Fred D. Miller, Jr.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2005) Vol. XLIII

Plato on the Rule of Reason

Fred D. Miller, Jr.
Bowling Green State University

“Isn’t it appropriate for the rational part to rule…?”

(Rep. IV.441e4)

1. Introduction:
Another Footnote to Plato
The rule of reason is the principle that a system should be
ruled by its rational part. Although this principle was antici-
pated by several early Greek philosophers, Plato was the first to
articulate it clearly, to offer a justification for it, and to
investigate its political applications in detail. 1 The rule of
reason is associated with a rationalist view of political legiti-
macy: a regime is legitimate insofar as the authority (whether
it is a monarch, assembly, elected officials, or, more abstractly, a
constitution and laws) exercises power in a rational manner.
This is opposed to a voluntarist view of political legitimacy: a
regime is legitimate insofar as the authority exercises power in
a way that expresses or conforms to the general will of the
community.2 For a voluntarist theory of legitimacy, rationality is
valuable only instrumentally, on the grounds that rational
deliberation is the most effective way of carrying out the
popular will. In contrast, for a rationalist view, consent is at
best a criterion of legitimacy, on the grounds that the people
voluntarily support the rulers when they do the right thing; but
the governed may fail to consent if, for example, they are too
irrational (or simply unwilling) to recognize that the govern-
ment is legitimate. Political philosophers have divided over this
issue, with some influential theorists (e.g., Plato and Aristotle)
favoring reason and others (e.g., Hobbes and Rousseau) the will,
although some (e.g., Kant and Hegel) attempt to accommodate
both.
The rule of reason is also associated with a particular view
of legislation: The statesman (πολιτικÒ˚) or legislator
(νοµοθ°τη˚) has a role analogous to that of the craftsman
(δηµιουργÒ˚). 3 Just as a sculptor, for example, creates a statue
by imposing a certain shape on a mass of clay according to a
model (παράδειγµα), the legislator bestows a constitution on

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preexisting materials (the population) according to a political

ideal grasped by reason. This is very different from the volun-
tarist view of the legislator as a guide to the people in carrying
out their general will.4
The rule of reason is first promulgated in Plato’s Republic,
which argues that the individual soul and the city have an
analogous tripartite structure and that the city and the soul
should each be ruled by its respective rational part. Although
this analogy is controversial, it helped set the agenda for future
psychology and political philosophy. For psychology the issue is:
Is reason the natural ruler over the passions, or ought it to be
their slave? In politics it is: Does the legitimacy of the state
derive from the rationality of the rulers, or does political
rationality have merely an instrumental role of efficiently
carrying out the general will?
My project here is to reconstruct the rule of reason as a
political principle in Plato’s Republic and to consider whether it
is still a theory worth considering.5 It might seem obvious that
the rule of reason should not be taken seriously because it gives
rise to a succession of paradoxes which Socrates himself
compares to waves of laughter that threaten to drown him in
ridicule and contempt (V.473c6-9). 6 On the grounds that it is
used to buttress Socrates’ totalitarian utopia, it might be
supposed that the rule of reason is inherently illiberal and anti-
democratic. In this paper, however, I shall argue that the rule of
reason can be distinguished and detached from the contro-
versial proposals advanced in the Republic, so that it may still
be worthy of serious consideration by modern political philoso-
phers.
2. The Rule of Reason:
Three Basic Principles
The rule of reason is one of three basic principles at work at the
end of Republic IV. The first is that a thing is in a correct
condition if, and only if, it exhibits proper order. This principle is
implicit in the analogy between health and justice in the
Republic, but it is asserted explicitly in a parallel passage in
the Gorgias, which argues that virtue in the soul is analogous
to health in the body: “It’s when a certain order (κÒσµος), the
proper one for each thing, comes to be present in it that it
makes each of the things there are, good” (506e2-4).7 Similarly,
in the Republic the just person has established order
(κοσµÆσαντα) within himself and harmonizes (συναρµÒσαντα)
the parts of his soul (Rep. IV.443d4-5).
The Republic explains how this order comes about in terms
of structural similarities between body and soul. “To produce
health is to establish the components of the body in a natural
(κατὰ φÊσιν) relation of control (κρατε›ν) and being controlled,
one by another, according to nature, while to produce disease is

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to establish a relation of ruling (ἄρχειν ) and being ruled

contrary to nature (παρὰ φÊσιν)” (444d3-6). By analogy, “[t]o
produce justice is to establish the parts of the soul in a natural
relation of control, one by another, while to produce injustice is
to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary to
nature” (444d8-11).8 The analogy assumes that a just soul and a
healthy body each exemplify a second principle: A thing exhibits
proper order if, and only if, some part of it is the natural ruler
over its other parts.9
The third basic principle is introduced in connection with
Socrates’ theory that the soul has three parts—reason, spirit,
and appetite. 10 He argues that the first of these parts is by
nature the ruler over the other two on the basis of two doc-
trines he has used earlier in Book I to argue that the just
person is happy. The first is the functional account of goodness,
which involves three claims: (1) The function of a thing is what
it alone can do or what it does better than anything else
(I.353a9-11). For example, the function of a knife is to cut. (2)
“Anything that has a function performs it well by means of its
own peculiar virtue and badly by means of its vice” (I.353c5-7).
The virtue of a knife is a feature like sharpness that enables it
to cut well. (3) A thing is good if it performs its function well
and bad if it does so badly (cf. 353e4-5). A good knife is one that
cuts well. 11 The functional theory of virtue and goodness is
combined with the principle of the natural specialization: each
part of a system should perform the function for which it is
naturally suited (II.370a-c, 374b-c). In Book IV Socrates asks
whether these premises can be applied to the rational part of
the soul: “Isn’t it appropriate for the rational part (λογιστικ“)
to rule, since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf
of the whole soul…?” (IV.441e4-5). He defines the virtues of
moderation and justice in terms of the rule of reason. An
individual is moderate “when the ruler and the ruled [within
the soul] believe in common that the rational part (λογιστικÒν)
should rule and don’t engage in civil war against it” (442c10-d1,
cf. 431a). Similarly justice—in the abstract “doing one’s own”
(443b)—is found in the soul when reason rules, because the
rational part is naturally suited to rule, while the appetitive
part is naturally suited to be ruled, and the spirited part is by
nature the helper of the rational part (444b, 441a). Therefore,
the rule of the rational part is according to nature (κατὰ φÊσιν),
whereas the rule of the nonrational part is contrary to nature
(πατὰ φÊσιν) (444d8-11). This is the gist of Plato’s third basic
principle: The rational part is the natural ruler over the
nonrational part.
To sum up, Socrates in the Republic relies on three principles:

1. Principle of order: A thing is in a correct condition if, and only

if, it exhibits proper order.

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2. Principle of rulership: A thing exhibits proper order if, and

only if, some part of it is the natural ruler over its other parts.
3. Principle of rule of reason: The rational part is the natural
ruler over the nonrational part.

Socrates maintains that these principles apply to the city as

well as to the soul (cf. IV.442d, 443b, 444a). The political
application of the rule of reason, however, raises difficult
questions. First, how is the rational part distinguished from the
nonrational part? Socrates says that “each of us differs some-
what in nature from the others, one being suited to one
function, another to another” (I.370a7-b1, cf. 370c). How is the
rational part of the city distinguished from the nonrational
part? If it is assumed that the rational part alone can possess
the wisdom that confers political legitimacy, what sort of
wisdom is this, and who has it? Second, what is the proper aim
of the rational ruling part? If it is supposed that this aim is to
be called “the common good” or “the public interest,” how should
such expressions be interpreted? Third, in what manner is it
appropriate for the rational part to rule over nonrational
parts? If it is supposed that the rational part alone possesses
the wisdom that confers political legitimacy, is it permissible
for it to try to control the nonrational part by means other
than rational persuasion, for example, by coercion, deception,
and emotional manipulation? Fourth, what reason does the
rational part have to rule over the nonrational, and to do so in
a correct or just manner? Several of the problematic policies
that Socrates proposes in the Republic touch on these thorny
issues.

3. Socrates’ Paradoxical Policies

Before considering Socrates’ political applications of the rule of
reason in the Republic, we should briefly review the context in
which they are proposed. In Republic Book I, Socrates criticizes
several definitions of justice including Thrasymachus’s definition
that justice is what is in the interest of the stronger, and he
argues in conclusion that justice is more profitable than injus-
tice. In Book II, however, Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge
Socrates to show that justice is good for its own sake and not
merely due to its consequences, that the benefits of justice
cannot be derived from the mere reputation of justice, and that
the deleterious consequences of injustice are unavoidable.
Socrates must explain what justice and injustice are and show
“what power each itself has when it’s by itself in the soul”
(II.358b5-6). That is, he must demonstrate that the just person
is invariably happier than the unjust person, even if they have
the reputation and receive the punishments and rewards of
their opposites (361c-d).

