Watson Self's Awareness of Itself

PUBLICATIONS
OF THE DE NOBILl RESEARCH LIBRARY

EDITED BY
GERHARD OBERHAMMER AND UTZ PODZEIT
VOLUME XXXII
COMMISSION AGENT FOR INDIA:
Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi
I
ALEX WATSON
THE SELF'S AWARENESS OF ITSELF
BHATTA RAMAKANTHA'S ARGUMENTS
. . . -.
AGAINST THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF NO-SELF
1
Wien 2006
ISBN 3-900271-38-0
AIle Rechte vorbehalten
. Copyright 2006
Sarnmlung de Nobill
Institut fUr Sudasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde
der Universitat Wien
Druck: Interpress Co. Ltd., Becsi str. 67, 1037 Budapest, Hungary
For
Harunaga Isaacson
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ............................................................................ 9
REFERENCES, ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS
1. Primary Sources Cited ............................................................ 17
2. Secondary Sources ................................................................ 26
3. Other Abbreviations and Symbols ................................................. 44
4. Conventions ...................................................................... 47
INTRODUCTION
Preliminary Remarks ................................................................ 49
1. The Buddhist-BriihmaIJical Atman Controversy .................................... 51
1.1. Early Buddhism ........................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 52
1.2. Sautrantikas and the Pramfu)a School ............................ 55
1.3. Miidhyamikas ................................................................ 59
1.4. Viitslputfiyas ................................................................. 59
1.5. The Soul Doctrines of Vedanta, Siiilkhya, and MImiirp.sii ............ 60
2. Saiva Siddhanta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 70
3. The Place ofNPP within Saiva Siddhanta ......................................... 74
3.1. Extent and Manner of Engagement with Other Traditions ..................... 74
3.2. The Soul in Saiva Siddhanta and NPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 80
3.3. Reliance on Saiva Scripture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 87
3.4. Comparison with Pratyabhijfiii ................................................ 88
4. RiimakaIgha's Soul Doctrine in Relation to Those of the BriihmaIJical Schools ..... 90
4.1. Vedanta and Siiilkhya in Brief ................................................ 90
4.2. Nyiiya and V ......................................................... 92
4.3. Siiilkhya ................................................. 92
Excursus on RiimakaI;l!ha's Ideas about Liberation ............................. 96
4.4. Knowledge of the Self ....................................... :................ 98
5. Constitution of the Text ofNPP .... 104
5.1. Editions ................................................ .. .... .. .... 104
5.2. Manuscripts................................................................ 105
5.3. Parallel Passages........................................................... 110
5.4. Editorial Policy .......... :................................................. III
6. The Date of Sadyojyotis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III
7. The Date of Ramakar;qha ........................................................ 114
8. RiimakaJ;ltha's Style.............................................................. 115
SYNOPSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF NPP ............ 117
CHAPTER 1: Can We Infer the Existence of the Self?
Background ....................................................................... 125
1. The Buddhist Challenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
2. The Naiyayika Response ........................................................ 130
Brief Remarks about the History of the Argument ............................... 159
Philosophical Summary......................................................... 163
3. ....................................................................... 166
3.1. The Philosophy of Nature Arguments....................................... 166
3.2. The Argument from Qualities to Quality-Possessor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Excursus on in ................................. 176
4. Sfuikhya .......................................................... _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.1. The Sfuikhya Argument .................................................... 192
4.2. Cognition is Self-llluminating ................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
CHAPTER 2: Can We Know the Self Through Self-Awareness (SvasaI!lvedana)?
1. Sadyojyotis' Verse and its Context .............................................. 209
2. RiimakaJ;ltha's Own View. Is It Different from the Buddhist View? ............... 213
3. Does the Perceiver Shine Forth as Stable or Momentary (Sthiragriihakaprakiisa or
Bhinnagriihakaprakiisa)? ................................ _.......................... 220
4. Is theIdea of Superimposition of a Permanent Perceiver Coherent? .............. 236
4.1. Sthiragriihakaprakiisa is Internal, not External . .'............................ 237
4.2. Superimposition Cannot Be Carried Out by Something Momentary. . . . . . . . . . 238
4.3. Cognition Cannot Fool Itself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
4.4. Refutation ofSelf-Awaieness? .............................................. 251
CHAPTER 3: Can We Perceive the Self Through I-Cognition (Ahampratyaya)?
Background ....................................................................... 257
1. The Co-Perception of Self and I-Cognition ...................................... 271
2. The Constancy of I-Cognition ........................................ :.......... 313
3. Do Verbal Cognitions Have Real Referents? ..................................... 319
CHAPTER 4: The Equating of Self and Cognition
Preliminary Remarks .............................................................. 333
1. Simultaneous and Sequentiallllumination- ....................................... 335
Philosophical Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
2. The Selfs Cognition and the Buddhi's Cognition................................ 349
Excursus on the Distinction in Saivism ....................... 373
CONCLUSION ................................................................... . 383
TEXT PASSAGES
CHAPTER 1 -....................................................................... 389
CHAPTER 2 ...................................................................... 395
CHAPTER 3 ............................................................ ,.......... 404
CHAPTER 4 ...................................................................... 409
GENERAL INDEX ............................................................... . 417
PREFACE
The present work is an attempt to understand the ideas of an author writing
over a thousand years ago in a civilisation profoundly different from our own.
Those who undertake to study the products of an alien culture, such as an-
thropologists, historians and philologists, will always have to confront the
question of whether the other's thinking can be understood in the terms of
their own thinking. The fact that, in western scholars' encounter with Bud-
dhis
Ill
over the last two centuries, Buddhist authors have been interpreted as
Hegelian, Heideggerian, Wittgensteinian, Platonic, Stoic, transcendental ide-
alist, phenomenologist, and as akin to Husserl, Russell or Whitehead,
l
indi-
cates that, instead of letting the texts speak for themselves, we have a ten-
dency to superimpose on them perspectives with which we are more familiar.
This raises worrying questions about our ability to recognize what is unfamil-
iar as unfamiliar.
If we want the classical Indian traditions to reveal themselves, not our own
preconceptions, and the voices of their thinkers to come across louder than
our voices, our most powerful tool is philology. While we can never com-
pletely eliminate our own subjectivity, we can, as philologists, attempt to set
it aside to some extent by sticking closely to an observation of the texts them-
selves, and, when interpreting, allowing our analysis to be guided by concepts
and ideas derived from the text itself or other texts of the same general period
and tradition. By devoting energy to the recovery of the precise wording of
the author prior to the many copying mistakes that have entered the transmis-
sion-through gathering variants and parallel' passages, and identifying and
solving corruptions-we can, as if turning the dial of a radio closer to the pre-
cise frequency of the station, reduce background noise and allow the voice to
come across with more clarity, and consequently with less distortion or blur-
1 See Kapstein 20013-8.
10 The Selfs Awareness ofItself
ring of the thought behind the words. By accumulating more and more infor-
mation about the cultural, linguistic and religio-philosophical context of
authorsltexts and by setting them more deeply in that context, we move fur-
ther from our own thought-world and closer to theirs. As we read more
sources, the back and forth of the hermeneutic process mean that the catego-
ries we apply to the texts are tested against richer and richer materials, shown
to be inadequate and hence repeatedly refined, such that we move closer and
closer to the author's own perspective.
Therefore the approach of this book is primarily that of philology. I give the
Sanskrit text of those passages of RamakaI).tha's in which he discusses the
Buddhist doctrine of No-Self, having edited them with the aid of manuscripts
and parallel passages neglected by previous editors (as well as by following
certain emendations suggested by Sanskritists far more advanced than I with
whom I was fortunate to read), I give a translation that ai'ms to be as literal as
possible without sacrificing readability, and I explain how RamakaI).tha's
points. are related to points he makes elsewhere or to views found in earlier
texts of his own or other traditions.
But in order to avoid a certain one-sidedness, I have tried to balance this per-
spective with another. One could caricature the field of the study of Indian
philosophy as consisting of a continuum of publications running from those
written by self-effacing and erudite textual scholars attending arduously to
the primary sources but seeing them as mere pieces of a historical jigsaw
puzzle, to those written by more vociferous but less learned comparative phi-
losophers or historians of philosophy who are more skilled in abstract think-
ing and analysis but less sensitive to context. If some such continuum exists
(and of course many if not most scholars combine elements from both sides)
this book aspires to fall more toward the first end, but there are aspects of that
extreme that it seeks to avoid.
Though I have focused on the precise wording of texts, it is their content
rather than their form that is the centre of interest and that I have sought to
elucidate in my commentary; the concentration on the particularities of the
language used is simply the necessary means of reaching an appreciation of
the nuances of the thoughts and ideas that it expresses. As Schopenhauer
(1851 555) wrote, 'Thoughts reduced to paper are generally nothing more
Preface 11
than the footprints of a man walking in the sand. It is true that we see the path
he has taken; but to know what he saw on the way, we must use our own
eyes.' Scholars engaged in producing critical editions-and this isnot always
realized by other specialists who pride themselves on being more analytical-
do and must 'use their own eyes', for in deciding how to constitute texts they
must (on the basis of an intimate knowledge of the author, his tradition and
those traditions to which he was responding) have hypotheses about what the
author 'saw on the way'; but a difference between the present study and a
critical edition is that I include for the reader an account of my deliberations
about what RamakaI).tha 'saw'. These deliberations, furthermore, often take
the form of engagement with, rather than pure observation of, the lines of
thought that RamakaI).tha travels down. The book has been written in the be-
lief that, if a philological perspective is accompanied by a philosophical per-
spective, the value of the work will, so long as the philosophy remains within
the reach of textual evidence, be enhanced rather than diluted. I have tried, in
my exegesis, to enter into the spirit of RamakaI).tha's arguments and those of
his opponents; to tease out the assumptions behind their positions; to consider
the validity of their reasoning; to. reflect on how they would respond to ques-
tions not directly addressed by them; to bring out what is most philosophi-
cally significant, what will be of most interest to philosophers and historians
of philosophy; to aim not only at 'encyclopedic breadth' through the accumu-
lation of contextually related material, but also at 'analytic depth,.2
There are three other closely related attitudes from which I distance myself.
When explaining a position of RamakaI).tha's by influence from earlier think-
ers, by pointing to an earlier occurrence of the same idea, or a close approxi-
mation to it, I do not wish to imply that RamakaI).tha simply cut and pasted
into his writings chunks from various earlier streams of thought. He was
grappling, in the passages examined below, with philosophical problems in
much the same way as contemporary philosophers do. Conformity to earlier
tradition was far from the be all and end all, as I hope will come across
clearly in the following pages. Equally if not more important was what con-
stituted a good argument. While insufficient attention to context is perhaps
the most common source of error in modem presentations of ancient and me-
2 The pair ofterms are Oetke's (1999 265).
12 The Self's Awareness ofItself
diaeval Indian ideas, surely context is not all-detemrining. When Ramakru;ttha
sat down to write he did not think, 'let me choose this that X said, mix it with
this that Y said etc'. He wrote what he wrote because he thought it to be the
case. Why he thought it to be the case is not always best explained by refer-
ence to contextual features, but sometimes by reference simply to the logic of
the ideas, a logic that we, to a large extent, share.
Secondly, by seeing Ramakru;ttha's or DharmakIrti's or Jayanta Bhaga's etc.
arguments only as reactions to a specific historical, linguistic and religio-
philosophical context, we cease to take them seriously. By regarding these
writers only as products of their time, we historicize away penetrating in-
sights that they may have had. If we see our task purely as the assigning of
their ideas to the correct place in a museum of historical antiquities, we rule
out a priori the possibility that they discovered something of relevance to our
own self-understanding.
3
Thirdly, though our thought-world may be a long way from theirs, I do not
believe there to be an uncrossable boundary between the two. A purely his-
torical-philological approach sometimes leads to a one-sided commitment to
the 'otherness' of the ideas, the setting up of an exaggerated barrier between
us and their formulators, as though it were impossible that their concerns
could overlap with our own. If this were the case, what would be the point of
studying their writings at all? Surely the fact that their writings are capable of
capturing our imagination, and of eliciting empathy, is evidence that it is not
the case. Do we not share with them the desire to understand what it is to be a
sentient being? Some studies of ancient Indian views leave their concepts
mysteriously unrelated to anything we can relate to; whereas in my view a
successful understanding should leave us quite able to imagine having held
those same views had we lived then and there.
I am in agreement with some remarks that Wezler made concerning such
matters. He (1993 328-329) mentions a distinction asserted by Alsdorf be-
tween European scholars' initial encounter with India, characterized by 'rap-
3 For an example of the way in which the contemporary debate about personal iden-
tity, in analytic philosophy, could be enhanced by drawing on classical Indian ideas, see
Tillemans 1996841-844.
Preface
13
turous imagination. and uncritical idealisation' and the more scientific ap-
proach of later scholars. He concedes that 'much of what Herder and the Ro-
mantics said about India was possible only because their knowledge about
India was still very limited indeed', but then continues as follows:
However, if the history of Indology is viewed only as a progress from belief
to knowledge, from phantastic idealisa.tion and romantic involvement to unbi-
ased and sober investigation of facts, then retrospectively Indologists can, on
the other hand, hardly avoid asking themselves critically whether in following
this course they have not entirely lost the sense of a great and noble adventure
and are all too content with counting the legs of flies. What has become of the
initial enthusiasm, who has still a good eye for what is really important in In-
dian culture? [ ... J Where are the outstanding intellectuals ready to risk an en-
counter with India and her spirit? [ ... J We cannot only be proud of the
achievements of our discipline, very remarkable though they are, but should
also be aware of what we have lost!
This book is a slightly modified version of my DPhil thesis. I was unusually
fortunate in the amount of help I received during the doctorate. For six terms
I met weekly with Alexis Sanderson to read Sanskrit together: first the iitma-
viida chapter of the Slokaviirttika and then the first chapter of the NareSvara-
Furthermore Harunaga Isaacson acted as a second supervisor
for no reason other than his seemingly infinite willingness to read Sanskrit
with anyone who showed a genuine interest. The texts covered in the many
hours spent reading with him-some of the most enjoyable times I had during
the years that I worked on the thesis-were, among others, the Nare-
the two earliest surviving commentaries on those Nyii-
yasiltras that concern the Self, and a large part of the seventh chapter of the
Nyiiyamaiijarf. Both waited patiently as I gave my slow and stumbling trans-
lations, and aided me with their encyclopedic knowledge and keen sense of
what precisely is obstructing someone's understanding at particular points of
the text. Harunaga Isaacson also gave me detailed feedback on drafts of the
thesis at every stage of its development. Without their help I would not have
been able to begin, let alone finish, a work such as this, based on a close ex-
amination of primary sources.
Somdev Vasudeva, Dominic Goodall and Harunaga Isaacson were extremely
generous in sharing e-texts, the former giving me an almost library-length
14
The Self's Awareness ofItself
collection (as well as regularly helping me with computer problems), and the
latter two between them typing in and sending me (among other texts) the en-
tire NareSvaraparfk$i'iprakiia.
To those tbree, as well as Kei Kataoka, Ferenc Ruzsa and Birgit Kellner, I
owe thanks for responding to e-mails full of questions about their areas of ex-
pertise. Ferenc Ruzsa proofread not only the whole first draft of the thesis but
also a large part of the last draft of the book, and gave me many useful com-
ments. Since fInishing the doctorate I have, intermittently, been working on
the with Dominic Goodall and Anjaneya Sarma;
from both I have learnt much, some of which has doubtless informed the
modifIcation of the present work from thesis to book.
During the third year of my doctorate I spent a wonderful tbree months in Vi-
enna, studying DharmakIrti under Ernst Steinkellner. I greatly benefIted from
his thorough comments on and corrections to my attempts to translate
DharmakIrti and his commentators, and was grateful for the way he enabled
me to feel very welcome in the institute. I would also like to thank Ernst
Prets, Roque Mesquita, Helmut Krasser, and especially Birgit Kellner. She
not only put up with me moving into her office, but also put at my disposal
her entire coliection of books and articles, her computer, and was always
available to answer questions.
The thesis was examined by Lambert Schmithausen and Karin Preisendanz. I
could not have hoped for more learned readers and was fortunate to receive
their various comments and corrections. Karin Preisendanz was also kind
enough to meet for further sessions in Vienna in order to answer questions I
had and to elucidate her comments in more detail. I thank her for, among
other things, explaining various subtle points of Nyaya and point-
ing me to secondary literature that I had neglected, signifIcantly increasing
my knowledge of typesetting conventions, applying for funding for one of my
visits and responding to huge numbers of e-mails. I am honoured and grateful
to her for proposing the book for publication in this prestigious series, and to
Professor Oberhammer and the de Nobili committee for accepting it.
For fInancial help from the British Academy, the Boden Fund, the Max-
Mliller Fund, the Spalding Fund, the Muktabodha Graduate Fellowship and
Preface
15
the Wolfson Junior Research Fellowship in Indology, I am extremely thank-
ful. I am much obliged to Wolfson College for the money from its Academic
Fund for Fellows which was given to the de Nobili Research Library to cover
some of the cost of printing this book.
Thanks also to Alexandre Piatigorsky (for inspiring me to continue my stud-
ies of Indian Philosophy beyond MA level), Richard Gombrich, Jim Benson,
James Mallinson, Csaba Dezs6, Isabelle Onians, Peter Bisschop, Ryugen
Tanemura, Whitney Cox, Fabio Boccio, Marcus Schmlicker, Lance Cousins,
Isabelle Ratie, Keith Alien, Takamichi Fujii, Sadananda Das, Godabarisha
Misbra, Achyutananda Das, Venkataraja Sharma, Taisei Shida, Marion
Rastelli, Jonathan Miller, Christian Ferstl, Simon Lawson, Gillian Evison, Pe-
ter Mole, Alan Hancock, Elizabeth Pacheco, my family (a special mention for
my father, who proof-read a whole draft) and, more than anyone, Sara.
i, ;
Ii:
, I
REFERENCES, ABBREVIATIONS AND
CONVENTIONS
AK(AL)
1. Primary Sources Cited
Amarakosa: Amarakosa: with the Unpublished South Indian
Commentaries. Ed. Ramanathan, A. A. 3 Volumes. Adyar Li-
brary and Research Centre, Madras, 1971.
AKBh(BBS) Abhidharmakosa and of
Aciirya Vasubandhu with Sphu!iirthii Commentary of Aciirya
Yasomitra. Ed. SastrY, Swami Dwarika Das. Bauddha BharatI
Series 5, 6, 7, 9. Varfu;lasI, 1981.
AKBh(P)
AKBh(S)
of Vasu-
bandhu. Ed. Pradhan, P. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8.
Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1967 (second, revised edi-
tion by Aruna Haldar, without improvement of the text: 1975).
Passages in the 5th and 9th Chapters
of Vasubandhu's Ed., translated and
annotated by Alexis Sanderson. Unpublished Teaching Mate-
rial for M.Phil in Classical Indian Religion, Oxford 1995.
AP Tattvaprakiisa, Tattvasangraha, Tattvatraya-
nin:zaya, Ratnatraya, Bhogakiirikii, Niidakiirikii,
Ed. DvivedI, Brajavallabha. Yoga-
tantra-granthamala 12. Varfu;lasI, 1988.
ATV Atmatattvavivekal).: The Atmatattva"\!iveka of Srf Udayaniichii-
rya with the (NiiriiyalJl) CommentGlY of Srf NiiriiyalJiichiirya
Atreya & the (Bauddhiidhikiira) Dfdhiti Commentary of Srf
18
Raghuniitha Siromani with Bauddhiidhikiira Vivrti of Sri Gadii-
dhara Bha!tiichiirya. Ed. Sftstri, Dhundhirftja.
Sanskrit Series 463, 464, 465, 466 & 467 (rebound together as
no. 84). Benares, 1940.
BhoKa Bhogakarika by Sadyojyotis: in AP.
BoCaAvPa Bodhicaryavatarapafijika: Bodhicaryiivatiirapaiijikii. Prajiiiika-
ramati's Commentary to the Bodhica'ryiivatiira of Siintideva.
Ed. de la Vallee Poussin, Louis. Bibliotheca Indica, New Series
1139. Calcutta, 1907.
BoYoCa'fi
BS
BSBha
CaSa
Bodhisattvayogacaracatu1;tsatakapka: Sanskrit Fragments and
Tibetan Translation of Candrakfrti's Bodhisattvayogiiciiraca-
tubsatakarfkii. Ed. S:uzuki, K6shin. Tokyo, 1994.
BrhatI: Brhatf, a Commentary on by Prablziikara
Misra with the Commentmy l:J.juvimalii of Sq,likaniitha Misra.
Ed. Sastri, P. A. Chinnaswami. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series
391, 406, 414 (rebound together as no. 67). Benares, 1929-
1933.
Brahmasiddhi: Brahmasiddhi by Acharya Mm:u;ialJamisra, with
Commentary by SmikhapiilJi. Ed. Sastri, Vacaspati Mahamaho-
padhyaya Vidya Kuppuswami. Sri Garib Das Oriental Series
16. Delhi, 1984. (Original Edition Madras, 1937: Madras Gov-
ernment Oriental Manuscripts Series 4).
The Brahmasutra Siilikara with
the Commentaries Bhiimatf, Kalpataru, and Parimala. Ed. Sas-
tri, Nurani Anantha Krishna and Pansikar, Vasudev Laxman
Shastri. Bombay, 1917.
Carakasarp.h:itil: AgniveSa' s Caraka' Sm!lhitii: Text with English
Translation & Critical Exposition, Based on CakrapiilJi Datta's
Ayurvedadfpikii. Volume 2. Ed. Sharma, Ram Karan and
Bhagwan Dash. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies 94. Varanasi,
1977.
D
GBha
IPVV
IsPraKa
Kas
Ked
KiTa
KV
MaAl
MaPra
References, Abbreviations, Conventions
19
sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon: sDe .dge Tripiraka,
bsTan 'gyur Tshad mao 20 Volumes. Tokyo, 1981-1984.
The Sii1Jlkhya-Kiirikii: ISvara 's
Memorable Verses on Siil.nkhya Philosophy with the Commen-
tary of Gaudapiidiiciirya. Ed. Sharma, Har Dutt. Poona Orien-
tal Series 9. Poona, 1933.
IsvarapratyabhijiiavivrtivimarsinI: The [svarapratyabhijiiii Vi-
vrtivimarsinf by Abhinavagupta. Ed. Kaul, Madhusfidan. 3
Volumes. KSTS 60, 62, 65. Srinagar, 1938-1967.
Isvarapratyabhijiiakarika: The !svarapratyabhijiiiikiirikii of Ut-
paladeva with the Author's Vrtti: Critical Edition and Anno-
tated Translation. Ed. Torella, Raffaele. Serie Orientale Roma
71. Roma, 1994.
Sucaritamisra's commentary, Kasika, on the Slokavarttika: in
SV(S).
KSTS edition of see NPP.
Kira.I).atantra: in KV.
Kira.I).avrtti: KiralJavrtti!l. Bharra RiimakalJrha's Commentary
on the KiralJatantra. Volume 1: Chapters 1-6. Ed. Goodall,
Dominic. Publications du departement d'indologie, Institut
de Pondichery / Ecole d'Extreme-Orient
86(1). Pondichery, 1998. (In references to this edition, line
numbers are not counted from the top of the page; they rather
follow the line numbers printed in the edition, which start
counting from the previous verse-segment.)
MadhyamakaIaiikara: in Studies in the Literature of the Great
Vehicle: Three MalziiYiina Buddhist texts. Ed. Gomez, Luis O.
and Silk, Jonathan A. Michigan studies in Buddhist literature 1.
Ann Arbor, 1989.
Mahanayaprakasa: Malziinaya-Prakiisha of Riijiinaka Shiti
KalJrha. Ed. ShastrI, Mukunda Rama. KSTS 21. Srinagar, 1918.
20
MatPa
MatVKP
MatVVP
MoKa
MoKaVr
MMK
MT
MTV
NB
The Self s Awareness of Itself
MataIigaparamesvara: in MatV.
MataIigavrtti, . Kriyapada: MatwigapiirameSvariigama: Kriyii-
piida, Yogapiida, et Caryiipiida, avec Ie commentaire de Bha!!a
RiimakalJ!ha. Ed. Bhatt, N. R. Publications de l'Institut fransrais
d'Indologie 65. Pondichery, 1982.
MataIigavrtti, Vidyapada: MatwigapiirameSvariigama: Vidyii-
piida, avec Ie commentaire de Bha!!a RiimakalJ!ha .. Ed. Bhatt,
N. R. Publications de l'Institut fransrais d'Indologie 56. Pondi-
chery, 1977.
by Sadyojyotis: in AP.
by in AP.
Millamadhyamakakarika: Miilamadhyamakakiirikiis de Niigii-
rjuna avec la Prasannapadii Commentaire de Candrakfrti. Ed.
Poussin, L. de la Vallee. Bibliotheca Buddhica 4. St. Peters-
bourg, 1913.
Mrgendratantra: The Srf Mrgendra Tantram: Vidyiipiida &
Yo gapiida, with the Commentary (-vrtti) of
Ed. SastrI, MadhusUdan KauL KSTS 50. Bombay-Srinagar,
1930. (Reprint New Delhi 1982).
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42
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43
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J
I
44
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t
o
a
ai
ac
B
cf.
3. Other Abbreviations and Symbols
When two of these obeli enclose text, they signal a word or
phrase that is uninterpretable and that I cannot improve upon.
When they enclose three dots they signal that I am un-
able to read occur at that part of the manuscript.
Marks where a lemma or quoted word has been extracted from
a larger word or compound:
Denotes-when occurring in footnotes to the text of the Matali-
gavrtti-a south Indian manuscript used for the edition. I have
not seen it but have transcribed its readings from the edition.
A south Indian manuscript used for the edition of the Mataliga-
vrtti. I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from
the edition.
the edition.
ante correction em (appended to the symbol for a manuscript as
in pac, or the symbol for an edition as it Ked
aC
), indicates the
reading of a manuscript or edition before it was subsequently
corrected by the scribe or editor respectively.
Baroda manuscript of the (see p.
105).
confer, introduces material that illustrates the preceding.
conj.
C
e
ed.
Ed.
em.
ga
I
JIP
JOR
ka
kha
45
A conjecture. Differentiated from an emendation on the, admit-
tely, subjective grounds thatless confidence can be felt as to its
correctness.
A Malayalam manuscript of the Nyiiyamaiijarf preserved in the
Malayalam Department of the University of Calicut, No. 2606.
The readings that I report have all been very kindly conveyed
to me by Kei Kataoka.
A DevanagarI manuscript used for the edition of the Mataliga-
the edition.
The edition (in footnotes to the text).
Edited by (in the bibliography).
An emendation. Differentiated from a conjecture on the, admit-
tedly, subjective grounds that more confidence can be felt as to
its correctness.
A Kashmirian manuscript of the
whose readings are occasionally reported in the KSTS edition. I
have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from there.
the edition.
Journal of Indian Philosophy.
Journal of Oriental Research.
have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from there.
have not seen it but have transcribed its readings frOID there.
46
KSTS
L
M
MS
MSS
Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.
London manuscript of the (see p.
107).
A south Indian manuscript used for the edition of the Matanga-
the edition.
. Madras manuscript of the (see p. 110).
The manuscript.
The manuscripts.
om. An omission.
P Poona manuscript of the (see p.
108).
pc
r
sic
post correctionem (appended to the symbol for a manuscript as
in ppc, or the symbol for an edition as it Ked
PC
), indicates a cor-
rection, by a scribe or editor, to what was first written or
printed in a manuscript or edition.
recto, the front of a folio of a manuscript (as in 3r).
One of three Kashmirian manuscripts whose readings have
been reported, but often wrongly neglected, by the editor of the
Matangavrtti. I have thus frequently transcribed its readings
from the edition.
from the edition.
The preceding words, syllables or letters may be wrong or sur-
prising, but they were indeed written in the source being cited.
u
v
v.l.
WZKS
47
A south Indian manuscript used for the edition of.the Matanga-
vrtti . I have not seen it but have transcribed its readings from
the edition.
from the edition .
verso, the back of a folio of a manuscript (as in 3v).
varia lectio, marks a variant reading.
Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens.
4. Conventions
In references to Sanskrit texts I separate chapter and verse numbers with a
full stop; and page and line numbers with a comma. For lines near the end of
a page, I sometimes count from the bottom. Thus 6.4b means piida b of the
fourth verse of chapter six; whereas 6,4b means four lines from the bottom of
page six.
References to the page and line number of the are
to those of the KSTS edition (abbreviated as Ked).
When Ramakru;t!ha repeats in his commentaries words from the verse being
commented upon, the translation of those words is given in italic.
In the middle of a paragraph of Sanskrit text, words in non-italic are conjec-
tures or emendations; see the footnote for details of the transmitted readings.
Two numbers following a contemporary author's name (as in Smith 1980
239) represent year followed by page number.
In translations from the Sanskrit, I use square brackets to enclose insertions
required to complete the sense, and round brackets to enclose explanatory
48
glosses and further elaborations. There are some borderline cases where my
choice has been arbitrary.
Sanskrit words in brackets in the translation are given in their pre-sandhi
form.
INTRODUCTION
Preliminary Remarks
If there is any 'central' issue in the debates between Buddhism and the
Brahmru;lical schools, it is that of the existence or
Its importance is reflected not only in the volume of writing devoted to it and
closely related issues, but also in the assertion that the possibility of attaining
liberation nirvii1J.a), the __9f :I:r1cl!.aI! depends
the stance one takes on this very
itTsCOITect knowledge of its true nature, that brings
__ _____. ____ --k--
about .cessation of samsanc existence; and, for Buddhist al!th.o:r;:s, owe are des- <--.-__ --;--- .0' __ _______ _. __ 0 __ 0 __ 0,0 __
tined to remain unenlightened until we realize that
responds to no substantial reality, that the word 'I' is misleading unless seen
- _._- ... ..'""'---..... .-."
as referring to nothing other than a changing sequence of psycho:-physical
---- .. .. .. , .. - - -._.---
Thus despite their opposed positions, both sides agree that
into the nature of our 'Self', and correct understanding of what the term does
-------- .
or does not refer to, is .essential for liberation. The purpose of this publication
is to introduce scholars and students of Indian Philosophy to the Saiva
Siddhanta voice in this debate, and to contribute to our knowledge of the his-
tory of Saiva Siddhanta. More specifically, itaims to present the arguments
of Bhana RamakaJ;ltha (c. 950-1000 AD), the most prolific and influential
exegete of early Saiva Siddhanta, for the existence of a Self (iitman). Of
RamakaJ;ltha's eight surviving texts,2 that in which he goes into greatest detail
1 SiiJikhyas, Vedantins, Naiyayikas, and (insofar as they could be termed
'Briihma1)ical') non-dualistic Saivas.
2 Mata-
ligavrtti, Siirdlzatrisatikiilottarav{tti (which includes the Niidakiirikii), Kirar.zav{tti, Tattva-
trayaniT1J.ayavivrti and Vyomavyiipistava. The last of these neither refers to, nor is referred
50
on this issue is the (NPP) , a commentary on
Sadyojyotis' (NP). I thus present the Sanskrit text of the
relevant passages in that work;3 an annotated translation of them; and a com-
mentary that seeks both to alert the reader to what would not necessarily be
clear. from the translation alone, and to relate the particular point being made
to Ramakffi.1!ha's wider system and to the earlier history of Indian philosophy.
I supplement this with the presentation of parallel or relevant passages from
Ramakar;t!ha's other texts. In the fourth and final chapter, one of the passages
examined is not from the but from the
Mataligavrtti. Of Ramakffi.1!ha's various texts, some extremely long, only the
first six chapters of his commentary on the and the twenty-five
verses of the Niidakiirikii, have been translated from the Sanskrit, or begun to
be studied seriously. This study will, I hope, improve that situation: it takes
into account all of his writings I am aware of on the question of the Buddhist
doctrine of no-Self, re-editing, and commenting on most, and re-
ferring to the rest. But these writings amount to a minute fraction of his total
to by, any of the other seven as sharing their author, and thus its attribution to Riimaka-
I).!ha cannot be confIrmed. See Goodall 1998 xix.
Goodall does not mention there, in the list he gives of the works of RamakaI).!ha, the
Tattvatrayanin.zayavivrti, for at the time of writing' he did not know of its existence. He
has recently come across a manuscript of the text.
Works bearing the following titles are referred to by RiimakaI).!ha or by others as
written by him, but appear not to have survived: Sviiyal1lblzuvoddyota, Mantraviirttika!fkii,
Sarviigal1lapriil1lii!lyopanyiisa, Agal1laviveka (which could be the same as the previous)
and Piligaliil1latavrtti. There is also evidence that he wrote a sub-commentary on a lost
commentary of Sadyojyotis on the Ralll'ava's treatment of mudriis. See Goodall 1998
xix-xxviii.
3 The text I present attempts to improve on the text given in the editions published so
far. I read through the entire first chapter of NPP at weekly meetings from January 1998
to February 2000 with the help of, among others, Prof. Sanderson, Dr. Harunaga Isaacson
and, whenever they were in England, Dr. Dominic Goodall and Kei Kataoka. Outside of
term time Prof. Sanderson was not present. Harunaga Isaacson was present at every single
session. They proposed several emendations and conjectures, as acknowledged in indi-
vidual cases in the notes to the text. I subsequently identifIed parallel passages in other
works by RiimakaI).!ha, and collated the readings of some manuscripts and a'second edi-
tion. These enabled further improvement and are all recorded in the notes to the text.
Introduction
51
oeuvre, so an enormous amount of work remains to be done
4
before a general
study of all of his ideas can be contemplated.
1. The Buddhist -BrahmaI).ical Atman Controversy
By the time Ramaklli;1!hC!- was writing he was entering a debate that already
had a history of almost one and a half millennia. According to the Brah-
mar;tical schools of philosophy , we ha'{.e.,-Q! rather are, an
of our body,
sense-faculties and of of
expenences.lt-is is the
death of the body, and begins a new life by becoming associated with another
embryo in accordance with the merit and demerit it has acquired through its
past actions.
The Buddhist schools also believed, of course, that we survive the death of
the bQdyand reincarnate to experience the positive or negatIVe consequences
But they attempt to explain this process-;ithout
--_ .. -6 '-"'-"-"---'-""-, .. _ ..- -
a permanent Self. A of Buddhist teachina is the doctrine of no-
__ . __ . __ . __ . ". __ .. _ ____ .... ".. 0._
Self deni_al of any soul,
any substantial 'I'.
4 In this vein, a fIrst translation critical edition) of the Paral1lolqaniriisakiirikiivr-
tti isalso being prepared by Dominic Goodall, Anjaneya Sarma and me.
S I know of one BriihmaI).ical philosopher for whom 'I' does not, in fact, refer to the
Self. The Naiyayika Jayanta Bhana held that if this were the case, the fact that 'I' occurs
in (some) verbal expressions of oUr perceptions would commit us to the view that we per-
ceive the Self. He held that to be impossible on the grounds that it could not simultane-
ously be the perceiver and perceived. Hence for him 'I' refers to the body. See NM(M)
Vol. 2, 268,6--284,5.
6 For an overview of the views of the flifferent Buddhist schools on the subject of the
Self, and an account of their various responses to the resulting tension with belief in rein-
carnation, see Krishan 1984.
52
1.1. Early Buddhism
Can this finn-rejection of the existence of the Self be traced back to the teach-
ing of the Buddha on the evidence of the sermons in the Pili canon? The pas-
sages that report the Buddha's teaching on this point are somewhat conflict-
ing. Some do indeed represent him as explicitly denying the existence of the
Self. But others restrict themselves to the view that none of the experience-
able features of people, which the Buddha names as the body (rilpa), feeling
(vedanli), ideation (saiijiili) , impulses (sa1!lsklira) and sensation (vijiilina),7
are a Self. None of elf for two reasons:
they are transitory and we do not have unrestricted control over them. When
------ --_. -- --
the Buddha is asked in these passages whether there is a real, substantial Self
behind these transitory appearances of the human person,
a refusal to answer or remains completely si1ent} In in the
-----------"'._- ._------------- . .-- --".'-- ---- - " -_. --,,---
Ni{ijjhimanikliya the Buddha rejects both the view that there is a real Self, and
the view that there is not.
9
- - - '----
This kind of variation has led to an enormous variety in the interpretations of
scholars. Schmithausen argues that those passages which fall short of a dog-
matic denial of the Self, restricting themselves to the view that no Self is per-
ceivable, fall within the earliest stratum of the canon, and that the absolute
denials belong to later strata. IO Collins argues that the many places where the
Buddha leaves open the question as to whether there is a Self beyond the five
skandhas should not be read in isolation: when supplemented by other clearer
denials it can be seen that the Buddha did indeed intend an absolute denial.
ll
Oetke argues that seeming contradictions are removed if we remember that
the word for S,elf in these, passages is used in two different senses: both to re-
7 I use the translations suggested in the study of the khandhas by Vetter (2000). For
the argument that the khandhas should not be seen as 'parts of which a human being is
comprised' but as a representation of our 'cognitive system', see Hamilton (2000 78 and
fOr1;h{qning).
( 1973 177.
9 Ibid. 178.
10 Ibid. 177.
11 Collins 198298.
Introduction
53
fer to a permanent Self or soul as taught by the BrahmaI).ical metaphysicians;
and to the being. It is former
that this distinction,
Oetke argues, that has led several earlier scholars
12
to argue that the Buddha
actually accepted a permanent Self beyond the five skandhas, like that taught
in the
It is for those with a closer acquaintance than mine with the PaIi canon to
continue this debate. I would just say, first, that Collins' argument only seems
to be valid if we assume there to be a consistent teaching (ekavlikyatli)
throughout the canon, something that is not necessarily the case if we accept
that it contains different strata; and, secondly, that there seems to be much to
be said for a view put by Frauwallner and developed by Schmithausen,
namely that the Buddha's primary attitude to the Self was that to concern
oneself with its nature is fruitless or even disadvantageous for spiritual ad-
vancement.
Such a view, stated explicitly in some passages of the canon, certainly pro-
vides a good explanation of the Buddha's reluctance to answer questions
about whether a permanent Self exists. And it renders understandable his de-
nial both of the view that there is a real Self as well as of the view that there
is not: both are purely theoretical obsessions that have no bearing on the pri-
mary aim of Buddhism, the bringing to an end of suffering. 13 .
The negative attitude of the Buddha to the Self is explained, on this view, as
from practical considerations what is ;ost conducive to
spiritual the Self.
assumption of earlyBuddhism, the
tion of passion, craving and desire. These presuppose the ofT or
'mine' ,Jar it IS only sensations etc. as
'I' or we crave on their was uproot
passion and craving, so that the Buddha showed that
the body, feelings and the other skandhas, since they are transitory and there-
Such as Perez-Remon (1980) and K. Bhattacharya (1973).
13\Schmithausen 1973 178; 1969 160.
14 I
flchmithausen 1969 160.
54
fore ultimately productive of suffering, are not the true Self. To claim that .
there existed beyond these experience able constituents of people an unper-
ceivable Self would have been, at best, unnecessary and, at worst, dangerous,
for it could lead to a strengthening of egoism and selfish desire. 15
Thus on this view the original Buddhism did not deny the Self, but out of
purely practical grounds dragged it into the background and excluded it from
the group of questions reflection upon which it considered 16
Collins describes this view as attributing 'pragmatic agnosticism' to the Bud-
dha, claims that it emphasizes 'occasional remarks in the texts,17 and groups
it under the category of views that 'refuse to believe that the "real" doctrine
taught by the Buddha is what the canonical teaching of anattii appears to
be' .18 But there is a certain overlap between his own view and this analysis of
the doctrine of no-Self as pragmatic agnosticism. He summarizes his own
view in these words: 19
To use my own metaphor, the denial of self in whatever can be experienced or
conceptualised-that is, in the psycho-physical being who is exhaustively de-
scribed by the lists of impersonal elements-serves to direct the attribution of
value away from that sphere. Instead of supplying a verbalised notion of what
15 Ibid. 161; Schmithausen 1973 178.
16 Schmithausen 1969 161. In order to rid oneself of craving and selfish desire the
Buddha prescribed a meditative practice in which one eliminates the concept of 'I' frorn
its association with sensations, perceptions and the rest, seeing these as purely impersonal
events. Schmithausen (1973 178) suggests that the dogmatic denial of the Self advocated
by later Buddhists and later layers of the canon arose through the desire to metaphysically
underpin this spiritu3J practice of the elimination of the concept of a Self from one's un-
derstanding, in order to strengthen the hold of the elimination.
17 Collins 1982 10. He is referring to Frauwallner's articulation of this view, not
Schmithausen's.
18 Collins 19827. Others who emphasize not agnosticism or pragmatism but positive
metaphysics in early Buddhist attitudes to the Self are Chandra (1978) and Inada (1981).
Gombrich (1996 16) attributes a pragmatic approach to the Buddha: 'Since he was inter-
ested in how rather than what, he was not so much saying that people are made of such
and such components, and the soul is not among them, as that people function in such and
such ways, and to explain their functioning there is no needto posit a soul. The approach
is pragmatic, not purely theoretical'.
19 Collins 198283.
Introduction
is the sphere of ultimate value, Buddhism simply leaves a arrow,
while resolutely refusing to predicate anything of the destination, to discuss
its relationship with the phenomenal person, or indeed to say anything more
about it.
55
He talks not of a general denial of self, but its denial in the experience able
psycho-physical being. He sees this not as a purely metaphysical denial but as
having as its aim to point us away from investing the five experience able as-
pects of ourselves with value; this reminds of Schmithausen's claim that its
aim is to instill in us the attitude that it is not worth striving or craving on
their behalf. And the finn silence he attributes to the Buddha on 'the sphere
of ultimate value' and 'its relationship with the phenomenal person' smacks
of agnosticism, which, even if principally directed at nirviilJa, would also
seem to involve the self.
1.2. V Sautrantikas and the Pramfu;la School
If there is room for doubt over whether early Buddhism denies absolutely the
, existence of the Self, there is no such room in the case of the branch of Bud-
dhism that is attacked by RamakaJ)!ha, namely, that which began with the
V was followed by Sautrantika modifications as articulated by
Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakosa and auto-commentary,20 and was further
developed and mixed with elements of Y ogacara idealism by his pupil
Dignaga and the latter's followers, most notably DharmakIrti.
For the V the Sautrantikas and the Pramfu).a school of Dignaga and
DharmakIrti, a person consists only of the five psycho-physical constituents
(skandhas). Concepts such as 'Self' or 'person' correspond to no real entit;.l
That which they denote is reducible to the five transitory constituents in the I
way that a forest is nothing other than individual trees. The thinking of these
schools is dominated by the thought that parts are more real than wholes, in- ,
dividuals more real than universals, elements more real than conglomerates.!
20 On this important text's denial of ' the Self, see Stcherbatsky 1920 and Duerlinger
1989, 1993, 1997, 1998 and 2000.
56
They distinguish these two orders of reality by designating the fIrst members
of those pairs as substantial (dravyasat) and the second members as merely
notional (prajiiaptisat). Whatever can be further broken down, either physi-
cally or conceptually, is merely notional. Only when non-composite building
blocks are reached do we fInd substantial existence.
Thus their view of the Self is entirely parallel to their view of external ob-
jects. Just as some milk, to take an example given by Vasubandhu, can be
broken down into, and therefore regarded as nothing more than, a certain
form and colour, a certain taste and so on, so likewise that to which we apply
the term 'Self' can be broken down into, and therefore regarded as nothing
more than, the fIve constituents.
Furthermore the radicalized transitoriness into
and the result was taken on by the other two schools in this branch also. The
substantial elements (dhanna) that are mistakenly taken to constitute objects
(such as milk) and the constituents that are mistakenly taken to constitute a .
Self consist of rows of momentary phases.z
z
Each phase is sufficiently similar
to the previous, and succeeds it so rapidly, that there is an illusory appearance
of a persistent entity. But persistent entities in fact exist only as notions in our
mind; the reality to which we apply those notions being these rows of mo-
mentary entities, where each entity is linked to the next only in the sense that
it causes it to arise in the image of itself, not in the sense that they together
form a more temporally extended object.
23
Thus the Self disappears by being deconstructed both diachronically and
synchronically. It is deconstructed diachronically into a plurality of distinct
momentary phases; and synchronically in that even the momentary phases are
21 Schmithausen 1969 16l.
22 There is variation between (and within) the three schools under on the
question of what the momentary phases of objects consist of: atoms, sensible qualities
such as colour, or simply images (iikiira) that are non-separate from their cognition. But
all three concur that objects, however analysed, consist of rows of distinct momentary
phases.
23 Nor is it correct, strictly speaking, to say that the phases 'belong to a
This implies that there is some continuum encompassing the different phases, when in
fact nothing exists except the individual phases.
Introduction
57
not unitary because they consist of fIve separate constituents. This model
stresses not only the transitory and insubstantial, but also the impersonal, na-
ture of our existence. The idea of a person acting and experiencing is replaced
with that of an impersonal stream of transitory mental and physical events.
The Brahrnru;rical schools objected that actions without agents are inconceiv-
able. When we say 'Devadatta moves', the event that that describes depends
upon Devadatta as the mover.24 Vasubandhu responds by describing the situa-
tion impersonally without any reference to a persistent agent that initiates the
action and sees it through to its completion. What is actually happening, he
explains, is that the fIve constituents at one moment of time cease to exist but
cause another similar fIve to arise in a neighbouring place, which then cease I
to exist and so on. There is thus not only no mover, but no movement either, I
because there is nothing that continues to exist over the relevant period ofi
time that could be said to change location. It is like the flame of a candle that I
appears to 'move' in a breeze, where in fact momentary flames arise succes-\
sively right next to one another.
-.l
Such a radical reductionism in which all those things that in everyday dis-
course are held to be unitary are taught to be unreal and to disappear into a
plurality must explain how the real plural entities come to be joined up in our
everyday understanding. Diachronic joining up is explainable from infor-
mation already given: adjacent phases are so similar and succeed each other
so rapidly that we are fooled into thinking that we are observing one thing
rather than many different ones. But how about synchronic coherence? If
consist of fIve separate things with no further entity of which they are parts or \
in which they inhere, why do those fIve streams not separate from each other? \
Why is my body always associated with my feelings, my perceptions and so \
on? If they are completely distinct what is to stop them from existing in isola- j
.
24 AKBh(BBS) p. 1218. On several occasions I paraphrase, or quote and translate,
passages from the ninth chapter of the Unfortunately, however,
the following publication came to my notice too late for me to see it before sending off
the final draft of the present work: Lee, C. (ed., with critical notes by the late Prof. Ya-
sunori Ejima), of Vasubandhu, Chapter IX:
Bibliotheca Indologica et Buddhologica 11. Tokyo: 2005.
58
DharmakIrti's answer is that the five psycho-physical constituents (or the
colour/shape, taste, smell and tactility of an object) together form a causal
complex (siimagrl). The body at one moment of time (t1) is the main cause
(upiidiinakiiralJa) of the body at the next moment of time (h), but it is also the
co-operating cause (sahakiiripratyaya) of the four other constituents at t2.
Similarly the body at t2 would not arise if it were not for the other four con-
stituents at t1 acting as co-operating causes for it. Thus it is because all five
constituents in one person depend on the same cause, namely the same causal
complex, that they cohere.
25
The process continues beyond death so that 'I' am linked to 'my' past and fu-
ture incarnations Gust like 'I' am linked to past and future moments of'my-
self' in this life) not in the sense that 'I' am those, but merely in that there is
an unbroken chain of causes and effects leading from 'me' to them.
It is this branch of Buddhism, particularly the Pramfu).a school, that was en-
gaged with most by the non-Buddhist schools of philosophy. It is taken by
RamakaI).!ha to be representative of Buddhism.
25 They also depend on the same karma. At PYa 2.48bc DharmakIrti answers the
question of why the body and cognition always exist together if they are separate. He
states that they have the same cause, like seeing and the other faculties of a single person,
or like the colour and taste of an object (hetvabhediit sahasthitib I n7parasavat).
He does not name the cause, but all the commentators give it as karma (see Franco 1997
119).
In a passage in his Svavrtti (7,12-8,11) he had already analysed the case of the colour
and taste of an object in detail. The reason that they always exist together (and the reason
we can infer one from the other) is that they depend on the same causal complex
(siimagnj. That complex includes the colour in the previous moment, which is the main
cause of the present colour and the co-operating cause of present taste; and the taste in the
previous moment, which is main cause of the present taste and the co-operating cause of
the present colour. If we read his remark at 2.48bc in the light of this Svavrtti passage it
seems just as likely that he meant by the common cause of body and cognition, not karnia,
but their causal complex (siimagnj in which the body in the previous moment is the main
cause of the body at the present time and the co-operating cause of cognition at the pre-
sent time; and cognition in the previous moment is the main cause of the present cognition
and the co-operating cause of the body in the present time.
Introduction
59
1.3. Madhyamikas
The Madhyamaka school gave more priority than the branch of Buddhism
just dealt with to those passages in the canon where the Buddha refuses to an-
swer questions about metaphysical issues. They justified this attitude of si-
lence on whether or not the Self exists through the view that the true nature of
things is ungraspable and empty of essence (sunya)?6 Thus it defies all con-
cepts, both Self and not-Self.
27
The five constituents of a person and all the
other elements held by the V and Sautrantikas to be the real build-
ing blocks of the world are held in this school to be just as unreal as the Self:
they too are merely notional (prajfiaptisat).
For the previous branch of Buddhism it is momentary associations of the five
constituents that act, and subsequent momentary associations that experience
the results of that action, whether in this life or a future one. The Madhya-
mikas rejected this view. Since, for them, the self is not less real than the con-
stituents, both being merely conventional, and since it is the self and not the
elements that is conventionally held to act and experience, they held that the
self, though merely notional, is indeed that which acts and experiences.
