O G C W: Il and As in A Hanging Orld

Energy and Environment Program
Oil and Gas

in a Changing World
2009 Forum on Global Energy, Economy, and Security
Luis Giusti and Joseph A. Stanislaw, Co-chairs
Leonard L. Coburn, Rapporteur

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Published in the United States of America in 2009

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Table of Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Oil and Gas in a Changing World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. The Economic and Energy Future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II. U.S. Policy Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
III. Natural Gas: New Resources and New Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
IV. Regional Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
V. Liquid Fuels for Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendices
Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Foreword
The Aspen Institute organized the first Forum on Global Energy,

Environment and Security in 2005. In recognition of increasingly
globalized energy markets and of the strong links between energy and
national economic and security concerns, an international group of
experts assembles annually to share information on these intersect-
ing issues. A dialogue format is used to encourage new, collaborative,
cross-disciplinary thinking on issues of national and global impor-
tance. A few brief presentations begin each half-day session, but the
majority of the time is reserved for discussion. An informal atmo-
sphere and a not-for-attribution rule encouraged candid exchanges
and creative thinking.
The topic in 2009 was “Oil and Gas in a Changing World,” reflect-
ing the turmoil caused by the severe economic recession and highly
volatile oil and gas prices. The Forum co-chairs were Luis Giusti,
Senior Advisor to CSIS and former Chairman and CEO of Petroléos
de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA); and Joseph A. Stanislaw, independent
senior advisor to Deloitte LLP, CEO of The JAStanislaw Group, and
former CEO of Cambridge Energy Research Associates. Their many
years at the center of U.S. and global energy and security policy dis-
cussions allowed them to pose relevant questions and draw out key
insights. The highly qualified group of speakers provided a wealth of
information and a variety of perspectives, and the diverse expertise
of the participants contributed substantially to the richness of the
dialogue.
v
Oil and Gas in a Changing World
On behalf of the Institute and the Forum participants, I thank

the Forum sponsors – ExxonMobil, Aramco Services Company,
The Chrysler Foundation, ConocoPhillips, and Toyota – for their
financial support. Without their generosity and commitment to our
work, the Forum could not have taken place.
I also thank Leonard Coburn, who served as rapporteur. His

extensive knowledge of energy enabled him to understand and cap-
ture the highlights of a wide-ranging discussion in this summary
report. The dedicated efforts of Timothy Olson, whose efficient han-
dling of the administrative arrangements once again contributed to a
pleasant and smoothly run Forum, are also gratefully acknowledged.
This report is issued under the auspices of the Aspen Institute, and
neither the Forum speakers, participants, nor sponsors are respon-
sible for its contents. Although it is an attempt to represent views
expressed during the Forum, opinions were often not unanimous
and participants were not asked to agree to the wording.
John A. Riggs
Senior Fellow
6
Oil and Gas
in a Changing World
Leonard L. Coburn
Rapporteur
A dramatic economic downturn and extreme price volatility in

energy markets characterized the past year. Unprecedented price
fluctuations led to investor uncertainty. This price instability made
it difficult for policy makers to determine optimal economic, ener-
gy, environmental, and transportation policies.
Oil prices gyrated, rising to $147.50 per barrel in July 2008, fall-
ing 75 percent to $35.00 per barrel in December 2008, and then
doubling to $70.00 by July 2009. Natural gas prices were similarly
volatile. The economic downturn led to reduced demand for crude
oil and natural gas — a dramatic change from the high-price, high-
growth scenarios discussed at the 2008 Global Energy Forum.
Expectations are that after 2010 global oil demand will increase
in emerging markets but not in developed countries. Whether sup-
ply will keep up with demand is an open question. The economic
turndown led to oil demand destruction, and many oil development
projects were deferred. In the next five years, robust oil demand and
reduced supplies could lead to the next volatile oil price cycle.
Volatile prices and uncertain demand raise questions about the

willingness of OPEC to make the necessary investments. Access to
oil reserves is another serious issue, and above-ground geopolitical
and financial issues as much as the adequacy of reserves make addi-
tional production difficult and uncertain.
1
A different way to affect the price of oil is to demand less. More

fuel-efficient cars and alternative fuels hold great promise, but their
rate of market penetration may not be adequate to offset the near-
term impact of uncertain oil supplies.
A bright spot in the American picture is natural gas, thanks to

the dramatically increased development of gas from shale. Recent
high gas prices and technology developments in hydraulic fracturing
and horizontal drilling led to an explosion in production and much
higher reserve estimates, contributing to lower prices. Increased
domestic supply and lower prices may lead to a greater use of natu-
ral gas as a bridge to non-carbon fuels in electric power generation.
Policy makers are struggling to decrease the use of oil and gaso-
line through a variety of costly but promising mandates — new
CAFE standards, enhanced biofuels standards, stronger demand
side efficiency standards, and possible new CO2 emission limits.
These changes could undermine the upward pressure on oil prices
and lead to a future with less price volatility.
The impact of volatility in energy markets and the kind of eco-

nomic recovery likely to take place will affect regional energy mar-
kets. Russian oil production is not likely to rebound beyond its 2007
peak of 10 million bpd. Central Asia and the Caucasus will experi-
ence strong production growth in the near future.
Future oil development in the Middle East will be cautious.

Capacity additions are uncertain, although Saudi Arabia continues
to increase capacity from 10 million barrels per day (bpd) to 12
million bpd. Oil and gas development in Latin America varies by
country, with Brazil developing its offshore oil reserves, Colombia
apparently back on track with increased oil production, and Mexico
and Venezuela experiencing political problems that are undermining
investment and reducing production, despite substantial resources.
The future of the U.S. automotive industry is as volatile as energy

markets. In 2007, 16 million automobiles and light duty trucks were
sold in the U.S. In 2008, only 9.5 million were sold. Two companies
entered bankruptcy and emerged dramatically changed.
2
A multi-pronged policy approach is essential for the world and

the U.S. to cope with problems associated with future economic
and energy growth. A focus on supply or demand alone will be
inadequate. Broader policies encompassing energy, environment
and transportation are crucial for rational economic and political
solutions.
3
I. The Economic and Energy Future
A. Economic Volatility, Global Recovery or a Lost Decade?
The worldwide scope of the financial crisis is unprecedented.

Global production is still declining, but increasing consumer con-
sumption, national and local spending increases, inventory rebuild-
ing, renewed demand for industrial materials and growth in emerg-
ing markets are starting to signal expanded growth.
The downturn varied greatly among regions. In the U.S., real

GDP fell by more than six percent in early 2009 followed by increas-
ing levels of unemployment reaching 9.5 percent in July 2009.
Western Europe’s decline was even deeper. Most Western European
countries are experiencing their deepest recessions of the postwar
period due in part to banks’ high leverage and exposure to Eastern
Europe. Exports, often the mainstay of many Western European
economies, and business investment are plunging. Home prices are
falling. Recovery in Western Europe will be sluggish and uneven.
Emerging Europe faces staggering challenges due to the drying up

of foreign borrowing that fueled past expansions. Social and political
unrest is a reality as citizens take to the streets in protest over lack of
jobs and stringent new government measures.
Asia is not immune to the global economic turmoil. China, India

and Indonesia are growing at lower levels than 2008, while the rest of
Asia is in recession. While finances are strong for most Asian coun-
5
tries, export dependence remains a serious problem. Government

stimulus packages were used to substitute for export growth. Due
to their success, Asia is leading the world’s recovery. While Western
Europe and North America had larger GDPs in 2008, Asia will be the
world’s top producer by 2018. The American consumer, the major
economic force leading past recoveries, will not lead this recovery
due to a retrenchment of spending to rebalance household accounts.
Of three scenarios for world growth, the most optimistic is “global

recovery,” reaching 4 percent real GDP growth by 2012 and then
flattening out through the rest of the decade. A second scenario
is “lost decade,” with real GDP growth reaching only 2.5 percent
by 2014 and declining to 2 percent or less through 2020. The last
scenario is “volatile future,” with real GDP fluctuating between 5
percent and 1.5 percent for the decade.
B. Energy Volatility — Too Much of a Good Thing?
The recession led to a decline of global oil demand by 2.5 to 3 mil-

lion barrels per day from 2007 to 2008. Through the early months
of 2009, oil demand was still falling, although the pace of the decline
was starting to slow.
For 2010 and beyond, demand growth is very dependent upon the
pace of the economic recovery. Demand in emerging markets will
continue to grow; however, there will be little or no early growth in
developed countries.
Assuming crude oil demand will rebound, a critical unknown is

the medium-term supply response. Volatile prices, demand destruc-
tion and high production costs since 2004 led to significant project
deferrals — up to 7.6 million barrels per day are at risk over the next
five years. Robust oil demand recovery along with reduced supplies
could lead to another upward oil price spiral. Demand may increase
by 25 percent over the next twenty years, from 84 to 104 million
barrels per day, based on the 2008 World Energy Outlook of the
International Energy Agency (IEA). Where will the additional supply
come from? Non-OPEC conventional oil supplies are peaking and
6
OTilheand
Economic
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orld
will decline in the future. Worldwide unconventional oil produc-

