SEARCCT ii
SEARCCT 1
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR UNDERSTANDING RADICALISATION
INTO VIOLENT EXTREMISM
1
Kumar Ramakhrisna
ABSTRACT
Ten years since the Bali bombings of October 2002 that killed 202 civilians,
the threat of violent extremism remains signifcant and of concern to many
governments in Southeast Asia and beyond. Te United Kingdoms well-
known Contest Strategy, for instance has long pointed out the need to fnd
ways to counter violent extremism.
2
In August 2011, moreover, the Obama
Administration afrmed its intention to work with local partners to prevent
violent extremism in the United States.
3
Tere is a need, however, to ensure
that there is clarity in what one means by the term violent extremism
and the oft-employed related term of radicalisation. Equally important,
is the imperative to more rigorously lay bare the relationship between these
concepts. Tis article will frstly, attempt the aforementioned task. Second,
it will also draw attention to the importance of cognitive extremism as a
potential precursor to violent extremism. Tird, the article will then identify
the key supporting factors that help turn cognitive extremism violent, and
fnally, the piece will explore possible early warning indicators of the shift
from cognitive to violent extremism.
Radicalisation into Violent Extremism
Te argument here is that before one can talk about violent extremism, one
should talk about radicalisation frst. Tis is because it should be understood
1
By Kumar Ramakrishna, Associate Professor and Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Email: [email protected]. Tis
is a personal comment.
2
Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King. Te Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism
(London: Demos, 2010), p. 57.
3
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (Washington D.C.: White House,
August 2011).
KUMAR RAMAKHRISNA
that while violent extremism is an outcome or end-state, radicalisation is best
understood as the process leading to that outcome. It is fair to say that there has
been much discussion in the wider literature about what radicalisation entails,
and many understandings implicitly recognise that extremism is integrally
related to radicalisation. For example the term violent radicalisation has
been said to mean the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief
system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance
political, religious, or social change.
4
Another popular defnition holds that
radicalisation entails the process of adopting an extremist belief system,
including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method
to efect societal change.
5
Te respected terrorism analyst and psychologist
John Horgan, on his part, posits that radicalisation refers to the social
and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to
extremist political or religious ideology.
6
On their part Cilufo and Saathof
argue that radicalisation refers to the process by which [individuals] adopt
extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for
political or religious purposes, and they add that extreme views are beliefs
that are anti-social, politically rebellious and anti-authoritarian.
7
Cillufo and Saathof, in addition. make a useful analytical distinction
between individual and organised radicalisation. Tey opine that individual
radicalisation results from exposure to an online source or charismatic
person espousing extremist ideas. Tis type of individual may decide to
pursue violence on his own, becoming a lone-wolf terrorist. He would
not necessarily have the support of a network, but may seek out a network in
the future, and may be at risk for recruitment at some later date. In fact the
mass casualties inficted by individuals such as Anders Breivik in Norway in
July 2011 and Major Nidal Hassan in Fort Hood, Texas in November 2009
underscore the apparent emerging importance of the individual radicalisation
pathway and the lone-wolf phenomenon.
8

2 SEARCCT
4
Te Violent Radicalisation and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act 2007, US Congress.
5
Charles E. Allen Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis , Chief Intelligence Ofcer
Department of Homeland Security 14 March 2007.
6
Kate Barelle, Leaving Violent Extremism, presentation at workshop on Countering Violent Extremism,
organised by SEARCCT, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia, 28 August 2012.
7
Frank Cillufo and Gregory Saathof, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalisation (Washington
D.C. and Charlottesville: Te George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute and the
University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group, 2007).
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING
Cillufo and Saathof also point out that organised radicalisation is
a process supported by external groups who seek to infuence vulnerable
individuals. Tese groups provide psychologically vulnerable individuals
with reading materials that promote extremist interpretations of religious or
other texts. Individuals are also directed to supportive groups that espouse
violence. Organised radicalisation is a relatively structured process then, of
top-down recruiting.
9
Tese enabling groups, to employ terrorism scholar
Louise Richardsons pithy term,
10
identify individuals with valuable skills
who can be recruited to carry out specifc actions in support of the groups
agenda.
11
Meanwhile in a well-known September 2007 study, the New York
Police Departments Intelligence Division forthrightly assert that terrorism
is the ultimate consequence of the radicalisation process. Te authors of
the study, Mitchell Silber and Arvind Bhatt suggest that in radicalisation,
individuals gradually adopt an extremist religious/political ideology which
legitimises terrorism as a tool to efect societal change. Moreover, they make
the observation that this ideology is continually nourished with a variety of
extremist infuences. In what represents one of the clearest articulations of the
innate links between the concepts of radicalisation and extremism, they argue
that internalising this extreme belief system as ones own is radicalisation.
Tey go on to suggest memorably that the progression of searching,
fnding, adopting, nurturing, and developing this extreme belief system to
the point where it acts as a catalyst for a terrorist act defnes the process of
radicalisation.
12
Silber and Bhatt identify four stages of the development
of the radicalisation process into violent extremism.
13
In Pre-Radicalisation,
nothing really remarkable is evident. In Self-Identifcation, they argue that a
cognitive opening caused by some personal, socio-economic or political
crisis increases the chances of radicalisation taking hold in the individual.
Indoctrination then follows via gradual intensifcation of extremist beliefs
and contact with a spiritual sanctioner and a small group of like-minded
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Treat (London: John Murray, 2006), p. 59.
11
Cillufo and Saathof, Out of the Shadows.
12
Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalisation in the West: Te Homegrown Treat (New York: NYPD
Intelligence Division, 2007). Hereafter NYPD Report.
13
I have slightly modifed their model by substituting the term violent extremism for jihadism. Tis is because it
should be recognised that the radicalisation into violent extremism is not unique to Islamists.
SEARCCT 3
KUMAR RAMAKHRISNA
individuals. Te fnal stage could be said to be Violent Extremism, where
the individual see himself as a fghter ready to engage in violent action.
14

Te authors it should be noted are careful to point out that they are not
suggesting a simplistic linear progression through each stage into violent
extremism. Tey assert that the reality can be more complex.
15

Figure 1: Moghaddams Staircase to Terrorism
Tere are other stage models of the radicalisation process into
violent extremism. Te above fgure is from Moghaddam. In this so-called
staircase concept, the process of radicalisation into violent extremism
starts from a situation where an individual, unable to alleviate a perceived
adversity, undergoes profound frustration, develops aggressive sentiments
that are displaced onto a target group, joins a terrorist organisation and
embraces its us-versus-them ideological paradigm, ultimately crossing the
moral threshold into out-group violence.
16

14
NYPD Report 2007.
15
NYPD Report 2007.
16
Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorist Point of View: What they Experience and Why Tey Come to
Destroy (Wesport and London: Praeger Security International, 2006).
4 SEARCCT
First Floor
Perceived Options to Fight Unfair Treatment
Third Floor
Moral Engagement
Second Floor
Displacement of Aggression
Ground Floor
Psychological Interpretation of Material Conditions
Fifth Floor
The Terrorist Act and Sidestepping inhibitory
Mechanisms
Fourth Floor
Solidification of Categorical Thinking and the Perceived
Legitimacy of the Terrorist Organization
Figure 2: Borums Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset
Randy Borum for his part suggests yet another Four-Stage Model of
the Terrorist Mindset, in which an individual frst frames a particular event,
condition, or grievance (its not right) as being unjust (its not fair).
Te radicalising individual then attributes the unjust situation to a target
policy, person or nation (its your fault), and ultimately dehumanises that
responsible party (youre evil). Tis, Borum suggests, leads to justifcation
or impetus for aggression.
17

Apart from stage models there also exist so-called process models
of radicalisation into violent extremism. Te Radical Pathways (RP)
Framework, developed by the current author, in contrast to the preceding
models by Silber and Bhatt, Borum and Moghaddam is a process model
rather than a stage model. Tat is, rather than seeking to identify particular
phases or stages that an individual is likely to pass through in the process
of becoming violently radicalised, the RP Framework seeks to lay bare the
various factors that may contribute to the individuals so-called radical
pathway. Tis model suggests a multi-dimensional explanation, arguing
that the individuals unique personality characteristics; his immediate social
group context; the way that groups ideological frame interprets historical and
geopolitical events and forces in ways that call for violent action; cultural
17
Randy Borum, Radicalisation into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical
Research, Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, Issue 4 (2011), pp. 38-9.
SEARCCT 5
Grievance
Its not right.
Injustice
Its not fair.
Target
Attribution
Its your fault.
Distancing/
Devaluation
Youre evil.
KUMAR RAMAKHRISNA
factors and the universal human drive for a secure and prestigious group
identity, all interact in highly idiosyncratic and personalised ways that difer
between individuals, to produce various degrees of radicalisation into violent
militancy.
18

Some Caveats
Tere are, it should be understood, three key problems associated with the
use of the term radicalisation. First, as Borum correctly observes, there
has been to date little discussion and even less consensus about what
radicalism means.
19
Second, to be radical may mean to reject the status
quo in a profound manner, but this does not necessarily entail a rejection
expressed in violence.
20
Second, if one looks at the historical record it does
seem clear that groups inspired by anti-status quo and hence radical ideas in
fact generated overall positive outcomes for the wider society. Hence radical
groups should not automatically be assumed to be socially or politically
dangerous and in need of elimination.
21
In fact, a recent review by Robin
18
Kumar Ramakrishna, Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalisation in Indonesia (Westport and
London: Praeger Security International, 2009).
19
Randy Borum, Radicalisation into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Teories, Journal of
Strategic Security, Vol. 4, Issue 4 (2011), p. 9.
20
Borum, Radicalisation into Violent Extremism I, p. 9; Bartlett, Birdwell and King, Edge of Violence, p. 7.
21
Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide (New York: Oxford University Press,
2009), p.149.
6 SEARCCT
Existential Identity
Culture
Group Context
Ideology
Geopolitics
Local
Historical
Forces
Situated
Individual
Personality
Figure 3: Te Radical Pathways (RP) Framework
22
Robin L. Tompson, review of Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalisation Happens
to Tem and Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, Issue 4 (2011),
pp. 195-6.
23
Douglas Pratt, Religion and Terrorism: Christian Fundamentalism and Extremism, Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2010), p. 440.
24
Pratt, Religion and Terrorism, p. 440.
25
Greg Barton, Identity, Violent Extremism, and Strategic Communication in the Digital Age, presentation
at workshop on Cyberia: Identity, Cyberspace, and National Security, organised by Te Asia Pacifc Center for
Security Studies (APCSS), Singapore, 22 August 2012.
26
Borum, Radicalisation into Violent Extremism I, p. 9; Sunstein, Going to Extremes, p. 149.
L. Tompson of a recent book by social psychologists Clark McCauley
and Sophia Moskalenko, correctly avers that at times radicalisation is
good and radicalised persons motivate others to take action for the good of
humanity.
22

Such caveats apply to the term violent extremism, like radicalisation
equally widely used in current scholarly and policy discourse. At its most
basic, extremism suggests being at the margins, of existing on the boundaries
or of functioning at the edges, and only tenuously linked to the normative
core or centre.
23
Extremism, Douglas Pratt informs us, takes its own wider
group identity be it religion or tradition to an extreme; not by a move
away from the centre, but rather by intensifying its self-understanding and
self-proclamation as representing, or being, the centre; hence extremism
represents a signifcant heterodoxy as opposed to normative orthodoxy.
24

Extremism, by defnition, the eminent Australian scholar Greg Barton
reminds us, involves rejecting the mainstream for the extraordinary and
the atypical. It can also mean rejecting the moderate and balanced for
the uncompromisingly pure and rejecting shades of grey for black and
white.
25
It has been suggested that many of the same problems aficting the
use of the term radicalisation apply to the word extremism as well: there is
little consensus on what the term means; being extremist in ones views does
not necessarily mean being violent; while as the incisive political scientist
Cass Sunstein pointedly observes, when people shift from indiference
to intense concern with local problems, such as poverty and crime, then
extreme movements are good, even great.
26

It is, nonetheless, widely recognised by terrorism scholars and
practitioners everywhere that the phenomenon of radicalisation into violent
extremism is an all-too-real and dangerous phenomenon. Some scholars
have, in this regard, even recently coined a new term Radicalisation and
SEARCCT 7
KUMAR RAMAKHRISNA
Involvement in Violent Extremism (RIVE).
27
To be sure, violent extremism
manifests in many forms. As discussed, one such form is organised terrorism,
such as the September 11 2001 Al Qaeda strikes in New York and Washington
D.C. and the Bali bombings by Jemaah Islamiyah in October 2002. Tere
is also as mentioned, individual or lone-wolf terrorism, as exemplifed
by Timothy McVeigh in the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Building
in Oklahoma City; the Fort Hood shootings by Major Nidal Hassan in
November 2009; and more recently the Norway attacks by Anders Breivik
in July 2011. It should also be recognised, though, that violent extremism
also drives other forms of out-group violence such as the inter-group ethnic
or religious violence that tore the Balkan states asunder between 1992 and
1995;
28
as well as the horrifc Hutu-Tutsi violence in Rwanda in 1994.
29

Cognitive and Violent Extremism: Recent Tinking
In a recent essay, the American analyst, Lorenzo Vidino, makes
the critical observation that while the threat of violent radicalism needs
addressing, equally important to note is that cognitive radicalism should
not be overlooked either. Tis is because cognitive radicalism is widely
understood to be the logical antecedent to behavioral radicalism.
30
In line
with this logic, for our purposes we may assert that cognitive extremism exists
when an individual immoderately refutes the legitimacy of the existing social
order and seeks to replace it with a new structure based on a completely
diferent belief system. Violent extremism then happens when an individual
takes the additional step of using violence to further the views derived from
cognitive extremism.
31

To be more precise, cognitive radicalisation leads to cognitive extremism.
Cognitive radicalisation can be thought of as a drastic identity simplifcation
27
Sara Savage, Four Lessons from the Study of Fundamentalism and Psychology of Religion, Journal of Strategic
Security, Vol. 4, Issue 4 (2011), pp. 131-150.
28
Michael Ignatief, Te Warriors Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Owl Books, 1997).
29
Neil J. Kressel, Mass Hate: Te Global Rise of Genocide and Terror. Rev. and updated ed. (Cambridge, MA:
Westview Press, 2002), pp. 73-100.
30
Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalisation in America: Lessons from Europe (Washington D.C: United States
Institute of Peace Special Report 262, November 2010), pp. 4-5.
31
Ibid., p. 4.
8 SEARCCT
32
Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: Te Illusion of Destiny (London: Allen Lane, 2006).
33
See Ramakrishna, Radical Pathways, p. 34.
dynamic. Tis requires elaboration. In general, as the Nobel laureate Amartya
Sen memorably puts it:
Te same person can, for example, be a British citizen, of Malaysian
origin, with Chinese racial characteristics, a stockbroker, a nonvegetarian,
an asthmatic, a linguist, a bodybuilder, a poet, an opponent of abortion,
a bird-watcher, an astrologer, and one who believes that God created
Darwin to test the gullible.
32

However, when the members of a social group perceive that they
collectively face the threat of either direct physical or more profoundly,
cultural extinction at the hands of a powerful adversarial Tem, all these
diverse social identities get drastically honed down to one single dimension or
axis of collective identifcation that is perceived to be at risk. Slavenka Drakulic,
in this respect, well describes the cognitively radicalising impact on the Croat
population of Serb attacks during the Balkan wars of the early 1990s:
33