28
1.4. VatslputrIyas
The Vatslputnyas, about whom little is known, rejected the existence of an
eternal Self as upheld by the BrahmaI).ical schools, but accepted a 'person'
(pudgala). This they held to be ineffable (aviicya), and neither identical to the
26 Schmithausen 1969 166.
27 For Madhyarnika arguments about the dangers of holding the Self to be a sub-
stantial entity, see Pr ad MMK 18.1-4; BoCaAvPa ad 9.56-75; and BOYQCaTi ad 10.1-4.
28 Tillemans 1996838. This is perhaps more of a Tibetan-idea than an Indian one. Al-
though Tillemans attributes it to 'Madhyamakas', the only source he mentions is Go rams
pa, a 15
th
century Tibetan writer. But if Indian Madhyamakas did not hold that the
self acts and experiences, they did, from Nagfujuna onwards, hold that our deep-seated
illusion of an 'I' is the vehicle and driving force of reincarnation (Tillemans 1996 847).
60 The Self's Awareness of Itself
five constituents, nor separate from them. Because the person is not identical
to the five constituents it is not transitory like them; and because it is not
. separate from them it is affected by their changes and therefore not eternally
the same. It is the substrate of mental states and of transmigration.
29
1.5. The Soul Doctrines of Vedanta, Sailkhya, and
MImarp.sa
In the is found the view that the core of our being, our Self
(iitman), is identical with the basic essence of the universe, Brahman. Brah-
man is said to be that from which beings are born, on which, once born, they
live, and into which they pass at death.
3D
The identity between the essence of
human beings and this single source and substrate of the universe became the
cornerstone of the later school of Advaita Vedanta. Two strands within Ad-
vaita Vedanta are frequently distinguished: the transformationism (pari-
lJiimaviida) of such authors as BhaItfprapafica and Bhiiskara, and the illusion-
ism (miiyiiviida) of authors such as SaIikara and MaJ:}.c;ianamisra. For the for-
mer our separate identities are temporary transformations of Brahman and at
liberation we dissolve back into it. For the latter our separate identities are not
real; liberation consists in realizing that we never have been separate from
Brahman.
Sfuikhya rejected this idea of a single absolute Self, postulating instead a real
plurality of individual SOUIS,31 one for each being, as did
falls further from Vedanta than Sfuikhya, in many respects. Sfuikhya souls, al-
though separate from each other, are, like the Vedantin absolute Self, omni-
present, or at least not delimited by space. The souls of early are,
29 See Chau 1984 and 1987, Cousins 1994, Namikawa 2002, Duerlinger 1997, 1998
and 2000, and Schmithausen 1969 163-164. There is also a monograph on pudgalaviida
that I have not been able to see: Priestley, L. (1999), Pudgalaviida Buddhism: The Reality
of the Indeterminate Self, University of Toronto, Centre for South Asian Studies, Toronto.
30 Taittirfya 3.1.
31 I use 'soul' more or less synonymously with 'Self'.
Introduction
61
by contrast, of definite size. The general orientation of V is that of a
philosophy of nature, which is just as interested in the external world as it is
in souls, and seeks to explain things on an atomistic-mechanistic.basis.
32
For
Sfuikhya, by contrast (as for Vedanta), souls form the centre of interest, the
entire material world being said to evolve for their benefit.
33
By the time of the classical formulati()n of V in the Prasastapiida-
the soul was held to be all-pervading, but according to the earliest
sUtras it was of limited size. Frauwallner mentions two views from before the
change took place, which he sees as two stages of development. 34 In the first
stage he claims that what was accepted was a thumb-sized soul
that resides in the heart and directs the body as a
charioteer directs a chariot. This soul is the bearer of life and when it departs
from its body the person dies. In the second stage of development the soul
becomes larger. Since sensations occur in all parts of the body, and since the
soul can direct movement right up to the extremities of the limbs, it was held
to be the size of the body. 35
32 Frauwallner 1956 15. does concern itself with liberation, but, in the view
of Frauwallner (as well as earlier scholars such as Faddegon and Ui), this concern is later
and less prominent than its drive to explain and classify natural phenomena. Halbfass re-
gards the view that V was originally a pure philosophy of nature, uninterested in
soteriology, as 'inevitably speculative', but considers it 'undeniable that the soteriological
orientation is not genuinely at home in (1983 288). Houben (1994), however,
argues that the V teachings on liberation occupied an important place from begin-
ning, and do not contrast problemajically with its physics. Adachi, too (1994 659-{j61),
argues for the earliness of that deal with reincarnation and liberation.
33 Frauwallner 1956 26.
34 Ibid. 62.
35 I reproduce this view of Frauwallner's with a word of caution. For although its
source, his 1956 account of early in the second volume of his Geschichte der
indischen Philosoph ie, was a work of ground-breaking significance and remains the best
overall account of early V it is not without fault. Though based on a thorough
familiarity with an impressive number of primary sources, the historical theses it puts
forward are not always supported by adequate evidence. (This point has been made by,
among others, Wezler (1983) and Preisen1anz (1989 and 1994a), who have argued for al-
ternative lines of development on specific issues to those proposed by Frauwallner.) Here
for example he gives the Kii!haka and the Mahiibhiirata as the sources of his
Alongside the difference between Sfuikhya and these early stages of
in the size they attribute to souls are two more related differences.
Sfuikhya draws a fInn distinction between the soul and the psycho-physical
organism that is constituted out of the twenty-three evolutes of Primal Matter,
namely the three mental faculties, Intellect (buddhi), Personalization (ahan-
kara) and Reflection (manas), the five faculties of sense-perception (buddhf-
ndriya), the five faculties of action (karmendriya) , the five pure elements
(tanmiitras) and the fIve gross elements (mahiibhuta) from Ether to Earth.
36
For Sfuikhya it is not the soul that transmigrates, Jor, being omnipresent, it
cannot move. Rather it is this psycho-physical organism (without the gross
elements of the body but with subtle forms of them
37
that constitute a subtle
knowledge of the first view, and of the second he says only that the Jains contiJ?ued to
hold it. In the absence of further evidence that these two views belonged to the same
stream as we should treat his assertion with caution. Furthermore, even if both
views can be shown to have existed in V it would require further evidence to
show that that in which the soul is smaller is earlier.
That V did at least in its earliest stages hold the soul to be of limited size has
been confirmed by several more recent specialists. See Adachi 1994 and others
that he mentions there. He argues that originally held the soul to be of definite
size and mobile; that by 225-250 it had come to regard the soul's size as infinite; and that
by the middle of the 5th century it had ceased to hold the soul to be mobile. For a discus-
sion of certain that seem to ascribe movement to the soul, see Faddegon
1918272-27'3, Wezler 1982 654-655 and Bronkhorst 1993 87-92. For skepticism regard-
ing the presence in the Vaise#kasiitras of Frauwallner's first view, that the soul is smaller
than the body and can move around within it, see Preisendanz 1989 153.
36 I say that it is 'constituted out of' these evolutes rather than 'composed of' them,
for the ta1l1niitras and mahiibhiitas are not part of the microcosmic organism, but rather
macrocosmic entities that play their role, as seeds, at the beginning of creation alone. The
. material elements that compose the individual are produced from the
sexual relations of the mother and father.
37 These subtle elements along with the gross elements that con-
stitute external objects (prablllltas), and the elements produced from the parents men-
tioned in the previous note are collectively known as particu-
lars. See the first half of SK 39: miitiipitrjii[z saha prablziitais tridha syu!z.
Larson (1983 312) states that the subtle body is made not of but tamniitras.
This seems to be at variance with SK 38-40: tanmiitrii{zy teblzyo blziitiini pafica
pal1cablzya!z I ete SI1Z!1ii siintii ghoriiS ca nil If/haS ca 113811 miitiipitrjii!z salza
Introduction
63
body to carry the faculties to the womb of the next birth).38 In early V
by contrast the soul itself transmigrates. 39.
Secondly, Sfuikhya souls are completely inactive experiencers (bilOktr) in the
form of pure sentience (caitanya): mental occurrences such as pleasure, pain
and cognition (jfiiina) thus bappen not to them but to the psycho-physical or-
ganism, in particular its mental faculties. The Intellect (budd/d), though mate-
rial and unconscious, 'thinks'; the soul merely observes the products of
thought. Souls are thus left to remain as unaffected, passive observers above
all that is earthly and changing, as a mirror does not have to change in order
for changing reflections to occur in it.
40
In the early by contrast the
soul is not removed from this world and from the empirical human being: it is
itself the bearer and locus of mental processes,41 and of the latent impressions
that cause memories.
prabhiitais tridha syu[z I niyatii matiipitrjii nivartante 113911
piirvotpannam asaktaJ.n niyataJp I saJ.nsarati nirupablzogaJp
bhavair adhiviisitaJ.n ZiJigam 114011 Verse 38 tells us that the tallmiitras are the 'non-
particulars' and that from these five are produced the five elements, which are
known as the partiCUlars. Verse 39 subdivides these elements/particulars into three, as we
have just seen, and verse 40 describes the transmigrating organism (liJigam) as mahadiidi-
as consisting of the Intellect down to the As support
for the ZiJigam requiring, for transmigration, a body composed of the subtle elements, the
next verse, citraJ.n yathiisrayam rte sthii{zviidiblzyo vinii yathii chayii I tadvad villii
Ila niriisrayallz ZiJigam II, states that an unsupported liJigam, without particulars,
cannot stand, like a picture without a support or a shadow without a pillar or the like. Note
that Larson's interpretation receives some support from Gamfapada, who reads vinii in the
just quoted verse as joined with i.e. as meaning 'without non-particulars', and
takes in the compound to refer to the tallmiitras .
But I do not follow this, given that in the previous verse is clearly used to refer to
one of the kinds of partiCUlar elements.
, 38 See Johnston 1937 59 for an account of what it is that transmigrates according to
the pre-classical Sfu'lkhya of the and Mahabhiirata.
39 Frauwallner 1956 65. For the argument that 5.2.18 refers to the
transmigratory movement of the soul, see Faddegon 1918272-273 and Adachi 1994659.
40 See TS(GOS) 296-8. 1
41 Frauwallner 1956 65.
64
Frauwallner's explanation for the change that occurred in from
souls being spatially limited to their being omnipresent is as follows.
42
He
sees the change as necessitated when V came to accept and classify
an invisible force known as 'the unseen' .43 This is created through the
actions of beings and is what explains the capacity of the acts. to have effects
in the future even after they have ceased. Since V took on the view
that the actions of beings determine not only the individual fates of those be-
ings, but also more macrocosmic features of the world, too had a two-
fold function, influencing both individuals and the cosmos. As an example of
the latter, it causes, at the beginning of every world period, the movement and
gathering together of atoms that leads to the creation of the world. It is also
the cause of all processes in nature whose explanation was not known, such
as the flaming upward of fire or the movement of iron towards a magnet.
44
Once accepted, had to be assigned to a place among the V
categories.
45
Since it is created from causes and later destroyed it could not be
42 Frauwallner 1956 91-97.
43 Preisendanz (1989 169) mentions this hypothesis approvingly.
44 There are clearly two types of phenomena that are accounted for by in the
and subsequent texts: the karmic fate of individuals, and proc-
esses that would today fonn the subject matter of physics. Certainly in the Prasastaplida-
in both of these contexts, refers to dhanna and adhanna, but Wezler
(1983), drawing on and extending Halbfass (1983), does not accept that the same is true
of the He thinks it quite possible that, in those siitras where the processes
of nature are explained, did not refer to the potency caused by the actions of indi-
viduals, as assumed by Frauwallner, but functioned simply as a gap-filler to account for
natural processes that lacked an otherwise ascertainable cause. Since Halbfass and Wezler
regard the non-dharmic meaning of as primary, however, they remain within a
wider Frauwallnerian framework that sees V primarily as a philosophy of nature:
see the following remark of Halbfass (1983 289), quoted approvingly by Wezler (1983
39). 'Adma, which may primarily have been a gap-filler in the explication of the uni-
verse, subsequently offered itself as a channel for a much more decidedly dharmic and so-
teriological re-interpretation of the V theory of the universe'. Bronkhorst (1993
89-92) also argues that the earliest meaning of had nothing to do with dhanna and
adhanna.
45 At the stage of the completion of the it had been accepted, but not
yet categorized (see Halbfass 1983 286). It features there alongside 'gravity' (gurutva)
Introduction
65
a self-existent entity. Nor could it be a quality of the psychical organ (manas)
or of atoms as their specific qualities are permanent.
46
Hence it was held to be
a quality of the soul. Given that as a cosmic force could influence any
place in the world, and that all influence, for V was through contact,
its bearer must be all-pervading. Thus came to give up the re-
stricted size of the soul and brought it in line, in this respect, with. the soul of
the Vedantins and SiiIikhyas.
This meant that the first of the two related differences that I outlined all but
disappeared. Once V souls were held to be all-pervading they could
no longer be regarded as that which transmigrates. This role was to
the manas. 47
The difference in the level of souls' involvement in this world according to
the two traditions persisted to some extent: the soul of the (and
Naiyayikas) remained the substrate of mental occurrences, and it remained an
agent (kartr) directing the body and the manas. But its all-pervasion meant
that both its relation to the mental occurrences that reside in it, and its agency,
came to be re-evaluated. There was now a sharp contrast between it and its
mental qualities, pleasure, pain, cognition and the like. Since the latter are re-
stricted to the body, and are merely momentary, they differ from the all-
pervading and permanent soul both spatially48 and temporally. Hence they
and 'fluidity' (dravatva) as a cause of physical motion that inheres in the material sub-
stance it affects; none of these three are there classified as qualities.
46 This at least was the argument given by Prasastapada, but we know that both of
these two positions were heid by some. They are referred to and rejected in the
and.vyomavatf(see Halbfass 1983 287). Prof. Preisendanz also pointed me
to the following in the Nyliyamaiijarf: adrsyo bhiitadhannas tu jagadvaicitryakliralJaln II
(NM(M) Vol. 2, 356,9).
47 Frauwallner (1956 98-99) states that the following SiiIikhya, posited a
subtle body (litivlihikasarfra) to transport the manas to the womb of its next birth. He
gives no evidence, but Prof. Preisendanz pointed out to me that he makes the same claim
later (p. 242), in the context of summarizing the where it is possible
to infer that he is referring to PrBha(Br) 80,I.
48 They are, in a sense, not spatial at l!ll, not having extension since qualities do not
have further qUalities. But the fact that they occur only in the body, despite their substrate
being all-pervading, implies a less intricate relation between them and their substrate than
66
came to be regarded as something extrinsic to it (even tbough they occur in it)
and accidental;49 and it, in its true nature, came to be regarded as free of
them.
50
Earlier it had written,5!
According to the Sankhyas, souls are without distinguishing marks; distinc-
tions occur [only] among bodies, sense-faculties and mental faculties, be-
tween objects, and between this or that cause.
52
[ ] to the
[by contrast] souls are distinguished by their own qualities.
Now'this was no longer quite true for the V given tbeir view tbat
souls, in their true natures, are devoid of all specific qualities. The V
soul has become a more Sfu'lkhya-like static entity, not something that
changes as its qualities change. The older view is in a sense more natural. If
one holds, unlike in Sfu'lkhya, that souls have qualities, would one not expect
souls to differ from each other, not only numerically but also qualitatively? If
one material object, an apple say, has one colour and another has a different
between, say, an object and its colour, or between them and the soul when it was con-
sidered to be the size of the body.
49 In characterizations of views in the of texts belong-
ing to rival traditions, the soul's mental qualities are described pervasively with such ad-
jectives as ligantuka (extrinsic, accidental, adventitious, incidental), a word contrasted
with naisargika (innate). They are not so described, in fact, in the
(where qualities are just classified into, for example, those that last as long as their sub-
strates, ylivaddravyabhlivi, and those that do not, or those that pervade their substrates,
lisrayavylipi, and those that do not); but they are in later texts and in such
Nyaya texts as the Nyliyamaiijarf (see NM(M), Vol. 2, 359,5).
50 See NM(M), Vol. 2, 359,6: sakaZagll(zlipor;lham evlisya n7pam.
51 NBha(NCG) ad 1.1.29, p. 28,15-29,2: niratisayliS cetanli[l, dehendriyamanalzsu
ca iti sliflkhylinlim ... cetanli iti yoglinlim.
Cited by Frauwallner in note 138, p. 241. For Yoga or Yauga in the sense of Naiyayikas
and he points to Jaina works and to Siilikanatha's lJ.juvimaZli. For more on this
usage, see Chattopadhyaya 1927, Chakravarti 1951 (73-76), Bhattacharya 1974, Bronk-
horst 1981 and Kumar 1983 (269).
52 I have followed Frauwa1Iner's interpretation. Prof. Preisendanz pointed out to me,
however, that although this interpretation receives some support from the Nyliyavlirttika-
tlitpmya!fkli, Vatsyayana may well have intended as a bahuvrfhi qualifying
It would then serve to explain why there are distinctions among the objects: be-
cause they have different causes.
Introduction
67
colour, then we would not say that tbe two apples are identical. But according
to the view that became standard in Nyaya and V two souls that are
having and have had completely different kinds of desires, pleasures, pains,
perceptions and so on inhering in them are unmarked by those qualities and
are thus qualitatively identical to each otber and to all other souls.
It is perhaps to be regretted that the view that souls change when their qual-
ities change did not survive in Nyaya and for its disappearance is a
contributing factor to tbe polarization of the debate between Buddhism and
the BrlihmaI}ical schools. It came to be one between two extremes: tbat we
are eternally unchanging, and that in every moment we are qualitatively and
quantitively different, with tbe middle ground virtually unoccupied.
I said above that the soul's agency was also re-evaluated. How can the soul
be an agent if it is all-pervading? Activity in V was held to be equiva-
lent to movement, which was now impossible for the soul. Frauwallner (1956
99) claims that previously tbe had held that the soul directs tbe
body through vibrating (parispanda),53 but this is clearly not an option for
something all-pervading. It is not surprising that the two traditions tbat from
the beginning held souls to be all-pervading, Vedanta and S fu'lkhy a, denied
that the soul was an agent. The problem of explaining agency in an all-
pervading soul also arose for the MImarp.sakas. They addressed it by denying
that all action is movement, and following the Grammarians in defining it as
that which is expressed by any verb, and tbe agent as the subject of tbat verb.
also released action's restriction to just movement, but did not
widen it to the extent of the MImarp.sakas. Rather it postulated just one more
kind of action in addition to movement, namely the action of the will tbat
causes motion. 54 It is through this impulse, which tbey termed effort (pra-
yatna), that tbe soul was said to direct the body and tbe senses. But, perhaps
owing to the persistence of the thought that all action is movement, prayatna
53 This view is witnessed though, only in Jain, and not in sources. Frau-
wallner does not state evidence for it belonging at one time in V
54 Frauwallner points to Buddhism the source of this idea. He quotes
(note 133 on p. 324) Abhidhannakosa 4.1: cetanli tatlqtal!l ca tat, 'That (i.e. action) is
[both] intention and that which is caused by that.'
68
came to be classified in the V lists of categories not as one of the
kinds of action (karman), but as a quality of the soul along with, for example,
cognition, desire, aversion, pleasure and pain. Thus the soul's agency ceases
to stand out as such an important part of its nature as it was in earlier
before the soul was regarded as all-pervading. Earlier the soul had
had,a dual nature as director of the body and knower (jnlitr). Now the former
comes to consist only in effort, and this was just one out of nine qualities.
Furthermore these qualities, as already explained, became merely adventi-
tious.
Because the soul's specific qualities were not regarded as intrinsic to it, there
arose the view that in its liberated state it is completely free of cognition and
action, like a rock. How does this compare with the liberated state of souls in
Sfuikhya? It was mentioned above that for Sfuikhya all mental processes hap-
pen not to the immaterial soul, but to the psycho-physical organism, all of
. which is made from Primal Matter. But the soul confuses himself
55
with this
organism, particularly with its highest constituent, the Intellect (budd/d) and
refers to himself what actually belongs to it. This false identification with the
Intellect leads him to believe that it is he who feels pain or undergoes the
process of cognition, when these in fact happen to a separate material entity
and do not affect him. Once this mistake is realized the interest of the soul in
the products of Primal Matter, which is what drives her on, ceases. He is no
longer seduced by her, and she has now achieved her purpose, which was to
lead him to a realization of his separateness from her. He observes matter no
more and she shows herself no more. She continues to mould herself into
psycho-physical organisms and objects of perception for other souls, but she
is as good as non-existent for those that are liberated. They are not rock-like,
though, as is the liberated soul of the Naiyayikas and They will
never again experience objects of perception through acts of cognition
55 The soul is conceived of as masculine, and Primal Matter feminine, both gram-
matically and in terms of the imagery of prakrti as a skillful courtesan (vidagdhavetya)
seducing the soul.
Introduction
69
(jniina), but they are not insentient (acetana) for their very pature is sen-
tience.
*****
I mentioned above that the debate between Buddhists and non-Buddhists over
the nature of ourselves was a debate between two extremes. It dominated
by, on the Buddhist side, the view that we are numerically distinct in every
moment, 56 and, on the other side, the view of all the Brahmanical schools
looked at so far, that we are eternal and unchanging. An assum;tion that led
the Buddhists to their doctrine of momentariness was that an entity cannot
change or be transformed and remain the same entity. For a thing to be trans-
formed is thus not to persist and be modified but to cease to exist and to give
way to a new entity resembling it but slightly different. The same assumption
can be seen in the view that we are eternally unchanging. To have accepted
that we are modified (by our qualities, actions, perceptions or whatever)
would have entailed that we become a different entity. That would have been
a heresy from the point of view of Brahmru;,tical thinking, for it would have
meant that the recipient of the karmic consequence of an action would not be
the same thing as performed the original action.
But MImarp.sa did not accept this assumption that to change means to cease to
exist, and they were prepared to hold that the soul is both eternal and chang-
. 57 A d'
mg. ccor mg to them, the soul never ceases to exist, never loses its iden-
tity as a particular conscious substance;58 but it is continually changing its
states. As it changes from being happy to unhappy, from perceiving a pot to
perceiving a cloth, it is like a snake coiling into different positions, or a piece
of gold that is remoulded from a dish, to a necklace, to an earring.
59
The
snake and the piece of gold are transformed but they do not cease to exist.
The Jains also accepted that the Self is both eternal and changing.
60
But Bud-
56 It is a pity that so little is known about the Vatslpumyas, for they fall in the middle
ground between these extremes with their concept of a pudgala.
57 See SV(P2), atmavada 22.
58 See SV(P2), atmavada 26.
59 ' ,
See SV(P2), atmavada 27-28, and Parthasarathimisra ad loco
60 See Uno 1999.
-- ----- - - I /" "" "
""
70
dhism and most of the other Briilima.I)ical schools were reluctant to take this
view. For them something can only have one essence or nature. It cannot be
both changing and etern8.I. They thought there was a logical fault in holding
that one thing has two natures.
61
Having given some outlines of the soul doctrines of and
Sankhya, and a brief statement of those of Vedanta and MImarpsa, it remains
to locate Ramakar).tha's soul doctrine in relation to these. But fIrst we will in-
troduce Saiva Siddhanta and look at the place of NPP within it, so that we can
see what ideas about the soul were available to RamakaJ?tha from his own
tradition.
2. Saiva Siddhanta
There is a common misapprehension in secondary literature that Saivism was
divided into Northern or Kashmir Saivism, comprising various Tantric tradi-
tions, and Tamil, Agamic Saiva SiddMnta.
62
It is true that Saiva Siddhanta,
after the twelfth century, survived only in the Tamil-speaking South. But in-
scriptions from the seventh to the twelfth century witness its presence allover
India;63 and a number of pre-twelfth century Saiddhantika texts survive, of
which NPP is one. The Saiva Siddhanta that survived in South India was very
different from the pre-twelfth century pan-Indian Saiva Siddhanta. Not only
61 I say that this was the case for 'most of the other BrahmaJ.1ical schools'. The
Sankhya concept of Primal Matter is an example of something permanent but changing.
Occasional such examples are found within the BrlilimaIfical schools of entities that are
eternal but not kaJastlzanitya (eternal and existing beyond all that is changing).
62 Many examples of publications that put forward this mistaken view, both general
studies of Hinduism and ones concerned specifically with Saivism, are given in a Preface
to Goodall 2002. To those could be added Alper 1979, in which the author identifies the
two most 'fertile' traditions of Saivism as 'KashmIrl Saivism', whose major exponents he
names as Somananda, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta and and Saiva Siddhanta,
which he regards as a South Indian tradition, arising in Tamilnad in the twelfth century
(pp. 346-347).
63 See Goodall 2002 xv, note 17.
Introduction 71
did it undergo major change as a result. of the influence of Bhakti and
Vedanta, but its texts also teach modes of public worship in Saiva temples,
whereas the earlier Saiva Siddhanta taught only personal ritual and
practice.
64
The claim that Saiva Siddhanta is a Tamil tradition that arose in the twelfth
century is thus inaccurate both temporally and geographically, because this
Tamil tradition has its in an earlier pan-Indian Saiva
Siddhanta. The latter was opposed by the syncretistic Trika-Saivism of Abhi-
navagupta, and the non-dualistic traditions on which it draws such as the
Pratyabhijfia, Spanda and Krama. To refer to these traditions as 'Kashmir
Saivism', as is still the norm in Indology, is quite inappropriate given that,
during the period of Abhinavagupta, Saiva Siddhanta was the dominant form
of Saivism in Kashmir.
65
It was based on a body of scriptures, many of the
surviving commentaries on which were composed in Kashmir in the tenth
century. Its exegetes produced dualist commentaries and treatises that formed
the basis of the religion of such later South Indian Saiva Saiddhantikas as
Aghorasiva.
Even more pervasive than the misunderstanding that locates Saiva Siddhanta
exclusively in South India and regards the Saivism of Kashmir as consisting
only of non-dualistic traditions is that which claims the scriptures of Saiva
Siddhanta to be 'Agamas' and those of non-dualistic Saivism to be 'Tantras'.
In fact the exegetes of early Saiva Siddhanta refer to their scriptures more of-
ten with the term tantra than with agama; and the colophons of manuscripts
of Saiddhantika scriptures, even South Indian manuscripts of South Indian
redactions of the scriptures, refer to them as Tantras.
66
Abhinavagupta, fur-
64 The scriptures and siistras of South Indian Saiva Siddhanta were written in both
Sanskrit and Tamil; those of the earlier Saiva Siddhanta were written only in Sanskrit.
65 See Sanderson 1985a 203; and Sanderson 1987.
66 After some time, though, the late Tamil Saiva Siddhantikas dropped the term Tan-
tra and used only Agama in its place. Goodall writes, 'That South Indian editors of works
of the Saiva Siddhanta invariably speak iigamas does not stem entirely from a coy re-
luctance to refer to their scriptures with the now sullied term tantra: neo-Saiddhantikas
writing in Tamil from at least the time of Aru!nandi (see, for example, the second verse of
72
thermore, refers to the scriptures on which he comments with the term iigama
as well as with tantra.
67
The general point could also be made here that Saiva Siddhanta and non-
dualist Saivism were not as separate as they are generally taken to be. Saiva
Siddhanta scriptures were studied, frequently quoted, and regarded as authori-
tative by Abhinavagupta and those in his tiadition.
68
They saw Saiva
Siddhanta as the generic base of their own more specialized and esoteric re-
ligion.
69
Both traditions accepted that the Vedas are valid, but held that the
sphere of their relevance is transcended by Saiva initiation.
7o
Almost all of these misunderstandings can be seen to spring from ignorance
of the existence of pre-twelfth century Saiva Siddhanta. Lists of its original
twenty-eight scriptures or Tantras are preserved in a number of sources.
Many of these scriptures ceased to be transmitted relatively early, something
that was taken advantage of by the Tamil reformulators of Saiva Siddhanta.
They composed new scriptures 71 but gave them names of ones of the twenty-
eight that were already lost. Thus the mere existence of a text that bears the
name of one of the original twenty-eight is not enough for us to presume that
it is early or is the same as the original text by that name. This has misled and
continues to mislead some scholars. The. person who has most clearly identi-
fied which surviving scriptures can be known to have existed prior to Rfuna-
kaJ;ltha and the other tenth century Kashrniri Saiddhantika commentators, and
who has done most work towards establishing a relative chronology between
the Civwiiinacittiyiir) profess adherence to two classes of scripture: Vedas and Agarnas
(Goodall 1998.xxxvi-xxxvii).
67 See Goodall 1998 xxxvi-xxxix.
68 Sanderson 1983 161.
69 Sanderson 1992281; 1995b 20; 1990 160.
70 Sanderson 1990 128. Brahmalaka and Satyalaka, the heavens that await followers
of Vedic religion (Vaidikas) who perform austerities, give donations and such like, are lo-
cated, according to Saivas, in prtlzivftattva, the lowest of the thirty-six levels that com-
prise the universe. The Brahman of the is situated higher, but still within the
impure universe.
71 Or in some cases re-redacted the old ones.
Introduction
73
them is Dominic Goodall.
72
He names three criteria that a scripture to
belong to early Saiva Siddhanta: the existence of an early Nepalese manu-
. f h 73 h .
scnpt 0 t e text; t e eXlstence of quotations of the text by' an .early author
(i.e. up to and including RamakaJ;ltha, who can be dated to c. 950-1000
74
);
and the existence of a commentary on the text by an early author. Applying
these criteria we arrive at the following list of surviving early scriptures: the
Rauravasutrasmigraha, Sviiyamblzuvasutrasmigralza, Kiral}atantra, Parii-
klzyatantra, Nisviisatattvasa1Jllzitii, Kiiiottara,
Matangapiiramesvaratantra, Mrgendratantra, Sarvajiiiinottara.
75
The earliest commentator works of whom survive is Sadyojyotis (seventh or
eighth century76). By him we have the Sviiyamblzuvavrtti,
Bhogakiirikii, Tattvasmigralza and
TattvatrayanirlJ.aya. After him nothing survives until a number of works from
the tenth and early eleventh century, written by a group of Kashmiri
who all belonged to the same lineage: the by SnkaJ;ltha,
Mrgendravrtti by NaraYaJ;lakaJ;l!ha, RfunakaJ;l!ha's father, eight works by
RamakaJ;ltha, listed in footnote 2, and the Bhiivacutjiimal}i by VidyakaJ;ltha II,
RamakaJ;ltha's pupil.
77
From Malava we have three works: composed some
time after the end of the eleventh centUry,78 the Siddhiintasiirapaddlzati by
Bhoja; some time before the middle of the twelfth century79 the Tattvaprakii-
sa also by one Bhoja; and composed some time before the middle of the
72 See the introductions to Goodall 1998 and Goodall 2002, which are also the most
careful editions and most reliable translations of (parts of) the early scriptures. The value
of these publications is further increased by the fact that they report elsewhere unpublish-
ed information communicated to the author by Sanderson.
73 The relevant manuscripts all belong to the ninth or early tenth century.
74 See page 114.
75 Goodall 1998 xxxix-xlvi.
76 See page 111.
77 For the most detailed account of Riimakat;lt!la's lineage see Goodall 1998 ix-xiii.
78 This limit to its date stems from Sanderson's discovery that it draws on the Sama-
samblzupaddlzati (1095/6).
79 This limit to its date derives from'the fact that the Tattvaprakiisa was commented
on by Aghorasiva (fl. 1157). For a study of the text, see Gengnagel1996.
twelfth century the Priiyascittasamuccaya by Hrdayasiva 80 After this there is
no evidence of Saiddhantika works composed outside South India.
3. The Place of NPP within Saiva Siddhanta
3.1. Extent and Manner of Engagement with Other Traditions
The sustained defence of the existence of a (particular kind of) Self and of
God that we find in NPP, its detailed philosophical argumentation consisting
of long sequences of dialogue between opponents and the
author himself (siddhiintin), is not something that is found in the scriptures of
the tradition. They belong to the rather different genre of revelation, in which
a form of Siva himself
1
is asked questions and responds with sermons whose
validity is assured simply through being spoken by him. That said, there is a
continuum rather than a clear distinction between the two genres.
82
Although
there is little sastric discussion in the Sviiyambhuvasutras01igraha, the Raura-
vasutrasaflgraha, the Nisviisa, the 83 the Siirdhatrisati-
kiilottara or the Sarvajiiiinottara, when we move to the Kir01}a, we find at
least that the questioner, Garu<;la, points to what he perceives as inconsisten-
cies in the sermon he is hearing from the Lord, prompting him to clarify. 84
80 For Hrdayasiva's dates see Sanderson 2001 3, note l.
81 There are two exceptions to this: the Mrgendra is spoken not by Siva but by Indra,
who claims that he is setting forth a shortened version of what has been passed down to
him from Siva through a series of intermediaries; and the Pariikhya is expounded by Pra-
kasa, who is identified with the sun.
82 I am here talking only of the sections of the scriptures that concern themselves with
knowledge. They also contain, of course, sections on ritual, observance and Yoga, which,
'being prescriptive in character, are clearly quite different from a text such as NPP.
83 We have only parts of this work, so in its case the assertion cannot be made with
certainty.
84 See Goodall 2002 xl.
Introduction 75
Then in the Pariikhya, the Mataflga and the Mrgendra85 the, dialectical di-
mension becomes more pronounced, and we find the questioners putting ob-
jections from the point of view of non-Saiva traditions such as Buddhism,
Sailkhya, Vedanta, Nyaya, Lokayata and MImaqlsa. Garu<;la's questions con-
fine themselves to the details of the system, but the questioners in these three
Tantras challenge fundamentals such as the existence of God and Self. The
former challenge is not in fact completely absent in the Kir01;za. Garu<;la had
there asked Siva how he could be known. One verse of Siva's response as-
serts that the universe, being gross and diverse, is an effect, and thus requires
a cause. That the cause could be past actions is ruled out owing to them being
insentient. But apart from that one verse, there is nothing by way of argument
that would need to be addressed by those traditions that denied the existence
of God. The rest is theology for the already committed: Siva explains to
Garu<;la his nature, his activities at the time of creation, his dispensing of
grace, his three forms, and his mantra-body. In the Pariikhya, by contrast, the
theology is supplemented by lengthy sastric digressions. And it is not only the
existence of God (which prompts eight objections) that is challenged but also
the existence of the Self. Prakasa states in one verse
86
its existence and
ture, and Pratoda then puts to him a sequence of twelve objections on the
matter before he is satisfied. The mere fact that something is stated to be the
case in these texts is thus not always enough: assertions must be justified
through logically respectable means.
Turning from the scriptures to the earliest commentator whose works survive,
we might expect that he would fall slightly further along the continuum that
we are delineating. In fact that is not clearly the case. Though his words do
not carry the weight of divine revelation, the amount of philosophical arg-
85 Not only are these three texts more sastric in orientation, but also: 1) the latter two
certainly, and possibly the Pariikhya, were composed in four piidas (jliiina, kriyii, caryii
and yoga), a feature that became standard but is not found in any of the other early scrip-
tures (see Goodall 1998 lviii ff.); 2) the Pariikhya and the Mrgendra are the only two of
the early scriptures that show knowledge of illusionist Vedanta (vivartaviida) (Goodall
2002 lii); 3) the Mataliga and the Mrgendra do not have names that appear in the lists of
the twenty-eight canonical Siddhantas. Svch facts, though inconclusive of course, indicate
that these three texts may be the latest of the surviving early scriptures.
86 PaTa 1.15.
ument as against theological assertion is no greater in the works of Sadyo-
jyotis than in the Parakhya, Matanga or Mrgendra. Neither is his Sanskrit,
which contains many seemingly superfluous particles (such as hi), and sev-
eral instances of relatives not picked up by correlatives, as clear as that of the
Mrgendra.87 In his Tattvatrayanin:zaya88-an investigation into Siva, souls
and maya-the existence of Siva and that of eternal, all-pervading souls are
not challenged or deemed to require argument. There is no engagement with
the views of other traditions. In the Tattvasangraha
89
his engagement consists
of two verses devoted to refuting the Sankhya view that the soul is not an
agent, and three verses at the end in which he very briefly refers to and rejects
four non-Saiddhantika doctrines: the Pasupata view that God's qualities are
transferred to the soul at liberation; the Vedanta view that all souls are part of
Brahman and merge with it at liberation; the V view that the ability to
cognize and act cease at liberation; and the Li'ikula view that as soon as a soul
is liberated, God hands over to it the task of running the universe and with-
draws to inactivity, so that rather than one God there is a row of liberated
souls taking on this role in tum. His Svayambhuva commentary90 contains lit-
tle that is dialectical. The two texts of his that contain most are the
and But, as we will be able to ob-
serve in the course of Chapters 2 and 3 below, there is an enormous differ-
ence between the verses and NPP in the depth and seri-
ousness with which opponents' views are treated. Thus for example Sad-
yojyotis simply adduces I-cognitions (ahampratyaya) as evidence of the exis-
tence of the Self,91 without addressing the possibility that these cognitions are
87 The fact that in attacking Vedanta he deals only with the doctrine of real trans-
formation"ofBrahman into the world of plurality (parbJ.iimaviida), seeming to be unaware
of the doctrine of merely apparent transformation (vivartaviida) that superseded it, is an
indication that he may have been writing before the composition of the Pariikhya and the
Mrgendra, which, as mentioned above, do confront vivartaviida in their refutations of
Vedanta. (Goodall2002lii.)
88 For a translation of this text see Davis 1997-2000.
89 This text has been translated into German by Frauwallner (1962), and into French
by Filliozat (1988).
90 This has been translated into French (Filliozat 1991) and English (Filliozat 1994).
91 1.15.
Introduction
77
invalid. He is also prone to such assertions as that the Yogacara rejection of
the existence of external objects is false because external objects are experi-
enced (anubhuyate).92
When one compares the discussion with rival traditions in both the works of
Sadyojyotis and the three most discursive of the early scriptures, the Para-
khya, Matanga and Mrgendra, with that in the fIrst chapter of NPP, the fIrst
group of texts appear to have as therr main aim to strengthen the convictions
of Saivas, whereas the latter could sometimes convince the members
of rival traditions that their own arguments are not well-founded.
Narayru;takru;ttha, Ramakru;ttha's father, falls just short of Ramakru;ttha on the
continuum, and thus a long distance from Sadyojyotis and the scriptures. In
his one surviving text, the Mrgendravrtti, the presentation of the views of
non-Saivas, such as Buddhists, is much less simplistic, and the refutation of
their arguments shows more subtlety. This is the earliest surviving Saiva
Siddhanta text that shows its author to have" a close acquaintance with the
primary sources of Buddhism and to have thought hard about how to counter
it non-superficially.93
Out of all the Saiva Siddhanta texts that predate Aghorasiva, I would place
NPP at the very extreme of the continuum, devoting as it does most space to
dialogue with other traditions.
94
It is not only the amount of space devoted to,
but also the manner of, this engagement with other traditions that sets the fIrst
chapter of NPP apart from earlier Saiva Siddhanta texts, and indeed from
many of the others by Ramakru;ttha. Many of the scriptures themselves and
the commentaries thereon by Ramakru;ttha and his predecessors argue in one
of two ways for the inferiority of other traditions to Saiva religion. Either
they claim that the authors" of the texts of other traditions were not omni-
scient, and for this reason cannot be relied upon to give one the full picture of
92
1
.
6
.
93 It is possible that his of, and responses to, Buddhism did not originate
from him but were derived from works by his guru and father, VidyakaIftlJa I, or the lat-
ter's guru, RamakaIftha I, none of which h,ave come to light (see Goodall 1998 ix). "
94 The ParamolqaniriisakiirikiivTfti and the 6th chapter of the Mataligav!fti are close
to it in this respect.
I
I
78
what exists, ultimate aims and the means of attaining those aims.
95
Or, relat-
edly, they argue that other traditions can only release one from lower levels
of the universe, Saivism being the only religion that recognizes the existence
of the upper levels of the impure Universe and that is powerful enough to
raise one beyond them to equality with Siva at the top of the pure universe.
They assign other traditions to particular sections of the hierarchy cif princi-
ples (tattvas).96 Thus for example in the Sarvflgamaprflmfll}yopanyflsa
97
RamakaJ).!ha states that the liberation one can attain from following the
Paficaratra path lands one in prakrtitattva; that the destiny of those en-
, lightened in the Nyaya tradition is buddhitattva; and that those who hold the
Self to be no more than the vital breaths can reach no higher than ahmikflra-
tattva. He also locates Pasupatas, Lakulas, Vedantins, Sankhyas, Jains, Bud-
dhists and others.
In many cases one can discern a certain logic linking the traditions with the
tattvas to which they are assigned. The highest level of the universe recog-
nized by the Paficaratras (NarayaJ).a) is held by themselves to be its material .
cause, and so they are said to be capable of reaching prakrtitattva, the mat-
erial cause, according to Saivism, of the world of sense-objects, bodies and
sense-faculties. For the same reason those who hold that Brahman is the ma-
terial cause of gUl}as and souls are also placed in prak!1itattva. The Sankhyas
hold that the highest aim is attained through discriminating between the soul
and the material world composed of the gUl}as. Thus they are said to be able
to liberate themselves from gUl}atattva and e'verything below. The Buddhists
hold that the self is nothing more than a stream of cognition, jiiflna, which,
95 See for example MT 1.2.11 and NiiraYaIfakaIftha's commentary ad loco
96 Saivism modified the scale of tattvas that they inherited from Sfu'lkhya in two ways
(see Goodall 1998 Ii-Iii): by adding further tattvas on top, and by understanding them not
just as principles/constituents/evolutes, but also as levels of the universe through which
the soul ascends on its way towards enlightenment. According to Saiva cosmology, above
the highest level of the universe recognized by Sfu'lkhya, come five more
levels, known as the Cuirasses (kaiicllkas), followed by Primal Matter (miiyiJ), followed
by five levels of the pure universe, the topmost being Siva. More detail on this is given
below (p. 81).
97 In a fragment preserved in two quotations, identified by Goodall, and reproduced
and translated by him on pp. xxii-xxv of Goodall 1998.
Introduction
79
is-in the scheme of tattvas-a function of the buddhi, and hen<;:e they are as-
signed to the functions of the Buddhi (buddhivrtti).98 The fact that those who
hold that the Self is no more than the vital breaths are placed in
ahankflratattva can be explained by the fact that the Ahru:ikara is the faculty
responsible for their functioning.
99
Those who hold that the Self is nothing
other than the manas or the sense-faculties are, not surprisingly, placed re-
spectively in manastattva and the indriyas. In each case that which the tradi-
tion in question could be seen to teach as its highest entity or principle corre-
lates with a relatively low level of the Saiva universe. But despite this 'logic',
such passages are little more than assertions of superiority and differ from in-
, teraction with other traditions through reasoned argument and dialogue: their
claims cannot really be argued against except through bald denial. Riima-
kaJ).!ha makes such claims not only in the Sarvflgamaprflmfll}yopanyflsa, but
also the 100 MatangavrttilOI and
vrtti,102 but they contrast with the nature of his engagement with other tradi-
tions in the fIrst chapter of NPP and would not be at home there.
98 It is hard to imagine how the of the Buddhi' (bllddhivrtti) could repres-
ent a geographical level of the universe. Hence Prof. Preisendanz wondered whether in
passages such as this the 'levels' to which souls are assigned might not denote spiritual
levels or levels of meditational experience as in the case of the Buddhist dlzyiinas,
iiyatanas and
99 The relevant half verse reads, ahanlq1all tll tadv[tti priir:zamiitraJ.n bhramer:za ye, and
Goodall (1998 xxiv) translates: 'In alzankiiratattva are those who erroneously hold [the
self to be] no more than the vital breaths, which are the activities of that [AhaIikiira].' Is
the position that the vital breaths are functions of the AhaIikiira attested elsewhere? SK 29
states that the breaths are a joint function of bllddlzi, ahankiira and manas. The Yllktidfpi-
kii ad loco lists eight kinds of priir:za beginning with priir:za, aplina, samlina, and then says
that they are vaikiirika, i.e. derived from the Ahankiira (tad etat vaikiirikam
YD 209,13-14). The vital breaths are associated with the AhaIikiira at BhoKa 33a-c and
in AghoraSiva's commentary thereto. I thank Prof. Preisendanz, Ferenc Ruzsa and Fabio
Boccio for pointing these passages out to me.
100 Ad 143-154.
101 Ad vidyiiplida 3.20ab.
102 Ad v. 58.
80
3.2. The Soul in Saiva Siddhanta and NPP
NPP is also distinctive in the way it approaches the subject of the soul. In or-
der to illustrate this point I will now present the characteristics of the soul that
are put forward in other Saiva Siddhanta texts. This will also serve as an in-
troduction for the reader to the basic ideas of Saiva Siddhiinta theology.
Souls, though eternally separate from God (as well as from each other and
from matter) are equal to him in being omniscient and omnipotent. That they
do not realize this until the time of their liberation is a result of their true na-
ture being concealed from them because of being covered in Impurity (mala).
The non-dualist Saivas conceived of mala as simply ignorance and thus capa-
ble of being removed through knowledge alone. But for the Saiddhiintikas it
was an unperceived physical substance. Just as a cataract does not disappear
simply through the person's knowledge that they have it, similarly the physi-
cal Impurity that obstructs one's powers of knowledge and action can be re-
moved only through active intervention in the form of Saiva initiation, in
which Siva acts on the soul through the medium of the initiating guru.
103
Thus souls are characterized as on a beginningless journey that will end, for
some, with Sivahood, the manifestation of their innate omniscience and om-
nipotence. The only difference between souls and Siva is that they have been
beginninglessly bound, while he has been beginninglessly liberated. The de-
scriptions tend to
l04
begin from the end of a period of Cosmic Absorption
(mahiipralaya) , which is also the beginning of a new cycle.
105
At that time
most souls will still be subject to the bond of Impurity and the bond of past
action (karman).106 For their benefit Siva stimulates the evolution of the ma-
103 See MatV KP ad 1.2-3b.
104 For example in the Svayambhuvasl7trasmigraha and the Kira{za.
105 Since God, souls and the Primal Matter out of which the universe is made (maya)
are eternal in Saiva Siddhiinta, the 'beginning' of the universe, or the time at which God.
creates it, is merely the beginning of one cycle, preceded by an infinite number of pre-
vious cycles, each containing their own creation of the universe.
106 Souls that will not are those that have become liberated in previous cycles and a
group known as vijiiallakevalills or vijiiallakalas, who have become devoid of the bond of
Introduction
81
terial world out of Primal Matter (maya).107 This is the thircl. of the three
bonds, so why is it of benefit to souls to become subject to it?
Two answers are given. It is only through taking on a body and becoming
immersed in a world of sense-objects, both of which are made from the prod-
ucts of Primal Matter, that the soul can experience the fruits of its past actions
and thus free itself from the bond of karman.
IOB
Secondly, mala on its own
cannot mature: for a soul's Impurity to ripen, and thus for liberation to take
place, experience (bhoga), which requires the products of Primal Matter both
as instruments and objects, is necessary.109 Thus in Saiva Siddhiinta maya is
not seen only as that which deludes souls, as in Sfuikhya; for it also, para-
doxically, facilitates their release from sQ/!lsara through empowering them
for experience.
110
Hence the soul travels downwards, as it were, III becoming
subject to the bondage of more and more of the products of Primal Matter.
maya, and also that of past action, owing to their own knowledge. They are contrasted
with pralayakevalills or pralayakalas, who are still subject to the bonds of kanllan and
mala, but not maya because it has been resorbed at the end of a cycle and not yet re-
emitted. For the source of this distinction, which is only found in two of the early
Saiddhiintika scriptures, but which became orthodox, see Goodall's remarks at PaTa p.
xliii.
107 Although Saiva Siddhiinta strongly opposes Sfuikhya's denial of agency in the
soul, the latter's relegation of agency to lower principles can be seen to have left its trace
in Saiva Siddhiinta's attitude towards God's creation of the universe. Although he is said
to be its creator, his instrument in the act of creation is his will alone, and it is not he, but
Ananta, the seniormost of eight Rudra-souls known as the Vidyesvaras, that acts directly
on Primal Matter, energizing it to produce the material world. For more on this see note
122.
108 KiTa 2.7-8.
109 KV ad 2.7-8; NPP ad 2.27c-28b. This is also implied in verse 17 of Tattvatraya-
n i ~ a y a
110 The claim that Saiva Siddhiinta is opposed in this respect to Sfuikhya is made at
KiTa 2.12c-15d. maya is not a standard Sfuikhya term, so the Kira7J.a presumably intends
to contrast the function of maya in Saiva Siddhiinta with that of prakrti in Sfuikhya. pra-
k[1i's function in Sfuikhya is in fact not infrequently characterized as the leading of the
soul to liberation; but the Kira7J.a may "Yell be right that the positive role of maya is
stressed more in Saiva Siddhiinta than that of prakrti in Sfuikhya.
11\ Being all-pervading, any movement attributed to it is merely metaphorical.
82
First come the five
ll2
cuirasses
113
(kaiicukas), a group of principles (tattvas)
that fall below the pure universe, but above the levels of the universe recog-
nized by the Sankhyas. These form the innermost layer of the structure of the
person surrounding the soul like a skin.114 Although they are a bond, they
empower the soul for experience by splitting apart Impurity and thus allowing
the partial manifestation of its powers of cognition and action. After this the
soul is enveloped by each in tum of the twenty-five principles that Saiva
Siddhanta inherited from Sankhya. The top principle of the Sankhya universe',
that of the soul becomes in the Saiva hierarchy the bound soul.
Lack of agency in that state is regarded, unlike according to S ankhy a, as
merely a temporary condition that ends when, equipped with the five cui-
rasses, the soul penetrates the Unmanifest (avyakta), the next principle.
