..

1
..
GRENADA
A PRELIMINARY REPORT
"The Marshal said that over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in
Latin America, today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious battle is
going on in El Salvador.''
-- Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Army Chief of
General Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkou and Grenadian Army
Chief of Staff Einstein Louison who was then in the Soviet
Union for training
March 10, 1983
"All citizens are asked to remain at home .. _ anyone who violates this
curfew will be shot on sight."
-- The Revolutionary Military Council
October 19, 1983
"I fully support President Reagan's moue... He really_ did save our lives. "
-- Grace Brooke, U.S. citizen studying in Grenada.
October 26, 1983
"The people of Grenada ... have welcomed the presence of the troops
[of the U.S.-Caribbean security force] as a positive and decisive step forward in
the restoration not only of peace and order but also of full sovereignty . .. "
Sir Paul Scoon, Governor General of Grenada
October 28, 1983
"Thank God they came. If someone had not come in and done some-
thing, I hesitate to say what the situation in Grenada would be now."
-- Alister Hughes, Grenadian journalist
October 29, 1983
Released by the Department of State and the Department of Defense
December 16, 1983
Washington, D.C.
Oo g-- ooo- ():)40Ys I- tJ
PREFACE
On October 25, 1983, units of the armed forces of the
United States joined with forces from six English-speaking
Caribbean countries to protect U.S. and other foreign
citizens and to restore order in Grenada.
What the joint forces found in Grenada included:
Five secret military agreements -- three with the
Soviet Union, one with North Korea, and one with
Cuba;
Written indications of additional military
agreements with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia;
Almost 900 Cuban, Soviet, North Korean, Libyan;
East German and Bulgarian personnel, including
"permanent" military advisers;
Artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, armored personnel
carriers and rocket launchers;
Thousands of infantry weapons with millions of
rounds of ammunition;
Grenadians imprisoned and tortured, occasionally in
the presence of Cubans;
Documents, notes and other evidence of a concerted
attempt to transform Grenada into an instrument for
Cuban and Soviet objectives; and
A warm welcome from Grenada's people, 91 per cent
of whom were "glad the United States troops came,"
according to a CBS News poll conducted on November
3, 1983.
All documents quoted in this report have been released
to the public. Although the information they contain is
impressive, large numbers of additional documents remain
to be catalogued and analyzed, hence the preliminary
nature of this report.
Readers wishing to obtain copies of documents quoted
in this report should direct inquiries to the Department
of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. 20520.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
I. The Collective Action 1
II. The New Jewel Movement and the 7
People's Revolutionary Government
III. Human Rights in Grenada 15
IV. The Military Buildup 18
V. Internal Breakdown 31
VI. Recent Developments 40
Appendix
iii
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OCEAN
---------------------
iv

I. The-Collective Action
In the early morning of October 25, 1983, elements of
a combined U.S.-Caribbean security force landed on the
beaches south of Pearls Airport and parachuted into the
Point Salines Airport. This force included units from the
United States, Barbados, Jamaica and four member states of
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. u.s. forces
provided airlift, sea and mechanized support for the
operation.
By October 28, all significant military objectives had
been secured, including the two airports, the campuses of
the St. Georges University School of Medicine, the
Governor General's residence, the radio and power
stations, Forts Frederick and Rupert, and the Richmond
Hill prison.
The combined forces were under strict orders to
minimize casualties on all sides. U.S. casualties
totalled 18 killed in action and 116 wounded in action.
Grenadian casualty figures were 45 killed and 337
wounded. Of the Grenadian dead, 24 were civilians,
including 21 killed in the accidental bombing of a mental
hospital l o ~ t e d next to an anti-aircraft installation.
Among the roughly 800 Cubans on the island, 24 were killed
in action and another 59 wounded. Five hundred
ninety-nine American citizens were safely evacuated at
their request.
By November 9, except for two Cuban diplomats, all
Cubans, 17 Libyans, 15 North Koreans, 49 Soviets, 10 East
Germans and 3 Bulgarians had returned to their countries.
Of the two Cubans who initially stayed behind, one left
after being declared persona non grata November 23.
By December 15, all U.S. combat forces had withdrawn;
among the U.S. forces only training, police, medical and
support elements remained
The U.S.-Caribbean Decision to Act
The combined security operation was triggered by the
disintegration of the government of Grenada following the
murder on October 19 of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop,
three cabinet ministers and other leaders.
1
u.s. participation was based on three considerations:
First, to ensure the safety of approximately 1000 u.s.
citizens whose lives were endangered by the breakdown of
law and order, by a shoot-on-sight curfew, and by an
unpredictable internal power struggle. In exchanges with
visiting U.S. officials on October 23 and 24, senior
People's Revolutionary Army officers repeatedly raised
impediments to the orderly evacuation of u.s. citizens
desiring to leave the island. Five State Department
officers on the scene monitored developments continuously
from October 22, and concluded that American lives were in
jeopardy and that a peaceful, orderly evacuation would not
be possible. This judgment was endorsed in public
statements by many of the students on their return. It
also was endorsed, in testimony before the U.S. Congress,
by the Chancellor of the St. Georges University School of
Medicine.
Second, to respond to a formal request for assistance
ftom the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States {OECS),
a regional grouping of Dominica, St. Lucia, Montserrat,
St. Christopher-Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, and Grenada. At a meeting held in
Bridgetown, Barbados on October 21, these democratic
countries determined by unanimous vote that conditions in
Grenada required action under the 1981 treaty that
established the OECS. Grenada, which had no functioning
government at the time, did not attend. The OECS asked
Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States to assist them.
The formal OECS request for u.s. assistance was
received on October 23. It cited "the current anarchic
conditions, the serious violations of human rights and
bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent
unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the
region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada."
Both the OAS Charter, in Articles 22 and 28, and the UN
Charter, in Article 52, recognize the competence of
regional security bodies to ensure regional peace and
stability.
Third, to respond to a confidential appeal from the
Governor-General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, to the OECS
and other regional states to restore order on the island.
The Governor General's appeal carried exceptional moral
and legal weight because it came from the sole remaining
source of governmental in Grenada. An
invitation by lawful government authority is a valid legal
basis for foreign states to provide the requested
assistance.
2

.
Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, chairman of the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States, discusses the situation in Grenada with Secretary of State George Shultz
(left), President Ronald Reagan and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane (back to
camera). The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington,
D. C., October 25, 1983.
3
ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES
Telegraphic Addre: OECAS ST. LUCIA
Telu: 6248 OECAS LC
P.O. Bo% 179,
Telephone: 22537-8 & 23185
Bridge Street,
Caltriea, St. Luclll,
Wut lndlea
Our Ref:
Your Ref:

!'
The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern
caribbean States presents her compliments to His
Excellency the Ambassador of the United States to the
Eastern caribbean and has the honour to transmit herewith
a request for assistance under Article 8 of the
establishing the Organisation of Eastern caribbea11 States.
The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern
caribbean States avails herself of this opportunity to
renew the assurances of her highest consideration.
...

1


Chairman
organisation of Eastern caribbean states
October, 1983
4

.
These three considerations -- the responsibility to
protect u.s. citizens on the island, the request from the
OECS nations, and the Governor General's appeal --
motivated u.s. action. They established a firm legal
foundation for u.s. participation in the collective action.
The Soviet and Cuban Connection
The murder of Maurice Bishop came after four and a
half years of deepening Grenadian political ties to Cuba
and the Soviet Union, a major military buildup based on
those ties, cooperation in the export of subversion, and
repression of human rights and democratic leaders and
organizations at home.
Though not a basis for the collective action, what was
known about the Cuban and Soviet presence in Grenada had,
of course, been a source of American and Caribbean
concern. The evidence found in Grenada since the
collective action provides a far more complete picture of
how one small nation became the victim of Cuban and Soviet
"internationalism."