Along with millions of other Croats, I was pinned to the wall of
nationhood not only by outside pressure from Serbia and the Federal
Army but by national homogenisation within Croatia itself. Tat is
what the war is doing to us, reducing us to one dimension: the Nation.
Te trouble with this nationhood, however, is that whereas before, I was
defned by my education, my job, my ideas, my character and yes, my
nationality too - now I feel stripped of all that (emphasis mine).
A similar observation was articulated by Lord Alderdice, the trained
psychiatrist and perceptive politician who played a leading role in brokering
the Good Friday agreement between Catholic and Protestant factions in
Northern Ireland in April 1998. He pointed out that during the Troubles in
Northern Ireland, the community had regressed or undergone a drastic
identity simplifcation dynamic from a myriad of individual diferences
maintained in a broad mosaic of relationships, to a narrower frame of reference
where the single diference between Protestant Unionist and Catholic Nationalist
SEARCCT 9
KUMAR RAMAKHRISNA
assumed pre-eminence (emphasis mine)
34
In our terms, both communities in
Ulster had undergone a process of cognitive radicalisation into a more or less
collective state of cognitive extremism. Tat is, the multiple identities within
one community had been drastically simplifed to a single overarching in-
group: Us, while the multiple afliations and self-identifcations in the
other community were similarly reduced to a single overarching, adversarial
Tem, the out-group. Hence, whether we are talking about Irish Catholics
and Protestants in Ulster; Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims in rapidly
dissolving Yugoslavia, Tamils and Sinhalese in confict-torn Sri Lanka; Shia
and Sunni in post-Saddam Iraq and Christians and Muslims in confict-
prone eastern Indonesia, what ties them together despite their diferent
circumstances and bases of identity is the fact that these were all cognitively
radicalised communities. Communities, like individuals, can cognitively
radicalise as well.
35
In this connection it is telling that a recent report by the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy points out that violent extremist
ideologues in nearly all cases, take pains to suggest that many aspects of
a persons identity can be - indeed must be - reduced to being Muslim, to
the exclusion of other identities.
36
Te upshot of this discussion is simple.
Such drastic intra- and inter-group identity simplifcation - the true essence of
the cognitive radicalisation process must occur long before any extremist
belief system justifying out-group violence is consciously adopted and for
that matter, resorted to in the real world.
Te mindset of the cognitive extremist towards his respective ethnic,
nationalist or religious out-group is not a particularly salubrious one. James
Waller puts it pithily:
Our cause is sacred, theirs is evil.
We are righteous; they are wicked.
We are innocent, they are guilty.
We are the victims, they are the victimisers
37
34
Alderdice cited in Ramakrishna, Radical Pathways, pp. 33-4.
35
Tompson, review of McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, p. 195. McCauley and Moskalenko highlight the
reality of mass radicalisation.
36
J. Scott Carpenter, Matthew Levitt, Steven Simon, and Juan Zarate, Fighting the Ideological Battle: Te Missing
Link in US Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Strategic Report, 2010), p. 8.
37
James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005), p. 243.
10 SEARCCT
If history teaches us anything, it is that it is very dangerous when the
out-group begins to be seen as evil, immoral, sub-human and linguistically
dehumanised. Linguistic dehumanisation of the out-group often results
in their social death or exclusion from the well-defned and ardently
defended moral circle of in-group members.
38
It is telling in this respect,
that during the Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists called the Tutsi rivals
inyenzi meaning cockroaches or insects; while Nazis euphemistically
redefned Jews as inter alia, parasites, flth, excrement, plague, or
tuberculosis.
39
Haig Bosmajian correctly warns that the distance between
the linguistic dehumanisation of a people and their actual suppression
and extermination is not that great.
40
Linguistic dehumanisation in the
religious sphere has arguably even more dire implications: if the out-group
is cognitively reconstrued and linguistically portrayed as evil beings, then
a process of satanisation takes hold. Under such circumstances, out-group
enemies deemed to embody pure evil, religious scholar and psychoanalyst
James W. Jones tells us, cannot be argued with or compromised with; they
can only be destroyed, as a moral duty.
41

It is arguably from such wider cultures of hatred,
42
or cultures of
violence
43
comprising cognitively extremist haters of varying degrees of
intensity, that the smaller minority of dangerous violent extremist killers
emerges. Tis, however, is by no means a linear, deterministic process. It
has been increasingly recognised, nevertheless, that violent potentials do
exist within cognitive extremism, including religiously-driven cognitive
extremism.
44
However, the transition from cognitive to violent extremism
requires the intervention of four sets of supporting factors: culture, ideology,
small-group dynamics and an enabling environment.
38
Ibid., pp. 236-7.
39
Ibid., p. 246.
40
Ibid.
41
James W. Jones, Blood that Cries out from the Earth: the Psychology of Religious Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), p. 44.
42
Willard Gaylin, Hatred: Te Psychological Descent into Violence (New York: Public Afairs, 2003), p. 195.
43
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: Te Global Rise of Religious Violence, updated ed. with a new
preface (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 10-15
44
Charles B. Strozier, David M. Terman, and James W. Jones, with Katharine A. Boyd , eds., Te Fundamentalist
Mindset: Psychological Perspectives on Religion, Violence and History, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 2010), Strozier et al. (2010).
SEARCCT 11
KUMAR RAMAKHRISNA
Supporting Factors in the Transition from Cognitive to Violent Extremism
Culture

Te eminent Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede, following a massive
study of 74 countries worldwide, identifed, inter alia, three dimensions of
national cultures
45
that are particularly pertinent for our purposes: collectivism
versus individualism, power distance (from small to large) and uncertainty
avoidance (from weak to strong.)
46
First, collectivism refers to the organising
principle of societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into
strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout peoples lifetimes continue
to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.
47
Second, power
distance is the extent to which the less powerful members within a social
collective expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.
48
Finally,
uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which the members of a culture feel
threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and search for solace in
larger collectives that ofer them existential certainty.
49
In collectivist societies,
personal opinions are subordinated to the collective will of the group and
its senior elders.
50
Collectivist societies also tend to be large power-distance
societies in which the lower classes depend on the power elites for preserving
social security and harmony; respect for parents and older relatives is a
lifelong basic virtue; and teachers are deeply revered.
51

Finally in strong uncertainty-avoidance societies that is, societies
which are relatively uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity - children
are socialised into frm rules of what is dirty and taboo; school students seek
the right answers which teachers are expected to have; and society as a
12 SEARCCT
45
Tere are many academic defnitions of the term culture. One useful way of thinking about culture is those
learned patterns of thinking, feeling and potentially acting. Such patterns distinguish one social group from
another. See Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind: Intercultural
Cooperation and its Importance for Survival, rev. and expanded 2nd edn. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), pp.
2-4, 377.
46
Hofstede and Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations, p. 23.
47
48
49
50
Hofstede and Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations, pp. 75-114.
51
whole prefers numerous, precise rules for regulating social behavior. In fact,
there is an emotional need for rules and regulations.
52
Hofstede observes
that strong uncertainty-avoidance cultures tend to evince greater levels of
xenophobia and ethnic prejudice, and in particular, the conviction that
in religion, there is only one Truth and we have it.
53
Hence it is largely
the strong uncertainty-avoidance cultures that tend to develop religious,
political, and ideological intolerance and fundamentalisms.
54
Hofstede
concludes that countries with diverse ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups
whose respective cultural outlooks are characterised by collectivism and
strong uncertainty avoidance are especially vulnerable to violent intergroup
strife.
55

Ideology

Culture is best understood as the unwritten rules of the social game.
56

Culture by itself is insufcient to mobilise social groups for action. Tis
is why Willard Gaylin argues that calculated propaganda is required to
mobilise the population.
57
Tis is where ideology comes into the picture.
C.J.M. Drake defnes ideology to mean those beliefs, values, principles and
objectives by which a group defnes itself and justifes its course of action.
58

While to be efective, ideology must certainly draw upon and well known if
inchoate and free-foating cultural symbols, stories, and themes, it is more
deliberately held and action-oriented than culture. While culture as noted
is unwritten and shared largely without mass conscious awareness, ideology
is primarily a relatively well articulated set of beliefs and ideas that are
consciously held to varying degrees by members of a group, and that provide
an agenda for action.
59
It is not for nothing that the respected terrorism
SEARCCT 13
52
53
54
55
56
57
Gaylin, Hatred, p. 178.
58
C.J.M. Drake,Te Role of Ideology in Terrorists Target Selection, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10, No.
2 (Summer 1998), pp. 53-85.
59
Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 183.
14 SEARCCT
scholar Louise Richardson points out that a legitimising ideology is part of
the lethal cocktail that generates terrorist action.
60

Small-Group Dynamics
In fact, as mentioned earlier, Richardson opines that ideology aside, an
enabling group is also part of the mix of factors supporting the transition to
out-group violence.
61
Tis is especially so in the case of a small group real-
world or even on-line that is largely insulated from outside infuences, and
is, for all intents and purposes, not unlike a religious cult. Te cult specialist
Arthur Deikman observes that a religious cult evinces total dependence on a
leader; utter compliance with the group; suppression of dissent; and fnally
and of no small importance, devaluation of outsiders.
62
It is hence within
the small cult-like group that the free-foating prejudices of the wider culture
of cognitive extremism are intensifed and focused into a relatively coherent
and more or less consciously held violent ideology - and cognitive extremism
arrives at the very cusp of out-group violence.
Enabling Environment
All that remains then for cognitive extremism to tip over into violence is for an
enabling environment to obtain: that is, a situation in which objective social,
economic and political grievances that empower and fuel violent extremist
ideology, dangerously meshes with systemic governmental corruption, weak
counter-extremism capacities and regulatory controls, and ultimately ease of
access to weapons material and expertise.
60
Richardson, What Terrorists Want, p. 59.
61
Richardson, What Terrorists Want, p. 59.
62
Arthur J. Deikman, Tem and Us: Cult Tinking and the Terrorist Treat. Berkeley: Bay Tree Publishing, 2003), p. 52.
KUMAR RAMAKHRISNA
SEARCCT 15
Early Warning Indicators of the Transition from Cognitive to Violent
Extremism
A fnal question worth asking is how would we know that the transition
from cognitive to violent extremism is imminent? Are there early warning
indicators of such a transition, so to speak? In recent years analysts have
begun addressing this issue. Te American analysts Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
and Laura Grossman, based on a study of 117 violent Islamists in the US
and UK, identifed six common indicators of the process of radicalisation
into violent extremism of these individuals: frst, a legalistic interpretation of
Islam; second, trusting the interpretations of a select and ideologically rigid
set of religious authorities; third, perceiving an inherent schism between
Islam and the West; fourth, displaying a low tolerance of perceived
theological deviance, even violently opposing alternative interpretations
and practices; ffth, imposing their preferred religious interpretations on
others; and ultimately, observably adopting the view that the only proper
response is military action.
63
More recently, the Australian analysts Mark
R. Kebble and Louise Porter, building upon the Silber/Bhatt stage model
of radicalisation discussed earlier reckon that the transition to out-group
violence is likely when certain risk factors are present. Tese include beliefs
by violent extremists that they are retaliating; that potential victims are less
than human; and that their actions are religiously justifed. Additional risk
factors include social isolation from positive infuences; a demonstrated
capability for violence, and a predilection to access violent materials.
64

Closing Refections
In this article we have sought to introduce clarity into the discussion of
the oft-used terminology of violent extremism and radicalisation, as
well as more rigorously tease out the symbiotic conceptual relationship
between these ideas. In the process we explored stage and process models
63
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the US and UK (Washington D.C:
Foundation for Defense of Democracies Press, April 2009), pp. 12-13.
64
Mark R. Kebbell and Louise Porter, An Intelligence Assessment Framework for Identifying Individuals at Risk
of Committing Violent Extremism against the West, Security Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 212-28.
16 SEARCCT
of radicalisation into violent extremism and seen that while radicalisation
is a process, extremism is the outcome of that process. After discussing
some caveats regarding radicalism and extremism, the article also ofered
fresh thinking on how cognitive extremism could be regarded as a potential
precursor to violent extremism. In this respect, we saw how a drastic
identity simplifcation dynamic is the real key to understanding cognitive
radicalisation. Tis was followed by a discussion of how culture, ideology,
small-group dynamics and an enabling environment all play roles as key
supporting factors that help turn cognitive extremism violent. Finally, the
piece explored possible early warning indicators of the shift from cognitive
to violent extremism. Te ideas discussed here are not intended to be seen as
the defnitive views on the subject at hand. Rather, it is hoped that they will
stimulate further discussion in both analytical and practitioner circles about
radicalisation into violent extremism a continuing and complex challenge
facing our simultaneously globalised and yet fragmented world.
KUMAR RAMAKHRISNA
SEARCCT 17
BATTENING DOWN THE HATCHES:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON PROTECTING THE MARITIME
SUPPLY CHAIN FROM MARITIME TERRORISM
Nazery Khalid
1
He shall spurn fate, scorn death, and bear his hopes bove wisdom,
grace and fear.
And you all know, security is mortals chiefest enemy
(William, Shakespeare : Macbeth)
A changed world for the worst?
Te importance of the seas in facilitating global trade and economic
prosperity cannot be overemphasised. An estimated 85% of world trade is
carried by seaborne transport
2
and ofshore oil and gas contributes to around
70% of global oil and gas supplies.
3
People around the world depend on
various maritime economic activities such as fshery and marine tourism,
and along coastal areas, for their livelihood and many of them live in coastal
areas. Naval forces count on freedom of the sea in the global commons to
enable their movements and safeguard their nations strategic interests.
It would, therefore, not be an exaggeration to say that without
security at sea, many of these activities would be interrupted or even halted.
Should there be any untoward incident at sea that causes shipping trafc to
be interrupted or economic activities such as ofshore oil and gas exploration
and production to be impeded, there would be serious repercussion to global
trade and economy. In addition, the strategic interests of the state bordering
the seas and the international community that depends on the uninterrupted
movement of ships in the sea would be compromised. Te impact of piracy
in the Gulf of Aden, a key shipping lane especially for energy transport, on
shipping companies, shippers and global trade underlines the importance of
protecting such a sealane from security threats.
1
Senior Fellow, Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA). Te opinions expressed are the authors own.
2
UNCTAD (2011). Review of Maritime Transport. Geneva : UNCTAD.
3
Estimate by Oil and Gas International (OGI), the leading online source of the oil and gas industry data
and information, in 2010.
18 SEARCCT
As a measure of how much the world has changed since the September
11, or 9/11 attacks, concerns over security have gripped the attention of
policymakers and the public. Amidst the dramatically changed, and still
changing, post 9/11 landscape, the maritime sector has also undergone
tremendous changes from a security perspective. Tis underscores concerns
of the vulnerability faced by seaborne transport, lives, and assets in the
maritime sector to the threat of terror.
While measures undertaken to boost security along the maritime
supply chain
4
have added a sense of security to players along the maritime
supply chain, those in charge of security should not be complacent. New,
asymmetrical and non-conventional threats are always evolving. Terrorists
are always thinking of new and innovative ways to strike.
Te last decade or so has seen a range of transport modes being targeted;
namely aviation (commercial airplane strikes during 9/11; attacks on
airports in Moscow in 2011, Glasgow in 2007 and Brussels in 1979), road
(bus bombing in London in 2005 and various attacks on buses in Israel),
rail (train bombings in London in 2005 and Madrid in 2004). Tese attacks
underscore the attractiveness of these targets to terrorists who are hell-bent
on causing as much damage and as many deaths as possible.
Te Bane of Maritime Terrorism
Since the 9/11 attacks, a considerable amount of literature has emerged on
the subject of maritime terrorism. Te Council for Security Cooperation
in the Asia Pacifc (CSCAP) Working Group has come up with an arguably
useful and reasonable defnition for maritime terrorism as follows :
the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime
environment, using or against vessels or fxed platforms at sea or in port, or against
any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements,
including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities
NAZERY KHALID
BATTENING DOWN THE HATCHES: SOME REFLECTIONS ON PROTECTING THE
MARITIME SUPPLY CHAIN FROM MARITIME TERRORISM
4
In the context of this paper, maritime supply chain refers to the network that links producers and consumers that
includes a maritime transportation component and consists of maritime-related assets such as ships and ports.
SEARCCT 19
Meanwhile, Janes Intelligence Review defnes maritime terrorism as:
5

the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat
of violence in the pursuit of political change, in the maritime domain.
Burns (2004) defned maritime terrorism as:
6

terrorist acts executed within, or with the intent of compromising the features
of the maritime domain.
Terrorists are driven by ideological and political motives.
7
Tey
operate in fairly well organised groups
8
; among the more well-known
ones are Abu Sayyaf which claimed responsibility for the Superferry
14 bombing and Al-Qaeda which claimed credit for the USS Cole
and Limburg attacks, have some form of training and deploy fairly
sophisticated tactics in pulling of attacks. Tey plan their attacks well
in advance, complete with sketches, plans and intelligence collection.
Tey tend to have backers who provide fnancing and the logistics to
prepare and mount the attacks. Tey seek to cause as much damage,
shock and destruction as possible and generate maximum publicity to
highlight their cause. Unlike pirates, terrorists take no prisoners and are
even willing to die in the process of carrying out their deeds.
Among the high-profle attacks on maritime targets in recent times were:
9

i) Te hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in Egyptian waters in 1985
which claimed the life of a disabled passenger;
5
See Drawing the Line between Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, Janes Intelligence Review, September 2004, 3.
6
See Burns, R. H. (2004). Terrorism in the Early 21st Century: Maritime Domain, IDSS Maritime Security
Conference, 2021 May 2004. See also Hofman, B. (2003). Inside terrorism, New York : Columbia University
Press. He defned terrorism as deliberate creation and deliberation of fear through violence or the threat of violence
in the pursuit of political change
7
In this regard, the defnition ofered by Hofman (2003) is instructive. He described terrorism as deliberate
creation and deliberation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. See
Hofman, B. (2003). Inside terrorism, New York : Columbia University Press.
8
See Richardson, M (2004).
9
For a reference of chronicles of terrorist/criminal activities aimed at maritime targets, see among others Shie, T. R.
(2005) Te Nexus between Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, CSIS
Issues & Insights, 4(4), 2005, available at <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/issues/v04n04_ch3.cfm>. See also Burns, R.
H. (2004).
NAZERY KHALID
20 SEARCCT
ii) Te attack on the United States Navy ship, USS Cole by an explosive-
laden speedboat in the waters of South Yemen in 2000;
iii) Te attack on Our Lady of Mediatrix in the waters of Manila in 2000;
iv) Te kidnapping of 21 people (including 10 foreign tourists) from Sipadan
Island, a popular diving spot of Sabah, in 2002 by Abu Sayyaf Group;
v) Te attack on the French tanker Limburg by an explosive-laden speedboat
in the waters of South Yemen in 2002 which killed a crew member of
the tanker;
vi) Te bombing and sinking of the passenger vessel Superferry 14 in 2004
in the waters near Manila killing 116 passengers (this to date remains the
worlds deadliest maritime terror attack); and
vii) Te suicide bombing attack on the Port of Ashdod in Israel in 2004
which killed 16 people including the bombers.
Tragic and unfortunate as those attacks were, they provided valuable
lessons and useful references for security agencies, regulatory authorities
and players along the maritime supply chain to help develop a better
understanding of the risks and threats of maritime security and to prepare
the necessary resources and responses to mitigate them. Analysing the factors
and circumstances involved in those attacks would enable the authorities
and security agencies to sketch the typology of maritime terrorism. Tis will
help them to identify the potential threats and possible means and targets in
order to propose efective countermeasures.
10

