EC325

2013-14

PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Camille Landais, 32LIF.323 Office Hour: Tuesdays 9:30-10:30 Lectures: Mondays 16:30-18:00, TW1. G.01 COURSE OUTLINE AND READING LIST Aims: To give students an appreciation of the analytical methods in economics for the study of the public sector and the role of the state in principle and in practice. To provide a thorough grounding in the principles underlying the role of the state, the design of social insurance and the welfare state and the design of the tax system. To enable students to understand the practical problems involved in implementing these principles. Objectives: By the end of the course the students should be able to: Discuss critically key issues in public economics. Present a coherent argument orally and in writing on topics in public economics. Demonstrate a familiarity with a range of policy issues and relevant analytical and empirical tools. Content: The first part of Michaelmas term lectures focuses on the issues of equity, efficiency and the role of the state. We begin by looking at questions of equity and alternative theories of the role of the state. We then look at problems of public choice and political economics, and go on to consider the implications of recent research in behavioural economics for welfare analysis. We conclude the first part by discussing issues of market failure, public goods and externalities, including environmental policy. The second part is devoted to the evaluation problem and empirical methods. The third part studies education policies, and the fourth part is devoted to social insurance programs. The final part is devoted to taxation, behavioural responses and the design of tax policy. We begin by examining the effects of taxes and transfers on labour supply and migration, and then go on to consider incomes and behavioural responses at the top of the income distribution. We look at the implications of taxation for economic efficiency and explore the optimal taxation of commodities and income. The final lecture is devoted to the question of development and public finance.

EC325 Public Economics 2013-14

Camille Landais

Reading: The recommended textbook for the course is Jonathan Gruber (2011) Public Finance and Public Policy, 3rd edition, Worth Publishers. This up-to-date textbook will be used heavily in both terms and students are strongly encouraged to purchase the text for ease of reference. Copies will also be available in the Library Course Collection. The second edition of the text (Gruber, 2007) is less up to date but has similar coverage (note that the chapter and section references for the 2nd edition are identical to those in the 3rd edition). Almost all of the journal articles in the reading list can be accessed via the LSE Library electronic journals collection. Hyperlinks are given for working and discussion papers. CC refers to Course Collection. General: J Gruber (2011) Public Finance and Public Policy, 3rd edition, Worth Publishers. [CC HJ141 G88] [or Gruber (2007), 2nd edition] N Barr (2012), The Economics of the Welfare State, 5th ed., OUP [CC HB99.3 B26]. Institute for Fiscal Studies, Mirrlees Review: Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century, Volume 1 (2010): Dimensions of Tax Design, Volume 2 (2011): Tax by Design. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Available online at:
http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesReview

A B Atkinson and J E Stiglitz (1980), Lectures on Public Economics, McGraw Hill (a good graduate textbook, now somewhat dated) [CC HJ141 A87]. Institutional and statistical: On developments in public spending in the UK, see H Glennerster (2003), Understanding the finance of welfare (Policy Press); or H Glennerster and J Hills (eds) (1998), The State of Welfare: The economics of social spending (Oxford) [CC HV245 S79]. For details of benefit rates and other social security rules, see the Department for Work and Pensions website (http://www.dwp.gov.uk). On the structure of taxation in the UK, see IFS (2011) A Survey of the UK Tax System, Briefing Note no. 9 (http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn09.pdf) and the HM Revenue and Customs website, (http://www.hmrc.gov.uk). The Institute for Fiscal Studies is an independent policy research institute and its website (http://www.ifs.org.uk) has a wide range of useful publications. The HMRC website includes information on the tax structure and statistics on tax payments (by income group, by type of tax, etc.) and overall revenues raised. The UK Treasury website (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/) provides a range of documents on economic policies and the public finances, including the annual publication, Financial Statement and Budget Report (the Red Book), published each year on Budget Day. The National Statistics website (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/) provides a wide range of current and historical data on economic and social indicators (as presented in the annual publications such as National Income and Expenditure (the Blue Book) and Social Trends.

EC325 Public Economics 2013-14

Camille Landais

For comparative international fiscal data, information and analysis, useful sources include the International Monetary Fund, IMF (http://www.imf.org/), the World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD (http://www.oecd.org).