tion and natural gas liquids will continue to increase. Conventional
oil production expansion will have to come from OPEC. Will Saudi
Arabia and other OPEC members such as Iraq and Iran expand their
production?
Normal oil field depletion rates average 4.5 percent per year. In
2007, production totaled 70.2 million bpd; by 2030, applying this
depletion rate, existing production will decline to 30.2 million bpd.
To meet the 103.8 million bpd of demand expected by 2030, new
oil production capacity of 45 million bpd will be needed. (Natural
gas liquids and non-conventional oil are projected to supply 28.6
million bpd.) The required new crude oil production capacity is 43
percent of projected 2030 oil supply — a serious supply challenge.
International oil companies (IOCs) have full access to only seven

percent of oil and gas reserves; national oil companies (NOCs)
control 85 percent, of which 73 percent have no equity position.
Russian companies control the remaining 8 percent. Of the top 25
oil and gas reserve holders, only six are IOCs, with a total of less
than five percent of total oil reserves. The investment philosophies
of the NOCs diverge sharply. Some countries such as Saudi Arabia
are investing heavily for the future, relying on the best technology
available and using the skills of the IOCs to their maximum advan-
tage. Others, such as Mexico and Venezuela, actually are disinvest-
ing. Both are diverting oil revenues to meet social needs without
adequately reinvesting in their oil wealth to ensure an adequate
future revenue stream.
By 2020 about 20 percent of U.S. supply is expected to come from

Canadian oil sands and another 20 percent from the Middle East.
If U.S. imports of oil from Canadian oil sands are limited due to
concern about greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (by some estimates
GHG emissions from oil sands production are five times those
from conventional oil), the consequences will be enormous. With
about 25 percent of U.S refinery capacity geared to heavier crude
oils, refiners are worried about shortages of these oils. If oil from oil
sands is limited, what will replace it?
7
Another key driver of oil prices is global drilling costs. Over the
last six years these costs more than doubled. While some of these
costs are declining, they are not returning to 2004 levels. Some costs
are cyclical, such as steel pipe. Others are structural, with more and
more oil reserve replacements coming from more difficult reserves.
Higher prices are required to develop these reserves. This leads to
the question of the longer term direction of oil prices. If oil sands are
the highest cost production, then they should set the long run price
of oil. Environmental concerns should be factored into the cost.
This would justify an oil price in the range of $60 to $70 per barrel.
A resumption of volatile and ever-increasing prices is likely. In

the near term, oil market fundamentals are weak: declining demand,
high inventory, and high OPEC spare capacity. For the medium
term, reduced supplies caused by less investment may set the stage
for the next upward price cycle. For the long term, the oil balance
is likely to tighten due to strong emerging market demand growth,
rising depletion rates for existing production, constrained resource
access, and a shift to higher costs.
C. The Role of Futures Markets
Futures markets play an important role in price determination

since many supply contracts are linked to futures prices. Some have
argued that speculation has been an important element in higher
energy prices. Others have found that speculators play an important
role in counter-trades but have not influenced the price signifi-
cantly. One way to test this argument is through an analysis of how
futures markets work and who participates.
Participation in futures markets by investors rather than oil

industry participants goes back to the 1980s, when oil prices plunged
to $10 per barrel. Many investors realized that oil as a commodity
could be a good investment and bought futures contracts. The year
2000 was viewed by many as the start of the commodity bull market
– a strong rise in the level of activity and the entry of different types
of participants. Previously financial firms, funds, and investors were
8
OTilheand
Economic
Gas in aand
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Energy W
Future
orld
responsible for only about one quarter of activity — known as open

interest. By 2006 this grew to more than half of the open interest.
This is evidence that the futures market no longer was viewed only
as a way to hedge against price volatility, but could be used as an
investment vehicle where price volatility was necessary for investors
to earn a return. The financials, funds and investors decided to invest
directly in the commodity rather than invest in oil companies.
This strategy was increasingly adopted as oil prices strengthened

and reached their peak in July 2008. On one exchange, open interest
more than doubled from 2005 to July 2008. As prices peaked, open
interest peaked and started its rapid decline, but not as sharply as
oil prices. While oil prices plunged about 75 percent, open interest
fell only 21 percent and then rebounded. Based on the open interest
level and activity, a $60 price for oil looks more realistic than either
the high of $147 or the low of $35. The lack of any significant differ-
ence in the identity of commercial and non-commercial participants
led futures markets observers to conclude that speculation was not
responsible for the rapid movements in oil prices.
D. Energy Efficiency — Changing the Energy Future
Oil prices are likely to increase due to supply constraints and

growing demand, but there are ways to slow demand. To achieve
significant reductions through energy efficiency, the U.S. will have
to overcome several market failures and market barriers. One is the
failure to take into account externalities — the costs of using the fuel
that are not reflected in its price. Pollution is a primary example.
Proposed actions to price CO2 emissions may change this. The risk
of price shocks due to disruptions in oil prices is another externality.
While the U.S. government takes steps to reduce these risks, the costs
are not reflected in the price of oil.
Another market failure derives from how consumers perceive

their role. For example, a building owner is more likely than renters
to install insulation, more efficient windows or appliances, program-
mable thermostats or low-flow showerheads. Both the owner and the
9
renter are engaging in rational economic behavior, but the result for
the energy use and GHG emissions is quite different.
There is little understanding of how consumers view energy use or

how to implement more fuel efficient technology even if it is offered.
A consumer seeking a car has a large array of choices. Most consum-
ers consider design, power, cost, and safety well before fuel economy
or other operating costs such as regular or premium fuel. As a result,
there is little consumer demand more fuel efficient cars today.
Another option for oil demand reduction is the electrification of

vehicles. Transportation relies on oil for about 96 percent of its fuel,
and about two thirds of all oil used in the U.S. is for transportation.
To achieve major reductions in this oil use by electrification, the
U.S. would have to shift to plug-in hybrids or electric only vehicles
in a significant way. The fuel used to generate the electricity matters
in terms of CO2 emissions.
A recent study by The National Academies on another fuel-

switching option estimated that by 2035 about twenty-five percent
of gasoline can be replaced by liquid fuels from biomass. About 700
million tons of dry waste per year (corn stover, grasses, and other
biomass waste) can be accumulated in the U.S. for conversion into
liquid fuel. In 2035, about 1.7 million barrels per day of cellulosic
ethanol could be produced if oil were between $60 and $100 per bar-
rel. At that price, about 2.3 million barrels per day of cellulosic and
corn ethanol together could be produced. If a mixture of coal and
biomass were used to produce liquids, a total of about 2.5 million
barrels of biomass liquids per day, or one quarter of U.S. gasoline
consumption, could be produced. These fuels would compete with
each other, and the estimates are not additive. In no situation, the
study concludes, could one half of gasoline consumption be pro-
duced from biomass, as some proponents have estimated. Other
options, such as the production of biofuels from algae, which is not
yet commercially viable, hold promise, and public policy must be
careful not to pick winners prematurely.
10
II. U.S. Policy Choices
A. U.S. Energy Policy — A History of Unfulfilled Promises
Beginning with President Richard Nixon, U.S. energy policy

focused on reducing American vulnerability to foreign oil suppli-
ers. The goal of Nixon’s 1973 “Project Independence” was energy
self-sufficiency by 1980. President Gerald Ford, succeeding Nixon
in 1973, continued with the goal of oil self-sufficiency. Their plan
posited that the U.S. could become a net exporter of oil by 1985 if
federal onshore and offshore oil resources were developed.
President Jimmy Carter vowed that starting in 1979 America

would never import more oil than it did in 1977 and that by the end
of the 1980s the U.S. would cut its reliance on foreign oil by one-half.
The Carter plan assumed that the world was running out of oil and
that the U.S. must rely more on conservation, efficiency, and renew-
able energy.
President Ronald Reagan’s first official act as President in 1981

was to sign an Executive Order eliminating oil price and allocation
controls, which began in the Nixon era, were continued by Ford, and
were set on a path for elimination by Carter. This action rationalized
the U.S. oil market, releasing pent up demand for development of
U.S. resources. Oil prices peaked in 1981 and continued to decrease
throughout the 1980s. Reagan’s strategy was to rely more heavily
on the market than on government actions, reducing or eliminat-
11
ing many synthetic fuels, conservation and renewable energy pro-

grams. He reversed the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act
that had limited the use of natural gas and began to fill the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (established under President Nixon) to protect
against oil market disruptions. Reacting to $10 oil prices in 1986,
Reagan issued a new energy plan focused on enhancing “Energy
Security” by expanding domestic oil production.
President George H. W. Bush continued many of the Reagan era

policies; however, the Comprehensive Energy Policy Act of 1992 also
addressed many issues in the electric power industry and established
an alternate fuels program for vehicles. The Clean Air Act (CAA)
Amendments of 1990 increased regulation on stationary air polluters
to reduce smog and instituted the first federal cap and trade system
to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions causing acid rain.
President William J. Clinton’s energy policy focused largely on