Given the stealth, unpredictable and sometimes sophisticated nature
of these terrorist groups, there is a need for security agencies, policymakers
and players along the supply chain to understand the features and workings
of the maritime supply chain. Tis is important to enable the right resources
to be allocated, the appropriate skills to be developed and the necessary
hardware (equipment, systems) to be installed to anticipate, thwart or respond
efectively to threats of terror. Tis is important, given that the maritime
NAZERY KHALID
10
Terrorist attacks on maritime targets may not just be direct assaults on vessels and ports, as have been recorded,
but may include scuttling of vessels, smuggling of weapons and terrorists in containers, and jamming of systems
at ports to sabotage operations and cause disruption to the supply chain. Some of these scenarios were discussed
in various literature, for example in Burns, R. H. (2004) and Raman, B. (2004), Maritime Terrorism: An Indian
Perspective, International Conference on National Security in a Changing Region held in Singapore, 2829 October
2004.
SEARCCT 21
realm provides a vast theater for terrorists to operate. Terror groups have
been known to have the propensity to target high-value maritime interests
beyond what they have already attacked.
11

Protecting the Maritime Supply Chain
Post 9/11, there have been a slew of maritime security measures introduced
to boost the security of lives and assets at sea and onshore. Tey include:
i) Container Security Initiative (CSI), an initiative by the US Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) Unit under the Department of Homeland
Security, CSI is based on four principles, namely using intelligence and
automated information to identify and target containers that pose a
risk for terrorism, pre-screening those containers that pose a risk at
the port of departure before they arrive at US ports, using detection
technology to quickly pre-screen containers that pose a risk, and using
smarter, tamper-evident containers
ii) Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism(C-TPAT), an initiative
of the US CBP under which shippers commit to improving the security
of their cargo shipments, and in return, receive a variety of benefts
from the US Government such as the pre-clearance of cargoes.
iii) Te International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code),
a comprehensive set of measures introduced by IMO in 2002 to
enhance the security of ships and port facilities. It was introduced
in response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks.
11
It was revealed that Al Qaeda had its own network of ships and agents and had developed a sort of manual to
carry out attacks on maritime targets. Te manual came with instructions on how to use mines and turn LNG
tankers into foating bombs. An Al-Qaeda operative believed to be its head of naval operations was captured in
November 2002 with a 180-page dossier listing possible maritime targets. See Bingley, B. (2004), Security Interests
of the Infuencing States: Te Complexity of Malacca Straits, Te Indonesian Quarterly, 32(4), 2004, 358.
NAZERY KHALID
22 SEARCCT
iv) Megaports Initiative, introduced in 2003 as part of the Second Line of
Defence Program of the National Nuclear Security Administration of
the US Department of Energy. Te initiative focuses on high-risk and
high-volume ports based on their attractiveness to smugglers of nuclear
materials and weapons, and entails maximum inspection of containers
at those ports regardless of their origin and destination.
v) Te Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), introduced by the US
Government in 2003 to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and related materials. PSI provides a platform to coordinate
governmental non-proliferation activities globally in the face of
advanced communications technologies and expanding global trade
that have facilitated the smuggling of WMD.
vi) Te Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), a partnership of
willing regional nations with varying capabilities and capacities to
identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under
existing international and domestic laws. Tis rather controversial
initiative empowers participating nations with the timely information
and capabilities they need to act against maritime threats in their own
territorial seas, and deciding for themselves what response, if any, they
need to take.
vii) Te Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), an initiative by the US to inspect all
containers at high-risk ports through an integrated inspection system
with an international shipping company to secure the global supply
chain against the threat of terror.
viii) Te 24-Hour Rule, an initiative led by the US that requires 24-hour
notice before cargo is loaded on vessels. High-risk containers, identifed
prior to vessel loading, are inspected at the port of origin.
Tese initiatives have enhanced security along the maritime supply
chain. However, there is certainly much room for improvement to boost
security along the maritime supply chain to prevent terrorists strikes there.
NAZERY KHALID
SEARCCT 23
Te following initiatives which have been identifed as requiring attention and
strengthening in order to boost security along the maritime supply chain are:
i) Enhancing cooperation among all parties along the maritime supply
chain, which is essential in foreseeing and confronting terror attacks. In
this regard, partnerships among local authorities and state and federal
governments must be promoted and enhanced. Tis cooperation
should include developing contingency and emergency operation plans
that enable local, state and federal governments and private entities to
work efectively together to coordinate routine and emergency response
mechanisms in the face of terror threats. Also, given the transboundary
nature of maritime crimes, greater international cooperation must be
encouraged to boost maritime security especially in SLOCs and key
waterways.
ii) Developing adequate capability to undertake quality counterterrorism
intelligence and analysis. In addressing the threat of terror in the
wide and complex expanse of the maritime supply chain, the need for
accurate, timely and relevant intelligence cannot be overemphasised.
Quality intelligence is crucial in enabling the development of risk
management solutions that can result in maximum security impact and
minimum threat exposure to lives and assets along the maritime supply
chain.
iii) Securing critical maritime-related ICT infrastructure and cyberspace.
Operations in sectors such as shipping, ports and ofshore exploration
and production are increasingly sophisticated and facilitated by high-
tech equipment and systems. Terrorists may fnd hacking into these
systems and paralysing the equipment an attractive prospect as it
does not require too much resources and visibility to carry out but
can, nonetheless, create havoc along the maritime supply chain. As
such, there must be a solid cyberdefence in place to safeguard critical
infrastructure and essential digital systems and technologies in the
maritime realm.
NAZERY KHALID
24 SEARCCT
iv) Securing maritime checkpoints at ports and passenger terminals by
reviewing immigration procedures and addressing loopholes and weak
points.
v) Enhancing emergency management; medical evacuation and
preparedness; public health management; and search and rescue
operations with a view to inculcating a culture of alertness, proactiveness
and a readiness to respond to terror threats and attacks at all times.
vi) Inculcating a sense of accountability among all the parties along the
maritime supply chain. It is vital to drive home the point that securing
the chain from the threat of terror is the responsibility of everyone along
it. Tere is a need to strongly emphasise to concerned parties that they
have a collective interest in securing the chain and hence must always
alert one another if they suspect, know of or see something amiss or
suspicious.
vii) Preventing the fow of fnancing and support towards terrorists and
raiding institutions and arresting individuals promoting radicalism and
ideologies that can foment terrorism.
viii) Leveraging the use and application of technology to come up with
innovative and cutting-edge solutions to enhance information sharing
among parties in the maritime supply chain in combating the threat of
maritime terrorism.
ix) Increasing patrols especially in SLOCs and known areas and logistical
corridors where terrorists operate, to show presence and to provide a
deterrence to them. Joint or coordinated patrols among navies of countries
bordering SLOCs should be carried out within a regional cooperation
framework to ensure consistency, efciency and sustainability of the
patrols.
x) Sharing of information among littoral nations and among the larger
international community that can lead to anticipation of attacks and
preparation of adequate and appropriate responses to thwart and
counter them.
NAZERY KHALID
SEARCCT 25
xi) xi) Not underestimating any potential terror threats to maritime targets.
Consider the threat to turn tankers into foating bombs, a scenario
imagined by several scholars after the 9/11 attacks, which was dismissed
by shipping practitioners who doubted the practicality and efectiveness
of doing so. Te dismissal of a threat could lead to the lack of vigilance
that could come at a high price to lives and assets along the maritime
supply chain and beyond, should such attacks materialise.
12
It is also
important not to underestimate the possibility of linkages between or
among terrorist groups in diferent locations that may share resources
and expertise to mount attacks against maritime terrorists.
13

xii) Assisting developing nations bordering waters where terrorists are known
to operate and most likely to strike, in building their capability and
capacity in counter-terrorism. Tis includes assistance in both the areas
of defense (equipment, systems, personnel, institutional framework)
and deterrence (legal framework) to prevent terrorism and also to fght
and prosecute terrorists.
Getting the Balance Right
Acts of maritime terrorism may be few and far between but the fallout arising
from them can be far-reaching and even generate catastrophic impact to
the littoral state(s) of the sites of the attacks and to the larger international
community. Te fact that the impacts of the attacks that have occurred
thus far, as listed earlier in this article, were localised or at most regionalised
should not allow stakeholders along the maritime supply chain to rest on
their laurels.
12
Te revelation in 2004 of a statement allegedly prepared by Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden exposed the
terror groups plan to attack Western oil interests. Excerpt from the statement, in reference to the Limburg attack
in 2002 : By exploding the oil tanker in Yemen, the holy warriors hit the umbilical cord and lifeline of the crusader
community, reminding the enemy of the heavy cost of blood and the gravity of losses they will pay as a price to their
continued aggression on our community and looting of our wealth. See Burns, R. H. (2004), 8.
13
It was suggested that LTTE, which was known to have a fairly sophisticated maritime terrorism capability, had
links with JI which could have been intended to boost the latters capability to conduct attacks on maritime targets.
See Borgu, A. (2004). Maritime Terrorism: An Australian Perspective, Workshop on Maritime Counter Terrorism
of the Observer Research Foundation, 2930 November 2004.
NAZERY KHALID
26 SEARCCT
NAZERY KHALID
We can be encouraged that governments worldwide have upped the
ante and paid greater attention to maritime supply chain security since 9/11.
However, measures to boost security along it should not come at the expense
of attaining a smooth fow of the maritime supply chain which is crucial
in facilitating global trade and economic growth. For example, proposals
to screen all containers without taking into account their diferent levels
of potential risks, is anathema to efcient movement of cargos along the
maritime supply chain.
14
It is unrealistic to check every single container and
at the same time expect that it would not have an impact on the smooth
fow of the maritime supply chain and add to the cost of transporting goods
through the chain.
Te cost of securing the maritime supply chain from terrorist threats
should not be too prohibitive, especially to developing countries which do
not have the fnancial means or the capability to confront this threat on their
own. Developed countries should help developing countries build capacity
in areas such as collection of intelligence; identifcation of existing and
potential threats; compliance with international security measures; and the
establishment of security plans, policies, procedures and systems. However,
the assistance rendered must not come with any pre-conditions and must
be in accordance with international principles and laws. Eforts must also
be made to ensure that the implementation of measures to counter terrorist
threats on the maritime supply chain must not result in the incurrence of
costs and inconvenience which cannot be borne, or tolerated by others.
In this regard, the successful countermeasures taken by the littoral
states of the Straits of Malacca could be emulated by others fghting maritime
terrorism. Teir comprehensive approach to maritime security not only
involves confronting the threats at sea but also in dismantling the terror
network on land and addressing the root causes of terrorism. A piecemeal
approach to securing the maritime supply chain would not do, given the
extent of the chain; the many players, assets, processes and systems involved;
and the huge volumes and variety of cargos passing through it. Equally
important is to address the root causes of maritime terrorism and mold
political and socio-economic solutions to overcome them.
14
Tis was the idea behind the SFI initiative led by the US.
SEARCCT 27
Every player in the maritime supply chain must be made conscious
of the importance of not only taking care of his own domain within the
maritime supply chain but also to be on the look-out for anything out
of place and suspicious and raise the red fag to others should they detect
something amiss. Tey must realise that the strength of the chain is only as
good as its weakest point. A strong sense of accountability and responsibility
to maintain security in ones operational domain in the maritime chain is
essential before players along the chain can develop awareness of the security
situation in the entire chain. Tey should also be made aware that investing
in improving security and being vigilant benefts them and can create value
across the business functions throughout the entire maritime supply chain.
Te players along the chain should strive to invest in security by integrating
security as a core business process rather than treating it as a peripheral issue.
Investing in security often yields dividends to their business as smart security
practices help protect their personnel, assets (fxed and in transit), brand and
goodwill of their customers.
It would be counterproductive to live in fear and over exaggerate the
threat of terror as it would just play into the hands of the terrorists and disrupt
many aspects of our lives. While we could imagine all sorts of potential
terrorist threats and worst-case scenarios, our resources and capabilities to
counter them are fnite and we need the maritime supply chain to operate
with optimal efciency to facilitate global trade and economic activities. But
it has to be remembered that the price to pay for being tardy in securing the
maritime supply chain could prove fatal to lives and damaging to assets and
economic interests,
15
not to mention the potential of inficting a political
fall-out to governments. As such, there must be a nuanced approach to
combating maritime terrorism; a risk-based security philosophy is more
practical than a looking for a needle in a haystack approach.
No one is immortal, but that does not mean we should leave
things to chance. All the players along the maritime supply chain owe it to
themselves to declare and treat maritime terrorism as, in the immortal words
of Shakespeare, the chiefest enemy.
15
It was estimated that should shipping trafc along the Straits of Malacca, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait and
Makassar Strait were simultaneously blocked, the extra steaming costs to shipping companies could run up to US$8
bil. a year. See Ho, J. (2005), Maritime Security and International Cooperation, Journal of the Australian Naval
Institute, 117, Winter 2005, 2930. Meanwhile, the attack on Limburg was estimated to have inficted a loss of
US$3.8 mil. a month to Yemens economy owing to the hike in insurance premiums for vessels visiting Yemeni ports
and the loss of business due to the diversion of shipping trafc to other ports. See Burns, R. H. (2009).
NAZERY KHALID
28 SEARCCT
References
Bateman, S. (2004), International Solutions to Problems of Maritime
SecurityTink Globally, Act Regionally!, Maritime Studies, November
December 2004.
Blanche, E. (2002). Terror attacks threaten oil routes, Janes Intelligence
Review, December 2002.
Borgu, A. (2004). Maritime Terrorism: An Australian Perspective, Workshop
on Maritime CounterTerrorism of the Observer Research Foundation, 2930
November 2004.
Bradford, J. (2004). Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy
Formulation and the Coastal State Responses, Contemporary Southeast Asia,
26(3), December 2004.
Burns, R. H. (2004). Terrorism in the Early 21st Century: Maritime
Domain, IDSS Maritime Security Conference, 2021 May 2004.
Davis, A. (2008). Terrorism and the Maritime Transportation System : Are
We on a Collision Course? Livermore, CA : WingSpan Press.
Drawing the line between piracy and maritime terrorism, Janes Intelligence
Review, September 2004.
Greenberg, M. et al (2006). Maritime terrorism : Risk and liability, Santa
Monica, CA : Rand Corporation
Haberfeld, M. & Von Hassell, C. A. (2009). Modern Piracy and Maritime
Terrorism: Te Challenge of Piracy for the 21st Century. Dubuque, IA :
Kendall Hunt Publishing.
Ho, J. (2005). Maritime Security and International Cooperation, Journal of
the Australian Naval Institute, 117, Winter 2005.
NAZERY KHALID
SEARCCT 29
Khalid, N. (2009). Raising of Security Alert in the Straits of Malacca :
Lessons learned. Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations. 11(1). 2010.
77-88.
Khalid, N. (2012). Sea Lines Under Strain : Te Way Forward in Managing
Sea Lines of Communication, Te IUP Journal of International Relations,
VI(2), April 2012. 57-66.
Mc Nicholas, M. (2007). Maritime Security : An Introduction. Burlington,
MA : Butterworth-Heinemann.
Richardson, M (2004). Te Treats of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in
Southeast Asia, Maritime Studies, NovemberDecember 2004.
Richardson, M. (2004). A Time Bomb for Global Trade : Maritime-related
Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Singapore : ISEAS.
Ritter, L. (2006). Securing Global Transport Networks, Burr Ridge, IL :
McGraw-Hill.
Stephens, H. W. (1987), Not merely the Achille Lauro : Te Treat of
Maritime Terrorism and Piracy, Terrorism: An International Journal, 9(3).
Valencia, M. & Khalid, N. (2009). Te Somalia Multilateral Anti-Piracy
Approach : Caveats on Vigilantism, Te Asia-Pacifc Journal : Japan Focus,
8(4), 17 February 2009.
Young, A. &Valencia, M (2003), Confation of Piracy and Terrorism in
Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility, Contemporary Southeast Asia, August
2003, 25(2).
NAZERY KHALID
SEARCCT 31
POST 2006 NEPAL: AN OBJECTIVE OVERVIEW
Nishchal N. Pandey
1
No other country in South or Southeast Asia has so radically changed its
political system in recent history as has Nepal. Nestled between the rising
economies of India and China and endowed with Mt. Everest and Lumbini,
the birthplace of the Buddha, it could easily have become one of the fastest
growing economies of the sub-continent. Instead, it has sufered instability
to such an extent that there have been 5 Prime Ministers in 6 years after
the historic change of April 2006, and still remains the poorest country in
the SAARC region after, Afghanistan. After the loss of more than 13,000
innocent lives in the armed insurrection, there was much hope that with the
Maoist decision to end the armed insurgency and participate in competitive
multi-party elections in April 2008, stability would return, tourism would
rebound and increased FDI would transform the rustic economy thereby
injecting dynamism into the new republic. Unfortunately, the frst-ever
Constituent Assembly (C.A.) elected to draft a democratic, federal, and
inclusive constitution did not complete its primary mandate when its term
expired in May 2012. GDP growth remained as low as 4.5 percent in 2009,
4.8 percent in 2010 and further plummeted to 3.9 percent in 2011. Tragically,
Nepals main political parties entrusted to carry through the spirit of the
peoples movement have themselves fallen prey to an unceasing yearning for
power in an eternal game of forming and dismantling governments, which
has weakened the system and raised frustration among the common man.
Te terai,
2
that is the main granary and an industrial area, harbors more
than 12 armed groups that compete with one another in abduction, looting,
murder and explosions. And all major constitutional bodies currently lack
leadership due to the absence of a legislature and a lack of consensus among
the major parties.
1
Te Author is the Director of the Kathmandu -based Centre for South Asian Studies (CSAS) and a well- known
academic and strategic analyst of Nepal.
2
Note: Terai are the plains of southern Nepal bordering the Indian states of U.P. and Bihar.
32 SEARCCT
NISHCHAL N. PANDEY POST 2006 NEPAL: AN OBJECTIVE OVERVIEW
Tere has been one major headway, however. Combatants of the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) belonging to the Maoists who were stationed
in UN monitored cantonments and later verifed by a special committee have
joined the army as envisaged by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
signed between the state and the rebels in November 2006. Te integration
of 1,450 former Maoist fghters into the Nepal army marks a historic step.
With this, the system of one country, two armies, which had existed since
the conclusion of the civil war in 2006, comes to an end. Te fate of the
former guerillas of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) had cast a shadow on
Nepali politics over the last four years.
3