The Caribbean Basin is strategically important to the
United States. Roughly half of u.s. sea trade and oil
imports pass through the Caribbean. Strategic planning
for the U.S. Navy requires free movement of ships from
ports on the Gulf of Mexico. The Panama Canal remains a
vital chokepoint for shipping.
The airport at Port Salines was scheduled to be
inaugurated on March 13, 1984. With a fully operational
9,000 foot runway under Cuban/Soviet control, MIG-23s from
Cuba and Grenada would have overlapping ranges covering
the entire Caribbean. And while in peacetime it would
have been used for tourism, the runway also would have
facilitated Cuban air support for its 40-50,000 personnel
in Africa, and Libyan and Soviet bloc flights to Central
America. Had the Point Salines Airport been operational
in April 1983, for example, the Libyan airplanes detained
in Brazil while clandestinely ferrying a cargo of military
supplies to Nicaragua could have carried out their mission
by refueling in Grenada .
The Soviet and Cuban embassies in Grenada were large
and active. Grenada's neighbors believed they were
secretly channeling funds to anti-democratic forces in the
Eastern Caribbean linked to Cuba, the USSR, Libya, Eastern
Europe, Viet Nam and North Korea. In addition, an OECS
statement of October 25, 1983, noted that "the extensive
military buildup on Grenada over the past few years has
created a situation of disproportionate military strength
between Grenada and other OECS countries." Already
worried by these activities, Grenada's neighbors were
5
alarmed by the explosion of violence against Bishop and
concerned "that military forces and supplies are likely to
be shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the
regime and that the country can be used as a stagirtg post
for acts of aggression against [OECS] members."
Prime Minister Bishop's visit to the United Sta.tes in
June, 1983, had led to speculation that Grenada might
adopt a more moderate course. In Bishop's meeting with
National Security Advisor William Clark and Deputy
Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, the United States
encouraged such steps. But Bishop's execution by his own
comrades suggests in retrospect that such hopes were not
realistic.
Cuban barracks area at Calivigny, which included perimeter security fencing, obstacle course
and vehicle storage sheds.
6

II. TheNewJewel Movement and the
People's Revolut1onary Government
The New Jewel Movement (NJM) was formed in March 1973
by the merger of two organizations: the Movement for
Assemblies of the People founded by two lawyers, Maurice
Bishop and Kenrick Radix, and JEWEL (Joint Endeavor for
Welfare, Education, and Liberation) led by Unison
Whiteman, Selwyn Strachan, Sebastian Thomas and Teddy
Victor.
After Grenada became independent on February 7, 1974,
a coalition between the NJM and other opposition parties
mounted a serious challenge to long-time Prime Minister
Sir Eric Gairy and received 48 per cent of the vote in the
1976 elections. The eccentric Gairy, however, was popular
with the peasantry and employed armed retainers (known as
the "Mongoose Gang") to intimidate critics.
On March 13, 1979, the NJM took advantage of Gairy's
absence from the country to carry out a coup d'etat. Some
50 to 60 NJM supporters seized the defense force barracks
and the radio station. There was little resistance, and;
Maurice Bishop was named Prime Minister of a new PeopleYs
Revolutionary Government (PRG). On March 25, Bishop
announced suspension of the 1974 Constituti9n, and
indicated that it would be replaced pending revision with
a series of "People's laws."
Radicalization
The NJM started as a loose local grouping
characteristic of many young political activists in the
Eastern Caribbean of the 1970s. The original NJM
manifesto, prepared in 1973 by Bishop and Whiteman, was an
eclectic mixture of West Indian, Tanzanian, Marxist and
nationalist formulations. It emphasized village
assemblies and grassroots agricultural development. It
rejected the "national-cultural prostitution" of the
tourist industry. "We are not in favor of building an
international airport at thrs-time," the 1973 manifesto
declared. "The present airport is more than adequate for
our needs."
Once in power, however, the NJM was transformed by its
ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union. One early link was a
Cuban, Oswaldo Cardenas, who worked with the NJM in
Grenada even before the 1979 coup (and later became Cuba's
Ambassador to Suriname). But the integration of Grenada
into the Soviet bloc was systemic as well as personal.
7
By 1983, Grenada had:
A Marxist-Leninist ruling party, complete with
Central Committee and Politburo;
An army and militia that outstripped the combined
forces of all of its OECS neighbors and provided an
important vehicle for indoctrinating youth;
A highly developed propaganda machine that relied
on government-monopolized media, and
party-controlled entities throughout the society;
An array of mass organizations designed to compel
support for the regime in all sectors of the
society; and
An internal security apparatus that dealt harshly
with critics.
In the United Nations, Grenada voted with the Soviets
and their allies in over 92 percent of the votes of the
1982 General Assembly, including the vote on Afghanistan
-- a pro-Soviet record exceeding even that of Nicaragua.
In Grenada itself, the new airport once rejected by
the NJM became the regime's major project. The rationale
was tourism, and the project had some Western financing
and contractors. But the bulk of the financing came from
Cuba, which was providing services valued at $40 million,
supplemented by $2 million from Syria, $2 million from
Iraq, $6 million from Libya, and $2 million from Algeria.
Construction was in the hands of Cuban workers with arms
and the training to use them.
Marxist-Leninist Power t r u c t ~ r e
Bernard Coard, the leader of the faction that
ultimately clashed with Bishop, started Marxist-Leninist
study groups within the NJM in 1974. Few NJM leaders had
actually studied in Communist countries before 1979. Once
in control of the government, however, both leaders and
party members began to travel routinely for consultation
and training to Cuba, the Soviet Union and to a lesser
extent Eastern Europe.
The NJM developed a Central Committee, a Politburo, a
militia, a National Youth Organization, a National Women's
Organization and other mass organizations designed to
"educate the people," to monitor popular attitudes, and to
develop party cadres. Party members held all major
government positions. Discipline, policy and loyalty
stemmed from the party.
8
..
Instead of the decentralized village assemblies
envisaged in the 1973 NJM manifesto, sectoral mass
organizations provided a high degree of central control.
A series of standardized profiles of local communities
contain analyses of recent political orientation, key
economic, social and military objectives, lists of "our
forces" and of "enemy forces." In the minutes of several
Central Committee meetings there also is talk of
organizing places of work and business, a proposal favored
by Bernard Coard.
Application of Soviet-Economic Model
Instead of local agricultural development, the central
government's planning and allocation role increased
throughout the economy. The minutes from a meeting of
economic ministers held on May 9, 1983, indicate that nine
mid-level economic officials would be sent to attend an
eight-week course being offered by GOSPLAN, the Soviet
economic planning entity. An undated draft resolution on
agriculture discussed "How to build the firm alliance
between the working class and the peasantry, begin the
process of collectivisation and transformation of the
countryside." The minutes of the Central Committee's
First Plenary Session in July 1983 note the "commencement
of long term trade with the socialist community "
Deception on Economic Matters
At a meeting on August 3, 1983, the Political/Economic
Bureau of the NJM noted that International Monetary Fund
requirements for badly needed assistance would be
difficult to meet. "Comrade Maurice Bishop suggested that
we use the Suriname and Cuban experience in keeping two
sets of records in the banks for this purpose." Later in
the meeting, "Comrades again highlighted the urgent
importance of training Comrades to adjust the banking
figures. Someone should be sent to Cuba or the Soviet
Union." And again, "The Comrades from Nicaragua and Cuba
must visit Grenada to train Comrades in the re-adjustment
of the books."
