JUNE 1986 VOLUME NUMBER 6

1 Mission: Air Traffic Control, MG Ellis D. Parker

2 LAMSON 719, Part I: Prelude to Air Assault,
CPT Jim E. Ph.D.
16 Against All Odds: Theoretical Aspects of Microburst
Flight, Part II, LCDR F. Towers
20 PEARL'S
22 Above The Best-James M. "Mike" Hudson,
Ms. Sones
24 Aviation Personnel Notes: Branch Letter,
M. What Must I Do to Get Promoted?;
New Dimensions of Adventure, CW3 Robert H. Grat-
UU"Y.:.Iru. Engineering Test Pilot Board Results
27 Army Aviation Museum: Aero Commander U-4A
28 DES Report to the Field: Recording Flight Time,
SFC R. A. Buck
30 The "Girl Back Home" and Army Aviation's H-19,
Mr. James
32 Dustoff Reunion, COL E. Moore
36 MILES, SFC Kenneth N. Westover
37 ATC Action line: DIDJUNO?, Mr. Forrest H. ~ o l o n h o r n o r
38 The Past: What Might Have Been-The Future:
What Can Be, COL
Cover: Terry and the Dil"!2tJl!l't:!' Milton Caniff
A composite of true action photos taken in
Vietnam about the time of "LAMSON 719"-this
month's lead article, beginning on page 2. Photos
at top right show a 50 caliber bullet hole in the
left window of a Huey piloted by CW4 Bob Rench
and copilot CW4 Mike Harbin. The round was
taken in Laos at LZ Delta, in March 1971 during
LAMSON 719.
Honorable John O. Marsh Jr.
Secrf!!tar'v of the Army
Major General Ellis D. Parker
Commander
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Brigadier General Rudolph Ostovich III
Assistant Commandant
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Richard K. Tierney
Editor
Mission: Air Traffic Control
THE RAPID PACE of the modern air-land battle re-
quires timely employment and synchronization of Army
Aviation assets. A key element in this process is Army air-
space command and control (A2C2). The proper integra-
tion and use of air traffic control (ATC) services, a subset
of A2C2, can provide the Army Aviation commanders the
services required to allow their fleets to operate at their
maximum potential. In view of this, the Department of the
Army (DA) made the decision to transfer proponency for
ATC on 6 December 1985 from the Information Systems
Command (ISC) to the U.S. Army Aviation Center, which
is proud and ready to be the leader for the ATC mission (see
page 8, May 1986 Aviation Digest).
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, with
assistance from the Army Materiel Command and ISC, was
tasked to provide the transfer implementation plan. The
plan establishes a separate directorate at the Aviation Cen-
ter that will serve as a DA field operating agency for world-
wide Army ATC operations. Also, all ATC units will fall
under the major Army command they support, as opposed
to the Signal Command. Fixed-base assets will be trans-
ferred from the Directorate of Information Management to
the Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Secur-
ity. In Europe and Korea, the tables of distribution and
allowances augmentation to the battalions will transfer to
U.S. Army, Europe, and Eighth U.S. Army.
A2C2 is the governing concept for the employment of air
traffic assets. At a minimum, A2C2 includes tactical land-
ing systems, airspace management, command and control,
and position navigation systems. Within this framework,
ATC provides two vital functions: flight following single-
ship aircraft and instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC) recovery operations. Today's quick reaction missions
and lethal threat environment make these missions quite
difficult to perform, yet essential to any Army Aviation
operation. Aviation commanders and ATC elements must
work closely together to ensure that ATC services are pro-
vided in the right places, at the right times, for every mis-
sion. As a general rule, due to the threat, IMC flight will
JUNE 1986
not be conducted in the division area. However, aVlatlOn
and ATC units must plan for inadvertent IMC conditions.
ATC units will be heavily relied upon at corps and echelons
above corps (EAC) for IMC and visual meteorological con-
ditions flight. Also, ATC units should be employed for air-
space deconfliction, en route navigation assistance, and as-
sistance at congested areas, such as forward arming and
refueling points. Well thought-out employment of ATC
assets will provide both aviators and the controllers the
confidence and satisfaction that they are making the best
possible contribution to the air-land battle.
The Army Aviation Center is aggressively pursuing the
goal of properly equipping ATC soldiers. In concert with
the Air Traffic Control Activity, the Aviation Center is up-
grading current equipment, including outfitting the TSW-
7 A tactical tower and the TSC-61 flight operations center
with new radios, and improving the reliability, availability
and maintainability of the TPN-18 radar. In the near future,
Army Aviation will use the microwave landing system
(MLS) as its precision landing system. An MLS ground
station will be installed at Cairns Army Airfield at the Avia-
tion Center and the Troy, AL, Municipal Airport in the next
2 years for the training base. Tactical MLS ground stations
will be provided at corps and EAC. Army Aviation also will
use the global positioning system. This exciting new system
will provide a passive navigation and landing capability
worldwide and an unparalleled capability to land anywhere
on the battlefield, without a ground emitter, to within 15M
spherical error probable. A y tem now in the concept
phase will automate all airspace management information
to include airspace usage, control measures, mission plan-
ning and flight following. The combat support air traffic
management system will provide a real-time, reliable air
picture to ensure maximum use and airspace deconfliction
among all users .
The future of air traffic services is filled with exciting
opportunities, and the Aviation Center enthusiastically em-
braces this new mission. Proponency for this function at
Ft. Rucker provides a most useful framework to ensure
ATC units are properly equipped to support Army Aviation
operations. I extend a hearty welcome to the fine soldiers of
the ATC community. rtt 1
1
2 u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
JUNE 1986
PART I: Prel ude
to Ai r Assault
I T IS INDEED important to
understand what happened before,
during and after the most signifi-
cant airmobile battle fought in the
Vietnam War- LAMSON 719.
This 1971 battle is a milestone in the
evolution of Army Aviation air as-
sault tactics because:
LAMSON 719 is the only his-
torical example of contemporary
Army Aviation operating in a mid-
intensity conflict.
During LAMSON 719 more
helicopters received combat dam-
age and were shot down than dur-
ing any other comparable time in
the Vietnam War.
The combat assault on Tche-
pone in Laos involved more heli-
copters in a single lift than any
previous combat air assault in
Army Aviation history.
Two of the blackest days in
Army Aviation history occurred
during the 45-day operation.
LAMSON 719 is the best con-
temporary example of AH-l Cobra
gunships conte ting enemy armor
in combat.
Lessons learned from LAMSON
719 contribute to the current and
developing evolution of Army Avi-
ation tactical doctrine more than
experience in any other operation
has in the past 20 years. This article,
next month's Part II: "The Battle,"
and August's Part III: "Reflections
and Values," clearly show that
Army Aviation has evolved into a
most important member of the
combat and, of course, the maneu-
ver arms of the United States Army.
3
LAM SON 719
SCALE OF MilES
t H '50 100 150
The 3-part series reveals that Army
Aviation is a unique organization
that packs great firepower and pro-
vides extensive mobility on the air-
land battlefield. It depicts Army
Aviation as a young and dynamic
combat force building a precious
heritage as it flies above, and
among, the best!
Vietnam-era aviators confirm
that most of the current air-land
battle doctrine we read about is a
historical summary and refinement
of techniques employed and tested
in the Republic of Vietnam. Army
4
Aviation has not reinvented the
wheel in the past 10 years. The ex-
periences in our history offer more
insights than you might think.
Part I of this article is a summary
of the pertinent history of the Viet-
nam War through the end of 1970.
It describes typical types of mis-
sions and combat operations con-
ducted by Army Aviation.
Next month Part II will describe
the LAMSON 719 operations
order, the operation itself, the bat-
tle statistics, the afteraction reports
and the lessons learned. Finally,
Part III concludes with reflections
and values of lessons learned not
only from LAMSON 719, but also
from Army Aviation's involvement
in Vietnam from the beginning.
Based on invited lectures that I've
given to aviation officer advanced
course classes at the Aviation Cen-
ter, Ft. Rucker, AL, and to others
elsewhere, it is obvious to me that
many people in Army Aviation
today know little about Vietnam.
We're already well into the next gen-
eration of people who were too
young to have cogent memories of
the Vietnam days. Also, there are
only a few capsular references (see
Part III in August) that I would rec-
ommend for obtaining additional
background on Vietnam. For those
reasons, I begin by giving more
detail than may seem necessary to
provide a contextual background
around LAMSON 719. But, the
successes, and more importantly,
the failures of the operation are
better understood in context with a
complete LAMSON 719 back-
ground. This article describes as-
pects of the Vietnam War that are
critical in understanding it but, too
often, are deemphasized or over-
looked in most references about the
war. For those who already know
something about the war in Viet-
nam, the article can widen the per-
spective gotten from other sources
and references.
A Troubled History
Vietnam as a country does not
have an impressive history of inde-
pendence. It was briefly occupied by
the Japanese during World War II,
but for more than 50 years it was
colonized by the French.
The French were defeated by the
Communist Viet Minh at Dien Bien
Phu in 1954. Because of sharply
different political philosophies,
Vietnam was divided by a Geneva
Accord into a non-Communist
state in the south, and a Commu-
nist-controlled state in the north.
The Communists, or Viet Minh,
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
represented only a small percentage
of the people, but they had the only
force able to effectively fight the
French. For about a year after the
French defeat, the population was
able. to move freely across the parti-
tion line. More than one million
anti-Communists streamed south
while only a few thousand Viet-
namese moved to the north.
The Geneva Accords were sup-
posed to be temporary with a reuni-
fication to occur after elections
scheduled for 1956; however, hostil-
ities between the Communists, Na-
tionalists and Buddhists prevented
any election from ever occurring.
The partition line soon became a
closed demilitarized zone. After
this, a Communist revolution
(directed by North Vietnam) was
started in South Vietnam by trained
combat veterans of the Viet Minh
army that had fought the French.
These soldiers, and those enlisted
from South Vietnam to fight with
them, were known as the Viet
Congo
By 1959 the Viet Cong in South
Vietnam were being directly as-
sisted by units of the regular North
Vietnamese Army. The U.S. Gov-
ernment, as part of the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization alliance,
in conjunction with other countries
including Australia and the Repub-
lic of Korea, sent an increased num-
ber of advisors under Military
Assistance Command Vietnam
(MACV) control to train and assist
the South Vietnamese. MAC V ac-
tually came into being in 1962 as a
reorganization of an earlier mili-
tary assistance and advisory group.
In 1960 there were fewer than
1,000 military advisors in Vietnam.
President John F. Kennedy had
been "burned" by the defeat at the
Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961 and
didn't want to see another country
fall to Communism. He authorized
and increased military presence
which grew to 3,000 troops in 1961.
President Kennedy was assassi-
nated in November 1963, but the
mandate was set and continued by
JUNE 1986
President Lyndon B. Johnson and
Secretary of Defense Robert McNa-
mara, to increase the American
presence as necessary to prevent a
Communist takeover. In 1964, the
U.S. Congress adopted the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the
President to take whatever meas-
ures he considered necessary to re-
pel attacks on American forces and
to prevent further aggression in
Vietnam.
By 1964, there were about 23,000
American troops in South Viet-
nam. In 1965, the emphasis on the
war shifted. MACV became more
combat operational and the first
American combat division was sent
to South Vietnam in the summer of
1965. The 1st Cavalry Division (Air-
mobile) deployed and engaged the
enemy with the first extensive and
sustained use of helicopters (prin-
cipally the UH-l Huey) in combat.
Helicopters were employed earlier
in Vietnam* and, in fact, were used
during the Korean War on a lesser
scale for movement of troops, re-
supply and aeromedical evacuation.
The development of Army Aviation
as we know it today began with the
deployment of the 1st Cav. Clearly,
the airmobile and air assault con-
cepts of the 1st Cavalry Division in
Vietnam demonstrated for the first
time in combat the enormous flexi-
bility and utility of helicopters on
the battlefield. On countless occa-
sions, from the battle at Ia Drang
Valley in 1965 to the standdowns in
1972, Army Aviation proved to be
of paramount importance in wag-
ing war in the defense of South
Vietnam.
Through the 1960s, as the United
States increased its involvement
and support to South Vietnam,
Russia increased its military sup-
port to North Vietnam, continually
and several times at higher compa-
rable monetary levels than the sup-
port provided by the United States.
American strength reached its peak
in 1968 at a level of about 550,000
troops. From 1969 on (through
President Richard M. Nixon's ad-
ministration) troop strength dra-
matically declined until in April
1972 there were fewer than 70,000
American troops in Vietnam. Op-
erational control in MAC V returned
to a more advisory rather than direct
combat role.
An Effort At "Vietnamization"
During the years of American
presence in Vietnam, MACV was
responsible for a program called
"Vietnamization" (term coined in
1969). It sought to train the Viet-
namese people about government,
agriculture, industrialization, educa-
tion and soldiering. The early plan
included organizing an army and
local reaction forces so that they
would be able themselves to con-
duct the war against the Commu-
nists. To do so, an effort was made
to train South Vietnamese soldiers
in the maintenance and operation
of military equipment to include
weapons, artillery, tanks and heli-
copters. Many Vietnamese also were
trained in the United States.
Unfortunately, most Vietnamese
were not well educated, their tech-
nical understanding was primitive,
and there was a serious language
barrier, all of which made inter-
actions, training and operations
difficult and frustrating for many
Americans. Progress was slow and
when the U.S. Army and Marine
Corps entered the war with direct
combat missions, Vietnamization
was further curtailed under the no-
tion that the Communists would
either back off or be quickly de-
feated by the large show of Ameri-
can force: Thus, a well-trained
Vietnamese force would not be nec-
essary. This was a fatal decision
that resulted in several years being
lost in developing greater auton-
* There were individual Army Aviation
units in South Vietnam as early as 1961. The
U.S. Army's 173d Airborne Brigade also de-
ployed to South Vietnam in 1965. By the end
of 1965 U.S. troop strength reached 181,000;
in 1966, 385,000; and in 1967,486,000.
5
6
The A Shau Valley,
renowned as the area
of heaviest enemy
concentration and
logistics centers in the
northern portion of
South Vietnam.
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
LAM SON 719
omy for the people and experience
for the Vietnamese Army.
In late 1967 and in 1968, the U.S.
Embassy helped MACV rejuvenate
the Vietnamization effort. In 1969,
MACV was also bolstered in advi-
sory troop strength severalfold to
further accelerate the formalized
Vietnamization program. Many
more Vietnamese were then brought
to the United States to learn how to
fly helicopters, drive tanks and
maintain equipment. Finally, it was
obvious that the days of a U.S. pres-
ence in Vietnam were numbered.
The Vietnamese were going to have
to learn to fight the war on their
own. LAMSON 719 became the first
serious test of the Vietnamization
of ground combat operations be-
cause American ground troops or
advisors would not be allowed to set
foot into Laos where the operation
was to take place.
Throughout the war in Vietnam
the Communists rarely showed con-
cern for their number of combat
losses. Human wave attacks were
not uncommon and generally ac-
counted for some of the few minor
battlefield victories the Commu-
nists enjoyed up through 1972.
However, it is not lofty or exagger-
ated to say that from 1961 to 1972,
except for LAMSON 719 (which
was more like a draw), the Ameri-
can and South Vietnamese deci-
sively won every major battle of the
war to include the most well-known
battle, the Tet Offensive of 1968.
The Tet Offensive and LAMSON
719 stand out as two different types
of battles that were very distin-
guishable from the way the war
was otherwise conducted. The Tet
Offensive involved more than
100,000 North Vietnamese Army
and Viet Cong troops. It was
launched on 30 and 31 January
1968, as an all-out surprise assault,
primarily against well-defended
military compounds in more than
115 different urban areas through-
out the country. The battle was
called the "Tet Offensive," named
after the lunar New Year in Viet-
JUNE 1986
UH-1 lands at a small pad at Mai Loc in 101st Airborne Division
area of operation. A fire support base can be seen on the distant
ridge (upper right corner).
nam which is the Vietnamese peo-
ples' most celebrated and important
holiday.
Before the offensive, the Viet
Cong had announced a 7 -day truce
over the holiday to further catch
U.S. and South Vietnam troops off
guard. The belief by the Commu-
nists at the time was that occupa-
tion of the major urban areas
would generate a popular uprising
among the people, mass defections
from the South Vietnamese Army
and the rapid collapse of the gov-
ernment. However, in just a few
days, except for small sections in
Saigon and Hue, the offensive was
totally crushed. Communist losses
ranged from 35,000 to 50,000 killed
with 3,000 South Vietnamese
killed, 1,500 Americans killed and
more than 10,000 civilians killed in
crossfires or murdered by occupy-
ing Communist forces.