Tis paper delves into the fault-lines of New Nepal and analyses the
roots of violence in Nepali society which have remained un-addressed despite
of the radical transformation of the political system. While old wounds have
yet to be healed, newer blemishes and scars have emerged. Te breakaway
Maoist party led by hard-liner Comrade Kiran has vowed that it will launch a
series of protests to oppose Indian investment in the hydro-power sector from
next month (Nov. 2012) as these are more in favor of India than Nepal.
4
Te
same rhetoric was displayed by his mother party led by Prachanda and Dr.
Baburam Bhattarai when the peoples war was initiated in February. 1996.
In their 40-point demand list submitted to the then Sher Bahadur Deuba
government, they raised almost the same issues of ultra-nationalism such as
the abrogation of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Agreement
of Tanakpur and the Mahakali water projects with India, the regulation of the
open border between Nepal and India, the cancellation of Gorkha recruitment
in the British and Indian armies, the initiation of the work permit system for
Indians and a ban on Indian flms.
5
It must be underscored however that
the Maoist leadership kept on living in various hideouts in India through
much of the insurgency period. If this trend of heaving anti-Indian sentiment
continues, Nepali politics will not only go back to square one, but will also
send ripple efects throughout the entire sub-continent. It will set-of high
levels of uncertainty and unpredictability, and future developments will be
3
Induction of Former Maoists into the Nepali Army should expedite much- needed economic development.
(2012, Oct. 5). Times of India.
4
CPN-Maoist against Indian Investment in Hydropower. (2012, Oct. 15). Te Kathmandu Post.
5
Shrestha, Chuda Bahadur (2004). Nepal Coping with the Maoist Insurgency, Kathmandu: Chetana Lok Shum
Publisher. p. 106.
SEARCCT 33
strongly infuenced by the strategic maneuverings of India and China as they
would not like to see a potential fashpoint emerging in an area that is so close
to the Naxalite -afected states on the one hand, and the Tibet Autonomous
Region on the other.
Background

Ten years of armed insurgency (1996-2006) have had a disastrous efect
on Nepalese economy and society. Critical infrastructure such as schools,
government ofces, police posts, bridges, telecommunication towers and
post ofces were destroyed. Even hydroelectric plants were not spared. In
a bid to tame the insurgents, the state doubled the strength of the army
from around 45,000 to 90,000, increased defense expenditure from Rs. 2.58
billion in 1996 to Rs. 10.9 billion a decade later. Te total budget for the
Nepal Police also rose dramatically from a mere Rs. 2.36 billion in 1996 to
Rs. 7.88 billion by 2006. However, by the end of the confict, the police had
abandoned 1035 police posts scattered all over Nepal.
6
As it was inefective
in countering the challenge posed by the insurgents, the government under
G.P. Koirala decided to set-up a separate para-military force known as the
Armed Police Force, in the year 2000. Te budget allocated for development
was diverted to implement emergency rule. Rising popular frustration in the
hinterland, steadily narrowed Kathmandus options. Te economy sufered.
GDP growth during the confict period, particularly after 2001 when
emergency was declared, was sluggish. Te average growth rate during the
eleven year period from 1990 to 2000 was 4.8 percent, whereas it remained
at 2.6 percent during the period between 2001 and 2005. Terefore, the
economy kept losing an average of 2.2 percent GDP each year after 2001.
7
Altogether 20 district headquarters out of 75 were attacked by the Maoists.
Together with the destruction of private property, a total of Rs 92.8 billion
is estimated to have been lost during the period from 1996 to 2005. In
fact, the economy lost an annual average of 6.3 percent of GDP over the
6
A Decade of Disaster: Human and Physical Cost of Nepal Confict 1996-2005. (May 2006). Kathmandu:
Community Study and Welfare Centre. P. 126
7
An Assessment of Economic Cost of the Ongoing Confict in Nepal. (2009). Retrieved from http://www.
fesnepal.org/reports/2005/seminar_reports/report_NEFAS_ConfictCost.htm.
34 SEARCCT
preceding year as a result of the confict.
8
During the decade of the confict
GDP fuctuated drastically. It was 4.8 percent in the fnancial year 1996/97,
and reached a peak of 5.7 percent in the fnancial year 1999/00 before going
down to its lowest level of 0.3 percent in 2001/02.
9

However, no marked improvement could be seen even after the
Maoists joined mainstream politics, and much of this low level of confdence
in the economy was due to the continuous political bedlam, power shortages,
crises in the terai and strikes called by trade unions afliated with one
party or another. Nepalese politics has long been about the acquisition of
government resources for purposes of patronage as the people of various
walks of life point at each level of government, a system that exists for seizing
and diverting the countrys resources to narrow rather than broader interests.
Political parties have been part and parcel of this institutional syndrome.
10

In fact, as soon as the peoples movement of April 2006 was successful,
the government began requesting funds for reconstruction and rehabilitation.
However, this by itself was insufcient to rehabilitate and reintegrate those
afected by the confict and resurrect the ravaged economy. Te bold
decision by the Maoist leadership to shun armed insurrection and embrace
competitive multi-party politics through the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement was, surely, a welcome change that the people of Nepal
and the international community both desperately wanted. Although it was
achieved after much bloodshed and devastation, there was hope of lasting
peace. Te holding of elections for the countrys frst Constituent Assembly
on April 10, 2008 was another landmark event in which the CPN (Maoist)
emerged as the single largest party. Te frst elected Prime Minister under
the republican order, Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda, managed to collect
record revenues during the tenure of the Maoist led government, exceeding
its target by 31.7 per cent. Te fnance ministry collected 39.3 per cent
more revenue at Rs 98.67 billion as per the year-on-year record.
11
However,
his government was short-lived due to a miscalculated decision to sack the
Army Chief-of-Staf which was not approved by the President. To save face,
Prachanda resigned. Since then, other political parties have been constantly
8
ibid
9
Pyakuryal, B. (2007). Nepals Confict: A Micro Impact Analysis on Economy, Kathmandu: p. 24.
10
Ghani, A., & Lockhart, Clare. (2008). Fixing Failed States London: Oxford University Press. p. 74.
11
Record Revenue Collection. (2009, April 19). Te Himalayan Times.
SEARCCT 35
blaming the Maoists for espousing the dictatorial ambitions of 20th century
communism. Relations between the private sector and the Maoist party,
severely strained due to forced donations and labor problems during the
course of the insurgency, did not improve even after the Maoists took
charge of the government. At a time when the government is seeking more
investments from the private sector, entrepreneurs have expressed concern
over increasing labor unrest, and political interferences which has weakened
the capacity of the private sector.
12

Terefore, despite high hopes, Nepal is still treading through
a rough transition. Te issues of federalism, the re-building of destroyed
infrastructure, and the writing of an inclusive and democratic Constitution,
within the now-lapsed, time-frame are critical issues that demand adept
handling by all political forces. Unfortunately, the state has not been able to
focus on these areas as a result of which popular frustrations are again rising.
Highways are regularly closed by bandhs and strikes. Internal displacement
is a huge issue as people move in their thousands from the villages to the
district headquarters or to towns and cities considered safe from the Maoists
but the state is yet to create an enabling environment for them to return.
Most of the forcibly confscated property still remains to be returned by the
Maoists.
Tere is, moreover, an acute shortage of electricity all over the
country which has resulted in the closure of several important industries.
In addition even Kathmandu has been grappling with erratic supplies of
essential commodities like petroleum, cooking gas and vegetables. Te
capital, Kathmandu, experiences 18 hours of daily load shedding during
winter, which is ironical in a nation that has 83,000 megawatts of unharnessed
energy potential. While impinging on the overall economic activity of the
country, these issues are negatively infuencing macroeconomic stability and
the regular budget outlays of the government, which has been criticised for
huge expenditures on unproductive programs. With the dissolution of the
legislative parliament in May 2012, the government has only a six-month
budget at hand and is unable to pass a full-fedged budget for the whole
year.
12
Political Interference, labor unrest behind slowing economy. (2012, Oct. 12). Republica National Daily.
36 SEARCCT
Rough Road to Federalism
One of the foremost challenges that the country faces is that the Interim
Constitution has already stipulated that Nepal will henceforth be a federal
republic but the modalities of federalism, the basis of such federal units
and their fnancial sustainability have yet to be examined. Te process of
peoples political mobilisation during the last ten years of insurgency had
sharpened the sense of identity among disparate ethnic groups and shaped
their political views.
13
A centralised state for over 200 years was badly
in need of restructuring but instead of looking at various viable models
of federalism, some political outfts want federal states carved out on the
basis of ethnicity. Tis is a highly explosive design that is certain to backfre
as Nepal has more than 102 recognised ethnic groups but none of those
group(s) in whose name the states are to be formed constitutes a majority.
Te Brahmins and Chhetris that comprise more than 32 percent of the total
population of the country are to be deprived of any state of their own if some
of the proposals submitted to the erstwhile C.A. were to be implemented.
Minority appeasement tactics to win over vote banks is a disease that has
already sneaked into Nepal from neighboring Uttar Pradesh but what the
countrys political leaders need to draw lessons from is the recent success
story of Bihar which has curbed crime, cleaned up bureaucratic red-tape and
is now recording a 13.1 percent GDP growth rate.
It is true that the federal debate was orchestrated in light of the
enormous pressure from Madhesis and groups from the indigenous
nationalities who rightly impugn the state as having marginalised them
in all spheres of activity including employment in government jobs. Tis
led to the Madhesh upheaval in 2007 where there were demands for better
representation of Madhesi people in the security services, government,
politics and the economy. In the elections held the following year, the
Madhesi parties secured less than the 3 major parties - the UCPN (Maoists),
CPN (UML) and the Nepali Congress but emerged as power brokers.
Taking the cue from their sudden success, other fringe parties and criminal
elements operating in the Indo-Nepal border also began promoting the
13
Pattanaik. S & Nayak, N. (2008). Post-Election Nepal: Maoist Success and Challenges Ahead. In Ashok K.
Behuria (Ed.), India and Its Neighbours: Towards a New Partnership. (p. 45). New Delhi: Institute of Defense
Studies and Analyses.
SEARCCT 37
Madhesi cause purely for personal, petty gains resulting in law and order of
the terai districts being the direct casualty. Te security vacuum in the terai
districts marked by a feeble presence of police and other border regulating
agencies known for their corruption has made this uniquely open border as
one of the most illegally trafcked border in the world. Te poorly guarded
open borders are increasingly tempting unscrupulous parties to engage in a
range of criminal activities. Te post confict uncertainties and the erosion
of law and governance have indeed raised the specter of criminal activities
engendering the security of both India and Nepal.
14

Terefore, the assertion of the ethno-linguistic chauvinism of the
Madhesis is a critical element to factor in the future stability of Nepal.
Tere is a real danger that if this ardor of ethnicity-based federalism and the
obscure demand of self-determination is not properly handled, the slow
balkanisation of Nepal will become an eventuality. Some academics however
feel that societies where federalism was introduced in an open environment,
based on mutual negotiations and compromises between conficting parties
have unifed countries and led to the consolidation of democracies. Te open
environment in those societies not only led to negotiated settlements between
various groups and regions but also allowed for progressive demands to be
aired and met in successive years.
15
How and by whom these conficting
issues will be dealt with have a bearing also on the security of Tibet and
North India essentially because ethnic groups are linked across the border(s)
by matrimony, religion and language. For instance, there are more Maithili
speaking people in India than in Nepal and an autonomous region of the
Sherpa community in Nepal could also bandwagon with their kith and kin
across the border in Tibet. Each state could also erect its own security force
which may compartmentalise the professional units of the Nepal Police and
other vital organs of the state. Tere is a huge demand and political pressure
to disintegrate the Nepal Police on ethnic and regional basis so that it may
save political parties locally and regionally.
16
If this happens, the law and
14
Upadhaya, A., (2011). Confict in Nepal and its Transnational Ramifcations. In Raghavan, V.R. (Ed.), Internal
Confict in Nepal (p. 133). New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt. Ltd.
15
Lawoti, M. (2010). Federalism, the Right to Self-Determination and National Security. In Bhattarai, R. &
Wagle, G. (Eds.), Emerging Security Challenges of Nepal. Kathmandu: NIPS. p. 184.
16
Tapa, R.R., (2011). Law Enforcement in Post-Federal Nepal. In Pandey, N.N. & Delinic, T. (Eds.) Nepals
National Interests, Kathmandu: CSAS & KAS. p. 250.
38 SEARCCT
order situation which is already in disarray could further plummet leading
to its total politicisation.
Nepal, which is a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-caste country
with an 80 percent Hindu populace, has historically been a tolerant society.
Since 2006, it has been ofcially declared secular. In 2008, a Hindu fanatic
planted a bomb in the Church of Assumption near Kathmandu killing
several people while other grave attacks against Muslim religious leaders
have also been reported. A combination of intellect, sagacity and a fnely
balanced policy of ensuring freedom to all religious groups without creating
a sense of estrangement to among the majority is the need of the hour which
again warrants wisdom from all political forces.
Macroeconomic Performance
Te foremost cause for a very low industrial output has been the political
bedlam in the terai, which is the main granary and also the industrial belt of
Nepal bordering U.P., Bihar and Uttarakhand. Te turmoil began in early
2007 as the terai parties began demanding better representation, more rights
and a budget for the Madhesis.
17
Terai occupies 23 percent of Nepals total
area, comprises 24 out of 75 districts in the country, and holds 48.5 percent
of the total population. 74 percent of paddy cultivation is in the terai. It
is famous for cash crops such as sugarcane, jute, tobacco, tea and pulses.
Staples such as paddy, wheat and maize are its main agricultural produce.
18