Coordination with Soviet and Cuban Communist Parties
An undated document entitled "Draft workplan of the
International Relations Committee NJM for 1983" indicates
as the overall foreign policy objective "To develop the
International Relations Work .of the Party through
programmes that raise the Internationalist consciousness
9
of our working people, [and] strengthen the Leninist
character of the International Relations Committee "
An agreement between the NJM and the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU}, signed in Moscow on July 27,
1982, cites seven goals, including "to promote cooperation
in the training of party and government cadres" and "to
develop contacts between the party press and other mass
communication media, to inform the public of their
countries about the activity of the two parties, and of
their home and foreign .. "
In a handwritten memo dated October 8, 1983, a
Grenadian student described the first month's activity of
NJM students at the Leninist School of the CPSU.
course lasted from September to July and included topics
such as "Historic Destinies of Marx's Teachings,"
"Proletarian International Law," "Lenin's Definition of
Strategy and Tactics," "Party Organization," and "Social
Psychology and Propaganda." Her report closes:
"We take this opportunity to express . our
confidence in the Party's leadership and
hard, organized, systematic, self-critical,
Leninist-type work. The CPSU International
Leninist Party School NJM Party Cell repledges
our commitment to the Party, to building a strong
party on Marxist-Leninist principles."
Cuba's Targets
An agreement with the Cuban Communist Party signed in
Havana on June 29, 1983, provided for training of
Grenadians in Cuba for:
"work on religion . "
"work on the Socialist International "
"work of Foreign Affairs, fundamentally with the
Caribbean," and
"work of organization, internal education and
propaganda."
In reporting on a June 12, 1982 General Congress of
the World Center for the Resistance of Imperialism,
Zionism, Racism and Reaction, the NJM delegate notes that
"Cuba generally made Grenada aware . what is their
position and general guidelines for us to follow.''
10
j
Seal of the National Youth Organization, the New Jewel party institution for young people.
.
\
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and President Fidel Castro at May Day rally in Havana.
11
A "Secret Regional Caucus" to coordinate efforts to
influence the Socialist International (SI) was held in
Managua on January 6 to 7, 1983. Cuba, which does not
belong to the SI, was represented by a member of the Cuban
Communist Party. Participants noted that "Many of the
European S.I. parties expect us to understand the concept
of 'the Soviet menace'." They agreed to seek actions
expressing SI "solidarity with Nicaragua, Grenada, and the
F.D.R., F.M.L.N., and M.N.R. of El Salvador." The first
and last are political organizations associated with the
Salvadoran the FMLN is the umbrella guerrilla
organization.
Propaganda
With the help of the Soviet Union and Cuba, the NJM
established an elaborate mechanism for disseminating
propaganda.
A document entitled "Work-plan and Guidelines for the
Party's Propaganda Department" includes the following
specific objectives of the 1983 NJM propaganda effort:
"Deepen the consciousness of the masses as to the
history and vanguard role of the party and the
heroes of the revolution . Deepen the
internationalist spirit and socialist
consciousness of the Grenadian masses . Defend
the party and revolution against
counterrevolutionary, backward and reactionary
attacks from inside and outside of Grenada
Guide and co-ordinate the propaganda of the mass
organizations and other party bodies."
In the print medium, the NJM immediately took control
of the old West Indian and converted it to the Free West
Indian, an organ of the new government. The NJM also
established a network of newspapers tied to economic
sectors and mass organizations. The same "Work-plan"
lists the following "party publications" and their
affiliations:
"New Jewel"
"Fight" --
"The Scotilda"
"Fork" --
"Pioneers Voice" --
"Workers Voice"
"Fedon" --
"Cutlass" --
New Jewel Movement
National Youth Organization
National Women's Organization
Productive Farmers Union
National Pioneer Movement (youth group)
Workers Committee
Peoples Revolutionary Armed Forces
Agricultural and General Workers Union
12
Radio Grenada was upgraded from a one-kilowatt station
to a 75-kilowatt station that could cover all the
Caribbean. Renamed Radio Free Grenada (RFG), the new
transmitter was built with Soviet equipment and installed
by Cuban and Soviet technicians. Immediately after
installation of the RFG transmitter, the Cuban news
service, Prensa Latina, began English-language broadcasting
at least partially to support RFG. Just before RFG began
operations, Grenada terminated British BBC broadcasting,
the island's traditional source of international radio
news. Items prepared by the Soviet TASS and the Cuban
Prensa Latina took their place. RFG 'broadcasts followed
the Moscow line on everything from Afghanistan to Poland,
the Soviet downing of the Korean Airlines Flight 007 and
Central America.
In a speech delivered at the inauguration of the
transmitter, on March 11, 1982, Bishop explained his
philosophy of journalism:
"We must make sure that news reflects what we
have been trying to achieve. We must make sure
that the news continues to demonstrate the
achievements of our revolution Therefore,
our broadcasters have a great, great,
responsibility to make sure that every single
word that they say on Radio Free Grenada is a
word that will bring credit and reflect glory on
our people and Revolution."
In addition to building this formidable propaganda
apparatus, the NJM blocked the dissemination of competing
views. It closed all independent news media including the
Torchlight, Catholic Focus and GrenadianVoice. Four
persons associated with the Grenad1anVo1ce, one a high
NJM official, were arrested 1n 1981; they were released
only after the arrival of the u.s.-caribbean security
force. In 1981, a law was passed retroactively
prohibiting publication of these or any other news
journals. In 1982, the Inter-American Press Association
condemned the Government of Grenada for "its repeated
attacks on the freedom of the press."
13
GRENADA, CABRIACOU AND PETIT MARTINIQU3
DETENTION ORDER
)IJ\DE BY '1'11E MINISTER R!!:SI'ONSIBLE FOR J.IAINTEN.ANCE OP PUBLIC
SAF;:TY AND PUBLIC ORDER UNDER REGULAi'IONS 2(1) AND
3(1) OP PEOPLE'S LAW NO. 21 OP 1979 (AS AMENDED)
AND .ALL OTHER FOWERS ZNABLING Hill IN THA!l' BE!Iit.L?.
.. --
-----:.--:--.. ::.,"!;:::::: ............ .
..... ... .... . ..... .
WlmliRIIS. I am.- sat.iai'ied. with respect to
of' Vincennes, St. David's
Mitchell,
I
tbt.1: tc,
.
prevent him acting in. a manner prejudicial to public saf'ety, public.,
order or the def'eno& of' Grenada, or with a view. :to .. subverting or
sabotaging the Peoples Revolutionary_ Governmei!t it is necessar,y to
provide f'or his preventive detention:
...... !'!OW TlmREl'OIIB :r:, 14ini.ster responsible tor maintenance of' public
-- tht! 8t!id.-::Xnt11onyliitcb.i1"---
- . . ..... - . . .. .. __ . . . . ......
or Vine Annes
1
. St.. -David e 'BE' DETiiiNED. J.n such place ..-.ad u-'ldcr
-- ...... .. ...._ . - .-
. auoh oollditiODB. as I may trom title to time direct.
GROUNDS. FOR DETENTION
That the said
Anthor.y Mitchell
on the 15th
dey of' October 19 7! is euspected counselling
and with other .Pflrscns to take action of' such a nature that
was likel,y to endanger public llll!ety, public. ordor or the dof'ence o:r
or to subvert. or sabot ega the People s Revolutionary Govertllllent
. ..... ---.. . --. .
.... ..
- .ds:/
- ... -. , ...
---.

. ..... _ _. .... _..._.....,
]!ovembar
1979

---......
....... ...... ___ .,,. __ _
Kinister of' National
Detention order for political prisoner, signed by "Minister of National Securi1:y" Maurice
Bishop.
14
III. Human Rights in Grenada
Public reaction to government abuses was muted because
of the regime's control over information media and its
ruthlessness in imprisoning its opponents or forcing them
into exile. Grenada consistently refused to permit
inspection of prison conditions by the International
Committee of the Red Cross.