After Tet, the Viet Cong were to-
tally eliminated as an effective
fighting force. Tet was a decisive
victory for South Vietnam in sev-
eral respects. It destroyed any credi-
bility for the Communists with the
South Vietnamese people and it
greatly bolstered the South Viet-
namese government and Army.
But, the most far-reaching outcome
of the Tet Offensive was a political
one in the United States. As the
battles unfolded, too many Ameri-
can journalists consistently dis-
torted the events and highlighted
the horrors of war. Everything the
Communists did was embellished
by those members of the media,
while the South Vietnamese and
American military were treated
with derision and cynicism, as
though they reported only fabrica-
tions.
The media's reflections of the
war, coupled with the U.S. Gov-
ernment's failure to effectively
communicate the purpose and ob-
jectives of the war, spread disillu-
7
Strong religious beliefs can be seen in the lives
of most Vietnamese, such as Kim Anh Thu.
The Culture of Vietnam
Captain Jim E. Fulbrook
A lot should be said
about the culture of the
Vietnamese people if we are
to fully understand the
war and the significance
of LAMSON 719. The
Vietnamese are influenced
mostly by Confucianism
and ancestor worship. They
are community and family
oriented, not nationalistic.
LAM SON 719
Most are superstitious,
religious and decidedly
nonviolent. They are
anti-Communist because
they fear a loss of freedom
that would prohibit ancestor
worship, religious freedom
and community traditions
like the "Council of Elders"
which dominated the rural
majority as the principal
form of government. It's
unfortunate that those
fears have been borne out
since the Communist
takeover in 1975. These are
the precise areas in which
the Communists have placed
their greatest efforts:
reeducating and reunifying
(nationalizing) the people.
This cultural background
makes it easy to understand
why millions of Vietnamese
since 1975 have risked
their lives to leave their
country by boat or whatever
means possible.
The cultural and ethnic
backgrounds of the
Vietnamese people seriously
impacted military operations
in Vietnam. Even the
indigenous armies were
divided along ethnic lines
to a significant degree.
The principal religions
in Vietnam include
Confucianism, Buddhism,
Cao Oai (belief that all
religions are "seeds of
wisdom planted by God"),
and "Cack" (Catholic or
Christian). There are two
main types of Buddhists:
those subscribing to
ancestor worship and those
believing in reincarnation
(sometimes called Mandarin
Buddhists).
The Buddhists who
believe in reincarnation make
good combat soldiers
because they believe that
if they are killed their
level of reincarnation would
be high, based on how
great their valor was on the
battlefield. Buddhists,
Confucianists and others
who followed ancestor
worship generally are poor
soldiers. They are nonviolent
in attitude, fearful of
leaving their village areas
where deceased ancestors
would protect them and
fearful to die if it were not
in the family order.
These cultural differences
are found throughout
Vietnam, but there is a
significant difference
between the people north
and those south of Oa
Nang where a major
mountain range aids in
dividing the country. Above
Oa Nang the average
Vietnamese were about
2 inches taller than
those in the south. The
"northerners" appear more
Chinese-like and Mandarin
Buddhism is more prominent.
The cultural differences
gave a significant advantage
to the Communists. Both
North and South Vietnam
built their armies from
volunteers and conscriptions,
but the Communists in the
north primarily conscripted
Mandarin Buddhists
(reincarnation believers)
sionment nationwide. That the
Communists could launch such an
offensive, even though it was deci-
sively crushed, was a shock to the
American public. Thus, the Tet Of-
fensive of 1968 marked the begin-
ning of disengagement by the
United States from a war in which
we were unbeatable on the battle-
field, but which we could never
win - at least probably not without
a direct invasion of North Vietnam.
A high-intensity conflict is a
war between two or more nations
and their allies in which the com-
batants employ the most modern
technology and resources of their
military organizations to include
nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons. Decisive engagements be-
tween large numbers of troops oc-
8
Levels of Conflict
It's important to define and de-
scribe the three levels of conflict
found in combat:
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
for combat duty. The South
Vietnamese conscripted
without discriminating, but
to a significant degree
assigned troops to specific
units based on cultural or
religious backgrounds.
In the south, the Republic
of Vietnam divided its
Army into three general
categories: Army of the
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
f.orces, regional forces and
popular forces. Organized
and trained along U.S.
military lines, ARVN forces
included marine, ranger,
airborne, infantry, artillery
and armor units generally
capable of being deployed
wherever necessary for
combat. While ARVN units
were frequently commanded
by officers appointed from
a non-Buddhist aristocracy,

A store in Tin Phuoc,
in the Tam Ky province.
the bulk of the ARVN
forces were composed of
Mandarin Buddhist soldiers.
From 1968 to the defeat
of South Vietnam in 1975,
ARVN forces faired well in
combat. Unfortunately
the same could not be said
too often for the -popular
and regional forces which
made up the largest part
of South Vietnam's combat
troops. Popular and regional
forces were territorial
in the worst sense of the
word. Many of these units
were organized and trained
more like paramilitary
reaction forces, or police.
These units rarely left
their immediate villages and
provincial regions, and
they varied considerably in
unit organization, leadership,
level of training, equipment
and resolve to conduct
search and destroy
operations around their local
areas of operation. As
you may have guessed, the
majority of these units
were dominated by the
Confucianists and believers
in ancestor worship.
American soldiers were
critical of South Vietnamese
soldiers, considering
many of them to be corrupt,
lazy, cowardly and without
the resolve to fight the war .
Many Americans believed
that one Communist soldier
A "Papa Sanh" selling meat to a store owner.
was worth about three
South Vietnamese soldiers.
Unfortunately, this was
true at times, especially in
the early 1960s. But few
Americans knew enough
about the Vietnamese
culture to understand the
reasons why. To survive,
the South Vietnamese would
have had to make dramatic
adaptations to their culture-
hardening it against a
relentless, countercultural
aggressor and accomplishing
this task in an inordinately
short period of time.
The South Vietnamese were
not able to make the
necessary adaptations before
United States' support
dwindled away in 1975, and
the country was overcome
by a conventional invasion of
the North Vietnamese Army.
It's unfortunate that many
Americans who served
as soldiers in Vietnam knew
little about the culture of
the people and almost
out of necessity seemed to
dehumanize the Vietnamese
to make killing the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese
regulars easier. That's
human nature and not
unusual, but a lack of
understanding hid any
purpose for most soldiers
to be there. I served in
Vietnam from May 1970 to
June 1971 and I came to
see a purpose in my mission
there: to protect the
lifestyle and culture of the
people.
cur with some frequency over a
broad geographic or even global ex-
panse. The direct combatants in a
high-intensity conflict have gener-
ally committed the majority of
their national resources and gross
national product toward the war ef-
fort. World Wars I and II are exam-
ples of high-intensity conflicts.
A mid-intensity conflict is a
war between two or more nations
and their allies in which the com-
batants employ their most modern
military technology and military re-
sources short of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons. These con-
flicts are for limited objectives
under definitive policy limitations
on the extent of destructive power
that can be employed, or the extent
of a geographic area that might be
involved. Decisive engagements be-
tween large numbers of troops will
occur at least occasionally at this
level. Only a part of a nation's as-
sets would be directed to the war
and the period would not be as pro-
JUNE 1986 9
LAM SON 719
tracted as in a high-intensity con-
flict. Examples of mid-intensity
conflict include the Korean War
and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli
Mideast Wars.
A low-intensity conflict is a
limited politico-military struggle to
achieve political, social, economic
or psychological objectives. It can
be quite protracted and range from
economic and political pressure all
the way through terrorism and in-
surgency. Low-intensity conflicts
are generally confined to a geo-
graphic area and constrained on
the use of weaponry, tactics and
levels of violence. Low-intensity
conflicts include Beirut, Grenada,
Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Viet-
nam during the United States in-
volvement. Of course, the list is de-
pressingly long with each conflict
having its own unique features.
Although three levels of conflict
have been conveniently defined, it
should be realized that these con-
flict categories actually occur along
a loosely defined continuum. Gen-
erally, most wars or conflicts do not
remain at one level, but tend to es-
calate or deescalate over time. Each
battle or period within a war can be
defined in its level of intensity as
well. Countless examples could be
given of the escalations and de-
escalations of conflict in any war.
However, where the Vietnam War
is concerned, during the United
States involvement, LAMSON 719
stands out as the only clear example
of a mid-intensity conflict or.battle.
LAMSON 719 lasted 45 days and
large numbers of troops (more
than 50,000 total) became deci-
sively engaged. The significance of
LAMSON 719 has been greatly
overlooked in contemporary U.S.
military history, and in Army Avia-
tion in particular. From the intro-
duction of the UH-l and from the
1965 deployment of the 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile) to Vietnam to
the present, LAMSON 719 also is
the best contemporary example of
Army Aviation in a "deep attack"
and as a combat and maneuver arm
10
ABOVE: A small squad area along
Route 9 in the valley just east
of Khe Sanh. Photo was taken in
the beginning of LAMSON 719.
RIGHT: Captured enemy 50 caliber
(12.7 mm) machinegun.
on a combined arms operation in
combat. Both of these will be de-
fined and discussed next month in
Part II, "The Battle."
Some people feel that the Tet Of-
fensive of 1968 was a mid-intensity
battle because it was a significant
escalation of the war and a large
number of troops were decisively
engaged. Granted, from an infan-
try standpoint, the battles to retake
Hue and the Cholon district in Sai-
gon during Tet may be examples of
a mid-intensity level but not where
Army Aviation is concerned.
While Army Aviation was in-
volved in Tet, it was not employed
to the degree that it was in LAM-
SON 719. Most of the Tet battles
were fought by South Vietnamese,
U. S. Marine Corps and U. S. Army
ground combat units. Remember,
Tet took place in more than 115 ur-
ban areas and was fought more like
a multitude of house-to-house skir-
mishes and small unit actions.
Most of the enemy attacks were de-
feated within 2 days; only the Hue
and Saigon battle areas were active
for more than 1 week (about 26
days in Hue). Actually, the Tet Of-
fensive is best suited as an example
of a military operation on urban-
ized terrain conflict, but such an
article will have to wait until an-
other time.
Low-Intensity Conflict in Vietnam
The general and most common
type of engagements in Vietnam
were termed "small unit actions"
which mainly involved company-
size units or battalion-size opera-
tions. Throughout the war the
Communists primarily operated in
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
small units within South Vietnam.
This was especially true after the
Tet Offensive of 1968 when the Viet
Cong were greatly depleted. These
units or cells were frequently com-
posed of only six troops with per-
haps only three of them carrying
weapons. The primary missions of
these cells involved harassment and
temporary interdiction, usually
without becoming decisively en-
gaged. In fact, the Communists
were so firm about this tactic in
some regions that, as captured doc-
uments reveal, a ranking person
could be shot if a superior officer
encountered a unit in size greater
than six that was not on a specific
operation. Larger units would be
formed as necessary for an opera-
tion, but after the operation the
unit would disperse into small unit
cells once again.
Against the South Vietnamese,
common tactics of the Communist
forces included murder, kidnap-
ping, confiscation of supplies,
impressment and other acts of ter-
rorism. The most frequent targets
were the "elders" in a village be-
cause they represented the local
governing body and, by culture, re-
ceived the highest respect and fear
for loss of their lives. It was not
uncommon for the Communists to
kidnap a ranking ancestor then
impress the younger of the family
members, sometimes even into
suicide missions as "sappers"
under the threat of the kidnapped
ancestor being "cock-a-dowed"
(phonetic pronunciation). "Cock-
a-dow" is Vietnamese for being de-
capitated which, according to the
Vietnamese culture, would separate
that ancestor's soul to wander aim-
lessly in the afterlife without as-
cending in the family order.
Sapper operations involved
either soldiers or impressed civil-
ians sneaking through tunnels or
under barbed wire at night to enter
a military compound with satchel
charges and grenades. Once inside,
the sappers would plant or throw
the charges to blow up as many
JUNE 1986
Aircraft shut down on fire support base in mountains.
people and as much equipment as
possible before being killed or
blowing themselves up. The main
operations the Communists con-
ducted against Americans included
hit-and-run skirmishes or am-
bushes, sapper attacks and the set-
ting of booby traps.
In the early phase of American
involvement in Vietnam, too often
when a village was occupied by the
Communists or thought to be sym-
pathetic to them, the U.S. troops
would literally blast the enemy
from a village or burn it to the
ground. This usually caused more
casualties and damage to the civil-
ians than anything else. However,
after the Tet Offensive, and the My
Lai massacre in 1968, a greater
effort was made toward the pacifi-
cation of the people.
As another part of the Vietnam-
ization program, civilians living in
the most rural and mountainous
areas were encouraged to resettle in
designated pacification areas, usu-
ally in the most defendable geo-
graphic location in a regional
province. From that location the
people were guaranteed protection
against the Communists, a place to
live, land for farming, health care,
education, etc. Everyone was still to
retain ownership of their ancestral
property in the unpacified areas
and would be able to return when
the war was over. Anyone choosing
to remain in the unpacified areas
was given no guarantee of security
or other benefits.
To a significant degree, the paci-
fication program run by MACV
was successful. Even many of the
Montagnards or "Mountainyards,"
as they were sometimes called,
came to cooperate with the pacifi-
cation program. Montagnards are
a primitive, pigmy-like, aboriginal
population of ethnic tribesmen
who inhabited areas of the central
and northern mountain ranges in
South Vietnam. They were excel-
lent, vicious fighters against the
Communists who routinely im-
pressed the Montagnard women,
children and elderly tribesmen
whenever they could capture them.
To provide greater security to the
people, many of the pacification
areas were made off limits to U.S.
military combat personnel. In addi-
11
LAM SON 719
tion, these areas and all other estab-
lished populated areas became
designated as control fire zones
(CFZs). All military, to include avi-
ation and artillery personnel, were
restricted from firing into a CFZ
without MACV or provincial civil-
ian approval. If a helicopter was
flying in a CFZ and received enemy
fire, the gunner had to have a posi-
tive identification of the enemy,
without any endangerment to the
civilian population, in order to re-
turn fire.
On helicopter combat assaults
the local province chief or a MACV
officer would be required to ride in
the command and control aircraft
to make the decision about whether
or not the gunships and troop car-
rying helicopters could "go hot" if
enemy fire were received. Hence, as
U.S. involvement continued into
1970, military operations became
more and more restricted. While
CFZs were occasionally frustrating,
they were probably the best way to
conduct operations in populated
areas. Of course, there were plenty
of free fire zones that had no re-
strictions on return of fire.
Between 1965 and 1970 about 11
percent of all deaths and 18 percent
of all wounds for U.S. combat
troops were caused by booby traps
and mines. For the Communists to
avoid decisive engagements and
just peck away at the U. S. troops
became increasingly frustrating,
and a serious no-win situation.
Clearly, the only way to defeat the
enemy would be to take the battle
farther westward, away from the
population centers and into the
Communist strongholds in the
mountains and plains along the
Cambodian and Laotian borders.
There, the enemy could also be
found in greater numbers.
Fire Support Bases and Airmobility
Conventional military opera-
tions in Vietnam were simply not
possible for several reasons. Aside
from the Communist tactics of
12
ambush and terrorism, and the ab-
sence of "front lines," the topog-
raphy and climate profoundly in-
fluenced the timing and types of
operations that could be con-
ducted. The climate is primarily
tropical and quite wet especially
during the summer monsoon sea-
son when military activity on both
sides was significantly reduced.
The southern part of South Viet-
nam is called the Mekong Delta,
which is flat, swampy and covered
with rice paddies. Delta areas were
generally no-go terrain for military
vehicles and tough going for sol-
diers on foot. "Riverine opera-
tions" by shallow-draft gunboats
were common in the Delta. The
capital city, Saigon, is located north
of the Delta in an area known as the
Piedmont, which consists of roll-
ing hills and plains. Armor opera-
tions were most frequent in this
area and along the coastal plain.
The coastal plain is a narrow
strip of beaches, river valleys,
marshlands and rice paddies along
the length of South Vietnam. The
coastal plain is the area of highest
population and commerce, and was
the location of most major U.S.
bases and logistics centers.
The great majority of the re-
maining northern half of South
Vietnam is composed of "triple
canopy" jungle and mountains,
some higher than 5,000 feet. Triple
canopy jungle comprises three
dense layers of foliage reaching as
high as 15 feet, 75 feet and 150 feet
from each layer of bushes and trees.
The only effective type of opera-
tions that could be conducted in
this terrain was airmobile assaults
by helicopters with small units of
infantry and artillery.