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To meet this challenge, Socrates compares the soul with the

city. Although bigger and easier to study (II.368d), the city is
“just” in the same sense as the soul. For if you call a thing by
the same name, it will be the same in respect of the Form
(ε‰δος) regardless of whether it is big or little (IV.435a5-b2).
Socrates turns to the city, in order to find out what justice is in
the soul and thereby answer the challenge to show that it pays
to be just.12
He invites his interlocutors to join him in making a city in
theory (λÒγος) from its beginning (II.369c9). The first city is
governed by the principle of natural specialization: “everyone
must practice one of the occupations in the city for which he is
naturally best suited” (IV.433a5-6, cf. II.370c3-5, 374b6-c2). This
anticipates the later definition of justice as “the having and
doing of one’s own” (IV.433e12-434a1). The initial city arises out
of mutual need, and the members perform the work for which
they are best suited: farming, building, weaving, cobbling,
trading, etc. They fulfill their subsistence needs, and “they enjoy
sex with one another but bear no more children than their
resources allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war”
(II.372b8-c1). Glaucon objects that the city offers no luxuries
and is “a city of pigs” (372d4). Socrates agrees to consider the
luxurious city which is “feverish” in contrast to the primitive
city which is “healthy.” The pursuit of luxury goods leads to war.
Accordingly, the principle of natural specialization requires that
there be a specialized class of guardians to protect the city
(372d-374e).
The transition from the “city of pigs” is somewhat puzzling
because Socrates calls it “the true city” despite its lack of a
qualified rulers. He seems to agree with Adeimantus that the
justice of this city is found in some need that the citizens have
of each other, although he also remarks that by examining the
luxurious city we may see “how justice and injustice grow up in
cities.” His point however may be that the first city is healthy
because all the citizens have self-regulated desires (see 372b-c,
cited above). This assumption is abandoned in Glaucon’s
luxurious city, leading to “the endless acquisition of money,”
and, in turn, to strife within and between cities (see 373e).
Because the producers cannot control their own desires, their
city can be restored to health only if they have guardians to
protect them from themselves and from foreign enemies who
are likewise uncontrolled. This leads to the first of Socrates’
policies based on the rule of reason:

Policy 1 There must be a class of rational rulers separate from

the other citizens.

Socrates remarks that the city’s rulers must be not only spirited
and strong but also in a sense “philosophical” (literally, lovers of

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wisdom). “Philosophy, spirit, speed, and strength must all, then,

be combined in the nature of anyone who is to be a fine and
good guardian of our city” (II.376c4-5). This leads to an exten-
ded discussion of the education of the guardians. Later
(III.412c-413c) Socrates distinguishes a special subclass of
guardians who are best at ruling the city. These men are guard-
ians also of the conviction that they must eagerly purse what is
advantageous to the city and be wholly unwilling to do the
opposite. Neither compulsion nor magic spells will get them to
discard or forget their belief that they must do what is best for
the city. “We must find out who are the best guardians of their
conviction that they must always do what they believe to be the
best for the city” (III.413c5-7). These are the “complete guard-
ians,” and their younger colleagues “we’ll now call auxiliaries
and supporters of the guardians’ convictions” (414b1-6).
Socrates’ city thus consists of three classes: guardians,
auxiliaries, and producers. The citizens are persuaded to
support this arrangement by means of the myth of the metals,
the aim of which is to make the citizens “care more for the city
and for each other” (415d3-4). The grain of truth in this “noble
falsehood” is that the rulers must be naturally capable of
carrying out the task: “the god who made you [citizens] mixed
some gold [i.e., reason] into those who are adequately equipped
to rule,” but anyone without gold in his soul “must have a rank
appropriate to his nature” (415a4-5, c1-2).13
The implication of the foregoing characterization of the
guardians is that they possess knowledge of the public good.
This soon is soon made explicit. The guardians are citizens who
possess the knowledge (§πιστƵη) which deliberates “not about
any particular matter but about the city as a whole and the
maintenance of good relations both internally and with other
cities” (IV.428c11-d3). Socrates claims that the ruling part will
consist of a minority of wise citizens: “A whole city established
according to nature would be wise because of the smallest class
and part in it, namely, the governing or ruling one. And to this
class which seems to me by nature the smallest, belongs a share
of the knowledge (§πιστƵης) that alone among all the other
kinds of knowledge is to be called wisdom (σοφαν)” (428e7-
429a3). The innate capacity for knowledge must be carefully
nurtured; hence Socrates’ emphasis on the education of the
guardians.
Eventually in the analogy between the city and the soul, it
becomes clear that the guardians’ authority is based on the rule
of reason: “Isn’t it appropriate for the rational part (λογιστικÒν)
to rule, since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf
of the whole soul?” (441e4-5). The four cardinal virtues are
explained in terms of this principle. An individual is courageous
when “the spirited part … preserves through pains and
pressures the declarations of reason (ÍπÚ τ«ν λÒγων) about

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what is to be feared and what isn’t” (442c1-3). An individual is

called wise “because of that small part of himself [i.e., the
rational part] that rules in him and makes those declarations
and has within it the knowledge (§πιστƵην) of what is
advantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is the
community of all three parts” (442c5-8). An individual is
moderate “when the ruler and the ruled [within the soul]
believe in common that the rational part (λογιστικÒν) should
rule and don’t engage in civil war against it” (442c10-d1).
Finally, an individual is just when each part of the soul
performs its own function (443b1-2). The rational part is
naturally suited to rule, while the appetitive part is naturally
suited to be ruled, and the spirited part is by nature the helper
of the rational part (444b1-5, cf. 441a2-3). 14 Thus the rule of
reason applies to the soul, and this explains why it applies to
the city.
The political implications of the rule of reason become quite
clear with the paradoxical proposal that some women must be
chosen along with men to share in their guardianship (V.456a-
b). Socrates argues as follows: In assigning citizens to jobs we
must focus on the form and sameness and difference that is
relevant to their ways of life (454c). Some women have
philosophical natures, while some have spirited natures, and
others appetitive natures (cf. 455d-456a). “So one woman may
have a guardian nature and another not, for wasn’t it qualities
of this sort that we looked for in the natures of the men we
selected as guardians?” (456a7-8). This argument is an
enthymeme. The tacit premiss is clearly the rule of reason: the
citizens who comprise the rational part of the city are by nature
guardians over the citizens who comprise its nonrational part.
Therefore, insofar as some women naturally belong to the
rational part, they should be admitted to the guardian class.15
Socrates has already (e.g., at II.376b-c and V. 456a) laid the
ground for his avowedly most paradoxical policy: “Until political
power and philosophy entirely coincide,… cities will have no
rest from evils” (V.473d3-5).

Policy 2 The rulers must be philosophers.

The rule of the philosopher in the city corresponds to the

rule of the rational part of the soul over the spirited and
appetitive parts. Each part of the soul has its distinctive
pleasure, desire, and type of rule (IX.580d-581b). The appetitive
part has desires for food, drink, sex and the like, although it is
called the money-loving or profit-loving part because its
appetites are most easily satisfied by using cash. The spirited
part yearns after control, victory, and good reputation and is
called the victory-loving and honor-loving part. Finally, the
rational part is “always wholly straining to know where the

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truth lies” and is called learning-loving or wisdom-loving. The

wisdom-lover (φιλÒσοφος), that is, the philosopher, has a soul
which is ruled by the part of the soul that learns, that is, the
rational part (582e8-583a3). That is, as noted by Norman O.
Dahl, “the objects of the desires of the rational part of the soul
dominate” this person’s conception of the good. 16 Because
philosophers are devoted to knowing the truth, they are also
uniquely suited to rule the city.
The policy of rule by philosophers rests on the idea that
rulers are craftsmen who require philosophical knowledge. A
ruler without knowledge of the Forms is like a painter without
sight. Rulers who lack the knowledge of each thing that is “have
no clear model (παράδειγµα) in their souls, and so they cannot
—in the manner of painters—look to what is most true, make
constant reference to it, and study it as exactly as possible.
Hence they cannot establish here on earth conventions about
what is fine or just or good, when they need to be established,
or guard and preserve them, once they have been established”
(VI.484c7-d3). The philosopher is also compared to a ship
captain who must know the art of navigation: “a true captain
must pay attention to the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars,
the winds, and all that pertains to his craft, if he’s really to be
the ruler of a ship.” Sailors who denigrate the genuine naviga-
tor as a mere “stargazer” are misguided like citizens who regard
philosophy as useless in politics (487e-489d).17
After studying the Forms the philosophical lawgiver will be
guided by “the account (λÒγος) of the constitution,” and the
rulers who follow him must be guided by this same account
(497c-d, cf. 412a-b).18 The Forms possess an intrinsic order and
by studying them the philosopher can establish order in his
own soul: “As he looks at and studies things that are organized
(τεταγµ°να) and always the same, that neither do injustice to
one another or suffer it, being all in a rational order (κÒσµƒ …
κατὰ λÒγον), he imitates them and tries to become as like them
as he can…. Then the philosopher, by consorting with what is
ordered and divine and despite all the slanders around that say
otherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered (κÒσµιος) as a
human being can” (VI.500c2-d1, cf. IX.591e). The true ruler
must be able to mark off in account (λÒγος) the Form of the
Good, separating it from all other things; without this one can
know neither the good itself nor any other good (VI.534b8-c5).
The philosopher alone is able to grasp the Form of the Good,
which provides reason with its ultimate norm.
As rational agents, philosophers should use the Form of the
Good as a guide not only to order their own souls, but, if they
are rulers, to order their cities (see VI.500e-501c, VII.519e-
520a). Their aim broadly conceived is “to see that the city as a
whole has the greatest happiness” (IV.421b5, cf. 428d and
V.466a). He invokes this principle to justify his proposed

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communistic arrangement for the ruling class: including com-

munal property, shared spouses and children, and common
meals (III.416d-417b, V.457-466a).

Policy 3 The ruler’s aim is the greatest happiness of the whole

city.