The Grenada section of the CountrS e ~ o r t s on-Human
Rights Practices for 1982, published y t e State
Department, states:
"The overthrow of the Gairy regime established
Grenada as having the first nonconstitutional
change of government in the commonwealth
Caribbean Prime Minister Bishop has
justified the continued detention of political
prisoners by arguing that 'every revolution
creates dislocations' There is physical
evidence that prisoners have been abused during
detention. Physical scarring would appear to
substantiate their claim of having been burned by
cigarettes and tortured with electric cattle
prods .. "
In suspending the 1974 constitution, the People's
Revolutionary Government empowered itself to arrest
persons without warrant tor suspected counterrevolutionary
activity. Although a 1980 law established a three-member
tribunal appointed by the government to review these
preventive detention cases, the tribunal did not adhere to
its announced schedule of semi-annual meetings. Because
the relevant law did not oblige the government to press
charges, political detainees could be held indefinitely
without formal charges.
In lieu of arrest. warrants, "preventive detention
orders" were issued. These orders stated only that the
accused was "reasonably suspected of counseling and
conspiring with other persons to take action of such a
nature that was likely to endanger public safety, public
order or the defence of Grenada or to subvert or sabotage
the People's Revolutionary Government." The orders also
provided that the accused "be detained in such place and
under such conditions as I may from time to time direct"
and often were signed by Bishop as "Minister of National
Security."
15
New Jewel internal surveillance report. Such reports, including lists of "enemies," were
made of each locality on the island.
16
-
-
----------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 21, 1983, Acting Commissioner of Prisons
Justin Roberts stated under oath that the Government of
Grenada was then holding 78 persons without charge at
Richmond Hill Prison for national security reasons. At
that time, some 25 members of the Rastafarian sect were
being held at the Hope Vale detention camp. With 103
prisoners, the People's Revolutionary Government was then
holding roughly one Grenadian out every 1000 as a
political prisoner.
Jerry Romaine, a former manager of Radio Grenada,
spent four years in Richmond Hill Prison without official
charges. He estimated after his release by U.S. and
Caribbean forces that 1,000 Grenadians -- one per cent of
the population -- were held as political prisoners at one
time or another during the four years of the Bishop
regime. Their ranks included "politicians, journalists,
labor union leaders, government officials, a sur'prisingly
large number of disenchanted members of the ruling New
Jewel Movement, and anyone else considered a threat."
Antonio Langdon, a Grenadian with permanent legal
residence in the U.S., was arrested by the Bishop regime
on August 15, 1979 during one of his periodic visits to
Grenada. He was freed four years later when his guards
abandoned their post at the Richmond Hill prison on the
first day of the combined action. Following his release,
Mr. Langdon publicly stated that he had been in prison for
more than a year before he was given any reason for his
arrest. As explained to him, he was under detention for
m k i n ~ remarks critical of the Grenadian revolution while
still in Brooklyn. On May 7, 1980, a prison guard shot
him three times at close range with a Soviet AK-47. As a
result, Mr. Langdon's chest is badly scarred and his left
arm paralyzed. Mr. Langdon also testified that he was
beaten and tortured, at least once by insertion of steel
rods into his upper back, an operation carried out under
the supervision of a Cuban "neurologist."
Following the murder of Bishop, members of his cabinet
and many civilians, the Revolutionary Military Council
closed down the airport, interfered with telephone and
telex lines, declared a 24-hour shoot-on-sight curfew and
arrested Alister Hughes, the only independent Grenadian
journalist with international standing.
17
IV. The Military Buildup
When the NJM took power in 1979, Grenada had a
British-style constabulary and a small and lightly-armed
defense force. By October 25, 1983, Grenada had a regular
army approaching 600 supplemented by a militia estimated
at between 2,500 and 2,800 members.
The decision to create a militia was announced soon
after Bishop took power. The militia's mission was to
assist the army in national defense, to perform
neighborhood control duties, and to serve as a vehicle for
ideological recruitment and indoctrination. Militia
members were uniformed but unsalaried, and received two
months of basic infantry training at army camps or other
sites, followed by two-hour classes each week largely
devoted to political education. Service in the militia
gradually came to be seen as a prerequisite for government
employment.
In January, 1981, the PRG formed the Peoples'
Revolutionary Armed Forces (PRAF), composed of the
People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), the People's
Revolutionary Militia (PRM), the Grenada Police Service
(GPS), the Coast Guard, the Prison Service, the Fire
Service, and the Cadet Corps. General.Hudson Austin, a
former prison guard, was placed in command of both the
PRAF and the PRA.
Although its forces already dwarfed those of its OECS
neighbors, Grenada was planning to field 3 more active
battalions and 9 more battalions in reserve. A July 2,
1982, request by the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Grenada to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union reads
as follows:
"The plan for the development of the Armed Force
during the three (3) year period 1983 to 1985 for which
the assistance is required is as follows:
"1983 (i) Further consolidation of:
(a) One Permanent Infantry Battalion.
(b) Five (5) Reservist Infantry Battalions plus
assurance and support units.
(ii) The creation of:
(a) Two ~ ) more regular Infantry Battalions
18
C 0 r ] A ill E H. H E
MeJ:i,ey IlpaBI-!TeJibCTBOM rpeHa,I:Ib! 11 IlpaBI-!TeJibCTBOM
CoseTCKI-!X COUI-!aJII-ICTI-!qecKI-!X o
ITOCTaBKax H3 CCP B rpeHa,I:IY cne1.1HaJibHOrO
H
CoaepweHHO ceKpeTHO
IT P 0 T C K 0 JJ
K -COrna.t:JeHI!lO Me:;my rpeHa.Ilbl
H CCCP OT 27 OKTR5pl!
1980 o nocTaaxax H3 CCCP B rpeHanY
H
DpaBHTenbCTBO rpeHa.Ilbl H DpaBHTenbCTBO C0!032 CoeeTCKHX
PecnyOnHK
P?.CTCCOL
-----
0!" TS COLLAECR.ATI0:1 BET'.-IEN TE OF TEE
OF C<JEA Ai'lD T::E P'"OPLE' S REVOLUTIONAHY GOVE;:;N;1ENT-
OF GRENADA
of the Republic of Cuca end People's Revoluti
nary Government of Grenada, in full exercise of their sovereign
right as free end incependent State, cased o:. the fraternal
Pages from the Soviet, North Korean, and Cuban military agreements with Grenada.
19
(b) Four (4) more reservist Battalions plus
assurance and support units.
"1984 Formation of one additional regular Infantry
Battalion together with two (2) reservist
battalions plus assurance and support units.
"1985 Formation of three (3) additional reservist
battalions plus assurance and units."
The proposed 18-battalion force, even if organized
into relatively small battalions along Cuban lines, would
put 7,200 men and women under arms. Battalions of more
conventional size would raise this to some 10,000 OI' more,
excluding personnel on the general staff and in other
support functions. In proportion to population, this
would have given Grenada one of the largest military
forces of any country in the world.
Military Agreements with the Soviet Union, Cuba-andNorth
orea
Documents found by the u.s.-caribbean security forces
on the island indicate that in the last three years,
Grenada signed at least five military assistance
agreements: Three with the Soviet Union, one with Cuba
and one with North Korea. The existence of a similar
agreement with Czechoslovakia is suggested by a bill of
lading and by an extensive memorandum written in the
Grenadian embassy in Havana, which also mentions a
military agreement with Bulgaria.
Secrecy. All of Grenada's military agreements were
secret. The agreements with the USSR commit both
governments to taking "all necessary measures to ensure
keeping in secret the terms and conditions of the
deliveries, all the correspondence and information
connected with [their] implementation." The protocol with
Cuba provides that Grenada and Cuba will "assure the
secrecy of the of the military personnel in
both states and the character of the activities, as well
as the mail and information related to the present
Protocol."
What was to-be provided. Taken together, the Soviet,
Cuban, North Korean and inferred Czechoslovakian
agreements provide for delivery by 1986 of the following
(excludes some small weapons and support items):
About 10,000 assault and other rifles, including
Soviet AK-47s, Czech M-52/57s, sniper rifles
and carbines.;
20
.'