Operations to interdict into
enemy-held strongholds which were
usually in the mountains, employed
the fire support base (FSB) con-
cept. The typical combat operation
involved the establishment of a self-
contained, self-defended artillery
base, usually on top of a hill or
mountain, from which infantry
"search and destroy" operations
could be supported. The FSB con-
cept reflected a universal truth in
contemporary infantry combat:
Never conduct operations beyond
the range of artillery support. FSBs
provided rapid, reliable, continu-
ously available fire support, which
was especially important when
weather conditions precluded air
support. By their locations, most
FSBs provided additional advan-
tages for communications relay,
observation and control of high
ground.
A typical fire support base would
consist of a battery of 105 mm or
155 mm howitzers, an infantry
company, four 81 mm mortars
from an infantry battalion, and
communications, administrative,
medical and special operations per-
sonnel (K-9 teams, psychological
operations teams, sniper teams
with night scopes, etc.). FSBs were
usually placed within range of the
supporting fire of another FSB.
Each FSB generally supported
three or more infantry companies
in conducting operations around
the base.
The development of the fire sup-
port base concept was an innova-
tion that went hand-in-hand with
the increased flexibility and mobil-
ity made available by the use of the
Vietnam workhorse - the helicop-
ter. Many FSBs had no access for
resupply and were wholly reliant on
helicopters for support. There were
generally few roads, and when there
were roads they were usually not
secure. Remember, this was a war
without front lines against an
enemy that favored ambushes and
terrorism. Clearly, the helicopter
made possible the FSB concept.
Airmobility and air assault tactics
in Vietnam enabled the U.S. Army
for the first time to move large
forces to specific locations rapidly
and on short notice. FSBs allowed
the Army to progressively strike
deeper into enemy-held terrain
without the loss of superior fire-
power.
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Fire support base with a battalion of artillery on it.
Army Aviation Missions and Units
Much could be written about the
missions and units of Army Avia-
tion in Vietnam, but only a short
review limited to rotary wing opera-
tions is necessary here. After 1965,
the major types of Army helicop-
ters employed in Vietnam included:
The AH-l Cobra gunship, the
OH-6 Cayuse and OH-58 Kiowa
scout and division artillery helicop-
ters, and UH-IC, D and H series
helicopters.
JUNE 1986
Unit sizes and types varied con-
siderably among divisions and the
four corps areas in South Vietnam.
They consisted of platoons, detach-
ments, teams, companies, batter-
ies, squadrons, battalions and
groups. At the height of U.S. in-
volvement there were more than
5,000 Army aircraft in Vietnam and
it is estimated that more than
13,000 Army aircraft cycled
through Vietnam between 1961 and
1972. A few of the more typical
types of aviation units and their
missions were:
Aeromedical Evacuation (Dus-
toff) Units. At the peak of U.S.
troop strength in Vietnam there
were 116 UH-l helicopter ambu-
lances in service. Between 1965 and
1969 alone some 373,000 military
and civilian casualties were evacu-
ated by Dustoff helicopters. While
many casualties were conveniently
evacuated by other aircraft in the
vicinity, the lion's share was han-
13
LAM SON 7/9
dIed by Dustoff units on a 24-hour
basis in all weather conditions.
Cargo Helicopter Units. An
aviation battalion in support of a
division consisted of two cargo
helicopter companies of CH-47
Chinooks. Their missions included
troop and cargo transport. Cargo
helicopters played an integral role
in the establishment and resupply
of fire support bases primarily by
delivering artillery pieces, ammuni-
tion, food and fuel.
Assault Helicopter Companies
(AHCs). Clearly, the workhorses of
the Vietnam War were the UH-l
Hueys of assault helicopter com-
panies. AHC missions included re-
supply ("ash and trash"), combat
assaults, psychological operations,
special forces and long range recon-
naissance patrol insertions, elec-
tronic surveillance, etc. The typical
AHC consisted of 24 to 27 UH-ls in
three platoons - two lift platoons
of UH-IH "slicks" aircraft and one
gun platoon of UH-ICs.
Air Cavalry (Cav) Units. Com-
bat divisions in Vietnam were
usually supported by air cav squad-
rons. Each squadron consisted of
three air cav troops and one ground
cav troop. An air cav troop con-
tained 27 helicopters, 9 to 10 AH-
IG Cobras or UH-IC gunships, 10
to 11 OH-6 or OH-58 scouts and 7
UH-ls. The typical mission of a cav
unit involved coordinating with a
combat brigade for reconnaissance
missions and bomb damage assess-
ment in specified grid squares. In
Laos during LAMSON 719, a recon
team often consisted of one low
AH-l gunship and three high AH-l
gunships on search and destroy
missions.
Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA)
Units. These units were designated
as batteries and had a total of 12
AH -1 G "heavy hog" aircraft. Each
had rocket pods capable of carrying
up to 76 rockets. ARA units worked
directly for a division artillery and
received fire missions the same way
as did ground artillery. The aircraft
were usually used to provide close
14
air support to ground units and to
assist assault helicopter companies
on combat assaults. During LAM-
SON 719 most ARA teams con-
sisted of three aircraft with the
additional mission of seeking tar-
gets of opportunity.
Low level flying in Vietnam was
strictly prohibited and viewed as
unsafe by most units up to the
standdowns in 1972. Aircraft were
supposed to fly at 1,500 feet above
ground level in Vietnam and at
3,000 feet above ground level in
Laos and Cambodia. Tight circling
approaches and climbouts were
typical for getting into and out of
landing zones (LZs).
Combat assaults also conformed
to the altitude restrictions and usu-
ally were conducted in tight forma-
tions of UH-ls, sometimes with as
many as 10 aircraft in one lift. Most
combat assaults, however, were di-
vided into multilifts with about six
aircraft per lift. Generally, the more
aircraft involved, the more normal
were approaches and departures of
flights, although terrain and LZ
factors largely determined the as-
sault tactics.
Each combat assault had at least
one team of UH-IC gunships that
would make a racetrack pattern on
one side of the flight around the
LZ, at an altitude of 500 to 1,000
feet, to provide gun cover if needed.
Occasionally, a smoke ship would
be used to provide additional cover.
Combat assault tactics men-
tioned above were effective in Viet-
nam when a unit was usually only
sporadically engaged, primarily
with just small arms fire. However,
during LAMSON 719, as we shall
see, such tactics were disastrous.
Before the end of LAMSON 719,
most aviators routinely flew low
level. Combat assaults were con-
ducted by single ship landings with
30-second separations, and gun-
ships made runs from higher alti-
tudes. The LAMSON 719 battle
probably did more than any other
operation in the history of the Viet-
nam War to revert Army Aviation
doctrine to the development of
nap-of-the-earth flight tactics, and
to move away from close formation
combat assaults.
The Ho Chi Minh Trail
Through the 1960s resupply and
reinforcement of Communist
troops in South Vietnam were ac-
complished via two primary routes.
The most efficient route to resupply
the southern half of South Vietnam
was by cargo ship to the port of
One of
countless
trails in
Laotian
panhandle
known as
the Ho Chi
Minh Trail.
Bomb
craters are
visible
everywhere.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) in
Cambodia. Prince Norodom Siha-
nouk, the Cambodian ruler, al-
lowed the North Vietnamese to use
the port, and to construct base
areas and logistical facilities in
Cambodia near the South Vietnam
border. This was stopped in March
1970 when Prince Sihanouk was
overthrown by an anti-Communist
government that ordered North
Vietnam out of the country and
sought U.S. support.
In May and June 1970, U.S. and
South Vietnamese forces launched
JUNE 1986
A typical combat
assault. Insertion
involved several
aircraft in tight
formation landing in a
large LZ. Most LZs
in mountainous areas
required hovering
instead of landing,
and were sometimes
booby-trapped.
Approach to a small
ground unit on a
typical "ash and trash"
resupply sortie.
a major offensive into the Commu-
nist sanctuaries in Cambodia. The
offensive was a major success.
Huge amounts of enemy supplies,
equipment and bases were de-
stroyed along with a serious loss of
Communist troop strength. Coup-
led with the major loss of troops
during the Tet Offensive, the North
Vietnamese were severely reduced
as a combat effective force in the
southern IV Corps region of South
Vietnam for years to come.
The second and most important
route for the movement of supplies
and reinforcements from North
Vietnam to the south was the Ho
Chi Minh Trail, named after the
North Vietnamese leader. By 1970,
it had been developed into an exten-
sive, well-organized network of hun-
dreds of miles of roads and trails
running south in a wide corridor
along the border between Laos and
Vietnam into Cambodia. With the
loss of the port at Sihanoukville, all
supplies and reinforcements had to
be moved down the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. Not only was this a long, ar-
duous trip, but for some time the
trail network also was continually
bombed by the Air Force, Navy and
Marines. Despite these problems,
the North Vietnamese had to dra-
matically increase activity on the
Ho Chi Minh Trail to try to recon-
stitute their forces in the south.
The Americans and South Viet-
namese had turned the war around
and wanted to continue the offen-
sive. So, in late 1970 an invasion of
Laos, into the heart of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, was considered. An op-
erations plan called LAMSON 719
was drawn up. The principal objec-
tives of LAMSON 719 were to inter-
dict and disrupt the flow of enemy
troops and supplies along the Ho
Chi Minh Trail in Laos that were
coming into South Vietnam.
Operation LAMSON 719 would
be the first major test of the Viet-
namization effort. It would buy
more time and safety for the con-
tinued withdrawal of U.S. troops by
further damaging North Vietnam's
ability to launch any offensives.
And, it hopefully would cripple
North Vietnam's strategy for com-
bat operations and enhance peace
negotiations, which were already
underway.
Next month: LAMSON 719,
Part II: "The Battle."
15
Part II
Against All Odds
Theoretical Aspects of Microburst Flight
By
LCDR Joseph F. Towers
---------------------------------ABOUT THE AUTHOR---------------------------------
LCDR Joseph F. Towers is a reserve Naval aviator flying as an instructor pilot in the DC-9 with VR-57 at NAS North Island,
CA. Commander Towers is a San Diego-based First Officer on the B-767 with American Airlines and an independent safety
consultant specializing in microburst-induced windshear, flight crew training, and mishap prevention. Commander Towers has
studied and written extensively on the phenomenon of microburst-induced windshear for the last 5 years. His most recent
effort was compilation of an in-depth paper on the flight-related aspects of the microburst phenomenon. He presented this
paper at the 24th Aerospace Sciences Meeting sponsored by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Reno,
Nevada, in January 1986.
Commander Towers' article on microbursts is being presented in three parts. In Part I in the May issue of Aviation Digest,
he discusses weather conditions that spawn this most lethal of the downburst family and specific meteorological phenomena
to look for. Commander Towers describes the crash of a massive L-1011 airliner in Texas to demonstrate what microburst-
induced windshear can do to an aircraft, particularly during the vulnerable takeoff and approach stages of flight. He stresses
the need for better understanding and awareness of microbursts by flight crews. Such knowledge is important not only for
their own protection, but because of the importance of warning other aircraft of impending danger from this fast-forming
weather phenomenon.
In Part II, Commander Towers presents a fundamental aerodynamic explanation of microbursts. In Part III, to be published
in July, Commander Towers provides some techniques to control flightpath direction of an aircraft caught in extreme micro-
burst conditions.
Are microbursts and microburst-induced windshear a danger to Army aircraft, or are they a problem only for larger aircraft
that operate in a wider variety of weather conditions? While the consequences are more likely to be catastrophic for large
aircraft and more lives are at stake, any aircraft can fall victim to a microburst.
In April of this year, an Army U-21 was approaching Atlanta International Airport. The tower reported windshear, but the
aircraft was already on short final and committed to touchdown. It encountered severe windshear, causing it to touch down
with the left wing low, allowing the propeller blades of the left engine to hit the ground. Fortunately, in this mishap the only
damage was to the propeller blades.
The more you know about microbursts, the safer you will be. You need to know the conditions in which they are most likely
to occur, what happens to an aircraft when it encounters a microburst, and what to do to survive. And there's something else,
your report of a microburst might be the difference in whether someone else survives-or doesn't.
Aspects of microburst flight
N
OW that you' re familiar with
the basic nature of microbursts
and have some specific
meteorological phenomena to look
for, let' s look at how a microburst can
affect an aircraft during flight.
A micro burst encounter is extremely
dangerous during the vulnerable
takeoff and approach because of the
aircraft's limited aerodynamic capa-
bility and its proximity to the ground.
To fully understand the aero-
dynamic effects of an encounter, we
would need complex equations of
16
Thrust

Weight
Resultant
Relative Wind

lift Reduced

detO e
'P
Weight
Figure 4 depicts the four forces of acceleration acting on an aircraft in flight. Dur-
ing microburst penetration, these forces can become unfavorably unbalanced due
to a transitory reduction in lift produced by an angular shift in the relative wind and
a reduction in airstream velocity. The result is an adversely altered flight profile as
the aircraft seeks an equilibrium condition.
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
fpm
KIAS
km
JAWS
VSI
HUDS
AOA
Glossary
feet per minute
knots indicated airspeed
kilometer
Joint Airport Weather Studies
vertical speed indicator
Heads-Up-Display
angle-of-attack
motion and acceleration. However,
fundamental vector analysis will illus-
trate how an aircraft's flight path
can change due to an altering of the
lift force.
A reconstruction of the Pan
American Flight 759 disaster shows that
the Boeing 727 penetrated a weak-
to-moderate, microburst-induced
winds hear that generated a 14-knot
headwind during the takeoff roll,
a downdraft and crosswind shortly
after liftoff, and then a 25-knot
tailwind.
The aircraft was airborne for only
20 seconds and attained a maximum
altitude of about 150 feet. During
this time, takeoff thrust and weight
were constant with negligible changes
in drag. Lift was the only force of
acceleration that could have adversely
altered the flight path.
Lift equals the coefficient of lift
(Cd times the dynamic pressure
(q which equals Y2 p y2) times the
surface area of the wing (S) and is
written as: L=CL ( Y2 p Y2)S.
The density ratio (p) and surface
areas of the wing (S) were constant and
can be eliminated, leaving us with
L = C
L
X y2, or to put it another way,
LIFT = (Angle-of-Attack) x (Indicated
Airspeed)2.
Therefore, the remaining variables
having a deteriorating effect on
the flight path are the coefficient of lift,
which is a function of airfoil con-
figuration and angle-of-attack, and
dynamic pressure, which is a function
of the square of the airstream
velocity. A reduction in one or both
of these pilot-controlled variables
can severely impair lift generation.
Thus the New Orleans disaster
was no doubt the result of the aircraft
JUNE 1986
Figure 5 is based on Dr. T. Fujita's reconstruction of the microburst winds that
existed along the route of flight of Pan American Flight 759 at Moisant International
Airport in New Orleans in July 1982. Note the dramatic change in wind speed and
direction.
Microburst
) ) \ \ 10'0',,:'10',,) 1
( l Headwind
1\\ )
Up to 200+::anot / ./)
Diff. ___ ;;;;---
Velocities _,.,-

, -
1000'
500'
4km 1km Runway Okm
Figure 6 illustrates how the flight path can change during microburst flight along
with the aircraft's anticipated changes in pitching moment. This assumes a con-
stant thrust setting, an initially-trimmed condition and no control inputs. Initial
headwind penetration will typically result in increases in indicated airspeed and an
increasing or erratic angle-of-attack. The result is an upward-pitching moment and
an INCREASING PERFORMANCE PROFILE. As the aircraft then penetrates the
downflow and tailwind areas, critical losses of indicated airspeed and angle-of-
attack will occur. These combined reductions will impair the aircraft's ability to
generate lift. This condition results in a downward-pitching moment and a DE-
CREASING PERFORMANCE PROFILE. If the aircraft is not developing sufficient lift
to support its weight, the resultant vector (of lift, weight, thrust and drag) will cre-
ate a temporarily unbalanced force gravitationally accelerating the craft in the
downward vertical plane as an equilibrium condition is sought. During this transi-
tion, the flight profile is adversely altered. If such an oscillation is not interrupted
by the flight crew or the negative vertical displacement exceeds altitude available,
ground impact will occur.
A second-order effect may also occur whereby the flight path is further altered
because the aircraft is now flying with increased downward momentum in a de-
scending air mass. The aircraft climb rate capability would then have to exceed the
rate of the downflow in order for a net climb rate to result, relative to the terrain.
A further complication arises whereby the rate of change in the microburst's con-
tinuous, variable gust velocities occurs at a rate greater than the aircraft's ability
to attain a stabilized condition. The aircraft's resultant oscillatory motion aggravates
an already critical situation. Furthermore, the normal relationship between indicated
airspeed and angle-of-attack may be altered to an unknown and variable degree.