efficiency standards and renewable energy. They also had a strong
environmental component — the Kyoto climate change treaty was
signed but not ratified during the Clinton years.
Under President George W. Bush, energy policy reverted to

more reliance on market mechanisms. Two major energy bills were
enacted during his administration. The Renewable Fuel Standard
(RFS) passed in 2005 required the use of 4 billion gallons of ethanol
in gasoline in 2006, increasing to 7.5 billion by 2012, or about 4.5
percent of gasoline consumption. The bill also introduced tax incen-
tives for more fuel efficient vehicles and removed some restrictions
on domestic oil and gas drilling.
In 2007 overall CAFE standards were raised for the first time since
the 1970s. The fleet-wide standard — for cars and light duty trucks
— was increased to 35 miles per gallon (mpg) by 2020. The RFS was
increased to 36 billion gallons per year by 2022, with increasing use
of cellulosic ethanol from 2013 onward. Incentives were provided for
hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles.
Despite 25 years of policies aimed at increasing domestic pro-

duction and reducing consumption and imports, consumption of
12
Oil and Gas in U.S.
a Changing
Policy CWhoices
orld
oil increased (from 17.3 million bpd in 1973 to 19.8 million bpd in
2008), domestic production decreased (from 10.9 million bpd in
1973 to 7.5 million bpd in 2008), and imports increased (from 6.4
million bpd in 1973 to 12.3 million bpd in 2008). A bright spot has
been the decline in energy intensity. In large part as a result of higher
energy prices, the U.S. now uses less than one half of the energy it
used in 1980 to produce a unit of GDP.
During this period U.S. energy policy was heavily influenced by

national security and economic considerations. Today reducing CO2
emissions is as important an objective of energy policy as nation-
al security. Policies developed to fight global warming through
improved fuel efficiency and alternative renewable energy sources
also will enhance national security by reducing oil consumption and
oil imports.
President Barack Obama has proposed to re-order U.S. energy

priorities, with climate change, energy efficiency, renewable energy
and advanced vehicle technologies receiving greater emphasis than
oil and gas production. Energy policies are important to his environ-
mental concerns since they can change how we produce and con-
sume energy and move the nation towards a clean energy economy.
There is renewed focus on energy efficiency standards and renewable
energy, and a strong effort to reduce liquid fuel use in transportation
through higher CAFE requirements and electrification of vehicles.
B. The U.S. and Climate Change — Policy and Politics
The centerpiece of President Obama’s energy and environmental

plan is cap and trade legislation. Stationary-source industries would
buy permits to emit CO2 — permits would be auctioned off and
tradable. The auction would provide billions for government to
compensate low income consumers, allocate money for renewable
energy, fund energy R&D, or other purposes.
The initial strategy in the House of Representatives was to amass

enough votes from the majority Democrats and bring along enough
Republicans to pass the legislation. Negotiations in the Energy and
13
Commerce Committee focused largely on winning the support of

Members from states with coal-burning utilities and smokestack
industries. The Waxman/Markey bill passed by the Committee alters
the Obama goals by seeking a 17 percent reduction of CO2 emissions
by 2020 rather than 20 percent. It also changes the cost allocation
by initially giving away 85 percent of the emissions permits in order
to reduce the price impact on certain hard-hit industries or their
consumers. The bill would also mandate a 15 percent renewable
portfolio standard in 2020, down from 20 percent in the Obama
plan. Gas industry representatives argue that the bill does not take
into account the recently recognized abundance of domestic natural
gas, prolonging the life of coal plants despite the fact that gas emits
50 percent less CO2 than coal.
There were also concessions to farm state Members. Farm inter-

ests wanted the Department of Agriculture (USDA) rather than the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to have jurisdiction over
the program allowing an emitter to invest in domestic agricultural
projects to “offset” CO2. USDA was viewed as more likely than EPA
to approve these offsets.
One of the major concerns about the bill is the provision of 1.5 bil-
lion tons of international offsets. These offsets could account for up
to 25 percent of total U.S. emissions of six billion tons per year. Not
only are there questions about whether such offsets would be verifi-
able, good projects are scarce. The European Union has not come
close to using 1.5 billion tons of international offsets over an entire
decade. While environmental and other groups wanted a hard cap on
emissions, others saw the use of offsets as a way to add flexibility. The
bill’s sponsors made the concessions to move the legislation along.
While many observers view the bill as too weak, it would mark
the first serious federal government effort to tackle climate change.
It also may be the limit of what is currently politically possible, and
many observers expect the Senate to weaken the bill further. Others
note that whatever is achieved, it is likely to be only the first effort,
with successive efforts imposing more stringent targets that are more
difficult to achieve.
14
Oil and Gas in U.S.
a Changing
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orld
Some opponents of a cap-and-trade approach prefer a carbon

tax. Like cap and trade, a carbon tax placed on CO2 emissions can
achieve specific emission reduction goals if adjusted periodically.
It can be administratively efficient by focusing on larger stationary
facilities that emit GHG. Many think that a carbon tax is more pre-
dictable and its costs more transparent. Like the auction revenues
under cap and trade, the tax revenue can be used to reduce the
burden on heavily impacted consumers, returned to the economy
by reduction in other taxes, used for incentives for new technology,
or applied to deficit reduction. Similarly, tax credits can be used for
offset projects and can more easily be made to comply with world
trade rules. A major political drawback of the carbon tax is the use of
the word “tax.” Perhaps the euphemism “refundable emissions fee”
might placate these concerns.
C. The Ethanol Mandate — It’s Not Easy Being Green
The 2005 and 2007 energy legislation introduced and expanded

the requirement to use ethanol as a substitute for petroleum trans-
portation fuels. The mandates were actively supported by the corn
producers, since almost all ethanol today is made from corn, but
actively resisted by the oil industry. Ethanol today represents about
7.2 percent of gasoline supply. The legislative mandate requires 36
billion gallons to be produced in 2022, which will comprise about 25
percent of gasoline supplies
Currently most ethanol is blended with gasoline at a 10 percent

ethanol-90 percent gasoline ratio or less. The 10 percent ethanol limit
is called the “blend wall.” Today’s vehicles are built to accommodate
this limit. Flex-fuel vehicles are produced that can use E-85 — 85
percent ethanol and 15 percent gasoline — but fewer than 2,000 of
the more than 100,000 service stations sell E-85. When the ethanol
mandates were enacted, it was assumed that up to 15 billion gallons
of ethanol per year could be accommodated easily with stable gasoline
demand. With the increase in gasoline prices between 2004 and 2008,
the higher costs associated with using more ethanol easily could be
included in the price of gasoline. But gasoline demand fell in the latter
15
half of 2008 and is continuing to fall in 2009. The RFS is volumetric,

not a percentage of the gasoline supply. As demand drops and ethanol
production increases, more ethanol is available than can be blended.
Also, with gasoline prices falling and ethanol production costs
remaining relatively high, the RFS poses economic costs on refiners.
What happens to ethanol production once the blend wall limit

is reached? Will marketers increase their production of E-85? Will
more stations put in E-85 pumps? Will manufacturers produce
more flex-fuel vehicles? Will they cover ethanol blends of more
than 10 percent under their warranties, or modify their vehicles to
accommodate higher blend ratios?
These and other policy questions raised in this section are critical
to the long-term success of the American economy. There is some
opinion today that the current policy making process is dysfunc-
tional. In the Executive Branch there are thirteen agencies with some
authority over energy. In Congress twenty-six committees and sub-
committees have some jurisdiction. Moreover, the time horizons of
the political process and industry differ substantially. The oil and gas
industry plans for 10 to 35 years or more. The political time horizon
is often two to six years. This mismatch can result in policy changes
that can jeopardize long-term investments. Solving the problems of
energy policy making also requires dramatic changes in consumer
behavior. There are serious deficiencies with education and infor-
mation that must be overcome if the nation is to move forward in a
progressive and productive manner.
A suggestion was made to remove energy policy making from

the political process as much as possible. The Federal Reserve was
discussed as one model. An independent agency could be created
with a Board of Governors that can act on a long-term basis. Experts
would staff the agency with a mandate to act in the best interests of
the nation. Another suggestion was to use something similar to the
military base closing commission, where the recommendations must
be voted on without amendment. But there was a general feeling that
dramatic change would be difficult, and that the American system of
democracy was better than any other system, despite all of its failings.
16
III. Natural Gas — New Resources
and New Thinking
A. Natural Gas — Missing an Opportunity
U.S. production of gas from shale has increased rapidly in recent

years. Increasing production is occurring through direct investment
by the industry, without any new government incentives or new
access to federal lands.
Over a 10-year period, production in the Barnett shale gas basin

in and around Fort Worth, Texas increased over 3,000 percent,
from 94 million to about 3.5 billion cubic feet per day (Bcfd). Other
fields, such as Fayetteville in Louisiana, Haynesville in Louisiana
and Texas, and Arkoma Woodford in Texas and Oklahoma, are all
showing similar signs of increased production. Marcellus basin, in
West Virginia, Pennsylvania and New York, is expected to be next.
All the basins in the lower 48 states are located under or near major
gas pipelines, leading to lower development costs.
Between 2006 and 2009, U.S. natural gas resource estimates

increased significantly, primarily due to increased availability of eco-
nomic shale gas resources.
Better technology allows economic production of a vastly greater

resource base. Improved hydraulic fracturing techniques and great-
ly improved horizontal drilling allow tight, geographically diffuse
reserves to be developed. Producers estimate the top seven basins will
17
Figure 1
U.S. Natural Gas Resource Estimates
Year Total Shale Gas Years of production
2006 1,530 Tcf 137 Tcf 82