More than 4,500 submachine and machine
More than 11.5 million rounds of 7.62mm

294 portable rocket launchers with more than
16,000
84 82mm mortars with more than 4,800 mortar

12 75mm cannon with some 600 cannon
60 crew-served anti-aircraft guns of various
sizes, with almost 600,000 rounds of

15,000 hand
7,000 land
30 76mm ZIS-3 field guns with almost 11,000
rounds of
30 57mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns, with about 10,000
rounds of
50 GRAD-P howitzers with 1,800 122mm
60 armored personnel carriers and patrol
vehicles;
86 other vehicles and earthmovers;
4 coastal patrol boats;
156 radio
More than 20,000 sets of uniforms; and
Tents capable of sheltering more than 5000
persons.
This listing includes enough to outfit a force of
10,000 with half that number in the field.
21
The Cuban Role
Early arms deliveries. Cuba began to provide arms as
soon as the NJM seized power. A 1981 memo from the
Grenadian Chief of Staff lists the following weapons
received from Cuba in April 1979:
3,400 Soviet and u.s. rifles with 3 million rounds
of ammunition;
200 machineguns with a half-million rounds of
ammunition;
100 pistols with 66,000 rounds;
100 shoulder-fired rocket launchers with 4,000
rockets;
12 82mm mortars with 4,800 mortar shells;
12 75mm cannon with 600 shells; and
12 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns with 237,000 rounds.
These 3,800 infantry weapons and 36 artillery pieces
arrived in Grenada long before the government had begun to
organize its expanded military establishment. Cuba's
rapid response is a good measure of its early interest in
Grenada.
Cuba asSovietintermediary. Cuba also took the lead
in developing the Soviet bloc's military relationship with
Grenada. The first two Soviet agreements were signed in
Havana. The terms of all of the agreements with the USSR
called for Soviet delivery of arms and supplies to Cuba
for transshipment to Grenada. When in 1981, Prime
Minister Bishop wished to send Army General Hudson Austin
to the Soviet Union to discuss additional needs and
assistance, he wrote to "Comrade Raul" {probably Raul
Castro) asking for "advice and suggestions on the best
ways to present this document to the Soviets." It was
through the Grenadian embassy in Havana that Grenada
formally requested the meeting with the Soviets. A bill
of lading for "1,250 cases explosive ammunition {warheads,
rocket)" sent by Czechoslovakia shows that other suppliers
followed the Soviet pattern of shipping via Cuba.
Military Training. A signed but undated treaty with
Cuba prov1ded for n1ne Cuban military "specialists" to be
stationed permanently in the General Staff of the PRA and
twenty to be stationed in the field with Grenadian units.
In addition, more Cuban military personnel were to be
22
:
J
assigned temporarily, six to the General Staff and six or
seven elsewhere on Grenada. Their mission was to "assist
Grenadian military men on the questions of Organization of
the Organic Structure, Organization of the Instruction and
combative and campaign training of the troops and
staffs and in the elaboration of the operative and
mobilization plans for the defence of the country." Teams
of experts were to be made 'available for service in
Grenada, and scholarships were to be provided to train
Grenadians in Cuban military centers.
The Soviet Role
Arms deliveries. The three Soviet agreements cited in
this report prov1de for delivery between 1980 and 1986 of
more than 1,000 pistols, more than 4,000 submachine guns,
more than 90 portable rocket launchers, 7,000 land mines,
15,000 hand grenades and virtually all of Grenada's
heavier artillery and heavier ammunition: 84 mortars, 400
heavy machine guns, 48 anti-aircraft guns, 50 GRAD-P
howitzers, 30 field guns, and 30 anti-tank guns. The
agreements also furnish sixty armored personnel carriers
and patrol vehicles, in addition to 86 other
military-related vehicles, and some 14,000 uniforms.
Military training. According to captured documents,
the USSR also prov1ded specialist training and courses for
selected high ranking officers. Army Chief of Staff
Einstein Louison attended a six-month course in the Soviet
Union. Both of Grenada's two Deputy Secretaries of
Defense, Lt. Col. Liam James and Lt. Col. Ewart Layne,
went to the USSR for training. All three Soviet-Grenadian
military agreements called for sending Grenadian
servicemen to the USSR to be trained in the use of the
promised Soviet equipment. The treaty signed in July,
1982, also stipulated that Soviet specialists would be
sent to Grenada.
Intelligence Training. In addition to military
training, the Soviet Union also furnished intelligence and
security training for a handful of Grenadians. A letter
dated February 17, 1982 from Army Commander Hudson Austin
to the then chairman of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, requested
training for three Grenadians for one year in
counter-intelligence and one Grenadian in intelligence.
Use of economic "cover". The U.S.-Caribbean security
forces found Sov1et weaponry in crates marked "Oficina
Economica Cubana," Cuban Economic Office. Bernard Coard's
trip to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in May and
June 1980 -- the first public Grenadian effort to seek
23
Soviet aid -- was portrayed as an economic mission. But
his discussions were followed by the secret signing in
Havana on October 27, 1980, of the first of the
USSR-Grenada military assistance agreements discovered in
the wake of the collective action. This was eighteen
months before the USSR opened an embassy in Grenada. The
documents also show that Grenadian contacts with the
Soviet Union were handled primarily by Coard. Bishop,
Army Commander Hudson Austin and lesser officials also
were involved, but Bishop in particular had closer
contacts with Cuba.
The Soviet-Bloc Role
East Germany was the most heavily involved of the
Soviet bloc countries, providing several kinds of
assistance. Documents confirm that East Germans were
active in party, trade union and youth organizations, and
provided equipment for security forces, including
uniforms, bedding, knapsacks and pistols. Two East
Germans were also upgrading the island's telephone
system.
Czechoslovakia supplied 3,000 assault rifles, 50
rocket propelled grenade launchers, and more than a
million rounds of ammunition.
North Korea
North Korea and Grenada announced a five-year
development program during Prime Minister Bishop's trip to
P'yongyang in April, 1983. According to the public
announcement, North Korea would help build a 15,000-seat
stadium, a party headquarters building, a fruit-processing
factory, two fishing boats and an irrigation system.
North Korea would provide technical advisors and some
construction materials and equipment, while Grenada would
provide the bulk of the labor and materials and pay for
the expenses of the technicians.
During that same visit to P'yongyang, however, Bishop
concluded a secret military assistance agreement in which
North Korea promised to supply small arms, ammunition and
equipment to equip a force of more than 1,000 men. This
equipment, listed in the formal agreement at a value of
$12 million, was to include 1,000 assault rifles, 80
machine guns, 50 portable rocket launchers, 2 coast guard
patrol boats, 6,000 uniforms, and large amounts of
ammunition and other equipment.
24
:
MHHHCTEPCTBO OGOPOHbl CCCP
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Hacrollmee CBHJleTeJJbCTBO _BbiJlaHo ..... .
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THE MINISTRY OP DEPENCE, USSR
CERTIFICATE
AN N'! 46207
This . is to certif>: that ........................................ ..
. .. .. . .-........ .. .......
entered in . .. ... 198.-l ... and graduated
from ................................................................................. ..
........................ ..... ........................... .
........................................... in .... !9.3.J.

The bearer of the Present Certificate enjoys
.
Military training certificate given by Soviet defense ministry to Major Einstein T. Louison.