Review: Students wishing to review their microeconomic theory should consult a textbook on intermediate microeconomic theory, such as Morgan, Katz and Rosen (2006) Microeconomics, McGraw Hill (CC HB172 M84) or J Perloff (2008) Microeconomics: Theory & applications with calculus, Pearson (CC HB172 P45). Please note: The starred items are compulsory. But you should make no attempt to read everything on the reading list; the supplementary readings are provided for students interested in pursuing a particular topic in more depth or for those seeking an alternative approach to that in the starred readings. It is not important to read a huge amount, but vastly important really to understand what you do read. Classes: The course includes weekly one-hour classes, beginning in week 4 of the Michaelmas Term. The organisation of classes is set out in the section following the course outline and reading list. Students will be expected to submit four pieces of written work during the year: a class presentation and a termly essay on the material presented in the Michaelmas Term and similarly for the material presented in the Lent Term. Examination: The three-hour examination is divided into three sections. The first section is shortanswer questions; the second and third sections are long-answer questions drawn from the material covered in the Michaelmas and Lent terms, respectively. Students are required to answer questions from all three sections. Note that the current structure of the course was adopted in 2007-8.

EC325 Public Economics 2013-14

Camille Landais

Introduction to public economics and public policy analysis Background reading: Gruber (2011), chs 2, 3 1. Introduction: what is public economics?

Motivation of the course. The 4 questions of public economics. Overview of the course topics. Outline of the course. *Barr (2012), chs. 2, 3, 5. *Gruber (2011), chs 2 (especially 2.3), 17 (section 17.1) [a brief introduction] Foundations of public economics 2. Foundations of welfare and distributional analysis

Utility maximization and welfare measures. Equilibrium analysis. Economic incidence. Fundamental theorems of welfare economics. *Gruber (2011), ch. 2 *Barr (2012), chs. 3, 4. 3. Externalities The theory of externalities. Market failure and the conditions for economic efficiency. Types of externalities. Private bargaining solutions versus government intervention. Alternative government policies: taxes, congestion charges, regulation, and zoning. Climate change. *Gruber (2011), chs 5, 6 (especially sections 6.1 and 6.2) *Fullerton, D, A Leicester and S Smith (2010) Environmental Taxes, Dimensions of Tax Design (The Mirrlees Review, vol. 1), ch. 5. Part A only (pp 423-449). http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/dimensions/ch5.pdf J Leape (2006), The London Congestion Charge, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20:4, Fall, 157176.
[http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.20.4.157]

N H Stern (2008), The economics of climate change, American Economic Review, 98, 1-37. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.1] Pizer, William (1999), Choosing price or quantity controls for greenhouse gases, Resources for the Future, Climate Issues Brief 17.
[http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-CCIB-17.pdf]

HM Treasury, The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, October 2006 (see especially part IV: Policy responses for mitigation) [http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternrevi ew_index.cfm]

The Economist, various articles and online debates including:

Getting Warmer: A special report on climate change and the carbon economy (5 December 2009): http://www.economist.com/node/14994872 How to live with climate change (25 November 2010):
http://www.economist.com/node/17575027

4.

Public goods

Sources of market failure and the role for government intervention: competition failure, public goods, externalities, incomplete markets, information failures. The theory of public goods: non-rivalness and non-excludability; efficiency conditions. *Gruber (2011), chs. 2 (especially section 2.3) and 7 *Morgan, J. (2000), Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries, Review of Economic Studies, 67, 761-784. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695947 Stiglitz, J., (2002) Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, American Economic Review, 92:3, June, 460-502.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3083351

Bernheim, B D and A Rangel (2005), Behavioral public economics: Welfare and policy analysis with non-standard decision makers, NBER Working Paper 11518, July, pp 53-62 only (warm glow theory). [http://www.nber.org/papers/w11518] Empirical methods for public economics: treatment evaluation 5. The evaluation problem (1/2) Potential outcome framework and the evaluation problem. Randomized experiments. Natural experiments. Diff-in-diff models and examples. Angrist, J. and A. Krueger (1999), Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics, in Ashenfelter and Card, Handbook of Labor Economics. !Angrist, J. (2008), Treatment Effects, The New Palgrave, http://econwww.mit.edu/files/32 Duflo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer. 2008. Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit. In Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 4, ed. T. Paul Schultz and John Strauss, 3895 3962. Amsterdam and San Diego Elsevier, North-Holland. 6. The evaluation problem (2/2) principles, examples. Regression discontinuity design:

Instrumental variables: principles, examples.