What exactly “the greatest happiness of the whole city”

amounts to is very controversial. Unsympathetic modern
writers such as Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper characterize
Plato as a statist comparable to modern fascists, Nazis, and
Bolsheviks. 19 C. C. W. Taylor helps to clarify this issue by
pointing out three essential characteristics of a totalitarian
regime: It is authoritarian, in the sense that the ordinary
citizen has no share, direct or indirect, in making decisions; it
has an ideology, understood as “a pervasive scheme of values,
intentionally promulgated by some person or persons and
promoted by institutional means in order to direct all or the
most significant aspects of public and private life towards the
attainment of goals dictated by those values”; and the locus of
political power directs the ideology. 20 It is hard to deny that
Socrates’ ideal city is “totalitarian” in the broad sense defined
by Taylor. But what specific kind of totalitarianism does
Socrates advocate?21
Taylor helps here also by distinguishing different types of
totalitarianism: extreme statism (in which individual interests
are abrogated in favor of the good of the state), political
organicism (in which individual interests are identified with
their contribution to the interests of the state), and paternalism
(in which individuals are compelled by government to promote
their own interests). Plato’s text does not support the first
interpretation, but commentators have defended the other two
readings.22
Karl Popper adopts the second interpretation, according to
which the city is a “super-individual” or “a kind of super-
organism.” 23 Some texts support this interpretation when they
compare legislating for the city and painting a statue: “You
mustn’t expect us to paint the eyes so beautifully that they no
longer appear to be eyes at all, and the same with other parts.
Rather you must look to see whether by dealing with each part
appropriately, we are making the whole statue beautiful”
(IV.420d1-5). Similarly the legislator should be concerned with
making the whole city happy. “In this way, with the whole city
developing and being governed well, we must leave (§ατ°ον) it
to nature to provide each group with its share of happiness”
(421c3-6). This suggests that individual happiness should be left
to nature rather than provided for through legislation.24
Aristotle criticizes the Republic for extreme organicism and
many commentators have followed his lead. Socrates’ language

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supports this interpretation: “For example, when one of us hurts

his finger, the entire organism that binds body and soul
together into a single system under the ruling part within it is
aware of this, and the whole feels the pain together with the
part that suffers.… The city with the best government is most
like such a person” (V.462c10-d2, 6-7). Raphael Demos also
offers an organicist interpretation:
What Socrates, in effect, is saying is that the perfection of the
whole requires the subordination of the parts; and that the
subordination of the parts contributes to the perfection of the
whole. Going further he asserts that the parts would not be
proper parts if they achieved a perfection independently of their
place in the whole. For the parts are defined by their function in
the whole….25

Aristotle reads the Republic this way, and objects that Socrates’
“hypothesis that it is best for the entire city to be one as far as
possible” implies that the city should be, to the greatest extent
possible, one in the same way as an organism: “if it becomes
more one it will become a household instead of a city, and a
human being instead of a household.” Aristotle dismisses this
aim as misguided: “even if one could do this, it ought not to be
done; for it would destroy the city” (Pol. II.2.1261a15-22). On
Aristotle’s reading, Socrates calls for the rulers to aim at a total
unity of the city that would obliterate individual differences
through communism of property, children, and spouses (see Rep.
V.462a-464b).
Other passages of the Republic, however, support a
paternalist interpretation. For example, “We take ourselves,
then, to be fashioning the happy city, not picking out a few
happy people and putting them in it, but making the whole city
happy” (IV.420c1-4; this precedes the statue painting analogy).
“[O]ur concern at the time was to make our guardians true
guardians and the city the happiest we could, rather than
looking to any one group (¶θνος) within it and molding it for
happiness” (V.466a2-6). On this interpretation the aim of the
guardians should be to promote the interests of the whole
community rather than sectional interests; it should not be (as
Aristotle interpreted) to promote the happiness of the city as an
abstract entity at the expense of its individual members. Again,
“it isn’t the law’s concern to make any one class in the city
outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness
throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with
each other … by making them share with each other (ἀλλÆλοις)
the benefits that each class can confer on the community”
(VII.519e1-520a1).26 As Julia Annas argues,
Plato does undeniably subordinate individual interests to the
common good; but this is not an entity over and above the

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varying kinds of goodness of the varying kinds of people. The

state is nothing over and above the people making it up, or
rather it is the context in which different kinds of people can
attain the excellence appropriate to them. Similarly the city’s
happiness is just the happiness of all the citizens.27

Read this way Plato anticipates John Rawls’s view of society as

“a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”28
Although each of these interpretations—organicism and
paternalism—has textual support, neither is free of difficulty.
A worry regarding organicism is that it foists onto Plato an
implausible and perhaps absurd conception of the greatest
happiness. Such an interpretation seems to leave the Republic
vulnerable to an objection of the sort raised by Aristotle.

But it is impossible for a whole to be happy unless most or all or

some of its parts possess happiness. For being happy is not the
same as being even; for the latter can belong to the whole even if
neither of its parts does, but being happy cannot. But if the
guardians are not happy, what other persons are? For at any rate
the artisans and the multitude of vulgar persons are surely not.
(Pol. II.5.1264b15-24)

On Aristotle’s interpretation, Socrates’ guardians are to aim at

the happiness of the city considered as a whole without regard
to whether any individual citizens are happy considered as
individuals. Of course, according to organicism individuals are
happy, albeit in a derived sense: individuals are happy insofar
as they contribute to the happiness of the city as a whole. But
Aristotle would reject this as preposterous (in the sense of
getting things backwards): the city as a whole is happy because
its citizens are happy, not vice versa. 29
A proponent of organicism might reply that it depends on
what is meant by a ‘happy’ city. It is worth noting that
Aristotle’s objection that a city cannot be εÈδαµων unless its
members are seems especially telling if εÈδαµων is translated
as ‘happy’, because ‘happy’ suggests an experiential component
which a city could not have on its own. But if εÈδαµων is
translated as ‘flourishing’, the holistic reading does not sound
so absurd. For a city as a whole might plausibly be called
‘flourishing’ insofar as it possesses internal harmony or order-
liness. Further, the Form of the Good provides philosophers
with a pattern by which they can bring order to things in the
perceptible world, including cities. According to John Cooper’s
suggestion, it is “a complex, ordered whole, whose orderliness is
due to the mathematical relationships holding among its
parts.”30 The philosopher “recognizes a single criterion of choice:
What, given the circumstances, will be most likely to maximize
the total amount of rational order in the world as a whole?” 31

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How far the philosopher can succeed depends on circumstances.

At the very least he should establish rational order in his own
soul insofar as possible (cf. IX.592b), and as a teacher he should
try to help others do the same (VI. 500b-d, cf. IX.592b). But, if
the opportunity presents itself, they should try to establish a
rational order in the city as a whole. A rationally ordered city—
that is, a city ruled by its rational part—will be in a flourishing
and optimal condition, and a city as a whole might be rationally
ordered to the greatest extent, even though its citizens are not
rationally ordered to the greatest extent with respect to their
individual souls. 32 Although this interpretation is supported by
the statue painting analogy, it is unclear whether it convinc-
ingly accounts for the claim that wisdom involves “knowledge of
what is advantageous for each part and for the whole”
(IV.442c6-8) or that the law’s aim is to make the citizens “share
with each other the benefits that each class can confer on the
community” (VII.519e3-520a3).
The paternalist interpretation faces a different sort of
problem. If the guardians must aim at the happiness of indi-
vidual citizens, it must be possible for citizens of all stripes to
be happy. But, as Aristotle, points out, the producers are surely
not happy (see Pol. II.5.1264b23-4, quoted above). Socrates
argues that individuals are happy only if they are just, and, on
his definition, an individual soul is just only if its rational part
rules over its nonrational parts. But if the producers are ruled
by their appetites rather than by reason, they could not possess
the sort of psychic harmony which would make them happy as
individuals. 33 Along similar lines, Cooper argues that it would
be “extraordinary” for Plato to hold that “a city can be just only
if its citizens are just” because “Plato consistently restricts
justice, as a virtue of individuals, to those who possess within
themselves knowledge of what it is best to do and be.” 34 The
producers of the just city can be neither just nor happy, if
knowledge of the Form of the Good is necessary for justice and
happiness.
A proponent of paternalism might try to overcome this
difficulty by offering a broader account of what it is to be ruled
by reason. The basic idea is that one may be ruled by reason
either directly or indirectly—directly, when one is guided by the
knowledge of the Form of the Good in one’s own soul, or indi-
rectly, when one is guided by the knowledge of the Form of the
Good in another person’s soul. For example, in the soul of the
manual worker the best part (i.e., reason) is naturally weak and
unable to rule the beasts (i.e., desires) within.

Therefore, to insure that someone like that is ruled by something

similar to what rules the best person, we say that he ought to be
the slave of that best person who has a divine ruler within
himself. It isn’t to harm the slave that we say he must be ruled,

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which is what Thrasymachus thought to be true of all subjects,

but because it is better for everyone to be ruled by divine reason,
preferably within himself and his own, otherwise imposed from
without, so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends,
governed by the same thing. (IX.590c8-d6)

On this view the producers are ruled for their own good and are
in what Gregory Vlastos characterizes a condition of “idealized
slavery.” 35 Socrates offers some basis for this interpretation, for
example when he speaks of the most important aspects of the
moderation of the masses as being “to obey the rulers and to
rule the pleasures of drink, sex, and food for themselves”
(III.389d9-e2). This implies that the producers can “internalize”
to some extent the guidance that they receive from the
philosopher rulers and thus attain a kind of (a lower grade to
be sure) of psychic harmony. Socrates also refers to the “political
courage” of the auxiliaries, which is “the preservation of the
belief that has been inculcated by law through education about
what things and sorts of things are to be feared” (IV.429c7-8).
Again, the myth of Er describes a soul which had “lived his
previous life under an orderly constitution, where he had
participated in virtue through habit and without philosophy”
(X.619c6-d1). On the basis of these passages, it might be argued
that nonphilosophers are not entirely bereft of virtue and
happiness, although what they enjoy is only an approximation
of the virtue and happiness attained by philosophers. Taylor
defends the paternalist interpretation along these lines:

The goal of the polis is the production of as much individual

eudaimonia as possible. But the majority of people are not
capable of eudaimonia on their own; since they are incapable of
grasping the Good, they cannot provide for themselves that
impetus towards it which is a necessary condition for psychic
harmony…. The nearest they can get to eudaimonia is to submit
to the direction by the intellect of someone else.36

The seemingly intractable issue concerning the aim of the

guardians seems to be related to certain ambivalence regarding
the lower classes, especially the producers. As Bernard Williams
remarks,