Its forests provide sal wood and commercially valuable bamboo and rattan.
It also controls the chief supply route to India. All daily essentials from
India to cities such as Kathmandu and Pokhara have to transit through the
terai districts. Continuous disruption in vehicular movement, especially
at the transit points has afected the Nepali industrial sector. For instance,
during the agitation launched by the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF)
and Jantantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) in Feb. 2007, thirty-six out
of 40 industrial units were closed due to a scarcity of raw materials in the
17
Note: Madhesis are people of Indian origin who live in Nepals southern area bordering India. Te word terai
and Madhesh have been used interchangeably. Tere are a substantial number of people from the hills too who
have settled in the terai.
18
Rakesh, R.D., (2007). Murder of Madhesh. Kathmandu: Safari Nepal Publishers, P. 9.
SEARCCT 39
Hetauda industrial zone of Makawanpur district. Among them, fve were
multinational companies including Colgate Palmolive, Unilever Limited
and Alcoa CSI Pvt. Ltd. Te import of raw materials from India and third
countries was obstructed. Colgate Palmolive shut all activities after it failed
to receive raw materials for two weeks. An ofcial stated that imported goods
were held up at the Birgunj customs post for a week. Another multinational,
Unilever Limited also halted manufacturing as goods produced at the plant
could not get to the market as they were held up at the Birgunj Customs
ofce for more than a week.
19

Although these industries have since resumed production, the Jyoti
Spinning Mill closed down completely, citing unsafe operating conditions
and daily power cuts. It was the frst modern spinning mill in the country
established in 1989 in Parwanipur with 1200 workers. Surya Nepal
Garments, an Indian multinational company in Biratnagar also closed down
on May 28, 2009 due to a dispute with the labor union. Te increasing
trend of demanding unwarranted wage increases, calling strikes on the
fimsiest of grounds and then blocking vehicular trafc along the highway
just to coerce the government into making a deal has increased the cost of
goods, reduced competitiveness and impeded economic growth. Insecurity
in the terai, unpredictability of power supplies and raw materials together
with waning harmony between labor and industry have adversely afected
the industrial sector.
20
Tis is one of the most important issues confronting
contemporary Nepal and unless we are able to create an investment friendly
climate, ensure the safety of enterprises, employ qualifed CEOs in relevant
businesses, and provide basic minimum requirements such as power, road
accessibility and other infrastructure, very little can be expected by way of
foreign investment. Nepal must draw lessons from the sorry predicament of
the state of West Bengal where similar issues hampered foreign investment
for over 3 decades of communist rule.
19
Tirty Six industries including multinational companies closed down in Hetauda. (March 15, 2007). Retrieved
from http://www.nepalbiznews.com/newsdata/Biz-News/hetaudaindustrialareanews.html.
20
See Tree Year Plan Document, National Planning Commission, >www.npc.gov.np< 2008.
40 SEARCCT
Tourism & Remittance
During the decade of confict no other sector of the economy was hit as
severely as tourism. Arrivals began to slide not only due to fghting along
famous trekking routes and tourist sites, but also because of a series of
mishaps that Nepal witnessed in the last decade. Te hijacking of IC 814,
the Royal massacre of 2001, the endless strikes and negative publicity in the
international media coupled with travel advisories that Nepal is not a safe
destination forced tourists to steer clear of Nepal. Tis, in turn, led to the
closure of several hotels in Kathmandu and Pokhara. A nation famous for
some of the worlds highest peaks and a haven of peace, where the Buddha
was born, had turned into a deadly war zone and it was only natural for tour
operators to look for alternative destinations. Even after the political change
of 2006, the country experienced one political crisis after another. In May
2010, the seven day closure called by the UCPN (Maoist) occurred during
the summer vacations for schools in India, thus directly afecting tourism.
Gross foreign exchange earnings in convertible currency from tourism stood
at US$ 230.6 million in 2007. It represented an increase of 41.7 percent
from 2006. Te year 2011 witnessed a slight increase in tourist infow but
this trend needs to be sustained.
Nepal relies heavily on the remittances sent by its manpower that
works in the Gulf, South Korea, and Malaysia. Te youth who escaped the
ravages of the insurgency, worked hard as laborers in these distant places but
have been earnest in regularly sending their earnings back to their families in
Nepali villages thus sustaining the economy even during pressing times. An
estimated 2.2 million Nepalese live and work in these countries at present.
On average the Nepali migrant workers earn around Rs 438.38 billion
annually. Nepalese working in the Gulf countries Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates earn around Rs 319.5 billion followed by
Malaysia (Rs 76.20 billion), South Korea (Rs 7.24 billion) and Kuwait (Rs
6.27 billion). About 1.5 million Nepalese work in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates while 500,000 are in Malaysia, followed by 8,500
in South Korea and 40,000 in Kuwait. Maintaining the national economy
through remittances as a source of income is not a dependable option, as
there are other social ramifcations to consider, like the health of the workers,
the increasing number of broken families, etc. However, for now, this seems
to be the only sector that is faring well.

SEARCCT 41
Conclusion
Nepal is yet to settle down despite the abrogation of the 1990 Constitution,
the holding of the Constituent Assembly elections, the declaration of
a republican order and the formation of fve diferent governments since
2006. Minimising the challenges of a transition that is prolonging and
boosting a sense of security among the populace can be done only if the
political parties exhibit maturity and evolve a healthy political culture. Since
a constitution could not be drafted by the C.A. and the country is now
devoid of a parliament, it is highly probable that Nepal will slide further
into instability and unpredictability. At least, if a broad national consensus
can be reached on basic issues such as foreign and economic policies, vital
institutions can still function until the political situation is resolved.
SEARCCT 43
VERNACULAR PRESS AND REPORTING CONFLICTS
Ranga Kalansooriya
ABSTRACT
Media always plays a key role in democracies, but once democracy is challenged
media, too, face multi-layer dilemmas. Reporting conficts becomes a confict
itself to media practitioners. In a confict theatre, democratic norms and values
are challenged and the medias attempts to protect vulnerable democracy results in
heavy costs even to the life of journalists and media practitioners. Te vernacular
press is the most volatile but also the most important segment of such a confict
theatre due to its outreach, accessibility and ability to infuence society at large.
Keywords: Global trends in news journalism, infuencing factors, ethics,
standards of vernacular press, news in conficts, enemy image
Introduction
Democracy is impossible without a free press (Baker, 1998) yet the media is
always accused of being politically allied, ethnically biased and agenda driven,
mainly when reporting conficts. Tese accusations get more advanced when
it comes to reporting terrorism, both at local and international contexts.
It is an undeniable fact that the media plays an extremely vital
role in defusing tensions, managing conficts and establishing democracy.
As Kurspahic (2003) argues, making the independence of the media
is an important part of future peace agreements and one of the must-do
requirements for international acceptance of states in transition. But the
real challenge is convincing the media to adopt this independence whose
commercial side is necessarily a blending of two separate disciplines: business
and journalism (Herrick; 2003). Apart from the commercial side, the media
has a strong political agenda as well.
Media in confict theatres is often accused of being ethnically,
politically or religiously biased or polarised. However, it is biased on
commercial terms to a greater extent. Many aspects such as market forces,
44 SEARCCT
the political alignment of ownership, readership infuence and the lack of
professional standards among journalists and editors are perceived to be the
root causes for this phenomenon.
Tis paper is aimed at shedding a critical light on the role of the
vernacular media in exploring whether it has a role in preserving a countrys
democracy by defusing the prevailing ethnic, political or religious tensions
and establishing harmony between the conficting parties. Te main focus
of the paper is news journalism, rather than features or any other form of
journalism.
News and News Reporting
Information, education and entertainment are the cardinal components
of the media of which information, as in the formation of news, reaches
the public. Some would argue that news and information are two diferent
components of media based on public response, but there exists a fne line
demarcating the two.
1

An independent media is the pillar of true democracy and no other
institution does what journalism does, namely to inform, monitor, and
critique public afairs (Stepp; 1996). To the extent that papers and stations
try to fx government through journalism or substitute journalism
for government they depart from their unique duties to provide checks
on government that are critically important to democracy, argues Stepp.
2
Tough he, in his academic commentary, does not deeply engage with the
concept of news in the feld of media, many scholars have argued that the
impact of news is the cardinal element in shaping public opinion at large.
News, one of the most important forms of information imparted
by the mass media (Roy; 2005), is considered one of the most important
components that shapes public opinion (Shrivastava; 2003). It also makes
people feel they are part of a bigger network of people, or a larger community
which could be derived through a formula where people and their actions
RANGA KALANSOORIYA VERNACULAR PRESS AND REPORTING CONFLICTS
1
Information is something that would generate an immediate response from an individual. One can receive
information through news which is more colourful, creative and attractive, according to Prof. Shrivastava of the
Indian Institute of Mass Communication (personal interview).
2
Carl Stepp,Public Journalism: Balancing the Scales, American Journalism Review 18 (1996): p40.
SEARCCT 45
3
Roy Barun in his formula [People + action + readers interest = News] argues that all these three adding
components are equally important in creating news.
are conjoined with the readers interest for which the news is generated (Roy;
2005).
3
But according to Dzur (2002), news is more than the information
that the public wants. According to him, the mandate of news goes beyond
just reporting but generating public discourse. More controversial than the
re-conceptualisation of what is newsworthy, so that it includes non-elite
stories and purposeful news, is the belief that to promote public deliberation
journalists must do more than report the news, and should broaden their
role to include helping the public convene and deliberate about public
afairs, Dzur says, adding that news journalists should play the role of the
neutral referee in such public deliberations which were derived from the
news he relayed to the public. Of course, the metaphor is not entirely apt,
since referees do not infuence the rules of the game and seldom urge the
players onto the feld. Like referees, though, journalists would immediately
lose their particular role-based authority if they were to actively root for one
side, Dzur argues.
But it is seldom that the journalist himself/herself takes the decision
to be one-sided. In the corporate business of news media, and also in the
Asian context where media is a value- added commodity in gaining political
power, the concept of objective news reporting has diferent variations and
interpretations. Several writers argue on diferent agendas in news reporting
in this context, especially on market interest, business models, corporate
infuence and political agendas.
Kressel (1987) argues that the judgments of media bias rest upon
three socio-psychological processes: a general, cognitive confrmatory bias
in judging evidence, a tendency for deeply involved partisans to have a
wide latitude of rejection, and a tendency for partisans to perceive (and
misperceive) media in accordance with their overall views. At the same
time he feels that the media criticism may also be understood as a partisan,
political tool. While the media do have an obligation to adhere to certain
journalistic norms and standards, it is difcult -if not impossible- to invoke
these norms without making normative and conceptual judgments, Kressel
says. In fact, something similar to Herricks concept of media business was
46 SEARCCT
tried, unsuccessfully, by several major media moguls in India several years
ago, after which they returned to the basics of news media management.
4

Media owners are not the only stake holding factions that attempts to
infuence media, news journalism in particular. Herbert (2001) argues that
politicians, statesmen, businessmen (advertisers), and the rich and infuential
throughout the world have tried to change the face of journalism and what
it publishes. However, with the advancement of the New Media in this
digital age, he says, their infuence has becomes redundant. Authoritarian
control over media still exists in many countries. But because of the way new
technology allows information to be transmitted and shared by journalists
and others worldwide, governments are fnding censorship increasingly
difcult to maintain,
5
he says.
Vernacular press and conficts
Te Oxford Dictionary explains the term vernacular as the ordinary
language of a country or district.
6
Tough, in contemporary media studies
the term press is used often to refer to all forms of mass communication
of information and opinion on afairs of current interest (Peiris, 1997:
01), press by and large in general usage is described as the print media.
Tus, the vernacular press is considered the local language print media in
a country. In fact, it is the most read and accessed print media compared
to English publications in any country. Tus, its impact is immense on its
readership, which is the majority of countrys population, no matter what
native language they use.
Tere is a general consensus that all conficts must be seen in a
regional context (Loewenberg; 2007). Even in internal conficts, neighboring
states are almost always involved directly or indirectly whether because of
minority/majority populations across national borders, the harboring of rebel
4
Some major Indian newspaper companies like the Indian Express made several attempts to reshape news
in-line with advertising interests and also through new marketing strategies where editors were advised to
emphasise marketing concepts when presenting news of the day. However, this attempt did not bring in the
expected commercial results to the corporate ownership prompting them to return to the basic concepts of news
presenting.
5
John Herbert, Practicing Global Journalism, (Oxford, 2001), p 8
6
Te Oxford Mini-reference Dictionary and Tesaurus; Oxford University Press; p 707
SEARCCT 47
groups, feeing refugees, state security concerns, political interests etc, says
Loewenberg. Against this backdrop, the importance of the local language
media is critical in disseminating information to the local population in
their own language.
Te mass media has played an increasing role in mobilising
population groups behind their leadership in violent conficts. In the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and many other countries, the local media have turned
a blind eye to societal inadequacies and the political or economic root causes
of conficts. During the escalation of conficts, the media have contributed
to it by perpetuating prejudices, stereotypes and the hate speeches against
other parts of the population using ethnic, religious or cultural identities as
rallying cries. (Bonde; 2007).
In pre-confict, during -confict and post -confict environments,
Bonde identifes several areas of media for intervention; content, media
structure, media legislations, ethics and capacity building a process
that would include all key stakeholders and institutions in a democracy,
Parliament, Government, regulatory bodies, broadcasters and print media
(ownership), media (at large), minority and human rights NGOs.
Te key feature in media biasedness is the portrayal of the enemy
image mainly in the guise of us vs. them concept. Tis phenomenon is
widely seen in the vernacular press when compared to the English press for
multiple reasons.
Patriotism plays a pivotal role in portraying the enemy image
mainly in demonising the enemy. Some social scientists explains this as a
socio-psychological issue while another school of thought believes this to
be a propaganda methodology employed by the state or other infuencing
sector. Kelly & Michela (1980) and Ross (1977) both argue that the
creation of a borderline between us and the other is a socio-psychological
mechanism that occurs in all human relations; in the neighbourhood,
community and society, people will include some but exclude others on the
basis of diferent criteria. Eventually nations start to defne other nations as
the other, according to Ottosen (1995). Philip Knightley (1975) describes
how an important element in war-reporting is to demonise the enemy and
to portray him as an animal in human disguise.
7

7
Ottosen Rune, Enemy images and Journalistic Process, Journal of Peace Research, Prio Oslo, 1995 p 98
48 SEARCCT
Tus, the journalistic practice get twisted and distorted with a hidden
agenda where the readership is heavily afected. Tis portrayal of the enemy
image by the agenda-guided media against the other was clearly visible in
the Balkans confict as explained in above paragraphs. Also it was obvious
mainly in the vernacular press during many conficts around the world,
including the Gulf War, global way against terror and also that of Sri Lanka.
In these confict environments, the stereotypes in the media can
legitimise violent actions even in news reporting, with the news slant and
rhetoric applied to the stories to enhance the prevailing enemy image and
systematically change the mindset of the public (their own clientele) against
the other.
To gain a deeper understanding of enemy images in everyday journalism,
one has to analyse a sample of newspapers over a longer time-span, including
periods when the situation is more normal than during overt conficts. Te
extent to which linkages can be found during commercial pressure and political
frames of reference should also be examined. (Ottosen; 1995)
Being patriotic or loyal to your own side makes it easy for the
journalist to portray the enemy image against the other but putting his
own practice of the profession in question says Herbert (2001). He argues that
the dilemma faced by journalists by being loyal to their own side without
allowing themselves to get caught up in the propaganda has been in existence
for a long period, until Vietnam provided a better lesson. Herbert says:
In Vietnam, the military, as they had done before, expected journalists
to be loyal to their own side. For a while this probably was the case.
Te Western allies were the good guys; the Vietnamese werent. But
then came the 1968 Tet ofensive when the journalists reported what
they saw, not what the military wanted them to see,
8

Another classic case in studying the concept of portraying the
enemy image in the media is the Israel Palestine confict. According to
(Kressel 1987) the critiques of media coverage ofered by pro-Arab writers
and pro- Israel writers contain some structural similarities. Both groups cite:
(1) unbalanced and disproportionately unfavorable coverage, (2) distorted
8
John Herbert, Practicing Global Journalism, (Oxford, 2001), p 36
SEARCCT 49
and untrue media portrayals of the confict, (3) prejudice and stereotyping,
(4) employment of double standards, and (5) various unfair political and
organisational barriers to an objective coverage. In addition, pro-Arab
commentators have highlighted quantitative under-representation in media
coverage. Pro-Israel writers have discussed limitations inherent in the media
themselves-such as the broadcast medias weakness at handling the contextual
background, Kressel argues.
Conclusion
Te media is a powerful tool in shaping the public mindset, and the
vernacular media has the highest impact among others. Tough the broadcast
media especially the radio - plays a major role in its outreach, the print
media (press), too, is signifcant in providing more analytical and thought
provoking content.
Te vernacular press is extensively challenged in confict theatres,
as its content has comparatively long shelf value and tangible accessibility.
It is directly targeted by various interest groups and parties to the confict
in shaping public opinion as well as disseminating information, mostly on
propaganda basis.
In contrast, the media has its own challenges. Poor professional
standards and ethics, the infuence of the ownership, the lack of understanding
of the confict, politically driven agendas and also the ethnically or religiously
biased vernacular press that could be more powerful than a lethal weapon.
Te most dangerous phenomenon is when the media becomes a
party to the confict, abandoning its due watchdog role. Ten it becomes
an us against them battle not only on the confict ground but even in the
news pages themselves. Tis was the case in many conficts in places such as
the Balkans, Sri Lanka, the Middle East and elsewhere. Te portrayal of the
enemy image by demonising the other party becomes the core business of its
content in what is termed Patriotic Journalism which totally contradicts the
basic norms of journalism. Enhancing professional standards, minimising
ownership infuence, sensitising the journalist and media gate-keepers to
confict through capacity building are among the recommended remedies in
addressing this issue.
50 SEARCCT
Bibliography
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SEARCCT 51
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52 SEARCCT
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RANGA KALANSOORIYA
SEARCCT 53
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THINK TANKS IN
COUNTERING EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM
Rohan Gunaratna
Introduction

To counter violent extremism, over 100 think tanks are currently engaged
in teaching, research, networking and outreach activities.
1
Te ability of
think tanks to develop excellence and also infuence both government and
community responses to security threats vary.
While some specialist think tanks work exclusively on violent
extremism, others work on security in general, including terrorism and
counter terrorism. In addition, one can also argue that if countering violent
extremism is a discipline, it should be based at an academic institution
else it may lack the necessary theoretical and methodological rigor and an
interdisciplinary approach.
2

Te focus of most security think tanks is to work with governments
where they mostly conduct contract research and engage in policy advocacy
on behalf of governments. But, in addition to working with governments,
it is also paramount for think tanks to work with community partners to
engage susceptible communities vulnerable to extremist ideologies. By
helping community organisations to counter extremist ideology and promote
moderation among their communities, think tanks help communities to
build social resilience. Future think tanks can play an appreciable role in
creating an environment hostile to threat groups and unfriendly to supporters
and sympathisers.