25
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on cooperation between the J E
of Grenada and ihe Commu
of the Soviei Union
Thf, Central Commiiiee of t.Jew JEWEL Movemeni c' G
Communis! Farty o! the Sc,. oel Ur.ion.
guided by the desire to det;:>tn relations be!wten the t"
solidarity,
noiing ihat common cornmit:;,t:ni io ihe id:l!lls o! pel!ICe, :-,,
atific socia!ism creafes favourc:,le for
proceeding from common in 1he sin:ggle against rrr.;:
rea.:-iion in al! their iorms end rnaniiesiBfions,
,.cauerling iheir .constant striving fo render
1r freedom, inde::ptndence and social progress,
considering thaf jnter-party cooperaiion ts a rr.osi im;Jc
"dly rE-la!ions between the pec;:,les of Grenede the Soviei
L 'b L'.
have signed the present uncie' wcuc" c.n.;:>a
1. io e>:iend end de-epen iheir '2;
2. Coniinuosly. to ex?erience ir-. v-.ork end
mic. and ccHural developmeni iheir countries, induding -reg;..
derials.on 1he .. roresaid topics.
3. Regularly. to exchange d.;i.;gation:S o! pariy ..;orke,s,
anges-'Of :opinionon international metiers, t:-robiems-::c! =-ihe
esen!-day social development, and other .rr.atiers ol mutual "
-- -----":-- :_ ... __ :_: __ r -- -'
Cooperation agreement between New Jewel Movement and Communist Party of Soviet
Union.
26
The-Cuban Presence
Cuban construction workers, other paramilitary
personnel and regular military forces in Grenada
outnumbered the total active strength of the Grenadian
People's Revolutionary Army (PRA). Cuban advisers held
positions in all key ministries.
According to an official Cuban communique, 784 Cubans
were on Grenada on October 25. The Cuban breakdown lists
636 as construction workers. Military and security
personnel, not including a dozen crew members of two
Soviet-built AN-26 transports, were listed as 53. Not
counting Carlos Diaz of the Americas Department of the
Cuban Communist Party, diplomats were listed as 18. Other
Cuban ministries listed as having more than 6 persons on
Grenada were Public Health, with 17, and Education, with
12.
Referring to the construction workers, Fidel Castro
stated at his October 26 press conference that "of course,
as workers, like all workers in Cuba, they have received
military training."
Cuban workers constructed a battalion-sized military
camp at Calivigny, less than five miles from the airport.
The camp included a large training area and Soviet-style
obstacle course. At Frequente, adjacent to the airport, a
Cuban barracks had rifle racks down the center aisle.
The Cuban officer who had commanded the Cuban military
mission in Grenada from 1981 until May 1983, Colonel Pedro
Tortolo Comas, returned to command the Cuban-led
resistance less than 24 hours before the landing of the
u.s.-Caribbean security force. More than 40 Cuban
military advisers on the scene were reporting to Havana
through a Cuban vessel, the Viet Nam Heroico, stationed
immediately outside St. Georges harbor. Relative to their
numbers, the highest casualty rate was suffered by the
Cubans, who had been instructed by Fidel Castro to "fight
to the death" in spite of U.S. assurances to Havana that
all Cubans would be treated humanely and repatriated to
Cuba as soon as practicable.
The Weapons Actually Found
Large numbers of weapons, many still in crates, have
been discovered on Grenada. The single largest
concentration was at Frequente, which probably was the
"central store room" referred to in several documents.
There were six warehouses at that site: one for arms; one
27
Crates of Soviet 7 .62mm small arms ammunition found in storage on Grenada.
U.S. Marines gather Soviet-built weapons captured from combatants.
28
.
.:
.
Soviet rocket propelled grenades (RPG's) in their shipping containers.
29
for and four for quartermaster items, spare
parts and vehicles. Arms also were found at the Cuban
construction camp, Fort Rupert, Fort Frederick, Richmond
Hill and many smaller caches.
A complete inventory of these weapons will be released
when it is available.
ThePoint Salines-Airport
The precise purposes behind this military buildup
remain unclear, but ostensibly civilian projects such as
the extension to 9,000 feet of the runway at the Point
Salines Airport, and the Soviet study of the feasibility
of a Grenadian port to service large deep-draft ships., had
important military potential.
Cuba reached an agreement with Grenada in November
1979 to build a new airport in the Point Salines area of
southern Grenada. Before the month was out, a pilot team
of 36 Cuban construction workers had arrived to begin the
project. The following March, the Cuban merchant ship
Plaza Larga arrived in Grenada with heavy construction
equ1pment and a brigade of 136 construction workers. By
November, 1980, the total involved in building the airport
had reached 300. According to the Cuban government
communique cited earlier, the total in October, 1983, was
636. .
Whiie most Grenadian officials consistently denied
that the Point Salines airport would serve any military
purpose, the possibility of both Soviet and Cuban use was
clearly envisaged. Selwyn Strachan, the Grenadian
Minister of Mobilization, stated publicly in 1981 that
Cuba would eventually use the new airport to supply troops
in Africa, and that the USSR would also find it useful
because of its "strategic location" astride vital sea
lanes and oil transport routes. An NJM member who had
received training in Moscow wrote in his personal
notebook, apparently in October, 1983, that rumors were
being spread that "the Party wanted Bishop to sign for the
Airport to be a Military Base and he did do that."
Finally, the Cuban motivation for constructing such a
modern, all-weather airport must be assessed in light of
the other Cuban activities on Grenada.
30
..
V. Internal Breakdown
While Grenadians were becoming disillusioned with the
regime, friction was rising sharply between Prime Minister
Bishop and a faction led by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard
Coard and his wife, Phyllis, who controlled Radio Free
Grenada.
Party Disarray
The draft minutes of the First Plenary Session of the
NJM Central Committee, July 13-19, 1983, express
dissatisfaction within the party:
"Over the year under review our Party has
demonstrated many weaknesses -- ideologically,
politically and organizationally. At the same
time, the emergence of deep petty bourgeois
manifestations and influence in the Party has led
to two ideological trends [one Marxist-Leninist
and the other not]."
The August 26, 1983, extraordinary meeting of the
Central Committee again raised these misgivings:
"We need to look at this situation in a special
way -- We are seeing the beginning of the
disintegration oftheparty." (Lt. Col. Liam
James, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Interior;
emphasis in original)
"Sections of the party have begun to rebel
against the higher organs of the party This
silent rebellion will turn into open rebellion if
we do not address it now it will be resolved in a
petty bourgeois way " (Minister of
Mobilization Selwyn Strachan)
Party Restructuring
In response to these criticisms, another extraordinary
Central Committee (C.C.) meeting was convened September
14-16. The agenda was: "(1) Analysis of the party and
revolution, (2) Analysis of the C.C. (Main Problem), (3)
The way fdrward." The session again began with
recriminations:
"[Failure] to build the party into a Marxist
Leninist vanguard in a country that is dominantly
31
petit bourgeois We have to develop an army
with more complicated means. Tighten our
relations with the World Socialist Movement,
especially Cuba, s.u. [Soviet Union], G.D.R.
[East Germany] " (Lt. Col. Ewart Layne,
Deputy Secretary of Defense and Interior)
"In some respects the masses have gone backwards
ideologically using the present positions on the
Korean plane incident and comparing it with the
position of the masses on the Afghanistan in the
early days of the revolution people are
getting their lines from VOA [Voice of
America]." (Chalkie Ventour, Central Committee
Member)
"All programmes of the Revolution are in a very
weak condition, while propaganda work is still
very bad. The mass organizations are showing
less participation in the political work The
guidance of the Women's Committee work is now in
the hands of non-party member The militia is
non-existent, the army demoralized If this
is allowed to continue the party will
disintegrate in a matter of 5-6 months .. the
Comrade Leader [Bishop] has not taken
responsibility, not given the necessary
guidance, is disorganized very often, avoids
responsibilities for critical areas of work ''
(Phyllis Coard)
Prime Minister Bishop joined in the self-criticism but
attempted to deflect the meeting's conclusions toward
increased "individual and collective leadership of the
c.c.i" the need to develop a more Marxist-Leninist work
guide and to improve communication with the masses and
membership of the party.
In the following session, however, Liam James offered
a proposal for restructuring the party leadership. The
completeness of the proposal, its close congruence with
the preceding discussions, and its almost immediate
acceptance by the majority of the Central Committee
suggest prior coordination among the members.