There have been those who thought that the working classes
were naturally of powerful and disorderly desires, and had to be
kept in their place. There have been those who thought that they
were good-hearted and loyal fellows of no great gifts who could
recognize their natural superiors and, unless stirred up, keep
themselves in their place. There can have been few who thought
both; Plato in the Republic comes close to being such a one, even
though we can recognize that his heart, and his fears, lie with

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the first story. His analogy helps him to combine both stories, in
particular by encouraging us to believe in an outcome appro-
priate to the second story from arrangements motivated by the
first.37

The second story tends to support the paternalistic interpre-

tation: the lower classes can attain virtue and happiness which
approximates, but falls short of, that of the philosopher rulers;
while the first story supports the organicist interpretation: the
lower classes are really incapable of virtue and must be kept on
a tight leash by the guardians. If it is correct that Plato’s
Republic combines both stories, it is not surprising that opposed
interpretations appeal to different commentators.
In order to achieve the common good, however it is
understood, the guardians must maintain control over the other
citizens. According to Socrates a soul is moderate or self-
controlled when “the naturally better part is in control of the
worse,” that is, reason is in control of spirit and appetite.
Analogously in a moderate city “the desires of the inferior many
are controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few”
(IV.431c9-d2). This condition requires political unanimity or
consensus (ıµÒνοια), that is, the ruler and subjects must share
the same belief about who should rule (431e10-432a9). We
might expect rational rulers to guide their subjects by means of
reasoned arguments. Yet Socrates’ city is replete with compul-
sory policies. In addition to using coercion if necessary against
their fellow citizens (III.415e, V.465a-b), the guardians must
enforce moral conformity by means of censorship and banish-
ment against poets and subversive craftsmen (II.377b-c;
III.398a, 401b). Socrates observes, that “our rulers will have to
make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the
benefit of those they rule” (V.459c8-d1; cf II.382c, III.414b). On
the other hand, he is clearly not advocating a brutal dictator-
ship, since he sees it as “the law’s concern to contrive to spread
happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into
harmony with each other through both persuasion and compul-
sion” (VII.519e1-4).38

Policy 4 Rational rulers should control their subjects through

both persuasion and compulsion. When it is necessary,
they may employ deception, manipulation, propaganda,
censorship, and coercion to secure obedience.

Rational persuasion is presumably the norm among the

guardians themselves because they are trained to be philoso-
phers and, having a “philosophical nature,” will “inevitably grow
to possess every virtue,” if they are properly educated
(VI.492a1-3). But it is permissible for even the guardians to be
deceived on some occasions. It is acceptable to try to use the

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aforementioned myth of the metals, a “noble falsehood,” to

persuade even the guardians, who have just been distinguished
from the auxiliaries, although Socrates concedes the attempt
will probably not succeed (III.414b-c, 415c-d). And a small
coterie of “rulers” may deceive the other guardians with a bogus
marriage lottery in order to maintain “the purity of the herd”
(V.459d-e).39
Compulsion will be practiced far more extensively upon the
lower classes according to Socrates’ relentless logic: If the rulers
must promote the common good and they issue commands based
on their knowledge of the good but the subjects are often unable
or unwilling to understand the reasons for these commands,
then the rulers are justified in the frequent use of means other
than reasoned argument to secure obedience. Is Socrates’
authoritarianism tempered in any way? This depends on the
extent to which the lower classes are amenable to persuasion.
Here again, Plato’s text is open to different interpretations.
On an ultra-authoritarian interpretation, the lower classes,
especially the producers, are impervious to rational argument.
In Popper’s terms, they are “human cattle, whose sole function
is to provide for the material needs of the ruling class.” 40 But
this interpretation seems inconsistent with indications that the
producer has a rational faculty although it is dominated by
appetites (see VIII.553d).
On a less authoritarian interpretation, the lower classes are
open to persuasion because the nonrational parts of their souls
can be controlled by true beliefs so that they are capable of
virtue to some extent. 41 Socrates mentions the agreement in
belief (ıµοδοξα) between the rulers and subjects and to the
lawful belief (δÒξα ¶ννοµος) of the auxiliaries (IV.433c6-8). In
the case of the auxiliaries at any rate the beliefs are produced
by education (429c7) so that they are relatively stable and thus
ensure a degree of psychic harmony. Similarly, the producers
will be amenable to some kind of persuasion.42 Yet the subjects
remain in a condition of “idealized slavery” because they are
completely dependent on the philosopher rulers for their correct
beliefs. 43 This interpretation arguably leads to a puzzle: if the
subjects are rational to the extent of forming correct beliefs and
reasoning, why aren’t they capable of self-government? As
Taylor states, “the intellect of the producers is both sufficiently
developed to have genuine control over their lives, and therefore
to ensure psychic harmony, and so weak as to require them to
be enslaved to the guardians for their own good.” 44 This
interpretation would be more plausible if it were shown how the
subjects could walk such a fine line.45 In any case this interpre-
tation allows for considerable compulsion and deception of the
subjects, though less so than the former interpretation.
The proposal that philosophers should rule the city leads to
another problem: What reason do philosophers have to shoulder

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this burden? Socrates regards their reluctance to rule as an

endearing trait of philosophers (VII.520d). The philosopher is
like a lover consumed by sexual desire: “he neither loses nor
lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being of each nature
itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, because
of its kinship with it, and, once getting near what really is and
having intercourse with it and having begotten understanding
and truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished, and—at that
point, but not before—is relieved from the pains of giving birth”
(VI.490b1-7). After beholding the Form of the Good, the philoso-
pher regards himself as happy and nonphilosophers as wretched
so that he would rather “go through any sufferings, rather than
share their opinions and live as they do” (VII.516d6-7, cf. 518a-
b). But only philosophers are qualified to rule, because their
unenlightened fellow citizens “don’t have a single goal at which
all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim” (519c2-3).
Socrates concludes that the legislators must not permit the
philosophers to shirk their civic duty (520a, 521b).

Policy 5 Rational rulers must be compelled to rule.

The Republic repeatedly mentions that the philosophers

must be compelled to rule. 46 Leo Strauss views this policy as a
poison pill in Socrates’ ostensibly ideal city. “The philosophers
cannot be persuaded, they can only be compelled to rule the
cities.” Strauss infers that “the just city is not possible because
of the philosopher’s unwillingness to rule.” But, as Myles
Burnyeat objects, the text suggests that philosophers are to be
compelled by means of rational argument. In fact, Socrates
offers a speech which is to be used to persuade the philosophers
(520a-d).47
Another difficulty lurking in this passage is, however, harder
to evade. When Glaucon objects that it would be unjust to force
the philosophers to live a worse life when they could live a
better one, Socrates reminds him that “it isn’t the law’s concern
to make any one class in the city outstandlingly happy but to
contrive to spread happiness throughout the city” (519e1-3).
Glaucon concedes, “That’s true, I had forgotten.” But Socrates
neglects to remind Glaucon about something else: his original
challenge to Socrates to demonstrate that the just person is
better off, happier, and more blessed than the unjust person.48
But Socrates himself has not forgotten it. He will later claim
that he has answered the challenge by proving that “justice
itself is the best thing for the soul itself” (X.612b2-3).
Socrates seems to have fallen into inconsistency. He makes
two claims here: (1) If the philosophers are just, they will agree
to rule the city. (2) The philosophers will be less happy if they
rule the city rather than contemplate the Forms. But these
conflict with the main thesis he has been defending since Book

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II: (3) The just life is invariably happier than the unjust life,
regardless of considerations such as punishments, rewards, and
reputation.
Some interpreters try to avoid the problem by rejecting or
qualifying claim (2). On this view, even though the philosopher
rulers must forsake the happiness of contemplating the Forms
while they are ruling, their lives are no less happy. After they
grasp the Form of the Good they undergo a momentous per-
sonal transformation so that they experience happiness not only
through contemplating the Forms but also in restructuring
their communities in light of the Forms. 49 Richard Kraut, in
defending this interpretation, concludes that the philosopher
rulers really promote their own self-interest after all: “one’s
highest good is not always served by purely contemplating the
Forms; rather, one’s highest good is to establish and maintain a
certain initiative relationship with the Forms, a relationship
that is strained or ruptured when one fails to do one’s fair
share in a just community.”50
This solution is not free of difficulty. Why do philosophers
have to be compelled to rule if they know they are better off
ruling? When Glaucon asks, “are we to do them an injustice by
making them live a worse life when they could live a better
one?” Socrates concedes that they would live a worse life by
carrying out their duty, so that they must be compelled. 51 The
reason is evidently that he regards pure contemplative activity
as better than political activity. Even if the philosophers derive
some satisfaction from meeting their just obligations, they
would be more satisfied overall if they were off contemplating
the Forms. Kraut accepts this, but remarks that “this does not
entail that pure contemplation that creates injustice is more
advantageous than political activity that is justly required.” 52
However, if pure contemplation involving injustice is not “more
advantageous” than political activity involving justice, then the
philosopher rulers make no personal sacrifice in doing their
duty, and it is misleading to suggest otherwise. Moreover, if
Socrates has no independent argument as to why it is not more
advantageous to shirk one duty’s than not, he seems to be
begging the question.
Other interpreters suggest the more radical solution of
rejecting (3) the claim that the just person is always happier
than the unjust. 53 On this approach philosophers agree to rule
because they have discovered upon grasping the Forms that
they have a higher end than their own happiness. They have
undergone a conversion which leads them to forsake their
personal well-being. As Glenn Morrow remarks, “every soul …
that has had any vision of the ideal is under an obligation to
try to transform the sense-world into its likeness.” 54 According
to Norman Dahl, “what motivates a person with a harmonious
soul is an impartial desire to instantiate Justice.” 55 On John

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Cooper’s interpretation, the philosopher is concerned with

maximizing the total amount of rational order in the world as a
whole rather than with promoting his own self interest.56