1
Benjamin Freedman, Terrorism Research Centres: 100 Institutes, Programs and Organisations in the Field of
Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Radicalisation and Asymmetric Warfare Studies, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.
4, No 5 (2010) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/123/html> <Accessed August
27, 2012>
2
Interview, Bruce Hofman, Director, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown Universitys Walsh School of
Foreign Service, August 15, 2012
54 SEARCCT
Te First Generation Tink Tanks
Spurred by the beginning of the contemporary wave of terrorism in 1968,
the frst generation of counter terrorism think tanks originated in the West
and in Israel. RAND staf Brian Michael Jenkins, since 1972, and Bruce
Hofman, since 1981, have systematically studied terrorism. While Jenkins
previously served in the US Special Forces in Vietnam, Hofman was an
academic specialist with feld experience. Tey built and maintained the
frst international terrorism database. Since then, over forty years, RANDs
reputation as a world leader in research on terrorism, counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency and homeland security has grown.
In the UK, the discipline of terrorism studies was founded by
Paul Wilkinson. Wilkinson was previously associated with and directed
the Research Institute for the Study of Confict and Terrorism (RISCT)
in London that functioned from 1989-1999. Together with Hofman,
Wilkinson established the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews in 1994. In addition
to hosting the RAND Terrorism Chronology and advising governments,
CSTPV ofered counter terrorism courses at the undergraduate and
postgraduate levels.
As much as the developments in Northern Ireland created the
impetus for the creation of a counter terrorism capability in the U.K, the
developments in the Middle East prompted the Israelis to create a similar
capability. In 1996, the Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) was founded
at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Israels frst private university. ICT
ofered counter terrorism courses at undergraduate and postgraduate levels.
Te National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
(MIPT) was created in response to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. Until 9/11, it was
the worst terrorist attack on US homeland and MIPT dedicated itself to
the training and professional development of nearly a million American
law enforcement ofcers, both in crime and terrorism prevention. With the
exception of the US Library of Congress, the MIPTs Lawsons Library hosts
the largest online repository of homeland security and terrorism data for use
by US law enforcement.
COUNTERING EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM ROHAN GUNARATNA
SEARCCT 55
Te frst counter-terrorism research think tank outside the West
and Israel was established in China. Te China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) launched the Center for Counter-
Terrorism Studies in 2000. Considered the frst academic research institution
specialising in counter-terrorist studies in China, the CICIR also focused on
transnational organised crimes, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
etc.
3
Te Center established databases, published research papers and held
domestic and international seminars.
Second Generation of Tink Tanks
Spurred by 9/11, the second generation of think tanks emerged both in
the global north and south. In the wake of Al Qaedas 9/11 attacks and
the disruption of the Al Jemaah Al Islamiyah plot to attack Singapore in
December 2001, the Government of Singapore reassessed the threat of
terrorism. In July 2002, a terrorism research programme was established
within the Institute for Defence and Security Studies, now the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies (RSIS), at Nanyang Technological University.
Te programme was subsequently upgraded into the International Centre
for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) on February
20, 2004. A critical node in global threat research, ICPVTRs functional
and regional analysts cover Asia, Africa, Europe, North America and the
Middle East. Analysts are drawn from a range of academic backgrounds
and government agencies and also include Muslim religious scholars. While
ICPVTR seeks to maintain its unique cultural and linguistic diversity, it
has a strong Muslim representation - of more than ffty percent among its
staf - that enables it to put into context Islamic concepts which have been
misrepresented in radical propaganda espoused by terrorist ideologues. Since
2003 the ideological response unit of ICPVTR, spearheaded and stafed by
clerics, built government capacities to rehabilitate terrorists and counter
extremism in communities.
4

3
China Institutes of Contemporary Relations, <http://www.cicir.ac.cn/english/organView.aspx?cid=382>,
<Accessed August 27, 2012>
4
Muhammad Hanif Hassan and Mohamed Redzuan Salleh, Jihadism studies in counter ideology: Time for
initiation in universities, RSIS Commentaries ; 085/10; S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, July 28,
2010 < http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0852010.pdf> ,<Accessed August 27, 2012>
56 SEARCCT
Te United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point
established a Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) on February 20, 2003.
Russ Howard, a former Special Forces Ofcer, who was the Head of the
Department of Social Science, was its founding Director.
Te Fletcher School for Law and Diplomacy created the Jebsen
Center for Counter Terrorism in 2005. Te frst graduate-only school of
international afairs in the United States established in 1933,
5
the Fletcher
School is at the Tufts University in Boston. Due to a lack of continuity in
funding, the Center was closed down in 2006 but Richard Shultz, a professor
of international politics, and other academics at Fletcher retain signifcant
expertise on counter terrorism and counter insurgency.
Te Australian government supported the development of university
and non-university think tanks to counter violent extremism in Australia.
Te impetus for this support was the terrorist attack in Bali in October 2002
that killed 202 persons including 88 Australians and the continuing threat
on its own soil. Te Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism
(PICT) at Macquarie University, Australia was established in 2005.
6

Te Global Terrorism Research Center at University of Monash was
established in 2006. Adam Dolnik, an ICPVTR alumnus and a Ph.D. from
RSIS, served as the Director of Terrorism Studies at Wollongong Universitys
Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention training a new generation of
Australian and international scholars and practitioners.
To guide counter terrorism research to secure the US homeland,
several government institutions have provided grants to US and foreign think
tanks. Tey range from the United States Institute of Peace, Ofce of Naval
Research and the Department of Defence. A U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Center of Excellence - Te National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) - was established
at the University of Maryland at College Park by Gary LaFree in 2005.
7

5
Te Fletcher School, Tufts University, <http://fetcher.tufts.edu/About/Fletcher-History>, <Accessed August 27,
2012>
6
Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University; <http://mq.edu.au/about_us/
faculties_and_departments/faculty_of_arts/centre_for_policing_intelligence_and_counter_terrorism/about_
pict/>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
7
Te National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland,
<http://www.start.umd.edu/start/about/overview/mission/>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
SEARCCT 57
Te International Centre for the Study of Terrorism (ICST) at the
Pennsylvania State University was launched in London on May 20, 2006.
Strong in social and behavioural science study, ICSTs multidisciplinary and
cross-national teams conduct contract research both for government and the
private sector.
8

Te International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) was
launched in London in January 2008 with Peter Neumann as its Director
who also co-directs the MA program in Terrorism, Security and Society at
the Department of War Studies.
Te International Centre for Counter-Terrorism at Te Hague was
launched on May 31, 2010. ICCT was founded and is supported by a unique
partnership comprising three renowned institutions based in Te Hague - the
T.M.C. Asser Instituut, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Clingendael and the Centre for Terrorism & Counterterrorism of Campus,
Te Hague/Leiden University. Supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Afairs and other donors, Peter Knoope has been the director since ICCTs
inception.
Non-University Tink Tanks
Several hundred non-university afliated think tanks also study and research
methods to counter violent extremism. While some are government or
government- supported, others are corporate or privately- funded think tanks
registered as NGOs. Te NGO think tanks are the ones close to the ground
working in confict zones and with access to serving and former violent
extremists. With funding from western governments including Australia,
Japan and other donors, they conduct feld research, publish research papers,
train and engage in outreach activity.
Established in 1997, the Institute for Confict Management (ICM),
New Delhi, is South Asias leading counter terrorism and counter insurgency
think tank. Te Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an independent,
not-for-proft, non-governmental research and advocacy think tank was
established on January 10, 2006.
9
Located in Kabul, Afghanistan, the
8
International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Te Pennsylvania State University, <http://www.icst.psu.edu/
About.shtml>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
9
Pak Institute for Peace Studies, <http://san-pips.com/>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
58 SEARCCT
Centre for Confict and Peace Studies (CAPS) is an independent think
tank engaged in action-oriented research to support and infuence policy-
makers.
10
Located in Dhaka, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) is a
non-proft, non-political, research and advocacy think tank established in
October 2000. Directed by Farooq Sobhan, a former Foreign Secretary and
Ambassador , BEI also serves as a platform to bring the specialist counter
terrorism agencies and other security stakeholders together.
11
Similarly, the
Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) is also a non-
proft, non-political, research and advocacy think tank devoted to the study
of peace and security issues related to Asia and beyond.
12
Directed by Major
General (Retired) Muniruzzaman, BIPSS launched the Bangladesh Centre
for Terrorism Research (BCTR) - a specialised centre dedicated to the study,
data management and research on terrorism and extremism.
Te Institute of International Peace Building (IIPB: Yayasan Prasasti
Perdamaian) in Jakarta is a non-proft, non-governmental organisation
established in early 2008.
13
It is led by a former journalist Noor Huda Ismail
who was a student analyst with ICPVTR in 2006 and holds a masters degree
from St Andrews University. A former student of the Jemaah Islamiyah
leader Abu Bakar Baasyir at the Pondok Pesantren Al Mukmin Ngruki,
Huda engaged in de-radicalising former members of Jemaah Islamiyah and
other violent extremists. IIPB also conducts extensive feld research. Te
Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)
is an independent, non-proft, non-governmental organisation launched on
March 6, 2008. Renamed the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and
Terrorism Research, PIPVTR is led by Rommel Banlaoi.
With its origins in November 2007, the Center on Global
Counterterrorism Cooperation (GCTC) builds partnerships through
collaborative research and policy analysis and by providing practical advice.
14

Te Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) launched the Center
10
Centre for Confict and Peace Studies, <http://www.caps.af/>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
11
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, <http://www.bei-bd.org/about-bei.php>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
12
Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, , <http://bipss.org.bd/index.php/page/about-bipss>,
13 Yayasan Prasati Perdamaian, <http://www.prasastiperdamaian.com/about/vision-and-mission/>, <Accessed
August 27, 2012>
14
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, <http://www.globalct.org/about_background.php>,
SEARCCT 59
for the Study of Terrorist Radicalisation (CSTR) in 2010. Te Jamestown
Foundation has emerged as a leading provider of research and analysis on
confict and instability in Eurasia. Since its foundation in 1984 as a platform
to support Soviet dissidents, Te Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC
has been regarded for its expertise on terrorism and extremism in Eurasia.
15

One of the best resources to counter-extremism is Te Middle East Media
Research Institute (MEMRI) in Washington DC. Created in February 1998,
MEMRI extensively translates literature produced by terrorist and extremist
groups in Arabic, Persian, Urdu-Pashtu and Turkish media into English.
16

Located in DC, MEMRI also has branch ofces overseas.
17

In the UK, in addition to the British government, charities also
support several think tanks. Specialist think tanks such as the Quilliam
Foundation, which is stafed by former extremists and terrorists, have been
efective in countering extremism. Created by Ed Husain, Maajid Nawaz
and Rashad Zaman Ali in 2008, Quilliam Foundation is the worlds frst
counter-extremism think tank set up to address the unique challenges of
citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalised world.
18

Tere are a number of foreign ministry and defence ministry research
institutes with specialist programs on terrorism studies. Te US has regional
centres worldwide. One of the best specialist centres is Norwegian Defence
Research Establishments (Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt FFI) Terrorism
Research Group (TERRA). TERRA conducts research on transnational
militant Islamism for the Norwegian Government but publishes many of its
products.
19
Te Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Malaysia, created its specialist
counter terrorism research centre, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for
Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) on July 1, 2003. Based in Kuala Lumpur,
SEARCCT engages in research, training and publications.
20

Many security think tanks with counter terrorism specialists run
terrorism research programmes. Tey mostly consult with governments and
15
Te Jamestown Foundation, <http://www.jamestown.org>,<Accessed August 28, 2012>
16
Te Middle East Media Research Institute, <http://www.memri.org>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
17
Te Middle East Media Research Institute, <http://www.memri.org/content/en/about.htm>,<Accessed August
, 2012>
18
Quilliam Foundation, < http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/about/>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
19
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, <http://www.f.no/en/Terra/Sider/default.aspx> ,<Accessed August
28, 2012>
20
Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism < http://www.searcct.gov.my/>,<Accessed August 28, 2012>
60 SEARCCT
corporations, host seminars and conferences and engage in research and
training. Founded in 2003, the George Washington University Homeland
Security Policy Institute (HSPI) is a non-partisan think and do tank.
21
Led
by Frank J. Cillufo, HSPI builds bridges between theory and practice to
advance homeland security through an interdisciplinary approach.
22

Te Washington Institute for Near East Policy produces timely reports
on terrorist threats and invites terrorism specialists from around the world
to participate in their activities. Former FBI Agent, Matthew Levitt, directs
the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Institute.
23

Similarly, the long standing Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) in Washington D.C., which is stafed by Arnaud de Borchgrave,
Tomas M. Sanderson and Juan Zarate, consults with the government,
runs projects and hosts conferences.
24
Te Council on Foreign Relations
(CFR) has also launched a programme to counter extremism through civil
society.
25

Te Against Violent Extremism Network (AVE) was seeded and
launched by Google Ideas at the Summit Against Violent Extremism in
Dublin in June 2011.
26
Led by Jared Cohen, Director Google Ideas, the
Summit brought together former extremists, terrorists and insurgents. Many
European counter terrorism academics and practitioners serve in universities
and think tanks but there are only a handful of specialist counter terrorism
think tanks in most European countries. Te Program on Global Terrorism
at the Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies in Spain
led by Professor Fernando Reinares is one such.
Some think tanks lack in-house speciality in countering violent
extremism. Such think tanks then invite specialists and convene meetings to
21
Te George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, <http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/about/
mission.cfm> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
22
Te George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, <http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/experts/
hspiStaf.cfm>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
23
Te Washington Institute for Near East Policy, < http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/about/research-programs/
stein-program-on-counterterrorism-and-intelligence/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
24
Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/category/topics/defense-and-security/
terrorism>,<Accessed August 28, 2012>
25
Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/csmd/>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
26
Google Public Policy Blog, <http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.sg/2011/06/google-ideas-launches-summit-
against.html>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
SEARCCT 61
discuss the threat of violent extremism. For example, Te Chatham House,
27

Te International Institute for Strategic Studies,
28
Te Ditchely Foundation,
29
Wilton Park
30
and other similar organisations address topical security issues
including terrorism and counter terrorism. Tey generate discussions with
the intention of addressing global, regional and national challenges.
Private companies such as the Terrorism Research Center, Soufan
Group,
31
Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE Institute),
32