The James proposal called for leadership to be shared
between Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard. Bishop would
remain Prime Minister and Chairman of the Central
Committee, but his specific responsibilities would be
reduced to the public aspects of party and government
work. Coard would return to the Central Committee as a
full member and chair the Politburo and the key Organizing
32
..
.
Committee. In addition, Coard would be responsible for
party organization, the "formation of cadres," and
"strategy and tactics."
After much discussion, votes were held on
formalization of "Joint Leadership" and specifically on
James' proposal; both were approved by nine votes out of
thirteen. Other shifts in the portfolios of the NJM
leadership also were approved, removing Bishop adherents
from key positions. Bishop did not oppose the decisions
as such but specifically called them a demonstration of
"no confidence" and questioned how he could carry out his
residual duties without the backing of the Central
Committee.
This restructuring was rationalized as follows in the
summary report on the August and September extraordinary
sessions:
"The C.C. acknowledged that in reality joint
leadership had existed in the party for 10
years. During this time, Comrade Bishop in
practice led the party in the areas now assigned
to him and Comrade Coard in his now assigned
areas ...
"In some countries, all of these [leadership]
qualities exist in one Comrade, e.g. Comrade
Lenin possessed them all. So does Comrade Fidel
today. In other countries all the qualities do
not exist in one person, e.g. Nicaragua since the
death of Comrade Fonseca. These qualities exist.
in nine Comrades, hence the establishment of a
nine-man Joint Leadership [the Sandinista
comandantes] ."
In fact, the Central Committee decision represented a
major shift in the leadership of the New Jewel Movement.
Bernard Coard now controlled the chief policymaking
element of the party (and therefore the government), the
Politburo, and the chief administrative organ of the
party, the Organizing Committee. By controlling these two
entities, he controlled two of the three chief organs
reporting to the Central Committee (the third was the
armed forces), thereby nullifying Bishop's theoretical
power as Central Committee chairman.
Bishop probably was kept as Prime Minister because of
his public standing. His political opponents were
apparently seeking a solution that he would not reject out
of hand and that would not enrage his many followers.
33
During the period September 16 to 26, the Central
Committee was in session almost every day. A meeting of
the full party membership overwhelmingly approved the,
restructuring on September 25. Notes from those meetings
indicate a general consensus in favor of addressing the
ideological and organizational problems raised in the
September 14-16 meetings. Except for a general meeting of
party members to which he was brought against his
inclination, Bishop boycotted all meetings for which
minutes are available.
Bishop Fights Back
Bishop departed on September 27 for Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. Before returning to Grenada on October 8, he
also stopped briefly in Moscow and East Berlin and made an
unscheduled visit to Cuba, where he met with both Fidel
and Raul Castro. He was accompanied by two of his
staunchest supporters: Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman
and AgLiculture Minister George Louison.
There is no indication that Bishop received backing
against the Coard faction on his trip. But Bishop's
campaign to regain the leadership of the NJM began in
earnest as soon as he returned. Bishop's bodyguard and
confidant, Cletus St. Paul, and others of his closest
adherents, reportedly began to circulate the rumor that
Bernard Coard was seeking Bishop's assassination.
Pro-Bishop elements of the militia tried to arm and
mobilize. Army Chief of Staff Einstein Louison sought to
rally support for Bishop in the PRA. Strikes and
demonstrations were held at key points including, for
instance, the Ministry of Education. Confusion and
suspicion were widespread. One insider wrote that "C.C.
members have been keeping their distance from each other
and have become very scarce at night."
The issue was joined squarely at a meeting of the
Central Committee on October 12. Bishop challenged both
the decision of the Central Committee on September 16 and
the idea of sharing power with Coard. According to
handwritten notes, Liam James led the attack on Bishop:
"We have to be coldblooded and cast all emotions
aside, we have to be determined. MB [Maurice
Bishop] is mainly responsible for the crisis in
the party
There have been threats on the lives of C.C.
Comrades as a result of the crisis -- B and PC
[Bernard and Phyllis Coard] and other comrades
who took the Leninist position.
34
..
"The security forces have adopted a number of
measures to secure the lives of the C.C. and
party comrades. (1) Confine MB [Maurice Bishop]
indefinitely. (2) Phones of MB cut off. (3)
Disarmed for his own safety by PS [Police
Service] comrades to guarantee his safety. (4)
Einstein Louison suspended and confined for his
opposition and petty bourgeois behavior on this
issue. He tried to influence Comrades in AF
[armed forces]. (5) The people spreading the
rumours being called in for strict warning and
others for indefinite detention.
"The situation demands Bolshevik staunchness.
The leadership of AF [armed forces] shares this
view."
Bishop lost again. The Central Committee remained
adamant and apparently voted to place him under house
arrest. On the morning of October 14, according to the
report of one of Bishop's supporters, General Hudson
Austin and Minister of Mobilization Strachan went to his
house and informed him he had been expelled from the
party.
Strachan announced that Coard, who had resigned as
Deputy Prime Minister on October 12, had succeeded Bishop
as Prime Minister. Coard, however, made no statement and
dropped out of sight. (He was not to be seen again until
u.s. forces found him in hiding with Liam James after the
collective action.) Justice Minister Kenrick Radix was
arrested for organizing a demonstration on Bishop's behalf.
General Austin, in an October 17 public statement on
behalf of the NJM, stated:
" Sisters and brothers, over the past
four-and-a-half years, the Central Committee has
struggled very hard to win Comrade Bishop to a
position of collective leadership. Comrade
Bishop was hoping to use the masses' love for him
and violate the principled stand by the Central
Committee of the party Even with all the
love and admiration which exists within our party
for Comrade Maurice, the entire membership,
except for a tiny minority, fully support the
position of the Central Committee Comrade
Bishop is at home and he is quite safe."
35
The Final Confrontation
On October 18, after five days of effort to achieve a
compromise, five ministers loyal to Bishop resigned:
Jacqueline Creft (Education), Norris Bain (Housing),
George Louison (Agriculture), Lyden Ramdhanny (Tourism)
and Unison Whiteman (External Affairs). Whiteman stated
that "Comrade Coard, who is now running Grenada, has
refused to engage in serious talks to resolve the
crisis ... it became clear to us that they did not want a
settlement and seemed determined to use force and provoke
violence to achieve their objective." That day, school
children demonstrated for Bishop's return to office.
On October 19, shops closed. A crowd of several
thousand, apparently led by Whiteman, freed Bishop and
Creft, also held prisoner at Bishop's home. They then
proceeded via the marketplace to Fort Rupert, where Radix
was believed imprisoned. Once there, the crowd disarmed
the garrison, and Bishop took over the fort's central
office. A few hours later, however, PRA troops, some in
armored personnel carriers, converged on the fort. 'rhey
fired into the crowd, causing numerous casualties and
general chaos. Bishop, Whiteman, Creft, Bain and two
union leaders were captured, brought into the fort's small
interior courtyard, and executed. CANA and EFE wire
services from St. Georges reported 50 casualties,
including women and children, from troops firing into the
crowds.
Radio Free Grenada announced the deaths and the
formation of a Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) headed
by Army Chief General Hudson Austin. That night an
official proclamation announced a round-the-clock, shoot
on sight curfew until October 24 at 6:00 a.m. Agriculture
Minister Louison, a strong supporter of Bishop, was
arrested. Pearls Airport was closed, a LIAT flight from
Barbados was turned back, and all subsequent flights were
canceled.
International journalists arriving in Grenada were met
at the airport and forced to depart the country
immediately. Alister Hughes, a widely respected
journalist and the only independent newsman to file
on-the-spot reports of the freeing of Bishop from house
arrest and later of the shooting at Fort Rupert, was
arrested immediately after Bishop's murder. He was l1eld
in prison until freed by the arrival of the combined
security forces.