JJ5
The
latter is the basis of the material world and the faculties, which facilitate the
person's state of incarnation. To those outside the tradition this principle of
the Unmanifest may appear somewhat redundant, given the existence of Pri-
mal Matter above it. 116 It gives rise to the Intellect (buddhi),117 Personaliza-
tion (ahafzkara), Attention (manas), the five faculties of sense-perception
(buddhfndriya), the five faculties of action (kannendriya), the five subtle
elements (tanmiltra) and the five gross elements (mahabhuta) from Ether to
112 In some sources there are only three: Activation (kala), Awareness (vidyli) and At-
tachment (raga). The other two of the five are Limitation (niyati) and Time (kala).
113 This is the translation used by Torella 1998 and Goodall 2002. Sanderson 1996
uses 'Integuments'.
114 See Torella 1998.
115 Sanderson 199620.
116 Both it and Primal Matter are envisaged as unconscious, undifferentiated stuff out
of which the levels of the universe below them are formed. Both also require to be ener-
gized: Primal Matter by Ananta, and the Unmanifest by the Rudra SrIkaJ?tha (see Sander-
son 199620).
117 Some sources, for example the Ralll'ava, the Kira{za, the Mataliga and the Tattva-
saligraha, insert an extra principle between the Un manifest and the Intellect, that of the
three Qualities (gU{za).
Introduction
83
Earth. Thus after the, last stage of this process the soul can fill,ally join with
what constitutes its gross body, the outermost layer of the person.
ll8
Just as it is Siva who brings about bondage in maya for those who need it, so
it is he who is ultimately responsible for the liberation of souls.
ll9
Until a soul
is ready for liberation Siva will keep it subject to Impurity; when that time
comes he intervenes by favouring it with a Descent of Power (saktipata) that
restrains the hold of Impurity on it. 120 This implants an urge in the person,
which leads them 121 to realize that they cannot escape from sal.nSara through
any other system, and prompts them to seek a Saiva guru. It also leads to cer:
tain changes in their behaviour, such as signs of devotion, which enable an
initiating guru to see that Siva desires that person's release and that they are
thus worthy to receive initiation. In this initiation Siva releases them from
bondage by acting through the guru.
122
During the ritual the Mantras prevent
118 Apart from a gross body the soul also has a subtle body, which it retains between
incarnations and during periods of Cosmic Resorption, and which is the receptacle of its
karma.
119 The first verse of the Tattvatrayanin,zaya alludes to these two roles. See also MT
1.4. 13d-1S.
120 Siva sends a salvific Descent of Power, according to some sources, when there is a
blockage of experience caused by two equally strong traces of past action reaching frui-
tion simultaneously (karmasamya); and according to others, when the soul's Impurity is
ripe to the extent that it is ready to drop off (malaparipaka). See Goodall 1998 xxxiii-
xxxvi.
121 I use 'they', 'them' and 'their' not only in plural, but also, as here, in singular
meaning, as a way of avoiding sexist language.
122 Although Siva is the agent, this agency is minimalized such that he is not con-
taminated by acting in the impure universe. The success of the ritual depends on Mantras,
souls that are denoted by syllables chanted by the guru. It is to these that the job of sever-
ing the bonds of the initiahd is sub-contracted by Siva, via Ananta. The latter, before he
has stimulated Primal Matter, appoints these Mantras, also called vidyas, to the task of
liberating the bound. They inhabit worlds within suddhavidya, the lowest level of the pure
universe, above Primal Matter, so that they too do not have to be contaminated by in-
volvement in the impure universe. Thus here too, as in the case of Siva's creation of the
world, we see a version of the Sankhya idea of action taking place below the level of that
which impels it. This applies to Siva and, to Ananta through their delegation of the job;
and to the Mantras themselves through their remaining in the pure universe while they
sever the bonds of initiands in the lowest level of the universe (Prthivftattva). The survival
84
all future karma and destroy all past karma, both good and bad.
123
But they
leave in place 'present karma', in other words past actions that are currently
bearing the fruit of that person's life. Neither do they completely destroy the
bond of Impurity and that of Materiality (maya). Thus liberation is attained
not immediately, but at death.124 Post-initiatory daily ritual gradually elimi-
nates the remains of the soul's Impurity and Materiality.
That concludes the account of the soul and its journey from bondage to lib-
eration that is characteristic of most Saiva Siddhanta texts. One might expect
that the first chapter of NPP, since it concerns itself with the soul or Self,
would follow the same pattern. In fact many of the features of the account
outlined above are ignored completely or given little space at the very end of
the chapter; a small number are concentrated on at length; and many new de-
tails about the soul are introduced. I take this to be a symptom of the fact that
had the tradition restricted itself to this kind of theology it would not have
been able to enter into detailed rational dialogue with the Buddhist Episte-
mological School, Nyaya, MlmaIpsa and the other philosophical traditions,
for too few of its categories and assumptions-for example the doctrine of the
three bonds and the soul's dependence on God's grace-are shared by those
traditions. Thus we find, roughly speaking, that in the first chapter of NPP
those features of the Saiva Siddhanta view of the soul that are not 'shared by
any of the philosophical traditions are ignored or dealt with briefly at the end
of the chapter; those features that are shared by one or more of those tradi-
tions, and that had already been aired in the inter-tradition dialogue, are ar-
gued for at length; and the new details are all features that arise not from ten-
sions or developments within Saiva Siddhanta theology but from discussions
of the Self outside Saiva Siddhanta in debates between philosophical schools.
of the Sankhya ideology that this betrays is striking given its co-existence with the strong
Saiva affirmation of agencyin the Lord and in souls, even after they are liberated.
123 I am talking here of initiation for liberation-seekers (mumu/qu), known as nirvii(za-
not of that for Siidhakas seeking supernatural powers or a period in a chosen para-
dise (bllbhll/qll), where the situation is slightly more complicated and the sources not
unanimous. See Sanderson 199633-37.
124 'Present karma', Impurity and Materiality are not left in place in that variety of
initiation known as which was given to the dying.
Introduction
85
To be specific, into the first category fall the omniscience and omnipotence of
the soul, its becoming equal to Siva at liberation, its beginningless connection
with the bond of Impurity, the existence of the five cuirasses that surround it,
the fact that Impurity is not simply ignorance but a physical substance, the
reason for its involvement with the material world being to facilitate its free-
dom from Impurity and Past Action, Saiva initiation being its only hope of
liberation, the idea that it can receive a descent of power, its dependence on
God's grace and the idea that its karma can be cancelled by Mantras. None of
these are mentioned before page ninety-nine (of the KSTS edition, out of
112), and the last six not at all.
l25
Into the second category fall the fact that
125 One can detect a conscious decision to avoid them. Note, for example, the course
of the following discussion (ad v. 55, p. 95,8-13): RiimakaI)tba states the conclusion of
his preceding arguments against a Vediintin opponent, namely that a plurality of eternal
and all-p'ervading souls must be accepted. The opponent objects that in that case, since all
would be present in all bodies, people's experiences would be mixed up. Riimaka-
I)tba responds that experiences are kept separate because they are restricted by people's
individual karma. The opponent objects that the karma too of one person would not be re-
stricted to that person alone for the same reason that their soul would pervade every other
body. RiimakaI)tba responds that karma is separate for different agents, since agency, be-
cause it is linked to the desire to act, is separate in different individuals. He supports this
by pointing out that one person never desires to act as a result of a desire to act in another
person. ity uktaYllktyii nityavyiipakasvabhiivii eva te 'bhYllpagantavyii itL yady evalJl
sarvatmaniil!l sannidhiiniid bhogasa/ikara!z. na, kanllabhir niyamitatvi1t.
nanll api sa eva na, kartrbhedena bhediit, ka/1rtva/!1 hi
pratyiif1Ila/Jl bhidyate, [Onyas Ked
Pc
, B;
Ked
ac
; vii Ped] upapadyate yata!z. What is noteworthy about
RiimakaI)tba's argument is that he does not bring up Limitation..Constraint (niyati). This is
one of the five cuirasses and its function is precisely to avert what the opponent refers to
in this passage as bhogasalikara, the mixing of experiences. It ensures that a soul experi-
ences only the results of its own past actions. The fact that RiimakaI)tba avoids mention-
ing this specifically Saiva principle, which could not be more appropriate in the context,
appealing instead to agency and 'the desire to act', concepts that are much less controver-
sial, illustrates the avoidance of ideas that would carry no weight in inter-tradition dis-
course.
I said that none of the members of the list are mentioned before page ninety-nine. On
that page RiimakaI)tba turns from the task of refuting other traditions to refuting other
Saiva, but non-Saiddhiintika, views of liberation (until page 103). Perhaps because he is
addressing other Saivas, he mentions for the first time in the text the soul's omniscience
86" The Self' s Awareness of Itself
souls exist, that they are eternally separate from each other, that they are all-
pervading, that they are separate from the body, the sense-faculties and the
manas, that they are agents, that their power of cognition is innate, that they
are non-momentary, that they are" separate from objects of perception and that
they survive the death of the body. As for the new details, we will encounter
them in the course of the four chapters. They concern mostly the claim that
the Self is nothing other than cognition, that it can be perceived, and the
elaboration of different kinds of such perception.
Thus both in the extent (and manner) of its engagement with the views of
other traditions, and in those features of the soul that it focusses on, NPP dif-
fers from other Saiva Siddhiinta texts. With regard to the first it was seen not
to be unique, but to lie at one end of a continuum. The same is the case with
regard to the second. Its avoidance of certain aspects of the soul and con-
centration on others was enabled by a similar pattern in the text on which it
comments, NP. Neither is NP the only other text that has a long examination
of the soul, concentrating on philosophical rather than theological issues: a
second is the Parakhya.
and its becoming equal to Siva at liberation, and alludes to its omnipotence with the word
Mi.
Even during this refutation of other Saiva views of liberation; he mentions that which
obscures the soul's power of cognition as avidyiidyiivara{w, 'hindrances such as igno-
rance' (ad 59, p. 100,3-4), avoiding the term mala, Impurity. It is in the context of this
refutation of other Saiva views of liberation that he first alludes to the five cuirasses with
the word kaliidi, 'Kala and the others' (100,13-14).
On pages 106-107 he, in one paragraph, argues for the existence of something that
obstructs (iivara{w) the full expression of the soul's powers and names this as Impurity
(mala). That is the one and only place in the chapter where he deals with the topic. Then
from page 107 to 111 he argues for the existence of the bonds above the Sfuikhya universe
that he referred to for the first time a few pages earlier with the word kaliidi.
Introduction
87
3.3.,Reliance on Saiva Scripture
I take these two differences as an indication that through NPP RainakaJ;ltha is
attempting to reach out to a larger audience, one consisting not only of
Saivas. If this were the case then we would expect him not to ,adduce Saiva
scripture as a means of knowledge in NPP, but to try to establish all of his
points by appeal solely to direct perception and inference
(anumana). This is, broadly speaking, the case. The first six chapters of KV
comprise roughly the same amount of text as the first chapter of NPP, and "
whereas in the former RfunakaJ;ltha quotes Saiva scripture twenty-six times,
he does so only twice in the first chapter of NPP.
One of these is in the section where he is refuting Pasupata and KapaIika
analyses of liberation 126 and it is easily explained as resulting from the as-
sumption that these Saiva groups would not want their analyses to contradict
Saiva scripture. The other comes in the section in which he deals with the ex-
istence of the specifically Saiva principles (tattvas) that constitute further lev-
els of bondage above those levels recognized by the Sfu:ikhyas. He informs
the reader of their names and their order of emission by quoting the
Raurava.127 But the fact that he does not regard the rnere citation of Saiva
scripture-outside of the small section where he is addressing other Saivas-
as much of an instrument of proof is indicated by the fact that he then imme-
diately has an opponent ask 'Are these [extra bonds] which are not recog-
nized in other schools, proved for you only by scripture?,128 He answers in
the negative and immediately articulates an inference of their existence. 129
126 Ad v. 65, p. 103,10.
127 Ad v. 69, p. 107,5b-2b.
128 Introducing verse 70, p. 108,2-3: kim iigamenaivaitiini darSaniintariiprasiddhiini
bhavatiil.n siddhiini.
129 Far and away the most quoted texts are those belonging to the Buddhist Pram1ir).a
School. Ramakav.!:ha quotes DharmakIrti on no less than forty-four different occasions
during the first chapter alone, and followers of DharmakIrti (such as Dharmottara and
Prajiiiikaragupta) five times. In general he, quotes texts that would be regarded as authori-
tative by the tradition that is being addressed at the time. The purpose is either to show
that his own views, though contrary to those of his opponent, are derivable from or con-
88
3.4. Comparison with PratyabhijfHi
I conclude from the above that whereas KV, for example, expounds one of
the scriptures of the tradition primarily for the benefit of those within it, NPP
looks without to the wider philosophical discourse of the time, in which Saiva
Siddhfulta was only a marginal voice. It attempts to locate Saiva Siddhfulta
within that discourse by taking on in debate a series of interlocutors from
other traditions. In this respect we could see it as a Saiva Siddhfulta equiva-
lent of the Pratyabhijfia tradition's texts.
130
It would have been hard to gain
ground in that discourse had he concentrated on the more theological aspects
of Saiva Siddhfulta, and thus, as we saw above, they take backstage in NPP
and are replaced by an emphasis on different aspects of the Self. Torella de-
scribes a similar process at play in the Pratyabhijfia's re-working of its inheri-
tance from the non-dualist cults based on the BhairavaTantras:
l3l
It was necessary to [ ... ] purge it, without changing its essential nature, of all
that it was felt could not be proposed to a wider circle-in other words, of all
that was bound to create an instinctive and insurmountable resistance-by [ ... ]
translating it into a discourse whose categories were shared by its addressees.
Bronkhorst comments on this process: 132
The Pratyabhijiia School demonstrates, through its transition, how strong must
have been the attraction to join the rational tradition that had united, at least
since the beginning of the common era, a variety of mutually opposing
gruent with their principles and so should be accepted by them; or to show that his oppo-
nents' views are contradicted by other views of their own school.
130 Sanderson (1985a 203) writes of Pratyabhijiia that it presented the idealism of the
Trika 'to a wider public by clothing it in the philosophically reasoned, anti-Buddhist dis-
course of high Brahmanism' (see also Sanderson 1990 162-63). Similarly Rlimal<aI)!ha
here presents Saiva Siddhanta in an anti-Buddhist treatise, which in its style, methodology
and subject-matter can be seen to belong to the same genre as the works of Nyaya, Vaise-
~ i k a MImaqlSa, Sfui.khya and Vedanta.
131 Torella 1994 xiii.
132 Bronkhorst 1996604.
Introduction
schools of thought in India. BrlihmaI)ical thinkers, Buddhists and ~ a i n a s had
opposed and sometimes viciously attacked each other, without ever desisting
from paying heed to each other, and trying to defend their own points of view
against the attacks directed against them. The very existence of such a "rational
tradition in India has never received the attention it deserves, and it goes
without saying that not all religious movements chose to be part of it.
Pratyabhijiia is an example of a school which originally remained aloof from
these discussions, but-in the persons of Somananda, Utpaladeva and others-
felt the need to join in.
89
Similarly Saiva Siddhfulta is a tradition whose early texts show little concern
for this 'rational tradition', but which, in the persons of NarayaI).akaI).tha and
RamakaI).tha, shows the desire to enter it.
One should not, however, take the comparison with Pratyabhijfia too far.
Pratyabhijfia is a separate school with its own lineages and doctrines. There
was no comparable breakaway tradition in Saiva Siddhfulta. The first chapter
of NPP may show signs of a similar tendency to focus on and develop those
sides of Saivism that were suitable for confronting the philosophical tradi-
tions, but it is a text that is claimed by no tradition other than that which sees
itself as following the Saiva Siddhfulta scriptures. Unlike the case of Abhi-
navagupta, whose Pratyabhijfia texts can be seen to belong to a different tra-
dition from that of his Trika texts, all of RamakaI).tha's texts belong only to
Saiva Siddhfulta.
The way that I placed NPP at the end of a continuum that unfolded in what is
more or less a plausible chronological order should not be taken to indicate
that over time Saiva Siddhfulta evolved into a less theological and more ra-
tional tradition. That is certainly not the case. The first chapter of NPP repre-
sents, if anything, a fringe phenomenon. The heart of Saiva Siddhfulta for
RamakaI).tha is its theology and ritual; the philosophical discussion in which
theological assumptions are set aside is a thin layer at its outer edge.
90 The Self s Awareness of Itself
4. RfunakaJ..1!ha's Soul Doctrine in Relation to Those
of the BrahmaJ..1ical Schools
4.1. Vedanta and Sailkhya in Brief
Concerning Ramakar;ttha's relation to Vedanta and Sallkhya there is in each
case a primary point of contention that is clear and simple to articulate.
Against the Vedantin Ramakar;ttha seeks to establish that rather than there be-
ing only one soul in the universe, there is a plurality of distinct souls that re-
main separate from each other even after their liberation. Against Sallkhya he
seeks to establish that the Self is an agent.
*****
Bronkhorst has written in some detail about the Saiva view that the Self is an
agent, which he encounters in Utpaladeva's [svarapratyabhijfiiikiirikii. He re-
gards it as contrasting strongly with 'practically all schools of Brahmanical
philosophy', and as 'surprising' when 'seen from the perspective of earlier
Indian philosophy' (1996611). For him it is characteristic of Brahmanism to
maintain that the way to attain liberation from karma is to realize that the Self
in its true nature is inactive. By realizing that one is different from everything
that acts one frees oneself from one's actions and therefore from their results.
He explains Utpaladeva's attribution of agency to the soul, which he de-
scribes as a 'fundamental reversal' (612), in the following way. Utpala holds
that something insentient cannot cause existence in something else. Thus the
relation of cause and effect is reduced to that of agent and object. This means
that in statements like 'the seed produces the shoot' the seed is not the real
cause. Rather God is the cause, i.e. the agent. Since God for him is nothing
other than the Self, we arrive at the view that the Self is an agent.
Glossing over the problem that this is a rather circular explanation for the rise
of the view that the Self is an agent, comparison with Saiva Siddhanta renders
it implausible. For Saiva Siddhanta too held the Self to be an agent (even in
its liberated state), and it holds neither Utpaladeva's view that God is the real
referent of cause-terms, nor his view that God is the Self. Bronkhorst writes
Introduction
91
as though the agency of the Self first appears in the Pratyabhiji\a School, and
as though its appearance must be explained as the solution to a philosophical
problem. But this doctrine pre-existed Utpaladeva in earlier Saivism, inclu-
ding in Saiva Siddhanta (in both the early scriptures and the works of Sadyo-
jyotis), which, being the exoteric base of non-dualistic Saivism, is likely to be
its source.
I am in no better position than Bronkhorst to offer a theory of how the doc-
trine first arose. But I would have thought it more likely that its origins lie in
the religious base of Saivism than in the philosophical attempt to satisfy what
he terms the 'correspondence principle'. For the religious activities of
Saivism had as their aim not only freedom from sarrzsiira, but also the free-
dom to do things that are impossible for most of us, the bringing about of su-
pernatural effects (siddhis). Perhaps it was this duality that led to Saivism
holding the Self to be both a knower and a doer.
Towards the end of his article Bronkhorst points out some similarities be-
tween Nyaya-V and Utpaladeva. For both, the Self was held to be an
agent, and its agency was explained by both in the same way: through the op-
eration of the will alone. But for Nyaya-V agency disappears at lib-
eration when insight into the Self's true nature means that all specific quali-
ties leave it and it reaches its real inactive nature. Bronkhorst wonders why
there is this difference between Utpaladeva and His expla-
nation is that, unlike Nyaya- Utpaladeva did not maintain the ob-
jective and independent reality of the material world and thus of karma. He
writes that whereas 'for the task remained to escape from
the effects of one's actions, for Utpaladeva the problem of karma had essen-
tially disappeared' (619). Hence Utpaladeva did not need the Self to be ulti-
mately non-agentive.
But here again the comparison with Saiva Siddhanta implies that if an expla-
nation for this difference is needed, it should be sought in the religious sub-
strate of Saivism, not in other philosophical positions held. For Saiva
Siddhanta, like upheld the objective and independent reali-'
ty of the material world, and of karma. But they did not hold that liberation
comes about through insight into inactive nature of the Self. This implies
that another explanation is needed for why Utpaladeva and Saiva Siddhanta
92
did not have to resort to liberating insight as a means of overcoming karma.
And there is quite an obvious one. Both Saiva Siddhanta and non-dualisic
Saivism claim that one's karma can be cancelled through Saiva initiation, so
the purpose served by asserting that the SeU: is in its true nature a non-agent
was already served by another means.
4.2. Nyaya and V
The view that consciousness or cognition is a quality that inheres in a soul
forms Ramakm;J.tha's main target in discussions with Nyaya and
We saw above that for these two schools cognition, like all of the soul's
qualities, is extrinsic to it. They hold . that momentary instances of cognition
are caused to arise in it owing to the presence of an object, the latter's contact
with a sense-faculty, the latter's contact with the man as and the latter's con-
tact with the soul.' Thus the soul's sentience is not innate but arises in it
adventitiously. This accidental relationship of the soul and its cognition, en-
tailing that the soul exists over and above cognition as a separate entity, and
implying that the soul itself is insentient, was strongly objected to by Riima-
km;J.tha. For him cognition is not something that sometimes arises in the soul
owing to external causes; it is never not in it, being its single nature. Thus for
him objects and sense-faculties do not bring about cognition: it exists inde-
pendently of them and they simply reveal it (vyafijaka).133
4.3. Sankhya
The tradition from which Ramakantha (and Saivism in general) inherits most
is Siiilkhya. We have already seen that Saiva Siddhiinta accepted their view
that the material world, being separate from souls, evolves out of an eternal,
unconscious Ur-matter (which is opposed to the Naiyayika and
133 See K:V ad 2.23c-24b, p. 52, 2-3.
Introduction
93
view that it is built up, in various stages, out of atoms). Along Saiva
Siddhiinta accepted the Siiilkhya view that the principles of the cosmos are
hierarchically ordered, and agreed with them over the identity of the bottom
twenty-four or twenty-five. Furthermore it took on the teleological assertion
of Siiilkhya that the unmanifest Ur-matter emits its evolutes for the sake of
souls, though for Saiva Siddhiinta it does so urged by God.
The extent of the inheritance from Siiilkhya sometimes means that Riima-
km;J.tha's debate with another tradition is a version of an earlier debate be-
tween Siiilkhya and that tradition.
134
This is true of the tlebate between Rfuna-
km;J.tha and Nyaya outlined in the paragraph before last: from Siiilkhya Rama-
km;J.tha inherits his view that cognition/consciousness is the innate nature of
the soul, not an adventitious quality of it. 135
It is also true to a large degree of Ramakm;J.tha's debate with Buddhism.
Ramakm;J.tha's opening move in that debate is to dissociate himself from the
Nyaya and V view that the Self exists as a further entity beyond cog-
nition. He presents this as a kind of ontological extravagance that is quite
easy for the Buddhist to refute. The debate between Ramakm;J.tha and Bud-
dhism is thus not one in which Riimakm;J.tha has to prove the existence of an
entity that the Buddhist does not accept; rather it is one in which he must
prove that consciousness or cognition is permanent and the Buddhist must
prove that it is momentary. The existence of cognition is not in doubt for ei-
ther of them. The same situation can be seen in earlier debates between Bud-
dhism and Siiilkhya. Thus the objections that Riimakm;J.tha has to confront
from Buddhism are ones that Buddhism had previously put to Siiilkhya. If
cognition is the very nature of the Self, then cognition must be single. But
how, in that case, can we explain that we experience a cognition of a colour,
followed by a cognition of a word and so on? If cognition always had the
134 This is also the case with RamakaJ.l!ha's predecessors. Sadyojyotis's argument
with the Naiyayikas at BhoKa 37-43 in which he rejects their position that the sense-
. faculties consist in material elements and asserts that they are derived from the
Ahruikara is a replication of Sfuikhya arguments against the Naiyayikas.
135 For more on this see Watson 2006.
94
same form how would it be able to experience different objects?136 Surely it
must be modified in some way, but if it were then it would not be permanent
so the Self would not be permanent. 137 For an articulation of these objections
in NPP and RamakaI.1tha's response, see Chapter 4 below.
Hand in hand with Sankhya's acceptance of cognition or sentience as the very
nature of the Self is a principle of theirs that anything that arises, is destroyed
or is modified is insentient.
138
This became a frequently used principle of
Saiva Siddhanta.
139
Because the Sankhyas had to hold that cognition, since it is the nature of the
Self, is eternal, they held that seemingly transitory instances of cognition such
as pleasure and pain are in fact objects of cognition. DharmakIrti produces
arguments against this view that seek to establish pleasure and pain as factors
associated with cognition (caittas).140 RamakaI.1tha continues this debate, de-
fending the Sankhya-and Saiva Siddhanta-position.
141
136 TS(BBS) 287-288: tatlapi n7pasabdadicetasalJ! vedyate katham I suvyaktal.n bhe-
davad n7pam ekii cec II ekariipe ca caitanye sarvakiilam avasthite I nanavi-
dhtirthabhoktrtvalJ! kathalJl namopapadyate II 'There too, if cognition is held to be single,
how is it that cognitions of colour, words and the like are clearly experienced to have a
plural form? And if cognition endures always in the same form, how can [it / the Self] be
the enjoyer of many kinds of objects?'
137 TS(BBS) 295a-c: vikriyaytiS ca sadbhtive nityatvam avahfyate I anyathtitvalJ! vi-
kiiro hi. 'And if [it] is modified, then [its] eternality is lost; for modification is to become
otherwise. '
138 TS(BBS) 303: acetantitmikii buddhi!l sabdagandharastidivat I utpattimattvantiSi-
tvahetubhyam iti cen matam II 'If [you adduce your] doctrine that the Buddhi is insentient
for the reasons that it arises and is destroyed, like sounds, smells, tastes and the like, [our
reply is as follows].'
139 See, for example, KiTa 2.26ab: paril}amo 'cetanasya cetanasya na Ylljyate.
140 See for example Pramal}aviniscaya 1.23 (identified in Stem 1991): 'pi
htihyasya prftitapayo!l I bhtivanaya narthariipa!l sllkhtidayal:t II 'Because
pleasure and pain differ [between people], owing to differences of mental predisposition
(bhavanti), even when the external [object] is the same, pleasure and the like are not of
the nature of objects [but rather factors associated with cognition].'
141 See sub-section 4 of Chapter 4.2 below.
Introduction
95
But there is a subtle difference between RamakaI.1tha and SaDkhya, which I
have been glossing over by talking of both as holding that 'cognition' inhe
nature of the Self. The word that Sankhya uses is caitanya, which, should per-
haps rather be translated 'sentience'; for jiiiina, which quite naturally trans-
latesas 'cognition', occupies a different place in Sankhya ontology. It is
never described as the nature of the soul, but exists lower down the hierarchy
of principles in the Intellect (buddhi). The soul's nature is thus pure passive
awareness; and cognitions (jiiiina) are generated by the Intellect and pre-
sented as objects of experience to the pure awareness. RamakaI.1tha (and ear-
lier Saiva Siddhanta) inherits this model from Sankhya.
142
But unlike the
Sankhyas, RamakaI.1tha had no qualms about describing the Self's nature as
jiiiina. The form of the two words, caitanya and jiiiina, indicate that they re-
fer, respectively, to a state of being and an action. This is probably part of the
reason for the difference here between the Sankhyas and RamakaI.1tha; for
RamakaI.1tha, unlike the Sankhyas" had no aversion to ascribing actions to the
Self. As to the problem of how RamakaI.1tha can maintain the Self to be eter-
nal despite its nature being denoted by an action noun, as well as the problem
of jiiiina for him being both the nature of the Self and a product of the Intel-
lect, see Chapter 4 and Watson 2006.
That RamakaI.1!ha intends his many assertions to the effect that the Self is of
the nature of jiiiina to distinguish his view from that of the Sankhyas can be
seen from a section towards the end of the first chapter of NPP143 in which he
is criticizing the notions of liberation of the Naiyayikas, the and
the Sankhyas. I differentiated above the liberation of the former two schools
from that of the Sankhyas in the amount of consciousness they are said to
contain. The liberated Sankhya soul may no longer see objects of perception
or experience acts of cognition, owing to his complete separation from Primal
Matter, but he is still sentient, unlike the liberated Naiyayika or
But from RamakaI.1!ha's point of view this difference is insignificant. He
142 An important difference is that for the Saiddhlintikas the Intellect alone is not ca-
pable of generating cognition (which here means determinative cognition): a further in-
strument is required, namely Vidya, one qf the cuirasses. But this difference is not rele-
vant here.
143 Ad 1.66.
96
treats all together as teaching a liberation devoid of cognition (jfiiinarahita).
The Sfu:ikhya soul may never lose its nature as caitanya, but, for Ramakar).tha,
that is so far away from his own view that the Self never loses its nature as
jfiiina as to be practically indistinguishable from the Naiyayika and
view of a soul that is insentient by nature. For Ramaka.J?!ha, of course, our
powers of cognition actually expand at liberation (into omniscience), for they
are occluded during sa:rp.saric existence.
Excursus on RfunakaIftha' s Ideas about Liberation
Before looking at a further subtle difference between the views of Rama-
ka.J?tha and Siillkhya we will remain for a while observing this section of NPP
in which Ramaka.J?!ha criticizes the notions of liberation of other traditions,
for it gives us an insight into some of his (and Saivism's) general attitudes to
the purpose of religion as compared to those of his rival traditions. He states
that a liberation of non-cognition as upheld and striven for by Naiyayikas,
and Sfu:ikhyas, in which one enters a rock-like or coma-like state,
does not appear as a good thing for any sane (anunmatta) person.
It is objected that to strive for the cessation of cognition (jfiiina) is not as mad
or unusual as Ramaka.J?!ha makes out, for people act for the sake of sleeping;
and when people suffer extreme and prolonged torment they desire non-
cognition and act to bring it about by throwing themselves off cliffs, into fires
or by drowning. Ramaka.J?tha answers the fIrst point by quoting the Yoga-
sutra, which includes sleep in a list of kinds of cognition; and the second,
somewhat tendentiously, by claiming that in those examples the people are
not seeking only to destroy their suffering but also to attain certain other-
worldly pleasures that they know from the study of scripture to follow from
such fatal hardships.l44
Ramaka.J?tha's attitude (following Sadyojyotis) is that it would be better to
continue to experience pleasure mixed with suffering than to destroy cogni-
144 Ad 1.67ab.
Introduction
97
tion altogether in order to eradic!lte suffering. But in any case it is impossible
for the Self's cognition ever to cease for it is its very nature. The Naiyayikas
and take the opposite view that since cognition is always mixed
with suffering it is better that it cease completely. It is like milk mixed with
poison; any sane person would refrain from drinking it altogether.
Having discussed the liberation of the Naiyayikas, the Vaisesikas and the
Sfu:ikhyas, Ramaka.J?tha turns to what he regards as the even' more radical
view of some Buddhists. Although those three schools all maintain that cog- .
nition (jfiiina) ceases at liberation, they do not hold that we cease altogether,
for the Self continues to exist. But for, those Buddhists for whom liberation
consists of the cessation of the stream of cognition, no part of us remains.
Sadyojyotis terms these the most heavyweight of fools (muhiiniir(l
malliil;). Rfunaka.J?tha regards it as amusing that, on the one hand, the Materi-
alist-Sceptics (Lokayatas) expect no continuation of life after death and thus
live their lives according to the maxim 'As long as one lives one should live
happily', free of moral restraints and curbs on sense-pleasures; and, on the
other, the Buddhists, having endured many lives of uninterrupted suffering
and much striving and abstinence on the Buddhist path, can hope for no more
than what comes automatically to the Lokayatas. 145
Finally Ramaka.J?!ha holds that this self-destruction is an unwanted conse-
quence of the Vedantin and Pancaratra positions, since for them the individ-
ual dissolves at liberation into, respectively, Brahman and NaraYa.J?a. Rama-
ka.J?tha concludes with the assertion that if liberation really does deserve to be
termed the highest aim of People, then it should be accepted to be, rather than
any of the conditions considered so far, nothing other than the manifestation
of omniscience and omnipotence.
*****
The second difference from Sfu:ikhya to which I alluded at the beginning of
that excursus is that Saiddhantika souls are not portrayed as sitting motion-
less, aloft and aloof, but as travelling downwards through the evolutes of
Primal Matter, and then, at liberation or at times of cosmic resorption, back
145 Ad 1.67cd.
98
upwards again. They are frequently referred to as being located at specific
points in the universe: the souls of Sadhakas reach one of the various worlds
(bhuvanas) as a result of the variety of initiation they have received; Mantra-
souls inhabit worlds within Suddhavidya, the lowest level of the pure uni-
verse; ail of the twenty-one
l46
worlds are governed by Rudra-souls located in
them; and during periods of cosmic resorption all souls are located in 'the
belly of Primal Matter' (ma.yodara).147 Surely these implications that souls
travel and are located are contrary to their ail-pervasion? This objection is ar-
ticulated and the response is that such references should be understood to re-
fer to the subtle body.148 But it is clear that Saiva Siddhanta sometimes as-
sumes its souls to be monads of definite size rather than all-pervading. Wit-
ness the many references to souls being covered (iivrta) by Impurity. These
are not so explainable as referring to the subtle body, for what are obscured
by this covering are the soul's powers of knowledge and action. It is these
that are partially revealed when the first of the cuirasses 'splits apart' Impu-
rity . Yet these belong to the soul itself, not the subtle body.
4.4. Knowledge of the Self
As to the question of how the Self can be known to exist, RamakaI.1tha re-
jected that it can be known through inference,149 holding instead that it is
146 This is the number according to the MataJiga.
147 See KiTa 2.9.
148 See for example KiTa 2.10 and KV ad loco
149 His reason for rejecting inference was twofold. He identified logical flaws in the
specific inferences commonly used to establish it, as we will see in Chapter 1. And he
held the more general position that the Self can never become that which is revealed, for it
is always the revealer, and whatever it reveals is other than it. See, for example, PMNKV
ad 43, p. 294,14-16: na ca tasyiinumitasyiipy [tasyiinumitasyiipy MSS; tasyiipy amllnita-
syO ed.] iitmatii yuktii, praklisakatatprakiisyayor [prakiiSakatatprakliiyayor MSS; prakli-
savat prakiiSyayor ed.] iitmaparan7patviit. yo hi svayam iibhiisate sa eviitmii, yas tu tena
prakliiyate sa eva tasya para [para MSS; prakliiyo 'para ed.] ity aSaJikaralz 'And it is
not correct that that which is inferred, for its part, is the Self, because the revealer and the
Introduction
99
known directly through perception.
150
There were several modeJs available to
him for how cognition or the Self (these two being essentially the same for
him) is perceived. The Buddhists
151
held that cognition is known through
'self-awareness' (svasal.nvedana). They argued that unconscious/uncognized
cognitions of objects would not be enough to establish linguistic usage with
regard to that object. Rather the cognition itself must also be perceived. Only
if the cognition itself is registered can the object be registered sufficiently to
be referred to in language by the cognizing subject. The Naiyayikas and Vai-
held that a cognition is perceived by the immediately following cogni-
tion. But this was not enough for the Buddhists as, given their presupposition,
it led to an infinite regress. The first cognition requires the subsequent one to
be established; but the subsequent one itself requires a yet subsequent one to
be established, and so on ad infinitUm. Thus the Buddhists held that every
revealed are of the nature of Self and other. That which shines forth of itself is the Self,
but that which is revealed by that is its other. Thus there is no mixing (i.e. one thing can-
not be both).' probably has the same point in mind when he writes at the be-
ginning of his examination of the Self in NPP that the perceiver itself cannot be inferred
by itself: svata eva sviinumeyatviinupapattelz [sviinumeyatviinupapatte!z Ped; viinumeya-
tviinupapattelz Ked, B] (ad 1.2, p. 4,6-9). takes on these ideas from his fa-
ther, see MTV ad 1.6.4ab, p. 153,1-12.
As to how the Self can be perceived if there is an uncross able barrier between the re-
vealer and the revealed, see below.
150 father, similarly privileged perception over infer-
ence as the means of knowing the Self: sii ceyam atftiinublzavasm[1i!z vijfiii-
nasya nirasyati, na tIt sthirasvablziivam iitmiinam anumiipayati tasya svasaJJIvedanasi-
ddhasya sviinubhatyekapramiilJatviit (MTV ad 1.2.25ab, p. 91,4b-lb). 'And this memory
of a past experience refutes that cognition is momentary, but it does not allow us to infer a
Self of stable nature, because the [Self], being established by self-awareness, has as its
only means of knowledge self-experience'. Possibly the origin of this tendency was
Sadyojyotis's comment at BhoKa 67ab: nelza pramiilJasaJ!IViidalz
'There is no overlapping of means of knowledge with regard to it, because
[its single] means of knowledge is direct perception'. The Bhogaklirikli is the subject of a
PhD thesis by W. A. Borody (1988). The revised thesis has been published in 2005 with
the title Bhoga Kiirikli of Sadyojyoti, with the Commentary of Aghora An Introduc-
tion with English Translation, but I not been able to see it. A critical edition and
translation of the text are currently being prepared by Fabio Boccio.
151 Specifically DhimnakIrti and his followers. See PVin1.55ff.
100
cognition is simultaneously aware both of itself and its object through bne
and the same momentary act, as a light illuminates both its object and itself.
They termed this reflexive awareness svasaJJlvedana, contrasting it with the
Naiyayika and V concept of cognition of the immediately preceding
cognitiOli (anuvyavasaya).
As for the perception of the Self, certain Naiyayikas and the Kaumarila MI-
maqlsakas held that those cognitions that include 'I' as part of their verbaliza-
tion (ahampratyaya) perceive the Self through that 'I'.152 Certain Sfu'lkhyas
held that the Self can perceive itself through looking at its reflection in the
mirror of the Intellect (buddhi).153 The Prabhakara MImaqlsakas took the
model of self-awareness (svasaJ.nvedana) that the Buddhists had applied to
cognition and applied it to the Self. This was the main strategy adopted by
RamakaJ?!ha, although he also included I-cognition as a second valid means
of perceiving the Self.
The idea that the Self is known through self-awareness
154
was maintained by
RamakaJ?!ha's father, NaraYaJ?akaJ?!ha,155 but the term is not used by Sad-
152 See NVa(NCG) 323,12-324,10; and SV(P2) litmavlida 107-139.
153 See MoKaVr 266,18-20: nanu buddhyuplin7tj.ha eva cetyata iti slilikhyli?z.
[ ... ] darpQ/yastlzlinfyliylil!Z buddhau dvayor api pratibimbakameZanQ/.n
bhoga!z: 'The Sankhyas object: "the soul is perceived only after being projected on to the
Buddhi. [ ... ] Experience is the meeting of reflected images of both object and that which
[perceives] the object, in the Buddhi, which acts as a mirror." ,
154 From now on it can be assumed that whenever I use the word 'self-awareness' I
have in mind the Sanskrit word svasal!zvedana.
155 See MTV ad 1.2.2Sab, p. 91,4b-1b, quoted in note ISO; MTV ad 1.2.2Sab, p.
88,11-13: tad etat sQ/.nvedanasya nairlitlllyablzlivanlibhYllpagamanQ/Jl ca no..
yuktQ/ll, svasQ/llvedanasiddlzasya praklisanlit, 'Neither
this momentariness of consciousness nor the acceptance of meditation on no-Self are cor-
rect, because the Self, which is established by self-awareness, stable and perceptible, ap-
pears [to us]'; and MTV ad 1.2.2Sab, p. 88,1b-89,2. Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me
that NaraYaJ:.lakaJ:.l!ha is not the first Saiva author to speak of the Self as svasQ/llvedana-
sQ/llvedya. The idea and terminology are found in Utpaladeva's !svarapratyablzijiiliklirikli
and vrtti thereon. See for example siddlza eva svasQ/!zvedanasQ/!zvedyatayli svaparayor
fsvaro 'Izalllpratyeya litmli ad ISPraKa 1.1.S. Torella (1994 87-88) translates, 'The Lord,
Introduction 101
yojyotis or by the scriptures of the tradition. Thus the number of
times that RamakaJ?!ha asserts that the Self is known in this way all occur in
the course of commenting on verses that make no mention of it.
One of the specific features of the self-awareness model of perception of the
Self is that it stresses that the Self is not known thereby as the object of the
perception but as its sUbJect.
156
Reluctance to accept that the Self can become
the object of perception had been expressed in Saivism as early as Sadyo-
jyotis. In four verses of the he rejects, for this reason, the
Sfu'lkhya model that the Self can be known, in the form of its reflection,
through cognition produced in the Buddhi (buddhibodlza):157
102: How can that [Buddhi], for which even the Self is not an object because
it is not the experienced [in as much as] it is the experiencer, reveal the Lord
Sailkara, who is self-revealing?
103: Awareness (omlina) of the soul has always already arisen; it (i.e. the soul)
is not the object of experience [through a specific action that happens at a par-
ticular time]. There is no time in which it becomes the object of experience by
means of [a reflection of itself] in the [Buddhi].158
104) It [would be] correct that cognition of the Self and the [Self] are the per-
ceiver and the perceived if [the Self and the cognition of the Self] occurred
one before the other. But because that is not so, it is not true that [they are]. 159
the Self perceived as 'I' in oneself and others, is established insofar as it is directly expe-
rienced through inner awareness.'
156 That is why RamakaJ:.l!ha's objection to the idea that the Self can be inferred, given
in note 149, namely that the Self cannot become an object of an act of revelation because
it is always the revealer, does not apply to this kind of perception of the Self.
157 MoKa: litmlipy yasyli bhoktliblzogyatvata?z [bhoktliblzogyatvata!z em.; blzo-
ktli bhogyatvatab ed.] katlzalll I svapraklisalll asall devalJz praklisayati salikaralll 1110211
sarvadotpannallllino 'sau nlinubhayate Ina so 'sti kliZo yatrliyalll atrastlzenlinll-
blziZyate 1110311 parvliparatvato Yllktalll litlllabodlzasya tasya ca lupaZabhyopaZabdhrtvQ/.n
[OpaZabdlz.rtvalJz corr; pa/abdlz(fdQ/ll ed.] tadablzlivlid ida'!z tv asat 1110411 pari(zlilllf pllmlin
blzogyab prliptas tadgocaro yadi I viparftli ca buddhi?z sylit virodlzas clipi darsane 1110sII
158 RamakaQ.!ha comments: bliddhisthelllipi nlivaiti (Mo-
KaVr 266,8b-7b). 'And the soul does not perceive [itself] through its reflection in the
Buddhi.'
159 The point seems to be that for to be perceived it must precede its cogni-
tion. But since, according to the previous verse, there is never a moment when cognition
102
105) The soul, if it fell into its (i.e. the Buddhi's) sphere, would be subject to
change and an object of experience, and the Buddhi should be the opposite
(i.e. unchanging and the experiencer); and there would be a contradiction with
[ ] d
160
your tra IUon.
Thus RiimakaJ).!ha inherits from Sadyojyotis a rejection of the Sankhya model
that the Self can be perceived through cognition in the Buddhi on the grounds
that it cannot become an object of experience. Furthermore, in Sadyojyotis's
statement that 'awareness of the soul has always already arisen' he had the
beginnings of an alternative model in which the Self's awareness of itself is
never absent. From his father he inherited the terminology, svasaTflvedana.
But he adds more detail. Most of this can be seen to arise from the concern to
avoid the implication that the Self becomes an object of perception. This ex-
tra detail resembles in its formulation the writings of the Prabhakara Mlma-
Ipsakas. I will give three illustrations.
1) Beginning with Prabhakara's remark in the Brhatf,161 'for consciousness is
cognized as consciousness, not as the object of consciousness,' the Prabhaka-
of the Self is not there, the Self cannot precede that cognition. R1imakaI)!:ha seems not to
interpret purvaparatvaO temporally. He comments: pratibimbiitmakatviid iitmano
tval!Z bJzogyatii ca. ca buddJzibodJzasya bJzoktrtvaprasaligalz, na caitad bJza-
vadbJzir abJzYllpagantavyam; 'The Self is [in your view] an object of cognition and expe-
rience [only] in so far as it is of the nature of a reflection. And because it is cognition in
the Buddhi (bllddJzibodJza) that has that [reflected Self] as its object, it unwantedly follows
that it is the perceiver, and you should not accept this.' (MoKaVr 266,3b-2b). I take this
to point to two faults in the Sfui.khya position that have nothing to do with temporal se-
quence: the perceived would not be the actual Self, but only the Self in the form of its re-
flection; and because it is cognition in the Buddhi that has that reflection as its object, it
would unwantedly follow that it, and not the Self, is the perceiver. It struck me that this
comment would be more appropriate as a comment on verse 105 than 104. But it comes
immediately after verse 104; is separated from 105 by api ca; and R1imakaI)!:ha glosses
and comments on verse 105 below it.
160 Sfui.khya draws a firm distinction between the Self, which is unchanging and the
experiencer; and all things below it, such as the Buddhi, which are changing and objects
of experience. But if the Buddhi is like a mirror reflecting the Self, then it should be the
stable, unchanging perceiver, and that which is reflected in it should be changing and an
object of experience. I thank Dr. Ruzsa for help with this and the last verse.
161 Brh 64,2-3: sal!zvittayaiva Jzi sal!zvit salJZvedyii na sal!zvedyatayii.
futroduction
103
ras had formed the habit of using the instrumental of abstract s,uffixes to ex-
press that although Self and consciousness are cognized; they are not cog-
nized as the objects of experience. See, for example, in Jayanta's formulation
of the Prabhakara position, 'the Self is illuminated as the perceiver, not as an
object of perception.'162 The same habit is found in RamakaJ).!ha's works in
the enormous number of places where he says that the Self shines forth in
self-awareness 'as the illuminator' (prakiiSakatayiilprakiiSakatvena). For an
example that is particularly striking in that, like the two quotes just given, it
also negates the unwanted mode of perception with a second parallel instru-
mental of an abstract suffix, see: '[It is illuminated] not as that which is illu-
minated, but as the agent [of that illumination]. 163
2) They sometimes used the present participle to contrast the mode in which
consciousness exists and is perceived with the mode in which objects are per-
ceived. RamakaJ).!ha does the same. 164
3) They held, as does RamakaJ).!ha, that consciousness (I the Self) shines forth
without requiring any other means, such as sense-faculties;165 and they often
convey this by qualifying a word meaning 'shining forth' with svayam or
svata, as does RiimakaJ).!ha.
166
162 NM(M) Vol. 2, 273,10-11: iitmii griiJzakatayaiva prakiisyate na griiJzyatayii:
163 MoKaVr ad 105, p. 267,8: na prakiiSyatayii kin tu kiirakatvena.
164 Compare Salikanatha's svayalJZ prakiisarapatviit sal!zvido na pariidJzfnaprakiisa[z,
iti na karmatii. na ca prakiisiiblziivalz. prakasamanaI!l castfty lIcyate, na pllnatz karmataiva
(i4,llb-9b) and Jayanta's eva prakasamanam
litmatattvam iista iti (Vol. 2, 273,12-13) with R1imakaI)!:ha's: svasaktyaiva prakiiSayann
ayam anubJzuyate (NPP 26,6-7). Prof. Preisendanz pointed out to me that R1imakaI)!:ha's
sentence is not completely parallel to the other two: their present participles construe with
astiliiste in durative auxiliary constructions ('is always I does not cease shining forth');
RamakaI)!:ha's does not, and is causative. On the present participle with astiliiste she
pointed me to Speijer 1998 294-296.
165 Each of the three quotes in the previous fooll1ote conveys this. See na pariidlzfna-
prakiisatz; eva; and svasaktyaiva.
166 Many examples could be given. Here is one from Jayanta's formulation of the
I .
Prabhakara position and two by RamakaI)!:ha: na hy iitmiinyajanyena jiiiinena glza!iidir iva
prakiisyate, api tu svata eva prakiisate fprakiisate C; prakiisyate ed.] (NM(M) Vol. 2,
104
5. Constitution of the Text of NPP
The text I present of NPP is based on an evaluation and comparison of the
readings of the following editions and manuscripts of NPP, and of parallel
passages found in other texts by RamakaJ).tha.
5.1. Editions
Four editions of the have, to my knowledge, been
published: that contained in various releases of 'The Pundit' in 1867 and
1868 (Ped);167 a Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies edition, edited bY,Maq.-
husudan Kaul, from 1926 (Ked);168 a 'Shri Shivoham Sagar' edition, edited
by Krishnananda Sagar, from 1985 (NPP(SS)); and a Yogatantra Grantha-
, mala edition, edited by RamajI Malavlya, from 2000 (NPP(YG)).169
Ped gives no information about its manuscript basis. Ked seems to have been
prepared in ignorance of Ped, and it is very unlikely that any of the four
Kash1f1irian manuscripts it used would have been used by the editors of Ped
in Benares. Thus the two are independent witnesses. The Shri Shivoham edi-
tion uses no new manuscripts and simply follows Ked, entering the readings
273,3-4); sarvadiirthaprakiisakatveniisya svato 'vablziisaniit (NPP ad 1.2, p. 4,7-8);
tatprakiisakatayiityantavivikta!l svayam avablziisate (MoKiiVr ad 105, p. 267;9).
On the Priibhiikara position see Chatterjee 1979.
167 For full bibliographical details see under Ped in the list of primary sources. The
text collated for Chapters 1 and 2 is given on pages 74 and 75, for Chapter 3 on pages 94-
96, and for Chapter 4 on page 78.
168 For full bibliographical details see under Ked in the list of primary sources. I have
inserted page numbers of Ked into the text that I give in the chapters.
169 I know of no translation of text, but it seems that Sadyojyotis' text
has been translated into Hindi; I have encountered mention of, but not been able to see,
the following 1975 PhD thesis from the University of Lucknow: a
Critical and Comparative Study with Hindi translation, by Magan Bihari Lal.