(Adapted from illustration by FASOTRAGRUPAC Media Services.)
17
temporarily not developing suffi-
cient lift to support its weight because
of reductions in angle-of-attack
and indicated airspeed. The resultant
vector (of lift, weight, thrust and
drag) temporarily generated an unbal-
anced force. Gravity dominated
and accelerated the craft downward
as an equilibrium condition was
sought. During this low-altitude transi-
tion, the flight crew was unable to
change the flight path direction to
prevent ground impact.
Roll and yaw rates may develop
because of the wide variation in air-
flow direction and velocity over various
sections of the airfoil. In a NASA
B-57 test aircraft penetration of a
developing microburst, variations
in airstream velocity were recorded in
excess of 10 knots between one wing
tip and the other, along with moderate
to severe turbulence.
Heavy rain is another factor to
consider during flight. It can reduce
visibility and may distract us from
concentrating on flight-path control.
The magnitude of heavy rain effects
on lift generation, drag rise and angle-
of-attack sensor alignment in unknown
and is currently being investigated.
Flight safety is further jeopardized
by possible erroneous readings of
pressure-sensitive instruments. Such
erroneous readings may be attributed
to variations in static pressure
within the micro burst. Specifically,
during penetration of a low-pressure
region from an area of higher pres-
sure, altimeter readings could indicate
an altitude higher than the true
altitude, and a barometric vertical-
speed indicator may show an errone-
ous rate of climb.
Indicated airspeed may also be
altered to an unknown degree. Air-
speed indicators are basic pressure
gauges. This gauge pressure is the
difference between total pressure at the
pitot head and static pressure at
the static ports, which is then cali-
brated in knots. As the aircraft
traverses regions of varying static
pressure, indicated airspeed may also
register a higher or lower value,
18
Representative Encounter with Downburst
Heavy Weight Takeoff Configuration
Angle of
Attack
Typical Swept-Wing Jet Transport
Just Before Immediately After
Figure 7 illustrates the reduction in angle-of-attack that can occur during the
highly dynamic conditions of a microburst. This angular reduction in the relative
wind may occur continuously with or without a significant change in indicated air-
speed. The net effect is that overall lift generation can be significantly reduced.
(Illustration taken from the Mac Flyer, as adapted from Douglas Aircraft and based
on a U.S. Navy Approach concept.) This illustration is fundamental in nature. Digital
flight recorder data taken from Delta Flight 191 (Da"as/Ft. Worth, August 1985) re-
vealed a very erratic angle-of-attack, one that would have been extremely difficult,
if not impossible, for a flight crew to use. This may be attributed to the extremely
turbulent winds within the microburst.

---Outburst
lAS lAS
Increase 1\\:::----' .. Drop
.----------- /. , TailWind
l- 'Drift Burst
I Right
Crosswind Burst
Figure 8 shows the effects of downburst and outburst upon an aircraft during a
final approach. Of these, the most dangerous effects are the down burst, crosswind
burst, and tailwind burst encountered near the ground. Outburst is defined as
being the strong outflow created when a down burst hits the ground and spreads
out. (Courtesy of Dr. Fujita; illustration modified by U.S. Navy Approach)
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
when given the same total pressure
at the pitot head.
Pressure profiles within
the microburst
The pressure profiles within the
microburst are very unusual. Dr. Fujita
attributes this strange pressure
change to the conversion of total pres-
sure into velocity pressure according
to Bernoulli's Theorem.
So, according to Dr. Fujita, what we
have is a pressure field characterized
by high pressure at the microburst
center which is encircled by a ring of
low pressure. The low-pressure ring
is surrounded by a high-pressure ring
located just inside the outer boun-
dary of a microburst. Outside this area
the pressure drops to the environ-
mental level.
If an aircraft were to encounter a
pressure differential (when compared to
normal environmental pressure for
the corresponding altitude) along its
flight path, the rate of climb or
descent registered on the vertical-speed
indicator would depend on the rate
of change in pressure along the flight
path, regardless of the true inertial
direction of the aircraft.
Pressure-sensitive flIght instruments
would indicate what they sense
based on dynamic and static pressure.
The problem is that this may not
necessarily be representative of the true
motion of the aircraft in inertial
space as it traverses sharp pressure
gradients.
During micro burst conditions, a
potentially deadly situation exists in
which an aircraft may be robbed
of indicated airspeed to where it's now
below the approach or departure
speed. As pilots, we've been obsessed
more with loss of airspeed than
flight path control. That's a dangerous
preoccupation. Furthermore, we've
had little or no awareness of the effects
that a dramatic change in angle-
of-attack can have. In light of this,
it is possible that the loss of several
aircraft may have been caused by
attempts, either consciously or uncon-
JUNE 1986
sciously, through pitch attitude
reduction, to attain a specific approach
or takeoff airspeed.
(Part III, the conclusion of
Commander Towers' article, will appear
in the July issue.) ,
\\ ~ \
~ ~ J ~ 0
~ t
Takeoff Roll Liftoff First Contact
I I I
Local Time 1608:40 1608:50 1609:00
Figure 9 is a three-dimensional illustration of a microburst, courtesy of Doug/as
Aircraft Company. An overlay of high and low pressure regions has been added
along with the approximate flight path of Pan American Flight 759. Could the absence
of voice communication during the last 15 seconds of flight be attributed to an
erroneous indication of climb on the aircraft's vertical speed indicator, thereby
giving the impression of impending recovery?
Figure 10 depicts an aircraft in extremis due to a microburst encounter. Such a
situation demands immediate and aggressive flight crew responses to redirect the
aircraft's flight path to avoid impact. (Painting courtesy of Blake Radar, U.S. Navy
Approach, September 1982.)
19
PEARL!S
Personal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown
PEARL.:S, Dawna Salazar, holds a survival food packet,
which is included in the Army aircraft survival kits. The
packet contains about 870 calories and consists of three
dried, compressed cereal bars, a chocolate fudge bar, soup
and gravy base, instant coffee and sugar. The instructions
state: "Eating slowly will give more satisfaction."
Staying Alive
If you were forced down in the wilderness, or
enemy territory, could you survive? Sure you can, but
you may end up doing things you never thought you
could. The Air Force Survival School instructors at
Fairchild AFB, located several miles outside of Spo-
kane in eastern Washington, are staffed by a nucleus
of officers and 230 enlisted instructors. These in-
structors often come from Montana, Wyoming and
other places where life is rugged. Many of them were
skilled in hunting, fishing and trapping before they
enlisted, and the Air Force rounds them out as full-
fledged survival, escape and evasion experts. This
survival school is tailored to aircrew personnel re-
gardless of the type aircraft they fly. We in the Army
can get quotas to this good school. Should you be
fortunate enough to go, you will have to work hard
20
but the experience you will receive will certainly be
beneficial should you ever be in a serious survival
situation. Properly trained aircrew personnel should
be able to survive just about anywhere.
The Arctic is very, very difficult to survive in. And
yet, it's something against which you can fairly well
protect yourself. A barren desert probably presents
the most grim survival challenge. You can get yourself
warm in the Arctic, but it's very difficult to get your-
self cool in the desert; and, you need water. The aver-
age person can last for 30 days, roughly, without
food. But, you do need water!
While techniques differ according to climate and
terrain, the goals are the same.
Survival is survival; it means staying alive, staying
in as good a condition as you possibly can, in order to
fly and fight again. That's basically the bottom line
of why you need to learn and live survival.
The Air Force course typically begins on a Wednes-
day morning with orientation followed by lectures on
the will to survive, the ability to survive and survival
medicine.
The following days bring more lectures - desert
survival, arctic survival, survival in the tropics and in
the water. Then come hands-on lessons in operating
radios, flares and signal mirrors. Next, the students
test their skills in Colville National Forest, which pro-
vides a remote and rugged setting.
Finally, it's graduation day. Late in the afternoon,
the students file into an auditorium at Fairchild.
Lieutenant Colonel Driscoll, a former Vietnam pris-
oner of war, strides onto the stage. For half an hour,
he tells the story of his captivity. It's a tale Driscoll
has told many times, and each time the students are
spellbound. Here's a man who has had to deal with
torture, beatings, atrocious food and humiliation for
7 years. Their 17 days of training suddenly seem
awfully mild.
We in the Army ask, "Why doesn't the Army have
such a course for our aircrew personnel?" We do have
such a course, but it's shorter; our survival course
runs only 6 days. It is sponsored by the Sixth Army
for Army Reserve Component aircrew personnel and
it is conducted by the Oregon Army National Guard
at Camp Rilea, which is about 84 miles west of Port-
land, OR. The point of contact is Major Pat Kelley,
AUTOVON 586-4133; PEARL believes another
course will be conducted in early spring. You should
work through your unit training officer to secure a
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
quota. There also are other survival courses being
conducted throughout the Army for water survival,
arctic survival, cold weather survival and desert sur-
vival. We don't want to duplicate any of the Air Force
survival courses because of the costs and manpower
involved.
XM-43 Aviator's Protective Mask
The XM-43 aviator's protective mask consists of a
form fitting faceblank with lenses mounted close to
the eyes; an integrally attached chemical/biological
(CB) hood and skull-type suspension system; an in-
halation air distribution assembly for regulating the
flow of air to the oral nasal cavity, lenses and hood
assembly; a pressure compensated exhalation valve
assembly for maintaining an overpressure in the
mask/hood assembly at all times; an electronic
microphone for communicating while in the aircraft;
and a portable motor/blower filter assembly for sup-
plying filtered air to the face piece/hood assembly.
The new mask provides the required CB protection
and allows for compatibility with the Integrated Hel-
met Display Sight System and the optical relay tube
of the AH-64 Apache aircraft. The mask will be worn
by attack helicopter aviators and will provide the avi-
ators the required respiratory/skin protection from
CB agents, toxins and radioactive fallout particles.
Point of contact for additional information is Mr. Joe
Graczak, AMCPM-ALSE, AUTOVON 693-3210.
New Happenings at Ft. Eustis
The ALSE supervisors' course is now available at
Ft. Eustis, VA, and is open to officers and warrant
officers. It carries an additional skill identifier of IF
for warrant officers. This course also will soon be
expanded to senior noncommissioned officers.
Anti-G-Suit Protection
Anti-G-Suit protection is a must if you are under-
going test pilot training or if you are assigned to
Edwards Air Force Base, or other high performance
aircraft test facilities as a test pilot. A "blackout"
from loss of G protection can occur in an average of
15 seconds. Use the G suit when you need it; it is
available from the Air Force and the Navy.
Downed Pilot Rescued
Pilots Tom Doyle and Jeff Lewis, accompanied by
Roy Bailey and Doug Boody, were recently on a
routine test flight in an S-76B corporate helicopter.
Bailey, an electrician, noticed something unusual in
the swamps below. "When I first saw it I thought it
was a survey cross," Boody, a crewchief, said. Pilot
Doyle suggested they go back and check it out. Upon
closer inspection by the crewchief, they saw someone
standing on the belly of an overturned single engine
Piper Tomahawk plane, waving furiously. Doyle
couldn't land and didn't have a hoist because of the
helicopter configuration. They hovered overhead, but
were afraid the plane's wing would rise into the rotor
blades. Doyle motioned for the pilot to get in the
water and away from the downed aircraft. Crewmem-
bers Bailey and Boody then pulled the pilot into the
S-76B cabin. Student pilot Sassano was on a solo
cross-country flight, he said, when his engine quit
and he was forced to land. The plane flipped on con-
tact. There is a message in this article, carry an emer-
gency locator transmitter or at least a survival radio.
Luckily, these pilots were in the right place at the
right time and were able to effect a safe rescue.
AN/PVS-5 Night Vision Goggles Update
Although this is not considered an ALSE item per
se, we are providing this information because it is
used by aviators. The major problem at present is
with the defective face mask assemblies that are
cracking with use. CECOM representatives are con-
tinuing to provide operator and organization mainte-
nance training on night vision devices, AN/PVS-5,
AN/PVS-4, and AN/TVS-5. Point of contact is
AMXEU-L-CECOM, Mr. White, AUTOVON 421-
6685.
ALSE Inspection, Maintenance and Repairs
With the firm support we are getting from the
ALSE training facility at Ft. Eustis, the Aviation
Center at Ft. Rucker, AL, the Reserve forces, includ-
ing the Army National Guard and the overseas ele-
ments, and the Aviation Life Support Equipment
Management Steering Council, we are strongly mov-
ing forward in our quest for what is needed to make
Army ALSE second to none. Air Force, Navy and
Army manuals/technical orders and NAVAIRs are
published pertaining to almost every item of ALSE
available. Currently, the Army does not have suffi-
cient people to adequately maintain this equipment to
the desired standards. The establishment of some sort
of ALSE facility named by qualified personnel is an
absolute necessity. Key to a successful ALSE program
could be centralization/consolidation wherever prac-
tical. Equipment to be inspected must be accessible
and readily available for inspection, maintenance and
repair. .. "
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, AMC Project Officer, ATTN: AMCPO-ALSE,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693-1218/9 or Commercial 314-263-1218/9.
JUNE 1986 21
ABOYE THE E ~ T
During his more than 4,200 hours of flying for the Army,
maintenance test pilot James M. "Mike" Hudson has put his
aviation skills on the line many times. But, it was his extraordi-
nary performance in November 1984 that earned him an Army
aviator's prized badge of honor, the Broken Wing Aviation
Safety Award.
Hudson, a Department of the Army civilian assigned to the
120th Army Reserve Command (ARCOM), Ft. Jackson, SC, is
credited with safely landing his T-42A Cochise airplane after
one of the two engines suddenly exploded and caught fire.
"Mike did an extraordinary job to save the crew and aircraft
from any further damage;' says Bob Medley, aviation safety
manager for Second U.S. Army at Ft. Gillem, GA. "The good
thing about Army flight training is that it teaches you to react in
an emergency;' he said.
Hudson was on a routine maintenance test flight awaiting
clearance for approach to Columbia Metropolitan Airport when
the explosion occurred, emitting an 8 to 10 foot ball of fire. Two
cylinders were blown out of the engine, one shattering the pro-
peller. The fire quickly spread to the wing and was intensified
when a piston broke through the cowling and severed the
primer fuel line.
"My primary concern was to get the fire out, or get down
before the wing burned off;' Hudson said. His first reaction was
to shut the fuel off, which helped bring the fire under control.
James M. "Mike" Hudson
Despite the violent pitching of the aircraft and minimal visibil-
ity from the smoke and spewing oil, Hudson was able to regain
control of the airplane and maintain the maximum allowable
power to keep the airspeed up. Meanwhile, crash and rescue
teams were standing by at Columbia Metropolitan Airport.
Once emergency flight procedures were complete, Hudson
landed the aircraft, shutting down all of the plane's electrical
systems and stopping without brakes to prevent any sparks
from setting off another fire, which could have destroyed the
aircraft.
"A test pilot has to take the attitude that anything and every-
thing can happen and react as best he can;' Hudson said. "I
tend to want to play devil's advocate with everything, even in my
personal life. I guess it's a matter of my makeup:'
Also aboard the aircraft was copilot Major Van Jones. Accord-
ing to Hudson, the two had flown together before through other
emergency situations, so they were used to working as a team.
The Broken Wing is given in recognition of extraordinary skill
and judgment in recovering an aircraft as a result of mechanical
failure or other emergency.
As a combat helicopter pilot in Vietnam in 1968, Hudson was
shot down three times while he was serving with the First
Cavalry Division (Airmobile). He is currently a reservist with the
120th ARCOM.
Ms. Mary Kay Sones, Public Information Office, Headquarters, Second US Army, Fort Gillem, GA
AVIATION PERSONNEL NOTES
Branch Letter
To All Company Grade Aviators:
I thought I would write a note to you in the field
and let you know that the Military Personnel Center
(MILPERCEN) is alive and well. For those of you
who call us with your requests and questions, you
know how busy the phone lines are. Since my arrival
here in June 1985, I have noticed a common trend in
the requests and inquiries from nearly all the com-
pany grade officers. I hope to answer some of those
questions and provide you some useful information
in this letter.
Tl:ze Role Of The Assignment Officer: In a recent
letter an old friend told me that he felt that the officer
in the field didn't believe that the assignment officer
was concerned with his individual needs. That is far
from the truth; but remember, just as you make diffi-
cult decisions and unpopular demands on your sol-
diers, so too must we in the course of our job. You are
charged with meeting a pickup zone time, keeping
your aircraft in a mission ready status, and a host of
other requirements that your reports are written on.
Remember that we are human just like you are. We
have to meet the Army's requirements above all other
considerations. However, the first item considered
when we make an assignment is the officer's prefer-
ence statement. Having a current one in your file is
the best action you can take to influence your next
assignment.