Angrist, Joshua D., and Victor Lavy. 1999. Using Maimonides Rule to Estimate the Effect of Class Size on Scholastic Achievement. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2): 53375. Krueger, Alan B. 1999. Experimental Estimates of Education Production Functions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2): 497532

EC325 Public Economics 2013-14

Camille Landais

Social choice and the scope of government 7. Public choice & political economy

Fundamental issues in public choice: preference revelation, aggregation of preference. Arrows Impossibility Theorem. Voting models and the new political economy. New contract theory and the scope of government. *Gruber (2011), ch. 9 *A Shleifer (1998), State versus Private Ownership, Journal of Economic Perspectives,12:4, Fall, 133-150. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2646898 Persson, T. and G Tabellini (2002), Political economics and public finance, in Auerbach, A. and M. Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Vol III, North-Holland: Amsterdam., see especially pp 1-25. (http://papers.nber.org/papers/W7097). O Hart, A Shleifer and R Vishny (1998), The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112:4, 1127-1161. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951268

Education 8. Public intervention in the education market

(i) Reasons for government intervention in education: market failure and redistribution. (ii) The crowd-out effect of free public schools. (iii) The arguments for and against school choice and school vouchers. (iv) Measuring the returns to education. (v) Human capital investment versus job market signalling. !Chapter 11 in Gruber (2011). Ashenfelter, O. and C. Rouse (1998). Income, Schooling and Ability: Evidence from a New Sample of Identical Twins. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 253-84. ! Duflo, E. (2001). Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment. American Economic Review 91, 795-813. Hanushek, E. A. and J. Luque (2003). Efficiency and equity in schools around the world. Economics of Education Review 22, 481-502. ! Poterba, J. (1995). Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health Care: Why and How? In V. Fuchs (ed.), Individual and Social Responsibility, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. N. Gordon (2004), Do federal grants boost school spending? evidence from title I. Journal of Public Economics, 88(9-10):17711792, 2004. Rouse, C. (1998). Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 553-602.
EC325 Public Economics 2013-14 Camille Landais 6

Social insurance 9. Social insurance

(i) Why do people value insurance? (ii) Why have social insurance? Asymmetric information and adverse selection. (iii) What are the problems with social insurance? Crowd-out and moral hazard. (iv) Applications to Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance. ! Chapters 12 and 14 in Gruber (2011). Bentez-Silva, H., M. Buchinsky, and J. Rust (2004). How Large Are the Classification Errors in the Social Security Award Process? NBER Working Paper 10219. ! Meyer, B. D. (2002). Unemployment and workers' compensation programmes: rationale, design, labour supply and income support. Fiscal Studies 23(1), 1-49. Chetty, Raj, A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance. Journal of Public Economics, 90(10-11):18791901, 2006. Landais, Camille, Assessing the welfare effects of unemployment benefits using the regression kink design. PEP working paper series, 16, STICERD, London School of Economics, Jul 2012.

10.

Retirement Pensions

Funded versus unfunded (pay-as-you-go) state pensions. Is there a pensions crisis? Intergenerational and intragenerational equity. Efficiency: effects on savings and retirement decisions. Options for reform. ! N Barr and P Diamond (2006), The Economics of Pensions, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 22. No. 1, Spring, pp. 15-39.
http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/22/1/15?ijkey=9DjQZbG8zPR17qI&keytype=ref

! N Barr (2006), Pensions: Overview of the Issues, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 22. No. 1, Spring, pp. 1-14.
http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/22/1/1?ijkey=xUhuLJ3z5zjh3d8&keytype=ref

! Gruber (2011), ch 13 (state pensions: US issues), ch 12 (social insurance) Barr (2012), Ch. 7. The Economist (2009), A slow-burning fuse: A special report on ageing populations, June 27, 2009 (especially pp. 3-5 (Introduction), 9-11 (Scrimp and Save, and 11-13 (Work till you drop))
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=42527197&site=ehost-live http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=42527205&site=ehost-live http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=42527207&site=ehost-live

Pensions: Challenges and Choices, The First Report of the UK Pensions Commission, October 2004.
EC325 Public Economics 2013-14 Camille Landais 7

[http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20070717120000/http://www.pensions commission.org.uk/www.pensionscommission.org.uk/publications/2004/annrep/index.ht ml]

A New Pension Settlement for the Twenty-First Century, The Second Report of the UK Pensions Commission, November 2005.
[http://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20070717120000/http://www.pensions commission.org.uk/www.pensionscommission.org.uk/publications/2005/annrep/annrepindex.html]

11.