Introduction
105
of Ked's correction pages into its main text, removing the occasional obvious
misprint and adding quite a few new misprints. The Yogatantra Granthamala
edition mainly follows Ked, usually adopting the readings of its correction
pages, but occasionally recording them as pli!hlintaras. It also makes spo-
radic use of Ped, either by accepting its reading or recording it as a
pli!hlintara. It introduces new misprints and eyeskips (e.g. p. 6,4), and has
not used manuscripts. I thus report the readings of Ked and Ped, but not those
of the other two editions.
Ked contains a long list of errata and corresponding corrections at the back of
the book-hence the proliferation of readings in my footnotes marked Ked
ac
and Ked
Pc
Kaul explains that the reason for this long list is that the fourth
manuscript came into his hands at the last minute when it was too late to
change the main pages of his edition. In fact Kaul seems to have been uncriti-
cally accepting of the readings of this fourth manuscript, without taking the
time to consider carefully the meaning of the (usually quite abstract and intri-
cate) passages involved; he repeatedly proposes correcting to readings that do
not, on close inspection, yield the meaning demanded by context. See below
the many footnotes to the text in which I accept Ked
ac
readings in place of
Ked
Pc
ones.
5.2. Manuscripts
I have reported the readings of the following manuscripts,170 none of which
seem to be any of the four used by Kaul:
1) A paper Sarada manuscript in Baroda (B).l7l I have not seen the manu-
script, but have a photocopy of it. Folios typically contain 12 lines-although
the first contains n -and 65-80 per line. The verso sides contain, at
170 I made copies of three of the manuscripts from copies belonging to Dominic Goo-
dall, to whom I am very grateful for thereby saving me much time and energy. A micro-
film of the fourth was prepared for me Py the helpful staff of the Wellcome Institute,
London.
171 Central Library, Baroda. Sanskrit Section. No. 1829.
106
the bottom of the left-hand margin, in Sarada, the abbreviation na ra pa pra
(which obviously stands for and a page number,
and on the right, either in the top or bottom margin, DevanagarI numbers,
starting with 15 on folio Iv, and increasing by one on the verso side of every
folio. I refer to the Sarada numbering. My photocopy covers only the first of
the three chapters, so I do not know how many folios there are in total in this
manuscript.
The collation for Chapters 1 and 2 runs from the sixth line of folio 3v to the
third line from the bottom of 6r; for Chapter 3 from the. sixth line of 10v to
five lines from the bottom of the same folio, and from the fifth line from the
bottom of 12r to the seventh line of 13v; and for Chapter 4 from the second
line from the bottom of 9r to the second line from the bottom of 9v.
anusviiras are used at the end of words, but homorganic nasals at the end of
prefixes and in compounds. jihviimillfya, upadhmiinfya and's' (before a word
beginning with's') are used in place of visargas, unless there is a break in the
sense at that point. The scribe, very rarely, uses two short vertical lines, about
half the height of his double dalJrjas, at the bottom of the line. These seem to
be some kind of punctuation-marker, but they are inconsistently used. They
will not occur for many folios in a row, but then, in a certain passage, will be
found several times on each line (e.g. on 4v). They are used at speaker-
changes or sentence-breaks or the beginning of iti clauses or the kinds of
places where we would use a comma.172 Elsewhere single vertical lines of the
same length are sometimes used in these kinds of places; but they may have
been added by a second hand, as there are never significant gaps between the
adjacent as there are either side of the double lines.
I have transcribed all the interlinear and marginal glosses, speaker-indications
and comments in this manuscript, which include two commentarial digres-
sions of some length.
173
The latter were clearly copied from an earlier manu-
script, not composed by the person who wrote them in this manuscript, as
they are considerably corrupt.
172 Once they are used, strangely, in the middle of a word-between that tlza and m of
katlzam in the sixth line of 4v.
173 See footnotes 52 and 113 on pages 138 and 245 respectively ..
Introduction
107
2) A paper Sarada manuscript in the Wellcome Institute, (L).174 I
have not seen the manuscript but have a microfilm of it, which gives the fol-
lowing measurements: height 125mm, width 170mm. It has 14 lines of text
per folio, and 30-35 per line. The beginning of the text is missing.
The manuscript begins with the sa1J1vidrilpam asya tu nflam ahm.n
vedmi iti, i.e. with a passage that occurs on page 19 of Ked. I have thus not
been able to use it for the text presented in Chapters 1 and 2. The first page is
not numbered, but the second (the text of which follows on correctly from the
first) is labeled 10 in Sarada at the bottom of the left margin, this numbering
increasing from then on by one every two pages. I thus take it that the first
page we have is lOr (since the norm for Sarada manuscripts is that the num-
bers are written on the verso side) and that the first nine folios are nnssing.
Handwritten Arabic numbers begin with a 1 on the first page, and increase by
one every two pages. The final two pages are labeled 112 (Sarada) and 104
(Arabic); thus there are 207 pages (104 folios) in this manuscript.
The collation for Chapter 3 runs from the fifth line from the bottom of 17r (8
in the Arabic numbering) to the second line from the top of 17v; and from the
top line of page 12 according to the Arabic numbering to the second line of
22v (adjacent to folio 14 in the Arabic numbering). Some folios in this sec-
tion have become disordered: page 12 (Arabic numbering) should come after
the folio with 19 in Sarada on it (19v), but it has been put after 21 v; page 11
(Arabic numbering) should come after 20v but it has been put after 19v; page
13 (Arabic numbering) should come after 21 v but it has been put after 20v;
and 21 v should come two pages after 20v, not two before it. The collation for
Chapter 4 runs from the penultimate line of 14v (opposite page 6 in the Ara-
bic numbering) to the third line of 16r (page 7 in the Arabic numbering).
Homorganic nasals rather than anusviiras are consistently used at the ends of
words and prefixes and in compounds. A candra-bindu rather than an anus-
viira is used when m at the end of a prefix or word is followed by a semi-
vowel. Semi-vowels are doubled after a candra-bindu (as in smnvvit), even if
they come at the beginning of a word (as in bhedakmn yjadii). r in a conjuct
sometimes causes doubling of consonants both before and after it: we find for
174 OR MS Indic Alpha 415.
example pradarssita and cittra. jihvlimiilfya, upadhmlinfya and's' (before a
word beginning with's') are used in place of visargas. The latter are very
rarely found, as sandhi is applied at the end of sentences; I have noted them
only at the end of verse-lines, or at the end of some prose introducing a verse.
Where the pre-sandhi form of a word ends in e and is followed by a word-
initial vowel, the scribe frequently inserts a glide. We find for example
anubhiiyatay iti for anubhiiyata iti, upagamyatay iti for upagqmyata iti and
sarfray eva for sanra eva. I have not reported such cases as variants. Whitney
(1997) writes, 'The later grammarians allow the y in such combinations to be
either retained or dropped; but the uniform practice of the manuscripts, of
every age, in accordance with the strict requirement of the Vedic grammars,
is to omit the semivowel and leave the hiatus' ( 133a). It seems that the
practice he mentions was not as universal as he claims.
Almost every folio contains some gaps between consecutive These
occur, apart from before and after verses, where a conjunct in the line above
comes down to the level of the headstroke and the scribe has preferred not to
cramp the writing there. I have not reported all 'insignificant' variants in this
manuscript.
3) A paper Sarada manuscript in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
Poona (p).175 I have not seen the manuscript, but have a photocopy of it. It
contains 12 lines per page, and usually 20-22 per line. Some of the
pages have become disordered. The first page, on which is written 1 in
Sarada, and which I count as 1 v, does indeed contain the beginning of the text
(preceded by more invocatory formulas than found in the other manuscripts,
and with extensive marginal comments). Every two pages from then on con-
tain Sarada numbers, increasing by one each time. These are thus ordered
correctly, but the intervening sides have often been placed incorrectly. After
the first page the text continues on what has been placed as the last page of
the whole manuscript. After this we need to jump back to 2v. The pages then
fall in the correct order until the end of 4v, after which we have to jump to the
page that falls after 9v, then back to 5v. The order is then correct until the end
175 BORl 536 of 1875-76.
Introduction
109
of 6v, after which we have to jump back to the page that has bee.n placed after
4v, then forward to 7v. The order is then correct until the end of 9v, after
which we have to jump back to the page that has been placed after 1 v, then to
lOv, then to the page that has been placed after 30v, then to 11 v. The colla-
tion for Chapters 1 and 2 begins on the eighth line of 8v and ends on the top
line of the page facing 17v (it is ordered correctly there so it can be termed
18r). The collation for Chapter 3 runs from the bottom line of 33v to four
lines from the bottom of the next page; and from the fifth line of 39v to the
fourth line of 45r. One page is disordered in that section: after 40v we have to
jump back to a page that has been placed after lOv, then back to 41 v. The col-
lation for Chapter 4 runs from the second line of 29r to the third line from the
bottom of the folio that has been placed after 6v, but should in fact come after
30v.
narao paprao is written above the Sarada page numbers up to and including
105. narao pa of course stands for prao stands not for pra-
kliSli but prathama, for the numbers 106 to 140 are headed by narao padvio,
and 141 to the end by narao patro. After 160 thenumbers are no longer visi-
ble in my photocopy; but counting from there indicates that, assuming no fo-
lios are missing, the number on the verso side of the last folio should be 220.
After that there is one more recto page; there are thus 440 pages in all. As
stated above, the very last (recto) page has been misplaced and contains text
from close to the beginning of the work. The last verso page ends with ata
eva yligaslidhanatvlinyathlinupapattyli yugapad vibhinnadeiavyavasthitline-
klidhi, which is part of the commentary to verse 3.103cd, i.e. 80 verses (49
pages in Ked) before the end of the text. It is quite possible that the end of the
text is contained in misplaced earlier folios-and that the manuscript is com-
plete; I have not searched for it.
The scribe tends to use homorganic nasals ratherthan anusvliras at the end of
prefixes or in compounds (e.g. astaflgatli, ahaflklira), and at the
end of words. But there are exceptions (e.g. sal!zbhava, arthafi ca,
jfilitliraJ.n). jihvlimiilfya and upadhmlinfya are used, in place of visargas, spo-
radically, and's' (before a word beginning with's') regularly. Vertical lines,
sometimes arching slightly like a left-hand bracket, are used as hyphens at the
end of a line. Occasionally sandhi after e is not applied; we find, for example,
110
saJ.nvedyate iti and pravahe eva. I have not reported all 'insignificant' var-
iants in this manuscript; I have reported the marginal and interlinear glosses,
comments and
4) A paper Devanagan transcript in the Government Oriental Manuscripts
Library, Madras (M).I76 I have not seen the transcript, but have a photocopy
of it. It transmits only Sadyojyotis' verses, not RamakaJ).tha's commentary.
On the title page, underneath both in Devanagan and Ro-
man, is written 'Transcribed from the Ms. of Kunnakkudimath'. It contains
one half-verse per line, and usually 24 lines per page. Some of the folios have
become disordered. It is not a useful witness, full of copying mistakes and,
for the verses examined in thisl book, not contributing once to improvement of
the text. I have not reported clearly corrupt readings, many of which are un-
derlined with dots to indicate that the scribe was uncertain of the syllables in
his exemplar.
Other manuscripts of NPP I know of are a paper Bengali manuscript in the
Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta,177 and a paper Sarada one in Sarasvati
Bhavan, Varanasi.
17S
I have also heard that one exists in Jammu.
5.3. Parallel Passages
Because RamakaJ).tha frequently uses identical wording when covering the
same topic in different texts,179 we often have the evidence of other texts to
help us establish correct readings. The two texts that overlap most with the
first chapter of NPP are the and the (sixth
ter of) the MataJigavrtti. I have tried to identify all relevant passages and have
presented these too in footnotes to the text. Out of these three texts, though, it
is the that is in by far the most corrupt state.
Thus the direction of help has usually been from the other two to it.
176 GOML R. No. 16820.
177 MS No. 1140.
178 MS. No. 82739 (ka and kha), Serial Nos 85996 and 86006.
179 See Goodall (1998 xxiv).
Introduction
111
5.4. Editorial Policy
The only two witnesses that clearly fall together against the rest are B and P.
They share a large number of interlinear and marginal glosses and speaker-
indications, as can be seen from the footnotes to the text. The fact that they
not infrequently both have mistakes-and interlinear and marginal glosses, '
speaker-indications and comments-not shared by the other indicates that,
rather than one being copied directly from the other, they both descend from
the same archetype, from which they copied, directly or via intermediaries,
not just the main text but also (selectively perhaps) the marginal and interlin-
ear material. ISO
Thus no source has been clearly derived, directly or indirectly, from another;
all of them have mistakes that none of the others have. Hence I have never
preferred a reading on the grounds that it is found in a certain witness. I have
judged the variants simply on the basis of what is most likely to be what
RamakaJ).tha wrote given the context of the sentence in question, the readings
of any parallel passages and general Sanskrit usage.
6. The Date of Sadyojyotis
Sadyojyotis is difficult to locate both spatially and temporally. It has been as-
sumed that, like Ramakantha, he was Kashmiri. lSI But there is no evidence to
180 It was noted above that B's scribe very occasionally uses two vertical lines as a
punctuation-marker. P's scribe does the same, equally rarely, and there is better agree-
ment as to the placement of these marks than one would expect if the manuscripts were
unrelated. Compare for example folio 11 v of P with folio 4v of B. Perhaps, then, punctua-
tion-marks were also copied from the archetype.
181 Thus Kaul, for example, in the introduction to Ked, states that because of the
,
amount of space Sadyojyotis devotes to refuting Buddhism he must have lived when
Buddhism was prevalent in the valley of Kashmir.
112
that effect.
182
Concerning his date, the only firm evidence I have seen addu-
ced in secondary literature is that he was known to Somananda (c. 900-
950).183 It is not easy to establish a limit after which he must have written, as
he does not quote other authors. However he does betray knowledge of
Kumarila/
84
who is dated by Frauwallner to 600-650.
185
He is usually said to have lived in the ninth century .186 But Sanderson,187 as
tentative evidence for an earlier date, pointed out that when dealing with
Vedanta he articulates and attacks only transformationism (parilyiimavlida),
not the illusionism (vivartavlida) that came to predominate.
188
To this could
be added the fact that his long attack on Buddhism in the fIrst chapter of NP,
all of which is interpreted by RamakaI).tha as aimed at DharmakIrti,189 in fact
provides us with almost no evidence of knowledge of DharmakIrti.
190
182 Sanderson 1990 158.
183 As evidenced by 3.13c (mentioned, for example, by Sanderson 1985a
210, note 41).
184 Prof. Sanderson gave me this list of verses from the second and third chapters of
the that echo verses in the (SAP) of
Kumfuila's Slokaviirttika: NP 2.22:= SAP 52cd; NP 2.28cd:= SAP 54ab; NP 3.2cd:= SAP
51; NP 3.50ab := SAP 71ab. He also pointed out to me that Sadyojyotis' commentary ad
SvSiiSa 4.5a shows knowledge of SAP 61abc.
185 These dates are dependent on a dating of DharmakIrti to 600-660. If DharmakIrti "
lived half a century earlier, however, which is possible (see note 189), then Kumfuila
should be regarded as having lived half a century earlier. (I thank Kei Kataoka for infor-
mation about Kumarila's date.)
186 For example, by Frauwallner 1962 9, and Hannotte 1987.
187 Sanderson 1985b 568.
188 Prof. Sanderson has communicated to me that he thinks Sadyojyotis' representa-
tion of the liberation of the Vedantins in PMNK 2b, and in his commentary on SvSiiSa
2.2 indicate that he was basing his account of Vedanta on that of the 6th century author
Bharl:fprapafica.
189 Frauwallner (following Vidyabhusana) dates DharmakIrti to 600-660, for which
important evidence is the fact that Xuanzang does not mention him. Lindtner (1980 32-
33) and Tillemans (2000 xiii-xv) argue that Frauwallner and those who follow him place
too much weight on this argument from silence. There are pieces of evidence for an ear-
lier date: the mention of DharmakIrti by the Tibetan historian Tfu"anatha, and a possible
mention of DharmakIrti by DharmapaIa, though the Chinese characters there could also
Introduction
113
Prof. Sanderson has recently pointed me to two more pieces of evidence for
an earlier date. First, Sadyojyotis's Svliyambhuvasiltrasaligraha.tfkli is the
source of a verse of Ratnakara's Haravijaya,191 which can be dated to around
830.
192
mean dharmavacana, or a synonym thereof, and we lack the Sanskrit original to check.
(Funayama 2000 argues that they cannot refer to DharmakIrti.) Tillemans concludes,
'Honesty would seem to demand an acknowledgement that, as things stand, we do not
have any genuinely significant grounds for placing DharmakIrti in the seventh
rather than earlier in the latter half of the sixth. Agnosticism may be unsatisfying, but it is,
for the moment, the rational response here' (p. xv).
190 I . 'al ' b I' .
wrIte most ecause pomt to one echo of a point made by DharmakIrti in
footnote 43 of Chapter" 3. I do not know however if DharmakIrti was the first author to
make this point.
I asked Prof. Steinkellner how quickly awareness of DharmakIrti spread in order to
find out how much can be concluded from an author's ignorance of him. He kindly gave
me the following information, reproduced, almost word for word, from his letter:
Even among Buddhists it was not until the middle of the 8th century that DharmakIrti
was taken up for discussion of philosophical issues. The first two commentators, Dharma-
ldrti's pupil pevendrabuddhi (c.630-690) and following him Sakyabuddhi (c.660-720),
composed their commentaries as 'mere' explanations of words and meanings. The same is
true for VinItadeva (c.710-770). Only the next wave of commentators like Arcata
(c.730-790), Dharmottara (c.730-790) and Prajfiakaragupta (around 800) are focussing
on the philosophical problems (mainly visible in their various digressions). At about the
same time reactions from non-Buddhist circles set in, with the possible exception of Ku-
mfuila who, according to Frauwallner rewrote the Slokaviirttika into a new commentary,
the Brhattfkii, after acknowledging some new ideas from the PramiiIJaviirttikasvav{1ti.
This conception is, however, not shared by John Taber (who thinks they did not know
each other). Mm;u;lanamisra (c.700) seems to be the first MIroilqlsaka to deal with
DharmakIrti. Among Naiyayikas the first was Sailkarasvarnin (second half of the 8th cen-
tury).
The dates given in brackets there are all taken from Prof. Steinkellner's letter apart
from that of Mm;u;lanarnisra.
191 Haravijaya 6.161 is a versification of Sadyojyotis' commentary on SvSiiSa 3.16.
Prof. Sanderson also pointed to Haravijaya 6.139. Although most of its features are based
on verses of the Tantra itself (SvSiiSa 3.11-13), Ratnakara's dvidhii sthitii is likely to be
echoing dviriipii in Sadyojyotis' commeptary, something that Sadyojyotis introduces
without anything corresponding to it in those verses.
192 For the evidence for this date, see Sanderson 2001 5-6, note 3.
114
Secondly, the fact that his name ends in -jyotis constitutes some evidence for
an earlier date. Such sources as the VidyiipuriilJa tell us that Saivas were di-
vided into four initiation lineages (gocaras): Siva, Jyotis, Sikha and Savitra;
that one belonged to the lineage of the .Acarya who initiated him; and that
one's initiation name ended in the name of the lineage to which he belonged.
But it seems that three of these four lineages died out fairly early, as almost
all of the' hundreds of recorded initiation names end in -siva. Apart from
Sadyojyotis, and his guru Ugrajyotis,193 there is only one further exception.
One Aghorajyotis, a seventh century guru, is mentioned in the unpublished
stone inscription of Sivagupta BaIfujuna.
194
Thus all we can say for sure is that Sadyojyotis wrote some time between 600
and 830. But the facts that his name ends in -jyotis, that he did not attack illu-
sionism when dealing with Vedanta, and that the evidence for his knowledge
of DharmakIrti is slim, despite having engaged in a long refutation of Bud-
dhism, suggest that a seventh or early eighth century date is more likely than
a late eighth or early ninth.
7. The Date of Ramaka1).!ha
The evidence that gives us a date after which Ramakru;ttha must have written
is that his father, Narayru;takru;ttha, has quoted Utpaladeva. Utpaladeva flour-
ished, Sanderson argues (1985b 567), c. 925-975 AD.
The date before which he must have written has been gradually honed in re-
cent years through the finding of references to him or his father in succes-
sively earlier authors. In 1977 Bhatt used the fact that Aghorasiva, who is
likely to have lived in the mid-twelfth century, frequently quotes or refers to
him to establish this limit. In the same year Brunner pointed out that
raja, who can be dated to the first half of the eleventh century, mentions
Narayru;takru;ttha, Ramakru;ttha's father. In 1994 Torella pointed out that it
193 He is mentioned by Sadyojyotis in the final verse of NP.
194 See Shastri 1995 382.
Introduction
115
must be Ramakru;ttha himself who is referred to in a mention by ;KJ;;emaraja of
a commentator on the KiralJa. In 1996 Sanderson noticed that verses quoted
by Abhinavagupta (975-1025)195 in the Tantriiloka were written by Rama-
kru;t!ha in his Matatigavrtti.196 Thus we can tentatively date Ramakru;ttha's pe:'
riod of activity to 950-1000.
197
8. Ramaka1).!ha's Style
Although Ramakru;ttha occasionally uses quite simple formulaic arguments, I
do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that frequently his prose is ex-
tremely difficult. The identification of speaker changes rarely presents prob-
lems, but to reconstruct the exact flow of the argument sometimes requires
great effort on the part of the reader and the ability to hold several ideas in
one's head at the same time. It is not always easy to determine.precisely what
it was about a previous assertion that the present objection is responding to.
198
Ramakru;t!ha assembles his arguments more densely, and with more speaker
changes, than Jayanta Bhana does, for example, though not with the elegance
and wit of the latter.
195 Abhinavagupta dates three of his texts to 990/91, 992/93 and 1014/15. See
Sanderson 20013, note 1.
196 For the texts and page numbers of the quotations and references mentioned in this
paragraph, see Goodall 1998 xiii-xvii.
197 For iriformation about where RllmakaJ.)P1a may have lived, and about other Rlima-
kaJ.)P1as with whom he is still confused, see Goodall 1998 ix-xiii and the introduction to
the forthcoming critical edition and translation of the Paramolqaniriisakiirikiiv[1ti by
Goodall, Sarma and Watson.
198 See for example tad Ion page 243. These are common difficulties of
course when reading many, if not most, philosophical texts in Sanskrit.
SYNOPSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THE
FIRST CHAPTER OF NPP
Verse 1
Verse itself:
Statement that Sadyojyotis will give an examination of the Lord, preceded by
an examination of the soul.
RamakaI).tha's commentary:
Brief statements of the views concerning God that will be refuted in the sec-
ond and third chapters of the text.
Justification of the need for an examination of the soul, given that the primary
subject of the treatise is the Lord.
Verse 2
The verse itself reads:
jiilitli kartli ca bodhena bllddhvli bodhYaJJl pravartate I
pravrttiphalabhoktli ca ya!l pllllllin lIcyate 'tra salz II
In this [chapter] is taught a soul that is a perceiver and an agent, that
undertakes action having cognized objects of cognition through cogni-
tion, and that is the experiencer of the fruits of [that] activity.
RamakaI).tha identifies this as the 'assertion siltra' (pratijiiiisutra), taking it to
state the programme of the rest of this chapter, which is concerned entirely
with the examination of the soul. He regards the structure of the verses in the
rest of this chapter as consisting in systematic elaboration of each of the
118
words in this assertion sutra in tum.
1
Thus he structures his commentary into
sections that each focus on one of these words.
His commentary on this particular verse consists in, for each word in the
verse, giving a very brief statement of the views that will be refuted when that
word comes to be elaborated later in the chapter.
3:
4:
Verses 3-5: 'perceiver' (jiiiitii)
Defence of the view that action would not be possible unless the fac-
tors of action (kiirakas) existed as separate entities.
2
Refutation of the Vedantin doctrine that all is one.
1 Though it is no doubt true that Sadyojyotis intended this verse to layout the pro-
gramme for the rest of the chapter, the following verses do not seem to have been com-
posed as rigidly as Ramak<n;ltha maintains, i.e. as forming discrete sections, each one an
elaboration of one particular word from the 'assertion sutra'. None of the three verses that
RamakaJ.1tha regards as corning in the section concerned with jiilitli ('perceiver'), for ex-
ample, are any more focused on that word/concept than they are on kanli, pravrttiplzala-
blzoktli or pumlill, and two of the three are just as much concerned with bodlzella,
buddhvli, bodlzyam and pravanate as any of the three just mentioned words. The verses
that Ramak<n;ltha includes in the two sections concerned with elaborating bodhella
('through cognition') and buddhvli ('having cognized') all have to do, in some way, with
cognition; but why one set is more concerned with elaborating bodhella than buddhvli is
not clear. Four out of the six verses that belong, according to Ramak<n;ltha, to a section
elucidating kanli (agent) deal not with such a topic (and are not interpreted by Ramaka-
J.1tha as such when he expounds the individual verses), but with the question of whether
there are, unlike according to Vedanta, a real plurality of souls. Several more examples
could be given.
2 I am summarizing here, and for the remainder of this synopsis, not the contents of
the verses but the contents of RamakaJ.ltha's commentary on them, i.e. his interpretation
of their intention:. Here, for example, the verse does not mention the klirakas and. is not
likely to be talking about them. I consider the original intention of this verse at the begin-
ning of Chapter 2.
5:
6ab:
Synopsis
119
Refutation of the attempts of the Naiyayikas,the and the
Sfuikhyas to establish the existence of a Self. (I translate this section
in Chapter 1.)
Defence of the view that the Self is proved through self-awareness
(svasaY[lvedana). (I translate this section in Chapter 2.)
Verse 6ab: 'having cognized' (buddhvii)
Response to the objection that if cognition were unchanging we
would not be able to cognize different objects. (I translate part of this
section in Chapter 4.1.)
Verses 6c-14: 'objects of cognition' (bodhyam)
Refutation of the Y ogacara denial of the existence of external ob-
jects:
6c-9: Refutation of DharmakIrti's argument that whatever one is conscious
of is of the nature of consciousness.
10-14: Refutation of Dharmaldrti's sahopalambhaniyama argument. (This
section is summarized at the beginning of Chapter 3.)
Verses 15-17: 'through cognition' (bodhena)
15-17: Proof of Self as known through object of I-cognition. (This section is
translated in Chapter 3.)
120
The Self's Awareness ofItse1f
Verses 18-22b: 'and is the experiencer of the fruits of [that] action'
(Pravrttiphalabhokta ca) with regard to other-worldly fruits (amutrikaphala)
18-22b: Refutation of the 'Laukayatika' view that even if there is a Self
that is distinct from the body and stable during life, it comes into
being at conception and is destroyed at death.
Verses 22c-48: 'and is the experiencer of the fruits of [ that] action'
(Pravrttiphalabhokta ca) with regard to this-worldly fruits (aihikaphala)
Ramakru;J.!ha tells us that although the last section is of relevance to the
tion of the Buddhist view that the perceiver is momentary, which is the sub-
ject of this section, there are two differences. The previous dealt with the per-
ceiver's experience of other-worldly fruits, i.e. its perdurance beyond death;
and this section deals with its experience of this-worldly fruits, i.e. its perdur-
ance during life. Secondly, the previous section advanced independent argu-
ments that happen to refute the Buddhist idea that the
perceiver is momentary (in that they establish a perceiver that, far from being
momentary, continues beyond death); and this section shows that the argu-
ments that the Buddhists themselves put forwqrd for their position are not
valid (sadhakapramalJabhava).
22cd: Refutation of DharmakIrti' s inference of momentariness from ex-
istence (sattvanumana).
23ab-33: Contention that given the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness lib-
eration would be impossible.
34:
35:
36-38b:
Proof of non-momentariness from recognition.
Contention that even Bodhisattvas should behave towards objects
seen over and over again, such as one's wife or mother, teacher or
servant in a way that conforms to them being stabl.e, otherwise
there would be mistakes!
Defence of the non-momentariness of mountains, including a
proof that one thing can produce more than one effect.
Synopsis 121
38cd-40: Given momentariness, the relation between cause andeffect could
not be established.
41-43:
44-48:
49:
50:
51:
52-53:
54-55:
Defence of the existence of universals.
Refutation of the Buddhist inference of momentariness from per-
ishability (vinasitvanumana).
Verse 49-51: 'a soul' (yall puman)
Refutation of the view that it is the collection of sense-faculties
that are conscious.
Refutation of the view that it is the material elements that are con-
scious.
This is distinguished from the earlier refutation of the Lokayata
(v. 18-22b) on the grounds that there what was refuted was that
the Self is non-eternal as a result of being an effect of material
elements, whereas here it is refuted that it is identical to the ele-
ments, even if both are eternal.
Refutation of the view of the that it is the
internal organ that is conscious.
Verses 52-57: 'and an agent' (karta ca)
Proof that the Self is multiple, as against the Vedantin view.
This is distinguished from the earlier section dealing with Vedan-
ta, verse 4, on the grounds that there it was shown that there are
no means of proving that all souls are one, whereas here positive
means of proving a multiplicity of souls are put forward.
Refutation of the transformationist Vedantins (parilJativedanta-
vids) and the SaIphita-Pliiicaratras, who teach a real plurality of
individual souls (jfvCitmans), but deny that these are all-pervading
122
56-57:
and hold them to arise and subsequently dissolve into, respect-
ively, Brahman and NarayaI).a.
Refutation of the Sfuikhya view that the soul is not an agent.
Verses 58-75: Examination of liberation
RamakaI).tha begins this section by stating that thus far the Self as described
in the assertion sfitra has been examined through a refutation of the views of
other traditions; and that now liberation will be examined in the same way.
The following is a defence, through the refutation of alternative views, of the
Saiddhantika view that our innate omnipotence and omniscience become
manifest at liberation (abhivyaktivada), owing to the removal of occluding
bonds that obscure them until that time.
58-61:
62-65:
Refutation of the view of those Saivas who hold that becoming
equal to Siva (sivasamatva) at liberation consists in omniscience
and omnipotence arising (utpattivada).
Refutation of the Pasupata view that the powers of the Lord are
transferred (saflkrantivada) to the soul, and the [Kapalika] view
that the soul is possessed (aveiavada) by them like a person pos-
sessed by a spirit (bhiUa).
66-67 ab: Refutation of the Nyaya-V i s e ~ i k view that liberation consists in
the complete absence of the specific qualities of the soul; and the
Sfuikhya view that it consists in separation from Primal Matter.
67cd: Refutation of the Buddhist view that liberation consists in the ces-
sation of the stream of consciousness; and the Vedantin and
Pancaratra view that it consists in the dissolution of the individual
selves into, respectively, Brahman and NarayaI).a.
68: Justification of the existence of Impurity (mala) as that which ex-
plains why our powers of cognition and action are not fully man-
ifest prior to liberation.
69-73:
Synopsis 123
Justification of the existence of the extra leveJs of bondage
(evolved from maya) above those recognized by the Sfuikhya and
others.
74: Statement that only if the Self is established do all the Agamas
such as the Vedas have a point.
75: Statement that this examination of the soul has preceded the ex-
amination of the Lord that will now follow, because the Lord is
the agent of the soul's experience (bhoga) and liberation.
CHAPTER 1:
Can We Infer the Existence of the Self?
Background
I begin my translation and exegesis of passages concerning RamakaJ:.ltha's
proof of the Self at the point in NPP where the Buddhist opponent enters the
discussion for the first time.
1
In order to understand his fIrst we need
to know roughly the content of the previous section.
2
In it RamakaJ:.ltha de-
bated with an Advaitavedantin opponent who claimed that this world of ev-
eryday interaction and language (vyavahara), characterized by difference
(bheda), is unreal, Brahman alone being real. RamakaJ:.ltha (who believes in
the independent and real existence of perceivers, perceived objects and God)
argues against the Vedantin on the grounds that there are no means of know-
ing this non-dual Brahman. Direct perception and inference actually refute,
rather than confirm, the oneness of everything in Brahman since, being based
on sense-data and inferential marks, they have difference as their object
Neither can scripture bring about knowledge of Brahman
for the following reasoning. The Advaitins themselves assert that Brahman is
beyond conceptualization, so how can it be that which is denoted by scrip-
ture? If, furthermore, it were, then the scripture would' also have to be real,
1 8,17.
2 7,6-8,17.
3 7,13-14. The opponent responds that the content of perception and inference is ac-
tually pure existence. (This is the view of MaJ}<;lanarnisra, expressed in the of
his Brahmasiddhi. See BS p. 39-73; and Thrasher 1978. Later on it became standard
Vedilntin doctrine that pure non-dual existence is the content of perception.)
replies that, because in that case there cou,d be no difference between perception and the
other means of knowledge, there would in fact be no means of knowledge at all (7,14-15:
tarhi pratyalqiidibhediisiddhelz pramii1)iibhiiva{z).
126
and to be related to Brahman in a relation of means of knowledge and object
of knowledge, which entails duality. Finally, if the Advaitin responds that
scripture works through the indirect method of showing that the knowledge of
the Self (i.e. Brahman) is 'not this, not this' then that which is denoted by
scripture would be non-objects just like 'the son of a barren woman', so how
could scripture bring about knowledge of the one real thing?
The Vedantin ceases to put forward further arguments at this point and in-
stead a Buddhist opponent, seeing RamakaI).tha's refutation of oneness as a
step in the direction of Buddhist pluralism, seizes the opportunity to urge
RamakaI).tha to go further.
1. The Buddhist Challenge
yady evam, bhedasya satyatviit,4 pratiSarfram iva pratyarthal.n5
ca biihyasyiirthasyiinahanktiriispadasyiihaJiktiriispadaJ.n vijiiiinaJ.n6 bhinnam
eva griihakam anubhavasiddham astu, niinya[z kai cid iitmii nama,
7
tasyo8pa-
anupalablzyasvariipasya ca [Ked p.
9]. sattii du[zsiidlzyaiva.
12
4 satyatviit P, Ked, Ped; satvatviit B.
5 Interlinear gloss above pratyartlzaJ.n in P: pratipadiirthalJl.
6 vijiiiinaJ.n B, P, Ked; vijiiiinaJ.n Ped.
7 niima conj. Goodall; niimeti B, P, Ked, Ped. This labelling of the school
of the opponent would be very unlikely to occur halfway through the opponent's asser-
tion. Moreover the very last words of the passage looked at in this chapter, ity
iitmaiiinyaviidina[z, seem to refer to the whole of this passage and thus make this speaker
label redundant. Most likely then iti was originally an interlinear comment in
a manuscript that a subsequent scribe took to be part of the text. (B and P abound in such
interlinear speaker-labels.)
8 Interlinear gloss above tasyoO in B and P: iitmana[z.
9 Interlinear gloss above in P: upalablzyasyety artha[z.
10 priiptasyiio P, Ked, Ped; priiptasya B.
11 See MatV VP ad 6.19c-21b, p. 150,3-4: te ca sarva eva priiguktajiiiinavyatirekel"la
niinya[z kai cid iitmiiblzidhiino 'rtlw vidyata ity iihu[z, jiiiinavyatirekel"la tasyopalabdlzila-
Chapter 1: Inferring the Self
[Buddhist] If that is the case,13 then because difference is real, cognition-the
point of reference for the sense of selfl4-of external objects, are not
127
The words te sarve refer to what RamakaJ}.!ha has just listed
as the four kinds of Buddhist Sautrantika, Mahiiyiinika and Miidhyarnika.
12 du[zsiidhyaiva P, B, Ked; du[zsiiddhaiva Ped.
13 I.e. if non-duality is not proved by any of the methods claimed by Vedantins.
14 What is meant by the word ahankiira here? In this Buddhist context it lacks the
connotation it would have in a Saiva context as that which arises out of buddhitattva and
gives rise to the evolutes below. Neither does it refer, for Buddhism, to a separate faculty
or instrument (karal"la) having a separate role, as it does in Saivism (and SliIikhya). (For a
Saiva account of the Ahaillciira see PaTa 4.130-133.) Vasubandhu uses the term in a con-
text similar to here in a passage in AKBb(BBS) (1226,8-1227,8) that begins as follows:
iitmany asati kimartha[z karmiirambha[z? 'ahaJ.n sukhf syiim', 'ahaJ.ndu[zkhf na syiim' ity
evamartha[z. ko 'siiv ahaJ.n niima 'yam ahanktira[z? '[But, says
the if there is no Self, with what purpose [would people] undertake action?
[We answer that they do so,] thinking 'May I achieve wellbeing [hereby or at least] avoid
suffering.' [The V asks:] What is the thing termed 'I' that is the basis of this sense
of self [expressed in these aspirations]? [The Buddhist] [The notion of 'I' is just] based
on the psycho-physical constituents.' (I draw on the translation given on p. 31 of
Sanderson 1995a.) The word 'basis' here indicates both the cause/support of the sense of
self, and that to which it is directed, its object.
Uddyotakara also uses the word ahanktira in a similar context in a passage (NVii
(NCG) 323,17-324,10) that begins, atha manyase, asty ayam ahampratyaya[z, na punar
asyiitmii hanta tarhi nirdiiyatiil.n rtipiidir iti cet. atha manyase,
riipiidaya eViihanktirasya tathii coktam ahanktiriilambanotpattinimittatviid
iitmety ucyata iti, tan na asattviic ca. (Non-italic typeface indicates not text-
segments from the under comment, but viirttikas that are then expanded.) 'If
you say that this I-cognition (ahampratyayalz) does occur, but that the Self is not its basis,
then [you] must please state what its basis is. If you say: '[its] basis is the body and the
[other psycho-physical constituents].' If you say: 'it is just the body and the [other psy-
cho-physical constituents] that are the basis of the notion 'I' (ahanktirasya), and thus it
has been said, "the reason [they] are [misleadingly] called the Self is that they are the
cause of the rise of cognition a of the notion '1', '" that is not correct because [I-cognitions
with regard to the body and the other constituents] are contradicted [by the words of the
Buddha] and do not exist.' The way that Uddyotakara there begins the passage discussing
the of ahampratyaya and after the viirttika switches to talk of the of the
Ahaillciira, shows that for him the two are or nearly so.
a) The Tiitparya.tfkti glosses iilambana as iilambyate 'nena, thus as a synonym
here of jiiiina. That is an artificial way of taking an awkward and surprising compound. If
128
points of reference for the sense of self, should be the perceiver, one which is
quite different from object to object and moment to moment, just as it is from
body to body/5 [and one which has the advantage over a Self that it is] estab-
lished by experience;I6 [it is] not some so-called Self, [an entity] other than
the author of this quotation, ahalikiirlilambanotpattinimittatvlid litmety lIcyate, held ahali-
klira to be more or less synonymous with ahampratyaya, as Uddyotakara does in intro-
ducing his remark, we would expect his compound to read simply alzmiklirotpattinimitta-
tvlid without the liZambana. What did he mean by it with the liZamballa? Harunaga Isaac-
son suggested that he probably indeed intended alzalikiirtlZambana in the meaning of
'cognition of AhaiJ.kara', as the Tlitparya!fkii construes it, but not through using liZambana
in the meaning of cognition, rather through intending ahmikiirlilambana as a BahuvrIhi,
'that whose support/object is the AhaiJ.kara'.
To sum up, the contexts of the remarks by RarnakaJ}.!ha's Buddhist, Vasubandhu, Ud-
dyotakara, and the author quoted by Uddyotakara are all the same in so far as they are
Buddhist denials of the position that the AhaiJ.kara is ba.sed on (i.e. directed to and arising
from) the Self. Vasubandhu, Uddyotakara and the author he quotes take it to be based on
the psycho-physical constituents; RarnakaJ}.!ha's Buddhist takes it to be based on cog-
nition. As to what they precisely mean by it, one can discern slightly differing shades of
meaning. Vasubandhu seems to use it to refer to the sense of self (with a small 's') that we
all have towards that which we call 'I', instinctively wishing it to be happy and to avoid
suffering. Uddyotakara uses it as a synonym of I-cognition (alzampratyaya). The author
he quotes seems to use it to denote the content of an I-cognition. These three thus give us
an idea of what RarnakaJ}.!ha's Buddhist may precisely mean by it.
15 Saiva Siddhantins would accept that cognition in different bodies is different: the
Buddhist urges that they should go further and accept that it is different when perceiving
different objects and even in every moment.
16 I received detailed comments on this sentence from both Prof. Schrnithausen and
Prof. Preisendanz. I have followed neither of them completely, but mixed suggestions
from both. I take it that the core sentence is yady evam, blzedasya satyatvlit, vijiilinm.n grli-
hakam astu, nlillya!l kat cid litmli nlima: 'if that is the case, then because difference is
real, let us accept that cognition, not some other so-called Self, is the perceiver.' Both
subject (vijiilinam) and predicate (grlilzakam) are then filled out in more than one wave.
The latter is specified as something established through experience and as being utterly
different, that is to say different from object to object and moment to moment as it is from
body to body; the former is specified as being the seat of the sense of self, in contrast to
the objects it cognizes, which are not seats of a sense of self. It is true that this is not the
sense that is suggested by wQrd-order. More in line with the latter would be to take blihya-
sylirtlzasylinalzalikiirlispadasylihalikiirlispadmJl vijiilinam as the subject, anllblzavasid-
dlzam as the main predicate, blzinnam eva grlihakam as a sub-predicate, predicatively be-
[cognition], [that is the perceiver],17 because it (i.e. a Self) is not perceived
[though] it has the [required] for perception.
I8
And the exis-
129
longing to the main predicate, and pratitarfram iva pratyartlzmll ca as ad-
verbial to the main predicate: 'Cognition ... should be established by experience for each
object and in every instant, just as for each body, as the surely different perceiver'. I have
rejected this for the following reasons. 1) The yady evam, bhedasya satyatvlit at the be-
ginning of the sentence makes it unlikely that the main predicate is anllblzavasiddlzam.
For a contention about what we experience would not depend on the truth of blzeda, or on
any truth. Given the primacy of anllbhava for RiimakaJ}.!ha and the Buddhist
(which will become evident below), it is the wrong way round to say that because plural-
ity is real we experience a plural perceiver. 2) If the words pratitarfram iva pratyartlzalJl
ca were adverbial to anllbhavasiddlzam, there would be no obvious point to
pratitarfram iva. I expect the iva to mark something that is accepted by both sides, which
it does if we take pratitarfram with blzinnam (because both sides accept that cognition is
different in different bodies, the contentious point being whether it is different in each
moment or with respect to each object). Why the words pratitarfram iva pratyartlzmJl
ca are so far removed from bhinnam remains mysterious, but I can see noth-
ing else in the sentence with which they unproblematic ally construe. Perhaps they were
placed at the beginning for the sake of emphasis.
17 Different interpretations of nlinya[l kat cid litmli Illima are possible depending on
whether we supply as its predicate asti/vidyate, sidhyati, or whether we read again,
through anllvrtti, grlilzakam. As support for the first option one could point to the parallel
given in note 11, where we have the word vidyate in a very similar sentence; and as sup-
port for sidlzyati one could point to the concluding sentence of 3.1 below, kuto 'nya!l
sidhyati, where anya[l, like here, means 'something other than cognition' and refers to the
Self. But I take it that predicates such as these would, if intended, be expressed explicitly
in the present sentence, and hence I prefer to read again grlilzakam. It is true that the fol-
lowing ablative phrase, is a well-known reason
for non-existence (of the Self or other entity), but it can serve equally well here as a rea-
son for the Self not being the perceiver, precisely by implying its non-existence.
18 I.e. it is such that perception would reveal its existence. The compound lIpalabdhi-
is common in the works of DharmakIrti, particularly in passages that dis- .
cuss anllpalabdlzihetu, the logical reason that consists of the non-perception of an entity
(see Kellner 1997 and 1999). Here the point is that if the Self existed it should be percep-
tible; perhaps the reason the Buddhist would give is its supposed involvement in acts of
perception.
The concern of the Buddhist to contrast cognition and the Self, on the grounds that
the former is something experienced readily by all bf us, and therefore impossible to deny
130
tence of something whose nature cannot be perceived is difficult to estab-
lish.
19
The Buddhist sees the postulation of a unitary Self, unchanging throughout
all of a person's cognitions, as parallel to the Vedantic postulation of the uni-
tary Brahman, unchanging despite the appearance to our sense-faculties of a
world of fInite and transitory objects. Since RfunakaJ).tha is prepared to reject
the latter on the grounds that there is absolutely no evidence for it, why does
he not reject the Self, argues the Buddhist, on the grounds that there is no
evidence for it? If the perceiver (grlihaka) could just as well be cognition as
the Self, surely it is less fanciful to opt for the former, given that unlike the
Self it is something we all experience. RamakaJ).tha does not reply to this by
putting forward his own view, but rather he introduces the response of those
Naiyayikas who accept that the Self cannot be perceived.
2o
2. The N aiyayika Response
2.1 satyam.
21
ata evelldriyadir iva
22
kiiryat so 'pr
3
cchatmakad
24
allumfyata iti
Ilaiyayika!l.
(see allubhavasiddham earlier in the sentence), while the latter is not perceived, runs
through this entire chapter. See p. 203.
19 This final sentence responds to the imagined response to the previous sentence that
the reason we do no.t perceive the Self is not because it does not exist, but because it is by
its nature imperceptible. The Buddhist thus presents his opponent with a dilemma: either
the Self is perceptible, in which case can know that it does not exist; or it is imper-
ceptible, in which case we cannot establish its existence.
20 When RamakaI).!ha comes to put his own view, in the section of the text that is
translated in the next chapter, we will see that he himself does not agree that the Self is
imperceptible.
21 Interlinear comment in P above satyam: etat iti
22 Marginal comment next to elldriyadir iva in P:yathii hy allupalabhyo 'pflldriyadi!l
iti. allupaZabhyasya yatlzii
tad allumallaJ.1l tathety al1halz.
23 so 'pt' P, B, Ked; atmapt' Ped.
24 Interlinear gloss above so 'pfcchiitmakiid in B: kiiryat.
2.1 The Naiyayikas [respond as follows]: That is true.25 It is precisely for that
reason that [we] infer the [Self], in the same way as [we do] the sense-
131
25 I.e. we do not and cannot perceive the Self. This was the original Naiyayika view.
At least there is nothing in the siitras to indicate that their composers regarded the Self as
perceptible, and Vatsyayana, commenting on 1.1.10, is explicit that it is not: tatratma
tavat [variant without tavat] Ila grhyate. sa kim aptopadeiamatrad eva prati-
padyata iti? Ilety ucyate. anumanac ca pratipattavya iti (NBha(NCG) 16,1-2): Among
these [objects of knowledge], the Self, first of all," is not grasped by direct perception. Is it
known through no other way than the teachings of a trustworthy person? No, [we] reply.
It can be also through inference. ,b
a) The Self comes first in the Nyaya list of the objects of knowledge.
b) Vatsyayana's remark that the Self cannot be perceived needs to be qualified
slightly, for he has earlier stated that it can be perceived through yogic perception: pratyalqaJ]l
yuiijallasya yogasal1lildhijam, 'aimallY [variant without atl1lalli] atmamanasolz
atma pratyalqalz' iti (NBha(NCG) 9,8-11): 'As a result of yogic absorption, direct perception
[of the Self] takes place for someone [so] absorbed, [as stated in 9.13:] 'the Self
is directly perceptible as a result of a particular conjunction in the Self of internal organ and
Self'. (For a detailed discussion of this siitra and its citations-including for example the likely
reason that Vatsyayana includes the word yuiijilnasya, seemingly superfluous given yogasamil-
dhijam. see Isaacson 1993. Isaacson points out that yoga or yogic perception is not mentioned
in this or the surrounding siitras, and hence that it is not to be altogether ruled out
that originally it was intended as a description of the perception of ordinary people. Its earliest
commentators and quoters, however, all take it as referring to yogic perception.)
But already by the time of Uddyotakara the opposite view was being proposed. Ud-
dyotakara does not show signs of disagreement with Vatsyayana when commenting on
1.1.10, but in the course of his long introduction to 3.1, he rejects that the Self cannot be
perceived: nasty atma, allupalabdher iti cet, atrapi NVa
(NCG); NVa(BI)], ca p17rvavat. yad apy allupalabdher
[yad apy allupalabdher NVa(NCG); yad anupaZabdher NVa(BI)] iti tad apy aYllktam.
sapy allllpalabdhir [sapy allllpalabdhir NVa(NCG); allllpalabdhir NVa(BI)] asiddha pra-
atmanalz. pratyalqena tavad atmopalabhyate. katha11l?
[katha11l? NVa(BI); katham NVa(NCG)] ZiligaZiligisambandhasmrtyanape-
lqaJ]1 aham iti vijiiiinaJ]l n7piidijiiiinavat [n7piidivijiiiilla-
vat NVa(NCG); r17piidijiiiillavat NVa(BI)] yac ciipi bhaviill mllktaSal]lSayalJl
pratyalqal]l pratipadyate. tasya kuta!l iti? avasYal]l bhavatii jliiinam Uliii-
Ilam NVa(NCG); vij/iiilla11l NVa(BI)] eva liligiidisambandhanirapelqaJ]l sViitmaSal]lVed-
yalJl pratipattavyam [NVa(NCG) 323,13-17 = NVa(BI) 344,1-7]: 'If you say there is no
Self because it is not perceived, in that calle too there is a fault in the assertion and in the
example, as before. And as for [the logical reason], "because [it] cannot be perceived,"
that is also incorrect. [For] this non-perception too is unproved because the Self is the ob-
faculties and the like, from [their] effects, namely, [in the case of the Self] de-
sire.
This inference of the Self will have to overcome the difficulty that it claims to
infer something that is never perceived directly: we are only able to infer fIre
on the mountain (on seeing smoke) because we have seen it elsewhere (in
conjunction with smoke). This problem is not enough in itself to render this
inference invalid, for some inferences of unperceived entities were accepted
ject of direct perception and the [other] means of knowledge. The Self is perceived, first
of all, by perception. How? Cognition of the form 'I' is direct perception, just like a cog-
nition of a colour or such like, not depending on memory of the relation between a mark
and that which has that mark, and conforming to the different own-natures of its objects.