The Advanced Course: All officers must attend an
advanced course in residence, and there are only three
exceptions to the rule: resignations, constructive
credit or approval by the commander, MILPERCEN
for exceptional reasons. You must attend by your
eighth year of active federal commissioned service.
Combined Arms Service Staff School: Those offi-
cers in year group 79 and later must complete Phase I
and attend Phase II in residence prior to their ninth
year of active federal commissioned service. There are
no exceptions!
Tour Extensions: Branch is approving these on a
very limited basis, and only after the local command
has initiated the request. Overseas requests and exten-
sions for command may be exceptions, but will be
24
handled on a case by case basis.
Records: Your selection for schooling, promotion
and all other personnel actions is based on your file
at MILPERCEN. Your Officer Record Brief (ORB)
tells us what you have done. It is your military resume
and keeping it current is your responsibility. A very
important item in your file is your photo. Weight and
mustaches are very sensitive issues and carry more
negative impact than positive. Keep your photo cur-
rent to make sure that it represents you well. It is the
only human element in your file, and introduces you
to every reviewer.
Success: Do your job well , get good reports and
you will advance. If the ORB tells us what jobs you
have held, then your reports will reflect how well
you've done. We consider a report with good com-
ments from the rater and a senior rater block check at
or above center of mass to be a respectable officer
evaluation report. There are some jobs that you
should all strive to hold. These are: platoon leader,
executive officer, primary staff at the battalion or
higher level, operations officer, and command. You
should hold at least three of those jobs before you
come into the zone for major.
Good reports from tough demanding jobs keep you
competitive for promotion. Promotion is not a re-
ward for past performance, but recognition of poten-
tial for future advancement. It is up to you to display
that potential.
One of the most critical and toughest Army Avia-
tion jobs is the maintenance officer's. Should you
volunteer or be selected to track in this field, consider
yourself in a very select group. Aviators in this area of
concentration are as competitive for 04 and 05 pro-
motion as any track.
There are also some very select nominative posi-
tions to which some of you may be assigned. Other
than command, the two most difficult positions to
nominate an officer to are Reserve Officers' Training
Corps and Recruiting Command. You are not being
cast off into the boiling sea if you are selected for one
of these positions. Those of you who did not get the
opportunity to command in aviation may want to
volunteer for a recruiting command.
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Assignments: You will not be considered for reas-
signment until 6 months prior to your normal rota-
tion date. If you are on orders to the advanced course
your assignment will be projected 60 days prior to
your report date. As I mentioned earlier, keep your
preference statement updated. Phone calls just slow
the process.
Aviation Branch Hotline: We now provide infor-
mation on available assignments, professional devel-
opment and other items of interest on our Aviation
Branch hotline. A recording containing up-to-date in-
formation can be obtained by dialing: Commercial
(202) 325-7150, or AV 221-7150. You will hear a re-
cording asking for a 7 digit number. At the tone dial:
278-2861 (CPT-AVNl): Captain Assignments
578-2861 (LTS-AVNl): Lieutenant Assignments
At the completion of the message, you can leave a
message if you desire.
I wish you all good flying and the best of luck in
your jobs. If you haven't asked for a copy of your
ORB in a while, send your requests to the following
address.
USAMILPERCEN
200 Stovall Street
ATTN: DAPC-MSR-S
Alexandria, VA 22332-0400
If you have any further questions feel free to write or
contact your assignment officer.
Sincerely,
Captain Jimmy M. Rabon
Aviation Branch, CAD
What Must I do to Get Promoted?
The latest sergeant first class promotion list has
been published, and now the questions start. Staff
sergeants are asking, "Why wasn't I promoted?"
Commanders and supervisors are wondering, "Why
wasn't Sergeant Smith promoted? He's the best staff
sergeant we have."
These questions have been asked before and will be
asked again. Let's look at the results of the fiscal year
(FY) 1986 Sergeant First Class Selection Board.
Of the total 8,106 noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) selected for promotion, 7,659 were selected
from the primary zone. Of the total selected from the
primary zone, 2,532 were considered in the primary
zone for the first time, while 5,127 had previous con-
sideration - some as many as 7 times.
Two important factors impacting on selection are
needs of the Army and the quality of soldiers being
JUNE 1986
considered as reflected by their file.
First, the needs of the Army may change from year
to year. Remember, you now compete only against
those in your military occupational specialty (MOS).
The number of projected vacancies at the next higher
grade determines the number that are to be selected.
This is called the select objective, and there is one for
each MOS. With Force Modernization and changes
to the force structure, the number needed in each
MOS may vary from year to year.
Second, the quality of NCOs competing for selec-
tion has improved. Therefore, is your file complete?
Check it yourself before the board convenes. See if all
your awards and decorations are listed and that all of
your enlisted evaluation reports (EERs), academic re-
ports and course completion certificates for resident
and nonresident courses that are eligible to be in your
official military personnel file (OMPF) are present.
Make sure someone else's documents are not filed in
your OMPF.
You should know better than anyone else what you
are authorized or have accomplished. Do you have
any old Articles 15 in your OMPF maintained at the
Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center? If you do,
get them out of your file. AR 27-10 gives procedures
for transferring old Articles 15 that occurred at a
junior enlisted grade, and have served their purpose,
from the performance portion of your OMPF to the
restricted portion. The restricted portion does not go
before a selection board.
Check your photograph: You should be standing at
attention, your uniform must fit properly and be the
right uniform. Many female NCOs have pictures that
show them wearing the skirt with oxfords instead of
black pumps. Other pictures show NCOs with hair
too long, mustaches too long or no brass. Make sure
your photograph is correct, and that it depicts the
way you want the board to look at you.
Are you physically fit? If you are overweight, lose
it! If you can't pass the Army physical report test,
work out, get in shape and pass it!
Study your military skills and do the best you can
on your skill qualification test (SQT). Raise your gen-
eral technical area aptitude score if it is below 100.
Continue your civilian education, and ensure it is
properly reflected on your personnel qualification
roster and OMPF.
Duty performance is the most significant factor
considered by the board members. Seek out the
toughest leadership jobs. Be a squad leader, platoon
sergeant or, if you are a master sergeant, a first ser-
25
geant. If your current duty position has you supervis-
ing several people, make sure the duty description and
narrative portion of your EER reflect that leadership
information.
In summary, there is no single item that guarantees
your promotion. You must be strong in all areas. Do
well in all your jobs. Seek the tough leadership jobs
for that extra plus. Stay physically fit. Take your
SQT, if available, and score high. Keep your official
records current. The opportunities for promotion are
there, but so is the competition!
New Dimensions of Adventure (CW3 Robert H.
Gratbowski, Warrant Officer Division,
MILPERCEN)
The AH-64 Apache program, for those with a de-
sire to seek high adventure, is an exciting opportunity
to equal the accomplishments of those who knew the
challenging times of early aviation. Perhaps there are
no more leather jacketed aces; pioneers of an unex-
plored sky. There are, today, aviators of unusual skill,
competence and training, dedicated to the task of
pioneering a new age in the sky where lasers, com-
puter controlled components and deadly weapons
systems are the norm. That is quite a leap into a new
dimension of operation. Most, perhaps as recently as
10 years ago, would have considered the AH-64 as
belonging to the realm of science fiction. Today, the
Army is training in and fielding this aircraft.
There is room in the AH-64 program for very spe-
cial aviators - aviators unafraid of a radically new
approach to mission performance - aviators capable
of mastering complex systems in potentially hazard-
ous environments. Aviators who, with the same fore-
sight and daring of their compatriots of leather jacket
days, are willing to open new vistas of aviation.
The program is not easily entered. An applicant
must be qualified as an attack helicopter pilot and
have a minimum of 2 years attack helicopter experi-
ence. Further, the applicant should be in a Condi-
tional Voluntary Indefinite or Regular Army career
status (waiverable in exceptional cases). If those basic
qualifications are met, the applicant may submit a
request, on DA Form 4187, for integration into the
AH-64 program. The request must be favorably in-
dorsed through channels to the appropriate career
manager at MILPERCEN. Once the 4187 is received
at MILPERCEN, the applicant's official military per-
sonnel file will be reviewed. After passing this thor-
ough screening process, the applicant's name will be
placed on the waiting list for the program.
26
It is also important to remember that there is a
3-year Active Duty service obligation associated with
the course and, once trained, the officer must antici-
pate repetitive tours in AH-64 attack battalions.
Although not necessary for selection, an officer eval-
uation report stating an officer's potential for maxi-
mum service to the Army as an AH-64 rated aviator
cannot hurt the overall chances of that officer's ac-
ceptance into the program.
Adventure is definitely not dead. It is alive and
thriving in the world of Army Aviation. If you would
walk this path, this new call to glory, then give close
consideration to the AH-64 program. The aircraft of
the future is waiting for you to climb aboard.
For further information on the program, commis-
sioned officers should contact Captain Bob Carter at
AUTOVON 221-0433/7822, and warrant officers
should contact CW 4 Euel Henry at AUTOVON 221-
7835/7836.
1986 Engineering Test Pilot Board Results
The 1986 Army Aviation Engineering Test Pilot Se-
lection Board met in February to select aviators to
attend the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School (USNTPS),
Patuxent River, MD. The selectees are:
CPT Eric S. Dean
CPT Robert A. Doyle
CPT Jack L. Kimberly
CW3(P) Mark E. Metzger
CPT Nancy J. Sherlock
CPT David F. Swafford
CPT Henry H. Waller III
The selection of Army aviators for participation in
the program is made by an annual Officer Personnel
Management Directorate (OPMD) board. Those se-
lected attend the Army Test Pilot Orientation Course
at Edwards Air Force Base, CA, to receive an aca-
~ e m i and flight refresher. At the USNTPS, they will
undergo a comprehensive ll-month course specifi-
cally designed to produce a proficient engineering test
pilot.
The next OPMD Engineering Test Pilot Board is
planned for February 1987. DA Circular 351-84-3,
"Army Aviation Engineering Test Pilot Program"
(currently under revision) contains the prerequisites
and application procedures. The deadline for apply-
ing for the 1987 selection is 31 December 1986. For
further information, write or call MAJ Hinds,
MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPA-CV, 200 Stovall
Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400; AUTOVON 221-
8156/7. rC,
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
GOAL-
$2,500,000
JUNE 1986-
$2,035,000
cash and pledges
iatio'1
USEUM
JUNE 1986
This is a series about the Army Aviation Museum Foundation fund
drive. Currently, plans call for building a modern complex to house
your Army Aviation Museum. Since last month additional donations
have been received. However, we still have a ways to go, as the
barometer above shows. If you would like to help "build" the Army
Aviation Museum's new home, you are invited to send a tax
deductible contribution to: The Army Aviation Museum Foundation,
Box 610, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362-5000. If you desire additional
information call Mr. Ed Brown at (205) 598-2508.
Aero Commander U-4A
A Look At What's In Your Museum
The U-4A, originally designated L-26B, was 1 of 15 pur-
chased by the U.S. Air Force and used for staff transporta-
tion. The Army bought one. It is equivalent to the U.S. Army
U-9B model and was turned over to the Minnesota National
Guard for duty. The U.S. Army Aviation Museum acquired
the standard Aero Commander 560A from the Minnesota
National Guard in 1965.
27
AVIATION
STANDARDIZATION
Recording Flight Time
Sergeant First Class R. A. Buck
Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
WITH THE INTRODUCTION of the main-
stay of Army Aviation, the helicopter, our sys-
tem of recording flight time became more
complicated. Today we have aircraft equipped
with extremely sophisticated electronic systems
designed to enhance safety and expand the mis-
sion capability of our aircrews and aircraft.
Our current system of keeping flight records is
not designed to track all the information neces-
sary to monitor an aviator's skills. Today we
track flight time for an aviator using the DA
Form 759 and 759-1. The problem arises from
the fact that we only track his time in very broad
terms. By looking at an aviator's DA Form 759
we can tell how many hours he has and break
those down by pilot, copilot and instructor pilot.
We also know whether this time is fixed wing or
rotary wing, single engine or multi engine. If we
want any more specific information we have to
go back through his DA 759-1 forms and extract
his time by type aircraft and flight condition.
This can turn into a complicated and time-
consuming process.
For the enlisted crewmembers, this system is
even more ambiguous. We have no direct gui-
dance on how to maintain their records. We
28
track their total flight time, but do not record
any special qualifications or experience. With an
aircrew training program being developed for the
enlisted crewmembers we will have to maintain
additional and more specific information on
these individuals, creating a need for a new and
more accurate system of maintaining flight time
and flight records.
With regard to aviator crewmembers, a new
system is being developed that not only tracks
the aviator's time by duty symbol and flight con-
dition, but also by type aircraft. The revised DA
Form 759 incorporates a chronological listing of
the aviator's qualifications and flight hours,
broken down by duty symbol in each aircraft
system. A separate DA Form 759-1 will be main-
tained for each separate aircraft the aviator is
required to operate. This form tracks the individ-
ual's total flight time in a specific aircraft by
duty and flight condition symbol. It is therefore
possible for an aviator to have more than one
DA 759-1 form for each close-out period.
For enlisted crewmember Inoncrewmember
personnel, a more specialized system for flight
records maintenance is being developed. Flight
records designed for crewmembers/noncrew-
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
members will use a DA Form 759 and DA Form
759-3. The DA Form 759-3 is a new form de-
signed to track flight time and maintain flight
pay computations for all individuals who must
fly for pay. It is a combination of the old DA
Form 759-1 and a flight pay computation work
sheet. When the individual is due a closeout, a
consolidated DA Form 759-3 will be completed
and maintained in his records. This will provide
a continuous record of his flight time and flight
pay qualification.
The revised flight records system for enlisted
personnel is also designed for those individ-
uals - scout aerial observer, aerial observer and
flight engineer-who must accomplish assigned
task and flying hour requirements as outlined in
aircrew training manuals. For these individuals,
you will still use the DA Form 759-3 as a work
sheet, but will not use it as a consolidation sheet.
Instead, their closeout will be done the same as
is an aviator's using the DA Form 759-1. This
becomes necessary so we can track their time by
duty and flight condition symbol, as required by
the ATM.
With increased emphasis on computers in the
Army, a new system of maintaining flight rec-
ords and flight pay is being designed for auto-
DES welcomes your inquires and requests to focus attention on an
area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander, U. S. Army
Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362-5000; or
mated and nonautomated use. This system gives
us the capability to track all aviators' qualifica-
tions and experience throughout their careers.
We have also incorporated a system of tracking
flight time for pay and computing time on flight
status for award of senior and master crewmem-
ber badges.
Much time and effort has been devoted to de-
velopment of a revised Army flight records sys-
tem that is usable at the unit level. Two Active
Army units are currently maintaining their flight
records under the new system to evaluate and
test procedures and design of the revised DA
Form 759 records. When these units have com-
pleted the test, the information will be collected
and their comments and suggestions reviewed;
the forms and procedures will then be revised in
order to develop the most user friendly system
possible.
New technology, mission requirements and
funding create constant changes in Army Avia-
tion. Development of a records maintenance sys-
tem that can react to change is long overdue.
Hopefully, this new procedure will cure that
problem.
The new procedures and forms will appear in
chapters 7 and 8 of Field Manual 1-300.
call us at AUTOVON 558-3504, FTS 533-3504 or Commercial
205-255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hotline, AUTOVON
558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message.
u.s. Army Class A Aviation Flight Mishaps
Flying Hours Total Cost
Number (estimated) Rate Fatalities (in millions)
FY 85 (to April 30) 30 847,493 3.54 27 $64.5
FY 86 (to April 30) 20 874,435 2.29 19 $45.1
JUNE 1986 29
The "Girl Back Home"
and Army Aviation's H -19
Mr. James Mowry
THE PRIME MISSION of the
H-19C Chickasaw (later redesignated
UH-19C) was troop movement and re-
supply during the Korean War-and
the "Hog," with tail marking 114272,
served her country well in that capacity.
However, her tour was not over with the
signing of the truce, and she didn't hit
the surplus list until 1968.
In the meantime she flew many more
missions, such as routine, medical evac-
uations, training and VIP flights. Old
114272 flew many VIPs - General
Maxwell Taylor, Secretary of the Army
Stevens, Congressman from Michigan
Gerald R. Ford Jr., actresses Mary
Murphy and Terry Moore, comedian
Rosco Odte and the singing Bell Sisters,
to mention just a few. Probably the
most publicized and most memorable
would be the 4-day USO mission flying
the late Marilyn Monroe.