Plato’s philosophers will settle for a less flourishing existence

than they might have had (519e1-520a4; cf. 420b4-8, 465e4-
466a6). On the other hand,… a true philosopher never concerns
himself with his own good. His ultimate end is to improve not
just the small part of the world that is constituted by his own
life, but the whole of it, this part taken together with the rest.57

This solution has an awkward result: The official argument

of the Republic is exposed as a sham, or perhaps a noble lie. At
the end of the dialogue, Socrates asks “And haven’t we found
that justice itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that
the soul—whether it has the ring of Gyges or even it together
with the cap of Hades—should do just things?” (X.612b2-5),
when he knows full well that he has proven nothing of the sort.
His ostensible thesis—that the just soul is happier than the
unjust—is like a Trojan horse because the philosopher ulti-
mately learns that, even if it is not in his interest to be just,
this doesn’t matter because he has a higher duty to maximize
the good-itself in the world.58
In conclusion, it is difficult to explain why the philosophers
would choose to be rulers, based on the text of the Republic.59

4. The Rule of Reason without

Paradoxical Policies
Socrates contends that “our city, if indeed it has been correctly
founded, is completely good” (IV.427e6-8). The rule of reason is
the theoretical bedrock for the Republic on which Socrates has
founded his Kallipolis, “the beautiful city” (VII.527c2). However,
Socrates prescribes some troubling policies for his just city,
involving elitism (a segregated class of philosopher rulers),
collectivism (the aim being “the greatest happiness of the whole
city”), authoritarianism (extensive use of deception, manipula-
tion, propaganda, surveillance, censorship, and coercion), and
alienated rulers (who consent to rule only from a sense of duty).
These not only conflict with common beliefs about political
justice, but in some cases they seem to generate apparent
inconsistencies within Socrates’ overarching argument that the
just life is the happy life. This prompts the question: To what
extent is the rule of reason responsible for the totalitarianism
of the Republic? Is the rule of reason an inherently authori-
tarian and antidemocratic doctrine? Let us review Socrates’
policies with these questions in mind.

Policy 1 There must be a class of rational rulers separate from

the other citizens.

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Socrates’ proposal for a separate class of guardians depends

in part on tendentious claims about the psychology of the
different classes that make up the city. Socrates apparently
assumes that the natural ruling class differs from the natural
subject classes with respect to both rational capacity and
motivational structure. As Williams remarks:

Criticism of Plato often concentrates on his opinion that ruling is

a matter of expertise; but he needs more than that opinion to
reach his results in the Republic, and has to combine with it a
set of views about what characteristics generally co-exist at the
level of individual psychology. In that area, he has to believe not
only that λογιστικÒν comes in two sizes (as we might say, regular
size and king size), but also that the talents and temperaments
that make good soldiers go with thymoeidic motivations, and the
talents and temperaments that make good workers go with
epithymetic motivations.60

Although details of Williams’s critique might be called into

question, 61 he seems right that Socrates’ elitism depends in
large part on the assumption that most citizens are psycho-
logically unfit for rule.
Aside from this controversial psychological theory, Socrates’
inference to a separate ruling class seems questionable in a
more general way. The rule of reason presupposes that a
community such as the city consists of two parts: the rational
and the nonrational. Socrates gives an argument for this
presupposition in Republic Book IV based on the hypothesis of
opposites: that a thing cannot act or be affected in opposite
ways in relation to the same object, at the same time, in the
same respect, and so forth. But even if it is granted that the
city, like the soul, has rational and nonrational parts and that
the former should rule over the latter, this does not establish
the need for a separate ruling class, for a thing may be said to
have “parts” in different senses. These parts may be separable
from each other and from the whole to which they belong, for
example, the wheels of a wagon. Or the parts may be aspects or
features of a whole and not separable except in thought, for
example, the concave and convex surfaces of a lens, or the axis
and circumference of a spinning top. The latter is of course
Socrates’ own example (Rep. IV.436d-e). 62 Hence, even if it is
granted that the city, like the soul, has distinct rational and
nonrational parts, it does not follow that these must exist
separately from each other. Thus it is not necessary that the
rational part and the nonrational part be separate classes of
citizens, for it might turn out that the rational and nonrational
parts are found in each of the citizens individually, or that they
are aspects of the citizenry as a whole. The rule of reason is
compatible with any of these possibilities.

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Policy 2 The rulers must be philosophers.

The rule of reason implies that those who participate in the

political process should exhibit rationality. But Socrates
assumes a very peculiar understanding of political rationality
when he advocates philosopher rulers. According to Socrates the
Form of the Good serves as a model for the rulers: “Once they’ve
seen the good itself, they must each in turn put the city, its
citizens, and themselves in order, using it as their model
(παραδεγµατι)” (VII.540a8-9). Another passage describes the
model as a sort of utopia.

[Glaucon] You mean that he [i.e., the philosopher] will be willing

to take part in the politics of the city we were founding and
describing, the one that exists in theory (§ν λÒγοις), for I don’t
think it exists anywhere on earth.

[Socrates] But perhaps, I said, there is a model (παράδειγµα) of

it in heaven, for anyone who wants to look at it and make
himself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. It makes no
difference whether it is or will be somewhere, for he would take
part in the practical affairs of that city and no other. (IX.592a10-
b5)

It sounds as though Socrates’ model is a real city in heaven

populated by ideal citizens, of which the human city is but a
faint imitation. It would be a literal utopia, having “no place” in
the perceptible world, although it might provide guidance for
real-world legislators. This suggests the sort of “hyperrealism”
found in neo-Platonic accounts which treat the Forms as higher
realities of which perceptible particulars are perceptible
particulars. The Form is an intelligible model analogous to the
perceptible human model used by a craftsman to create a
product. Just as the picture of a bed made by a painter is an
imitation of the perceptible bed made by a carpenter, the
perceptible bed is an imitation of the Form of a Bed made by a
god. On the hyperrealist view, crudely stated, the Form of a Bed
is not only made by a god, but it is a bed a god could sleep in
(see X.597b).63 On an alternative the model is more like a recipe
or design according to which the product is made. 64 Such a
recipe might describe a mathematical structure shared by
particular instances. 65 The latter interpretation yields a more
plausible view of the Forms, although it requires us to take
Socrates’ comment about making oneself a citizen of the model
city as a metaphor for making one’s own soul virtuous.66
But even the less extravagant interpretation goes well
beyond the rule of reason in assuming that political expertise
requires philosophical knowledge of the Form of the Good. This
assumption is criticized by Aristotle.

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The idea has a certain plausibility, but seems not to be in accord

with what we find with the various sorts of expert knowledge; for
all of them seek some particular good, and though they look for
whatever is lacking, they leave out knowledge of the form of the
good. And yet it is hardly likely that all the experts should be
unaware of so great a resource, and should fail even to go looking
for it. But it is also difficult to see how a weaver or a carpenter
will be helped in relation to his craft by knowing this good
“itself ”; or how someone who has seem the form itself will be a
better doctor or a better general. (EN I.6.1096b31-1097a11,
trans. Rowe)

Aristotle’s objection is that knowledge of the Form of the

Good can provide no practical guidance in ethics or politics. 67
Aristotle agrees with the need for political expertise, but he
argues that political wisdom is a species of practical wisdom
(φρÒνησις) which is expressed in good deliberation about the
things that conduce to the good life, and not a species of
theoretical wisdom (σοφα), which is expressed in scientific
demonstrations (in physics, astronomy, optics, and other
natural sciences) (VI.5.1140a25-7, 7.1141a16-20, 8.1141b23-4,
cf. a20-b12). Although Aristotle endorses the rule of reason,
he does not even discuss the claim that rulers must be
philosophers.

Policy 3 The ruler’s aim is the greatest happiness of the whole

city.

According to the rule of reason the rational element has the

natural right to rule because it alone knows what is good for
the whole of which it is a part (III.412e; IV.441e, 442c, 444d).
This whole may be a soul, a city, or even the whole cosmos.
However, as was noted above, “the good of the whole” and more
specifically “the happiness of the whole city” can be understood
in very different ways. Commentators disagree over whether
Socrates understands the “happy city” as involving the mutual
advantage of each social class or even of each and every citizen
or as involving the collective well-being of the city, which may
entail significant sacrifices on the part of various classes or
individual citizens. It was suggested that the controversy is
difficult to resolve due to the vagueness of crucial passages. But
the very existence of such an interpretative dispute indicates
that the rule of reason by itself does not require the wholesale
collectivization proposed by Socrates in the Republic.

Policy 4 Rational rulers should control their subjects through

both persuasion and compulsion. When it is necessary,
they may employ deception, manipulation, propaganda,
censorship, and coercion to secure obedience.

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The rule of reason can provide a justification for the use of

compulsion. For if reason reveals what is objectively good and
an individual wants to do otherwise, the individual may be
compelled to abide by reason. However, it may be possible to
compel an individual through rational persuasion, as we saw
earlier in the passage in which the philosopher rulers are
compelled by means of argument to share in governance
(VII.519a-521a).68 But if the individual is unable or unwilling to
be persuaded rationally, other means may be justified, as when
a parent tricks a child or a pet unwilling to take its medicine by
concealing it in a tasty morsel. As we saw Socrates advocates
extensive use of such measures especially with the producers
whom he lumps together with children, women, and slaves due
to their defective psychology (see IV.431b-c, X.590c-d).
There is again no reason to suppose that the rule of reason
as such licenses such authoritarianism. Indeed, insofar as each
of the subjects is capable of rational deliberation the rule of
reason requires instead that the rulers use rational persuasion
to secure their compliance. And if practical wisdom is distinct
from philosophical wisdom, as Aristotle argued above, the
capacity for rational deliberation does not need to be limited to
a philosophical elite.

Policy 5 Rational rulers must be compelled to rule.