2009 2,074 Tcf 616 Tcf 100+
% change 35 % 350 %
Source: Potential Gas Committee, Potential Supply of Natural Gas
in the United States, June 2009
Between 2006 and 2009, U.S. natural gas resource estimates increased signifi-
cantly, primarily due to increased availability of economic shale gas resources.
produce from 27 to 39 Bcfd upon full development. Thanks largely to

the enhanced expectations for shale gas, domestic natural gas produc-
tion is estimated to grow from about 55 to close to 90 Bcfd, a growth
of 35 Bcfd, the energy equivalent of 42 percent of expected vehicle fuel
use or 50 percent of electricity generation from coal in 2030.
Strong demand with a stable price in the $6-7 per thousand cubic
feet (Mcf) range is necessary for continued shale gas development.
A critical issue confronting the industry is the ability to continue
using hydraulic fracturing. The tight formations require fracturing
to allow the gas to flow (See Figure 2), and some concerns have been
raised about high-pressure fracturing. The concerns focus on pol-
luting underground aquifers because the liquids used to fracture the
rock could seep through the cracked rock and cause contamination.
Producers and other experts are confident, however, that careful
development and existing regulation can prevent harm.
Analysis of U.S. natural gas must consider liquid natural gas

(LNG). The focus of discussion nationally shifted as the domestic
LNG industry matured from the need for permits for new gasifi-
cation facilities in the U.S. to how the gas market functions and
whether price manipulation occurs. So far the price for LNG in the
U.S. is within an acceptable range and is competitive, undermining
arguments about price manipulation.
18
Natural Gas: ONilewand
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Gas in a and
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hinking
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Figure 2
Production of Gas from Shale
Source: Navigant Consulting Inc. 2009
Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling release natural gas from tight formations
found far below drinking water aquifers.
Global LNG prices are more volatile because they are reacting
to too much or too little supply. Also, where LNG and natural gas
prices are linked to oil prices, they followed oil’s recent volatility. In
2009, world natural gas prices settled to less than $5 per million BTU
(1 million BTU ≈ 1 Mcf). The problem for most gas markets is that
with weak and uneven economic growth and weak oil demand, it is
difficult to discern a price pattern.
Natural gas prices, however, behave differently in different regions.

In Asia, where gas demand overall was only 27 Bcfd in 2007, high
prices in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan led to more efforts to con-
trol demand growth. China is seeking new supplies and is building
a new pipeline to connect with natural gas rich Central Asia. These
efforts are having some success in altering supply and demand pat-
terns. Prices in Asia are still linked to oil prices; however, the reliance
19
on more pipeline gas eventually may lead to a decoupling from oil.
In Europe 90 percent of natural gas is delivered by pipeline. More

LNG import capacity is being built to lessen dependence upon pipe-
line gas. LNG capacity will almost double by 2010 (from 10 Bcfd to
19 Bcfd), while pipeline delivery capacity will increase only ten per-
cent (29 Bcfd to 32 Bcfd). This additional capacity is necessary since
any new supplies will have to be imported. Domestic production is
stagnant — 28 Bcfd in 2007 vs. 29 Bcfd in 2010. By 2020 and after, a
substantial amount of new pipeline capacity is being planned from
Russia, from North Africa and from the Caspian/Middle East. The
Nabucco Pipeline delivering gas from Iraq, Azerbaijan and Central
Asia is viewed as an alternative to natural gas from Russia.
Natural gas flows from Algeria and Norway continue without

disruption. Russia is bearing the brunt of the decline in demand due
to its high prices and European fear of over-dependence on Russia.
In 2010, Asia/Pacific LNG production of 13 Bcfd will continue
and be supplemented by 3 Bcfd from the Middle East/Gulf region.
European LNG demand of 6 Bcfd will be met from Middle East/
Gulf, Africa and Caribbean production. This leaves about 11 Bcfd of
LNG production for the Atlantic basin that could move into North
America or Europe depending upon prices.
In North America, LNG import capacity will increase from 5.0

Bcfd in 2007 to 16.8 Bcfd by 2010. Too much capacity will be avail-
able; only about 33 to 45 percent of it will be utilized in 2010. Since
there is a strong incentive to maintain natural gas production due to
the large sunk capital costs in the LNG chain and strong prices for
natural gas liquids, gas in the Atlantic will be plentiful and subject
to arbitrage. It will go to the market with the greatest incentive to
buy the gas for storage and eventual consumption. In this arbitrage
market, North America, with its relatively abundant storage capac-
ity, will play a critical role.
How much LNG can the North American market absorb? Will
LNG become an important part of the U.S. energy mix, especially
in light of the dramatic increase in shale gas production? Will it be
20
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part of the base load or will it be the marginal gas supply? Will it
hold the price of natural gas down and limit the production of gas
from shale?
Answers depend on the price of natural gas in the U.S. If natural

gas is at $6-7 per Mcf, everyone will produce natural gas and LNG
will be competitive. If the price is lower, then it will be difficult to
sort out the role for LNG and shale gas. Abundant LNG will be pro-
duced, but whether it will come to North America will depend on
prices in North America relative to Asia and Europe.
Another question for the LNG market is where new large capac-
ity will come from in the next twenty years? Will Russia and Iran
become major LNG producers in the future? Iran is looking at LNG,
but its internal problems overwhelm any effort to develop an LNG
industry. Russia is just entering the LNG market; however, its focus
still is on pipelines.
B. Climate Policy — Gas Is Missing from the Solution
With such high levels of natural gas resources, what role will gas
play once the U.S. imposes a price on CO2 emissions? Historically,
cheap and plentiful coal dominated U.S. electric power generation.
In the 1970s nuclear became a fuel of choice for new capacity addi-
tions as the nation diversified its generation mix. Since 1999, more
natural gas capacity has been added than any other fuel due to its
abundance and capital cost advantage. More recently some renew-
able energy entered the mix.
Even before the 2008-09 recession, electricity demand growth was

slowing. Based on Energy Information Administration (EIA) pro-
jections, which do not assume future policy changes, it will continue
to do so. From 2000 to 2007 electricity demand grew at 1.1 percent
per year. The projections for growth to 2030 are even lower — 0.9
percent per year. Expectations are that by 2030 generation capacity
will be only 25 percent above today’s levels.
21
The EIA projects that the mix in fuels will change substantially
between now and 2030. Coal will continue to fall from its high
of 58 percent of total generation to under 45 percent. Natural gas
will increase its share to about 20 percent. Renewable energy, pri-
marily wind and biomass, will have the strongest growth, from 8
percent of today’s generation (including hydro) to 16 percent in
2030. Renewables will meet 44 percent of total electricity generation
growth between now and 2030. Nuclear will add some new genera-
tion, but its total share will decline a little to less than 20 percent of
total capacity.
In a study that does anticipate climate policy changes, the EIA

projects that fuel choice will play out differently in three different
competitive arenas: old versus old facilities, new versus new, and old
versus new. The four key factors that will determine the outcome of
these competitions are capital costs, fuel costs, climate policies, and
wild cards.
The capital costs of all energy projects increased significantly over

the last three years. New coal and nuclear capital costs increased the
fastest. Higher capital costs favor existing plants and less capital-
intensive new plants. In fuel costs, natural gas prices increased much
faster than coal prices, increasing interest in other technologies.
Placing a value on CO2 will raise the price for all fossil fuels. Coal will
be the most heavily affected; natural gas will be affected much less.
In the competition among fuels, a levelized cost analysis (capital

and operating costs) indicates that it would take a much higher
value on CO2 to discourage running an existing coal-fired plant than
to discourage the construction of a new one. With natural gas prices
of $5 per Mcf or less, however, no matter what the CO2 value is, new
natural gas plants are always more cost effective than either new or
old coal plants. New renewable energy or nuclear plants would be
more desirable than new or old coal plants with CO2 values of $20
per ton or more. CO2 values would have to increase to $50-60 per
ton before new renewable energy and nuclear plants would be more
desirable than new or old natural gas plants with natural gas prices
22
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between $5 and $13 per Mcf. The wild cards are potential policy
developments such as the elimination of subsidies for renewable
energy or problems in licensing and building new nuclear power
plants.
This analysis indicates that in all scenarios one impact of climate