On October 21, the curfew was lifted between 10:00 am
and 2:00 pm to allow the purchase of food. Riots and
looting were reported.
36
J
L
Cuba issued a statement asserting its non-involvement,
called for investigation and punishment" of
those guilty of the deaths of Bishop and the others. But
Cuba also reaffirmed its support for the "revolutionary
process" in Grenada.
Diplomats from the u.s. Embassy in Barbados attempted
to travel to Grenada on October 19 but were turned back
because Pearls Airport was closed. On October 22, after
passing a request to the Grenadian authorities through the
medical school, two U.S. diplomats from Embassy Barbados
arrived on a charter flight. On October 23, one of them
met with Major Leon Cornwall, the British Deputy High
Commissioner and the local British representative to
discuss evacuation of u.s. and British nationals.
Cornwall denied that there was any need for an evacuation
and demanded that anyone departing utilize commercial
carriers. However, LIAT, the regional carrier, was no
longer flying to Grenada. Another charter plane brought
in two additional u.s. diplomats, including the Consul
General from Barbados, who continued the conversations
with Cornwall. All U.S. participants concluded that
Cornwall was stalling for time and seeking to impede the
orderly evacuation of U.S. citizens as much as possible.
The RMC announced on the radio on October 22 that a
new cabinet would be appointed "within the next 10 to 14
days." Scattered looting and lawlessness were reported.
Adding to the confusion, the RMC announced that Lt. Ashley
Folkes had been "erroneously named" a member of the
Council the day before, that Pearls Airport would reopen
October 24, and that the curfew would be reduced. In
fact, although a few small planes were allowed to land and
depart, the airport was not opened to normal traffic.
NOTE: Spelling in the quotations from NJM notes and
other documents has been corrected throughout to
facilitate reading.
37
- .... #". ..
..
Grenada's Governor General Paul Scoon
(C) in consultations with Gen. Rudyard
Lewis (L) of Barbados and Prime Min.
Tom Adams (R) of Barbados at Scoon's
residence in St. George's.
October 29, 1983
38
..
American students at St. George University on Grenada surround an American soldier after
his arrival at the campus with the U.S. - Caribbean forces .
Soviet-built BTR-60 P armored personnel carriers disabled during the Grenada operation.
39
VI. Recent-Developments
On October 28, Governor General Sir Paul Scoon
delivered a radio broadcast to the nation thanking the
countries involved for corning to Grenada's assistance and
stating that the Grenadian people had welcomed the troops
as a positive and decisive step toward the restoration of
peace, order and sovereignty.
On November 1, the Governor General broke Grenada's
diplomatic relations with the USSR and Libya and reduced
ties with Cuba.
On November 15, the Governor General named an Advisory
Council to serve as an interim administration until
elections can be held. The Council's membership was as
follows on December 8:
Nicholas Braithwaite - Chairman - health,
education, youth and community development and
sports;
Dr. Alan Kirton - Deputy Chairman - civil services
and secretary to the Advisory Council;
Arnold Cruickshank - agriculture, natural
sources and industrial development;
Dr. James Pitt - construction, housing
environmental matters, science, and technology;
Patrick Emmanuel - foreign affairs, civil aviation
and tourism;
Mrs. Joan Purcell - labor, employment and women's
affairs;
Christopher Williams - without portfolio;
Raymond Smith - telecommunications, information
and postal services; and
Randolph Mark - without portfolio.
Alister Mcintyre, Deputy Secretary General of UNCTAD,
was initially invited by the Governor General to cha.ir the
Advisory Council, but health problems prevented him from
assuming this responsibility. The expertise in economics
he was expected to bring to the Council is now to be
provided by William Demas, Director of the Caribbean
Development Bank, who has agreed to serve as Economic
40
:
Consultant to Grenada. The newly appointed legal advisor,
retired British Foreign Service officer Anthony Rushford,
resigned on December 6, reportedly following disagreements
over the pace of institutional restoration. However, the
Governor General announced December 9 that a Supervisor of
Elections would soon be named, and that voter registration
would begin in March.
In its first ordinance, the interim administration
lifted the state of emergency and created an Advisory
Tribunal to review the cases of persons under detention.
The ordinance also states that except for cases that would
endanger public safety, detainees must be released or
formally detained within 72 hours of being apprehended.
The Tribunal reviewed the cases of all detainees,
concluding that some 30 prisoners fell under the terms of
the new ordinance and should continue in detention.
Additional measures have been taken to assure that
detainees have access to counsel and are held under safe
conditions in accordance with the guarantees of the 1974
constitution. Governor General Scoon has invited access
to detention facilities by the International Committee of
the Red Cross. Efforts are also underway to reorganize
and train the Grenadian police force, which was completely
politicized under the Bishop regime.
Free institutions -- press, trade unions, political
organizations -- have begun to reappear.
Foreign Assistance
As soon as the fighting ceased, the u.s. Agency for
International Development (AID) began to ferry emergency
supplies by air. This assistance included generators,
water tanks, medicine, food, and infant supplies valued at
$475,000. Personnel from the Department of Defense, AID,
the Atlanta Center for Disease Control and the Government
of Grenada together determined the most immediate needs.
AID initiated disaster rehabilitation activities in
health, water, electric power, sewage disposal,
environmental sanitation and critical road repair at an
additional cost of $1.7 million. These activities already
have employed more than 500 Grenadians.
The U.S. Congress in November provided $15 million for
medium- to long-term economic development in Grenada. A
$5 million balance of payments grant under this authority
will help provide liquidity for resumption of commercial
lending to the private sector, help the Grenadian
Government meet local costs of development programs and
help finance essential supplies of food, raw materials and
41
spare parts needed to permit economic recovery and
increased employment.
A number of Caribbean institutions are also expanding
their activities in Grenada. Key areas include
agricultural extension, farm research, private sector
credit and investor identification, development training
and management improvement. Additional projects being
considered include rehabilitation of some 14 miles of
seriously deteriorated roads; training of Grenadians who
are replacing Soviet bloc technicians; labor union
training; and agricultural marketing, land conservation
and soil analyses. The first Peace Corps volunteers are
scheduled to arrive in January.
With regard to the incomplete Point Salines airport,
an economic feasibility study is under consideration to
help Grenadian authorities decide the best approach to
this costly project.
Cheering townspeople of Greenville, Grenada, welcome the arrival of the U.S. -
Caribbean forces.
42
~ ~ ~
APPENDIX
The Government of Grenada
(As of August 31, 1983)
Governor General .. Sir Paul Scoon
Prime Maurice Bishop
Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard
Minister of Agriculture . George Louison
Minister of Communications,
Works and Labor . Gen. Hudson Austin
Minister of Defense and Interior Maurice Bishop
Minister of External Relations . Unison Whitemen
Minister of Education, Youth
and Culture.... . . . Jacqueline Creft
Minister of Health .. Christopher De Riggs
Minister of Housing Norris Bain
Minister of Industrial Development
and Fisheries .. Kenrick Radix
Minister of Lands and Forestry Unison Whitemen
Minister of Justice .................. Kenrick Radix
Minister of National Mobilization Selwyn Strachan
Minister of Tour ism .................. Lyden Ramdhanny
Minister of Women's Affairs ... Jacqueline Creft
.
Attorney General ... .................. Richard Hart
43
Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement
(As of August 31, 1983)
Maurice Bishop, Chairman
General Hudson Austin
Selwyn Strachan
George Louison
Unison Whiteman
Phyllis Coard
Maj. Leon Cornwall
Lt. Col. Liam James
Lt. Col. Ewart Layne
Christopher de Riggs
Chalkie Ventour
Kamau McBarnette
'!'an Bartholomew
Fitzroy Bain
Ian St. Bernard
44
,j
Last U.S. combat troops departing Grenada.
..
~ '
7.62mm ammunition found in crates marked "Oficina Economica Cubana."
..