30
There is an old saying in the military,
"Keep your eyes and ears open and
never volunteer." But, flight time had
been scarce for a while around the 13th
Helicopter Company, so it was that I
volunteered for a highly special mission
that cold February day in 1954. Of
course, when the nature of the mission
was disclosed everyone volunteered,
but too late - a well-balanced crew had
already been assigned. Four H-19Cs,
including 114272, met Miss Monroe
and her entourage at Seoul City Airport
(K -16) on 16 February.
The word had got out, and lines of
military police restrained an eager
crowd when Miss Monroe's group was
transferred from the C-54 Air Force
transport to the H-19s. Miss Monroe,
the usa tour director, an Air Force
nurse and Mrs. Frank "Lefty" O'Doul
(wife of the famous baseball player who
in the old Pacific Coast League was
manager of the San Francisco Seals)
were assigned to the lead aircraft. The
support band "Too Far East" and the
press boarded the other three H -19s.
Miss Monroe waved from the cargo
door as we waited for takeoff and told
the troops she had become "bored"
with baseball in Japan and decided to
visit her friends in Korea. (Her hus-
band, Joe DiMaggio, the "Yankee Clip-
per," and Lefty O'Doul, were in Japan
assisting Japanese baseball teams.)
Suddenly, the military police lines
broke and the "hungry-for-a-closer-
look" GIs swarmed our helicopter. As
the troops pressed closer and the heli-
copter started to rock under the force, a
quick decision was made to remove
Miss Monroe from the cargo compart-
ment and put her in the copilot's seat,
high above and out of the reach of the
outstretched hands. The copilot (LT
John Dunn) climbed outside and lifted
the seat to allow Miss Monroe to climb
the short ladder to his compartment.
The arrangement worked and as John
assisted Miss Monroe in getting into the
shoulder harness and seatbelt, the
crowd moved back. (I'll never forget the
expression on my copilot's face as he
carefully positioned the shoulder straps
and locked them into the seatbelt.) Miss
Monroe was dressed in olive green win-
ter fatigues with the two top buttons
unfastened on the tight fitting blouse.
As he secured the seat buckle, the third
button "popped" loose and I heard a
short spoken "oops" as John nearly fell
from the side of our Hog! It was a tense
moment to be sure.
With the crowd moved back, the
H-19s were fired up and we started the
first leg of our mission. Since the tour
was unplanned and time was short,
Miss Monroe had chosen to visit the
troops along the old main line of resis-
tance and our first stop would be at 1 st
Marine Division headquarters. It was a
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
short flight but my first with a female
copilot. I enjoyed every minute - I
smiled the whole way! As we landed she
said, "These birds are wonderful!" I
agreed.
The weather was bitter cold but our
reception was warm at each division.
As we approached the 7th Division
command post, we could see yellow
smoke billowing from several grenades,
to help guide us to the landing zone,
and we also saw a group of officers
awaiting her arrival. Major General
Lionel C. McGarr and his staff had
been waiting more than an hour in
near-zero temperatures to welcome
Miss Monroe to the Bayonet Division.
After a short picture-taking session
they whisked her away in an open jeep.
The evening show was before a crowd
of about 4,000 GIs; many had waited
all day in the bitter cold to ensure hav-
ing a good seat. Some had brought
their winter sleeping bags and looked
pretty warm, all zipped in with only
nose and eyes peering out. In contrast
Miss Monroe came on stage in a low-
cut, tight-fitting blue sequin cocktail
dress. She had to be cold and "goose
bumps" were visible on her bare arms.
Later someone asked, "Were you cold?"
She said, "I didn't feel anything but
good!"
The show was fairly short. She sang,
"There is Nothing Like a Dame," "Dia-
monds Are a Girl's Best Friend" and
Gershwin's "Do It Again." More often
than not, the applause and "cat calls"
lasted longer than the song. At the con-
clusion of the show General McGarr
made Miss Monroe an honorary mem-
ber of the Bayonet Division saying she
was a great morale booster, then add-
ing, "You are the greatest hit the Yankee
Clipper ever got," referring to the
couple's recent wedding.
After the evening shows, Miss Mon-
roe would visit the officers club and the
enlisted club, making small talk and
JUNE 1986
answering questions of all kinds. The
troops loved her. At the 7th Division it
was 2 o'clock in the morning before she
retired, but long before our 0700 hours
takeoff she was up and touring the regi-
mental areas in an effort to see more of
her fans who were on duty and thus
missed the show the night before.
Except for the first leg of our tour,
Miss Monroe rode below - to the de-
light of the crewchief, CPL Arm-
strong - (from New York City). He got
to know her pretty well, even made the
seats on one side of the helicopter into a
bed so that she could "cat nap" in
flight, between shows. Before the tour
was over he told Miss Monroe, "They'll
never believe this back home." Her re-
sponse was that they would have to
believe pictures and several were taken
of the two of them together. She was a
good sport.
The crowds were the same at the 3d,
40th and 25th Divisions; they ranged
from 6,000 to 10,000 or more. At the
40th Grenadier Division, Colonel John
G. Kelly, commander of the 160th In-
fantry Regiment, felt a tank was the
safest mode of transportation to the
outdoor theater. It was an odd sight to
see such beauty above the open hatch of
a heavy tank as it moved down the road.
The sun was bright when we landed
in front of the bunkers area at the 2d
Division command post. But, a light
skiff of snow swirled above our blades.
It had been subzero the night before
and by noon it had only warmed to
about 7 degrees above.
Major General William Barriger had
greeted Miss Monroe and assigned two
very large military policemen (MPs) to
escort her while in his area. We were all
prepared to eat a steak lunch at the
general's mess, when Miss Monroe
asked to be excused. The two MPs
showed her to an improvised ladies
room. About 20 minutes later Miss
Monroe hadn't returned and two more
MPs were sent to search. They returned
shortly to advise the general that, "Miss
Monroe was having lunch with the
troops." They explained, "She just
picked up a steel mess gear and fell in
line behind the other troops." (They
were having beef stew.) As she left the
mess tent she called to the MP, "CPL
Knapp, where are you, I can't keep
track of you!" The slightly embarrassed
escort responded, "That goes both ways
ma'm." I don't believe General Barriger
was too happy, but I'm sure the troops
enjoyed it.
Her show at the 45th Thunderbird
Division was marred by an unexpected
demonstration when about 6,000
troops broke through MP guarded rope
barriers and surged forward like a
human tidal wave; one trooper was in-
jured and the show was cut short. Miss
Monroe was dashed off by Brigadier
General John C. Oakes, acting division
commander. It was the only incident
that marred an otherwise perfect tour.
On 19 February 1954, after 4 busy
days, old 114272 dropped its beautiful
cargo near Chunchon (K-47) for her
flight back to Japan. It was estimated
that in excess of 25,000 GIs viewed Miss
Monroe's performances during those
4 days, and that after the tour her fan
mail jumped from 50 to more than
5,000 letters weekly.
Miss Monroe stated later, "When I
first started, I had several little parts at
Fox Studio, then the letters started
pouring in from Korea and I got some
wonderful roles."
Korea may have made Marilyn Mon-
roe a star, but to the troops who shared
part of those 4 days, 32 years ago, Miss
Monroe made their stays in Korea a bit
more enjoyable. She was like a breath of
springtime, kind and soft -like the girl
back home.
It may have been my imagination but
Army Aviation's H-19, number 114272,
seemed to smell better too! I i i f ~
31
DUSTOFF
REUNION
The author describes the gratifying feeling he had during and after last
year's Dustoff reunion. It was the first time he had attended. Have you been
missing your units' reunions? Try to attend the next one and experience
warm and proud feelings as you help build your unit's, and your country's,
proud heritage.
Colonel Douglas E. Moore
Deputy Director. Health Care Operations
Office of the Surgeon General
Washington. DC
I WENT ro a reunion several months ago. Not a
high school or college reunion, but a reunion of the
men who piloted medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
helicopters in Vietnam and the medics and crewchiefs
who flew with them.
The Dustoff Association, named after the call sign
of the MEDEVAC helicopters in Vietnam, began
holding annual reunions in San Antonio, TX, several
years ago, but I hadn't gone to any of the earlier
gatherings. I can't explain why I didn't because I've
always been proud I flew MEDEVAC helicopters, and
I'd like to think some of the more than 11,000 casual-
ties I've evacuated over the years have gone on living
because I was there.
I've always used the excuse I was too busy to go,
but I'm not certain that was the real reason. It's not
because I harbor any negative thoughts about the war
either. I believed both then and now that what we set
out to do was the correct thing and my only regret is
that we pulled out too soon and abandoned many
good Vietnamese to the fate they suffer today.
For some reason, I decided to attend the last re-
union. A few days after deciding, I received an unex-
pected phone call from a guy I'd flown several tough
missions with in 1964 and early 1965. Walt Harris got
32
out after that tour, and I hadn't heard from him in
almost 20 years. You can imagine my surprise when
he phoned here at the Pentagon and informed me
that he's now an Episcopal priest serving as a chap-
lain in the Air Force. He dropped another bomb when
he told me that he, too, was planning to attend the
reunion for the first time.
You could've knocked me over with a feather. Walt
Harris - a preacher? Not Walt Harris! He was one of
the craziest pilots who ever climbed into a helicopter
as well as one of the bravest. Walt was one of the first
Army guys to get involved with the agent orange
spray missions in Vietnam. In fact, Walt attended the
first meeting with a newly arrived group of Air Force
guys who called themselves the "Ranch Hands": They
flew old, raggedy looking C-123s.
Because the Air Force had no crash-rescue capabil-
ity in Vietnam in 1964, the Ranch Hands asked if
we'd fly cover for them while they carried out some of
the most dangerous missions of that long war. We
agreed to help and decided the code name should be
"Harris Missions" because Walt attended the initial
planning meeting.
Many were the afternoons when the phone would
ring and the Ranch Hands would tell us they needed
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
support for a Harris Mission at dawn the next day.
We'd meet at some airborne rendezvous point and
then follow them to the spray area where we had
ringside seats as they made low level passes over areas
like the Iron Triangle, War Zones "c" and "D," the
mangrove swamps of the Delta, the Ho Bo Woods
and the Bo Loi Forest.
In a single pass over the Bo Loi early one day, an
old C-123 named "Patches" took what was reported
to be nearly a hundred hits and began spewing every
fluid aboard the aircraft. Paul Bloomquist and I
pulled the power up to the red-line on our old "B"
model UH-1 Huey and stayed on the C-123's tail until
Patches cleared the fence at Ben Hoa Airbase and we
heard over the radio, "Thanks, Dustoff. We got it
made now."
Unfortunately, Paul Bloomquist never attended
any of our Dustoff reunions. He was named "Army
Aviator of the Year" in 1965 and survived almost
3 years in Vietnam only to get killed by a gutless
group of terrorists called the Bader-Meinhof Gang in
JUNE 1986
an explosion at V Corps Headquarters in Frankfurt,
Germany, on the eleventh of May, 1972.
For weeks before this year's reunion, I wrestled
with the memories and with "how in the heck" could
Walt Harris have become a minister. I have to admit,
there were some anxious moments when I walked into
the hotel and ran into Walt. To my surprise, he's still
the same crazy guy he always was, but I sensed an
inner strength, a confidence and a direction to his life
that I found both admirable and enviable.
Walt and I laughed a lot as we recalled the times
several of us had too much Chinese food and Viet-
namese beer in Cholon and then engaged in hair rais-
ing pedicab races into Saigon. We chuckled about the
day, following months of careful preparations, the
Air Force tried to burn a Viet Cong sanctuary in the
Bo Loi Forest only to have the heat cause a towering
cumulus buildup, which eventually turned into a
thunderstorm that doused the fire.
We reminisced about the night when, scared to
death, we let down through 4,000 feet of broken
33
Our Nation pays homage to Dustoff crewmembers, recognizing them as truly Ali-American heroes who overcame all
obstacles to rescue and comfort the wounded.
clouds trying to get into Thu Da Mot to evacuate
several Americans and Vietnamese hurt during a
sapper attack. We finally broke out at 200 feet and
bounced off the top of a tall jungle tree growing on a
small hill overlooking the compound where the
wounded were located. Fortunately, we landed with
no damage other than some scratches on the bottom
of the helicopter and a limb or two hanging off the
skids. At the reunion, Walt reflected, "God was on
our side that night."
Know what? I believe him!
After loading the wounded, we sped to the U.S.
Navy's old hospital in downtown Saigon. As we flew
over the city that night, we found the streets filled
with massive demonstrations. It seemed that one of
the many coups we experienced in those early years
was underway.
Walt and I spent a lot of time together over the
weekend. When I took him out to Lackland Air Force
Base to catch a hop back to Tyndall, it was tough
letting go. Neither of us wanted to say goodbye. I
34
think there's a special kinship that develops among
aviators and others who've been on the ragged edge
together, and I don't believe it's duplicated in other
relationships. Tears came to my eyes when I turned
and walked away from Walt - Chaplain Harris, I
should say.
It was good seeing the other guys too. I did a lot of
thinking as I renewed friendships with the folks from
the early days and those I met during a later tour in
1968 and 1969. Some of us are visibly older now.
There was quite a bit of grey hair and a lot less hair in
some cases. There were more lines around everyone's
eyes and some are guilty of an extra pound or so, but
20 years really hasn't made all that much difference.
As we relived war stories and talked about what's
happened in the intervening years, a sudden realiza-
tion came over me. Represented in that group were
some of the finest pilots who ever strapped on a heli-
copter and perhaps some of the best our country will
ever produce. Our generation of aviators flew regu-
larly for many years and we accumulated a lot of
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
flying time under all kinds of conditions. The
MEDEVAC pilots and gunship pilots with names like
"Playboys," "Vikings" and "Razorbacks" along with
lift pilots like the "Little Bears" and others became
expert flyers and the helicopter seemed to be a natural
extension of their bodies. Most of them could do
anything with a helicopter, regardless of the enemy,
weather, terrain or other circumstances. It dawned on
me that these flying skills probably won't ever be
equalled again, unless we go to war.
I came to another realization as I met with these
old friends from the past. In that group were some of
the most courageous Americans who ever put on an
Army uniform. I was struck with that thought as I
stood on the balcony of the hotel's hospitality suite
with Chief Warrant Officer (CW4) Mike Novosel.
Mike Novosel is nothing short of an American leg-
end himself. He flew bombers in the Army Air Forces
in World War II, was back in the U.S. Air Force for
Korea, and then asked to come into the Army as a
warrant officer to fly helicopters in Vietnam. By
then, he'd been on flying status for 41 years, but was
facing the end of his career, having been extended a
short time to serve with his son, Mike Jr., a Master
Army Aviator who'd recently been promoted to
CW 4. Can you imagine that; a father and son team
serving at the same time as CW 4s and Master Army
Aviators? That's incredible!
Mike's not more than 5 feet 8 inches or so, I sup-
pose, with the sort of face you wouldn't pick out in a
crowd. I've known him for a long time, but as I stood
there on the balcony with Mike that afternoon, I sud-
denly realized the enormous respect I have for this
great man who's dedicated most of his adult life to
serving his country. Besides his long history of flying,
there's something else remarkable about this kind and
humble man. He's one of the few living Americans
who wears our Nation's highest award for valor, the
Medal of Honor, earned as a MEDEVAC pilot in
Vietnam in 1969. I don't have all that many heroes,
but Mike Novosel stands tall with those I do have. I
felt honored just to be in his presence again for that
short weekend.
There were others at the reunion who were equally
as courageous. The number of awards for valor held
by that group of brave men would have taxed a calcu-
lator if someone had tried to add them up. As I spoke
with Mike and the others, I realized that they, the
gunship and lift pilots, had set standards for courage
that may never be attained again. I earnestly hope the
new generations of pilots will remember the Vietnam-
JUNE 1986
era pilots for their heroism and for their forging the
way for Army Aviation. I'd bet all of us older guys
share a common hope though - that the young guys
never have to try to match our standards of courage.
On Sunday morning, we had the most beautiful
memorial service I've experienced. It was fitting that
the chaplain also had conducted services for one of
our Dustoff crews at Soc Trang in 1969. The chap-
lain's message was simple, yet magnificent, and his
delivery was flawless. His wife sang two beautiful
hymns and I don't believe there was a dry eye in the
house.
I couldn't take it. I cried too as I listened to the
chaplain's words and let my mind wander back across
the years. I remembered Major Charles Kelley, Cap-
tain Bob Cottman, Lieutenant Doug McNeil, War-
rant Officer Timmy Cole, Specialist Fifth Class
Wayne Simmons and the other pilots, crewchiefs and
medics who died serving their country while trying to
help their fellow man. These people set standards for
courage, sacrifice and selflessness that ought to be
remembered forever.