change legislation on the future mix of electric power will be less
coal used in 2030. The level of reductions will depend upon the
rigor of the policies. Renewable technologies, especially biomass
and wind, will increase in all scenarios. Biomass is particularly
important, starting out with co-firing and then shifting to dedicated
plants using energy crops. Natural gas use is important but will
become much more so if nuclear, biomass and carbon capture and
storage all run into trouble. If the introduction of these options is
constrained, electricity prices will be higher, overall demand will
decline, and natural gas use will accelerate.
23
24
IV. Regional Issues
A. Russia in the Doldrums; Central Asia Rising
Russia’s oil production increased steadily from 2000 and reached

its peak in October 2007, with production slightly over 9.9 million
bpd. Since then its production trended down for most of 2008 into
2009. The growth was due to a change in the political and economic
environment with the election of President Putin in 2000 and to the
use of western technology to improve the management of old West
Siberian oil fields. Production declined as Russia’s and the world’s
economy turned sharply downward in 2008.
The 2008 dip raised alarms throughout the world as many saw
it as the start of a long-term trend. A closer examination revealed
that Russia’s tax environment was undermining all incentives to
produce more oil. The combination of the mineral extraction tax
and the export duty along with the profit tax was taking more than
90 percent of the marginal revenue generated by exporting crude
oil. The export duty was based on the oil price two months earlier.
Since oil prices were falling precipitously, exporters actually were
losing money by producing and exporting oil. Production was shut
in. Later in 2008, the government altered the calculation of the duty
to look back only one month, making exports marginally profitable
once again. Despite these changes, production continued falling.
25
Falling production now was the result of lower capital invest-

ments, which declined by 30 to 50 percent as the Russian GDP fell
by double digits. By mid 2009 production started to increase again,
mostly because production costs denominated in rubles fell as a
result of ruble depreciation.
Major problems remain in West Siberia as the old fields rapidly

decline despite new technology. The resurgence in production is
coming from new areas, such as Timan Pechora in the north or
in East Siberia. These new fields and the Sakhalin fields will be the
future success story for Russia.
Forecasts for Russian production show a small increase to about

10 million bpd, but the large number of variables (economic
recovery, taxation, infrastructure development, oil prices, export
demand) suggest it could go either way. There certainly is no politi-
cal will to push Russian production beyond 10 million bpd, since the
Russian government does not want to see oil prices collapse with too
much supply.
In Russia, politics and economics are even more closely linked

than in other countries. Both rely on oil and natural gas production
and prices. The majority of Russia’s budget revenues and foreign
exchange earnings come from oil and natural gas. At least two thirds
of Gazprom’s revenues and earnings come from the sale of natural
gas to Europe. Most of Russia’s oil markets are in Europe. Russia
needs both European and Chinese markets to sustain its economy
and future growth.
Russia also worries about becoming too dependent upon China

for revenues from oil and gas. Russia still has border conflicts with
China, has concerns about too many Chinese settling in East Siberia,
and worries that its army is relatively weak compared to China’s.
Russia wants to use its energy as a way to dominate the Russian-
Chinese relationship. China sees Russia as a major source of future
energy but is not willing to cede power. After years of negotiations
over pipeline natural gas deliveries, China still refuses to accept
Russia’s demands in pricing. Russia now is less interested in a natu-
26
Oil and Gas in a Changing
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ral gas OPEC since it was rebuffed in locating its headquarters in St.
Petersburg. The location will be in Doha, Qatar.
In Azerbaijan, oil production continues to increase despite opera-

tional problems in its largest offshore oil field. Production is now
in the range of 1 to 1.1 million bpd. Future prospects look positive
until about 2020 as current offshore production expands, primarily
through field extensions. Production will peak at about 1.3 million
bpd in 2020 and then start a decline to about half that level by about
2030. Azerbaijan’s biggest discoveries will be in natural gas. As new
natural gas pipeline capacity is built, production will expand.
Kazakhstan’s oil production steadily increased to about 1.5 mil-

lion bpd by mid-2009. Its potentially largest discovery, Kashagan in
the northern Caspian Sea, has huge development problems. The oil
has up to 18 percent hydrogen sulfide and is under high pressure,
meaning that special equipment will be needed to produce the oil
and eliminate the deadly hydrogen sulfide. Also, Kashagan is in an
environmentally protected area due to sturgeon spawning.
Kazakhstan’s export potential is much larger than its current

capacity. Its export problems will occur in 2011-12 because of capac-
ity limitations in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline
that delivers crude oil from the Tengiz field through Russia to the
Black Sea. After years of negotiations Russia is now willing to allow
its expansion, permitting more oil exports. In addition, other export
options will be available, including more pipeline capacity to China
and increased cross-Caspian barge shipments to feed the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline. Kazakhstan will need all of these options as its
exports could exceed 2.5 million bpd by 2025. Reliance on Russian
routes will still be at 58-60 percent of total exports, so Kazakhstan will
need to tread carefully among Russia, China and the west.
B. China’s Search for Energy
Several estimates indicate that China’s oil demand will more than
double by 2030. Its natural gas demand is likely to triple. The eco-
nomic crisis and lower prices created favorable conditions for China
27
to secure energy supplies for the long term. With so many compa-
nies having financial difficulties, there is less competition for assets,
and China’s state controlled NOCs are not cash constrained. The
three largest banks in the world based on asset value are Chinese,
and Chinese banks are willing and able to provide financing for
acquisitions.
China’s banks instituted a series of loans-for-oil deals whereby

the banks loan money to foreign companies and obtain access to
oil in return. Figure 3 indicates the most recent deals and the play-
ers involved. In these situations, China acquired oil or natural gas
by loaning money to the foreign company or bank. Except with
Kazakhstan, these deals are not tied to upstream acquisitions of
assets, just to the purchase of oil. This differs from the past Chinese
practice of building infrastructure (railroads, for example) in order
to acquire oil assets. China hopes that these loans-for-oil deals
eventually will lead to enhanced opportunities for asset acquisitions.
Figure 3
Chinese International Loans-for-Oil Deals
Country Lender Borrower Amount

Russia CDB Rosneft $15 billion
Russia CDB Transneft $10 billion
Kazakhstan CEIB KDB $5 billion
Kazakhstan CNPC Kazmunaigaz $5 billion
Brazil CDB Petrobras $10 billion
Venezuela CDB Bandes Not finalized
Turkmenistan PTR PetroEcuador $1 billion
CDB = China Development Bank

CEIB = China Export Import Bank
KDB = Kazakhstan Development Bank
PTR = PetroEcuador
Source: Erica Downs, The Brookings Institution
28
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The loan-for-oil deal most important to China is the loan to

Transneft for building the spur line from the Eastern Siberian
Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline to China. Without this loan, as well
as the loan to state-owned Rosneft for a twenty-three year oil supply
deal, it was unlikely that the Chinese spur line would be built.
The loan-for-gas deal with Turkmenistan is likely to be the most

geopolitically significant. China National Petroleum Company
(CNPC) made a deal with Turkmenistan’s natural gas company to
help develop the South Yolotan field, considered one of the largest
onshore natural gas fields in the world. The Turkmen are looking
to foreign investors for expert assistance to develop this field, which
is very deep, very high pressure and very high in hydrogen sulfide.
The Turkmenistan-China pipeline provides Turkmenistan with an
outlet for its natural gas, including South Yolotan, that does not go
through Russia and will erode Russia’s influence and dominance
of Turkmenistan’s gas. Turkmenistan could be among the world’s
largest exporters of gas in ten years. Most of this production will
be going to the east, not the west. The first of the Chinese pipelines
will be completed by early 2010. A decision on the second, parallel
pipeline will be made in the future.
Separate from these loans-for-oil deals are the merger and acqui-
sition activities of Chinese NOCs, including CNOOC’s LNG deals
in Australia. All Chinese NOCs are active in Iran, while CNPC is
looking downstream at refinery acquisitions.
C. The Middle East – A Changing Role in a

New Energy Balance
The Middle East has huge hydrocarbon resources with little or no

pipeline access by the west, except for Iraq. There is a high degree
of political uncertainty in the region, but it has always been a reli-
able oil and natural gas supplier. An expansive suggestion was made
indicating the majority of world’s petroleum resources are found in
a corridor starting in Saudi Arabia and going through the Caspian
region, Siberia, and ending in Canada. Resources from this corridor
29
flow to the closest geographic market — China is very close to this

corridor. China has an interest in the corridor’s resources, including
Alberta, where China is investigating the idea of an oil pipeline from
Alberta to Canada’s west coast.
Many think that the real future of Iraqi petroleum development

is in natural gas. The Nabucco Pipeline is looking to the Middle
East as a source of gas. At the moment, no Turkmen gas is available.
Iranian gas is not a likely source for political reasons. The Kurdish
region of Iraq has huge potential. Two European Companies, OMV
of Austria and MOL of Hungary, made deals with the Kurds to
produce and export natural gas from 2015. These deals could be
pivotal for Nabucco and for the European relationship with Russia.
The unanswered question is the speed of development given all the
political problems.
Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world yet
does not export any gas. Serious internal problems complicate its
ability to complete projects with foreign companies. Many believe
that there is not much of a future for gas exports. Its production
is difficult, as difficult as its politics. If it does get produced and
exported, it will go east rather than west due to cooperation with
Pakistan and India over a new pipeline.
The Middle East could become a center for green power. The
development of a green grid in Qatar is a possibility. Saudi Arabia
also is interested in a green grid. There could be a good balance
between wind at night and solar during the day. The problems with
solar in Saudi Arabia are high temperature and sand. The sand is so
fine that it can get into the solar panels and lower the efficiency of
the panels.
D. Latin America — Large Potential, Missed Opportunities
The World Bank commissioned a study of Latin America in the