Health

(i) Reasons for government intervention in health care markets. (ii) The moral hazard cost of subsidized health insurance and the price elasticity of health care demand. (iii) Optimal health insurance. (iv) What is the effect of public health insurance on health outcomes? (v) The rising health care expenditures over time. ! Chapters 15 and 16 in Gruber (2011). ! Currie, J. and J. Gruber (1996). Saving Babies: The efficacy and Cost of Recent Changes in the Medicaid Eligibility of Pregnant Women. Journal of Political Economy 104, 1263-1296. ! Poterba, J. (1995). Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health Care: Why and How? In V. Fuchs (ed.), Individual and Social Responsibility, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Propper, C. (2001). Expenditure on Healthcare in the UK: A Review of the Issues. Fiscal Studies 22(2), 151-183. Taxation and transfer programs 12. Tax incidence

Defining incidence. Partial equilibrium analysis of simple incidence problem and the role of elasticities. General equilibrium analysis. New behavioural research in salience. *Gruber (2011), ch. 19 *J Rothstein (2008) The Unintended Consequences of Encouraging Work: Tax Incidence and the EITC, Princeton University, CEPS Working paper no. 165, May 2008. Sections 1,8 only. [http://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/165rothstein.pdf] *R Chetty, A Looney and K Kroft (2009) Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, American Economic Review 99:4 (September), 1145-1177. (see, especially, pp 1145-1149, 1175-1176) [http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1145] Fullerton, D and G Metcalf (2002), Tax incidence, in A Auerbach and M Feldstein, eds., Handbook of Public Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier, Vol. 4, pp. 1787-1872. (Available as NBER W8829: http://www.nber.org/papers/w8829) 13. Poverty alleviation

(i) Inequality and poverty across countries. (ii) Different types of social programs. (iii) The moral hazard costs of low-income support. (iv) Reducing moral hazard:
EC325 Public Economics 2013-14 Camille Landais 8

tagging, in-kind benefits, and ordeals. (v) Lessons from the U.S. welfare reform efforts. ! Chapter 17 in Gruber (2011). Blank, R. (2003). US Welfare Reform: Whats Relevant for Europe? CESifo Economic Studies 49, 49-74. Currie, J. (2004). The Take Up of Social Benefits. NBER Working Paper No. 10488. ! Nichols, A. L. and R. Zeckhauser (1982). Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients. American Economic Review 72(2), 372-77. D. A. Black, J. A. Smith, M. C. Berger, and B. J. Noel. Is the threat of reemployment services more effective than the services themselves? evidence from random assignment in the UI system. American Economic Review, 93(4):13131327, Sept. 2003 14. Taxes, transfers, and labour supply

(i) The theory of tax and labour supply: income vs substitution effects, hours worked vs labour force participation. (ii) Evidence on tax and labour supply. (iii) In-work benefit programs: theory and evidence. ! Chapter 21 in Gruber (2011). ! Eissa, N. (1995). Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 as a Natural Experiment. NBER Working Paper No. 5023. ! Blundell, R. (2001). Welfare Reform for Low Income Workers. Oxford Economic Papers 53, 189-214. Or, alternatively, Evaluating the Labour Supply Responses to In-Work Benefit Reforms for Low Income Workers, in M. Buti, P. Sestito, and H. Wijkander (eds.), Taxation, Welfare and the Crisis of Unemployment in Europe, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. Eissa, N. and J. Liebman (1996). Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit. Quarterly Journal of Economics 61, 605-37. Heckman, J. J. (1993). What Has Been Learned About Labor Supply in the Past Twenty Years? American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 83, 116121. 15. Taxes, transfers, and migration

(i) The effect of local taxes on migration within a country. (ii) The effect of taxes on international migration. (iii) The effect of welfare benefits on migration. Borjas, G. J. (1999). Immigration and Welfare Magnets. Journal of Labor Economics 17, 607-637. ! Feldstein, M. and M. V. Wrobel (1998). Can state taxes redistribute income? Journal of Public Economics 68, 369-396. ! Kleven, H. J., C. Landais, and E. Saez (2009). Taxation and the International Mobility of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market.
EC325 Public Economics 2013-14 Camille Landais 9

16.

Incomes and behavioural responses at the top of the distribution

(i) The long-run evolution of top income shares and top marginal tax rates. (ii) The elasticity of taxable income: concept, policy relevance, and estimates. (iii) The highincome Laffer curve. ! Brewer, M., E. Saez, and A. Shepard (2008). Means Testing and Tax Rates on Earnings. IFS Working Paper, forthcoming in The Mirrlees Review: Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century, Oxford University Press. http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/press_docs/rates.pdf Feldstein, M. (1995). The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Journal of Political Economy 103, 551572. ! Saez, E. (2004). Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates, 1960-2000: Evidence and Policy Implications, in J. Poterba (ed.), Tax Policy and the Economy vol. 18. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/saez/NBER10273TPE04.pdf Saez, E., J. Slemrod, and S. Giertz (2009). The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review. Forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Literature. http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/saez/saez-slemrod-giertzNBER09.pdf 17. Tax inefficiencies and optimal commodity taxation