In view of the preceding discussion it is tempting to try to slice

through the Gordian knot and simply dispense with the
philosopher rulers. It is not clear however that this would
completely solve the problem Plato has unearthed. Granted that
the rulers are individual agents with their own reason for
acting, it seems inevitable that tensions will arise between the
public good and the good of the rulers considered as individuals.
Regardless of whether the rulers are lovers of wisdom, lovers of
honor, or lovers of pleasure, they must forego their own
happiness as individuals to some extent if they are to be fully
just rulers of the city. 69 The rule of reason needs a solution to
this problem if it is to be a tenable political theory.
Plato suggests different possible approaches in the Laws.
The legislators should try to institute a system of moral
education not to produce an elite class of absolute philosopher
rulers, but a body of citizens each of whom has “a keen desire to
become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as
justice demands” (I.643e5-6). This would of course require a
profound transformation of the motivations of ordinary citizens.
Another approach (compatible with the first) is to make the law
itself the ruler over the city. The Athenian Stranger says that
reason (λÒγος) “strives to become law” (VIII.835e5). The “golden
cord” which is the power of calculation (λογισµÒς) in the
individual soul is called the common law in the city (I.644d-

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645a). The Athenian Stranger suggests that it cannot be an

accident that the name of this divine and wonderful thing, law
(νÒµος) is so suggestive of intelligence (νοËς) (XII.957c6-7, cf.
IV.714a). Rather than hoping for purely disinterested rational
agents, the legislator should design a constitution which
embodies policies for rational cooperation including procedures
to ensure that the aberrant tendencies of public officials are
held in check. Echoing these arguments for the rule of law,
Aristotle adds, “That is a better ruler which is free from passion
than that in which it is innate. Whereas the law is passionless,
passion must always sway the human soul” (III.15.1286a17-20).
“Appetite is a wild beast, and spirit perverts the minds of
rulers, even when they are the best of men. That is why the law
is intelligence (νοËς) unaffected by desire” (16.1287a30-2).
Although the rule of law is itself a controversial doctrine, it is
no surprise that proponents of the rule of reason are drawn to
it.70

5. Conclusion
I have argued here that the rule of reason can be extricated
from other, more controversial doctrines in the Republic, such
as elitism, collectivism, and ubiquitous compulsion. But the rule
of reason is so far only a skeletal doctrine. The principle that
the rational part of the state should govern the nonrational
part rests on the claim that the rational part alone is capable of
knowing the common good, that is, what is good for the whole
community. On the basis of this knowledge, it is possible to
distinguish between just political systems and policies (those
that promote the common good) from unjust ones. The task of
political science should be to found or reform political systems
and policies so that they are just or at any rate as just as
possible. Further, insofar as the citizens are rational, they have
a right (just claim) to participate in governance.71
Fleshing this out would require a number of questions which
are answered in the Republic in a controversial way: Is there an
objective good, and can it be known through a rational process?
What sort of rational process would this be? Who is capable of
carrying out such a process successfully? Further, in what sense
is the common good “common”—is it good for each and everyone
or good for the whole community in some other sense? Should
political rule may be exercised directly by rational individuals
issuing commands or indirectly through laws, customs, and
intermediate institutions? Or does this depend on circum-
stances?
If persuasive answers are forthcoming, the rule of reason
may still be relevant to modern political philosophy. For
example, it might be argued that democracy is the most
defensible political system because it is best suited for making
correct political decisions. Aristotle seriously considers this sort

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of “wisdom of the multitude” argument: “the many, each of

whom is not excellent man, none the less by coming together
can be better (not individually but collectively) than those….
For each individual among the many has a portion of virtue and
practical wisdom, and when they come together the multitude
becomes like one human being, having many feet, hands, and
senses, so also regarding character and thought” (Pol.
III.11.1281a42-b7). This type of argument is developed much
more fully in John Stuart Mill’s Considerations on Represen-
tative Government and in the burgeoning contemporary litera-
ture on deliberative democracy. If an argument along these
lines is sound, then the rule of reason may form the theoretical
basis for a democratic constitution that ensures rational
deliberation concerning public policy.72
In conclusion, the rule of reason is one of Plato’s ideas that
modern political philosophers may still be able to defend. It is
worth the effort.73

Notes
1
This in an important theme in early cosmology, e.g., Xenophanes:
“There is one god, greatest among gods and men, similar to mortals in
neither body nor thought (νÒηµα),” (B23) and “without effort with the
thought of his mind (νÒου φρεν‹) he shakes everything” (B25).
Anaxagoras: “he has knowledge (γν≈µγν) of all things and greatest
power; and mind controls (νοËς κρατε›) all things that have soul …”
(B12). Diogenes of Apollonia: “what has thought (νÒησιν) is that which
men call air, and by this all things are governed (κυβερνᾶσθαι) and it
controls (κρατε›ν) all things …” (B5). Aristotle made the rule of reason
a fundamental principle in his own political science, e.g., “It is clear
that it is natural and advantageous for the body to be ruled (ἄρχεσθαι)
by the soul over the body, and the passionate part by the mind (ÍπÚ
τοË νοË) and the part possessing reason (λÒγον)” (Pol. I.5.1254b6-9).
2
According to Rousseau, “the general will alone can direct the
forces of the State according to the end of its institution, which is the
common good” (Of the Social Contract II.1.1, trans. Gourevitch).
Voluntarist theories take different forms: they may require that the
rulers have the consent of the governed (either tacitly or expressly) or
that the regime embodies the general will in a less definite way.
Subjectivist variants of this approach appeal to interests, desires,
subjective preferences, and so forth. It does not seem necessary to
make the voluntarist/subjectivist alternative more precise for the
purposes of this paper, which is narrowly concerned with the
rationalist view found in the Republic.
3
The guardians are called craftsmen (δηµιουργÒι) (Rep. III.395b9-
c1, IV.421c2), and the legislator is compared to a statue painter
(IV.420c). Compare Laws X.889d6-e1 where politics is called a craft
(τ°χνη) and legislation is a matter of craft. Similarly, the Timaeus
employs the craftsman analogy in its “likely story” about the origin of
the empirical world, with an immaterial intelligent demiurge shaping
preexisting matter into an orderly cosmos (30a, c, 37d, 53a-b, 69b-c).
Many scholars have commented on the parallels between the cosmic
demiurge and the human legislator, e.g., Morrow 1953-54, Laks 1990

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 Fred D. Miller, Jr.

and 2000, and Bobonich 2002.

4
Rousseau argues that the legislator is necessary as a guide
because “by itself the people always wills the good, but by itself it does
not always see it. The general will is always upright, but the judgment
which guides it is not always enlightened … the public enlightenment
results in the union of understanding and will in the social body, from
this union results the smooth cooperation of the parts, and finally the
greatest force of the whole. Hence arises the necessity of a Lawgiver”
(Of the Social Contract II.6.10, trans. Gourevitch). Rousseau’s
voluntarist view of legislation is the antithesis of Plato’s rationalist
account.
5
Owing to space constraints this paper is confined to the Republic
except for a few brief references to other dialogues which shed light on
the Republic. I plan in a sequel to examine the rule of reason in
Plato’s later dialogues. It should be noted, however, that the rule of
reason is implied by Socrates’ claim in the Gorgias that he alone puts
his hand to political expertise (πολιτικØ τ°χνη) and practices political
things (521d6-8). The rule of reason becomes a cosmological principle
in later dialogues which claim that mind (νοËς) regulates and directs
the cosmos (Phil. 28d, cf. 30c; Polit. 272e, 273c-d; Tim. 30a, 37d, 53a,
69c; Laws XII.966e, 967b). As Broadie remarks, “Plato holds that this
sense-perceptible universe of ours can also become intelligible to us
humans because it was constructed according to a rational plan, and
we are in a position to make reasonable assumptions about the
content of that plan” (2004, 72). Similarly, Plato holds that political life
becomes intelligible only if it is constructed according to a rational
plan and we are in a position to make reasonable assumptions about
the content of that plan.
6
Demos 1957 offers an overview of the paradoxes in Plato’s
Republic and attempts to solve them.
7
Trans. Donald J. Zeyl in Cooper 1997. This principle is explicitly
expounded in the Gorgias, where Socrates argues that “when a certain
order (κÒσµος), the proper one for each thing, comes to be present in it
that it makes each of the things there are good” (506e2-4). This order
arises from organization (τάξις), correctness (ÙρθÒτης), and craftsman-
ship (τ°χνη). Socrates has earlier argued that the true craftsman, e.g.,
shipbuilder or housebuilder, imposes order on his subject matter and
compels one thing to be suited for another and to fit to it until the
entire object is put together in an organized and orderly way; likewise
gym teachers and doctors give order or organization to the body (503e-
504a). Order results in health and strength of the body. Similarly an
orderly soul is better than a disorderly soul, since it is lawful,
moderate, and virtuous (506d-507a). Finally, Socrates argues that a
man who has an orderly virtuous soul is happy whereas a man with a
disorderly vicious soul is miserable (cf. 507c). He also suggests that
this principle applies to the universe as a whole: “Partnership and
friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justice hold heaven and earth,
and gods and humans, and that is why they call this universe a world
order (κÒσµος), and not an undisciplined world-disorder (ἀκοσµαν)”
(507e6-508a4). Similarly, the Philebus connects the good with beauty,
proportion (συµµετρα), and truth (65a1-2), which are exemplified by
“an incorporeal order (κÒσµος) that rules beautifully over an ensouled
body” (64b7).
8
All translations from the Republic are by G. M. A. Grube, revised

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 Plato on the Rule of Reason

by C. D. C. Reeve, in Cooper 1997 unless otherwise indicated.