1990s with suggestions for improvements to their economies. The
recommendations focused on improvements to governance, fiscal
terms, international monetary reserves, labor reform, and exchange
30
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markets. By 2000, many of the recommendations were carried out

and the region looked much improved. Inflation was down, mon-
etary reserve positions were better; labor problems were under
control; overall governance was better. The test came in 2008 with
variable results.
An oil and natural gas summit in 1994 in Miami created the

Energy Initiative in Latin America that looked at barriers to energy
integration on the continent. The dream coming from this summit
was energy integration throughout Latin America. In the years since
not much has happened to move closer to the dream.
The Latin America energy picture has its successes and its prob-
lems. Brazil is the most vibrant economy in Latin America and is a
large producer of ethanol used for automotive fuel. It set a target for
energy self-sufficiency, although its reliance on imported natural gas
is making this goal elusive. It is developing its offshore with a strong
investment model. Two huge new offshore oil fields recently were
discovered. It has 11 billion barrels in oil reserves, but only 8.8 Tcf
in natural gas resources. It imports about 1.5 Bcfd natural gas from
Bolivia. Brazil’s answer on natural gas is to import LNG from Africa.
Colombia is among the success stories. It was producing 900,000

bpd of oil in the mid 1980s. Then decline set in due to political
issues and poor contracts with discouraging fiscal terms. It has large
reserves: 1.6 billion barrels of oil and 4 Tcf of natural gas, with more
than 80 percent of its basins still not explored. In recent years con-
tracts were transformed, and the production decline was arrested. Its
political troubles have lessened, and it now is producing 650,000 bpd
and looking to 1 million bpd in the near future. Trinidad is another
success with natural gas reserves of 26 Tcf and a large LNG facility. It
is an important source of LNG for the U.S. and Europe.
The problem countries unfortunately outnumber the successes;

Argentina has large natural gas resources and used to export gas to
Chile and Brazil. The supply situation deteriorated when new con-
tracts made new investment difficult. The natural gas price is frozen
and tied to the old currency, and a new export tariff is preventing any
exports. This situation remains unresolved.
31
Another problem country is Bolivia with natural gas resources

of 54 Tcf. Its wells are very deep — 12-13,000 feet. President Evo
Morales now says that all of the natural gas belongs to the govern-
ment, but the government is not doing anything to support existing
or new production. It is no longer producing enough natural gas to
export to Argentina.
Several smaller countries have oil or gas reserves but are having
difficulty attracting investors. Peru does not have much oil, perhaps
250 million barrels of reserves. But it has about 16 Tcf in natural gas
reserves. At one point, Hunt Oil joined with an Argentine company
to produce gas that now supplies Lima, but few new investors are
interested due to political turmoil. Ecuador produces 500,000 bpd
of oil and is exporting to the U.S. Because investors are leaving due
to political problems, its future is not bright. Few western investors
are interested in Cuba, which has small oil production. Most of its
oil comes from Venezuela free of charge.
Mexico and Venezuela both have huge potential, but their turbu-
lent political environments are leading to disinvestment and lower
oil production. Mexico has large oil and natural gas reserves: 12 bil-
lion barrels of oil and 15 Tcf of natural gas. It used to have oil reserves
of 27 billion barrels but has lost 1 billion barrels per year due to field
depletion. Its production is now at 3 million bpd and continues to
fall, although the trend could be arrested at 2 million bpd. For his-
torical reasons, the rights to subsoil development were transferred
to the central government. Constitutionally, development of these
resources is limited to State-owned companies — today Petroléos
Mexicana (Pemex). President Vincente Fox unsuccessfully tried to
change the constitution to allow foreign company participation.
More recently President Felipe Calderon tried to implement change
and also failed. Mexico already imports gasoline and will soon start
importing natural gas. No policy change is expected soon.
Venezuela also faces serious oil production issues. When President

Hugo Chavez was elected ten years ago, he took on Petroléos de
Venezuela (PDVSA) and fired 20,000 people, including most of the
professionals. At that time PDVSA was producing 3.5 million bpd
32
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of oil by relying on a large number of joint ventures with foreign

participants totaling $35 billion in investment. The potential was
there to reach 4.7 million barrels of oil per day. Today PDVSA pro-
duces 2 million bpd. Chavez uses oil as a political tool, providing 17
countries with free or subsidized oil. He uses revenues from PDVSA
to carry out internal social programs and to spread his political
philosophy throughout the region. PDVSA lost some international
joint venture partners recently as Chavez arbitrarily ordered changes
in the fiscal terms of the production contracts. Reinvestment is
lagging, and production is likely to continue to fall. Chavez has
promoted the idea of integrating the continent with a natural gas
pipeline to Argentina, but the natural gas reserves do not exist to
support such a pipeline.
33
V. Liquid Fuels for Transportation
A. Modern Transport Policy: Reframing the Issue
A discussion of oil markets is not complete without examining

global transportation, which is 90 percent dependent on oil. The
future of the automotive industry will largely determine how the
world and the U.S. consume oil. Transportation policies can be used
to alleviate congestion and simultaneously reduce CO2 emissions.
Fuel economy and technology improvements are important to solv-
ing the emissions problem; they are not the end of the story.
One view suggests that the U.S. transportation system is broken

— there is no unified national policy to deal with transport problems
— but the U.S. approach is to treat energy, climate change and trans-
portation policies separately. Cities in emerging economies are even
more seriously bogged down in congestion and pollution. In China,
India and other countries, per capita CO2 emissions are low but are
increasing rapidly as more autos are bought due to rising affluence.
New transport policies are important to dealing with congestion.
Significant progress can be made by shifting to other modes of

transportation. Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) is one solution, using dedi-
cated lanes to reduce travel times and emissions while alleviating con-
gestion. These systems are operating in several congested cities includ-
ing Mexico City and Jakarta. Truck transport is also very important
globally. Better logistical planning can help by cutting down on empty
35
trips. Promoting inter-modal movements with rail can also help, as

can improving truck efficiency. Unclogging congested rail centers is
critical. In Chicago, cargo coming from the west destined for the east
must be unloaded on the west side of the city, trucked to the east side
and transferred again to rail to complete its journey.
The introduction of biofuels may have some impact, although

all options are currently expensive. Making changes to vehicles can
also lead to less oil consumption and lower CO2 emissions, but fac-
tors such as population growth and increasing vehicle miles traveled
could offset these gains.
Reframing the issue in terms of transport policy can help make

the problem more manageable. A new policy could include vehicle-
miles-traveled taxes and/or congestion pricing and internalizing
transport, CO2, and energy costs by imposing a $1 per gallon oil
security fee. Shifting funding to BRT or other public transit could
affect land use choices and foster the use of public transit, bicycles,
and walking. Ending unproductive subsidies in energy, agriculture
and transportation could generate substantial revenues to pay for
these new programs and also provide funds for incentive programs.
B. A Challenge to the U.S. Auto Industry
The Obama Administration in March 2009 announced new fuel

economy standards for cars and light duty trucks, bringing them in
line with California’s proposed standards. For cars, the new goal is
to reach 39.5 mpg by 2016. Only one car company, Toyota, meets
today’s standard of 27.5 mpg. For light duty trucks the goal is to
reach 30 mpg, up from today’s 21.5 mpg. No U.S. automaker meets
today’s standard. The goal for 2016 is for the combined auto/light
duty truck fleet to achieve an average 35 mpg, a 27 percent increase
from today’s 27.5 mpg.
U.S. industry has the technology today to meet increasing stan-

dards over the next two to three years. The industry has six years
and two model changes in order to reach the 2016 standards. The
36
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uels a Changing
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standards are achievable, but it will take many engineers and $50-
100 billion for new equipment.
A multiple technology approach rather than any single solution

will evolve to reach the 2016 standard. Vehicle technological changes
include weight reduction, friction reduction, tire friction reduction,
and better aerodynamics, transmissions, and valves. More advanced
technology will be used on gasoline internal combustion engines
and on diesel engines. Direct injection can use fewer cylinders to
achieve similar power while increasing efficiency by twenty percent.
The move to gas-electric hybrids and all-electric vehicles will

reduce gasoline use while offering different levels of CO2 emission
reductions. Gas-electric hybrids are likely to have lower CO2 emis-
sions than plug-in electric vehicles because the latter must include
emissions from power generation in the overall calculation. If the
electricity is generated from renewable energy or nuclear, plug-in
electric vehicles are likely to have lower CO2 emissions. Gas-electric
hybrids also are cheaper and therefore are likely to be a more cost-
effective solution.
From 1987 to 2007 fuel economy in the U.S. fleet declined by

2 percent while horsepower increased by 89 percent and weight
increased by 29 percent. Technology improvements that could have
been used to improve gas mileage moved the U.S. auto fleet in the
wrong direction. With the new standards, technology over the next
ten years will have to take the industry in the right direction, with
fuel economy increasing by 45 percent, horsepower declining by 50
percent and weight declining by 30 percent. Without incorporat-
ing the recent changes in fuel economy standards, EIA projected
that gasoline demand in the U.S. would remain flat even as liquid
fuel use increases; these increases will be met by renewable fuels
through at least 2020 and perhaps to 2030. An approach to lessen oil
dependence should rely on a portfolio approach including biofuels,
electrification, fuel economy standards, and technology. Changes in
vehicle technology and efficiency can yield a saving of 4 million bar-
rels per day by 2020 from what demand would otherwise have been,
37
while a change to biofuels could save another 2-2.5 million bpd.