And why is that which you hold without doubt to be direct perception, direct pe:-ception?
Necessarily you must maintain [that it is direct perception because it is] just cognition that
does not depend on [memory of] the relation between a mark and [that which has that
mark], and that is experienced by one's own self [all of which apply equally to 1-
cognition]. '
The next sub-commentator whose work survives, Vacaspati Misra, does not, like Ud-
dyotakara, avoid commenting on Vatsyayana's claim tatratma tavat na grh-
yate. He writes the following: tadavatararthalJl tatratmeti. aham iti jfianaJ!1 gau-
radyakiiralJl sarfravabhlisaJ.1l na sakyalJl gha!adijfianavad drag atmani prama1J.ayitum ity
abhipraya!l, paradehavartyatmabhiprayalJl va (NCG(MIS) 391,17-19): 'The
[says] 'tatriitma ... ' in order to introduce the [sutra]. The intention [of that statement] is
that the cognition'!', having as its form 'fair etc.', has the body as its [objective] appear-
ance, [so] it cannot immediately demonstrate the Self, in the way that a cognition of a pot
or such like [can immediately demonstrate the existence of the pot or such like]. Alterna-
tively[the intends the Selves in other bodies.' Thus first Vacaspati interprets in
accordance with Vatsyayana's intention, but then, in order to accommodate Uddyota-
kara's views perhaps, puts forward the unlikely suggestion that when Vatsyayana said the
Self can not be perceived, he was talking only of the Selves of other people.
Jayanta follows Vatsyayana, without feeling the need to leave room for Uddyota-
kara's opposed view. He argues that the Self cannot be perceived (because one thing can-
not be simultaneously perceiver and perceived) but can be inferred. He claims that'!, re-
fers to the body, so that statements such as 'I am fair' are literally true, whereas state-
ments such as 'I know' are only metaphorically true. See NM(M) Vol. 2, 268,6-284,5.
Udayana follows Uddyotakara and devotes the entire fourth and final chapter of his
Atmatattvaviveka to refuting the claim that the Self cannot be perceived.
133
by almost all the Indian traditions as valid. A standard example is the infer-
ence referred to here, that of the sense-faculties.
26
tad ayuktam.
27
kiiryad dhi kiira1J.amatral!1 sadrsam eviinumfyate. tae ea pt1rva-
kaJ!128 vijfiiinam eva pt1rvatarajfianajasaJpskiirasahiiyam ubhayaviidi
29
sid-
dhaJ.1l nflapftiidijiiiiniiniim iviisyii!z kiiraJ;.am astfti
30
kwo
tvantara
31
siddhi!z.
[Buddhist:] That is not correct, for from an effect only a cause that is similar
[to it] can be inferred.
32
And just that previous cognition [that we to
above], along with a trace arisen from a yet earlier cognition, being accepted
26 The full inference is given by Vasubandhu at AKBh(BBS) 1190,4-1191,2: ...
tadyathii pafieiiniim indriyii(liim. tatredam anumiinalll: sati kiira(le kiira(liintarasyiibhiive
kiiryasyiibhlivo bhlive ea punar bhliva!l [bhliva!l suggested by the Tibetan; bhava!z .
AKBh(p), AKBh(BBS)] tadyathlinkurasya. saty eva viibhlisapriipte manaskiire ea
kiira1J.e punas ea bhliva!l, andhabadhiriidfniilll anandhli-
badhiriidfniil!l ea. atas tatriipi kiira(lantarasyiibhavo bhiivas ea nisefyate. yae ea tat kiira-
1J.iintaraJ.n tad indriyam ity etad anumiinalll. ' ... just as of the five sense-faculties: in their
case the following inference is available. When [most] causes are present [but] one further
cause is absent, the effect is found to be absent, and when [that further cause is also] pre-
sent, [the effect], for example a sprout, is then present. Now when a manifest object and a
[second] cause, attention [on the part of a perceiver], are present, perception of the object
is found not to occur for the blind or deaf etc., but to occur for the non-blind, non-deaf .
etc. Therefore in this case too the absence and presence [respectively] of a further cause is
determined. And that further cause is the sense-faculty, so this inference [is forthcoming
in the case of the sense-faculties].'
27 Interlinear comment above tad ayuktalll in B and P:
28 tae ea pt1rvakaJ!1 P, Ked; atas ea piirvaJp Ped; tatas ea piirvakal!l B.
29 Interlinear gloss above ubhayavadi
O
in P:
30 Interlinear gloss above asya!l kiira1J.aJll astfti in B and P: ieehliyii!l.
31 Interlinear gloss above in B: iitmiikhya.
32 I have translated as though the text read kiira(lal.1l sadrsamiitram allumfyate or
kiira1J.aJP sadrsam eviillumfyate. The phrase kiira(lamiitraJ.1l sadrsam is a little odd. One
possibility is to assume that two points are being made, kiira1J.aJniitraJ.ll expressing that
only a cause, and not an agent, can be inferred, and sadrsam expressing that the inferred
cause must be similar to the effect: ' ... from an effect a mere cause [and] only one that
is similar can be inferred.' The Sanskrit struck Prof. Sanderson as sufficiently odd for him
to conjecture kiira1J.al!1 sadrsam evallumfyate.
134
by both disputants, is available (asti)33 as the cause of it (Le. desire), just as
[it, along with a trace, is the cause] of cognitions of blue and yellow etc.
34
So
33 asti may have this nuance of 'is available' (suggested by Prof. Schmithausen), or it
may be used here, and in the parallel sentence (see next note), simply as a copula (sug-
gested by Prof. Preisendanz). Preisendanz wrote, 'The fact that Sanskrit does not need a,
copulative verb in simple third person nominal-predicative sentences should not be turned
into a (refutable) dogma that asti cannot be used as a copula. There are quite a lot of
counter-examples, even in the MahiibhiifYa.' Schmithausen wrote, 'Eine Verwendung
von asti als "emphatische" Kopula in Sonderfallen ist angesichts der Kopula-Funktion
anderer Formen von as denkbar, scheint mir an den beiden vorliegenden Stellen aber
nicht zwingend, da mit einem Ansatz asti = "steht (schon) zur Verfligung" ein mindestens
ebenso passender Sinn erzielt werden kann.'
34 This sentence, tac ca pilrvakalJl vijiiiinam eva pilrvatarajiiiinajasalJlskiirasahiiyam
ubhayaviidisiddhalJl nflapftiidijliiiniiniim iviisyii!z kiiralJam astfti kuto
tvantarasiddhi!z, is somewhat problematic; but is exactly parallel to the concluding sen-
tence of 3.1 below: tac ca vijiiiinam eva praviihiitmakal.n sal.nskiiriidivasata!z pilrvoktiise-
ubhayaviidisiddham astfti kuto 'nya!z sidhyati. Both also occur in
similar contexts, coming as they do after sentences that end 'should be inferredpostulated'
(anumfyate/kalpyalz). One possibility is to take the tat to be picking up the subject of the
previous sentence, the thing of which it has been said that it should be inferred/postulated.
Thus the present sentence would mean, 'And that [similar cause] is [in this case] just the
previous cognition, along with a trace arisen from a yet earlier cognition, which is ac-
cepted by both disputants, just as [it, along with a trace, is the cause] of cognitions of blue
and yellow etc.' But at that point we would have to punctuate and treat asyii!z kiira1}am
asti as a separate sentence, 'There is a cause of it, so how ... '. Since the parallel sentence
below has no break between tac ca and asti, and since the parallel structure makes it un-
likely that we should interpret the two sentences syntactically differently, I am not satis-
fied with this solution. Another possibility, the one I have opted for without being certain
that it is correct, is to take tat in both sentences as qualifying vijiiiina, thus indicating a
reference to a previous mention of the term. This interpretation of tat is slightly less
smooth for this sentence than for the later one: tac ca vijiiiinam there refers unproblemati-
cally back to the mention of vijiiiina in 2.4; but the fact that we here have pilrvakam be-
tween tat and vijiiiinam makes a reference back to vijliiina in 1 a little unsmooth. We have
the option for this sentence of adopting a different reading: atas ca or tatas ca for tac ca,
but in the parallel sentence tac ca is unanimously transmitted, and there is a simple expla-
nation (pointed out to me by Prof. Schmithausen) for why corruption to atas ca could
have occurred here, but not there, namely that the preceding syllable here is te (but there it
is aM: tetacca > tetasca > te 'tasca. Could tat function in both sentences in the meaning
of tasmiit? Only if it linked with the kuta!z question: 'And therefore, because just the pre-
how could a further cause, that is more unlike [the effect]35 and has never
been observed, be established [from it]?
135
Since something readily accepted by both sides-the previous cognition along
with a latent trace-is all that is necessary to explain desire, how could one be
justified in claiming that desire indicates the existence of some imperceptible
and disputed entity such as a Self?
tad uktam
36
yasmin sati
37
bhavaty eva yat
38
tato 'nyasya
39
kalpane I
taddhetutvena sarvatra hetilniim anavasthiti!z II iti.
40
vious cognition ... is / is available as the cause of it, how could a further cause ... ?', which
stretches the Sanskrit somewhat. Emending tac ca in both sentences to tatra (suggested
by Harunaga Isaacson for the later sentence, before he was aware of the parallel sentence
here) would produce two much smoother sentences (with tatra meaning 'in this case',
'with regard to this demand'), but I am reluctant to assume corruption in both places.
35 Instead of 'more unlike' one could simply translate as 'quite/very unlike', but the
tara suffix here can easily be taken as indicating a comparative: the previous cognition
and the trace are of a slightly different nature from the desire, but a Self is of a yet more
different nature.
36 PVa 2.24.
37 Interlinear gloss above yasmin sati in B: kiira1}e.
38 Interlinear gloss above yat in B: kiiryal.n.
39 Interlinear gloss above 'nyasya in B: kiira1}iid anyasya kiira1}asya.
40 All editions of the Pramii1}aviirttika give this verse with satsu ... tebhyo in
place of yasmin sati ... tatoo So do the quotations or paraphrases of it that I have seen in
non-Saiva texts: NBhii 481,11-12; and TS(BBS) verse 90 satsu bhavad
asatsu na kadiicana I tasyiinyahetutiik!ptiiv anavasthii kathalJl na te II). Ramakru),tha also
quotes it with satsu ... tebhyo in chapter two of this text (NPP 120,1-2 ad 2.4). But
he quotes it with singulars in three other places in addition to here: NPP ad 1.23ab; KV ad
3.9ab; and Matarigavrtti ad vidyiipiida 6.21ab (MatV VP 152,2-3). The singular is not ab-
. solutely required by the present context since more than one factor has been mentioned:
the previous cognition and the trace of a yet earlier cognition. Ramak!U].tba is not the first
author to give the verse with singnlars: his father, Naray!U].ak!U].tba, quotes it with yasmin
sati ... tato in MTV, ad 1.1.9ab, 23,12-13.
Sanderson commented that the version with the singulars is likely to have been influ-
enced by the prose formula asmin satfdal.Il, bhavati or asmin satfdam asti (Pili: imasmi/Jl
sati idalJl hoti). This would have been well-known to all the disputants as the essence of
the Buddhist view of causation.
136
Thus it has been said:
When B must (eva) arise when A has arisen, if one postulates as the
cause of B something other than A, there would j:Je an infinite regress
of causes for everything ..
This verse asserts the principle that in arriving at explanations one should
stick to those factors whose concomitance with the effect to be explained can
be observed. A pot can be observed to come into existence on condition that
there is a potter, clay, and an action on the part of the potter.
41
If one postu-
lates something else that is not observed as the cause of the pot, then why
stop with that? What is it that differentiates this further entity from any other
entity in the universe, making it more likely to be a cause than anything else?
Though I have translated anavasthitib as 'infinite regress', this 'infinite re-
gress', if it can be so called, seems not to mean that each time we postulate a
cause we need another one to make the former intelligible and so on ad infini-
tum. Rather it is simply that if we abandon the principle that observed con-
comitance with an effect is what determines whether something is a cause or
not, we open the floodgates to absolutely anything being allowed as a cause.
42
The original context of this verse is one of DharmakIrti's arguments against
the view that God can be inferred as the creator (kartr) of the universe.
DharmakIrti points out that those things of which God is postulated as cause
occur concomitantly with observed entities. Wounds are healed following the
application of medicinal herbs, the use of surgical instruments and such like
As noted below, the original Buddhist context of this verse is not a refutation of the
litman, but a refutation of the view that the universe is created by God. All the quotations
and paraphrases of the verse mentioned in this footnote, with the exception of Ramaka-
l}!ha's quotation in the 6th chapter of the Matmigav[fti occur in discussions of God. In
that part of the Matmigav.rtti he, like here, has his Buddhist use it to argue against the
litman.
41 The example that PrajiHikaragupta gives when commenting on this verse.
42 Manorathanandin's explanation of anavasthitib is aparliparakalpanli: thus for him
the unwanted consequence here is that one could go- on postulating further and further
causes. Prajiiiikaragupta's commentary reads ekakliryli1J.lil.1l hetiinlim anavasthi-
tib paryavaslinm.1l na sylit (PVBh 49,15): there would be no end of all causes having a
single effect.
137
treatments.
43
Sprouts can be observed to arise when earth, seeds and the like
are present, but" not when these are not present.
44
Bodies, instruments and
worlds can be seen to arise from the elements.
45
In such cases we should take
it that the seen entities are the of the effects in question, not some un-
seen entity such as God. If God, whose co-presence with the things he is held
to cause cannot be observed, is postulated as their cause, then our very no-
tions of cause and effect will be contaminated.
The use of the verse by the Buddhist in NPP is clear. It can be put to the pur-
pose of undermining arguments which infer the Self as a cause, just as much
as arguments which infer God as a cause, since the supposed effect of the
Self, desire, already has causes that are accepted by both sides. After the
Buddhist opponent's first interjection we deduced that he sees the postulation
of a unitary Self as parallel to the Vedantic postulation of an all-encompas-
sing Brahman. Now, after his second interjection, we can deduce from his use
of this quotation that he also regards it as parallel to the postulation of a God
who creates the universe. In the context of this parallelism of God and Self
from the Buddhist point of view, it could be noted that the example of me-
dicinal herbs that DharmakIrti uses to introduce this verse in his discussion of
God,46 is also used in a similar fashion in Vasubandhu's discussion of the
Self. Vasubandhu's iitmaviidin opponent there adduces features of cognition
that indicate the causal influence of the Self, and Vasubandhu argues that
these features can be explained just through cognition depending on specific
latent traces.
47
It is just like, writes Vasubandhu, the case of quack doctors
who claim that their herbal medicine cures owing to their having enchanted it
with mantras (in order to dissuade the patient from simply procuring the
herbs themself).48 To claim that the Self is required to explain cognition is
43 PVii 2.22.
44 The example that Manorathanandin gives when commenting on this verse.
45 That is the way the Buddhist opponent responds to the Saiva inference of the exis-
tence of God from these three effects, at KV 68,8-9. He then quotes this Pramli!wvlirttika
verse.
46 Reference given in note 43.
47 AKBh(BBS) 1224,1-2: cittlid
48 See AKBh(BBS) 1224,2-3: na hi kil.n cid litmalla lIpalabhyate slimm1hyam
dhakliryasiddlzliv iva kuhakavaidyaphllbsvlilzlilllim; and YaSomitra ad loco (Prof. Sand-
138
just like claiming that mantras are required to make medicine efficacious.
Similarly DharmakIrti points out the redundancy of adducing God as a factor
in healing wounds, when the medicine alone is enough to render the healing
comprehensible.
2.2 na, nfliidijfiiiniiniilll
49
iviisyii!150 kiiryatviisiddhe!l.
2.2 [Naiyayika:] No, because it (i.e. desire) is not established to be the same
kind of effect as cognitions of blue and the like.
51
icchii hi
52
piirviinubhiitasukhasiidhanatvlidyanusandhiinasiilllarthyasiddhatat-
sallliinakartrtvajfiiina53 sahabhiivillf. 54
erson prefers this reading phU!lo of AKBh(P), instead of AKBh(BBS)'s phiilz. His rea-
sons are spelt out iIi AKBh(S).)
49 Interlinear comment above Ila Ilfiiidijfiiiniiniilll ivii in B: etat na Ilfliidijfiiilliilliilll i[i
em.; e B]vetyiidikal.llnaiyiiyikavacallal.n; in P: piipa, Ilaiyiiyikavacanam. The first word is
of course an abbreviation of piirvapalqa.
50 Interlinear gloss above syiilz in B and P: icchiiyiilz.
51 Most literal would be to take this to mean that desire is not proved to be an effect at
all, unlike cognitions of blue and the like which are established to be effects. I take it in
the way I do because of context. It is not the same kind of effect as a cognition of blue,
because it, unlike the latter, is accompanied by awareness of same agency, as is about to
be explained.
52 Marginal comment in B on the passage beginning icchii hi: icchii hi ekam anusall-
dhiitiiral!l villii Ilo[no corr.; Ila MS]papallllii, yatprakiirasya padiirthasya sambandhiid
ayal.n sukham anubhiitaviin pun as tatprakiiral.n padiirthal.n patydn sukhasiidhanatvam
amlsmrtya tal!l icchati
a
yata!l [yata!l conj. Isaacson; ya MS]. Ila asiddhatviid ity-
iidi [asiddhatviid ityiidi conj. Isaacson; asiddhatviidi sarfrakiid ityiidi MS] iiha.
t ... t sarfrakiid icchii bhavet [sanrakiid icchii bhavet conj. Isaacson; icchii bhavet MS]
t ... t tarhi yuvasarfrasya sukhasiidhanatiinubhavalz vrddhasarfrasya tadanllsandhiilWl!1
allyasya tadiiditsety eva bhavet. yadi vii ekasya vijfiiinasya allubhavalz dvi[dvi carr.; dva
MS]tfyasya slllaralJalJl ityiidy. anekakal1rkam anusandhiinapratyaya!l syiit na tatsam-
iinakartrkajiiiinal!l [OjfiiilWl!1 conj. Isaacson; jiiiital!l MS] bhavet. (I have not here applied
sandhi where the manuscript has not, or corrected it where it has been applied incorrectly,
in case doing so removes clues to corruption.) The composer of this comment was not the
person who wrote it in this manuscript, for, as can be seen, it is corrupt in many places.
The scribe must have copied it from his source manuscript. 'For desire is not possible
a single synthesizer [of the previous cognitions on which the desire depends]; for
(yatalz) owing to connection with a particular kind of object this [synthesizer/person] ex-
For desire occurs together with awareness that [its] agent is the .as the
agent of a [previous pleasure]. [This awareness is] established from the ability .
139
perienced pleasure; later on, seeing the same kind of object, and remembering that it is a
means of pleasure, he desires to obtain it.
b
The says, 'no, because it is not
proved' etc .... Desire may arise from the body (sarfraka?) . ... In that case it could simply
occur that the experience that [the object] is a means of pleasure is had by the youth's
body, the synthesis of that by the old person's body and the desire to obtain the [object]
by another [body]. Or perhaps the experience [of pleasure] is had by one cognition, [and]
the memory by a second, and so forth. [Thus] the synthesizing cognition is [cognition] in-
volving more than one agent, not a cognition involving the same agent [as the original ex-
perience etc.].' (For the translation of the last sentence I follow the suggestion of Preisen-
danziSchmithausen made in their examiners' report, which significantly improves upon
my earlier attempt.)
a) Note that the similarity between yatprakiirasya padiirthasya salllbandhiid ayal.n
sllkham anllbhataviin pun as tatprakiiral!l padiirthal!l patyan sllkhasiidhanatvam anllsmr-
tya ta'll grahftllm icchati and the following in the Nyiiyamafijarf is too pronounced to be
co-incidental: yajjiitfyalll artham lIpaYlliijiina!1 purii sllkhalll anllbhiitaviin, pllna!l
kiiliintare tajjiitfyalll al1halll upalabhya sllkhasiidhanatiim anllsmrtya tad iidiitllm icchati
(NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,7-9).
b) Up to this point, the author of this comment has been commenting on the NPP
passage from icchii hi to etad anyatropapadyate yata!l. The rest of the comment, as can be
seen from the fact that it begins na asiddhatviid ityiidi and ends na tatsamiinakartrkajiiii-
nal.n bhavet explains the Buddhist response in 2.3: na, asiddhatviit, na hi tatsamiinakartr-
tvajiiiinasahabhiivitvam asyii!l siddhal.n (9,16-17).
53 Marginal gloss above anlisandhiinasiilllarthyasiddhata,tsamiinakartrtvajiiiina in B:
ya eviihal!l sa RamakaJ.llha writes ya eviihal!l sa below
(with transmitted in B) as h\s formulation of the awareness of same agency.
54 Note the terminological overlap between RamakaJ.llha's formulation of this argu-
ment and that of Jayanta: anlisandhiinasiimarthyaO is mirrored by anusandhiinasallla-
rtham at NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,10; piirviinubhiitasllkhasiidhanatviidyanllsandhiinao by
piirviinubhiitasllkhasiidhanatviinllsandhiinao at NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,lb; and tatsallliina-
kartrtvajiiiinaO by tatkiiryasamiinakartrkatviivagamiit at NM(M) Vol. 2, 279,1. The com-
bined weight of these parallels is, I thiIik, sufficient to demonstrate that RamakaJ.llha is not
using his own words here but borrowing from an earlier source. The earlier source could
be Jayanta directly, or a third author who is the source for both of them, or who borrowed
from Jayanta and was borrowed from by RamakaJ.llha.
[of the desiring person] to synthesize (anusandlzlina) such things as
55
the fact
that [the desired object] was a means of previously experienced pleasure. 56
The word anusandhiina will recur several times during this passage, as it de-
notes the process that is at the heart of this Naiyayilca argument. I do not stick
to one translation but use variously combining, co-ordinating, linking, con-
necting, bringing together, synthesizing or fusing (or instead of the action
noun, one referring to the completed process, e.g. combination, synthesis). It
denotes the accessing and bringing together of earlier and later cognitions,
enabling the interpretation of one's present perception in the light of past ex-
periences. In the present argument what is envisaged is a chain of (at least
three) events, which RamakaJ)tha does not bother to layout, but which other
versions of the argument do: one experiences pleasure from an object in the
past, now one sees the same kind of object, and hence desires it. In this con-
text anusandhiina refers to the bringing together of the present seeing with
(the memory of) the experience of pleasure it gave one in the past. If no such
connection were made between the present seeing and the fact that the object
seen caused one pleasure, one would of course not desire it. Hence the mere
fact that desire occurs when one sees an object of past pleasure is enough for
us to be sure that between the seeing and the desiring, anusandhiina must
have taken place.
Both in the course of this argument below and in the versions of Naiyayilca
authors, the Buddhist opponents do not disagree with the Naiyayilca assertion
that this cognitive process of anusandhiina must take place, they just disagree
over how it arises and what we can deduce from it.
*****
The Naiyayilca in the sentence under discussion 1) assumes that desire im-
plies this mental process of combining past and present cOgnitions;57
55 It can be seen from fuller accounts of this argument that the lidi refers most likely
to the perception of the object immediately before the desire for it arises.
56 It is also quite possible that pilrvlinubhilta should qualify not suklza but suklzasli-
dhana, the meaning being 'the previously experienced fact that the desired object is a
means of-pleasure'.
141
2) claims that this combining entails that the agent of the desire is aware that
(s)he is also the agent of the previous pleasure. 58
57 We do not have to assume, I think, that this argument concerns absolutely all
stances of desire. Even allowing that occasionally we desire things the like of which we
have never experienced (where clearly no synthesis of past experiences is required), the
inference can still work through appeal to those occurrences of desire that clearly are di-
rected towards an object of previous pleasure and that clearly arise in dependence on that
previous pleasure.
58 The argument being put forward here from desire and anusandhlina is that which
Vatsyayana offered as his interpretation of NS 1.1.1 0:
jfilinliny litmano liligam. This argument is an unnatural construal of the siitra, not least be-
cause though one can readily see how (most cases of) desire and aversion and
possibly effort, are dependent on anusandhlina, the other members of the list, pleasure,
pain and cognition, would not normally seem to require it. For a stimulating discussion of
what the siUrakiira's intention may have been, and what may have caused Vatsyayana to
be disinclined to interpret in that way, see Oetke 1988 254-256 and 258-260.
Uddyotakara also gives this argument as one possibility for the meaning of the sutra,
but his version of it differs from that of Vatsyayana. Jayanta gives a third version of the
argument, and it is his that RamakaQ.!ha's most closely resembles. 1) For both Jayanta
(see NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,11-12; 280,3-4, and 281,5b-4b) and RamakaQ.!ha (see 2.1
above) this inference of the Self is essentially one from desire as effect (kiil}'a). The con-
sideration that desire involves anusandhlina is supplementary, to show that desire is not
like other effects. Neither Vatsyayana nor Uddyotakara even mention that desire is an ef-
fect in the context of this argument. 2) Jayanta introduces the term anusandhlina as a
synonym of pratisandhlina, where Vatsyayanaoand Uddyotakara use only pratisandhlina.
anllsandhlina is the term that RamakaQ.!ha uses. 3) For both Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara
it is cognitions that are brought together or combined: see for example the phrase repeated
throughout Vatsyayana's argument (3 times on page 16 of NBha(NCG)) darsanapratisan-
dhlina, and Uddyotakara's pratyaylinlil.n pratisandhlinam (NVa(NCG) 60,16). Jayanta, by
contrast, has a habit of making forms of the verb anllsandhli govern the abstract of the
noun slidhana, i.e. not a cognition but a property of the object: sllkhaslidhanatvlinllsan-
dhlina (NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,lb); dlllzkhasiidhanatlim anllsandhliya (NM(M) Vol. 2,
280,8-9). RamakaQ.!ha adopts this manner of talking. 4) For Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara
the argument, crudely summarised, is that pratisandhlina would not be able to take place
unless there were a single agent of all the cognitions being combined, who performs the
act of combining them. But Jayanta's is far more complicated. One extra ele-
ment of it is that he adds a middle stage that anusandhlina implies awareness of same
agency. This middle stage is taken on by RamakaIj!ha. Awareness of same agency is not
142
What precisely is the relationship between the anusandhiina and the aware-
ness of same agency, that enables the claim in 2 that the former entails the
latter? The Naiyayikawill state it below: anyathiinupapattilz, 'impossibility
otherwise'. In other words he regards the anusandhiina as impossible in the
absence of awareness of same agency, inconceivable without it. Jayanta ex-
plains that when earlier and later cognitions are brought together, the anusan-
dhiina contains both an awareness that the cognitions are directed to the same
(kind object, and an awareness that they have the same agent.
59
To access
and bring together present and past cognitions simply is to be aware that the
past one had, as its agent, the agent of the present one: if one verbalizes the
anusandhiina it will take some such form as 'previously I experienced that
object, and this same I am again experiencing [it] now',60 in which an aware-
ness of same agency is apparent. I assume that Ramakrugha has some such
idea in mind.
iti jfiiitrantarebhya iva sarfravijiiiiniintariidibhyo 'pi kiiryatvena vyiivartamii-
nii jfiiitiira1Jl sthiram anumiipayatfty iitmasiddhi!l. na hi ya eViihalJ!
sa etad anyatropapadyate yata!z.62
Therefore, being excluded from being an effect of the body, another cogni-
tion, and [other generally accepted constituents of a person] ,63 just as much as
[from being an effect] of other cognizers,64 [desire] allows us to infer a stable
mentioned by Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara at all. 5) As pointed out in note 54, Ramaka-
I).tha in some places uses precisely the same wording as Jayanta.
59 See note 134.
60 See pilrvam aham amum artham anubhiltaviin, aham eViidya punar anubhaviimi in
note 134.
61 P, Ked; B, Ped.
62 Interlinear gloss above anyatra in P: iitmani; in B: iitmavyatirikte vijfiiina. Perhaps
the reason that the author did not write vijfiiine was that if one inserted this phrase into the
text instead of anyatra, sandhi would result in vijfiiina. B's gloss seems appropriate, P's
not.
63 Literally, 'turning away from the body, another cognition and such like as effect
64 The talk. here of what desire is an effect of reminds us that the anusandhiina argu-
ment occurs as a middle stage of an inference from effect to cause. In this case it is a
cause that is both inherence cause I substrate (samaviiyikiira1}a, upiidiinakiira1}a, iiSraya)
and agent (kartr).
cognizer, who is separate [from the body and cognition etc.]. Thus the Self is
.
proved. For this [awareness of same agency], 'that "I" who [was] the per-
ceiver am exactly the same as this desirer' is not possible with regard to any-
thing else [other than a Self].66
143
Note 58 gave several parallels between this version of the argument and Jay-
anta's. This piece of text provides two more. First there is another similarity
of wording (possibly coincidental, possibly not): RamakaJ).tha writes
jiiiitiira1Jl sthiram anumiipayati; Jayanta iisrayam anumiipayati.
67
Secondly, rather than proceeding straight from having established awareness
of same agency to concluding that the Self is thus established (as that agent),
both authors state that the awareness of same agency excludes the possibility
that desire is an effect of a substrate such as the body. 68 This is an interesting
contrast with the position of Vatsyayana, who regards the argument from de-
sire and synthesis as only capable of proving a single agent of perceptions
who endures from the time of the past pleasure to the subsequent desire.
69
He
thinks that one is still left with the possibility that this perceiver is not sepa-
65 It will appear strange to many that this sentence contains both a hi and a yatab.
However RamakaI).tha not infrequently uses seemingly superfluous hi's in sentences that
also contain ablatives or yatab 'so See for example in section 4.2 of Chapter 2, tasyiipi hi
svaia!l and tatpratibhiisitve hy iiropiinupapatteb; and
in section 3.3 of Chapter 4.1, tasya hi pradfpiider ivaikasyiinekakiilyakartrtvena bhavad-
bhir
The same habit is found in RamakaI).tha's predecessor, Sadyojyotis, both in his prose
and verse works. See for example SvSuSa p. 36,2b-lb: kilp kiira1}aln? yato na hi suddha-
sya sivasya bhoga!z samblzavati.
On RamakaI).tha's tendency to use sentence-final yata!l, and the mispunctuation to
which this has given rise in editions of his texts (Ked punctuates here after anyatropapa-
dyate), see Goodall 1998 xxviii.
66 Le. in such a cognition 'I' could not refer to anything other than a Self. Alterna-
tively we could translate as, 'is not possible in anything else [other than a Self]', i.e. only
a Self could have such a cognition. Or, fInally, anyatra could be being used in the sense
of anyathii: 'unless we postulate a Self'.
67 NM(M) Vol. 2, 279,2.
68 See NM(M) Vol. 2, 279,1-2: tatkiiryasamiinakartrkatviivagamiit
dhe sati. '
69 See Oetke 1988 257-58.
144
rate from the body, senses, internal organ etc., and thus he presents Nyayasut-
ras 3.1.1 ff. as turning to that question.
7o
Looking more closely at the piece of text above, the Naiyayika concludes
from the fact that desire is accompanied by awareness of same agency that it
cannot be an effect of another cognition, the body etc. In order for this to
amount to a proof of the Self, as it purports to be, all recognized constituents
of a person must be excluded from being possible substrates, leaving the Self
as the only option. Thus the 'etc.' must certainly include the sense-faculties
and the internal organ (manas). Let us take each of these in turn.
1) The contention that desire cannot be an effect ,of another cognition refers to
the Buddhist position mentioned in his last interjection that desire is simply
an effect of the previous cognition plus a trace.
71
That can now be ruled out,
for if it were the effect of simply the previous cognition, as opposed to an
agent over and above the stream of cognitions and in which they inhere, then
it would have no agent in common with the earlier pleasure so the awareness
of same agency would be inexplicable.
2) For similar reasoning to rule out the possibility that the body is the sub-
strate of desire, we must be dealing with a notion that between the past pleas-
ure and the desire the body ceases to exist and gives way to a new body. For
if the body endured over that timespan, it could indeed be the agent and sub-
strate of both the pleasure and desire, so the awareness of same agency would
be explained. The view of the body that came to dominate Nyaya is that one's
baby body is not the same thing as one's body during childhood, which is in
turn different from that in youth and old age. See for example Vacaspati
Misra's comment, 'and this single [entity] which is the [earlier] experiencer,
and the [subsequent] rememberer, inferrer and desirer is the Self. And the
body cannot be such (i.e. the single entity spanning that whole time period)
because it is [not only qualitatively but also quantitatively] different in accord
70 NBha(NCG) 135,4-12. Vacaspati regards the argument as capable of excluding the
possibility that desire inheres in the body (see note 72), but his version contains none of
the other parallels with RarnakaI)!ha's version that Jayanta's does.
71 We can now see that the relevant trace would be that of the past pleasure.
145
with the differences between babyhood, childhood, youth and old age.'72 See
also Jayanta's similar remarks: sarfra1Jl tavan necchader asrayal;, saisava-
yauvanavardhakadidasabhedena bhinnatvaP3 and sarfra1Jl ca balyadyava-
sthabhedena bhinnafn.
74
These remarks cannot be interpreted to mean that the
body has four distinct states while itself remaining the same thing, for when
. an opponent proposes this after the second of these sentences, Jayanta then
spends four more pages arguing that plurality in the body is not just on the
level of its states but on the level of the body itself.
Even if we were to assume that the body is the same thing throughout each of
these four periods, only ceasing to exist at the end of the period, that would
still be enough to disqualify the body from being the substrate of desire,
given that instances of desire can occur in youth for objects that have not
been experienced since childhood, etc. In fact though, Jayanta argues for a
much more numerous division of the body. Every time there is a change in its
colouration, size, configuration (sanniveSa) etc., the body ceases to exist and
a new one is reconstructed. The same happens whenever we eat, and food,
having been digested, turns into new dhatus, the essential constituents of the
body. In fact he goes so far as to say that the body arises and is destroyed in
pretty much every instant.
75
This is a far remove from the view of the Nyayasutras, which was that though
undergoing changes the body remains the same thing from birth to death and
beyond-lip to the time of its decomposition or bUrning.
76
Perhaps that is why
Vatsyayana did not regard this argument as capable of establishing that the
agent of our perceptions is separate from the body.
n .
NCG(MIS) 392,4-6 yas ciisiiv eko 'nubhavitii ca smartii ciinumiitii caisitii ca sa
iitmii. na ca sanram evalJz bhavitum arhati, tasyiipi biilyakaumiirayauvanaviirdhakabhe-
deniinyatviit.
73 NM(M) Vol. 2, 284,8-9.
74 NM(M) Vol. 2, 284,14.
75 sanre ... priiye1}a prati/qa1}am utpiidaviniiSau sambhavata[z NM(M) Vol. 2, 287,
5-8.
76 See note 187 in this chapter.
146
3 & 4) Vatsyayana's reluctance to see this argument as establishing the sepa-
ratenessof the agent of our perceptions from the sense faculties and the inter-
nal organ is also understandable, for they would seem to last long enough to
be the agent of both the past pleasure and the subsequent desire (the internal
organ being even eternal). I do not see how either RamakaI).tha or Jayanta
could derive from this argument alone, as they have laid it out, the impossi-
bility of desire inhering in one of the sense faculties or internal organ.
77
Vacaspati states in the middle 0. his exegesis of this argument that desire
cannot inhere in them, but he supports that not with considerations deriving
from this argument but by mentioning in brief different arguments and stating
that he will come to them in the future.
78
)
*****
In the sentence of NPP under discussion, the Naiyayika likens the possibility
that desire is an effect of the body, another cognition and such like to the pos-
sibility that it is an effect of another cognizer (through his use of iva). That it
cannot be the latter is agreed to by all disputants: past pleasure in one cog-
nizer cannot produce a subsequent desire in another, since the latter person
does not have access to the former's pleasure. The implication of the com-
parison is that if, instead of cognitions having as their agent or inherence
cause (samavayikaral;.a) the Self, they were produced by different phases. of
the body or simply by the previous cognition, access to the earlier pleasure
for subsequent cognitions would in that case too be impossible. The assump-
tion there is that the reason that pleasure in one person cannot be accessed by
a cognition in another is that the pleasure and the cognition do not share the
same agent or inherence cause. Since this lack of same agency also holds
77 They would at least need to specify that the pleasure from the object came from en-
countering it with one sense-faculty and the subsequent desire on encountering it with a
different sense-faculty. There are certainly arguments involving prati-iallusandhlilla that
are directed to establishing a Self beyond the senses: darsanasparSaniibhyiim ekiirthagra-
hQ/Jiit (Nyiiyasatra 3.1.1), as interpreted by Vatsyayana (see note 129 below) and those
who follow him, and illdriyiilltaravikiiriit (NyiiyasiUra 3.1.12 / one part of
3.2.4), as interpreted by, among others, opponent below (section
3.1).
78 NCG(MIS) 392,6-8.
Chapter 1: Inferring the Self 147
within one person's stream of cognition on the Buddhist view, a later cogni-
tion should not have access to an earlier pleasure. The Buddhist would dis-
pute that assumption. For. him the reason that a cognition in one person can-
not access (memory of) a pleasure in another is not that the cognition and the
pleasure lack the same agent, but rather that there is no chain of cause and ef-
fect linking the two (enabling the 'passing' of traces along the chain),
whereas there is between cognitions in one person. He will voice this opinion
that traces are sufficient to explain desire and anusandhana below.
*****
1 take RamakaI).tha's expression 'that "I" who was the perceiver am exactly
the same as this desirer', in the last of the sentences above, to be the aware-
ness of same agency that occurs when one brings together the present desire
with an earlier perception. Why is it the present desire and an earlier percep-
tion that RamakaI).!ha envisages as being brought together here?
The perception that is most commonly mentioned in the lists of events culmi-
nating in the desire in other versions of the argument is the seeing of the ob-
ject that immediately precedes the desire. But that is unlikely to be what is
being referred to because, if it were, the argument would only be able to es-
tablish continuous agency from the desire back to the immediately preceding
perception. The Naiyayika would not be exploiting its maximum potential.
Desire is not, in most versions of this argument, one of the cognitions in-
cluded in the anusandhana; it is rather that which arises from the bringing to-
gether of such cognitions as the present seeing of the object with (memory of)
the past pleasure from the object. RamakaI).tha's text, too, can be seen to be
working with this model of desire arising from the anusandhana cognition,
because the Buddhist will explicitly say as much below, at the end of 2.3
(anusandMnajiianata evasyaJ:t samutpatteJ:t). If desire arises from the anu-
sandhana cognition, then presumably it comes into existence after it and so
cannot be referred to within it.
There is one sentence in Jayanta's account of the argument, which, if read by
RamakaI).tha, would explain why he included a reference to the desire within
the awareness of same agency; why 'a reference to a perception; and what that
perception is. That he may have read it has some independent support from
148 The Self' s Awareness of Itself
the fact that, given all of the evidence so far adduced, it is clear that his ac-
count of this Naiyayika argument is based on Jayanta's or one very close to
Jayanta's. The sentence in question runs:
79
'Therefore it is established that
this desire, being known/cognized as having the same agent as effects such as
the first perception of the object, allows us to know a support that is different
from tlJ.e body and the like, because ofits being an effect [which logical rea-
son is further] qualified.' If this were read by Ramakru;ttha then he could natu-
rally have regarded it as implying the existence of a cognition of the form
'that "I" who was the perceiver am exactly the same as this desirer', where
the perceiver means the agent of the first perception of the object prior to the
pleasure (not the second perception prior to the desire).
For Ramakru;ttha to have included a reference to desire in his formulation of
the awareness of same agency is consistent not only with this sentence by
Jayanta, but also with Ramakru;ttha's earlier sentence that desire occurs to-
gether with (0 sahabhavint) awareness that its agent is the same as the agent of
the previous pleasure. Perhaps Ramakru;ttha chose here, not desire and the
previous pleasure, but desire and the first perception of the object because
these are the earliest and latest margins of involvement with the object and
hence indicate continuous agency for the maximum time. But the problem
remains of how Ramakru;ttha could have squared the fact that his anusandha-
na refers to the desire with the fact that it is a necessary requirement of the
rise of desire.
Prof. Preisendanz here suggested that we are dealing with more than one syn-
thesis, or with a synthesis that expands to include more elements over time. In
order for the desire to arise the present seeing must be synthesized with the
earlier pleasure, and there will be an awareness that they share the same
agent, but when the desire arises this too will be synthesized with the earlier
experiences of the object, and the awareness of same agency will be extended
to include the agent of the desire.
79 NM(M) Vol. 2, 280,4-6: tad iyam icchii prathamapadiirthadarsaniidikiiryasamii-
nakartrkatayiivagamyamiinii sarfriidivilalqa1}am iisrayam avagamayati kiir-
yatviid iti sthitam.
2.3 na,80 asiddhatviit. na hi tatsamiina
81
kartrtv
a8
:jiiiinasahabhiivitvam asyii!183
siddham, tatsiddhatve hi pratyalqa eViitmoktalz syiid iti nityii-
nllmeyatviibhYllpagamavirodha!l.
2.3 [Buddhist] [That] is not [the case],84 because it is unestablished. For it is
not established that it (i.e. desire) occurs together with awareness that [it] has
the same agent as the [previous pleasure]. For if that were established, the Self
would be the content of cognition, so it would be said to be directly per-
ceptible. Therefore there would be art incompatibility with [your] acceptance
that [the Self] must be always inferred.
85
149
The Buddhist here points to a dilemma that must be confronted by the propo-
nent of this inference of the Self. The inference depends on awareness of
same agency, for it is that that shows that the substrate of desire must also be
the substrate of the pleasure and therefore continuous over time. But aware-
ness of same agency implies awareness of the agent, something that the Nai-
yayika has agreed to be impossible.
80 na omitted in P. Interlinear comment above na in B: etat.
81 Interlinear comment above asiddhatviit na hi tatsamiina in B: sabdaviicye sarfre-
ndriyiidau vii. The intention of the comment is not clear to me. Harunaga Isaacson sug-
gested the following partial explanation. It is intended as a note on (tatsamiina)kart.rtva-
(jiiiina). With the Buddhist speaking one might find it slightly problematic who the kartr
is thought to be. sabdaviicye is thus an abbreviation of kartrsabdaviicye.
82 kartrtvao Ked, B, P; kartl Ped. .
83 Interlinear gloss above asyiilz in P: icchiiyiilz.
84 I.e. it is not the case that desire, since it is accompanied by awareness of same
agency, is different from cognitions of blue etc. and is capable of establishing a Self.
85 This Naiyayika conceded that the Self can only be inferred, when, in his first inter-
jection (at the beginning of 2.1), he responded to the Buddhist claim that the Self cannot
be perceived by saying, 'True, that is exactly why we infer the Self ... '. Most Naiyayikas
did indeed put forward this argument as capable of proving the Self despite its not being
perceived. Vatsyayana says as much when introducing it. Jayanta goes to great length to
formulate it in such a way that it does not assume the perceptibility of the Self; in fact the
opponent throughout his exposition of the argument is not a Buddhist, but another
Naiyayika (whom he calls a svayiithya, 'one of our own fold') who argues that one could
not infer the Self if it were not perceived., Even Uddyotakara, who elsewhere claims that
the Self is perceptible, when putting forward this argument claims that it can prove an un-
perceived Self (anllpalabhyamiinam iitmiinam).
150
Here too RamakaI.1tha's account is closer to Jayanta's than Vatsyayana's and
Uddyotakara's. Neither of those authors introduces objections that point to
this problem, but Jayanta's opponent elaborates it in great detail on more than
one occasion. At one point for example he writes:
86
'You say that these [men-
tal phenomena listed in NS 1.1.10, namely] cognition, desire, pleasure, pain,
[aversion and effort] are inferential marks of the Self. [But only] when they
are known as having a substrate that is the same [as that of earlier cognitions]
do they allow us to infer a bringer together [of the cognitions who is the agent
of all of them]. And cognition of them as being thus (i.e. as having a substrate
that is the same) depends upon knowledge of the substrate. If [the substrate]
is known, the inferential marks are fruitless with regard to it.
87
But if it is not
known, [they] cannot be used to infer [the Self].' Elsewhere he writes,88 'How
do [you] know that without a bringer together [who is the agent of the cogni-
tions that are brought together] these effects like desire etc. are not possible?
If [you] say, 'Because [we] find desire etc. [only] when there is a single
knower I [only] in a single knower,'89 then because [you could only know this
86 NM(M) Vol. 2, 277,14-17: jfianecchiisukhadullkhadi kileda1Jl liligam atmanall I
eklisrayataya jfiatam anusandhatrbodhakam II tathatvena ca tajjfianam asrayajfianapii-
rvakam Ijfiate tatraphalaJ.n lbigam, cijiiate tu na lbigata II
87 There is a small difference between Jayanta and RamakaI)tba's version of this di-
lemma. If one opts for an appeal to awareness of a same agent/substrate, then, says Rama-
kaI)tba, the Naiyayika's own admission is contradicted; and says Jayanta, the inference is
pointless. Why would one need to infer the Self if it can be perceived? If one admits that
an inference of its existence is required, then one cannot adduce perception of it in the
course of the proof, for one would then be assuming what one has admitted not to be the
case.
88 281,7-11: anusandhataram alltarel)a tad etad icchadi kliryaJ]l navakalpata iti
kathaJ]l jfiayate? ekatra pramatari [pramatari ed.; jiiatari C] taddarsanad iti yady [yady
C; yad ed.] ucyate tad idam ekapramatrgraha{lad aligf!qtaJ]l syad iti
vyartham anumanam. agraha{le tu pramlitur ekasya tatpiirvakatvenecchade!l pratiban-
dhagrahal)ad asakyam anumanam iti.
89 The proponent of the anusandhana argument here tries a slightly different alterna-
tive to appealing directly to awareness of same agency, namely pointing out that desire is
found to occur only 'in a single knower', that is to say, only in the knower who also expe-
rienced the earlier pleasure etc. The plausibility of this claim derives from the fact that de-
sire in one person does not occur as a result of pleasure experienced by someone else. The
Buddhist would of course also agree to that. But for the Buddhist one person is not a sin-
151
to be the case through] grasping a single knower, [you] would have assumed
this perceptibility of the Self, so the inference would be without point. But if
a single knower is not grasped, then the inference is impossible, because the
firm link has not been grasped between desire etc. and dependence on a [sin-
gle knower].'90
nanv
91
ata
92
eva tad apt
3
sarvatmana']l sukhasadhanatvadyanusandhanasa-
marthyatalJ. sadhyata ity uktam.
[Naiyayika:] But that is precisely why the [fact that desire is accompanied by
awareness of same agency],94 for its part,95 is established for everyone
96
from
the ability [of the desiring person] to synthesize such things as the fact that
[the object] is a means of pleasure, as [we] have said.
gle knower but a stream of separate cognitions, so the fact that desire never occurs in one
person as a result of pleasure in someone else does not mean that it only occurs 'in single
knowers'. If the proponent of the argument wants to claim to know that it only occurs 'in
single knowers', he commits himself to the view that he knows, i.e. perceives, that single
knower, rendering its inference pointless. .
90 Jayanta puts the problem in a nutshell at another place: 'This is a rope which has a
noose at both ends. Either the Self is perceptible or the pervasion cannot be known'
(280,2b-lb): seyam [seyam corr.; seyas NM(M)] ubhayata!zpasa rajju!z. atma va praty-
alqa!l, vyaptir va duravagameti.
91 Interlinear-incorrect-comment above nanu in P:
92 Marginal comment referring to nanv ata in B: nanv ata naiyayika.
93 Interlinear gloss above tad api in B: tatsamanakartrtvajfianasahabhiivitvaJp. Mar-
ginal comment referring to tad api in P: tatsamanakartrtvajfianasahabhavatvasya para-
marsas tad apfty anena.
94 Like the author of the interlinear gloss in B (see previous note), I take the tat here
as tatsamanakartrtvajfianasahabhavitvam, for that is what was said in the opponent's last
remark to be na siddham.
95 The api could mean: as well as the Self, the principal object of the irIference; but
that would not be so relevant here, so I take it in its basic function as a focus particle, as
suggested by Prof. Preisendanz.
96 I have avoided translating as 'for all Selves', for the Naiyayika certainly does not
need or want to assume the Self here. Thr tone is probably simply that no one can deny
that synthesis entails awareness of the identity of the agents of the experiences it brings
together.
The Naiyayika attempts to wriggle out of the dilemma by clinging to the
awareness of same agency while emphasizing that it is not something known
directly but rather inferred from synthesis.
The awareness in question, 'this I who is the perceiver is exactly the same as
the desirer' is one that could, in another argument, be put forward to establish
the Self on its own, as an instance of perception, or more specifically perhaps
as an instance of recognition. Just as similar recognitions such as 'this is that
pillar' are used by non-Buddhist schools to establish the stability of their ob-
jects, pillars and the like, so this cognition could be used to establish the sta-
bility of its object, the 'I' who is the perceiver, and who is (subsequently) a
desirer. But it occurs here in the context of an inference of the Self on the part
of Naiyayikas who accept that the Self cannot be perceived. Thus when the
argument was laid out above, the awareness featured not as a perceptual
demonstration of the existence of its referent-the Self-but as one stage of an
argument towards that end. It served 'as a means of eliminating the possibility
that its substrate could be any of the recognized constituents of living beings.
In answer to the Buddhist objection that this still involves assuming that the
Self is directly perceived, the Naiyayika claims here that the awareness itself
is only inferred. Presumably on this view 'it is only known to have taken place
after the event, when we reflect on what is required for synthesis and desire to
take place, and not consciously registered at the time.
97
Hence, on the one
hand, it is thus not vivid enough to count as perception of the Self and, on the
97 Elsewhere I state that I do not use the English term 'awareness' for determinate or
conceptual cognition (adhyavasiiya, savikaipakajiiiina), but reserve it for non-conceptual
cognition. My usage here could be seen as a counter-instance given that this cognition is
verbally formulated ('this 'I' who is the perceiver is exactly the same as the desirer'). I
have allowed myself to use the term here, however, on the grounds that this cognition is
sufficiently indeterminate to have to be inferred after the event.