Stratfor,
33
and World-Check also conduct research and host conferences on
terrorism and counter terrorism issues.
In the Middle East, several think tanks work on security measures
in collaboration with research programmes on terrorism and extremism.
However, with the exception of Israel and Turkey, there are no dedicated
think tanks focusing on terrorism in the Middle East. Te International
Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM, Uluslararas
Terrizm ve Snraan Sular Aratrma Merkezi) was established in July
2007. Te Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (Terrizmle
Mcadele Mkemmeliyet Merkezi: COE-DAT) was established in Turkey
on December 1, 2003.
34
Located in Ankara, Turkey, this NATO- supported
think tank engages in training throughout the year.
Te leading think tank in the world countering on-line violent
extremism is Assakina Campaign for Dialogue. A specialised campaign in
the Arabic medium, Assakina not only counters extremism but also promotes
moderation by targeting websites, forums and groups. Te campaign is
spearheaded by Sheikh Ahmad Munam al-Mushawwah.
Although there are government think tanks working on terrorism
in the Middle East, there are no dedicated academic think tanks working
on counter-extremism. Te frst such think tank will be the International
Centre of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism in Abu Dhabi to be
launched in October 2012.
27
Chatham House, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/security>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
28
Te International Institute for Strategic Studies, <http://www.iiss.org/programmes/transnational-threats-and-
political-risk/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
29
Te Ditchley Foundation, <http://www.ditchley.co.uk/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
30
Wilton Park, < http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/en/about-wilton-park/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
31
Te Soufan Group, <http://soufangroup.com/>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
32
Search for International Terrorist Entities, <http://news.siteintelgroup.com/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
33
Stratfor, < http://www.stratfor.com/about>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
34
Centre for Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, <http://www.coedat.nato.int/history.htm>, <Accessed August
28, 2012>
62 SEARCCT
While a variety of US based think tanks do work on threats in Latin
America, there are specialised think tanks on Latin American soil dedicated
to countering violent extremism. Many experts on Latin American threat
groups work for government think tanks and universities.
While there are no dedicated African think tanks engaged in counter
extremism, there are a dozen think tanks working on security in general that
cover counter terrorism, counter extremism and peace building. Tey include
the Observatory of Confict and Violence Prevention (OCVP), University of
Hargeisa, Somaliland,
35
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation,
Ethiopia, African Centre for Security and Strategic Studies, Kenya,
36
Africa
Peace and Security Program, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis
Ababa University,
37
Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Ethiopia,
38
Institute
for Security Studies, South Africa,
39
African Centre for the Constructive
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), South Africa,
40
and Kenya Muslim
Youth Alliance (KMYA).
41

In the global south, especially in the Muslim world, a few hundred
entities engage in countering violent extremism. As they work at the grass
root levels, they do not bear the name counter terrorism but their work
does help to reduce terrorist threat. While some of these think tanks are
afliated to academic or government institutions, others are registered as
voluntary and non-governmental entities. Tese think tanks play activist
roles at grass root levels seeking to infuence the human terrain. Most of
the counter-extremism works conducted by NGO think tanks are project
-based. Depending on the funding received from governments or other
private donors, they launch initiatives in counter-extremism. Te US,
Canada, Europe, Australia and Japan through their diplomatic missions
provide funding to these NGO think tanks.
Changing Roles of Tink Tanks
35
Observatory of Confict and Violence Prevention, <http://www.ocvp.org/>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
36
African Centre for Security and Strategic Studies, <http://www.afcesss.org> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
37
Institute for Peace and Security Studies, <http://www.ipss-addis.org/>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
38
Africa Center for Strategic Studies, <http://africacenter.org/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
39
Institute for Security Studies, http://www.issafrica.org/default.php, <Accessed August 29, 2012>
40
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, http://www.accord.org.za/, <Accessed August 29,
2012>
41
Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance, <http://kmya.org/>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
SEARCCT 63
While several hundred think tanks research and publish on terrorism and
counter terrorism, the specialist centers focusing exclusively on terrorism
studies are less than 100. Of the specialist centres dedicated to the feld,
a few dozen think tanks use that knowledge to train a new generation
of practitioners and scholars. Of the dedicated think tanks working on
terrorism and counter terrorism issues, only a few dozen ofer university
degrees specialising in terrorism studies as most think tanks are without
teaching components. Of the university think tanks with research and
teaching capabilities, a handful conduct networking and outreach activities
in their communities.
Non- university think tanks are best suited to engaging in community
networking and outreach activities in many countries sufering from
terrorism and extremism. One of the most notable trends is that university
think tanks are increasingly working and supporting NGO think tanks
engaged in community networking for research and outreach activities to
infuence the community against ideological extremism and terrorism. Tink
tanks in the global south working on terrorism studies that have signifcant
language capabilities are also able to conduct research into counter-ideology.
Identifed as radicalisation studies, these think tanks research and propose
recommendations to counter the threat before it matures into terrorism. In
future, think tanks working to counter violent extremism must focus on
three core areas:
i. Improving Engagement
ii. Capacity Building
iii. Establishing Partnerships
42

To improve engagement, think tanks must be willing to be inclusive
in their approach towards combating violent extremism. Rather than doing
research and promoting advocacy at government level to fght violent
extremism, there must be an efort to work with the community at large with
the aim of developing a comprehensive government-community strategy
to mitigate the issues of violent extremism. To stay globally competitive in
combating violent extremism and to create an impact, think tanks must also
establish partnerships with a variety of stakeholders.
42
Interview, Salim bin Mohamed Nasir, Associate Research Fellow, International Centre for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research, Singapore, August 1, 2012
64 SEARCCT
Security think tanks focusing on terrorism and insurgency were
pioneered in the West. Until 9/11, most of the staf who worked and
students who trained in these think tanks were Americans, Europeans and
Australians. Te number of Asians, Africans and Middle Easterners were a
handful. With the rise of global terrorism and the proliferation of centers
in the West after 9/11, the doors opened for both staf and students from
the global south. Te decade that followed 9/11 witnessed the emergence of
similar academic centres and think tanks worldwide. Until then there was
no support in the developing world to create specialist centres working on
terrorism and counter terrorism. Most scholars and practitioners viewed the
subject of security as the preserve of the government. Although the think
tanks in the West experienced terrorism and focused on counter terrorism,
their counterparts in the global south better understood radicalisation and
focused on counter-radicalisation.
Even as the British launched its counter terrorism strategy CONTEST
with Prevent as a strand in early 2003, the West, in general, woke up too late
to the challenge of prevention and rehabilitation. With a few exceptions such
as the Muslim Contact Unit led by Robert Lambert, Western governments
and their partners failed to engage Muslims until the attacks in London on
July 7, 2005.
43
Te US had no lead agency to counter ideological extremism.
Americans committed to freedom of expression were against infuencing
the beliefs of fellow Americans. Most American scholars and practitioners
believed that there was no problem of radicalisation in the US. Under the
leadership of David Cohen, the Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence, the
New York City Police Department (NYPD) released a study of domestic
radicalisation in 2007.
44
Raymond Kelly, the Commissioner, and Cohen
were committed to developing a community engagement program but there
was no mainstream support. Te FBI, too, produced a similar study widely
circulated within the law enforcement community. In August 2011, the
Obama Administration fnally announced its counter-radicalisation strategy.
It was devised to address the forces that infuenced some people living in
the United States to acquire and hold radical or extremist beliefs that may
eventually compel them to commit terrorism. Tis is the frst such strategy
43
Robert Lambert, Partnering With the Muslim Community as an Efective Counter-Terrorist Strategy,
Chatham House, September 21, 2011

44
Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: Te Homegrown Treat, City of New York
Police Department, Intelligence Division, New York, 2007.
SEARCCT 65
for the federal government, which calls this efort combating violent
extremism (CVE).
45