Together this would amount to about half of the automotive fuels
currently used in the U.S. Electrification could take another big leap
towards reducing the remaining gasoline use.
Natural gas vehicles (NGVs) are not included in the portfolio

suggested because, while the technology is available to build these
cars today, the infrastructure is lacking to supply them. There was a
push for NGVs in the Energy Policy Act of 1992; however, the lim-
ited availability of refueling stations and the lack of a commitment
to support the development of a refueling system doomed any gov-
ernment sponsored incentives. There may be a market for natural
gas vehicles in trucks and buses, but these are likely to be limited to
fleets that can be refueled at central facilities.
C. From Theory to Reality — What Cars Will People Buy?
Major changes occurred in the past year as U.S. auto sales plum-
meted from 16 to 9.5 million vehicles. To jump start sales, the U.S.
government intervened. “Cash for Clunkers” to remove old cars and
replace them with new, more fuel efficient ones began in late July
2009. Many thought that this program was too complicated, but
post-Forum results show that it was very popular. Comprehensive
cap-and-trade legislation currently being considered by Congress
would also change the landscape for auto manufacturers. For the
U.S. to reach the ultimate target of 80 percent GHG reductions by
2050, companies need to start making changes today.
These actual and proposed policies come on top of new biofuels

and fuel economy standards. Automobile companies expect that
technology improvements to gasoline internal combustion engines,
plug-in hybrids and other gas-electric hybrid vehicles, electric vehi-
cles, and hydrogen fuel cells will be necessary to make the required
transitions.
38
OilLiquid
and GFas
uels a Changing
in for Transportation
World
Electric vehicles were first marketed in California in 1991 with

sales of only 300 vehicles per year. To be sustainable, at least 100,000
vehicles need to be sold annually. The program failed due to many
issues. All technological problems must be solved before introduc-
tion. The consumer and the market must be ready for acceptance.
Regulatory policy must be aligned with both the available technolo-
gy and consumer acceptance; consumers will not accept a new prod-
uct unless it is better in every respect than what was used previously.
Building on their experience with gas-electric hybrids, some

companies are moving towards plug-in hybrids, which have lower
CO2 emissions and increased fuel economy. The introduction of
plug-in hybrids using lithium ion batteries presents many challenges
including cost, durability, high and low temperature performance
and energy density (range per charge). Companies also are look-
ing at hydrogen fuel cells. It is conceivable that a hydrogen fuel cell
automobile will be ready by 2015.
The path to meet increasingly strict fuel economy and emissions

requirements is difficult. With twenty years required to replace the
on-road capital stock, products sold today need to take into account
requirements twenty years out. This sets an extremely high hurdle.
It requires certainty in government policies. It demands an environ-
ment where companies can experiment with various technologies.
And it necessitates maintaining an open attitude to avoid picking
winner and losers too early.
39
Appendices
Agenda
Friday, June 26
8:30 – noon
SESSION I: The Economic and Energy Future
Economic growth, or lack thereof, will be a primary near-term factor in

energy demand. Access to reserves and other above-ground constraints on
production will influence supply, and futures trading can have a short-term
influence on price. Innovation can have a large impact in the medium to
long term. This session will discuss these factors and their influence on
energy projections.
Economic growth forecast Sara Johnson, Managing Director

Global Macroeconomics
IHS Global Insight
Oil and gas supply & Marianne Kah, Chief Economist,

demand forecast ConocoPhillips
The role of futures trading Albert Helmig, President,

Hong Kong Mercantile Exchange
The potential of James Sweeney, Director,

energy efficiency Precourt Energy Efficiency Center
Stanford University
43
1:30 – 5:00 p.m.

SESSION II: U.S. Policy Choices
U.S. energy and environmental policies, including legislation on climate

change, domestic oil and gas production, and promotion of biofuels, could
affect energy supply and demand both within the United States and glob-
ally. The Forum will discuss some of these proposals, the prospects for their
adoption by Congress, and their possible impacts.
Challenges of achieving Herman Franssen, President

Administration goals International Energy Associates
Prospects for Jason Grumet, President

Congressional action Bipartisan Policy Center
Pricing GHG emissions Sherri Stuewer, Vice President,

Environmental Policy and
Planning, ExxonMobil
Scaling up biofuels Lucian Pugliaresi, President

Energy Policy Research Foundation
(EPRINC)
Respondent John Hofmeister, CEO

Citizens for Affordable Energy
44
Saturday, June 27
8:30 – noon
SESSION III: Natural Gas
Is natural gas a fuel for long-term growth, or a bridge towards a no-

carbon energy future? Two years ago this Forum heard projections that
growth in North American gas demand would continue to outpace North
American supply, and that increasing LNG imports would increasingly tie
the U.S. into a global gas market. These projections will be re-examined
in light of recent increases in U.S supply, largely from shale, and climate
change policies that could significantly increase the demand for gas in the
electricity sector.
US and global Rick Smead, Director

resource availability Navigant Consulting
Global LNG market Charif Souki, CEO

Cheniere Energy
Economics and geopolitics Michelle Foss, Bureau of Economic

of gas Geology, University of Texas
Climate policy and demand Howard Gruenspecht, Acting

for gas Administrator, US Energy
Information Administration
1:30 – 5:00 p.m.

SESSION IV: Regional Focus
Specific economic and political developments in key producing and con-

suming regions will affect the global supply and demand picture. The
Forum will discuss some of the factors at play in the Middle East, Russia
and Europe, China, and Latin America.
Middle East Joseph A. Stanislaw, CEO

The JA Stanislaw Group
Russia and Europe Julian Lee, Senior Energy

Analyst, Centre for Global
Energy Studies
45
China Erica Downs, China Energy Fellow,

Brookings Institution
Latin America Luis Giusti, Senior Advisor CSIS
Respondent Yonghun Jung, Executive Director,

Korea Energy Economics Institute
Sunday, June 28
8:00 – 11:30 a.m.

SESSION V: Transportation Demand
The transportation sector remains one of the largest and the most uncer-
tain sources of demand for oil. This session will consider the prospects for
efficiency improvement and various alternative fuels, the obstacles to their
adoption, and the timing of any significant penetration into the market.
Prospects for alternatives Lee Schipper, Precourt Energy

and efficiency Efficiency Center, Stanford University
Theodore Eck,
Consulting Economist
Institute for Defense Analyses
Toyota outlook Jo Cooper, Group VP, Public Policy

and Government/Industry Affairs,
Toyota North America
Chrysler outlook Reginald R. Modlin,

Director, Regulatory Affairs
Chrysler Group LLC
46
List of Participants
Red Cavaney Erica S. Downs

Senior Vice President- China Energy Fellow
Government, Public Affairs John L. Thorton China Center
and Communications Brookings Institution
ConocoPhillips 1775 Massachusetts Avenue,
1776 Eye Street, NW, #700 NW
Washington, DC 20006 Washington, DC 20036
Leonard L. Coburn Theodore R. Eck
(Rapporteur)
Consulting Economist
President
Institute for Defense Analysis
Coburn International Energy
Consultants, LLC 1052 Rt. 10, PO Box 8
2828 Albemarle St, NW Oxford, NH 03777
Washington, DC 20008 Stephen Eule
Jo Cooper Vice President for Climate &
Group Vice President-Public Technology
Policy & Government/ Institute for 21st Century
Industry Affairs Energy
Toyota U.S. Chamber of Commerce
601 13th Street, NW, Suite 910S 1615 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005 Washington, DC 20062
47
Michelle Michot Foss Howard Gruenspecht