We should never forget the brave heroes who died
for the United States. We, as a Nation, can't afford to
forget them. They gave their lives representing Amer-
ica in that hope that men can live free and without
oppression. We, as the Army, can't forget them either.
They showed us what courage is all about and they
died exhibiting the same kind of spirit and determina-
tion that American soldiers have demonstrated
throughout our Nation's brief history. We, as Army
aviators, must remember them. Like a brilliant bea-
con in the night, their memories ought to shine for-
ever as symbols of what makes America great. These
were young men, in the primes of their lives, repre-
senting every ethnic and socioeconomic group. They
give special meaning to that beautiful verse, John
15:13, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a
man lay down his life for his friend."
Well, I've told you about my reunion. I'm glad I
finally attended one and I don't intend to miss any in
the future. In fact, I just received notice of the 1986
reunion and I'm already making plans to attend. Sure
would be nice if we had an Armywide aviator re-
union, because I still owe a beer and a word of thanks
to some "Bandit," "Razorback," "Firebird" and other
gunship drivers who saved my butt. Maybe, someday.
Going to the Dustoff reunion reinforced my pride
in the work I did in Vietnam. It made me proud to be
an Army aviator and prouder still to be an American.
I walk a little taller as a result.
35
36
MTL-ES
When installing the Multiple Integrated Laser Engage-
ment System (MILES) on the AH-1 Sand UH-1 H series heli-
copters, CAUTION should be exercised.
Standard aircraft screws are made of a soft material that
strips easily under stress and can lead to possible separa-
tion of detector belts and cabling from the aircraft during
flight. The MILES screws are made of a hardened material
that meets airworthiness specifications and must be used.
The following technical manuals require replacement!
use of MILES screws in place of aircraft standard screws
when MILES devices are installed on AH-1 Sand UH-1 H
aircraft:
TM 9-1270-223-10 "Operator's Manual for Multiple
Integrated Laser Engagement
System (MILES) Simulator
System, Firing, Laser: M80 AH-1 S
Attack Helicopter Weapon
System, NSN 1270-01-165-6240"
TM 9-1270-224-10 "Operator's Manual for Multiple
Integrated Laser Engagement
System (MILES) Simulator
System, Firing, Laser: M79, NSN
1270-01-159-0481 for the UH-1H
Utility Helicopter"
All installation hardware will be issued with the MILES
KITS when drawn from the Training and Audio-Visual Sup-
port Center MILES warehouse. If the MILES installation
hardware is missing, DO NOT use those MILES KITS.
SFC Kenneth N. Westover
Project NCO
U.S. Army Training Support Center
Ft. Eustis, VA 23604-5166
AV: 927-4713/4714
Commercial: (804) 878-4713
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
u.s. Army Information Systems Command
ATe ACTION LINE
DIDJUNO?
Mr. Forrest H. Helfenberger
u.s. Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
A LOCAL RADIO program in the Washington, DC, area
entertains rush hour motorists and assists them in passing
time in long lines on trips home. Dialogue between the
announcers leads into a "DIDJUNO" ("DID YOU
KNOW") segment providing entertaining and informative
trivia. DIDJUNO:
You can request development of instrument procedures
for civil airfields using civil NAVAIDs? For helicopter oper-
ations this can be extremely beneficial in obtaining lower
minimums. For example: Your unit's mission requires flying
to locations publishing only circling approach minimums.
If a copter procedure is available better approach mini-
mums result. Why? Circling only minimums (using fixed
wing criteria) are published when the following occurs:
- Alignment of the final approach course does not meet
TERPs criteria.
- Descent gradient on final exceeds TERPs criteria. Heli-
copters are not dependent on alignment and their TERPs
criteria allow for a steeper descent gradient. So, it is logical:
better minimums result. We wait for your requests!
Airports are indexed differently in approach books
than in the IFR Supplement? For the U.S. IFR Supplement,
the cross-reference index is contained in the VFR Supple-
ment. Confusing? You bet! Because someone filled out a
COMM Card telling us about the problem, we initiated a
change. Our first proposal to index supplements similar to
lAP books was approved. A cross-reference index will be
placed in back of the U.S. IFR Supplement. We proposed
for airports with only radar approaches, that an airport
sketch be added to the back of the U.S. IFR Supplement.
These changes should make it easier to locate destination
airfields and eliminate the need for a VFR Supplement.
Last year, only five quality feedback cards were sent to
DMAAC about paper or binding deficiencies in DOD ter-
minal products? About 4,254,400 terminal books were dis-
tributed, so the products are adequate for normal handling
during the 28 to 56 day life cycle. If you don't report prob-
lems with any FLIP product, little can be done to improve
the product. Use QUALITY FEEDBACK CARDS in the
supplements to express all noted deficiencies in quality;
otherwise, we'll think everything is OK when it's not.
On U.S. en route charts, we depict an airfield with its
name enclosed in parentheses? Legend says "military land-
ing rights not available." No one knows what this means. It
isn't explained in FLIP or other accessible references. A
recent FIB article explains it. Military landing rights not
available means no written agreement exists between air-
port management and the military. You can use the airport
unless a published restriction is in the airport remarks sec-
tion. An airport marked "PVT" is restricted from use except
in emergencies or with permission of the airport owner /
manager. We recommend the parentheses be removed from
all airports on the en route charts since this is of little
significance. If this doesn't work, we will publish an expla-
nation in FLIP and correct the En Route Supplement leg-
end to reflect the real meaning of a "PVT" airport.
We plan to republish a special edition FIB titled "Use
of U.S. Government Terminal Instrument Procedures
Charts"? It will replace FIB 1186, 13 July 1984, same sub-
ject. Request your assistance in providing recommendations
for improvement, corrections and/or any new material you
want added; phone, message, COMM Card or any means is
OK.
A major revision to AR 95-15 should be in the field
soon after this article? This AR revision covers: Responsi-
bjlities of USAATCA; mapping, charting and geodesy re-
quirements; sending changes to FLIP via COMM Cards;
Service B, automated air facilities information files and
aircraft nontactical call sign policy; obtaining terminal in-
strument procedures; and, aeronautical information publi-
cations requirements and distribution process.
Aviation personnel should be thoroughly familiar with
the contents of AR 95-14.
If you believe ATC treated you unfairly, we can inter-
cede for you, to learn the details? But notify us as soon as
possible after the incident. ATC handles you on a first-
come first-serve basis. Also, tell us when you receive excep-
tional service from ATe. We'll get a pat on the right per-
son's back.
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to: Director, USAATCA
Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22304-5050.
JUNE 1986 37
The Past:
What Might Have Been
The Future:
What Can Be
Does the past dictate the future? If it does, to what extent
and how should past lessons learned be effectively applied to
the present? This article takes a historic glance at past
conflicts and a look at Army Aviation's role in winning on
tomorrow's air-land battlefield.
ONE WISE SAGE postu-
lated that in planning for successful
battles on tomorrow's battlefield,
we must carefully study and restudy
lessons learned from past battles. If
one considers the turmoil and un-
certainties facing the free world
today, this sound advice from the
past may be more important than
ever.
Well, with this in mind, you
might say, "But, the Army Aviation
Branch is relatively new to the bat-
tlefield, and we don't have lessons
learned from the past to fall back
on, as do the Infantry, Field Artil-
lery and Armor Branches."
This is true; and, even though
Army Aviation did play an ever in-
creasingly important role during
World War I (reconnaissance, ob-
servation, aerial combat, and, ulti-
mately, interdiction), this was not
the Army Aviation Branch as we
know it today. Nor during World
38
War II did Army Aviation possess
the capabilities that our branch
does today. Consequently it did not
playa role that enables us to recall
and reuse innovations in tactics and
techniques that worked on the bat-
tlefield.
It was really toward the end of
the Korean War before the helicop-
ter's potentially tremendous impact
on a conventional battlefield was
recognized by visionaries. In the
years immediately following the
war, the helicopter's armament,
tactical employment and medical
evacuation roles were further devel-
oped along conventional lines, pri-
marily at the U.S. Army Aviation
Center, Ft. Rucker, AL. But from
1962 to 1972, Army Aviation was
geared for a different role in a dif-
ferent kind of war and against a
different kind of enemy. The Soviet
ZSU-23-4 self-propelled automatic
antiaircraft guns and SA-7 Grail
FIGURE 1: The Normandy
Invasion, 6 June 1944.
o 5 10 15
H H H I I
SCALE OF MI LES
surface-to-air missiles were intro-
duced onto the battlefield, causing
us to reorient our thinking toward
conventional tactics.
Now, you have all read recent
articles by key Army branch chiefs
that clearly relate how Army Avia-
tion will function and support
tomorrow's battlefield from the In-
fantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Avi-
ation and Air Defense perspectives.
These are solid articles and should
unquestionably impact on your
units' training, tactics, techniques
and procedures. (A list of these
articles and how to obtain them is
at the end of this article.) However,
even these articles don't really give
us concrete lessons that we need,
from the past, nor will any other
articles because they simply don't
exist.
So let's take a bold approach to
Army Aviation lessons learned on
the conventional battlefield. We'll
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
ognes
make up our own. In looking for a
starting point, let's go back to June
1944 and assume that Army Avia-
tion then was the viable, well-
equipped and well-trained force
that it is today.
The scenario: Somewhere in
southern England.
The players: The U.S. V Corps
commander and staff; the com-
manders of the 1st, 2d and 29th
Infantry Divisions; and the com-
manders of ~ l 17th and 12th Avia-
tion Groups.
The corps commander's guid-
ance: "At 0530 hours, 6 June, the
12th and 17th Aviation Groups will
air assault the leading regiments of
the 2d and 29th Infantry Division,
across the English Channel, into
landing zones Isigny, Treviers, and
along the Aure River (figure 1). The
divisions will secure key road inter-
sections, prevent enemy reinforce-
ments from attacking Omaha
JUNE 1986
L
Beach during the 1st Infantry Divi-
sion's assault landing, and conduct
linkup operations with the 101st
Airborne Division, which will con-
duct a parachute operation behind
Omaha Beach beginning 0100
hours on 6 June.
"It is essential that the initial air
assaults place a full regiment from
each division on the ground. I want
the remaining regiments to be on
the ground no later than H minus 6
hours. I also want to ensure that a
minimum of one 105 battery for
each regiment be carried by heli-
copter with the initial assault.
"On the corps' right flank, the
90th Infantry Division, VII U.S.
Corps, will be air assaulted in to
protect Utah Beach for the 4th
Infantry Division and will link up
with the 82d Airborne Division."
Does this sound like a preposter-
ous mission for Army Aviation?
Well, it shouldn't - not at all! I
Colonel Eugene Grayson
u.s. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks. PA
LEGEND
1.iII. Oerm.n D',,'.'on
~ U.S. D',,'.'on
U U.S. Re.,lment
~ U.S.Corp.
15 U.s. Army
~ u.s. A"I.flon Oroup
~ u.S. Airborne D',,'.'on
-J(XlI:- bound.ry
~ city
o town
would challenge you to imagine the
differences between two infantry
divisions attacking a hostile shore:
First, envision troops off-load-
ing from ships into vulnerable land-
ing craft that are under constant
enemy fire as they move ashore in
formation at 5 knots; then the
troops offload the landing craft and
advance up a mine infested beach
all the while under small arms,
machinegun, mortar and artillery
fire. The troops are loaded down
with equipment. They conduct a
frontal attack against a dug-in
enemy who offers fierce resistance
no matter how much air and naval
gunfire support we provide.
Now, envision the same troops
being lifted by helicopters from a
ship or friendly shore, traveling at
100 knots, low level, over multiple
flight routes, along corridors pro-
tected by tactical air and naval gun-
fire, over the hostile beach, and
39
landing at selected landing zones in
the enemy rear area!
Impossible? Not at all! Yet there
still are "naysayers" who loudly
proclaim that the helicopter cannot
survive on a mid-to-high intensity
battlefield!
This criticism is not new. But a
story told long ago by an "old sol-
dier" offsets it and opens the eyes of
doubters. The story was told in
1962 to a group of junior aviators
during operations of the Army Tac-
tical Mobility Requirements Board
(Howze Board) by the XVIII Air-
borne Corps commander, General
Hamilton H. Howze, about the
merits of the helicopter on the
modern battlefield. General Howze
had been involved in rather heated
discussions with Defense Depart-
ment staffers who were convinced
that the helicopter was really not
suitable for any combat operations
other than for counterinsurgency
operations. There was no doubt in
their minds that the helicopter was
nonsurvivable on any conventional
battlefield.
I will always remember General
Howze's comment to this assertion
that questioned the survivability of
the helicopter in combat. He re-
plied, "Well, you folks said the
same thing when we were planning
the Normandy invasion . . . that
the boats were too slow; they were
too vulnerable; and the landings
might not succeed. Yet, it did suc-
ceed, as did others throughout the
Pacific; and the boats were far
more vulnerable than the helicop-
ter, regardless of the intensity of the
combat environment."
Leaving our Normandy Beach
example, now imagine the impact
of Army Aviation support at Sa-
lerno, Italy, during World War II,
had a regiment from the 45th Infan-
try Division been air assaulted into
the road junction east of Altavilla
in order to block the German 29th
Panzer Division from attacking the
beachhead. Envision what a high
toll the light infantry units sup-
ported by attack helicopters wou!d
40
have taken of the enemy armor
units moving over a single road
through a narrow mountain pass!
Or, during the Fifth Army's ad-
vance northward in September and
October 1943, where U.S. troops
suffered terrible casualties crossing
the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers
and during torturous fighting
through the Apennine Mountains.
Would it have been better to have
air assaulted the 34th and 45th In-
fantry Divisions over these rivers
and into strategic terrain in the
mountains, rather than conducting
those costly frontal assaults to
achieve success?
What would have been the out-
come at Guadalcanal in early Feb-
ruary 1943 in the South Pacific
during World War II, had the 25th
Infantry Division conducted an air
assault behind enemy lines in sup-
port of the 1 st Marine Division,
which instead had to slog through
dense jungle where progress was
measured in yards? Or, what would
have happened in New Guinea in
October 1943, had the 32d Infantry
Division been air assaulted over the
Owen Stanley Mountains to seize
Samarai Bay, instead of infantry
fighting for more than 2 months
almost in single file to seize the port
city?
Think about what might have
been if we had been able to put
several Army Aviation groups off-
shore at Leyte in October 1944
when the U.S. Sixth Army went
ashore, and if we had been able to
air assault the 24th Infantry Divi-
sion inland to seize key road junc-
tions at Cavite and Sante Fe.
How much easier would the
Tenth U.S. Army's job have been at
Okinawa, if the 7th Infantry Divi-
sion had been air assaulted inland
to secure key road junctions, thus
preventing the enemy's 62d Infan-
try Division from reinforcing its
defensive lines?
Finally, from a World War II per-
spective, would there have been "a
bridge too far," had a light infantry
division supported by attack heli-
copters air assaulted onto the final
bridge, rather than using airborne
forces that were far too immobile
and vulnerable to do the job?
If today's air assault operations
had been available during the
Korean War, they would have en-
hanced every battle fought, from
attack helicopters supporting
TASK FORCE SMITH to air as-
saulting the 7th Infantry Division
inland in conjunction with the 1st
Marine Division landing at Inchon
in order to secure key lines of com-
munications leading into Seoul. If
you've been in Korea, you know it's
"infantry country"; air assaults by
light infantry forces on key terrain
features, right along with towed ar-
tillery, would have been absolutely
invaluable. And, finally, imagine
the difference in the outcome on
the ground, had light infantry units
been air assaulted in a classic deep
attack into Kimpo and Munsan,
rather than parachute drops by the
187th Airborne Regiment during
the drive north by the U.S. Eighth
Army. (Army Aviation maneuver
operations in Korea with Infantry
and Armor have been the subject of
intense study and development for
many years. Much of it has been
highlighted in Aviation Digest arti-
cles. A listing and how to obtain
copies of these articles is at the end
of this article.)
You may be wondering just what
is the purpose for all of these hypo-
thetical "what ifs" regarding an
Army Aviation scenario that never
existed in our last two conventional
wars. Simply speaking, the key
point is that during World War II
and the Korean War, troops went
ashore in vulnerable landing craft;
attacked hostile beaches; crossed
countless well-defended river lines;
fought through jungles and forests;
fought up and down steep moun-
tains and across rugged desert ter-
rain - and did all of these things
brilliantly! So, the naysayers who
think that the helicopter on the
World War II and Korean War bat-
tlefields would not have been abso-
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Army troops swam ashore from an amphi bious landing craft at Omaha Beach on the D Day invasion on
6 June 1944. They braved heavy enemy crossfi re f rom concrete pillboxes and i ntense artillery and mortar
fire in the successful invasion of France.