Conclusion
At the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed a shift from traditional
military security to non-traditional security. Te think tanks rose up to the
challenge posed by non-state armed actors. Today, insurgents, terrorists
and extremists from ethno-political, politico-religious and left/ right wing
ideologies participate, support and advocate violence. To reduce the threat
of violence and extremism, the community of security think tanks must
conduct in-depth evidence based research. To fnd solutions to threats,
think tanks serve as the ideal platforms as they bring together specialists
from diverse disciplines and cultures. Te challenge is to reach the widest
possible audience and to infuence leaders in governments, corporations
and the community. Publicly and privately funded, think tank executives
and researchers should produce research on real work issues and make the
world a better place. As media shapes public opinion, think tanks have a
role to engage both the old and new media. Te think tank environment
and culture enables its operation in high- risk arenas where governments are
hesitant or unable to efect desired change.
As no think tank has a monopoly over knowledge, think tanks should
also move towards greater collaboration. Tink tanks are vital to change
and shape the thinking both of government and the general population. To
counter violent extremism, academic, government and NGO think tanks
should engage a range of actors. Tink tanks can operate at a higher strategic
level and at the grassroots level. As such, think tanks are premier infuencers
of government and society. To reach out to the general population, think
tanks must collaborate with the media that shape government and public
opinion, religious institutions, the educational establishment, NGOs that
play an activist role, and community organisations that infuence community
perceptions. To be efective, think tanks should work with multiple entities.
Tis can only be done if future think tanks recruit both thinkers and doers.
45
Countering Violent Extremism in the United States
Jerome P. Bjelopera, Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism Congressional Research Service, May 31, 2012
SEARCCT 67
DEFINITION AND FRAMEWORK OF CYBER TERRORISM
Zahri Yunos, Rabiah Ahmad and Noor Azwa Azreen Abd Aziz
ABSTRACT
Cyberspace is a virtual place that has become as important
as physical space for social, economic and political activities.
Many nations in the world are increasing their dependency on
cyberspace when they utilise Information and Communications
Technology (ICT). In this digital age, the concept of cyber
terrorism has emerged that is the use of cyberspace to carry out
terrorist activities. Interestingly, there are many concepts of cyber
terrorism provided by academics, researchers, policy makers
and individuals. This paper proposes a framework describing
the core components of cyber terrorism. The framework defnes
cyber terrorism from six perspectives: Motivation, target, method
of attack, domain, action by perpetrator, and impact.
Keywords: Cyber Terrorism, Cyberspace, ICT, Cyber Terrorism
Framework
Introduction
Cyberspace and the Internet are at the center of modern life and have
become an important medium for political, social and economic expression.
Many nations all over the world are becoming increasingly dependent on
cyberspace as they maximise the use of Information and Communications
Technology (ICT). ICT is a double-edged sword. It can be a useful instrument
in maintaining law and order in modern day societies. However, at the same
time, it also provides opportunities for criminals to exploit. Te real threat
from cyberspace does not only come from sovereign states but also from
others like individuals or organisations.
68 SEARCCT
Te Concept of Cyber Terrorism
Te term cyber terrorism was frst coined in the 1980s by Collin [1].
According to him, the virtual world and the physical world converge to
form the vehicle of cyber terrorism. Collin further clarifes that the virtual
world is the place where computer programs function and data moves,
whereas the physical world is the place where we live and function. Te
growing convergence of the physical and virtual worlds is becoming more
complex. Nowadays, ICT plays a major role in the convergence of these two
worlds.
Denning [2] defnes cyber terrorism as unlawful attacks or threats
of attack against computers, networks and the information stored therein,
when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people to further
their political or social objectives. Denning also clarifes that, Further, to
qualify as cyber terrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons
or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead
to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination,
or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical
infrastructure could be acts of cyber terrorism, depending on their impact.
Attacks that disrupt non-essential services, or that are mainly a costly
nuisance, would not. Te concept of cyber terrorism as defned by Denning
consists of several important components. First, it refers to unlawful attacks.
Second, the attacks, and threats of attacks against computers, networks and
the information stored within them. Tird, the purpose of these unlawful
attacks is to intimidate or infuence a government or society to further their
political or social objectives. Fourth, the attacks result in violence against
persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Lastly,
serious attacks against critical infrastructure could be construed as acts of
cyber terrorism.
Likewise, Lewis [3] defnes cyber terrorism as the use of computer
network tools to shut down critical national infrastructure (such as
energy, transportation, government operations) or to coerce or intimidate
a government or civilian population. Mantel [4] defnes cyber terrorism
as highly damaging computer attacks by private individuals designed to
generate terror and fear to achieve political or social goals. Mshvidobadze [5]
defnes cyber terrorism as cyber acts designed to foment terror, or demoralise
ZAHRI YUNOS, RABIAH AHMAD AND
NOOR AZWA AZREEN ABD AZIZ DEFINITION AND FRAMEWORK OF CYBER TERRORISM
SEARCCT 69
a target population for a perpetrators specifc purpose, most likely involving
some kind of attack on critical infrastructure. Cyber terrorism, as its name
implies, involves computer technology and means as a weapon or as a target
by terrorist groups or agents [6]. In the context of cyber terrorism, the above
defnitions suggest that civilian populations and the computer systems of
critical infrastructure would appear to be attractive targets to cyber terrorists
and contribute to the uniqueness of cyber terrorism resulting in direct
damage to both.
It can be argued that the term cyber terrorism comprises components
of motivation such as political and, social motivation as well as beliefs. For
example, Conway [7] argues that, in order to be labeled as cyber terrorism, the
attacks must have a terrorist component, resulting in death and/or large scale
destruction, and be politically motivated. Pollitt [8] defnes cyber terrorism
as the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information,
computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence
against non-combatant targets by sub- national groups or clandestine
agents. Czerpak [9] argues that cyber terrorism is a politically driven attack
perpetrated by the use of computers and telecommunications capabilities,
which lead to death, bodily injury, explosions and severe economic loss.
Nagpal [10] defnes cyber terrorism as the premeditated use of disruptive
activities, or the threat thereof, in cyberspace, with the intention to further
social, ideological, religious, political or similar objectives, or to intimidate
any person in furtherance of such objectives.
Te method of attack in cyber terrorism appears to be the use of
computer technology. Beggs [11] defnes cyber terrorism as the use of ICT
to attack and control critical information systems with the intent to cause
harm and to spread fear among people, or at least with the anticipation of
changing domestic, national, or international events. Similarly, Weimann
[12] defnes cyber terrorism as the use of computer network tools to harm
or shut down critical national infrastructure (such as energy, transportation
and government operations). CRS Report for Congress [13] defnes cyber
terrorism as the use of computer or weapons, or as targets, by politically
motivated international, or sub-national groups, or clandestine agents who
threaten or cause violence and fear in order to infuence people, or cause a
government to change its policies.
70 SEARCCT
As defned by Denning, the action by a perpetrator involves unlawful
attacks against targeted groups. Tis notion is supported by Ariely [14] who
refers to cyber terrorism as the intentional use, or threat of use, without
legally recognised authority, of violence, disruption, or interference against
cyber systems resulting in death or injury of a person or persons, substantial
damage to physical property, civil disorder or signifcant economic harm.
Tis understanding is in line with a study conducted by Nelson et al. [15]
which defned cyber terrorism as the unlawful destruction or disruption
of digital property to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in the
pursuit of goals that are political, religious or ideological.
Cyber terrorism can have a critical impact on its targeted groups by
engendering fear, violence, death and destruction. Stohl [16] argues that cyber
terrorism includes some form of intimidation, coercion, infuence as well as
violence. He defnes cyber terrorism as the purposeful act or the threat of
the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/
or audience of the act or threat. In a report to the United Nations General
Assemblys First Committee on Disarmament and International Security,
cyber terrorism mentioned as actions conducted via a computer network
that could cause violence against, or generate fear among, people or that
could lead to serious political or social destruction [17]. Tis defnition is,
perhaps, is taken from the US Governments defnition of terrorism which
includes the term computer.
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that there is no common
agreement on the concept of cyber terrorism internationally and among
researchers. While there are many defnitions of cyber terrorism, these suggest
a trend that requires further analyses [18] [19] [20] [21]. Tis is evident as
the study of this concept has been the focus of many policy-makers and
scholars, but their perspectives vary. Due to the multidimensional structures
(or components) of cyber terrorism, it can be said that the concept of cyber
terrorism is a contested concept whose interpretation varies from party
to party. Te context of cyber terrorism denotes diferent understandings
and interpretations and therefore, an accurate knowledge of the context of
cyber terrorism enhances clarity of intent. Tus, there is a need for a more
structured approach in understanding the various components of cyber
terrorism.
SEARCCT 71
Te Proposed Cyber Terrorism Framework
Tis paper proposes that the nature of cyber terrorism should be formulated
from six perspectives: motivation, target, method of attack, domain, action
by perpetrator, and impact (Figure 1). Motivation is about infuencing
human beings and the decisions they make. Motivational forces behind cyber
terrorism are social, political, ideological and economic. With the growing
interconnectedness of critical infrastructure on ICT, the selection of a target
that allows the maximum level of disruption would signifcantly infuence
the terrorists. Cyber terrorists can exploit vulnerabilities over a targeted
system through a vast array of intrusive tools and techniques. Te method
of attack could be through network warfare and psychological operations.
Cyberspace is the domain where a terrorist-type attack is conducted with
cyber terrorists employing unlawful use of force or unlawful attacks to
conduct a premeditated attack. Te impact or consequence is high as the
cyber attacks are carried out to intimidate or coerce a government or people
leading to violence against them or their properties.
Te framework suggests that the core components of cyber terrorism
constitute the six perspectives as illustrated in Figure 1. In other words, the
framework suggests that all attributes (or components) contribute to the
decision-making process in order to determine whether someone gets involved
in cyber terrorism or not. Te authors suggest that all six components of
cyber terrorism in this framework are bound together to form the concept
of cyber terrorism.
Cyber
Terrorism
Target
Impact
Method of
Action
Domain
Tool of
Attack
Motivation
Critical National
Information
Infrastructure
computer system
Critical
Infrastructure
Civilian population
Political
Ideological
Social
Economic
Network
warfare
Psychological
operation
Cyberspace
(includes the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems and embedded
processors and controllers)
Borderless
Unlawful
means
Severe
economic loss
Cause fear,
death or bodily
injury
Mass disruption
or seriously
interfere critical
services
operation
Factor AND
Figure 1: Cyber Terrorism Conceptual Framework
72 SEARCCT
Motivation
Motivation is about infuencing human beings and the decisions they make
[22]. Perpetrators generally have multiple motives for attacking targets.
Te motivating forces behind cyber terrorism are political, ideological and
social motivation [23]. Trough these forces, terrorists are psychologically
motivated to drive terrorism. Terrorist intentions are to undermine confdence
in the political structure and create difculty within the body politic. From
the motivation perspective, cyber terrorism exists if the person or group of
people operates with a specifc political or ideological agenda to support
their activities [11]. For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) engaged
in terrorist activities for a predetermined political purpose with the objective
of maintaining and strengthening political control [24].
Cyber terrorism can be well understood by identifying the profle of
actions or motivations that drive the action of the perpetrators. A politically
motivated cyber attack, which results in a tremendous amount of fear and
panic among the public, may well be characterised as cyber terrorism even
though it does not lead to physical injury or death. Many types of terrorism,
including religious terrorism, have strong theological foundations [25]. In
the feld of cyber terrorism, many look for its causes from the surrounding
contexts and underlying conficts whether social, political or ideological.
Target
Te act of cyber terrorism is unique as it combines a specifc target with a
wider audience [26]. Te disruption of the Critical National Information
Infrastructure (CNII) would have a severe impact on the economic strength,
image, defence and security, public health and safety as well as government
capability to function. Based on this argument, the CNII computer system
would be an extremely attractive and high-profle target in the world of
cyber terrorism [27] and the possibility of disabling the entire CNII
communication networks and attacking the civilian community at large
would probably be among the most infuential factors in a terrorist groups
decision, as the damage and destruction would be extraordinarily signifcant
SEARCCT 73
and costly to society and the country attacked.
Due to the advancement of technology, many essential computing
services are using the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems, which are connected to the Internet and can be controlled remotely.
An attack on the SCADA system that controls and manages critical
infrastructure may have been unthinkable in the past, but with current
technological developments, it is now possible for the SCADA system to
become a target for terrorist attacks. Brunst [28] discusses three scenarios
that could be taken into consideration - attacks on hydroelectric dams,
tampering with railway and air trafc control systems, and taking over
control of power plants. Brunst, in his literature review, provides excellent
examples of terrorist attacks in these control systems, which would generate
fear within a population. Successful cyber attacks on these control systems
would certainly have long-term efects, create fear and pose immediate
danger to human lives.
Apart from focusing on the ICT infrastructure, cyber terrorism also
targets civilian populations [29] [16] [26]. Attacks against critical infrastructure
that spread fear and harm to innocent people within a community would be
classifed as cyber terrorism [11]. From an efect perspective, consequences
on civilian population are immense, thus attracting huge media attention
and publicity. Te selection of a target that allows the maximum level of
disruption would signifcantly infuence the terrorists.
Tools of Attack
Heickero [29] concludes that cyber terrorism comprises diferent types of
methods such as computer network operations and psychological operations.
Te capability to conduct a cyber attack can be divided into three groups:
Simple (unstructured), advanced (structured) and complex (coordinated)
[30]. Veerasamy [31] defnes network warfare as a modern form of confict
in which computers and networks are used as weapons with information
serving as leverage control. Modern forms of network warfare include all
the computer and network security means through which computers are
attacked and exploited (worms, denial-of-service, bots) as well as all the
protective mechanisms being implemented (intrusion detection tools, anti-
74 SEARCCT
virus software and frewalls).
Tere has been ample research on individual characteristics, including
psychological infuences that contribute to a persons motivation for engaging
in terrorist activity. Taliharm [32] suggests that the term cyber terrorism
should also involve several other activities carried out by terrorists via the
Internet, including propaganda via terrorist websites. Te dissemination
of propaganda via Web 2.0 media is part of the psychological operation
[33]. Te coverage of mainstream media is important as news coverage in
the media is always repeated, thus increasing the reach of the propaganda
message.
From a psychological perspective, a disgruntled employee within an
organisation also poses a threat to the organisation. However, this category
of individuals can be bought; and information can also be sold to terrorist
groups. An insider could also act as a cyber terrorist [29]. Te extra advantage
is that they have inside knowledge. An insider can be planted within the
organisation or through a sympathiser who is working in that organisation.
Te objective is, perhaps, to provide sensitive information or to perform
certain tasks such as putting malware into critical control systems for future
attacks. In the US, it was reported that 20 employees were arrested for
possession of false identifcation used to obtain security access to facilities
containing restricted and sensitive military technology [33].
Domain
Cyber terrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. Cyberspace,
whether accessed by computer systems or other devices, is the domain
(medium) through which a cyber attack would be delivered. Te National
Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive
23 of the US Government defnes cyberspace as the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers [34]. Te UK Government defnes cyberspace
as an interactive domain that consists of digital networks that are used to
store, modify and communicate information. It includes the Internet, but
also other information systems that support businesses, infrastructure and
SEARCCT 75
services [35].
Cyber terrorism thus can be seen as a relevant threat due to its strong
relation to ICT and cyberspace. Apart from land, sea, air and space, cyberspace
is another dimension of warfare. Weimann [12] writes that cyberspace is, in
many ways, an ideal arena for the activities of extremist terrorist organisations.
Among others, it ofers an easy and fast fow of information. By its very nature,
cyberspace is also capable of reaching out to a vast audience throughout the
world by disseminating information in a multimedia environment via the
combined use of text, graphics, audio and video.
Method of Action
Rollins and William [33] argue that, there are two views when defning
cyber terrorism, which are based on impact (efect-based) and intention
(intent-based). Tey clarify that, efect-based cyber terrorism exists when
computer attacks result in efects that are disruptive enough to generate
fear comparable to a traditional act of terrorism, even if done by criminals.
Tis implies that, cyber terrorism should focus on the act rather than the
perpetrator. Intent-based cyber terrorism, however, exists when unlawful
or politically-motivated computer attacks are done to intimidate or coerce a
government or people to further a political objective, or to cause grave harm
or severe economic damage.
Te cyber terrorist can have the same motives as the traditional
terrorist, but they use the computer and network media to attack their targets.
[25]. Cyber terrorists use unlawful force or attacks to engage in premeditated
attacks to intimidate or coerce a government or people to further their
political, social or belief objectives, or to cause severe economic damage.
Te impact or consequence is high as the attacks are done to intimidate or
coerce a government or people and that can lead to violence against persons
or properties.
Impact
Cyber terrorism exists when there is an attack on a computer system that
leads to violence against a person or property and the disruption is enough
76 SEARCCT
to generate fear, death or bodily injury [2] [3]. It is carried out to cause grave
harm or severe economic damage or extreme fnancial harm [24] [13] which
could, thus, paralyse world trade and economy. As reported by Rollins and
Wilson [33], if terrorists were to launch a widespread cyber attacks, the
economy of the country singled out would be the target for disruption, while
death and destruction might be considered collateral damage. Terrorist-
type cyber attacks may target chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
(CBRN) computer network installations [9] [33]. A successful attack on
these installations would cause severe economic disruption and harm to the
civilian population in the form of death and bodily injuries.
With the growing interconnectedness and interdependencies of
critical infrastructure sectors, cyber terrorism would be directed at those
targets that allow for a maximum level of disruption [24] [11]. Terrorists
cyber attacks probably aim at critical infrastructure as their target with
successful cyber attacks in one sector having cascading efects on other
sectors. Consequently, a large-scale terrorist-type cyber attack could have
an unpredictable and, perhaps, catastrophic impact on other sectors, and
possibly long-lasting impact on the countrys economy.
Conclusion
Te term cyber terrorism is becoming increasingly common in popular
culture, yet a solid defnition of the word seems elusive. Tere is no universally
accepted defnition for the word cyber terrorism. Cyber terrorism is about
threat perception that makes the concept difer from one to another. Te
concept of this term is an essentially contested concept where its interpretation
difers among academics, researchers, professionals and policy makers.
Due to the trans-boundary nature of cyber terrorism, there needs
to exist a mutual understanding between countries about what constitutes
cyber terrorism. Understanding the perceptual similarities and diferences
in cyber terrorism can provide us with an insight into the concept of cyber
terrorism. Tis work provides a baseline in establishing and defning the
concept of cyber terrorism. Te perspectives are useful in determining
whether someone is involved in cyber terrorism or not.
For future works, this framework can be validated and assessed by
SEARCCT 77
encompassing both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Quantitative
methods can be used to quantify the data with applied statistical methods
being used to test the dynamic relationships between the components of
the cyber terrorism framework. Additionally, future research from this study
could be used to improve the defnition of the concept of cyber terrorism
and its adoption in a holistic manner. Continued research in this area can
be conducted and this may lead to the development of a strategic and
technological framework to counter cyber terrorism.
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80 SEARCCT
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Kumar Ramakrishna is an Assosciate Professor and Head of the Centre
of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at the S. Rajaratnam School
of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore. He was Head (Studies) of the
School from 2003-2006, He obtained a First Class (Honours) in Political
Science from the National University of Singapore in 1989 and a Masters
Degree in Defence Studies from University of New South Wales in 1992.
He went on to secure his PhD in History from Royal Holloway and Bedford
New College, University of London in1999. His current research interest
include British propaganda in the Malayan Emergency, propaganda theory
and practice, history of strategic thought and counter-terrorism, with a
focus on radicalisation. He was also an Australian Department of Foreign
Afairs and Trade (DFAT) Special Visitor in March 2003. In 2008, he was
appointed Senior Advisor to the Trusted Information Network on Extremism
and Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia and Australia. He has co-edited
two well-received books on counter-terrorism, Te New Terrorism: Anatomy,
Trends and Counter-Strategies (2002) as well as After Bali: Te Treat of
Terrorism in Southeast Asia (2004). He has also written two books entitled
Emergency Propaganda: Te Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds, 1948-
1958 (2002) and Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalisation in
Indonesia (2009). He is a member of the Singapore Government Parliamentary
Committee (GPC) Resource Panel on Home Afairs and Law, member of
the Board of Trustees, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore,
member of the Board of Governors of the Islamic Religious Council of
Singapore (MUIS) Academy, and Executive Committee Member of the
Political Science Association (Singapore). He is a member of the Executive
Board of the Council for Asian Transnational Treats Research.
Nazery Khalid is a Research Fellow at Maritime Institute of Malaysias
(MIMA) Center for Economics Studies & Ocean Industries. He has
presented talks and papers at many international conferences and forums
on a wide range of maritime issues including port development, maritime
security, ship fnancing, multimodal transport, ofshore oil and gas and
SEARCCT 81
freight logistics. His research fndings and views on various maritime issues
are often quoted in the media and have appeared in various publications
and maritime journals. Nazery holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business
Administration from Ottawa University, Kansas, USA and an MBA from
International Islamic University, Malaysia.
Nishchal N. Pandey is Director of the Centre for South Asian Studies,
Kathmandu and is a well-known Nepali strategic analyst. A man of letter,
he is author of three books: Nepals Maoist Movement and Implications
for India and China (Manohar, 2005), Indias North-Eastern Region:
Insurgency, Economic Development and Linkages with Southeast Asia,
(Manohar Publishers, 2008) and New Nepal: Te Fault-lines (SAGE
Publications, 2010). He obtained his PhD. from Tribhuvan University,
Kathmandu and was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies
(ISAS), Singapore in 2006-07 and Visiting Fellow at the University of Hull,
UK in 2009. Some of his edited books include: New Life within SAARC
(IFA, 2005), Labour Issues and Foreign Policy (IFA, 2006), Nepal-Japan
Relations (IFA, 2006), Nepal as a Transit State: Emerging Possibilities
(IFA, 2006). He is also the Co-Editor of Comprehensive Security in South
Asia (Manohar Publishers, 2006). His latest co-edited books are: Nepals
National Interests (CSAS-KAS, 2011), Towards a More Cooperative South
Asia (CSAS-KAS, 2012) and SAARC: Towards Meaningful Cooperation
(CSAS-KAS, 2012). He is at present an international research committee
member of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo and visiting
fellow at the Institute of Peace and Confict Studies, New Delhi. He was also
Advisor to the National Planning Commission of Nepal in 1997. He can be
reached at: [email protected].
Noor Azwa Azreen Abd Aziz is currently the Strategic Policy Research
Executive at CyberSecurity Malaysia. She holds a Bachelors Degree in
International Relations from Victoria University of Wellington, New
Zealand.
82 SEARCCT
Rabiah Ahmad is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Information
Technology and Communication, Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka,
Malaysia. She received her PhD in Information Studies (Health Informatics)
from the University of Shefeld, UK, and M.Sc. (Information Security)
from the Royal Holloway University of London, UK. Her research interests
include healthcare system security and information security architecture. She
has delivered papers at various health informatics and information security
conferences at national as well as international levels. She has also published
papers in accredited national/international journals. Besides that, she also
serves as a reviewer for various conferences and journals.
Ranga Kalansooriya is a journalist from Sri Lanka has been reporting on
his countrys confict to local and international media for over 18 years. He
is currently reading for his PhD on reporting ethnicity in the vernacular
press. Ranga is a Reuters Fellow at Oxford University, United Kingdom. His
publication LTTE and IRA Combating Terrorism and Discussing Peace
[Case studies, Te Northern Ireland and Sri Lankan Peace Processes] was
based on his research at Oxford University in 2001. He received his Masters
Degree from the Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur
and Bachelor of Science (Mathematics) degree from the Open University of
Sri Lanka. Te Masters Research project on e-fying terrorism was conducted
at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore.He was appointed spokesman to the Minister of Foreign
Afairs, Sri Lanka and then became Counsellor (Information), Sri Lanka
High Commission, Kuala Lumpur. He is a visiting Lecturer in Journalism
in several Sri Lankan universities. After completing his diploma in News
Agency Journalism at the Indian Institute of Mass Communications, New
Delhi, Ranga attended Reuters Training on International News Writing,
Reuters Headquarters, London and UN training on Reporting UN and
International Afairs, UN Headquarters, New York. He is a Member of the
Governing Board of the Council for Transnational Treat Research (CATR)
established by the Institute of Defence Analysis (IDA) Washington DC. He
was also the Director General of the Sri Lanka Press Institute until August
2009 the managing body of the Sri Lanka College of Journalism and the
Press Complaints Commission of Sri Lanka. Currently he is the Asia Pacifc
Advisor to the International Media Support in Denmark.
SEARCCT 83
Rohan Gunaratna is an Associate Professor and Head of Rajaratnam School
of International Studies (RSIS) International Centre for Political Violence
and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR). He obtained his PhD in International
Relations from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland and a M.A. in
International Peace Studies from the University of Notre Dame. His
research areas include terrorist operational and support networks, maritime
terrorist tactics, technologies and techniques, terrorist organisations, suicide
terrorism, terrorist rehabilitation, counter-terrorism intelligence and
terrorism in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. He is also the author and
editor of at least 15 books including Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of
Terror (Columbia University Press). He is also a member of the Advisory
board, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Te Hague, member
of the steering committee of George Washington Universitys Homeland
Security Policy Institute, Senior advisor, CSIS Washington DC Project on
Arc of Instability and Project on Al Qaeda and Associated Movements and
Senior Fellow Alumnus at the United States Military Academys Combating
Terrorism Centre at West Point. He is also the litigation consultant to the
U.S Department of Justice.
Zahri Yunos is currently the Acting Chief Executive Ofcer of CyberSecurity
Malaysia. Zahri holds a Masters degree in Electrical Engineering from the
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Malaysia and a Bachelors degree in Computer
Science from the Fairleigh Dickinson University, New Jersey, USA. He is a
certifed Associate Business Continuity Professional by the Disaster Recovery
Institute International, USA. Zahri has been awarded Senior Information
Security Professional Honoree in July 2010 by the (ISC), USA. He has
contributed various articles and presented papers on topics related to cyber
security and Business Continuity Management.

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