153
other, it is not simply appealed to without being established tprough argu-
ment.
98
*****
The Buddhist decides not to push the point that if the awareness is to serve its
purpose it must contravene the Naiyayika's admission that the Self cannot be
perceived, and instead shows how we are not justified in I?ostulating it at all.
kim idal.n siimarthYalJ1
99
yena tasya siddhilz? anyathiinllpapattir eva. sii kasya?
na tiivad icchiiyiitl, anllsandhiinajiiiinata eviisyiilz samlltpatte!I.100 [Ked p. 10]
atha
lOI
tasyaiviinllpapattir
lO2
iti na, tasyiipi pilrviinllbhavasal.nskiirata
lO3
eva
bhavadbhir apy lItpiidiibhYllpagamiit.
[Buddhist:] What is this ability through which the [awareness of same agency]
is established?l04
[Naiyayika:] It is simply that [it] is impossible without [that awareness].
[Buddhist:] What is [impossible without it]? Not desire, first of all, for that
arises simply from the synthesizing cognition. If [you say] it is precisely that
(i.e. the synthesizing cognition) which is impossible [without the awareness of
same agency], [that] is not [correct] because that too is accepted even by you
to arise simply from a trace of a previous experience. 105
98 I will not here describe Jayanta's long, and rather different, attempt to extricate
himself from the dilemma, but will just note in passing that, in formulating the argument,
he may have chosen the word avagamalavagamyamiinii (in the sentences given in notes
,54 and 79, governing samiinakartrkatvaltii) in the sense of 'knowledge' or 'understand-
ing' rather than 'awareness' or 'perception', precisely in order to avoid the implication
that the agent is directly perceived.
sya.
99 Interlinear comment above kim idalJ1 siimarthYal.n in B:
100 samlltpatte!l B, Ked; samlltpiidiit Ped; samllpapatte!l P.
101 Interlinear gloss above atha in B and P: yadi.
102 tasyaiviinllpapattir B, Ked, Ped; tasyaiviinllpapittir P.
Interlinear gloss above tasyaivlt' in B: anllsandhiinajiiiinasyaiva; in P: anllsandhiina-
103 SalJ1skiirata B, Ked, Ped; Sal.nskiira P.
104 I.e. what is it about the synthesis that establishes awareness of same agency?
105 The Buddhist here asks the Naiyayjka to clarify what precisely would be impossi-
ble in the absence of awareness of same agency. He gives two possibilities; first desire
and then the synthesizing cognition, showing that both are otherwise explainable. But it
RamakaJ).!ha's version departs here from that of Jayanta. Whereas Jayanta de-
votes the remainder of his discussion to elaborating how one can know that
desire oqly occurs in a single knower without perceiving that single knower,
RamakaJ).!ha here allows his Buddhist to begin to get the better of the Naiya-
yika by deconstructing the process of the rise of synthesis and desire and re-
vealing the latter as requiring nothing more than the synthesizing cognition;
and the synthesizing cognition as requiring nothing more than a trace of the
previous pleasure.
The Buddhist points out that the Naiyayika also admits that a trace is a causal
factor in the rise of desire, and he could here have repeated his earlier princi-
ple (similar to Ockham's razor) that when one already has a cause for some-
thing one cannot be justified in postulating another unseen one.
*****
RamakaJ).!ha's text is strikingly similar at this point to a passage in the
Slokaviirttika, where Kumarila used exactly the structure employed here to
dissolve the argument from desire. He is there commenting on a passage in
the occurring in the middle of an extended quotation of the
Vrttikara, that gives this very argument from desire, the main difference be-
ing that the Vrttikara's argument does not mention synthesis (anusandhiina,
pratisandhiina) but appeals in the corresponding places simply to memory
(smrti). The presentation is also different in that the Vrttikara first argues on
the basis that one does not desire something that one has not perceived be-
fore, and when the Buddhist has combatted that, strengthens his argument by
asserting that one does not desire something one does not remember, and by
turning to what is involved in memory. Kumarila asks rhetorically why mem-
ory, resembling the case of desire, is brought forward by the Vrttikara as
was in fact unambiguous in the preceding discussion that the Naiyayika intends the syn-
thesizing to be that which is impossible without awareness of same agency. See anusan-
dhiillasiimarthya at 9,11 (section 2.2) and 9,19-20 (section 2.3). Thus RamakaJ;llha em-
ploys this device of a request for clarification, not in order to highlight a previous lack of
clarity, Qut simply to give his Buddhist the opportunity to show how even starting from
the very end of chain of events with desire, each is explainable through merely the
previous cognition plus a latent trace.
something different. For they are alike in that neither occurs wht<n their object
has not been seen before, and both can be explained as resulting from traces
of experience.106 He answers his question by differentiating them on the
grounds that desire is produced from the memory alone without depending on
the perception, so its agent is not definitely the same as that of the perception;
whereas memory accords with the perception, so its agent is the same. That is
why memory is brought forward by the Vrttikara even after the refutation of
the argument from desire.
107
But ultimately memory too, even though it is a
stronger argument, is not up to proving same agency: memory can be ex-
plained despite the stream differentiated, because the trace that causes
memory is in its stream.
108
RamakaJ).!ha's wording does not echo the wording of this text, but in its struc-
ture it contains four exactly parallel steps. In both cases the proponent of the
argument tries to establish a line of continuous agency stretching back from
desire to the original experience. In both cases the Buddhist first shows that
desire only depends on the previous cognition (anusandhiinajiiiina in the case
of RamakaJ).!ha and memory in the case of Kumarila). In both cases the pro-
ponent of the argument then urges that this cognition would be impossible in
the absence of same agency. And in both cases the Buddhist then adduces
traces.
These exchanges occur in the Slokaviirttika as a natural explanation of the
course of the Vrttikara's discussion, but do not fit so neatly into Rama-
kaJ).!ha's text. As pointed out above (note 105), to include them RamakaJ).!ha
has to introduce them with the question 'What is impossible without that
awareness? Not desire, first of all ... " despite the Naiyayika having previ-
ously stated with clarity what he held to be impossible without that aware-
ness; and it was not desire but synthesis. This slight lack of continuity in
106 SV(P2) iitmaviida 103: bhedena kim lIpanyastii tulyanyiiyecchayii smrtiJ.z 11Ibha-
yarJllla hy 'rthe viisaniitas ca sidhyati II
107 SV(P2) iitmaviida 104-105: lIpalabdhim aniisritya smrtyaivecchopajiiyate I upala-
bdhisamiino 'syii[z kartii naikiintato bhavet 1I1Ipalabdhyanllsiirel)a smrtyiitmii punar
I samiillas tena kar1iisti tadarthar!z pllnar ur:yate II
108 SV(P2) iitmaviida 106: tatliipi tll samiiniiyiilJl santatall viisanii yatalz I tasmiit saty
api bhillnatve II
RamakaI).!ha's text reinforces the possibility that he is taking these exchanges
from an earlier source, and not from the same source he has been drawing on
for the exposition of the argument up to that point. 109
The possibility that Kumarila is his source, in spite of there being no overlap
in wording, is increased by the fact that the two texts parallel each other not
just in this set of exchanges but in the surrounding passages too. This set of
exchanges is in both cases embedded in a wider context that consists of a dis-
tinctive strategy for arriving at the reality of the Self. Both Kumarila and
RamakaI).!ha adopt the strategy of allowing the Buddhist opponent to overturn
all of the Naiyayika and V inferences of the Self, before securing its
existence by saying that it is directly perceivable.
In the. Slokavlirttika, a begins this section
110
by arguing that we can
infer the existence of the Self through such acts as breathing, which cannot be
properties of the body because they cease before the body ceases. After a few
exchanges it seems to be conceded that this argument is inconclusive owing
to the fact that breathing and the like, existing externally and being perceiv-
able by other people's senses, could be properties of an external substance. 111
The V tries a new argument that at least internal properties such as
pleasure must inhere in the Self. The Buddhist replies by simply refusing to
accept that pleasure and the like are properties, depending for their existence
on some other substrate.
ll2
Rather than allowing the to reply,
Kumarila lets the Buddhist have the final say on the point. Then comes the set
of exchanges already looked at, from which it emerged that although memory
was considered a stronger argument than desire, it too is explainable through
traces.
So for the third time in a row Kumarila has the Buddhist win a confrontation
with litmavlida. Then he finally introduces his own view: 'The arguments
109 If Jayanta was his main source up to these exchanges then it is natural that he
would cease drawing on him at this point, for J ayanta holds that the argument can estab-
lish the Self, whereas RiimakaJ?!ha's text, from here on, shows that it cannot.
110 Verse 93.
III Verse 98.
112 Verse 101d-102.
157
thus adduced by others (i.e. and Naiyayikas) having been rejected,
now the litman is ascertained as that which is known through I-cognition by
itself.' ll3
This outline of Kumarila's strategy is also the strategy of RamakaI).!ha in a
nutshell. We will see that in this chapter RamakaI).!ha takes a series of Nyaya,
and Sankhya inferences of the Self in turn and has his Buddhist re-
fute every one of them, without feeling the need to state his own views at all.
Although it is his and Kumarila's principal aim in these chapters to overturn
the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self, they both seem to agree with Buddhism that
the standard arguments of their fellow litmavlidin traditions are incapable of
doing so and can be overcome by Buddhist considerations. Like. Kumarila,
RamakaI).!ha, when he introduces his own voice, will rely not on inference but
on direct perception. As we will see in Chapter 2 and 3, his view is that the
Self can be known both through self-awareness (svasal.nvedana) and 1-
cognition (alzampratyaya).
Returning to the passage in question: the Naiyayika now tries to undermine
the Buddhist attempt to replace single agency with traces by arguing that the
role of traces would be incoherent if there were no Self.
2.4 tarhi sa eva
ll4
salJlskiiro nityena dhannb:zii vinii nopapadyata iti tatas
tatsiddhilz
2.4 [Naiyayika:] In that case [we respond that] that latent trace itself [would]
be impossible in the absence of an eternal substrate
ll5
[in which it could re-
side]. So a [Self as eternal substrate] is proved from that [latent trace].
If cognition ceases in every moment and does not inhere in a permanent sub-
strate, the latent traces contained in cognitions must also cease in every mo-
113 Verse 107: hetufV eVal.n samprati I ahampratyayavijiieya!l
svayam iitmopapiidyate II
114 Interlinear comment above tarhi sa eva in B and P: naiyiiyikavacanal/l.
115 In some contexts dhannin and iisraya are consciously distinguished by an author,
the former renderable as 'property-possessor' and the latter as 'substrate', for example
discussions by late Buddhist authors in pramii1}a school in the context of rescuing the
sattviinumiina from the fault of iisrayiisiddhatii. In the current context no such distinction
is relevant however.
158
ment. For a latent trace to produce its effect at some time subsequent to its
origination, it must continue to exist uninterrupted over that period. Therefore
its locus must exist uninterrupted over that period. Thus its locus cannot be
cognition but must be the Self.
na, anitylinlim
1l6
evonmattall7bfjlinlilll llikflidisa/Jlskliras
1l8

dinli siddha
1l9
iti vijfilinasantatliv eva kramavatylil!z sa
120
sidhyati nlinyatrli-
tyantlisiddhe.
121
[Buddhist] That is not [correct]: [when datura seeds are dyed with lac or an-
other coloured dye and then planted], a trace of the datura seeds' lac or [other
dye] is established [to exist] by the redness or [other colour] in the flower of a
[dyed seed], [even though the seeds are] clearly non-etemal.
122
So a [trace] is
established in just a stream of cognitions existing in a sequence, not in some-
thing else (i.e. an litman) which is completely unestablished.
The salient feature of the example is that, even after the seeds have ceased to
exist, they leave traces of their redness in subsequent flowers. Thus a cogni-
tion that is 'coloured' in a certain way may leave a trace that outlives it, com-
ing to fruition long after it has ceased in something other than it.
123
Applying
1,16 Interlinear comment above na anitylinlim in B and P:
117 vonmattaO B, P, Ked; votpannaO Ped. Interlinear comment above onmattaO in P:
dhafl7ra. The word is spelt in that way here, but as datilra in the marginal comment re-
ported in note 119.
118 Marginal gloss of in P: rafijana/!z nlima saIJlsklira!z.
119 Marginal comment in P referring to this sentence: datilrabfjlinlilJl rafijitlinlil]l vli-
penlirur.:zliny eva jliyante, na tu svetlini, iti loke prasiddham.
120 Interlinear gloss above sa in B and P: saIJlsklira!z.
121 Interlinear gloss above nlinyatrlityantlisiddhe in B and P: litmlikhye

122 A similar example is given at AKBh(BBS) 1231,5-6: ... yatlzli llikflirasarafijitlin
phale raktalz keiara upajliyate. ' ... , in the
same way that from a flower of a citron tree that was dyed with lac, red pips, produced
from a particular transformation of the series, arise in the fruit.' The example is there used
to illustrate a slightly different point, which is why it mentions transference of colour
from flower to pips, not seed to flower.
123 This kind of explanation features in the AKBh(BBS) where the process through
which a trace of a past action or cognition can affect the future is described as a particular
transformation of the series to which that action or cognition belongs (tatsantatiparir.:zlima-
on the model of a seed leading to a transformation of its own series culminating in
159
this more specifically: because a trace of the past pleasure can later
(when the object is re-encountered), the pleasure can be accessed by a synthe-
sizing cognition, which in turn gives rise to the desire.
2 5 'fl' 'd I 124d b . k ka - 125 'ddl'
z na VI ma.z prayoga . am aravyatzre er.:za syanyasya Sl lIr yena
tad api jfilina/Jl slidhyate.
2.5 Thus we do not see what else-apart from a host of pointless arguments-
is established, as a result of which this awareness [of same agency], for its
part (api), which is a qualifier of the logical reason (i.e. desire), is established.
The main logical reason of the argument is desire. Its qualifier is awareness
of same agency, for it is the supposed fact that it is accompanied by this
awareness that gives the logical reason its power to prove a Self. But nothing
has been brought forward that has convinced the Buddhist that this awareness
occurs. Rfunaka:Q!ha does not have his Naiyayika come back at the Buddhist
but leaves the latter as the victor in this confrontation.
Brief Remarks about the History of the Argument
A thorough history of the Naiyayika argument from desire and synthesis has
not, to my knowledge, been The two earliest versions are, as far as I
that of Vatsyayana and that of the Vp:tikara. According to Kei Kata-
oka's unpublished doctoral thesis the Vp:tikara must have written after Dig-
naga, since he clearly responds to the latter's critique of MImaIp.sa. This
its fruit. This type of explanation occurs there as a Sautrantika one, opposing itself to the
view of the who held that karmic results arise directly from the past actions
(which according to their doctrine of sarvlistivlida still exist in some sense), without the
need to postulate any gradual transformation of the series. See AKBh(BBS) 1229,11-
. 1230,5, which begins: naiva tu vaya/!l liyatylil.n phalotpattil!z brilmalz,
ki1.n tarhi bfjaphalavat.
124 prayogaO B, P, Ked; Ped.
125 kasylinyasya Ked
Pc
, Ped; kasyli B, Ked"C; kasya P. In deciding whethet to regard
the inclusion of the anyasya as original, I have been influenced by the following sentence
that occurs shortly: n7paraslidisamudliyaryatireker.:zlinyasya kasya cid limraphallider dha-
nnir.:zo 'nllpalambhlit.
160
would place the Vrttikara's terminus post quem around 500. Vatsyayana on
the other hand did not know Dignaga and is placed by Oberhammer in the
second half of the fifth century. 126 This dating is corroborated in Franco and
Preisendanz 1995. Thus it appears likely that Vatsyayana was writing before
the Vp:tikara. I would suggest as a hypothesis for further study however that
the Vp:tikara reproduces or draws on an earlier, Naiyayika most likely, ver-
sion of the argument than Vatsyayana's, for the Vrttikara's appears to be
slightly more primitive. It mentions only a previous perception (upaZabdhi) of
the object, memory (smrti) of that, and desire; not synthesis (prati-
lanusandhiina). And it is sufficiently different to seem unlike a simplified
summary of Vatsyayana's argument.
As we move from the Vrttikara's argument to Vatsyayana's to Uddyotakara's
and to Vacaspati's, the number of things necessary for the rise of desire in-
creases. The Vrttikara mentions a ,previous perception of the object and
memory of that; Vatsyayana, previous contact with an ,object, pleasure as a
result of that, subsequent seeing of that kind of object and pratisandhiina;
Uddyotakara, all of those plus memory. Vacaspati likens the process to the
carrying out of an inference. First there is the contact with an object leading
to pleasure (= the pervasion), then, on subsequently encountering the same
kind of object, there is memory of the pervasion (vyaptismara1J.a) and the see-
ing of the new object as being of the same kind as the earlier one
then the inference, 'this [object in front
of me will be] a cause of pleasure', culminating in the desire. This desire is
said to be impossible if there is not a single agent, because in that case
pratisandhana would be impossible. 127
Vatsyayana introduces the term pratisandhana, for which, as we have seen,
later authors use the synonym anusandhana also. There is variation among
the different versions of the argument in its regard in (at least) three ways:
126 Mentioned in Franco and Preisendanz 1995 86.
127 392,1-4: yajjlitfyasyeti vyliptismrtikathanam. tajjlitfya/.n paiyann iti pa!qadhanno-
panaya[z. tasmlid aYa/JI suklzahetur ity anumiiylidlitum icclzati. seyam icchedrf vylipti-
graha/;tatatsmara1;tapa!qadhannatligraha1;tlinumlinecclllidfnlim ekakartrtval.n siicayati,
bhede pratisandhlinlibhlivena tadanupapatte!l.
161
whether it is clearly distinguished from memory; whether it is, a cognition;
and what is 'brought together' by it.
On the question of its relation to memory it is to be noted that in
Vatsyayana's argument it occupies the place that memory does in the
Vrttikara's argument. Oetke, who gives detailed analyses of the other argu-
ments looked at in his book, devotes only one paragraph128 to expounding
Vatsyayana's pratisandhiina argument stating that it is hard to gather what
Vatsyayana intended. It is striking that he regards Vatsyayana's argument as
based not on 'Verkniipfung' (his translation of pratisandhana) but on mem-
ory. There is more to pratisandhana, for Vatsyayana, than memory. His us-
age of the term both in this argument and in his commentary on 3.1.1
129
indi:-
cates that there is,at the very least, the difference that whereas memory usu-
ally has as its object only one cognition or thing, pratisandhana has more
than one. I interpret the pratisandhana in Vatsyayana's argument to mean
that on seeing the object a connection is made between that seeing and the
earlier pleasure. Memory of the previous pleasure is therefore certainly in-
volved, and is not something separate from the pratisandhana; but it is only
part of it. If one saw the object, and then remembered the previous pleasure,
without co-ordinating the previous' pleasure with the present seeing, desire
would still not arise.
Perhaps it is for that reason that in Uddyotakara's version of the argument,
unlike in Vatsyayana's, memory and pratisandhana have become separated,
both being mentioned as factors involved in desire,130 and it is implied that
memory is one of the cognitions that are brought together. 131 For Vacaspati
132
128 Oetke 1988256-257.
129 He there argues that since we have such cognitions as 'I'm touching what I saw',
where cognitions from two different senses are brought together (pratisandhfyete), the
agent of the cognitions who brings them together (pratisandadhliti) must exist beyond the
sense-faculties. On this siitra see Oetke 1988 260-269, Preisendanz 1994 183-187, Taber
1990 and Laine 1993.
130 See for example tasmlid yasmin smrti!l sambhavati tatra pratisandhlinam iti
nyliyam (NVa(NCG) 62,10).
13l See caitat smrtyli saha
na pratisandhlinam (62,6-7). Again Oetke regards Uddyotakara's argument as based on
162
and Udayana,133 who follow Uddyotakara on this point, memory is explicitly
said to be one of the things that are brought together. So too for Jayanta,134
but elsewhere Jayanta's version shows traces of the view that memory and
anusandhlina are not separate things: when first describing the sequence of
events leading up to. desire he writes ... sukhaslidhanatlim anusmrtya (tad
lidlitum icchati),135 but further down the same page 136 sukhaslidhanatvlinu-
scmdhlinao.
Thus if it is correct that the Vrttikara's argument draws on an earlier version
than that of Vatsyayana's (a suggestion that certainly requires more evi-
dence), it seems plausible that initially the argument was based on memory;
then memory was replaced by pratisandhlina, as in Vatsyayana; then the two
were distinguished and both included separately, as in Uddyotakara and oth-
ers after him.
memory, not pratisandhiina. This seems to be an unnecessarily one-sided description of
the argument. It entails that Uddyotakara himself is mistaken about the nature of his own
argument, given his encapsulation of it at the outset with the words icchiidfniilJl
pratisandhiinam iitmiistitvapratipiidakam NCG(MIS) 388,7-8.
132 NCG(MIS) 395,27-396,1: smrtilz pl7rviiparapratyayiibhyiim ekakartrkli, tiibhyiil.n
pratisandhfyamiinatviit.
133 See note 140.
134 NM(M) 277,9-l3: siimiiniidhikarar.zYaJJl ca I anusandhfya-
miinaJJl yad driyate tat kathaJJl bhavet II pl7rvam aham amum artham anllbhl7taviin, aham
eViidya pllnar anllbhaviimfti tlllyakartrkatiipi tatra praklisate, itarathii tv
anllmiitllm apy iitmii na sakyeta.
a) I thank Prof, Preisendanz for bringing this reading to my at-
tention. It is the reading of NM(K) and, she informs me, of the Gaurinath Shastri edition
and the Allahabad manuscript. NM(M), in general the most reliable edition, has here the
clearly inferior tiivat.
'And as for what we observe to happen, namely that the co-referentiality of memory
and experience etc. is brought together, how does that occur? In the [anllsandhiina cogni-
tion] (tatra) "previously I experienced that object, and this same I am again experiencing
[it] now," just as the fact that [the past experience that is remembered and the present ex-
perience] have the same object is manifest, so too is the fact that they have the same
agent. Otherwise the Self would not be able to be inferred either (i.e. in addition to not be-
ing able to be perceived).'
135 NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,8-9.
136
278
,17.
163
Is pratisandhlina considered to be a cognition or not? For Vatsyayana desire
requires that a single seer brings together cognitions, but he does not state or
imply that the bringing together is a separate cognition. Neither does Uddyo-
takara. Jayanta
137
and Vacaspati13
8
could be seen to imply that it is a separate
cognition in that they give verbal formulations of it. But it is noteworthy that
Vacaspati does not include it in the list of the elements of his inference cul-
minating in desire, only stating afterwards that desire would not be possible
without it.
139
In Ramakru;ttha's version of the argument it is defInitely a sepa-
rate cognition as he refers to it as anusandhlinajfilina. For Udayana too it is a
cognition, being carried out by anuvyavasliya.
140
On the third question, namely what precisely is brought together, there is
variation over whether it is cognitions or properties of the object, and whether
memory is included. The second of these has been discussed. For the first see
note 58.
Philosophical Summary
I follow these preliminary and tentative remarks about the history of the ar-
gument with some brief observations that are more philosophical than philo-
logical. Both the Vrttikara's and Vatsyayana's arguments draw attention to
the readily observable pair of facts that one does not desire something that
137 See note 134.
138 NCG(MIS) 393,6-7: yajjiitfyaIJ1 candanavanitiidi slikhahetUl.n pratftaJ]l smariimi
tajjiitfyam imaJ]l pratyemfti pratisandhiinam.
139 See note 127.
140 Udayana defines pratisandhiina the following way: pl7rviinllbhl7titatkliryasmrti-
tatkliryiinllbhl7tfniim ekeniinuvyavasiiyellaikakartrkatayii salikalanam ity arthalz (NCG
(MIS) 398,21-22). It is the fusion, through a subsequent cognition, of three
things as having the same agent. Those three are the earlier pleasure (Pl7rviiIlUbhl7ti), a
memory that is caused by that (tatkliryasm.rti), and an experience of the present object that
is influenced by that memory (tatkliryiinllqhz7ti). Perhaps the iast of these three involves
seeing the object as the same as the cause of the previous pleasure, or as likely to produce
pleasure.
164
has never been perceived (fruits that grow to the north of the Meru mountains
is the Vrttikara's example); and that one does not desire something that has
been perceived by someone else but not oneself. Extrapolating from this, they
conclude that if we consisted of a series of discrete cognitions we would not
desire anything, for even if an object has been perceived by a cognition in the
same stream, it will have been perceived by something different from any po-
tential subsequent desiring cognition.
This lays itself open to the Buddhist objection that it assumes the reason for
desire not arising in one person for an object perceived by another to be that
the perceiver and the (potential) desirer are different things. The Buddhist re-
jects this assumption, explaining the reason for the non-arising of desire in
such cases to be that there is no chain of cause and effect linking the perceiv-
ing cognition with cognitions in the other person. Because there is such a
causal relationship between cognitions within the same stream, traces can be
'passed' from one cognition to the next allowing desire to arise for an object
perceived by what is indeed something else on the Buddhist view.
There is a plausibility in the argument that the cognition 'this is that object' /
'I desire this object that I saw earlier' could only occur in a cognizer who was
also the cognizer of the object on the previous occasion. But this plausibility
rests on equating two situations that the Buddhist can distinguish: 1) an object
is experienced in one person and re-experienced subsequently by another; 2)
an object is experienced by a cognition, which ceases to e?dst but causes an-
other, which causes another ... which causes another that experiences the
same object. Since the Buddhist can distinguish these in that in the latter in-
fonnation can be passed from one cognition to the next through the vehicle of
sarrzskaras, the impossibility of desire arising in 1 does not mean that it could
not arise in 2.
The problem for the proponents of the argument was to establish that the non-
occurrence of memory/synthesis/desire in 1 results from an absence of same
agency, not from an absence of a chain of cause and effect. Vatsyayana had
simply asserted that the synthesizing of different perceptions would be im-
possible without them having the same agent, but more than that was required
to deal with the Buddhist counter-argument. Jayanta claims that we can know
synthesis only to take place in single cognizers because we can observe that it
165
never takes place between different cognizers. But his opponent, easily count-
ers this by saying that since a single stream of cognition consists of different
cognizers we cannot know that it never takes place between different cogniz-
ers. Uddyotakara points out that at least in cases where both sides agree that
there are different cognizers no synthesis takes place. But predictably this
does not convince his Buddhist that the absence of synthesis results from the
plurality of cognizers rather than the lack of a cause-effect link.
Sometimes proponents of the argument try to tackle this problem by pointing.
to some special feature of synthesis that mere chains of momentary cogni-
tions would not be capable of explaining. Thus, as we saw, RamakaI}.tha's
version of the argument claimed that the act of synthesis necessarily involves
an awareness of the single agent. This move is countered on the grounds that
it assumes what the argument sets out to prove. Uddyotakara claims that even
if some kinds of synthesis may arise from a sequence of causally related but
distinct entities, desire involves a specific kind of synthesis. 141
Some non-Naiyayika atmavadins regard the argument as a failure, as we saw,
and so indeed do some Naiyayikas.
142
But it is noteworthy that even Uddyota-
kara and Jayanta, proponents of it, are prepared to allow their Buddhists to
overcome the strategies mentioned thus far. They both predicate its efficacity
ultimately on a demonstration of the incoherence of certain aspects of the
Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Uddyotakara allows his opponent to an-
swer each of his points until at the end he argues that a momentary entity
would not be able to leave a trace on another momentary entity that did not
exist at the same time as it. Similarly, throughout Jayanta's long discussion
the opponent is able to answer all of Jayanta's assertions and the debate is
only closed when J ayanta asserts that he will explain later in the chapter that
there can be no relation of cause and effect between momentary cognitions
and no activity based on that. 143
141 caitat pratisandhiilWl!l sm]1yii saha
pratisandhiinam (NVii(NCG) 62,6-7).
142Th th J f'
ose at ayanta re ers to as svayathya, 'those of our own fold'.
143 '
NM(M) Vol. 2, 284,3-4: yathii jfiiiniiniil.n kliryakliralJ.abhiivo niisti yathii ca na
tatkrto 'ym.n vyavahiiras tathiinantaram eva savistaral!l
166
3. V
3.1. The Philosophy of Nature Arguments
etena api
vikarai[ll44 smrtYadibhis eannanumanalJl pratyuktam.
By this [argument], the inference of the Self that the teach-from
the outgoing and ingoing movements of the breath, the closing and opening of
the eyes, life, the movement of the internal organ, the fact that a sense other
than [that directly involved is sometimes also] affected, and from memory and
the like-is also refuted.
145
144 VS(C) 3.2.4: sukha-
dulzkhe prayamas eety annaliligani. On this siitra, and the very similar lists
of liligas Mthe Self in the CarakasalJlhita, see Preisendanz 1994263-274.
145 Riimak!l1flha presents the V argument in two compounds. The first com-
pound occurs in 3.2.4. The version of this siitra commented on by Candra-
nand a is given in note 144. The commented on by Bhana Vadlndra
and SaiJkara Misra are both different from that of Candrananda. As a result of his investi-
gation of manuscripts containing only the without one of these three com-
mentaries, Isaacson has also uncovered two more separate recensions of the
tras. This particular siitra happens to be one that is slightly different in all five recensions.
(For all of the variants see Isaacson 1995 293.) All five however include the compound
identical to that found in this
sentence except for the case ending; but none of the five mention memory (smrti). Where,
then, in V literature are we to look to find the argument for the Self from memory
that Ramak!l1flha mentions in this sentence? Here are some possibilites. 1) VS 9.22 (in the
numbering of VS(C)) reads: atlnamanasolz sal.llSkarae ea smrti[l. This
could easily be taken to represent an argument for the Self's existence on the grounds that
it would be impossible to account for memory without a conjunction of Self and internal
organ. 2) Memory is an instance of cognition and Prasastapada argues that cognition im-
plies an agent of cognition: prasiddhya ea prasadhako 'numfyate (prBha(Br)
15,1-2). (SrIdhara sees this as an argument for the Self as support or ground (asraya[l) of
cognitions: prasiddhir jlianam. tatrapi prasadhako jfiatanumfyate.
jfianaJJl kvacid asritam, kriyatvae ehidikriyavat. yatredam asritaJ!1 sa anna (NK 169,8-
10). But it may not have been intended as such: see Oetke 1988 282-283.) 3) Next
167
It is still the Buddhist talking here. Before explaining how the argumentation
he has used against the Naiyayikas is also capable of refuting these V
inferences he flrst expands on them:
tat!la hi tiryaggatisvabhavasya vayor nopapadyate,
bhastradhmateva kas cit kalpyalz. delzavayavasrita-
nam api prayamayukto jfvanasyapi dhanna-
dhannakaryataya tadgu1)asrayabhiltalz, manaso 'py aeaitanyai
46
ratlzader
iva prayamavan preraka[l, darjimadyambla
147
tararasaphaladarsanena danto-
dakannakarasanendriyavikarasya darsanad sarvendri-
yartlzanusandlzata kas cit kalpyalz.
PraSastapada argues that cognition cannot belong to the body, the sense-faculties or the
intemal organ. In arguing agamst the second of these possibilities he adduces the case of
memory specifically: nendriya1)am, kara1)atvad, eanusmrti-
darsanat (prBha(Br) 15,4--5). Since it (sometimes) occurs when the sense-faculties have
been destroyed and when no sense-object is near, it cannot be a quality of the sense-
faculties. 4) The latent traces (salJlskara) that cause memories are included among the
qualities of the Self by Prasastapada: tasya (=annana[l) gU1)a buddhisukhadulzklIeeelzadve-
(prBha
(Br) 16,7-9); and he argues that the Self can be inferred from qualities as the substance
that possesses them ea gU1)air gU1)y anumfyate (prBh
(Br) 16;3-4). This is the least likely to be intended by RiimakaI.1lha because he turns after
this to the argument from qualities to possessor of those qualities (gU1) in). 5) When
Candrananda comments on 3.2.4, he interprets indriyantaravikara as im-
plying an inference of the Self from memory.
Prof. Preisendanz pointed out to me that the CarakasalJlhita, in its continuation of the
list of marks of the Self given in 3.2.4, includes memory: see CaSa, sarfra-
stlzana l.72c.
146 aeaitanyad Ked, pac; aeaitanyad B, ppc, Ped.
147 The more usual form is amla.
148 vikarasya darsanad aO conj. Sanderson; B, P, Ked, Ped. I follow this
diagnostic conjecture-as support for which Sanderson pointed to rasanavikriyadarsanad
in the given on page 170-because I do not see anything that vika-
rasya can be construed with in the transmitted text. Since the genitives that parallel vika-
rasya in the other phrases in this sentence jfvanasya and manasa[l)
are all qualified by an api, we could the loss of one more syllable here: vika_
rasyapi darsanad aO.
1490 -ksPKdPd -ksoOB
gava . a , e, e : gava . 1
168
To explain further, the impelling of the wind upwards and downwards, [given
that] its nature is to move horizontally, is not possible [unless one assumes a
further entity that is doing the impelling]: some [entity] parallel to a person
blowing bellows must be assumed.
150
Likewise some controller also of the
opening and closing of the eyes-as of a puppet-and other [similar uncon-
sciously controlled functions] located in the parts of the body who possesses
volition;151 [and] who-because life, for its part, is the effect of dlzanna and
adhanna-is the support of those qUalities;152 [and] who-because the intemal
150 See PrBha(Br) 15,10-12: prli1)lidibhis ceti [variant without the iti]. katham. sarfra-
parigrhfte vliyall vik.rtakarmadarsanlid bhastrlidhmlipayiteva. '[One can infer a controller
who possesses volition] also through the outgoing and [ingoing] breaths, the [closing and
opening of the eyes etc.]. How? [One can infer an entity] parallel to a blower of bellows,
because in the case of the air that is enclosed within the body we observe an altered
movement.' See also the relevant part of Candrananda's commentary on 3.2.4: tiryak-
pavanasya vliyor dehasthitasya yat prli1)liplinakanna tat prayatllakliryam, sarfrapari-
sati vi!crtatvlit, bhastrliparigrhftavliYllkamzavat (VS(C) 28,16-18).
151 See [variant niyatena diiruyan-
traprayokteva [variant prayoktreva] (prBha(Br) 15,12); and prayat-
naklilyii, (VS(C) 28,
18-19).
152 Prasastapada's explanation of how jfvana in 3.2.4 is an inferential
mark of the Self differs from Riimak!lI).tha's here that it is an effect of dhanna and adha-
nna and so implies a support of those qualities. PraSastapada gives instead the argument
that the Self must be inferred as the cause of such bodily phenomena as growth and the
healing of wounds and breaks, paralleling a builder and repairer of a house: dehasya
[variant nilllittiit] grhapatir iva (PrBha(Br)
15,13-14). That he intends this as an explanation ofjfvana in 3.2.4 is highly likely given
that the two arguments he gives before it definitely correlate with the two items in the
sutra-list beforejfvana and the two arguments he gives after it definitely correlate with the
two items in the sutra-list after jfvana (see Oetke 1988 300-301). It thus appears that there
were two different traditions of interpretation with regard to this element of the list.
Candrananda gives at the beginning of his commentary on this sutra a brief general
outline of what kind of arguments it contains, before turning to each of them in detail:
manogatis ca prayatnakliryatvlid litmano liligalll, jfvanalll adr-
... (VS(C) 28,15-16). When he comes to treat this argument in detail he
writes, manasii sa1Jzyoga iitmano 'drs!lipekso jfvanam, sarfravrddlzylidi tatkliryam api
jfvanalll, sarfral!z
jfT1)agrhavat (VS(C) 28,19-21): 'Life is the conjunction of Self and internal organ de-
pending on the Unseen. [Or] it is such [processes] as the growing old of the body, which
organ, for its part, is not conscious-directs it, like a chariot or other [vehicle],
with effort;153 [and] who co-ordinates the objects of all the
like [objects seen through] many windows,154 because we observe, as a result
of seeing a very sour-tasting fruit, such as a pomegranate, a modification of
the taste-faculty in the form of saliva, 155 must be assumed.
169.
is also an effect of the [Unseen]. The body, like an old house, is presided over by some-
one who possesses volition, because [the latter] is the cause of [the body's] growth and
the healing of [its] wounds and breaks.' I take lIlallasii salJlyoga litmano
jfvanalll to indicate an argument resembling Riimak!lI).tha's; and sarfravrddhyiidi tatkli-
ryam api jfvanam, sarfral.n
ttatvlit, jfT1)agrhavat to give the argument used by PraSastapada. Candrananda gives the
impression that the two arguments are in fact one, namely that life is an effect of
but that one can define life in two ways. His attempt to bri.JJg the two arguments together
is not convincing however, since it is not clear how the body's growth and healing depend
on being an effect of for their logical power. His own explanation that they imply
someone who possesses volition to preside over the body seems self-sufficient. It is to be
noted that PraSastapada feels no need to mention
Candrananda does not make clear how being an effect of by which I take him
to mean dhamza and adhanna, implies the existence of the Self. The implication of
Ramakat:ltha's that it must be their support is one option but not the only con-
ceivable one, and not stated explicitly by Candrananda. On definitions of jfvana see Preis-
endanz 1994238-239.
153 PraSastapada (see mana[zkar-
lIla1)ii pelakapreraka iva diirakalz PrBha(Br) 15,14.,.15) and Candrananda (see
indriyiintaral.n prati lIlanaso galllanal!z lIlanogatilz prayatnakliryli, abhimataprade1asalll-
bandhanimittatviit, pelakakriyiivat, sii hi diirakaprayatna!crtii (VS(C) 28,21-22)), both
appeal to the comparison of the internal organ's movement with that of a ball being
thrown by a young boy. The fact that Riimak!lI).tha does not do so, when combined with
the distinctiveness of his explanation also of jfvana and indriyiintaraviklira, suggests the
possibility that the source for his elucidation of the sutra-list is neither of those two
authors. On different interpretations of manogati see Preisendanz 1994263-267.
154 Or perhaps 'like [someone who co-ordinates objects seen through] many win-
dows'. is slightly awkward: it does not fit easily with the syntax of the
rest of the sentence. B's reading, is no better and can be explained as a
corruption of resulting from Kashmiri ioticisation. PraSastapada's corre-
sponding compound is unproblematic: see in the sec-
ond footnote after this.
155 The modification of the is described in the not just as
dantodaklitma, but as dantodakasalJlplavabhuta (see next note). Preisendanz (1994 274)
Prasastapada lays out the argument based on indriyiintaravikiira (the excita-
tion of a different sense-faculty) as follows:
rasiinusmrtikramelJa rasanavikriyiidarSaniid
vad ubhayadarSf kas cid eko [variant without eko] vijfiiiyate (prBha(Br) 15,
2b-16,2). 'Because we observe a modification of the taste-faculty immedi-
ately after seeing an object of the eye, through the mediation of remembering
the taste [of the object], we come to know that there is some single entity who
perceives both [taste-objects and visual objects], analogous to someone look-
ing out from inside several windows.' Candrananda, before giving his version
of the argument in full, informs us that instances of 'the modification of an-
other sense-faculty' are inferential marks of the Self because they arise owing
to memory. (See ... iitmano liligam ... indriyiintaravikiiriiIJ smrtiprabhavatviit
(VS(C) 28,15-16)). As well as this phenomenon of indriyiintaravikiira form-
ing one item among many in the under comment, it also
makes up one whole Nyiiyasiitra on its own (NS 3.1.12: indriyiintaravikiiriit).
Vatsyayana comments: kasya cid amlasya phalasya grhftatadrasasiihacarye
riipe gandhe vii kena cid indriyelJa grhyamiilJe rasanasyendriyiintarasya vi-
kiira!z rasagardliipravartito dantodakasamplavabhato grhyate.
tasyendriyacaitanye 'nupapattib, anyab smaratfti (NBha(NCG)
142,4-6). 'When some sour fruit's appearance or smell, whose co-occurrence
with its taste has been grasped [on a previous occasion], is perceived by a cer-
tain sense-faculty (i.e. that of sight or smell), [we sometimes] observe a modi-
fication of a different sense-faculty, namely taste, [this modification consist-
ing of] the flowing together [of the taste-faculty] with saliva, as a result of, on
remembering [the fruit's] taste, desiring that taste. This [modification of a dif-
ferent sense-faculty] would not be possible if it were the sense-faculties
[rather than the Self] that are conscious, [for] one thing does not remember
something seen [only] by another (i.e. the faculty of sight would not be able
explains' that dantodakasalJlplava does not just mean the flowing together of saliva, for
that would not be a modification of the taste-faculty, but just of the water in the mouth.
Rather it means, as explained by Uddyotakara, together [of the taste-faculty]
with saliva'; since the taste-faculty consists of water it too can flow. RiimakaI)tila, how-
ever, does not include the word salliplava in his compound; he seems to use vikiira to re-
fer to the product, not the action, of modification.
171
to remember the earlier taste of the fruit, which was experienced by the fac-
ulty oftaste).'
Oetke (1988)'distinguishes between two kinds of argument for the Self, those
that rely on the metaphysica1/logical principle that one entity cannot remem-
ber something experienced by another (or, as in the Nyaya argument above,
that one entity cannot synthesize cognitions had by another), and philosophy
of nature arguments in which the Self is argued for as the best possible hy-
pothesis to account for an empirical phenomenon. The first kind of argument
seeks to prove a Self that is also the subject of memory and cognition; but the
latter may not. Indeed the phenomena in this list, breathing in and out, the
movement of the eyelids, the movement of the man as and so on, have in
common that they are not (usually) consciously controlled, which leads Oetke
to propose, quite plausibly, that they may have been intended to prove an
iitman existing beyond our consciousness. If it were some conscious control-
ler of the body that were intended to be argued for, surely examples of more
consciously controlled processes, such as the movement of the limbs, could
have been put forward.
Prasastapada, Candrananda and Vatsyayana all take indriyiintaravikiira as re-
ferring to an argument in which memory of a previous taste of the object is
relevant. But Oetke (pp. 273-4) suggests the following alternative possibility.
The fact that the stimulation of the faculty of sight leads to the stimulation of
the taste-faculty suggests the existence of an entity that receives information
through one sense-faculty and transmits that information to another sense-
faculty. Such an entity does not necessarily play any role in memory. The
phenomenon of the taste-faculty being modified when an object is looked at
may by itself have formed the basis of the argument for an atman, without an
earlier taste-experience of the object having been part of the picture. And
even if it was, and the Self argued for is thus that which stores the earlier taste
experience and then later, on seeing the object again, stimulates the taste-
faculty, it follows only that such a Self carries out functions necessary for
memory, not that it is the subject of memory and experience.
The appeal to memory is the central part of the argument put forward by
Candrananda and Vatsyayana: they' employ the principle that one thing (in
this case a sense-faculty) does not remember something seen (not by them
172
but) by another, and the Self that is proved for them is the rememberer. The
way that neither Prasastapada nor RfunakaI.J.tha mention this principle, both
appealing rather to the example of one person looking out of more than one
window, indicates that their arguments belong more to a philosophy of nature
that advances the Self as the best explanation of the observed phenomenon in
question. Prasastapada's, however, contains a feature of the argument from
memory: he mentions memory of the taste of the object as one of the stages in
the process, between the present seeing and salivation. Oetke (p. 284) sug-
gests that this double-nature of his argument may be due to him reproducing
an old argument that did not originate with him. RfunakaJ;t!ha's argument
does not mention memory at all. It does, however, seek to prove an anusan-
dhatr, which is certainly not an entity beyond our consciousness, but the sub-
ject of synthesis, and hence of memory and cognition.
The fact that RainakaI.J.tha, when he writes sarvendriyiirthanusandhatii in this
sentence, appeals to the same notion-anusandhiina-as that on which the
Naiyayika argument in the previous section was based, illustrates that anu-
sandhiina can be used in two different kinds of argument for the Self. In one
it is used to illustrate how perceptions at different points of time are accessed
by a single entity, who must therefore exist continually over that timespan. In
the other it is used to illustrate how perceptions from different sense-faculties
can be accessed by a single entity, who must therefore exist over and above
the individual sense-faculties, which are themselves restricted to only one
type of object each. The perceptions through the different sense-faculties
must inevitably take place at slightly different times (because the Self cannot
simultaneously experience two different perceptions from two different
senses), but the argument would go through even if the perceptions were si-
multaneous. What is aimed to be proved is not necessarily an entity that en-
dures over time, but one that exists above and beyond the plural sense-
faculties. The example used of a person looking out of several windows does
not rely on the fact that the windows are looked through at different times,
but simply that more than one window (i.e. sense-faculty) is looked through.
*****
173
Having expanded on each of the items in the list (except memory) the Bud-
dhist now explains how the same consideration used to dispose of the
Naiyayika argument can dispose ofthese arguments.
tae ea vijfiiillam eva praviihiitmakaJ.Il sGl.llski'iriidivasata!l
kriyiillirvartakam ubhayaviidisiddham astfti kuto 'Ilyalz sidhya
l56
ti.
And just that cognition [that we advanced in our argument against the
Naiyayikas] is available [as the required controller of bodily functions and co-
ordinator of sense-data], [since it,] as a stream, all 'of the above-
mentioned purposeful actions through latent traces etc.,157 and is established
for both disputants.
158
So how is anything beyond that
l59
established?
What was said about desire in the earlier argument with Nyaya is here said
about bodily functions such as breathing, eyelid-control, salivation on seeing
certain foods etc.: all that is required to account for them is cOgnition.
160
What
these arguments claimed to require is some controller of bodily
processes preraka), that has volition (prayatna), and that is able
to carry out anusandhana. The Buddhist has shown against the Naiyayika
how cognition, aided by traces, can do the latter, and similar considerations
could show how it, rather than some standing outside the stream of
cognition, is capable of bringing about the bodily processes in question here.
These philosophy of nature arguments, as Oetke terms them, indicate, any-
way, the existence not so much of an eternally extended Self, but of an intel-
156 kuto 'Ilyalz sidhya
O
P, Ked, Ped; not readable in the photocopy I have of B. It has
been inadvertently covered up by a scrap of paper on which is written 'dravyagw:zakanlla-
samavii ... ' (breaks off there).
157 The iidi could be referring to effort (prayat/la).
158 For a defence of the translation of this sentence, see note 34.
159 Such as a Self.
160 This is precisely the response to these V arguments of the author, said by
Chinese tradition to be NagiiIjuna, of the Mahi'iprajiiiipiiramitasiistra. An opponent puts
forward 3.2.4, to which the response is (quoted at Kapstein 1989 52),
'Mais tous ces caracteres sont des caracteres de la connaissance (vijfiiillaiakfa{la)! C'est
parce qu'il y a connaissance, qu'il y a respiration, regard droit ou oblique, vie, etc. Et
quand la connaissance quite Ie corps tout cela disparait.' 'Regard droit ou oblique' is not a
good translation of the could either have occurred in the transla-
tion from Sanskrit to Chinese, or Chinese to French.
174
ligent entity within the body that is not found in insentient matter.
161
Hence
the Buddhist here simply puts forward cognition to fulfill that role without
providing further argumentation. 162
3.2. The Argument from Qualities to Quality-Possessor
yad apfcchiidfnlim raslidivad gw.zatve saty aylivad-
dravyabhiivitvlic plirisenlid litmano
l64
glll.zino 'nllmlinam,165 tad api p. 11 ]ntlisiddher vyliptyabhlivlid anai-
kiintikam.
166
And as for the inference of the Self, [as] a possessor of qualities, [namely] -
desire and the like are invisible [but] perceptible, like taste, [sound, touch and
smell], therefore they are qualities; [but] while being [qualities], they cannot
be specific qualities of the body or the [sense-organs] because they do not last
as long as [those] substances. Therefore, because there is no alternative, [we
infer a further entity, a Self, as the substrate of these qualities] -
that too is inconclusive because of a lack of pervasion, because the example is
not proved.
161 See Oetke 1988 285-286.
162 One wonders whether these arguments arose in the context not of debate with
Buddhists, but of debate with Ciirvakas, although see the early Buddhist sources collected
by Preisendanz (1994 263-265) that report and respond to this argument.
163 Ped; B, P, Ked.
164 litmano P, Ked, Ped; litmal.zo B.
165 See the parallel in MatV VP (where he attributes the argument to Naiyayikas, not
nanll jiilinasyotpattimattve sati raslidivad
aylivaddravyabhlivitvena ca avaSyal[l glll.zinli bhavi-
tavyam [bhavitavyal1l ii, r, f; bhavitavyal1l ity ed.]. yatra [yatra ii, r; atra ed.] ca glll.zatayli-
vasthitalJl tat, sa tat, sa ii, r, f; gw.zitaylivasthitas tatra ed.] litmeti
naiyliyikii!l (153,5-7).
166 See the parallel passage in KV ad 2.25ab, p. 53: nanu jnlinal[l tlivad asmadiidi-
pratya0;atve saty raslidivad gw.zena ca dravylisritena
bhavitavyal1l iti. yas tasylisraya!l sa ajnlinariipa evlitmli sidhyati ... so
'py aYllkta!1 prati slidhyadhannlisiddhatvlit.
175
I) The first stage of this that if something is invisible to the eye, but
. nevertheless perceptible by soine other means, it must be a quality, is also put
by Uddyotakara,167 Jayanta
168
and Candrananda.
169
This arguD;lent is not
elaborated in any detail by these authors nor by RamakaI).!TIa, but clearly one
can discern in it the implication that none.of the things grouped under any of
the other V categories beside that of qualities are both invisible to the
eye and perceptible by some other means. How is that borne out by classical
V as expounded in the
All of the substances are either perceptible through sight, for example earth
(Prthivl) , or imperceptible, for example the mental organ (manas).170 Move-
ments are perceptible by sight and touch because they inhere in perceptible
substances.