(i) Reasons for using commodity taxes. (ii) The deadweight loss from commodity taxes. (iii) The Ramsey optimal tax problem and the Inverse Elasticity Rule. (iv) The uniformity versus selectivity debate. (v) Extensions: equity concerns, externalities, internalities. (vi) Cigarette taxation as a case study. ! Chapter 20 in Gruber (2011). ! Slemrod, J. (1990). Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, 157-178. Stern, N. (1990). Uniformity Versus Selectivity in Indirect Taxation. Economics and Politics 2, 83-108. 18. Optimal income taxation

(i) The fundamental theorems of welfare economics and the informational constraint in income taxation. (ii) The deadweight loss from income taxation. (iii) The optimal income tax problem. (iv) The relationship between optimal income taxation and the Laffer curve. (v) The optimal marginal tax rate at the top. ! Chapter 20 in Gruber (2011). ! Brewer, M., E. Saez, and A. Shepard (2008). Means Testing and Tax Rates on Earnings. IFS Working Paper, forthcoming in The Mirrlees Review: Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century, Oxford University Press. http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/press_docs/rates.pdf

EC325 Public Economics 2013-14

Camille Landais

10

P. Diamond and E. Saez. The case for a progressive tax: From basic research to policy recommendation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4):165190, Nov. 2011.

19.

Taxation and savings

The theory of how taxation affects savings. The two-period Fisher life-cycle model of saving. Problems with the standard life-cycle model. Behavioural models of saving. Optimal taxation of savings. Applying the Fisher model. Empirical analysis: behavioural models and institutional design. Gruber (2011), ch 22 B D Bernheim and A Rangel (2005), Behavioral public economics: Welfare and policy analysis with non-standard decision makers, NBER Working Paper 11518, [http://www.nber.org/papers/w11518] Sections 3 (especially pp15-28, 33-35) and 6. J Choi, D Laibson, B Madrian, and A Metrick (2004) For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior in David Wise, ed., Perspectives in the Economics of Aging. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 81121. [http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/laibson/files/forbetter.pdf] R G Hubbard and J Skinner (1996), Assessing the effectiveness of savings incentives, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10:4, 73-90.
[http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138555]

B D Bernheim (1999), Taxation and Saving, NBER Working Paper 7061 [http://www.nber.org/papers/w7061], published in A Auerbach and M Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics, (pp 1-10, 28-38, 46-52, 65-66) 20. Public Finance and Development

(i) Lessons from optimal tax theory. (ii) Actual tax systems across countries and over the course of development. (iii) Explaining the divergence between optimal and actual tax systems in under-developed economies. (iv) Tax evasion and tax enforcement: theory and evidence. ! Gordon, R. and W. Li (2009). Tax structures in developing countries: Many puzzles and a possible explanation. Journal of Public Economics 93, 855-866. ! Kleven, H., M. Knudsen, C. Kreiner, S. Pedersen, and E. Saez (2011). Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark. Econometrica 79, 651692. http://personal.lse.ac.uk/kleven/Downloads/MyPapers/Publications/KlevenEtAl_E CTA_May2011.pdf Kleven, H., C. Kreiner, and E. Saez (2009). Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries. NBER Working Paper 15218, August 2009. http://personal.lse.ac.uk/KLEVEN/Downloads/MyPapers/workingPapers/NBER_w1 5218.pdf

EC325 Public Economics 2013-14

Camille Landais

11

Kleven, H. and M. Waseem (2011). Tax Notches in Pakistan: Tax Evasion, Real Responses, and Income Shifting. Working Paper, May 2011. http://personal.lse.ac.uk/kleven/Downloads/MyPapers/workingPapers/klevenwaseem_may2011.pdf Qian, N. and T. Piketty (2009). Income Inequality and Progressive Income Taxation in China and India, 1986-2010. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1, 5363.

EC325

PUBLIC ECONOMICS CLASSES

Class work You will be asked to do two class presentations (to be submitted no later than one week after the class presentation in the form of a presentation handout), one on a Michaelmas term topic and one on a Lent Term topic, plus two termly written assignments, to be submitted via Moodle, by noon on Wednesday, December 18th (for the Michaelmas term topics) and by noon on Wednesday, March 19th (for the Lent term topics). Presenters must provide members of the class with copies of a one-page essay plan (outline) for their presentation (or copies of slides, where relevant). Class presentations should not take more than 12 minutes. Since your presentation is your contribution to the common good, failure to show up to give your presentation is regarded as a serious offence. The programme of classes will be circulated before classes start in week 4.

EC325 Public Economics 2013-14

Camille Landais

12