9
This principle is also invoked in the Phaedo: “When the soul and
the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to be
ruled, and the other to rule and be master” (79e9-80a1, trans. G. M. A.
Grube in Cooper 1997; cf. 94c-d). See also Rep. I.353d.
10
See Miller 1999 for critical analysis of the argument for the
tripartite soul.
11
See Santas 2001 for an illuminating discussion of the functional
theory of the good and its role in the Republic.
12
There is a great controversy over whether and to what extent
Socrates’ argument succeeds. In a famous article Sachs (1963) argues
that Socrates commits the fallacy of relevance: The challenge is to
prove that it profits one to possess vulgar (i.e., conventional) justice,
which is displayed for example in caring for one’s parents and in
refraining from fraud, theft, murder, adultery, impiety, and so forth
(see Rep. IV.442e-443a). Socrates argues that it benefits someone to
have Platonic justice, i.e., a harmonious soul, which is analogous to
health in the body (444d-445b). But, Sachs objects, the argument fails
because Socrates does not show that Platonic justice is a necessary
and sufficient condition for vulgar justice. Two valuable overviews and
attempts to resolve the problem the problem are Dahl 1991 and Kraut
1992. This issue is relevant to the central theme of this paper insofar
as it bears on the relation between the rule of reason and psychic
harmony, especially in connection with the fifth Socratic policy
discussed below.
13
It is interesting to contrast this myth with the democratic myth
in the Menexenus, which argues that all the citizens are equal because
they have a common mother: “equality of birth (!σογονα) in the
natural order makes us seek equality of rights (!σονοµαν) in the legal”
(239a2-3, trans. Paul Ryan in Cooper 1997). The myth of metals also
contrasts with Protagoras’s myth, in which Zeus gives all cities a
share in justice and political wisdom (Prot. 322d-323a).
14
Cooper points out that reason is assigned “a double job: to know
the truth and to rule (ἄρχειν, 441e4, 442c5). For reason to rule here
takes the form of its deciding on its own authority what is the best
thing to do, issuing injunctions (442c6, ταËτα παρÆγγελλεν), and
seeing to it that the required action is undertaken” (1984, 6; cf. 1977,
152). It should be noted, however, that the other parts also have
secondary jobs: being ruled (appetite) or helping the ruler (spirit).
15
Scholars disagree over whether the argument implies “feminism”
in the sense of some commitment to equal rights for women: Vlastos
1989 argues (qualifiedly) that it does, and Annas 1976 that it doesn’t.
16
Dahl 1991, 820. Dahl argues persuasively that the rule of reason
does not consist in merely choosing in accordance with the agent’s
“overall conception of the good.”
17
See Keyt 2005 for a critical discussion of the ship of state
analogy, which presumes that rationality and virtue are confined to
the rulers. As Keyt shows the steersman (κυβερνÆτης) “was captain,
helmsman, and navigator all rolled into one.” He argues that the point
of the analogy is that just as the steersman knows how to get the
ship’s passengers to its true destination, the philosopher ruler knows
how to get the citizens to the real good.
18
As noted earlier the human ruler is analogous to the divine
intelligent craftsman (δηµιουργÒς) of the Timaeus who looks to an

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unchangeable model (παράδειγµα) in fashioning the sense-perceptible

cosmos (28a-29d). In order for the creation and creator to be as good as
possible, the maker must have been guided by an eternal model, not
one that has come to be (28c5-29a3). Broadie (2004, 76) points out an
analogy with human producers who often take created perceptible
objects as their model: “human makers are at their best and most
godlike (cf. 90b6-c6) if and only if they look instead to the eternal
paradigm of whatever it is they proposed to make.” A product modeled
after a created product is apt to be inferior because the maker may
reproduce characteristics of the model which are inessential or which
were formerly necessary but are now inappropriate. Along similar
lines Sellars 1959 compares the divine craftsman to the soul and
statesman.
19
According to Popper (1966, 107), for Plato, “[t]he criterion of
morality is the interest of the state,” and “the individual is nothing but
a cog (sc. in the state machine)” and hence “ethics is nothing but the
study of how to fit him into the whole” (108; cited by Taylor 1997, 35).
Regarding Bolshevism, Russell comments, “Far closer than any
historical parallel is the parallel of Plato’s Republic…. The Communist
Party corresponds to the guardians; the soldiers have about the same
status in both; there is in Russia an attempt to deal with family life
more or less as Plato suggested” (1949, 28–9).
20
Taylor 1986, 4–5.
21
See Schofield 2000, 218–19 on this controversy.
22
See Taylor 1986, 6–8. Likewise, unabashed modern proponents of
extreme statism are scarce, if only because it is a hard sell. One
suspects that would-be extreme statists often package their ideology
as political organicism.
23
Popper 1966, 76 and 79.
24
The word §ατ°ον (IV.421c4) means “must be let alone” or “given
up.”
25
Demos 1957, 167.
26
Cited by Vlastos 1977, 28, who notes that Popper (1966, 80)
omits “with each other” in his translation of 519e5-520a1. Compare
Laws V.739d7 where the Athenian Stranger claims that in a city in
which property is owned in common, the inhabitants will enjoy
themselves (εÈφραινÒµενοι) (cited by Taylor 1986, 15).
27
Annas 1981, 179.
28
Rawls 1971, 4. Vlastos (1978) argues further that Plato’s
conception of justice implies “rights of persons” although not the sort
of equal human rights espoused by modern liberalism.
29
Taylor (1986, 20) raises a related criticism: “The concept of a
eudaimôn polis seems … to contain a crucial ambiguity.” It can mean
either a city where each citizen considered as an individual is
εÈδαµων (individualistic reading) or a city which is εÈδαµων as a
whole even though its citizens considered as individuals are not
(holistic reading). Taylor regards the apparent incompatibility of these
two readings as a central problem in making sense of the Republic.
30
Cooper 1977, 155.
31
Cooper 1977, 156. Other commentators offer similar inter-
pretations, e.g., Kraut (1992) and Irwin (1977, 237). Cooper is more
explicit in emphasizing the role of maximization. It is not clear what
evidence there is for this interpretation in the Republic, although
it might be suggested by Timaeus 30a1-2: the demiurge “wanted

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everything to be good and nothing to be bad so far as that was

possible.”
32
Platonic justice on Cooper’s interpretation resembles modern
utilitarianism, the view that the rightness of actions involves
maximizing the good however it is distributed. Cohen (1977) raises
some interesting problems for this interpretation. For example, even if
it is granted that the just person should try to transform the per-
ceptible world into a likeness of the rationally ordered Form, does this
entail trying to maximize the total amount of rational order in the
world (utilitarianism) or trying to bring about the most perfect
instance of rational order (perfectionism)? Should the philosopher try
to produce a small amount of nearly perfect order (e.g., in his own
soul) or a greater amount of less perfect order (e.g., in the city)?
33
This problem is related to an objection raised by Bernard
Williams (1973), who contends that Socrates’ argument relies on two
principles: First, “A city is F if and only if its men are F” (cf. Rep.
IV.435e), which Williams calls “the whole-part rule.” Second, “The
explanation of a city’s being F is the same as that of a man’s being F
(the same ε‰δος [Form] of F-ness applies to them both)” (cf. 435b1-2),
which Williams calls “the analogy of meaning.” Williams objects that
these two principles come into conflict when ‘just’ is substituted for ‘F’.
On Plato’s theory of justice, a soul or city is just if, and only if, each of
its parts does its job, and the job of the rational part is to rule over the
two nonrational parts (i.e., the spirited and appetitive). Given the
whole-part rule, the warriors and producers cannot governed by their
rational part because, otherwise, they would belong to the rational
part of the city. But if they are not governed by their rational part, the
warriors and producers, considered as individuals, cannot be just,
given the analogy of meaning.
34
Cooper 1977, 153 n. 7. Cooper notes the repeated references of
knowledge at 428b6, c11, d8, e8, 429a1-3. Cf. Irwin 1995, 323-6;
Bobonich 2002, 43.
35
Vlastos 1977, 28. Vlastos defends the paternalist interpretation.
36
Taylor 1986, 20–1. This interpretation of the passages is
controversial. Other commentators (including Bobonich, Cooper, Irwin,
and Kraut) contend that virtue requires philosophical knowledge in
the Republic. Another passage (VII.518d9-e3) mentions “what are
called the virtues of the soul” which are akin to those of the body
because they are added later “by habit and practice” and contrasts
them with the virtue of reasoning (φρον∞σαι). “What are called”
translates καλοʵεναι, which is sometimes equivalent to “so-called,”
and may suggest that habitual virtue is not really a virtue.
37
Williams 1973, 204.
38
The translation departs from Grube and Reeve, who render
πειθο› κα‹ ἀναγκ˙ as “through persuasion or compulsion.” While not
mistaken, “or” for κα‹ might misleadingly suggest that persuasion and
compulsion are mutually exclusive. The present passage leaves it open
whether the guardians can compel their subjects by persuading them.
For further discussion of this passage, see below in connection with
Policy 5 below. Compare IV.421c1: ἀναγκαστ°ον … κα‹ πειστ°Òν,
quoted in n. 42 below.
39
Reeve (1988, 195–7) suggests that the philosopher rulers are an
elite subclass “spawned” by the complete guardians. Presumably
philosopher rulers would not need to lie to each other.