171
Universals are perceptible through the sense faculty that per-
167 NVa(NCG) ad 3.2.18: anityatve sati rasavat sid-
dho gw.zabhiivalz. 'The fact that something is a quality is established from the fact that,
like taste, it is, while not being eternal, necessarily both invisible and perceptible.'
168 NM(M) Vol. 2, 278,14--15: cecchiidfnlil1l
raslidivad darsitam licliryailz. 'The Master has shown that desire and the like must be
qualities, for such reasons as that they are perceptible, but not through the visual-faculty,
like taste and the other [qualities].' It is interesting that Uddyotakara adds the qualifica-
tion, 'while not being eternal', and Jayanta does not. The reason must be that Uddyotakara
holds the Self to be perceptible while Jayanta does not. Thus if Uddyotakara had not in-
cluded that qualification, it would follow from his argument that the Self, since it is in-
visible but perceptible, is a quality.
169 When commenting on 2.2.28, acli0;lIsatvlit na kanna, he writes:
dravyal[l karma vli yad tac api ayalJl tll
sabda!l, 'pi san, na eValn $thito 'Whatever substance or
movement that is perceptible to other sense-faculties is also found to be visible. But as for
sound, although it is perceptible to the faculty of hearing, it is not visible. Thus it exists as
a qUality.'
170 Three of them are perceptible through touch, but those three are also visible.
171
(PrBha(Br) 44,
15-45,1).
176
ceives the substrate in which they inhere. 172 Particulars are perceptible only to
YoginS.173 Inherence is imperceptible. 174
Excursus on ACiik.Ju.Japratyak.Jatva in V
The compound occurs in the
but what is puzzling is that it is there given as an example of a false hetu.
Prasastapada is at that point of the text dealing with statements containing in-
ferential marks (liligavacana) that are false proofs (anapadda). He divides
such statements into four: those which are unestablished (asiddha), contradic-
tory (viruddha), doubtful (sandigdha) and unsure (anadhyavasita). The dif-
ference between the last of these two is that doubtful inferential marks occur
both in the and the whereas unsure ones occur in neither.
is mentioned by Prasastapada as an example of the
last. He writes: nanv ayam asiidhiiral}a
salJlhatayor tatas ciinadhyavasita
iti (prBha(Br) 52,1-3). 'Actually (nanu) this is in fact (eva) un-
172 upalabhyiidhiirasamavetiiniim iisraya-
griihakair indriyair gralzar.zam ity etad asmadiidfniil.n pratyalqam (prBha(Br) 45,3-4).
173 Presumably that is why the version of the argument reported in note 166 includes
the qualification asmadiidipratyalqatve.
yoginiil.n mllktiitma-
manallsll ciinyanimittiisamblzaviid yebhyo nimittebhyall pratyiidhiiralJl vilalqar.zo 'yalJl
vilalqar.zo 'yam iti pratyayavyiivrtti[z, ca paramiir.zall sa eviiyam iti
pratyabhijiiiinalJl ca blzavati, te 'ntyii (prBha(Br) 84,7-12).
174 ata eviitfndriya[z, sattiidfniim iva vrttyablziiviit sviitmagatasalJlvedanii-
bhiiviic ca. tasmiid iha buddhyanllmeyall samaviiya iti (PrBha(Br) 88,8-10). In fact this
seems only to apply to people like us, for elsewhere PraSastapada includes Inherence in a
list of things perceivable by Yogins: tll yoginiilJl YllktiiniilJl yogaja
dlzanniinugrhftena manasii sviitmiintariikiisadikkiilaparamiir.zllviiYllmana[isli tatsanlllveta-
samaviiye ciivitathal!l svarapadarsanam utpadyate (prBha
(Br) 45,5-9).
175 The reading of some editions is See PrBha(Br) 52,2 and
the variants given in the footnote.
177
common, because like invisibility and perceptibility, the two [parts of the rea-
son] taken together are not possible in either of the (Le. in either the
or the and therefore we term it unsure.' What the ayam re-
fers to need not concern us here. What is quite clear from this sentence is that
for Prasastapada the logical reason is an invalid rea-
son, occurring neither in the nor Prasastapada does not say
what siidhya this reason would be used to prove, but SrIdhara implies that it is
gUl}atva
176
and Vyomasiva identifies it as gUl}avyavahiira (which Nen-
ninger
177
translates as 'daB es sich urn Eigenschaft handelt').178
Nenninger suggests that this sentence in the became
corrupted before the time of SrIdhara and Vyomasiva's commentaries, argu-
ing that it would make more sense if we read in place
of Thus we are left with the possibility that
as an argument for the fact that something is a quality
may have arisen in only through corruption; and with the puzzle
that it seems to have been regarded by authors as an invalid reason.
On the first of these two points it should be said that even if Nenningeris cor-
176 yathii pratyekalJl 'pi samuditayor
(NK 585,1-2). 'Even though invisibility and percepti-
bility taken individually deviate from the qualities, taken together they do not occur any-
where apart from the qualities.' The point there is that though there are non-qualities that
are invisible (e.g. the manas) and non-qualities that are perceptible (e.g. earth), there are
none that are both invisible and perceptible.
177 Nenninger 1992 100.
178 yathii hi gllr.zavyavahiire siidhye [siidhye
conj. Nenninger; siidhya ed.] siimiinyavattviid (pratyalqe conj. Nenninger; dra-
vyatve ed.) sati hetur na sapalqe n7piidiivasti, niipi vipalqe gha!ii-
diiv ity aSiidhiirar.zall (VyV Vol. 2, 198,15-17). 'Because the qualities other than colour
and the imperceptible ones have a universal, it is to be proved whether it is appropriate to
call them qualities. The logical reason for this siidh;ya-being invisible with the restriction
that they are perceptible-does not exist in the sapalqa, for example in colour, and neither
in the for example in pots, so it is uncommon.' Dr. Ferenc Ruzsa, of the Univer-
sity of Budapest, informed me that the sole manuscript of this text (not its transcript on
which both editions were based) reads-ilt the part where Nenninger felt compelled to
conjecture alternative readings-siidhyasiimiinyavattviidravyatve [210 r 1-2].
179 NenningerJ992 100.
178
The Self's Awareness ofItse1f
rect in his suggestion that the reading is a corrup-
tion, we are not justified in deducing from that that the argument
from to something being a quality arose through
this corruption. For the argument could have occurred already in other
V texts before the became corrupt. Indeed if
such were the case then the substitution of this word for the original reading
could be explained through it being known to the substitutor.
On the second point, I propose the following as a possible solution. Although
both SrIdhara and Vyomasiva state to be an inva-
lid reason for something being a quality, the validity of an argument depends
(at least according to Prasastapada's trairilpya theory) not only on Izetu and
siidhya but also on the For SrIdhara the is all qualities. Thus
there is no therefore the argument is invalid on the grounds that the
reason does not occur in the For Vyomasiva the is only those
qualities which are both invisible and perceptible. Thus nowhere in the
comprises colour and imperceptible qualities such as heavi-
ness-does the reason occur; hence the argument is invalid. But Jayanta's ar-
gument and that of RamakaI).!ha's have as their desire, aver-
sion, pleasure, pain and the other mental qualities; and Uddyotakara's has as
its cognition (buddlzi). Since in those cases taste, sound, smell and tan-
gibility fall within the the reason occurs in the and so the
arguments would be valid. The is the case for Candrananda's argument,
for which the is sound; hence taste, smell and tangibility fall within the
It seems quite possible that SrIdhara and Vyomasiva were aware of
this valid application of the argument, but, since they were commenting on a
text that appeared to give it as an example of an invalid argument, construed
it in that particular context as applying to that would render it invalid.
*****
II) Turning now to the second stage of the NPP argument: why does it follow
from desire and the like not lasting as long as the body etc., that they cannot
be qualities of the body etc.? Early examples of this argument are the
and the Nyiiyasiltra. In the former ayiivaddravyabhavi-
179
tviit occurs as one reason out of four for the contention that pleasure etc. are
not qUalities of the body or sense-facuIties.
180
Whereas it states that [pleasure
and the like] do not last as long as those substances (i.e. body and sense-
facuIties), the Nyiiyasiltra states that colour and the like do last as long as the
body [in which they inhere].l8l Thus it can be seen that the argument that
these two texts and NPP put forward rests on the contrast between those
qualities which are generally accepted to be qualities of the body (colour and
the like) and the mental phenomena in questio,n, in that the former last long
as the body, but the latter do not. This contrast is deemed sufficient to rule out
the possibility that the mental phenomena are qualities of the body.
We will examine the argument in more detail by looking at its occurrence in
the two above mentioned early sources. It is easy to understand the contention
that the colour of a body lasts as long as the body itself: right up to the time
that any material object ceases to exist it will have a colour.
182
But how about
180 ea gw:zair gU(zy anumfyate. te ea na sarfrendri-
yagw:zli[z [variant: ete na ea kasmlit? alzankiire(zaikavlikyatli-
bhiivlit [variants: alzanklire(zaikyavlikyatliblzlivlit; alzaliklirqzaikavlikyatvabhiivlit] prade-
savrttitvlid aylivaddravyabhiivitvlid [variant: ylivaddravyabhiivitvlit] biilzyendriylipratya-
lqatvlie ea [variants: ea; (prBha
(Br) 16,3-6). 'And from the qualities pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort, a posses-
sor of those qualities can be inferred. And these are not qualities of the body or the sense-
organs. Why? Because of the fact that the [words for them] can make a single sentence
with [the word for] our sense of self [in such cases as alzalJl dll[zklzf, I am ill pain]; because
they occur in a [single] part [of the body]; because they do not last as long as [the body
and sense-organs]; and because they are not perceived by the external sense-organs.'
PraSastapada is there explaining the second half of VS 3.2.4: ... suklzadulzklze
prayatnas eety litmaZiliglini (the reading ofVS(C).
181 NS 3.2.47: ylivaeclzarfrablzlivitvlid riiplidfnlim.
182 In fact not all of the qualities recognized by PraSastapada as of inhering in
the body last as long as it. Its colour, taste, smell and touch (all of which are
last as long as it, but many of its common qualities (slimlinyagll(zas), for example number
(saliklzyli), connection (sa/!zyoga), disjunction (vibhiiga), dispositions (sa1Jzsklira) do not.
This draws attention to the fact that in the NPP version of this argument, the conclusion is
not that the mental phenomena are not qulflities of the body, but more narrow-that they
are not specific qualities of the body. For the inference of the Self to follow it must be es-
tablished that the mental phenomena cannot be any kind of quality of the body. But all
180
the claim that pleasure, desire and the like do not last as long as the body?
Both Nyaya and V hold individual instances of cognition, pleasure,
pain and the like to last only for a moment, so perhaps the contrast is between
their momentariness and the body's longer perdurance. Oetke (1988 295-
296) has pointed out that, in fact, that is very unlikely to be the contrast that
underlies this argument, at least in the Nyayasiitra, given the evidence of the
following two siitras. The next siitra objects by introducing the example of
the change in colour of a clay pot, as it cooks, from brown to red.
I83
If the
brown colour inhering in a pot's earth atoms can cease despite the earth at-
oms continuing, why can it be ruled out that cognition, pleasure etc. inhere in
a body just because they cease despite the body continuing? The response to
this objection in the next siitra involves showing how the example of the
earth atoms and their changin,g colour differs from the case of the body and
cognition.
I84
In the example, the old brown colour is replaced by a new colour
that is incompatible with it (in the sense that they cannot both exist at the
same time in the same earth atoms). The implication is that cognition, by con-
trast, is not replaced by new cognition that is incompatible with the previous.
But if it were particular, momentary instances of cognition that were being
borne in mind, there would be no contrast between the body and them, on the
one hand, and the earth atoms and their changing colour, on the other. For in-
that seems justifiably to follow from aylivaddravyabhavitva is that they are not specific
qualities of the body. This suggests the possibility that this argument goes back to a time
when the body/earth was considered to have only four qualities: smell, taste, colour and
touch. By the time of Vatsyayana and PraSastapada more qualities of the body/earth had
been added, but Frauwallner reconstructs the history of as containing a stage
when it had only those four. If the argument originated in that period then it would have
successfully differentiated all bodily qualities from the mental phenomena in question. If
later, then it must always have been accompanied by supplementary arguments to differ-
entiate those qualities that can inhere in the body but that do not last as long as it from the
mental phenomena in question. Such arguments are used to respond to opponents of the
aylivaddravyabhavitva argument in Nyaya texts that post-date the Nyliyasiltras and
texts that post-date the (See for example Vatsyayana ad
NS 3.2.47 (NBha(NCG) 203,13-204,5) and NM(M) Vol. 2, 289,5-ti.)
183 NBha(NCG) 3.2.48: na,
184 NBha(NCG) 3.2.49: pratidvandvisiddhelz plikajlinlilll [variant: plikajlitlinlilll] apra-

181
dividual momentary instances of cognition do give way to new, incompatible
instances.
I85
Thus it is clear that what is being envisaged by these siitras is a
phase of the body's existence when it has no cognition or other mental phe-
nomena at all, i.e. after death. The opponent's example of earth atoms chang-
ing their colour shows nothing because those earth atoms at least have some
colour (inhering in them) throughout their whole existence. But dead bodies
exist without any of the mental phenomena whatsoever. Therefore although
the mental phenomena manifest in the body during life they cannot be intrin-
sic to it, cannot inhere in it.
The NyayasiUra argument, therefore, seems to be based on the consideration
that at death cognition and the other mental phenomena cease, whereas the
body continues (for a while). But if we assume that this is also what
Prasastapada had in mind when he wrote ayavaddravyabhavitvat, then we are
forced to interpret him as stating the same argument twice. For, as Oetke
points out, two paragraphs earlier he wrote, 'cognitiOli does not [belong to]
the body, because [the body], like a pot, is a product of material elements (i.e.
earth atoms), and because [cognition] does not occur in dead bodies.'186 Al-
though the overall context, spanning both places, is the proof of the existence
of the Self, the ayavaddravyablzavitvat argument occurs in the more particu-
lar context of establishing that pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort can-
not be qualities of the body or sense-faculties; and the just quoted sentence
occurs in the context of establishing that cognition cannot belong to, or be an
effect of, the body. Perhaps the slight differences between these contexts al-
low for the possibility that Prasastapada would have introduced the same ar-
gument twice. If not, then we could interpret Prasastapada's ayavaddravya-
bhavitvat argument as based on the fact that an individual instance of pleas-
185 Just over twenty siltras ago it has been stated that individual cognitions are de-
stroyed by immediately following cognitions, just like in the case of sound: anityatvagra-
[variant: grahad] buddher buddhyantarlid vinlisa!z [variant: hi nlisa!z] sabdavat
(NBha(NCG) 3.2.24). According to Nyaya and sound travels across space in
rows of sound-moments, each one being destroyed by the subsequent and spatially neigh-
bouring one, except for the last one in a row.
186 PrBha(Br) 15,3-4: na sarfrasya gha!lidivad bhiltakliryatvlin [variant:
bhiltatvlit kliryatvlic ca] IIlrte clisambhavlit.
182
ure etc. does not last as long as the body. The onus would then be on Prasas-
tapada to show how that differs from a particular colour of an earth atom not
lasting as long as an earth atom, but he may have been capable of distinguish-
ing the two. 187
*****
Regarding the philosophical worth of these arguments, are they viciously cir-
cular, devoid of argumentative power as a result of assuming what they aim
to prove? To claim that bodily qualities all last as long as the body is to as-
187 SrIdhara points out that the fact that pleasure and the like do not last as long as the
sense-faculties cannot be used to exclude them from inhering in the sense-faculties, be-
cause sound inheres in the faculty of hearing but does not last as long as it. (NK 206,2-4:
ito 'pi na sarfrendriyagw:za[z sukhadayo bhavanti, ayavaddravyabhavitvat, vyatirekelJa
nlpadaya eva nidarsanam. tu naywJl hetu[z, srotragulJena sabde-.
nanaikiintikatviit.) Whether PraSastapada intended the word ayavaddravyabhavitviit to
denote an argument for the exclusion of the sense-faculties as well as the body is not cer-
tain. It is true that it follows the proposition te ca na sarfrendriyagulJa[z, but it is only one
out of four reasons for that, and he could have regarded the sense-faculties as excluded by
others of the four, not this one. The NyayasUtras, the commentaries thereon, and the
Nyayamafijarf use the argument only to exclude the body as a possible substrate of the
mental qualities. NPP uses it to exclude also the sense-faculties, in so far as there is no
other plausible referent of the adi in the compound sarfradi.
The NyayasUtra interpretation of the argument requires a view of the body as some-
thing that continues to exist, numerically identical, throughout life and beyond death up to
the time of its decomposition or burning, despite the changes in its appearance. Oetke
(1988 296, note 39) identifies this as the 'old view' of Nyaya and It was cer-
tainly not the standard view in later Nyaya. See for example the remarks of Vacaspati
Misra and Jayanta given on page 144. Jayanta's view, mentioned there, that the body
arises and is destroyed in almost every instant is clearly very different from the 'old Nya-
view' and is not really compatible with either interpretation of the ayavad-
dravyabhiivitviit argument. While Oetke may be right that the notion of the body as re-
maining always the same thing despite undergoing changes is older than the view of a
plurality of bodies belonging to one and the same person, the former does not disappear
completely when the latter has become orthodoxy. Jayanta, for example, immediately af-
ter arguing for the latter, gives the ayavaddravyabhiivitviit argument, thus presupposing
the notion of a more enduring body than he has just argued for. It seems that he allowed
himself some flexibility on the nature of the body in accordance with whatever was de-
manded by the particular argument he is employing.
183
sume that pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort and cognition not bodily
qualities, precisely what is in question. And to claim that anything which is
perceived, but not by the visual organ, must be a quality, is to presuppose the
whole framework of the categories and the lists of individual en-
tries that come under those categories. Nevertheless, one can state the
ayiivaddravyabhavitviit argument in a way that stresses empirical principles
more than prior commitment to a classificatory scheme.
One could point out that in the case of the smell, taste, touch and colour asso-
ciated with a particular body, no one claims them to inhere in anything other
than the body. But in the case of the pleasure etc. that manifest in a particular
body, there is disagreement over whether they actually inhere in the body or
not. One way to decide the problem is to look at what characterizes those
qualities that uncontroversially inhere in the body. One thing that char-
acterizes such qualities is that they stay with the body until it ceases.
Alternatively one could argue that in deciding that smell, taste, touch and
colour inhere in the body, one at that stage, knowingly or unknowingly, took
the fact that they last as long as the body as important evidence.
*****
The NPP argument could be divided into three stages, the conclusions of each
stage being: 1) desire and the like are qUalities; 2) they cannot be specific
qualities of the body or sense-faculties; 3) they must be qualities of the
Self. 188 There are thus different ways that it could be rejected. One frequently
attested view is acceptance of the first stage that they are qualities requiring
some support, coupled with the assertion that their support is the body. In this
vein the Carvakas claimed that desire and other cognitions arise from the
body, or are a power of it, in the same way that the power of intoxication
arises in material elements when certain of them are combined in particular
proportions. In response to the argument that if cognition isa
power of the body it should be present in the dead body also, they maintain
that it is not innate to the elements of the body, but emerges there owing to
188 For more on the logical structure' of this argument (as presented in Nyaya and
sources), see Chakrabarti 1982 and Kano 2001.
184
specific configurations and transformations of the bodily elements, as the in-
toxicating power of an alcoholic drink was not present before fermentation.
When these specific and transformations are abandoned at
death the power of cognition ceases. Their motivation in grounding cognition
in the body was to underpin their view of the impossibility of life after death.
. Buddhists and were united against them in that regard.
What divided Buddhists and on this question was the manner in
which they explained the possibility of the continuation of cognition after the
body with which it is currently associated ceases. Cognition is not restricted
to one particular body, for the V because it inheres not in the body
but in the immaterial, eternal and all-pervasive Self; and for the Buddhists,
because it does not need to inhere in anything at all.
189
Thus, returning to
NPP, it is the very first stage of the three listed above (that desire and cogni-
tion etc. are qualities at all) that the Buddhist opposes, by clai;ming that the
example used to establish it, that of taste and the like, is unproved. The first
stage proceeded through showing that desire and the like must fall within the
same ontological category as taste and the like. The upshot of the Buddhist
objection is that even if they do, that does not entail that they are qualities,
for, as the Buddhist is about to state, he does not accept that even taste and
the like are qualities.
na hi rasiidfnii/Jl gu!wtvam asmiika/!1190 siifzkhyiiniim api vii prasiddham,
n7parasiidisamudiiyavyatireke(liinyasya kasya cid iimraphaliider dharmi(lo
'nupala1.llbhiit.191
For it is not proved that taste and the like are qualities, for us or for the
SiiIikhyas either. For we do not perceive any separate property-possessor,
189 and Ciirviikas thus stood together against Buddhists in that they both
denied that cognition could exist without a support. See Chapter 4 of Franco 1997.
190 Interlinear gloss above asmiika'll in B: iitmasilnyaviidinii; in P: iitmasilnyaviidi-
nii/.n.
191 See KV ad 2.25ab, lines 4-8: nanu jiiiinasya rasiider iva gUl:zatve hetur ukta eva.
so 'py ayukta[l prati siidhyadhanniisiddhatviit. rasiidayo hi bhiivii[l SalJl-
hatii eva jiiyamiinii[z sa'l:l1wtii eva nirllddhiis ca, siifzkhyasaugatiidibhir iviismiibhir api
pramii!wsiddhatviid arthakriyiikara(lii[l kathyante, na tv anya[l kas cit iisrayabhiltas
tadvyatireke(la tasyiinupalambhaniid iti. See also MatV VP 153,8-11.
such as Jl mango fruit, over and above the conglomeJ;ation of colour, taste and
the rest.
185
As well as this being a Buddhist and a Sfuikhya view it is also Ramaka:Q.tha's
own (as can be seen not only from his silent agreement here, but also from
other of his texts), perhaps part of Saiva Siddhanta's inheritance from San-
khya, or perhaps a result of the close connection between Buddhism and
Saivism in Kashmir. It continues to be put forward in later South Indian Saiva
Siddhanta after other core Saiddhantika doctrines have disappeared under the
influence of Vedanta and devotionalism.
192
It is well-known that the denial of any substrate or property-possessor over
and above conglomerations of qualities is a Buddhist view. In the Abhi-
for example, Vasubandhu advances this position in a
context very similar to the present discussion. In response to an opponenfs
claim that the Self is required as the support (iiSraya) of consciousness (citta)
and traces (sa1'(lskiira), he questions what kind of notion of 'support'could
hold between the Self, and consciousness and traces. He first voices and dis-
misses the possibility that these two could be supported by the Self in the way
that a mural is supported by a wall, or some fruits by a bowl. Next he brings
up and answers the possibility that the Self could support them in the way
that earth supports its qualities such as smell: yathii gandhiidfniil!1- prthivfti
cet, smafz. idam eva hi nafz pratyiiyakaJ!1- niisty iitmeti, yathii na
gandhiidibhyo 'nyii prthivfti. ko hi sa
193
gandhiidibhyo 'nyiil!1- prthivfl!1- nir-
192 Sastri (1934) mentions that the view of substance as a substrate or possessor of
qualities is denied by the Tamil commentator on the Sivajiiiinabodha, Sivajfiiinayogin,
and by Umapati Sivacarya on p. 455-460 of the As to whether this was
the same Umapati as the 14th century author of several Tamil works, or the author of the
Kuiicitiifzghristava and the Sataratnasafzgraha see Goodall 1998 xliv, note 99 and
Goodall 2000 211, note 20.
193 AKBh(P) reads ko hi sa, AKBh(BBS) ko hi satpllriso, and Yaomitra's com-
mentary ko hi Sanderson, noting that there is no evidence of in de
la Vallee Poussin's translation of Xuanzang's translation of the text, tentatively suggested
that it entered the text between the time of Xuanzang and Yasomitra, and hence conjec-
tured here just ko hi. Schmithausen into this matter further, giving me the follow-
ing information. Xuanzang's Chinese indeed has no equivalent for or sa.
Paramartha's (meaning 'for what person') is difficult to judge, reflecting possibly just ko
186
dhiirayati? (AKBh(BBS) 1225,2-4), 'If [he replies] that [the Self is the sup-
port of impressions and consciousness] in the way that earth [is the support]
of odour [, taste, form] and [tactility]), [then] we are delighted beyond meas-
ure. For this is exactly what proves to us that the Self does not exist, namely
the analogous non-existence of earth over and above the odour and other [en-
tities which they take to be its qualities]. For who is there that perceives earth
as something discrete over and above [a certain combination of] odours and
the like?,194 For and KamalasIla's refutation of the view that de-
sire and the like require a support, see Hulin 1978 100-101.
But that it is a Sankhya view is less well-known. Wezler drew attenti01l. to it
in 1985. He argued that both Mallavadin and his commentator Sirphasilri re-
garded the phrase gw.zasandriivo dravyam, found in the as rep-
resenting a Sankhya doctrine (Wezler 1985 3-9); and that both Kaiyata and
Nagesa regarded the phrase gw.zasamudiiyo dravyam at another part of the
as a Sankhya definition (p. 11). Nagesa, he reports (p. 14), took
this to imply that there is no difference between the samilha (= dravya) and
the samilhin (= gUlJa). Wezler also quotes the following passage from
Kaiyata's commentary on the gUlJiib, tat-
parbJiimarilpiis ca tadiitmakii eva sabdiidayafz palica gw.ziib. tatsmighiitaril-
pa1Jl ca ghatiidi, na tu tadvyatiriktam avayavi dravyam astfti siitikhyiiniil.n sid-
dhiintab-which attributes to Sankhya the view that pots and the like are sim-
ply conglomerations of qualities, not some independently existing substance.
Bronkhorst produced a further study focussed on this Sankhya doctrine in
1994.
195
To the passages adduced by Wezler, he added the following.
hi or possibly ko hi The Tibetan has no equivalent for but does re-
flect the sa (with de). The Tibetan translation of Y!iSomitra's commentary confirms ko hi
Schmithausen concludes there is an old corruption for sa
where sa is a pratfka and a gloss. The AbhidlzamzakosabhiifJa manuscript
clearly supports sa. Schmithausen therefore wonders if kalz sa + verb is used like ko 'yam
+ verb, where the person asked for is not somebody present but remote (or not found).
194 I am there following the translation given at Sanderson 1995a 29.
195 I e-mailed Prof. Bronkhorst several questions about his article, and he kindly re-
plied by' addressing my queries directly and by sending me two more draft documents that
187
Bha.rq.-hari's commentary on the attributes to Saru,rnya the view
that a pot is a collection of colours and so on (rilpiidisamaviiyo ghatafz). The
Viikyapadfya, in the context of describing a Sankhya view, qualifies the word
sabdiidfniim (sound and the like) with sarvamilrtyiitmabhiitiiniim ('which
constitute all corporeal objects'). PUI).yaraja, commenting on a different part
of the Viikyapadfya writes, ghatasabdab ... siitikhyair gUl.zasamiihiiramiitram
abhimanyate. And Dharmapala, commenting on Catufzataka 301, writes (in
the translation of Tillemans): '[The Sankhya philosopher] Kapila asserts [the
following]: Things such as vases and cloths are established simply as [visual]
forms (the word thus translated is the Chinese equivalent of rilpa) ... and
other such [properties]' (Bronkhorst 1994309-310).
Despite all these references in the texts of other schools, neither Wezler nor
Bronkhorst were able to find a statement of this view in a surviving Sankhya
source.
196
It is a measure of how much that was central to this tradition is lost;
and how arbitrary is what survives.
It seems quite safe to assume that the denial of a substance over and above
conglomerates of colour, taste etc. that RamakaI).tha attributes to the Sfui-
khyas is the same view that is referred to by such phrases as rilpiidisamaviiyo
ghatab or gUl.zasamudiiyo dravyam. There is some evidence though that. the
Sankhya view, though opposed to the model of a separately exist-
ing substrate in which qualities inhere, was still quite a way away from the
Buddhist reductionist elimination of substance altogether. For Wezler argues
(1985 18) that the following passage in the outlines the Sankhya
view: athavii yasya api priidurbhavatsu tattva1Jl na vihanyate tad
dravyam. kim punas tattvam. tadbhiivas tattvam. tadyathii, iimalakiidfniilJl
phaliiniilJl raktiidayab pftiidayas ca priidurbhavanty iimalakm.n bada-
ram ity eva bhavati (II 200,23-25). According to this, substance is that which
he has written since, 'The qualities of SiiIikhya: some supplementary observations' and
'On the nature of Pradlziina'.
196 Dr. Ruzsa, however, sent me, among others, the following references. SK 12:
anyonyiisrayiilz gll!ziilz; Jayalllaligalii ad ,loc.: niisrayiintaram Siilikhyasatra 6.39:
sattviidfniim ataddlzamzatvaliz, tadriipatviit (tat = pradlziina). YD ad SK 16c (p. 163) na Izi
vo dlzal7lzebhyo 'nyo dlzannf(vo = Siilizklzyiiniim).
188
The Self' s Awareness ofItself '
does not cease despite different qualities manifesting, just as a fruit remains
the same ;fruit despite changing colour as it ripens. It thus seems that.despite
opposing the V model, this Sfuikhya view did hold there to be some
difference between substance (the conglomerate) and qualities (the constitu-
ents).
Wezler concentrates on identifying areas of doctrinal resonance between this
view of substance as a conglomerate of qualities and the Sfuikhya of the
Yuktidfpika that is more familiar to us. Bronkhorst, on the other hand, finds it
hard to reconcile the two. He points out that, according to the Yuktidfpika,
material objects consist not of qualities but of the five elements,: earth, water,
fire, wind and ether. Each of these possesses qualities: ether has sound, wind
has sound and touch, fire has sound, touch and colour etc. Not only do the
five elements have qualities, but so do the tanmiitras out of which the ele-
ments evolve. He shows (1994 313-314) that the attempt to interpret Malla-
vadin through superimposing on to him this classical model of Sfuikhya as
opposed to the model of a world constituted of qualities has led both
Mallavadin's commentator Si:rphasfiri and Wezler to misinterpret him. This
leads him to claim that Si:rphasfiri, unlike Mallavadin, was aware of the ideas
of classical Sfuikhya just outlined; and that 'a major change took place in
Sfuikhya doctrine, perhaps some time in the 5th century of our era.' Before
this change material objects were looked upon as collections of qualities, af-
terwards not.
Assuming that to be the case, it is striking that an author as late as Ramaka-
J.l!ha refers to this as a Sfuikhya view centuries after it had been abandoned by
Sfuikhyas.
ata eviimrasya rasa iti bhedavyapadeia!! samudiiyaikadeiatva
197
khyiipaniiya
, vanasya dhava!! sobhana iti
198
vad upapadyata eva.
197 Goodall conjectures desa in place of desatva (see note 281 on page 252 of
Goodall 1998), perhaps prompted by the parallel in KV (see
tipiidaniiya in note 205). The transmitted reading seems to me to construe naturally how-
ever. Furthermore, when the Buddhist, in a few sentences, comes to extrapolate this re-
mark about expressions such as iimrasya rasa!! to expressions such as devadattasyecchii
he describes the latter as The fact that
That is precisely why the expression, 'the taste of the mango', [that exhibits in
its formulation] difference, serves [in fact] to designate [simply] 'that [the
taste] is a single part of a conglomerate, just like [the expression] 'the Dhava
tree
199
of the forest is beautiful'.
189
Everyday phrases such as 'the Dhava tree of the forest' are not intended by
the speaker, or understood by the hearer, to indicate that the forest exists
'separately from the individual trees in.it, but rather that the tree in question is
a part of the forest in question. Similarly, when we talk of the taste, smell etc.
of something, we are specifying not a quality of a substance, but a part of a
whole, the whole being no more than the conglomerate of the parts.
kasya tarlzryam icdlii? karma{lo griimiider eva. atha heto!z
kasyeti, ucyate yato 'nantaralll drsyate tasya jiiiinasya
purvatarajiiiinajasal!lskiiraparipiikiitmana!z.
What in that case is this desire of?200 [Buddhist:] Just the desired
object-a village
201
or the like. [Or] if [you mean], '[desire arises] from what
cause?,202 we reply: [it arises] from that particular cognition immediately after
which it is seen, whose nature is the maturation of a trace produced by an ear-
lier cognition.
The Buddhist rejected that taste is a quality inhering in a substance, which
was the example on which the V inference rested. He asserted instead
that in phrases where taste is used with a word in the genitive such as
he uses an abstract suffix in this corresponding compound, makes the conjecture hard to
defend.
198 sobhana iti Ked, B, P; soblzata iti Ped.
199 According to Meulenbeld the Dhava tree is Anogeissus Latifolia Wall (see Das
1988442).
200 The questioner means, 'to what does desire belong?', but the respondent exploits
an ambiguity in the use of the genitive, and takes it to be asking, 'what is the desire for?',
i.e. what is it directed to.
201 When one has a desire to go to that village.
202 These sentences do not translate easily into English, for 'who/what does desire be-
long to', 'what is desire of', and 'what is the cause of desire' are not phrases that overlap
in mealling in English. But the Sanskrit phrase kasyecclzii can mean all three of them,
which accounts for the course of the dialogue from kasya tarhfyam icdlii? to atha hetoh
kasyeti. The questioner intended the first but the Buddhist replies to the second
and then rephrases the question in the third meaning.
190
amrasya (of the mango), what is implied is that the taste is one part of the
conglomerate that we refer to by the word 'mango'. The V returns
here from the example; taste, to the proof-subject itself desire. What
kind of word goes in the genitive with the word 'desire', if not a substance in
which it inheres? The Buddhist gives two answers: the object desired and that
from which desire arises. But the kind of case that the is really con-
cerned with is, of course, that in which a word for the agent of the desire oc-
curs in the genitive. So next he forces the Buddhist to address this kind of
case.
katham tarhi devadattasyeeehetylidiko 'tra kart[1Vavyavaharo laukikalz? ku-
tarkadadanlibhYlisamiila upahata eva,203 vitastliylilz pravliha itivad Vli
204
vi-
yukta eva.
205
How in that case do we have everyday expressions of agency
with regard to [desire], such as 'Devadatta's desire'? [Buddhist:] Being rooted
in the inculcation of traditions that possess bad logic, [expressions like that
are] just wrong; or they are for the sake of indicating that [the desire] is con-
.. '06 lik [h . ] 'th
nected with a particular stream of cogmtIOn,- e suc expreSSIOns as e
flow of the Vitasta [river]', [in which case they are] appropriate.
If 'Devadatta's desire' is used to express that the desire belongs to something
other than itself, it is wrong. But if it is used to express that the desire is con-
nected with one particular stream of cognition, Devadatta's, as opposed to
another stream, it is acceptable. Being 'connected with a stream' should not
be taken to mean that at the time of the desire there is any other entity with
203 emma l;pahata eva em. Goodall; miilopahata eva Ked, Ped, B, P (See miilo
bhrlinta eva in note 205.)
204 itivad vli Ked, B, P; itivae eli Ped.
205 See KV ad 2.25ab, lines 8-10: kathalJl tarhi prthivylil.n gandha itylidivyavaharalz
kudarsanlibhylisalm7lo bhrlinta eva. yadi vli vana-
sya dhavalz sobhana itivad yukta eveti. Note that in this parallel section in KV (the beg-
inning of which is given in note 191 and the continuation here) asmlibhi[! (in note 191)
refers to Saivas, whereas the corresponding asmlikam in this text refers to Buddhists. It is
Ramaka:t;ttha himself who is arguing against the V there, not a Buddhist, despite
the close mirroring of wording. See also MatV VP 153,12-13.
206 Goodall quotes this sentence and translates it in a footnote to the parallel passage
in KV. He interprets differently as 'stream of particular cognitions'
(p. 253, note 285).
191
which it is connected. Rather the point is that it is connected previous
cognitions and subsequent cognitions. These are linked to it because they
form a chain, each one causing the next. Even Buddhists who believe only in
these chains of mental events and not in any substrate beyond them still need
of course to specify, when they talk of an individual 'link' such as a desire,
which chain that desire falls in. Expressions such as 'Devadatta's desire' for
this purpose are therefore acceptable to the Buddhist.
207
That expression is
likened to 'the flow of the river' because it underlines that 'Devadatta' is
nothing more than a chain or stream of events by comparing him to a river.
And by comparing 'desire' to 'flow' what is highlighted is that just as the
flow is the river at one time and place, desire is Devadatta at one time.
litmavlidinlim api vli devadattasya svlitmaivlitra pramli!zam iti katham asau
vyavahlira!z. pramlil)enlinupapadyamlina!z kalpita eveti eet, krtal.n vyavahli-
rel)a. pramlil)am eva hi satyetaratvavyavasthlipanliylinusara!zfyam, tae eeta-
ratrlipi samlinam, iti jiilinam eva ieehli, na tu gUl)alz kasya cit.
Alternatively [we could reply]: how do even [you] who postulate a Self [ex-
plain] the everyday expression, 'Devadatta's own Self alone is the authority in
this matter,.208 If [you] say, '[that expression] is artificial, [since it is] not jus-
tified by valid means of knowledge,' then enough of everyday linguistic us-
age, for it is [therefore] valid means of knowledge alone that should be fol-
lowed in order to establish whether something is true or false. And the same
207 Vasubandhu gives the same explanation of the use of such expressions: vyapade-
sas tu prthivyli gandhlidaya iti te hy eva tadlikhyli gandhadayo yathli pra-
tfyeran
a
nlinya iti, sarfravyapadeavat (AKBh(BBS) 1225,5-6), 'We
do speak of the odour etc. of earth, but [only] to be specific, so that only those odours etc.
that are referred to by that [expression] be understood and no others, just as we speak of
the body of the wooden image'. I.e. we say, 'the body of this wooden image' to show that
we are not talking of any other body, but we do not thereby imply that the wooden image
exists over and above its body.
a) pratfyeran AKBh(P), MS; vijiiliyeran AKBh(BBS).
208 I am not certain in what context this expression would have been used. Possibly
the sense would have been: in deciding how to act Devadatta should follow his own in-
stincts alone. In any case the point of the ,Buddhist citing it here is clear, namely, that it
seems to imply that Devadatta is something separate from his Self, in the way that 'the
mango's taste' seems to imply that the mango is something separate from its taste.
192
goes for the other [everyday linguistic usage, 'Devadatta's desire,].209 So de-
sire is just a particular cognition, not a quality of anything.
4.Sfuikhya
4.1. The Sfu'lkhya Argument
yad api slinkhyai[z sal.nhatlinlil.n plirlirthYal!z sayanlidfnlim iva kliryakaralJ-li-
nlilJl parasiddhliv anumiinam upanyastam, tad apy ubhayavlidisiddhalJl vijiili-
nam eva slidhayatfti siddhaslidhanam.
And as for the inference put forward by the Sfuikhyas in order to prove [the
existence of] a further [entity] (i.e. a soul)-namely the fact that the body and
sense faculties [that comprise the material human being], being compounded,
are for the sake of something else, just like beds etc. [are compounded and are
for the sakeof something else]-that too proves only cognition, which is es-
tablished for both disputants, so [this argument] proves [only] what is already
established?1O
The argument referred to is mentioned in the Sankhyakarika.
211
The three
principal commentators on that text reconstruct it slightly differently. Accor-
209 I.e. that too is not justified by valid means 9f knowledge, so it must be artificial. I
am taking tat as pramli1J.enlinupapadyamlinatvam.
210 It does not prove the existence of anything disputed (vipratipanna) or unseen
such as a Self.
211 SK 17: sanghlitaparlirthatvlit trigu1J.lidiviparyaylid I 'sti bhok-
trbhlivlit kaivalylirthalJl pravrttes ca II The commentators disagree as to whether san-
ghlitaparlirthatvlit stands by itself as an independent reason, or whether it is explained
and completed by trigu1J.lidiviparyaylid. (Gau<;lapada thinks the former (GBM 20,16-18),
Vacaspati the latter (TK 120,9-27). The redactor of the Slinkhyasutras gives two separate
siltras: salJlhataparlirthatvlit and trigu1J.lidiviparyaylit (SS 140 and 141)).
Ramakrugha treats this argument at MatV VP ad 6.18c-20 (148,lb-149,6b). It is also
expounded and defended by Uddyotakara in the Nyliyavlirttika (NVa(NCG) 326,7-327,5),
and mentioned in the Slokavlirttika: sanghlitasannivesau ca na sta[z plirlirthyavarjitau,
'And composites and arrangements do not exist without the property of being for the sake
of something else.' (SV(P2), litmavlida 114ab). It is discussed in many Buddhist texts, in-
cluding the Pramli1J.asalnuccayavrtti (ad Pramli1J.asamuccaya 3.22 and 26: mentioned by
193
ding to GaUl;laplida its formal structure is:
212
'It is inferred that this very
[body], which is a composite of the Great and the other [evolutes]213 is for the
sake of the soul, because it is insentient like a bed.' The author of the Yukti-
dfpika, by contrast, writes:
214
'In this [world], compounded things, like beds,
chairs, chariots, houses etc., can be observed to be for the sake of something
else. And there exists this compounded thing, namely the body. Therefore
this too must be for the sake of something else. That something else is the
soul. Therefore the soul exists.' Vacaspati Misra, finally, also gives a slightly
different version of the argument:
215
'The Unmanifest (avyakta), the Great
(mahat), the Ego (ahankara) and the other [twenty-one evolutesf16 exist for
the sake of another, because they are compounded, like a bed, a chair and
other means [of enjoyment].' He then reminds us why they are all com-
pounded: because they are composed of the three gUlJas.
Tillemans 1992 445-446); NyliyapraveSa (NyPr 5,7-11); Pramli1J.avlirttika (pVa 4.29-
33); Nyliyabindu (NyBi 3.87), Tattvasangraha (TS(GOS) 307-310) and their commentar-
ies. This tradition of response on the Buddhist side stretches back at least as far as Vasu-
bandhu, since DharmakIrti quotes him on the subject at PYa 4.32. (Although the quotation
is un attributed by DharmakIrti, the commentaries identify its author. See for example
PVV 426,10-11: yathoditam licliryavasubandhunli parlirthlis ity atra paras
ced litmli so 'siddho iti. Tillemans (1992 445) comments that the
quotation is most likely from the Vlidavidhi.) .
212 GBM 20,10: yo 'yalJl mahadlidisanghlita[z sa ity anumfyate, aceta-
natvlit paryankavat.
213 mahadlidisanghlita[z could be referring not to the body but to the whole manifest
universe. I take it as referring to the body because after this sentence, Gau<;lapada explains
the example and then, returning to and summing up the main argument that he stated in
this sentence, writes: tat parlirtham idal.n sarfralJl paiiclinlilJl mahlibhutlinlilJl sanglzlito
vartate. asti yasyedal.n bhogyal.n sarfral!z blzogyamalzadlidisanglzlitampal.n samut-
pannam iti (GBha 20,13-15).
214 ilza sanglzlitli[z parlirtlzli tadyathli sayanlisanarathasara1J.lidaya[z [variant
cara1J.lidaya[z]. asti cliyalJl sanghlita[z. tasmlid anenlipi parlirthena blzavi-
tavyam. yo 'sau paralz sa tasmlid asti (YD 168,5-7).
215 TK 120,10-11: avyaktamalzadahan,kliraprabh.rtaya[z parlirthli[z, sanghlitatvlit, sa-
yanlisanlidyangavat.
216I.e. everything in the Sfuikhya universe except the soul.
194
Ramakru;ttha does not give the argument in its formal structure but it seems
safe to say that in his version the logical reason is being compounded, the
property to be proved is being for the sake of something else, and the proof-
subject is that denoted by his compound kiiryakaralJiiniim.
The three Sankhya commentators differ with regard to their proof-subject in
that Vacaspati gives it as the Unmanifest (= prakrti, pradhiilia) and its evo-
lutes, and the other two as the body.217 In translating Ramakru;ttha's kiirya-
karalJiiniim as 'the body and sense faculties' I align him with Gaw;Iapada and
the YD (taking all three's proof-subject to be 'body' in the wide sense as in-
cluding the faculties of sense and action and the three mental faculties) and
against Vacaspati. 218
217 The proof-subject in the Nyayavarttika, Nyayapraveia, Nyayabindll, Tattvasali-
graha and Pral1lalJavarttikav.rtti is 'the eyes and the [other sense-faculties],: pararthas
salighatatvac NyPr 5,8-9; pararthas
adaya[z salighatatvac chayanasanadYaligavat NB 82,16-17; pararthYal!l
yat pllna[z pratipadyate I sayyasanadivat" tena sanghatatvella hetuna II TS(GOS) 307; pa-
rarthas salighatatvat sayallasa[sa conj. SiiIilqtyayana; sa MS]nadyangavat
PVV, 425,7. The Yuktidlpika also uses this formulation, subsequent to its
initial salighata!l: tasl1lad aYllktal!l sal!lhatartha!l sayanadivac
ya[z (YD 168,17).
a) Both editions read sayyasalladivat. sayyasanadivat is the reading of the Patan
manuscript, as kindly conveyed to me by Kei Kataoka.
218 karyakarananal1l has senses. It refers to the twenty-three Sfuikhya tattvas
, .
below prak{1i: see SK 32, and YD ad loc., where these twenty-three are divided into the
thirteen and their ten karyas (five tanlllatras and five l1lahabhiitas); and it refers
to the body composed of those ten karyas and the sense-faculties corresponding to those
thirteen tattvas. (The compound karyakaralJa is frequently used in the
As evidence that it sometimes intends by karya the body, see for example
sarfrakhya!l PaBha 26,4.) I prefer to see Ramakruttha as primarily denoting by it the body
and senses for two reasons. 1) Vacaspati's proof-subject is eccentric. As pointed out in
note 217, the proof-subjects in the versions of the argument appearing in Buddhist texts
and in the Nyayavarttika are all i.e. the faculties that make up human organ-
isms. Moreover, in the five remaining early commentaries on the Saflkhyakarika-'-
Saflkhyavrtti, Saflkhyasaptativrtti, Jayalllaligata, Maf/zarav.rtti and (paramartha's Chinese
translation of) the Sllvan.zasaptati-the proof-subjects are either the body (sarfra) or the
conglomerate of faculties 2) Ramakruttha's compound echoes the
195
The property to be proved in Gaw;Iapada's argument is being for the sake of
the soul. This leaves him open to the following charge. Either he intends his
example of a bed as being for the sake of the soul or not. If not, then perva-
sion with being for the sake of the soul is not established; if so, then he is as-
suming in his example precisely what the argument seeks to prove.219 Perhaps
for this reason, the other three divide the argument into two. First they prove
being for the sake of another from being compounded. It is the pervasion be-
tween these two that the examples of beds and the like instantiate. Then they
identify this other with the soul as another step. It is the step that Rama-
kru;ttha's Buddhist (and the opponents in Vacaspati's commentary and the
Yuktidfpikiii
20
decides to challenge.
Turning lastly to the logical reason, the YD, Vacaspati and, as I construe him,
Ramakru;ttha give it as 'being compounded'. Gauc.Iapada by contrast holds that
compounded things are for the sake of the soul, not by virtue of being com-
pounded, but by virtue of being insentient.
Some modern scholars have construed the claim that compounded things are
for the sake of another as indicating that compounded things are assembled
by this other.221 It is presumably this idea which has led others to characterize
terminology that the YD uses, where it is clearly not the tattvas, but the material human
organism that is being referred to. Thus we read ca ca
karyakaralJasya (YD 175,4-5); and karyakaralJasanghatall devadattasabdavacya[z (YD
169,1). 3) Ramakruttha deals with this argument in MatV VP (ad 6.18b-19c), where the
fact that he gives the proof-subject as makes it likely that the proof-
subject here too is the human conglomeration of faculties. I have greatly benefited from
detailed discussion on this point with Dr. Ferenc Ruzsa, who gave me the information
contained in 1 and 2. I do not accept his suggestion, however, that karyakaralJa should be
translated 'instruments for an effect'.
219 It could be that Gaugapada deliberately equivocates between the two shades of
meaning of man and soul.
220 There are no objections in Gaugapada's commentary.
221 See Phukan 196093: 'When we find that they [= inanimate things] are so arranged
that they can serve an useful purpose, we know that an intelligent person must have ar-
ranged them for himself or for another'; atld on the following page: 'There can be no or-
der, law, symmetry or co-operation in an assemblage of inanimate objects unless some in-
telligent being had skillfully arranged them ... '
the argument as from design.222 But no version of this argument that I have
read in a primary source attributes the logical power of the argument to com-
pounded things requiring a maker. It would in fact be highly 'un-Sfuikhya' to
do so, since the Sfuikhya's soul (for whose sake they exist) is not their maker,
not being an agent. Existing for another's sake in this argument means not
having been constructed by the other, but being an object of experience for
that other. Thus, when Gau<;lapada is explaining his example he writes, 'There
is a man who lies on the bed, for whose purpose it is. ,223 He does not say that
there is a man who made it.
In the NPP sentence under discussion the Buddhist dismisses the argument on
the grounds that the other, for whose sake compounded things exist, could be
cognition, and hence the argument proves what is already established
(siddhasiidhana). The opponents in Vacaspati's commentary and in the Yukti-
dfpikii also deny that the other, for whose sake compounded things exist, is
the Self; but they propose that it is something different from cognition. The
reason for this difference is that the context of the argument in the
Siilikhyakiirikii is different from the context in which it occurs in NPP. In the
latter it is being used to argue for a Self beyond cognition. In the
Siilikhyakiirikii it is being used to argue for a soul above the twenty-three
manifest evolutes of the material world and their unmanifest source. Thus the
opponents in Vacaspati's commentary and in the Yuktidfpikii begin by argu-
ing that the other, for whose sake compounded things exist, could be another
composite of these material evolutes.