Chief Energy Economist Acting Administrator
and Head Energy Information
Center for Energy Economics Administration
University of Texas at Austin US Department of Energy
1901 Allen Parkway 1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Houston, TX 77019 Washington, DC 20585
Herman T. Franssen Jason Grumet
President President
International Energy Associates, Bipartisan Policy Center
Inc. 1225 I Street, NW, Suite 1000
4515 Willard Avenue, Washington, DC 20005
Suite 902S
Chevy Chase, MD 20815 Robert A. Hefner III
Owner and Managing Partner
Luis E. Giusti The GHK Companies
(Co-chair) 6305 Waterford Boulevard,
Senior Advisor Suite 300
Center for Strategic and Oklahoma City, OK 73118
International Studies
Former Chairman and CEO Albert Henry Helmig
Petroléos de Venezuela, S.A. President
1800 K Street, NW, Suite 400 Hong Kong Mercantile
Washington, DC 20006 Exchange
1905 International Commerce
Renee S. Grossman
Centre
Managing Director
1 Austin Road West
TerraNova Capital Partners, Inc.
Kowloon, Hong Kong
European American Equities,
Inc. Paul Hoenmans
350 Madison Avenue, 8th Floor Former Executive Vice
New York, NY 10017 President
Mobil Oil Corporation
PO Box 9608
Aspen, CO 81612
48
Participants
John Daniel Hofmeister Melanie Kenderdine

Founder and CEO Associate Director
Citizens for Affordable Energy, MIT Energy Initiative
Inc. 77 Massachusetts Avenue
2121 Kirby Drive, 26 NE E19-307H
Houston, TX 77019 Cambridge, MA 02139
Karen Laurie Hofmeister Koichi Kimura
Treasurer General Manager
Citizens for Affordable Energy, Tokyo Gas, New York Office
Inc. 405 Lexington Avenue, 33rd
2121 Kirby Drive, 26NE Floor
Houston, TX 77019 New York, NY 10583
Sara Johnson Kenji Kobayashi
Managing Director President
Global Macroeconomics Asia Pacific Energy Research
IHS Global Insight Centre
24 Hartwell Avenue Inui Bldg., Kachidoki 16F
Lexington, MA 02421 1-13-1 Kachidoki, Chuo-Ku
Tokyo, 104-0054 Japan
Fred C. Julander
President Vincent Lauerman
Julander Energy Company President
475 17th Street, Suite 700 Geopolitics Central
Denver, CO 80202 2509 Dieppe Avenue SW,
Suite 200
Yonghun Jung Calgary, AB T3E 7J9 Canada
Executive Director
Korea Energy Economics Raymond Learsy
Institute Author
665-1 Naeson Dong PO Box 36
Euiwang-Si 437-713 Sharon, CT 06069
Republic of Korea
Julian Lee
Marianne Kah Senior Energy Analyst
Chief Economist Center for Global Energy
ConocoPhillips Studies
600 North Dairy Ashford 17 Knightsbridge
Houston, TX 77079 London, SW1X 7LY UK
49
Flynt Leverett Rod Nelson

Director Vice President
Geopolitics of Energy Schlumberger
New America Foundation 5599 San Felipe, Suite 1700
Penn State University Houston, TX 77056
1899 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036 Boyko Nitzov
Director, Eurasia Energy Center
Michael Levi The Atlantic Council of the U.S.
Senior Fellow 1101 15th Street, NW
Council on Foreign Relations Washington, DC 20005
58 East 68th Street
New York, NY 10021 Tom Price
Senior Vice President
Jan W. Mares Corporate Development &
Senior Policy Advisor Government Relations
Resources for the Future Chesapeake Energy Corporation
1616 P Street, NW 6100 North Western Avenue
Washington, DC 20036 Oklahoma City, OK 73118
Kenji Matsuo Lucian Pugliaresi

General Manager President
Tokyo Electric Power Company Energy Policy Research
1901 L Street NW, Suite 720 Foundation, Inc.
Washington,DC 20036 1031 31st Street, NW
Reginald R. Modlin
Director – Regulatory Affairs James Ragland
Chrysler Group LLC Director, Economic Research
CIMS 482-00-71 Group
800 Chrysler Drive Aramco Services
Auburn Hills, MI 48326 1667 K Street, NE, Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20006
Kevin Murphy
U.S. Government Relations Ralph Dale Samuelson
Manager Vice-President
Exxon Mobil Corporation Asia Pacific Energy Research
5959 Las Colinas Boulevard Centre
Irving, TX 75039 Inui Building Kachidoki 16F
972-444-1117 1-13-1 Kachidoki, Chuo-ku
Tokyo, 104-0054 Japan
50
Participants
Patricia Lynn Scarlett Joseph A. Stanislaw

Independent Consultant (Co-chair)
Environmental Consulting Independent Senior Advisor,
830 S. Lincoln Street Deloitte LLP; CEO, The
Arlington, VA 22204 JAStanislaw Group; and
Co-Founder and Former CEO,
Lee Schipper
Cambridge Energy Research
Senior Research Engineer
Precourt Energy Efficiency Associates
Center 160 Federal Street, 17th Floor
Stanford University Boston, MA 02110
631 Vincente Judith Zee Steinberg
Berkeley, CA 94707
Former Executive
C. Kyle Simpson Mobil Oil Corporation
Policy Director PO Box 9608
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Aspen, CO 81612
Schreck
Sherri K. Stuewer
1350 I Street, NW, Suite 510
VP-Environmental Policy &
Washington, DC 20005
Planning
Richard Smead ExxonMobil Corporation
Director 5959 Las Colinas Boulevard
Navigant Consulting, Inc. Room 3332
909 Fannin Street Irving, TX 75039
Houston, TX 77010
James Lee Sweeney
Charif Souki Director
Chairman and CEO Precourt Energy Efficiency
Cheniere Energy, Inc. Center
700 Milam Street, Suite 800 Stanford University
Houston, TX 77002 Yang & Yamazaki Environment
& Energy Building - MC 4205
473 Via Ortega, Room 175
Stanford, CA 94305
51
Jonathan Temple Staff:

Director
Bellona USA David Monsma
5508 Namakagan Road Executive Director
Bethesda, MD 20816 Energy and Environment
Program
Michael E. Webber The Aspen Institute
Assistant Professor, Department One Dupont Circle, Suite 700
of Mechanical Engineering and Washington DC 20036
Associate Director, Center
for International Energy & John A. Riggs
Environmental Policy Senior Fellow
The University of Texas at Energy and Environment
Austin Program
1 University Station The Aspen Institute
C2200 One Dupont Circle, Suite 700
Austin, TX 78712 Washington DC 20036
R. James Woolsey Tim Olson
Venture Partner Project Coordinator
VantagePoint Venture Partners Energy and Environment
8283 Greensboro Drive Program
McLean, VA 22102 The Aspen Institute
Suzanne H. Woolsey One Dupont Circle, Suite 700
Lead Trustee, Rocky Mountain Washington DC 20036
Institute and
Director, Fluor Corporation
815 Cumberstone Road
Harwood, MD 20776
52

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Energy and Environment Program

Oil and Gas

Leonard L. Coburn, Rapporteur

The Aspen Institute

For all other inquiries, please contact:

The Aspen Institute

David Monsma John A. Riggs Timothy Olson

Copyright © 2009 by The Aspen Institute

The Aspen Institute

Published in the United States of America in 2009

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

Oil and Gas in a Changing World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. The Economic and Energy Future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II. U.S. Policy Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

III. Natural Gas: New Resources and New Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

IV. Regional Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

V. Liquid Fuels for Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

The Aspen Institute organized the first Forum on Global Energy,

On behalf of the Institute and the Forum participants, I thank

I also thank Leonard Coburn, who served as rapporteur. His

A dramatic economic downturn and extreme price volatility in

Volatile prices and uncertain demand raise questions about the

A different way to affect the price of oil is to demand less. More

A bright spot in the American picture is natural gas, thanks to

The impact of volatility in energy markets and the kind of eco-

Future oil development in the Middle East will be cautious.

The future of the U.S. automotive industry is as volatile as energy

A multi-pronged policy approach is essential for the world and

A. Economic Volatility, Global Recovery or a Lost Decade?

The worldwide scope of the financial crisis is unprecedented.

The downturn varied greatly among regions. In the U.S., real

Emerging Europe faces staggering challenges due to the drying up

Asia is not immune to the global economic turmoil. China, India

tries, export dependence remains a serious problem. Government

Of three scenarios for world growth, the most optimistic is “global

B. Energy Volatility — Too Much of a Good Thing?

The recession led to a decline of global oil demand by 2.5 to 3 mil-

Assuming crude oil demand will rebound, a critical unknown is

will decline in the future. Worldwide unconventional oil produc-

International oil companies (IOCs) have full access to only seven

By 2020 about 20 percent of U.S. supply is expected to come from

A resumption of volatile and ever-increasing prices is likely. In

C. The Role of Futures Markets

Futures markets play an important role in price determination

Participation in futures markets by investors rather than oil

responsible for only about one quarter of activity — known as open

This strategy was increasingly adopted as oil prices strengthened

D. Energy Efficiency — Changing the Energy Future

Oil prices are likely to increase due to supply constraints and

Another market failure derives from how consumers perceive

There is little understanding of how consumers view energy use or

Another option for oil demand reduction is the electrification of

A recent study by The National Academies on another fuel-

A. U.S. Energy Policy — A History of Unfulfilled Promises

Beginning with President Richard Nixon, U.S. energy policy

President Jimmy Carter vowed that starting in 1979 America

President Ronald Reagan’s first official act as President in 1981

ing many synthetic fuels, conservation and renewable energy pro-