Major General Hamilton H. Howze, championed the development of Army
Aviation airmobile and air assault tactics in the early 1960s. Concerning
helicopter survivability in combat , he countered "naysayers," saying they also
questioned survi vability of amphibious landing craft. He contended
that landing craft were more vulnerable than helicopters, but were still
highly successful.
lutely invaluable are dead wrong!
Moreover, those who loudly advo-
cate no more light divisions and
helicopters on the mid-to-high in-
tensity battlefield of tomorrow
need to reread their military history
books.
During World War II in Europe,
57 of the 80(+) Allied divisions
were Infantry; in North Africa, 13
of 17 were Infantry; and in Italy it
was 16 of 19. All in the United
States were Infantry divisions; with
the Sixth and Eighth Armies in the
Philippines and in Korea, respec-
tively, we unquestionably had "In-
fantry" wars - which they most
likely would continue to be in fu-
ture conflicts in those areas.
One of our senior Army aviators,
in a recent article in one of our
JUNE 1986
more illustrious military maga-
zines, completely misses the boat
when he badmouths light forces
and, in particular, calls for dis-
banding the 2d Infantry Division. I
would only suggest he take a careful
look at the terrain on both sides of
the 38th Parallel in Korea and look
for places where armor can run
rampant, as it did on the vast Soviet
Steppes during World War II. If
that is not convincing enough, ask
any Israeli tank battalion com-
mander who fought in the Sinai
1973 Mideast War, "What killed the
majority of I raeli tanks?" You
might be surprised to find that it
was Egyptian light infantrymen
with antitank weapons! Also take a
close look at the terrain in both the
U.S. V and VII Corps' areas of
operations in Germany and you
might be surprised to find that
some 60 percent of it is still good
"Infantry country."
So let's relook, in two respects,
this Army Aviation Branch that we
have today:
We must never forget our last-
ing marriage to the light infantry.
For the sake of this article,
boost our thinking above company,
and even battalion level, and let's
"think big."
Let's not talk about air assaulting
Company A to Hill 703, or placing
an attack section in support of a
company team, etc. Instead, let's
get up to an operational level and,
furthermore, let's look only at
worst case scenarios. Then let's
look at getting t h ~ r e maneuvering
41
OUTLAND
I FARPJ
LEGEND FOR FIGURES 2 - 4
IRJ f::,::;rzed
D;,,;sion
_
Oillislon
m Artillery
I Battery

Alliation
Battalion

Infantry
Battalion
p
Combat
Aviation
Brigade
Armored
Div;s;on
Mechanized
Infllntry
Division
Corps
C";)
,- - - - - "
.. _e _' Posit ions


Refueling
Point
. 11 11 of
-xx- Boundary
r. r. r. Forward Line
of Own Troops
. _. _. _ . Border
@ City
o To.wn
++-t-+ Railroad
FIGURE 2
and fighting there, sustaining our
positions there, and, yes, winning
there.
As a first example, consider an
unexpected crisis that requires a
42
!iii!!:. 2 days march
I!II!I from border
General terrain features of
border area. Note deployment
of three infantry companies .
Company A, TLAT Battalion,
has been cross attached to
infantry companies. A Battery,
32d Field Artillery, has been
positioned in order to support
all approaches into the 1 st
Aviation Brigade area of
operation.
rapid response. It calls for a strate-
gic deployment that involves a
power projection ashore, followed
by a rapid employment over a
lengthy distance, emplacement of
troops and equipment, and com-
bat - anywhere in the world. Let's
examine our worst case situation
and look 12,000 miles away to
Southeast Asia. Our scenario sees
an unfriendly government openly
sponsoring an insurgency against
an ally.
As events unfold, the insurgents
invite into the conflict a third coun-
try that readily responds. Conse-
quently, we find elements of a
motorized rifle division and a tank
division moving southward. They
are expected to reach the border in
72 hours.
The situation facing our senior
planners (once the decision has
been made to deploy) is who, what,
where, when and how! In other
words, what force can rapidly
deploy, reassemble and become
immediately tactical, with appro-
priate firepower and sustaining ca-
pability?
The point is, what do we have
that can get to a port of embarca-
tion; reassemble at the other end;
move 150 miles north; employ; en-
gage armor and motorized forces;
and prevent the two threatening
divisions from passing through the
mountains along the border, thus
allowing open maneuver room for a
drive on the capital city? Punch all
of this into the magic computer and
out pops the card which says, "De-
ploy an aviation brigade; attach a
light infantry battalion, a towed
155 howitzer battery, a light engi-
neer company, and a TOW light
antitank (TLAT) company. Other
attachments will be determined."
"Who are you kidding?" one
might ask. "Do you mean to deploy
an aviation brigade 12,000 miles
away in order to fight a tank and
motorized division, should these
units cross a border? And, what in
the world do you mean by attaching
nonaviation units to an aviation
brigade?"
Unlikely? Why not? What's the
difference? This kind of cross at-
tachment is not new, and it will not
pose any difficulties for the avia-
tion brigade commander to manage
such units.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
There is no reason the brigade
staff should experience any unusual
difficulties in this situation. Some
surely will say, "We must deploy
armor to fight armor!" They may
be right but neither time nor avail-
able airlift will permit this, and in
all likelihood, armor could not do
the job in this situation - at least
not as effectively as can the avia-
tion brigade (reinforced).
The situation: H minus 5 days.
Location: Hunter Army Air-
field, GA.
The mission: "The 1st Aviation
Brigade (Reinforced) will deploy by
military airlift from Hunter AAF to
the International Airport in IN-
LAND. Upon arrival , you will be
under operational command of
USCENTCOM. Your mission is to
deploy north to the Zarge River and
establish defensive positions to de-
lay the enemy tank and motorized
divisions for 72 hours if they cross
the border into INLAND.
"You will have attached to the
brigade, the 1st Battalion, 2d Bri-
gade, 18th Light Infantry Division;
Company C, 28th Engineers (light);
A Battery, 32d Field Artillery
(towed 155); and, Company A,
TLAT Battalion. We will discuss
additional attachments. It is essen-
tial that you reassemble the brigade
rapidly upon arrival and move to
the Zarge River. This is a 150-mile
move over rugged terrain, and the
use of key bridges is questionable at
this time. The Ninth U.S. Air Force
will deploy a composite F-16/ F-15
fighter wing and one A-I0 attack
squadron. Forward air controllers
will deploy with the brigade, and
will control close air support from
scout helicopters. Within 72 hours
following your arrival in INLAND,
advance elements from the 12th
Mechanized Division will begin ar-
riving (figure 2)."
This is an ideal mission. Strategic
lift assets are limited, and it is es-
sential to get a tailored unit into the
theater quickly - one with the nec-
essary mobility, command, control
and communications, a tank-kill-
JUNE 1986
When divisions are locked in
decisive combat at the FLOT,
commanders cannot withdraw
units to engage penetrations.
---XXX--..... ,--------
) .IIII.iilll
fUl
10
181
4
),.1111
I ).1111 liiia,
x x ~ ~
J.,IIII ~
-> -
~ 12 ) .11111&111, .1111
'}
(-)
10 ')
----XX X --....... ,P--------
FIGURE 3
The 10th U.S. Corps FLOT is
in serious jeopardy of being
ruptured.
---XXX--.... ,--------
)
~ 1 0 ,81
4
5
x x ~ ~
~ 1 2 ->J .1111 1 .... 1'
-x----' ... .,-I-III' ... ' .1111
'}
(-)
FIGURE 4
X
xxx
')
The combat aviation brigade
is the corps commander's
most responsive, most
maneuverable and the only
unit that contains all of the
essentials to handle this
penetration.
ing ability, and the capability to
sustain combat. What better choice
is there for this particular situation
than the aviation brigade (rein-
forced)? What you end up with is a
unit that can:
Rapidly deploy,
Maneuver regardless of terrain
obstacles,
Provide an excellent reconnais-
sance capability,
Furnish an airlift towed artil-
lery,
Rapidly position tank-killer
teams and kill tanks and other
armored vehicles,
Position and sustain forward
arming and refueling points,
Conduct flank attacks and
joint air attack team opera-
tions.
The list goes on and on.
What we have here is an ex-
tremely difficult situation where
U.S. forces will be committed
across a distance of 12,000 miles
with time being the key ingredient. I
suggest to the strategic planners
that there is not a unit better suited
to accomplish the mission in this
scenario with the same degree of
success as the aviation brigade
(reinforced).
Let's move into another high in-
tensity scenario where a U.S. corps
has suffered a major penetration,
and if the enemy advance is not
halted the entire forward line of
own troops (FLOT) and corps' rear
area will be in jeopardy (figure 3,
page 43). This, of course, will
result in a disaster deep in the rear
area.
This is about as bad a situation
as our planners care to portray.
How will this penetration be dealt
with? Where are the assets-the
combat forces that can rapidly ma-
neuver to engage the penetration?
It's certainly not the division sup-
port command or corps support
command units! Who will manage
rear area close air support, rear
area artillery, direct combat and
combat support units, etc? Well,
one might wonder if our doctrine
44
and planning that talks about rear
battle and rear battle combat oper-
ations is going to work in a scenario
that sees every form of detailed
planning, commander's guidance,
command, control and communi-
cations (and so forth) go to pieces.
It should be obvious that the com-
bat units on the FLOT are locked
into decisive combat. No division
commander can give up an armor
or mechanized brigade to withdraw
from the fight at the FLOT and en-
gage the penetration. Yet the pene-
tration must be stopped.
Which unit has the ability to
move rapidly, regardless of terrain;
deliver devastating antitank and
antipersonnel firepower; conduct
joint air attack team operations
with whatever type aircraft are
available; direct artillery fire; direct
close air support strikes; deploy in-
fantry tank-killer teams; move
combat engineers wherever needed;
and on and on? And, of the great-
est significance during a precarious
scenario such as this, which unit
can get a handle on the tactical situ-
ation, a first-hand update on the
enemy location, talk to the division
and units in a retrograde, and
rapidly emplace aerial delivered
mines? Well, what about the avia-
tion brigade?
Assign the penetration to the
aviation brigade commander (fig-
ure 4, page 43). Things are in a
pretty bad state and the division
commanders are barely hanging
on. To maneuver anywhere is im-
possible. Now, I challenge the nay-
sayers to come up with a better op-
tion than to commit the aviation
brigade! What else is there that can
do the job in the same successful
manner? Nothing!
Just what is the magnitude of
the penetration facing the corps
commander? Well, if the FLOT
ruptures, he is faced with the possi-
bility of at least 300 tanks and some
400 troops and airborne assault
gun BTR/BMD armored vehicles
heading deep into, and raising
havoc, in his rear area. If this is not
halted, it could well result in the
battle ending in unfavorable terms
for the corps commander.
Is the aviation brigade the right
unit to use in such a situation?
Think big! In the aviation brigade
you have a command and staff
group that:
Is intact;
Is accustomed to responding to
rapid mission orders;
Is used to commitment into
tough combat situations;
Fully understands the corps'
mission;
Has excellent command, con-
trol and communications;
Can physically locate units,
friendly and enemy;
Can position infantry tank-
killer teams wherever needed;
Can direct artillery fire and
rear area close air support mis-
sions; and, of the greatest sig-
nificance,
Can move quickly, mass anti-
armor fire and kill tanks!
Assign the job to stop the enemy's
penetration to the commander oj
the aviation brigade.
The corps commander has, in ef-
fect, committed into battle 40 plus
antiarmor systems that possess a
tremendous tactical advantage over
attacking armor. Tanks are but-
toned up; road networks are restric-
tive; the terrain favors the defender,
particularly the attack helicopter. If
attack helicopters kill from 10 to 40
tanks during training exercises, why
not the same result during actual
combat, where well-trained attack
helicopter crews attacking from
well-concealed positions are engag-
ing enemy tanks amidst all of the
battlefield confusion? Add to this
the fact that our ground forces are
still vigorously engaging enemy ar-
mor and mechanized forces inside
the penetration. Good infantry
mathematics would result in each
attack helicopter killing five to six
tanks, thus causing the penetration
to grind to a halt. Will this kill ratio
always occur? Probably not. Some
will kill 1, others will kill 20. The
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
same holds true for the enemy's
BTR/ BMD armored vehicles. How-
ever, the fact is that we have noth-
ing other than the aviation brigade
on the battlefield that can:
Respond to a serious tactical
situation such as a major pene-
tration.
Maneuver rapidly.
Effectively eliminate the
enemy's thrust.
Does this imply that the aviation
brigade alone will eliminate the two
attacking enemy divisions that have
ruptured the corps FLOT? Cer-
tainly not! Tactical air strikes,
directed by aviation brigade avia-
tors will take a high toll of attack by
armor and mechanized forces; light
infantry tank-killer teams, moved
by lift assets, will kill tanks; com-
bined joint air attack team opera-
tions will kill tanks; Field Artillery
missions, coordinated by aviation
brigade aviators, will disrupt and
delay enemy forces; engineers,
moved by Army Aviation assets,
will emplace mine fields, other ob-
stacles and blow bridges; attack
helicopters, joining friendly tank
units, will kill tanks together- and
the list goes on. If more attack heli-
copter assets are needed, attach
them to the aviation brigade. No
unit can do the job better!
Aviation commanders, it's time
to start thinking BIG! Think about
strategic deployment; power pro-
jection ashore; the effectiveness of
Army Aviation and light infantry
forces. Fight vigorously to ensure
that aviation assets are not piece-
mealed out during the battle.
Spread the word on just what Army
Aviation can do for your com-
mander, regardless of what kind of
unit he commands. Get your head
out of section and platoon tactics
and start thinking on a more opera-
tional level. Be bold and imagi-
native in developing tactics, tech-
niques and procedures to conduct
aggressive combat action on the
battlefield.
Execute long-range operations,
where speed is essential and obsta-
JUNE 1986
cles pose no barriers. In places and
exercises such as Yakima, WA; Ft.
Hood, TX; Korea; REFORGER;
etc., demonstrate to your com-
manders the awesome firepower
and tank-killing capability of the
attack battalion when massed. Let
the ground commanders know that
the 2.75 inch rockets fired from one
attack company equal the fire-
power of an entire division artillery.
Get your ground commander in the
front seat of the attack helicopter
and let him track a tank with the
telescopic sight unit. Show him the
maneuver capability of your attack
unit. Let your division commander
"feel" the punch Army Aviation
packs -let him fire a TOW at max
range.
manders you support know just
what the capabilities are in the
Army Aviation units you com-
mand. Get involved in air-land
battle doctrine. When your
counterparts start discussing the
deep attack - get involved! Tell
them how, in a desert environment,
the aviation brigade can boldly
move around the flank of a major
enemy force, at rapid speeds, below
radar coverage, during periods of
darkness or limited visibility, and
raise hell with the enemy by de-
stroying his armor or motorized
forces some 60 to 75 kilometers
across the FLOT.
Captains and majors, at every
opportunity let ground com-
THINK BIG, be aggressive and
never forget what can be - what
mu'St be-Army Aviation's role on
tomorrow's battlefield. --.=;.
Copies of the following articles can be obtained by writing to Aviation
Digest, P.O. Box 699, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362-5000, or calling: AUTOVON
558-3178; FTS 533-3178; or commercial 205-255-3178.
Korea and Team Spirit 84:
"Roller Coaster Operations Across the FEBA:' Lieutenant Colonel
William C. Page Jr. , March 1980.
"An Army Aviation Overview:' Major General Kenneth C. Leuer,
August 1984.
"Profile of Army Aviation in Korea:' August 1984.
"View From the Eagle's Nest:' Colonel William C. Page Jr. , August
1984.
"Fit to Fight:' Captain Thomas F. Hands, September 1984.
"Dustoff Does It Better:' Captain Thomas Bailey, September 1984.
"45th Transportation Company Keeps 'Em Flying:' Major Robert
Foote, September 1984.
"Managing Team Spirit Airspace, Dirt to 600:' Major Maurice
Brooks, October 1984.
Army branch chiefs' articles
concerning combined arms operations:
~ t t a c k Helicopter Operations on the Heavy Battlefield:' Major
General Frederic E. Brown, Armor Branch chief, July 1985.
"The Combat Aviation Brigade in the Light Infantry Division:' Major
General John W. Foss, Infantry Branch chief, August 1985.
"Field Artillery and Army Aviation:' Major General John S. Crosby,
Field Artillery Branch chief, February 1985.
"The Challenge of Winning:' Major General Ellis D. Parker, Army
Aviation Branch chief, September 1985.
45
Reprinted by permission: Tribune Media Services and Milton Canlff
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