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40
Popper 1966, 47.
41
See Vlastos 1973, sec 8.
42
This seems to be suggested by IV.421b7-c3: “We must compel and
persuade the auxiliaries and guardians to follow our other policy and
be the best possible craftsmen at their own work, and the same with
all the others.” Here “all the others” (τοÁς ἄλλους ἄπαντας) clearly
refers to the producer class.
43
Vlastos 1977, 20.
44
Taylor 1986, 28 n. 17.
45
Lear (1992) offers a solution to this problem, involving a complex
psychological process of internalization and externalization whereby
the souls of the citizens are adapted to the constitution. In brief, the
philosopher rulers initially internalize the Form of the Good in their
own souls and then externalize it by reshaping the souls of their
subjects, who in turn internalize the appropriate cultural influences.
Although the lower classes continue to be ruled by their nonrational
desires, they are habituated to control these desires and to believe
that it is better for them to share with the rulers the belief that
philosophers should rule (III.389d-e; IV.431d-e, 433c-d).
A problem for this interpretation is that Socrates makes no explicit
provision for moral education of the producers, although he mentions
education (παιδεα) in law of the auxiliaries (IV.429c). He also
contrasts the education of the guardians with that of “cobblers, who
are educated in cobblery” (V.456d10), which according to Taylor
“implies that the producers are confined to a purely technical
education” (Taylor 1986 n. 17; cf. Hourani 1949). But this is an
argument from silence. The passage clearly implies that the producers
are unqualified for the education received by the guardians. It does
not imply that the producers are incapable of any sort of moral
training. Socrates does not rule out all moral education of the
producers. Taylor also makes reference to IV.430b which contrasts the
correct belief of animals and slaves which is not the result of
education, to be inculcated by law, with the political courage of the
auxiliaries involves the latter sort of belief. But again the passage
does not necessarily imply that the producers have only the sort of
belief found in animals and slaves. Socrates makes a vague reference
at III.414d1-5 to having educated the rulers, the soldiers, and “the rest
of the city” (i.e., presumably, the producers), but unfortunately he does
not say anything specific about the form this education took.
46
Brown 2004, 280 and n. 25 lists seven explicit references to
compulsion: VI.500d4-8; VII.519e4, 520a8, 520e2, 521b7, 539e3, and
540b5.
47
Strauss 1964, 51–3; Burnyeat 1985, 36.
48
See II.357b1, 358a3, 360c8, 361d3, 367d3-4, 368c6. Kraut (1992,
313) cites these passages.
49
Kraut offers an eloquent description of the Platonic
transformation: “We must transform our lives by recognizing a
radically different kind of good—the Forms—and we must try to
incorporate these objects into our lives by understanding, loving, and
imitating them, for they are incomparably superior to any other kind
of good we can have…. [Plato] takes the discovery of the Forms to be
momentous because they are the preeminent good we must possess in
order to be happy, and he takes reason to be the most worthwhile
capacity of our soul because it is only through reason that we can

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possess the Forms” (1992, 319). Irwin (1995) and Vernezze (1992) offer
similar solutions.
50
Kraut 1992, 337.
51
Some commentators argue that Socrates only means “compul-
sion” in a weaker sense, e.g., “necessary if they are to fulfill the
requirements of justice” (Irwin 1995, 299). Brown (2000) argues
convincingly that such “deflationary readings of ἀνάγκη” fail because
Socrates is clear that the philosophers prefer not to rule even after
they have been educated. Brown’s essay is a valuable critical overview
of the controversy.
52
Kraut 1992, 337 n. 34.
53
See Cooper 1977, Annas 1981, 266–7, and White 1986.
54
Morrow 1953-4, 9.
55
Dahl 1991, 826.
56
Cooper 1977, 155–6.
57
Cooper 1977, 157. Cooper argues that the just man is neither an
egoist nor an altruist: “Plato’s just man is no egoist, in any acceptable
sense of this term. Not only does he not do everything he does out of
concern for his own good, he never does anything for this reason. Even
where he acts to benefit himself, recognizing that he does so, his
reason for acting is that the good-itself demands it. That his good
demands it is strictly irrelevant. By the same token, at no time does
he act to benefit others out of regard for them and concern for their
good, just because it is theirs. Again, he confers all benefits out of
regard for the good-itself, not out of regard for these more immediate
human beneficiaries … the just man is no egoist, and no altruist
either, but a sort of high-minded fanatic.…” By a “fanatic” Cooper
seems to mean that the just person is a sort of utilitarian, devoted to
maximizing the good itself (see n. 32 above).
58
White 1986 maintains that in agreeing to rule the philosophers
are moved to act contrary to their own interests. This interpretation
carries a high price: the official argument of the Republic collapses.
Dahl (1991, 829 n. 34) contends that “even if Plato does maintain that
a philosopher sacrifices his interests when he chooses to rule, this will
not undermine Plato’s overall defense of justice.” But Socrates’
response to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus has been
seriously compromised by this move.
59
Brown (2000, 9–10) suggests that the reason philosophers agree
to rule is that the law commands them to and they have “a conception
of justice which makes obedience to just laws obligatory.” Hence, “the
law changes the circumstances and thereby alters how much
happiness is available.” A problem with this solution is that it is
unclear how acting justly in this sense makes one happier. Moreover
there is little textual evidence for the legalistic conception of justice in
the Republic, and the legislators’ speech to the philosophers makes no
reference to the law’s command (VII.520a-d).
60
Williams 1973, 204.
61
For example, it is questionable whether Socrates argues in the
way that Williams maintains because Socrates does not actually assert
that the whole-part rule holds for the predicate ‘just’. Williams himself
entertains the possibility that Socrates holds instead that “a city is F
if and only if the leading, most influential, or predominant citizens are
F” (1977, 53). Socrates clearly holds the latter version in the case of
wisdom, and the suggestion is that he also holds it for justice as well.

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On this account only the philosopher-kings possess virtue, including

justice, and the city as a whole is virtuous because its rulers are.
62
See Shields 2001 for an excellent discussion of this point. Shields
distinguishes three sorts of parts: (1) x is an aggregative part of y iff:
(i) x is a portion of y; (ii) x can exist as x after the dissolution of y. For
example, a single brick is an aggregative part of a pile of bricks. (2) x
is an organic part of y iff: (i) x is a portion of y; (ii) x is a functionally
defined entity; and (iii) x is parasitic on y for its identity conditions.
For example, my heart is an organic part of my body. (3) x is a
conceptual part of y iff: (i) x is a portion of y; (ii) x is a not a
functionally defined entity; and (iii) x is parasitic on y for its identity
conditions. For example, the beauty of Helen is a part of her if she is
beautiful. Shields is mainly concerned with the issue of separability. If
the parts of the soul distinguished in Republic Book IV can exist
separately from the whole soul, this would seem to undermine the
proof in Book X that the soul is immortal. Shields argues however that
only aggregative parts are separable, but that the argument of Book
IV is consistent with the soul having merely conceptual parts (a
possibility left open by Socrates’ example of the spinning top example).
Hence, the argument in Book IV does not show that the soul is
composite in a sense which would contradict the claim defended in
Book X that the soul is immortal. As I argue in the main text, Shields’
analysis seems to have an important implication for the parts of the
city as well, although he does not discuss it.
63
As Broadie (2004, 79) observes, “Hyperrealism gives us an intel-
ligible world thick with far more reality than needs to be postulated to
make sense of our universe and of human intellectual endeavours.”
64
Broadie (2004) defends this interpretation. She mentions (78 n.
13) a passage in which the laws are a παράδειγµα for good conduct:
Prot. 326c8.
65
Compare Cooper who describes the Form as “a complex, ordered
whole, whose orderliness is due to the mathematical relationships
holding among its parts” (1977, 155). The craftsman should endeavor
to replicate this kind of order in the sensible world.
66
Burnyeat 1992 offers yet another interpretation, according to
which the model city exists not in the world of Forms but in the world
of imagination. “The whole Republic is an exercise in the art of
persuasion, designed to lead us from here to there. The ideal city is
built in our imagination by persuasive argument, in such a way that
successful persuasion in the world of imagination guarantees the
possibility of success in the actual world.”
67
Popper objects along similar lines: “purely formal information is
all we get. Plato’s Idea of the Good nowhere plays a more direct ethical
or political role …” (1966, 145). “Plato’s Idea of the Good is practically
empty. It gives us no indication of what is good, in a moral sense, i.e.,
what we ought to do” (274).
68
Bobonich argues that the Laws explicitly asserts the compati-
bility of persuasion and compulsion: “none of the lawgivers has ever
reflected on the fact that it is possible to use two means of giving laws,
persuasion and force (πειθο› κα‹ βα).… They have used only the latter;
failing to mix compulsion (ἀνάγκην) with persuasion in their
lawgiving, they have employed unmitigated force alone” (Laws
IV.722b5-c2, trans. Bobonich 2002, 97, adopting Ast’s emendation of
ἁνάγκην for µάχην found in the manuscripts). Compare X.890b-c. The

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 Plato on the Rule of Reason

Athenian Stranger recommends that persuasion be provided by means

of preambles or preludes attached to the laws (723a). The argument
offered in Republic VII.520a-d to persuade the philosophers to serve as
rulers may be viewed as a prototype of the preambles of the Laws.
69
Irwin 1977, 242–3 suggests that Plato “mistakenly suggests” that
the philosopher ruler must be compelled to rule because “he is
influenced by the contemplative view of the philosopher.” It seems true
that the policy proposed by Socrates assumes that the philosopher
values contemplation most highly. But the sort of conflict envisaged by
Plato can arise if the rulers are assumed to be individual agents with
any distinct values of their own.
70
These comments are only meant to be suggestive. I plan to
discuss the rule of law in connection with the rule of reason in Plato’s
later dialogues in a sequel to this paper.
71
This is implicit in Socrates’ argument that women are qualified
to be guardians if they have a philosophical nature (Rep. V.456a).
72
Such an argument for democracy is not uncontroversial. As
Runciman remarks, “Cognitive defences of democracy tend to put the
emphasis on elite forms of representation and a ‘filtering’ of public
opinion, in order to protect political decision-making from the un-
thinking preferences of the general public; as a result, they often
sound distinctly undemocratic” (2004, 20). Runciman considers
possible responses to this objection. The rule of reason would in any
case probably not endorse extreme democracy. It would no doubt
require, for example, provision for an educated and responsible
electorate and constitutional constraints on majority voting.
73
I carried out the research for this essay as a visiting scholar at
the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs at the University
of St. Andrews. I am grateful to John Haldane the Centre Director,
Sarah Broadie, Stephen Halliwell, and Peter Woodruff for their
valuable suggestions. I also benefitted from comments of Eric Brown
and other Spindel Conference participants, especially Timothy Roche.

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