When the Sfuikhya argument is discussed in Buddhist texts, both of the points
that RamakaJ).tha puts into the mouth of his Buddhist, that it proves only cog-
nition, and is thus a case of siddhasiidhana, are found. Regarding the fIrst, the
argument is said at various places to prove jiiiina, 224 vijiiiina
225
or citta.
226
Re-
222 See Davies 1957 30: 'The first argument is from design.' Mainkar, writing more
recently, takes on this idea from Davies: 'This is the argument of design' (Mainkar 1972
93).
223 GBha 20,13: asti yab parymike sete yasyiirthaJ!l paryankab.
224 See note 23l.
225 See TSP(GOS) 117,12.
226 See, for example, TSP(GOS) 117,8b.
197
garding the second, see for example ('proving of
what is accepted,)227 and KamalasTIa's siddhasiidhyatii ('the having as one's
property to be proved something that is already established,).228 When
DharmakIrti claims that vaiphalyam ('pointlessness,)229 would accrue, and
when writes siidhanaf(l vyarthaf(l ('the proof is without
point'),230 they are there also making the same point: the reason they term the
argument pointless is because of it establishing only cognition.
231
227 See note 23l.
228 At TSP(GOS) 117,12 and 117,19.
229 At PVa 4.33c'd: bhaved vaiphalyam eva vii II 'Otherwise (i.e. if the
property to be proved is simply being for the sake of another and not being for the sake of
the soul), then either [the property to be proved] would be something unintended, or [the
proof] would be completely superfluous.' lowe my understanding of the verse to Tille-
mans 2000 57.
230 See note 23l.
231 The general Buddhist strategy is to ask for clarification about the precise property
to be proved: if it is 'being for the sake of the soul', then it is not instantiated in the exam-
ple; if it is being for the sake of cognition or simply being for the sake of another, then it
proves only what is established / is pointless. See for example TS(GOS) 308-310:
hryiitisayiirthatvaJJl yady upapiidyate I yad te 'smiibhir jiiiinopakii-
II avikiiryllpakiiritvasiidhane siidhyasiinyatii I calasyaiva yuktiis te 'py
II siimiinyena tu piiriirthyaJ.n yady samprasiidhyate I tathiipi siidlzanaJ!l
vyarthaJJl siddhiis cittopayogina(l II 'If these [eyes and the like] are argued to be for the
sake of something that can be assisted (and thus modified), then [all that is] proved is
something accepted [by us], for we accept that they are factors which aid cognition. [But]
if [the argument is held to] prove that [they] are factors which aid something unmodifi-
able, the example lacks the property to be proved; [for] the [beds and seats cited in the ex-
ample], for their part, should be appropriately regarded as factors which aid only some-
thing in flux (calasya). If, on the other hand, they are proved to be for the sake of another
in general [without the nature of that other being specified], even then the argument is
pointless since [for us] they are established to be factors aiding the mind.'
Buddhists can undermine the argument's proof of the Self without disputing the per-
vasion it claims between compounded things and being for the sake of another. But do
they in fact accept this pervasion, or do they just agree to it for the sake of the argument?
According to DharmakIrti, they do indeeq agree to it. He says in the PramiilJ.aviniscaya:
'They [i.e. the Buddhists] accept that composites accomplish the benefit of another, and
thus the siidhana is superfluous.' (Quoted at Tillemans 1992447. I use his translation of
198
23? ?33 . 1_ I . ., 'I I
nanu - tasya- anztyatvlit f(.famelJa SalP zatatvam zt! tato pyanyo SalP zata.z
par0234 'numeyalz.
[SiiIikbya:] Since that (i.e. cognition) is impennanent it is compounded se-
quentially, so surely we should infer something else uncompounded beyond
even that.
The SaiJ.khya gets around the problem by re-applying the argument, this time
with cognition as the proof-subject.
satyam, yadi tatlziiblziitena vyliptilz siddlzli [Ked p. 12] blzavet. salplzatlinlilplzi
eva plirlirtlzyalp siddlzam, iti jiilinam eva
tatlzliblziital.n sidlzyati.
[Buddhist:] That [would be] true if concomitance [of the logical reason, being
compounded,] were established with something of that nature (i.e. being for
the sake of something uncompounded). In fact (Izi), in the example, the fact
that compounded things are for the sake of another is established [with the
'other' there] referring to nothing other than things like bodies, which are
compounded. So [the argument] proves only cognition of that nature (i.e.
compounded).
The Buddhist here appeals to an analysis of the bed example that is main-
tained by the opponents in the SaiJ.khya commentaries, namely that it is for
the sake of a body. Since this is a compounded entity, the SaiJ.khya propo-
nents of the argument are hardly on firm footing to claim that cognition, as a
result of being compounded, can be disqualified from being (ultimately) the
other.
In order to understand the next sentence of NPP we will look in some detail at
how one of the SaiJ.khya commentators, Vacaspati, attempts to overcome this
objection. Vacaspati's opponent states that since beds and the like are for the
sake of compounded bodies the argument allows us to know another com-
the Tibetan: de dag 'dus pa gian gyi don byed par ni klzas blans pa 'i plzyir. sgrub par
byed pa 'bras bu med pa yin no. P 289a 7, D 191a 6-7.)
232nanu Kedpc, B; omitted in Ped, Kedac; vakra P.
233 tasya B, P; vijiilinasya Ked, Ped.
Marginal gloss above tasya in B and P: vijiilinasya.
234 Marginal gloss above para in B:
pounded thing, not an uncompounded litman.
235
Vacaspati replies, that if com-
pounded things were for the sake of another compounded thing then that too
would be for the sake of another compounded thing, which would also be for
the sake of another compounded thing ad infinitum. If an infinite regress can
be avoided then it should be, because otherwise one is committing the logical
fault of being unnecessarily heavy on postulation. In this case the infinite re-
gress can be avoided by somewhere along the line assuming that a
compounded entity is for the sake of something uncompounded. Thus rather
than assuming that there are only compounded entities in the universe, Vacas-
claims that an uncompounded, unperceivable soul can be proved through,
ironically, the principle of economy of postulation.
He imagines an opponent stating that if there are valid means of knowledge
for an option involving more postulation, then heaviness of postulation is not
a logical fallacy, and should be endured. What the valid means of knowledge
is in this case is not stated, but probably it is the fact that in the inference's
example what is observed is being for the sake of something compounded.
Since this is observable, is it not better to accept an infinite number of these
than one case of being for the sake of something uncompounded, which is not
observed? Vacaspati answers that the argument's pervasion is simply be-
tween being compounded and being for the sake of another, nothing more
specific than that, so it provides no evidence for the proof-subject, the evo-
lutes, being for the sake of something compounded.
Thus in Vacaspati's argument we have two clearly delimited stages. He re-
quires no more of the first stage than that it establishes that the evolutes are
for the sake of another.
236
He is not afraid to acknowledge that it cannot lend
any weight to whether they are for the sake of something compounded or un-
235 TK 120,12-14: sylid etat-sayanlisanlidayalz sanglzlitli(z sal.nlzatasarfrlidyartlzii
na tv litmlinal!z prati parlirtlzlilz. tasmlit sanglziitlintaram eva paralp gamayeyulz,
na tv aSalplzatam litmlinam iti.
236 Thi 1 .
. s contrasts strong y WIth the argJIment of Gau<;lapada where the property to be
proved is not just being for the sake of another, but being for the sake of the soul/person

200
compounded.237 What clinches it for the latter is the independent con-
sideration that such a choice enables avoidance of the threat of infinite re-
gress.
It is noteworthy that Vacaspati clearly takes the example as being for the sake
of something compounded. He differs here from the author of the Yuktidfpikii,
who responds to the problem of the beds etc. in the example being for the
sake o,f something compounded in the following way.238 It is commonly ac-
cepted (prasiddha) in the world, he says, that beds and the like are for the
sake of the material human being, thus the example is formulated accor9.ing
to that. But it is later refuted by the overall conclusion, at which point it can
be seen that they are for the sake of the soul. There is no suggestion in
Vacaspati's commentary that the example must be corrected. Rather he ac-
cepts -that beds are for the sake of something compounded, bodies. Bodies, in
turn, are for the sake of the uncompounded soul. In the Yuktidfpikii, once the
soul has been established we can assume that all compounded things are for
the sake of it. For Vacaspati, rather than all material entities being on the
same level-for the sake of the soul-there is a hierarchy in which although
all compounded things are for the sake of something else, some are for the
sake of another compounded thing, which is itself for the sake of the soul.
ante 'py anavasthiiparihiirarthal!l kasya cit tathabhiitasyaivabhyupagalllan
nanyo 'tathiibhata!l.
Because, in order to avoid an infinite regress, [we] accept something simply
of that nature (i.e. compounded) even at the end, there is no further [entity]
not of that nature (i.e. there is no uncompounded entity).
RamakaJ.?tha's Buddhist here imagines that the Sankhya might use the argu-
ment we have just observed Vacaspati to use, namely, that the Self is needed
to avert an infinite regress. He asserts that to postulate an uncompounded en-
237 In fact he uses it to his advantage: by admitting that the example does not support
that the other is uncompounded, but merely illustrates pararthya, he can then assert that
equally it does not support that the other is compounded.
238 YD 169,5-7: ucyate: na prasiddhyanurodhat. satyal!l kilryakaral}asanghiitasya
pararthYal!l bhokt(tVaI.n ca rca omitted in MSS] nopapadyate. loke tu devadattarthatval!l
sayanadfna'!l prasiddhalll. atas tad anugacchanto vayalll apy eVal!l briilllah.
201
tity is not the only way of averting it, for the chain can simply end with some-
thing compounded.
RamakaJ.?tha does not have his Sankhya come back at this. But -it does not
seeIlllike an entirely satisfactory solution, for if something compounded ex-
ists that is not for the sake of something else then the pervasion between hetu
and siidhya is broken. Thus far the Buddhist had been arguing as though he
accepted the pervasion?39
na hi yad asiddhavyaptikal!l vastu, tad dhetu!1240 svasakty-
aiva
241
sadhayitulJl saknoti, jfiapako 'yal.n na kilrako yata!l.
For a logical reason cannot establish through its own power alone some-
thinl42 which does not feature in the example and whose concomitance is not
established. For it is something which [passively and disinterestedly] reveals,
not an active performer.
Smoke does not cause fire but merely reveals knowledge of it. In the same
way this logical reason cannot somehow bring about
piiriirthyam when all that it can be observed to be concomitant with is sa1Jl-

239 Uddyotakara, as well as Vacaspati, appeals to something uncompounded as the
only way of averting infinite regress, in the course of his defence of this Siiilkhya para-
rthya argument. Oetke (1988 381) discusses the philosophical validity of Uddyotakara's
argument and is unconvinced by it, claiming that the Buddhist can avoid the regress in the
following way. 'Er kann bestreiten, daB der RegreB nur durch Annahme eines nicht-
zusarnmengesetzten Gegenstandes zum Stehen gebracht werden kann.-Warum nicht
durch die Annahme eines aus Bestandteilen bestehenden Gegenstandes einer speziellen
Art oder einer besonderen Kategorie?' But whether or not the entity at the end is 'of a
special kind or particular category', if it is compounded then I do not see that the infinite
regress has been successfully averted. Only if one rejects the pervasion can the chain
come to an end with something compounded. But if one rejects the pervasion then there is
no problem of infinite regress anyway. Thus I regard Oetke's other three critiques (p.
ofUddyotakara's argument as more incisive than this one.
240 Above taddhetub in B is a marginal gloss: tasyanlllllana. This implies that its
author takes taddhetll!l to be a compound.l have not done so.
241 svasaktyaiva B, P, Ped; svasaktya Ked.
242 In this case
202
Ramakru;ttha's giving of the fmal word in this argument to the Buddhist, from
which we can infer a silent agreement on his part that the Sfuikhya argument
cannot refute the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self, is particularly noteworthy
given that two of the scriptures of Ramakru;ttha's own tradition, the Mrgendra
and the MataJiga, put this argument into the mouth of Siva, advancing it as a
valid proof.
243
What is Ramakru;ttha's reason for distancing himself from a Sfuikhya argu-
ment that was accepted by the earlier texts of his own tradition? My impres-
sion is that he wants to forge a more separate identity for his tradition; and
that he wants his own version of atmavada to be firmly distinguishable from
those of the Brahmru;tical traditions so that the Buddhist arguments against the
latter, which he recognized to be strong, would be irrelevant to his own posi-
tion.
4.2. Cognition is Self-illuminating
na ca jiiiinam asmiikam asiddham iti viicyam. arthaprakiiio hy aym.n sakala-
lokaprasiddho 'nubhuyata eva.
And [you] cannot say, 'cognition is not established for us,' for this shining
forth / illumination of objects (i.e. cognition) is actually experienced, being
well-known to everyone in the world.
The Buddhist has just denied that the argument proves compounded things to
be for the sake of an uncompounded atman, since nothing of that nature can
be shown to occur in the example and therefore to be concomitant with the
243 See MatV VP 6.18c-19b and MT 6.2-3. In the Mrgendra the argument is 'Sai-
vised': it is stated that earth and other effects are created by the Lord; that they are how-
ever of no use to him; that nor do they exist for each other, since they are insentient; and
that nor are they without purpose in view of the importance of their author. It follows that
they exist for the sake of something different from both the Lord and each other, namely
the soul (/qetrajiia). Narayru;.akru;.!:ha adds two details: that effects are created by the Lord
to enable sentient beings to attain the four aims of man beginning with Dharma; and that
strictly speaking they are not created by Siva, but by Brahma and others prompted by
Siva.
203
logical reason. He here imagines that the Sfuikhya will respond,ina parallel
fashion, by claiming that what the Buddhist takes compounded things to be
for the sake of, cognition, is also completely unestablished. That response
would amount to a second attempt by the Sfuikhya to overcome the Buddhist
position that compounded things are for the sake of cognition. The first was
to point out that cognition is itself compounded and so must in tum be for the
sake of the soul. This second response would entail that compounded things
must be directly for the sake of the soul, cognition not being an option owing
to its existence being rejected.
. But this imagined objection is not only brought up here because it is a way of
overcoming the Buddhist refutation of the Sfuikhya inference. It is also
brought up because it is a way of overcoming all of the Buddhist refutations
of the various inferences of the Self in this chapter. As we are drawing to a
close of this chapter, the Buddhist has to justify the assumption common to
all of his arguments, that, unlike the Self, cognition is perceivable and readily
accepted by all disputants. In each case the Buddhist has shown that that
which is supposed to force us to infer the existence of the Self, being impos-
sible if a Self did not exist, is in fact perfectly explainable given the existence
of cognition. But if the Self could explain these phenomena just as well as
cognition, why should we accept cognition rather than the Self? The answer .
is that the former is already accepted by both disputants, ubhayavadisiddham.
It is experienced by everyone and not something imperceptible like
an eternal unchanging soul. It is this insistence on the part of the Buddhist
that cognition is just what each of us experiences that gave him the edge in
each confrontation; for why postulate an unperceived and disputed entity to
explain something, when a perceived and already accepted one will explain it
just as well? The necessity of inferring something asiddha and was
removed in each case by the Buddhist providing a siddha and category,
namely cognition, to do the explaining. In every Buddhist argument this con-
trast between an unperceivable Self and readily accepted cognition has been
expressed through stating that cognition is anubhavasiddhamlubhayavadi-
siddham, or signalled through the use of eva: ... vijfianaYfl bhinnam eva
grahakam anubhavasiddham ... atas ca piirval.n vijfianam eva
piirvatarajfianajasaJ.nskarasahayam ubhayavadisiddhaYfl ... (9,3-5); vijfiana-
santatav eva kramavatyalJ'l sasidhyati nanyatratyantasiddhe (10,5-6); tatra
204
VlJnanam eva praviihiitmaka1Jl sa1JlskiiriidivasatalJ
kriyiinirvartakam ubhayaviidisiddham asti (10,17-19); jiiiinam eva
icchii na tu gw}ab kasya cit (11,16-17); yad api siiflkhyaifz ... piiriirthya1Jl ...
anumiinam upanyastam, tad apy ubhayaviidisiddha1Jl vijiiiinam eva siidhayati
(11,17-20). Since so much weight is placed on this contrast, the Buddhist
does not finish before formally justifying it. So I insert a sub-section break
here to bring out that this question of whether cognition is experienced, which
occupies the rest of the chapter, is not only a product of the Sfuurnya argu-
ment, but addresses itself to the core of the Buddhist's strategy since the be-
ginning of the chapter.
na clisliv arthadhannalz, 244 artha-
sya sarvlin praty ca.
And it is not a property Qf objects, because we experience it internally as
something distinct from objects; and because Tif it were] it would undesirably
follow that an object, since it is the same with everyone, [on being perceived
by one person] would be perceivable for all.
TIris imagined objection (from a Kaumanla point of view) that cognition is a
property of objects has the same double edge to it as the last one in that it re-
sponds both to the Buddhist distinction that runs through the chapter, and
specifically to the Buddhist refutation of the Sankhya argument. It threatens
the claim that the Buddhist has just made that cognition is directly experi-
enced (because according to this tradition cognition is not known directly but,
for Sabara, by inference, and, for Kumarila, by arthiipatti) and hence it
threatens the distinction crucial to the Buddhist throughout the chapter be-
tween an unperceivable Self and directly perceived cognition. But at the same
time, although it is a MImaIp.saka, not a Sankhya idea, it could be seen as a
further attempt to undermine the Buddhist refutation of the Sankhya argu-
ment: for if cognition were a property of objects it would not be a good can-
didate for the other (para), leaving the Self to fill that role.
244 Marginal gloss under na clisliv arthadhanno: kaumlirilamata1!z na clisliv
arthadhanna.
245 P, Ked, Ped; B.
205
The point of the Buddhist's second response to this objection as follows.
Objects and their properties, not being mentally created, have no special rela-
tion to any particular person. Thus if, when an object is cognized, that mani-
festness becomes a property of the object, the object should be manifest to
everyone.
246
Therefore all the objects in the world that are being cognized
should be being cognized by everyone else in the world.
247
Only if cognition
attaches to perceivers rather than public objects will the cognition of an ob-:
ject be private to an individual perceiver.
248
nlipi pUl.nsvabhlivas, tasylisiddhelz.
249
siddhau cliprakiislitmano vyatirekii-
bhlivlit tasylipy aprakiisarilpatvam ity liylitam lindhyam jagata{z.
And neither is [cognition] the own nature of a soul,250 because that (i.e. a soul)
remains to be proven. And if it were proven, then because [cognition] would
not be different from the non-illuminating Self,251 it too would be non-
illuminating, so the whole world would become blind.
246 See sarvlitmapraka!atli sylit in the next footnote.
247 See two parallels elsewhere in the text: na bodhyadhannas tadbodho jaiminfya-
bhedlinlim iva, tasya sarvlin praty sarvaboddhrbodhyatliprasanglit (5,3-5); and
tad apy ayuktam, arthasya sarvlin praty sarvlitmapraka!atli sylit, iti sarvasya sa-
rvajnatliprasanga{z (18,1b-19,2).
248 Prof. Schmithausen pointed out to me that Ramak3l)!ha simplifies the view of the
Kaumfuilas here in representing them as claiming that jnlina is a property of objects. For
they distinguished between 'manifestness'l'cognizedness' (prlika.tya, jnlitatli), and cogni-
tion as an action (a distinction not accepted to be real by the Buddhists), the former alone
being a property of objects. The former they held to be directly perceived, the latter in-
ferred.
249 tasylisiddhe{z B, Ked, Ped; tasylilz siddhelz P.
250 If it were, then the Sankhya could claim that the Buddhist, by admitting that com-
pounded things are for the sake of cognition, is effectively admitting that they are for the
sake of the soul.
251 Why would the Self not illuminate? Because whether we are talking of a Nyaya-
V or a Sankhya Self it is non-illuminating-for the Sankhyas prakiisa is a property
of the buddhi not the Either the Self is different from or the same as cognition. If
the same, then it is just cognition. But if different then it would not illuminate, for it
would be strange to assume two conscious entities within the same person. But at the
same time, if cognition is the own nature 0\ the Self, as is imagined here, it would not be
different from the Self because a thing and its nature are not different. So it too would be
non-illuminating.
206
tad uktam
252
prasidhyatill iti.
Thus [DharmakIrti] has said:
For someone [according to whose view] the perception [itself] is not
perceived, [even] the perception of the object is not possible.253
. The Buddhist seems to cite this not as support for either of his two previous
points but for the one before: 'this shining forth of objects (i.e. cognition) is
actually experienced, being well-known to everyone in the world.'
pradfpavat svaparapraklisaikasvabhiivatvena vijiiii-
Ilam allubhavasiddlza/ll niipahllotulll sakyam iti.
[Since] cognition, which reveals particular objects, is like a lamp in that its
sole nature is to illuminate itself and other things, it is established by experi-
ence; [thus] it cannot be denied.
tad idam uktam
254
jiiiiniirtlzau salza n7padfpa
255
tulayii jiitau I
Therefore this has been said:
Cognition and object, according to the doctrine of the are
similar to
256
light and form.
252 PVin l.55cd. Also quoted at NPP 61,1; NVV Vol. 1,209,27-28; TSP(BBS) Vol.
1, 490,5b-4b and Vol. 2, 705,17; NM(M) Vol. 2, 490,10 and 498,7; and by Jayaratha ad
Talltriiloka 1O.96c-97b.
253 I follow Vetter in taking as a BahuvrIhi: (1966 106, note
61). A Karmadharaya interpretation is possible (,A perception that is not perceived could
not perceive an object'), but less likely given that Karmadharayas consisting of adjective
followed by noun are rare unless resulting in some sense transcending that of the same
two words with the adjective inflected. The Tibetan translates as though the Sanskrit con-
tained a locative absolute or ayadi: dmigs pa mnoll sum ma yill na (PVin 96,10).
254 Source unknown.
255 n7padfpao Ked, B; bhiivariipao Ped.
256 The expression saha tulayii jiita is not familiar to me.
. Chapter 1: Inferring the Self
iitmanii blzoktr57 din7pel)iinyena sanyii!z skandhii ity iitmasanyaviidin,alz.
Thus the constituents of a person are devoid of any other Self that is an expe-
riencer and [agent]. So say the [Buddhists] who hold that [everything] is de-
void of Self (AtmaSiinyavadins). .
257 blzoktrii Ked, Ped ; blzoktii B
207
CHAPTER 2:
Can We Know the Self Through Self-
Awareness (Svasaf!lvedana)?
1. Sadyojyotis ' Verse and its Context
atriiciirya iilza [Ked p. 13]
1.5) niiblziiva!l sakyate vaktUl.n pratyaye I
sz7nyatii tena blziiviiniilJl bodhabiidlzitii II
To this [Buddhist view] the master says:
1.5) The non-existence [of the Self] cannot be proclaimed, given [the
existence of] cognition that is the witness of all [objects]. Therefore
[the Buddhist doctrine] that all things are empty [of Self] is refuted by
experience.
The text here continues straight on from the last sentence translated in Chap-
ter 1. I have translated the verse according to RfunakaI).!ha's commentary. In
order that the reader can see the context in which it occurs in Sadyojyotis'
verses, I will here give the verses up to and immediately after this point:
atlza meyiibdhiratnasya salikarasyiimitadyute!l I
parf"/qiilJl
2
[dato vacmi pll1Jls
3
parf"/qiipuralzsaram
4
111.111
jiiiitii kartii ca bodlzena buddhvii bodhYalJl pravartate I
prav.rttiplzalabhoktii ca yaEl pumiin ucyate 'tra sa!l 111.211
kartriidinii vyavalziira!l samiipyate I
vyavastlziipayitll1Jl sakyo lliiyam ekiintaviidiblzi!l 111.311
1 Ked, Ped, B, P; M.
2 parf"/qiilJl Ped, B, P, M; parf"/qii Ked. J
3 PUlJlSo Ked; Pll1Jl
o
Ped, B, P, M.
4 saram Ked, Ped, P, M; sariim B, v.l. in Ked.
210
sarvaikatvaprasiddhau tzl pramiitzal!l niisti kiiicalla I
iimniiyas cell na yeniisau viisaniisamprakiisakalz 111.411
niibhiiva!l sakyate vaktU/Jl pratyaye I
sl7llyatii tena bhiiviiniilJl bodhabiidhitii 111.511
arthasyiipi na ciibhiivo yato 'yam allubl1l7yate I
. In 1.1 Sadyojyotis introduces the whole text by stating that he will teach an
examination of the Lord preceded by an examination of the soul. 1.2 begins
the examination of the soul (that will occupy the whole of the first kiilJrja) by
defining it as that knower and doer that acts having cognized objects of cog-
nition through cognition, and that subsequently experiences the fruits of those
actions. 1.3 states that everyday activity is enabled by four distinct things: an
agent and three others. It cannot be explained by one-sided philosophers
(ekiintaviidins). 'Precisely what this group of four things is, and who the
ekiintaviidins are, is not completely certain.
6
But if we want to see close con-
tinuity between this verse and the ones before and after, then we could as-
5 tzt Ked, Ped, B, P; ca M.
6 identification of the four is not entirely convincing. He claims that
the group referred to is that of the causal factors involved in an action (kiiraka), some-
times one, two, three or up to six. (NPP 6,2-5: sa (=lokavyavahiiralz) ca sarva eva [sarva
eva B, Ked; sarvo Ped] lavanapacaniidyiitmaka!l kartriidillii
kriyiilliballdhanena kiirakabhedella yathiisambhavm!l kvacid ekella dViibhyiilJl tribhir vii
drsyate.) It seems unlikely that Sadyojyotis would explicitly
designate the group as fourfold if he were referring to the kiirakas.
identifies the ekiintaviidills as 'Iains' (jaillii[z) who deny that the kiirakas
have distinct functions, seeing them rather as equivalent to a seed, moisture etc., which
together constitute a causal complex (siimagrf) and produce their effect when they enter a
certain state. They at that point become a cause merely by existing immediately before
their effect. (NPP 6,8-11: atha kim allena hi
bfjiidayo 'rthiis tattadavasthiiyuktii eva aJikllriidikiirymJl kii-
iti jainii!l.) ekiintaviidilla!l would be a surprising
label for the lains given that they are more commonly known as allekiintaviidins; indeed it
seems that may be using the word jainii!l there to refer to Buddhists rather
than lains because on p. 171 of MatV VP he attributes this same view to his Buddhist op-
ponent. Prof. Sanderson provided me with another instance of this usage at Haravijaya
47.51: ... jaillair uditii bhavabhaJigahetzllz
Chapter 2: Self-Awareness
211
sume that the group of four is intimated in the previous verse
7
and that those
referred to as one-sided philosophers those he is about to attack: Vedan-
7 From the previous verse's mention of kartii, bodhena. bodhyam and buddhvii we
could see references to, respectively, kartr, karma and kriyii; or since the last
three of those words from the previous verse pertain to cognition rather than action, and
jiiiitii is also mentioned as well as kartii, we could see a reference to the group offour that
is mentioned by Vatsyayana in a similar context at the beginning of the
namely, pramiitr, prameya and pramiti: tatra yasyepsiijilziisiiprayuktasya pravr-
ttilz sa pramiitii, sa yeniirthmJl yo 'rtha;lz pramfyate tat prame-
yam, yad arthavijiiiinal.n sii pramitilz, caivm.nvidhiisu tattvm!l [variant: arthata-
ttvmJl] parisamiipyate (NBha(NCG) 1,13-15).
A similar verse to Sadyojyotis' occurs in the Mrgendratantra (1.2.13) in the context
of refuting Vedanta: atha tatriitmii prameyatvmJl prapadyate I yatraitad ubha-
ymJl tatra api sthitam II 'If there is a means of knowing that, then the Self be-
comes an object of knowledge. Where this pair (i.e. means of knowing and object of
knowledge) [occur], all four exist.' (Hulin's translation of this verse does not seem cor-
rect. Rather than seeing the first three words of the verse as a suggestion for how the
Vedantin may defend his doctrine that there is only one Self in the universe, and the rest
as giving a consequence of that that undermines the Vedantin, he takes tatra to mean
'here', atha to mean 'in sum' (despite gloss of it as yadi), and pramii-
to be in apposition with iitmii: 'lei, en somme, Ie Soi-qui est Ie moyen de connais-
sance droite-devient (en plus) l'objet a connaitre' (Hulin 1980 70).) fa-
ther, in commenting on this, quite naturally takes the four to be pramiitr,
prameya and pramiti, which he explains as kal1r, kanna and kriyii. He
concludes with, yad iiha iilqapiidalz. caivmJlvidhiisu sarvo 'pi vyavalziira!l pari-
samiipyate', which must be a citation of a slightly different version of the last sentence of
the passage given above. That Iayanta also knew a version of the Nyiiya-
passage that contained the words vyavalziira!l parisamiipyate is plausible given his
commentary on the passage: tad ayam ilza pramiitii prameymJl pramitir iti ca-
NM(K); caturvarga eva NM(M)] vyavahiira!l parisam-
iipyate (NM(M) Vol. 1, 38,8-9). Thus when Sadyojyotis writes kartriidillii
vyavahiira!l samiipyate it is likely that he had (such a version of) the pas-
sage in mind. Since would certainly have read his father's commentary on
the Mrgelldra, and thus been familiar with, the s group of four and the claim
that they are all needed for vyavalziira, it is strange that he does not interpret Sadyojyotis
as intending that group (or at least the related kartr. kanna and kriyii). I
can only think that he deliberately distorted the meaning of the verse because he wanted
to bring up in his commentary the Buddhist (lIain?) view that the kiirakas are of the na-
212
tins.
8
1.4 criticizes the Vedantin doctrine of the oneness of everything on the
grounds that there are no means of knowing that oneness, scripture included.
1.5 is the verse under discussion and 1.6ab says that the non-existence of ob-
jects is also incorrect, because they are experienced.
Returning to 1.5, we ask how accurate Rfu:nakaJ;ltha's interpretation is.
One might wonder if he is correct to assume that the non-existence mentioned
in the fIrst half of the verse refers to the non-existence of the Self, given that
the Self is not mentioned. But the way that Sadyojyotis turns in the next verse
to 'the non-existence of the object too' means that objects are not the focus of
the present verse, making the Self quite plausible. Hence RamakaJ;ltha is
probably also correct that in the phrase pratyaye the emphasis is
on the witness rather than all the objects that it witnesses (sarvaO).
And it is thus natural for him to take sanyatii to mean ' emptiness [of Self]'.
9
That leaves just one possible discrepancy between the two authors.
sarvasiik#ni may not be agreeing with pratyaye-: its locative ending may be
indicating the object of the cognition denoted by pratyaye (' given that there is
a cognition of the witness of all objects '). Rfu:nakaJ;ltha takes the two words as
ture of a causal complex without each member of the complex having its own defined and
separate role.
8 That it is Vedantins, and not Buddhists (or Jains), that Sadyojyotis has in mind in
this verse is perhaps made yet more likely by the fact that in the Mrgendra verse quoted in
the last footnote it is Vedantins that are the target. Possibly the label ekiintaviidin did not
so much connote 'one-sided' as refer to the Vedantin teaching that all is one, in which
case one could translate it as 'absolutist' or 'monist'.
9 That RilmakaI).!:ha does take silnyatli in that way can be inferred both from the last
sentence of the last chapter and the one at the very end of this chapter: tad eVaJ.n sarva-
daikantpasthiragrlihakaprakiisiitmiiniiropita eva yena
svasaqlvedanasiddha!z, tena kiiraljeniitmasilnyii!z skandhii iti
eva. The word tena from the verse is clearly being glossed there by sarvadaikantpasthira-
griihakaprakiislitmliniiropita eva yena svasa/!lvedana-
siddhall, tena kiiraJ;tena; and bodhabiidhitli by Thus silnyatii ... sarve-
bhiiviiniilp is very likely being glossed with iitmasilnyli!z skandhii iti I trans-
late bhiivliniil.n as 'of all things' and not as 'of the psycho-physical con-
stituents', because I take it that RilmakaI).!:ha must have held this to be its meaning, even if
he regarded its most relevant connotation in the context as the psycho-physical consti-
tuents.
213
in agreement for doctrinal reasons: for him pratyaya (cognition) is the Self.
The two may not have been identifIed so strongly for Sadyojyotis.
2. RamakaJ).!ha's Own View. Is It Different from the
Buddhist View?
yady eVaJp jiiiiniitmani griihakasvantpe praty-
saty abhlivo niitmana!z sakyall pratiplidayitllln, anubhavasiddha-
tvlit. bhoktrtva/.n hi jiiiitrtvam ucyate tad eva ca piiramlirthikalll iitmano
rilpam. tac ca bhavadbhir apy anubhavasiddham ity uktam. ata!z kjm anyat
siidhyam iti.
[Siddhantin:] In that case, since something of the nature of cognition that is
engaged in witnessing all objects and is by nature a perceiver is proved by di-
rect perception, the nOll-existence of the Self call/lOt be demonstrated, because
it is established by experience. For being a perceiver is said to be [the same
as] being an experiencer; and it is simply that (i.e. being -a perceiver) that is
the ultimate form of the Self. 10 And even you have said that that (i.e. being a
perceiver) is proved by experience. So what else is there to prove?
10 RilmakaI).!:ha's claim in the previous sentence that 'the non-existence of the Self
cannot be demonstrated, because it is established by experience' follows because 1) as
just stated, cognition (jiililllitman) is proved by direct experience, and 2) cognition is not
differj!nt from the Self. 2 is what is argued for in this sentence in two ways: first by equat-
ing jiiiitrtva and bhoktrtva; and then by equating jliiitrtva and the Self (or, strictly speak-
ing, identifying the fomer as the ultimate form of the latter). In both equations jliiitrtva,
which RiimakaI).!:ha is using synonymously with jniina, features as that which is accepted
by the Buddhist, and that with which it is equated is what RilmakaI).!:ha holds they should
also accept.
That RilmakaI).!:ha is using jiilitrtva synonymously with jiilina is evidenced not only
by the flow of the argument here, where 2 would only be established if that were the case,
but also in what follows. For in the next sentence RilmakaI).!:ha claims that the Buddhist
has said thatjiiiitrtva is proved by experience, when what he actually said in the last chap-
ter was that jiiana was proved by experielfce. Then when the Buddhist responds to these
sentences he uses the words vijiiiinam asmlibhi!z pratipiiditalll. That is to say he talks of
the vijiiiina that is taught by him, not of the jiiiitrtva that is taught by him-which would
214
RamakaJ?tha's commentary on this verse does not begin here. The entire pas-
sage translated in the last chapter was' his introduction to this verse, coming
as it did after he had finished with Vedanta, the topic of the last verse. Be-
cause he interprets the verse to mean that acceptance of cognition engaged in
perceiving objects precludes the possibility of holding that there is no Self, he
decides that before he comes to the verse his Buddhist will have argued for
the existence of cognition.
ll
What is clever and distinctive about Rama-
kaJ?tha's strategy is that he has his Buddhist achieve that aim through refuting
all of the other principal Atmavadin traditions in a manner that opposes an
uncontroversial and universally experienced cognition with the invisible and
fanciful chimera of a soul that serves no explanatory function whatsoever.
Thus he signals that his own version of atmavada and his arguments for it
will not contain the shortcomings that the Buddhist has correctly, in his opin-
ion, identified in those of the BrahmaJ).ical realist schools. And when he now .
turns to what is wrong with the Buddhist view, his sympathy with and under-
standing of it, evidenced in the previous portion of the text, will make his cri:"
tique seem all the more convincing. The way that the Buddhist is so clearly
on top in the previous pages, being invested with a false sense of security be-
fore being brought down to earth in the present chapter, is akin to a reversal
of fortune in story-literature, when nemesis finally strikes.
be a natural response to tae ea (= jiilitrtvG1!l ea) blzavadbhir apy anllbhavasiddham ity llk-
tam.
Any implication of identity between j1ilitr and jiilina would be anathema to a
Naiyayika or a V and it goes against the grain of Sanskrit usage in that jiilitr is an
agent noun and jlilina is an action noun. But for both Buddhism and for RamakaJ.l!ha,
there is no agent of cognition separate from cognition. The word grlihaka can naturally be
used both as a synonym of the agent noun jiilitr and to refer to the nature of cognition.
Hence it is not surprising that in this context where it is held that the jiilitr is nothing other
than jiilina, RamakaJ?!ha inserts grlihakasvarilpa as a synonym of jiilinlitma, and in the
Buddhist response, qualifies vijiilinam with grlihakarilpam.
Though it is true that in both the Buddhist and the Saiva view jiilitr is nothing other
than jiilina, one could state the difference between them as being that whereas for Bud-
dhism there is no agent of cognition (jiilitr), only the action of cognition (jiilina), for
RamakaJ?!ha there is an agent of cognition but it is cognition.
11 The whole of the passage looked at in the last chapter was thus in effect a commen-
tary on the phrase pratyaye
215
We will now look closely at these sentences. RamakaJ?tha says tl:;1at.given the
existence of cognition which is 1) engaged in perceiving objects, 2) a per-
ceiver by nature, and 3) established through direct experience, the Self cannot
be denied. If we look back at the very first sentence spoken by the Buddhist,12
and one from the very end of the last chapter,13 we can see that these three
qualifiers of cognition are all picking up on claims that the Buddhist has
made. Thus RamakaJ?tha is effectively claiming that the Buddhist, in the
course of refuting the Self of the Naiyayikas, the V and the SaDkhyas
was inadvertently arguing for a Saiva one. Of course he is being dis-
ingenuous, but what enables him to pretend to such a claim is that, whereas
for Naiyayikas and the Self exists as a further entity beyond cog-
nition, for RamakaJ?tha the Self is cognition itself. He stands with Buddhism
against the BrahmaJ).ical realist traditions in denying a Self beyond cognition:
That is the point of his finishing his opening sentences with, 'So what else is
there to prove?'
It is not true, obviously, that there is no more to the Saiva view than the Bud-
dhist one; but equally the correspondence between the two is real, and not
something that RamakaJ?tha propagates here merely as a sophistical device. 1)
RamakaJ?tha has no quibble with any of the arguments that the Buddhist used
in the last chapter to argue against Nyaya and V for they concerned a.
Self beyond cognition, which is, in RamakaJ?tha' s view, just as much as in the
view of Buddhism, both unperceivable and uninferrable. 2) Whereas for
Nyaya and cognition is a quality that adventitiously rises in the
perceiver caused by, among other things, the presence of an object, for Bud-
dhism and for RamakaJ?tha the perceiver just is cognition. 3) For Buddhism
and for RamakaJ?tha, cognition, in revealing objects, reveals itself as well.
Both employ the metaphor of light to convey this idea. It is opposed to the
idea that a cognition is known, not by itself, but by a subse-
quent cognition. 4) In the KiraJ}avrtti ad 2.25ab RamakaJ?tha argues that cog-
12 yady evam, bhedasya satyatvlit pratisarfram iva pratyarthal]l ea bii-
hyasylirthasYlinaharikiirlispadasyliharikiirlispadGl.n vijiilinGl.n bhinnam eva grlihakam anll-
bhavasiddham astll (8,17-20).
13 pradfpavat svaparaprakiisaikasvabhlivatvena vijiilinam
anllbhavasiddhGl!l nlipahnotlll]l sakyam iti (12,14-15).
216.
nition does not reside in any substrate (asraya) other than itself and supports
this by claiming that nor do other qualities such as taste. He defends this with
almost identically worded arguments as the Buddhist in the last chapter
to argue for the same view. In KV the view is attributed to 'us', Buddhists
and Sankhyas; whereas in NPP to 'us' and Sankhyas. It is striking that Rama-
kat;ttha is prepared to vary so little the wording of the view and the supporting
arguments and yet have 'us' in NPP referring to Buddhists, and in KV to
Saivas.
One can discern a hierarchy in Ramakat;ttha's view of his opponents (or at
least of their theories of Self) in which (ironically, given that they, like Rama-
kat;ttha, are Atmavadins) the Naiyayikas, and Sankhyas come be-
neath the Buddhists; and it is as though he delegates to the Buddhist the task
of dismissing the views of those three traditions, before turning to the more
difficult task of refuting the Buddhist, for which he himself will finally have
h
h 14
to open IS mout .
nanu ea pratyarthGl[l pratik$a1J.al[l ea bhinnam evedGl[l griihakariipGl[l vijiiii-
nam asmiibhi[z pratipiiditam, na tv iitmiibhidlziina[z kas cit sarviirthasiik$i-
bhiito 'rtha[z. yadi ea tad eviisiiv ity ucyate, bhavatu niimabheda[z parGln, sar-
ve1J.a tv iitmaviidinii sthiran7po 'sau darsallfya[z
[Buddhist] But what I was teaching was this perceiving cognition that is
completely different with respect to every object and in every moment. [I
14 In a text of RamakaI).!ha's only citations of which survive (the Sarviigamapriimii-
{zyopanyiisa) he details the level of liberation attained by thinkers of rival systems. Naiya-
yikas are there in fact placed slightly higher than Buddhists: the former are said to read;!
buddhitattva and the latter are placed 'in the products of buddhi' (buddhivrttau) (see
Goodall 1998 xxii-xxiv); Thus it seems that the hierarchy implicit in NPP's treatment of
Nyaya and Buddhist opponents (where what is being judged could be said to be superior-
ity of argumentation) does not correlate with his hierarchy in the different context of the
highest level of the universe attainable by those opponents (where the conclusions they
hold could be said to be more important). The second hierarchy is scriptural so probably
he would not have felt free to change it even if he had wanted to. (Elsewhere, for example
in MatV VP ad 6.21cd, p. 154,15, RiimakaI).!ha states that the Buddhist view of no-Self
(nairiitmyadarsalUi) has as its result the attaining of buddhitattva, i.e. he does not differ-
entiate the level attainable by the Buddhists from that attainable by the Naiyayikas.)
was] not [teaching] some thing by the name 'Self', a witness of all ?bjects.
15
. And if [you] say 'the [Self] is simply that (i.e. perceiving cognition)" let there .
be just (param) a difference of name,16 but all Atmavadins should present
17
the [Self] as enduring.
217
Throughout the whole of the last chapter the Buddhist addressed himself to
non-Saivas. Ramakat;ttha did not state his own view at all, allowing the Bud-
dhist to win all confrontations, thereby giving the impression that he con-
curred with Buddhist arguments. Now that Ramakat;ttha has, in the previous
sentences, finally used his own voice, the differences between the Saiva view
and the Buddhist view can be examined.
Ramakat;ttha tried in the previous sentences to subsume the Buddhist view
within the Saiva, and predictably the Buddhist pulls away here, not wishing
to be ensnared in a Saiva net. Both sides agree that there is no further entity
beyond cognition; but for the Buddhist cognition is momentary, whereas for
Ramakat;ttha it is a stable Self. It is not so much a dispute over the existence
or non-existence of an entity, but rather over the nature of an entity they both
agree to exist.
iti eet, ucyate niitra bhavadabhyupagamo 'ligatveniismiibhir ukta[z. na hi
pratidarsanGl[l vyavasthiipakiiniil[l sarvapramiitfJ:liim
l8
anubhavabheda[z sam-
bhavati, tasya svabhiivasiddhatviit. yad iihu[z19
jiiiinal[l praty abhiliipdl[l ea sadrsau balapa1J.fj.itau II iti.
tat sa eviiyGl.n sakalalokaprasiddha[z sviinubhavo niriipyatiim.
[Siddhantin:] If you say that,20 then [we] reply that we did not say that accep-
tance by you was needed for [our conclusion]. For thl!. direct experience
21
of
15 For the Buddhist, cognition witnesses only one object. By the time another object is
witnessed it is another cognition doing the witnessing.
16 The Buddhist would not have a problem with the idea that there is a difference of
name only, if this meant acceptance of the Self as something different in every moment.
17 Or 'should see'.
18 vyavastlziipakiiniil[l sarvapramiitfJ:liim Ked, Ped; pramiitfJ:liim vyavastlziipakiiniim
B; vyavasthiipakiiniil[l pramiitfJ:liim P.
19 VaPa III sambandhasamuddesa 55cd.
20 The Buddhist's speech began with 'a nallu and ended with an iti eet. There is an-
other example of this in the text nan v adr$!GI[l karmaiviismiibhir i$Yata iti eet (120,9).
218
all knowers who set out [views] in the different philosophical traditions can-
not differ, because it (i.e. direct experience) is established [entirely] by [its]
own nature [not at all by the mental conditioning of knowers]. As they say:
With respect to cognition and language, children and the wise are
alike.
Therefore this very experience of oneself, which is readily known py the
whole world, must be examined.
Ramaka:r;t!ha jokes here that he never said Buddhist acceptance was a neces-
sary requirement of his position. Ramaka:r;t!ha has claimed that the Self is es-
tablished by direct experience (anublzavasiddlza); and the Buddhist has
claimed that momentary cognition is established by direct experience. So the
urgent task is to focus on that language-defying, pre-conceptual experience
(anublzava) which is the same for everyone, whether Saiva, Buddhist, wise
person or fool. The point behind Ramaka:r;ttha's joke is that he can go straight
to an examination of anublzava to test his conclusion without the Buddhist
way-laying him. Refuting Buddhist arguments or convincing Buddhists of
Saiva arguments are insignificant compared to that examination.
In the last chapter the Buddhist repeated in each of his arguments that his
concept, cognition, unlike the Self of his opponents, was anublzavasiddlza.
The unchallenged assumption throughout the chapter was that the Buddhist
concept of momentary cognition was indeed an accurate reflection of the way
we experience the perceiver of objects, i.e. the way we experience ourselves.
All of the arguments were therefore ones that only the Buddhist could win,
since they were contests between an established (siddlza), visible en-
tity and an unestablished, invisible one. But Ramaka:r;t!ha's Self, since it is
simply the cognition that we all experience, is not Hence he attempts
to reverse the status quo of the last chapter, and claims that anublzava actually
Schmithausen pointed out that in such cases we need not view one as redundant, for the
nanu can be seen as part of the contents of the objection and the iti cet as a genuine frame
element.
21 Ramakrugha sometimes uses the word anubhava as a general word for experience
(for example in the phrase anubhavavirodha), but he also uses it in a more restricted
sense, as here, to denote the kind of experience which is identical in all knowers, namely
direct, pre-conceptual experience of things, unmediated by our interpretative categories.
Chapter 2: Self-Awareness 219
supports the concept of a Self, not that of momentary cognition. This anu-
blzava. then, as Ramaka:r;ttha says in his last sentence, must be examined.
This sets the parameters for the ensuing discussion. The enquiry has become
less metaphysical and logical, and more experiential and empirical. Infer-
ences and refutations will recede into the background for a while and direct
experience of ourselves, svlinublzava, which is the same for all of us, appear-
ing to us before we impose our own culturally conditioned concepts on to it,
will be examined. For the build-up so far (the first chapter and this chapter up
to here) has established that it is on this point and this point only that Rama-
ka:r;ttha disagrees with Buddhism, namely whether this pre-conceptual cogni-
tion is stable (stlzira) or momentary
When cognition features in Nyaya and V arguments for the existence
of the Self, it is used as the starting point from which to prove the litman.
This is done in a variety of ways: cognition is said to be an action that there-
fore requires an agent (jtilitr); or to be a process (blzliva) that therefore re-
quires a bearer of that process (blzavitr); orto be a quality (gUl}a) that there-
fore requires a substrate or possessor of that quality (lisraya, gUl}in); or the
Jinguistic usage of the word cognition is seen as pointing to a further entity
that is its subject ('X cognizes Y', 'The thing which cognizes ... '); or the Self
is postulated as some kind of cause of cognition.
22
Ramaka:r;ttha's discussion
is thus unusual in that once cognition has been proved, he does not have to
prove anything beyond it: rather he simply has to prove that it is non-
momentary. 23
The text is reaching a climax. Ramaka:r;t!ha articulates precisely what needs to
be determined.
22 This could be either inherence cause (which would make this argument essentially
the same as that from cognition as quality); or empirical cause, which would make this
more of a 'philosophy of nature' argument along the lines that in order to explain the
corning into existence of cognition, the Self is required as a causal factor. (This is Oetke's
(1988 282-283) judgement of one of PraSastapiida's arguments, where he terms cognition
prasiddhi and the Self its praslidhaka.)
23 I say 'simply" there, not wanting to suggest that this will be an easy task for Rama-
l
kaI).!ha (far from it), but to bring out that in terms of ontology this constitutes a major dif-
ference.
kilp pratyarthmp ciipurvo 'purva!z purvottariibhyiim [Ked p. 14]
anllbhaviibhyiilp bhinna!z24 griihaka!z prakiisata lIta
sarvadaiviibhinna
25
iti:
Does the perceiver shine forth as different from the earlier and subsequent ex-
perience, ever new with regard to every object and in every moment, its form
appearing only for a moment, or does it shine forth as always the same?
3. Does the Perceiver Shine Forth as Stable or Mo-
mentary (Sthiragriihakaprakiisa or
Bhinnagriihakaprakiisa) ?
After that build up, in which there was a gradual homing in on the crucial is-
sue that separates the two sides, RamakaJ;l!:ha now attempts to answer the
question he has set himself by giving in one long sentence a rhetorical de-
scription of the way we experience ourselves.
3.1 tatriiya1Jz sthiranlpa[t prakiisa!z sarvadaiva griihyopiidhi
26
bhede 'py an-
iisviidita
27
sviitmabheda[t, kiilatraye 'pi tirask.rtasvagatapriigablziivapradhva-
,.nsiiblziiva!z, niiniividhapramiilJiidyanekacittav(ftylldayavyayasalpvedane 'py
akampitatadgriihaka
28
sthairyavedana[t, apl9 avilllptajyoti[t,
apy akhalJrjitasvasmpvit, satatam eva svaprakiisatvena gamyatviid
24 bhinnah Ped; omitted in Ked'c; bhinnao Ked
Pc
, B; bhinnalao P. bhinnah makes best
. .
sense, and is supported by the parallel sentence in the (see
note 30).
25 aiviibhinna B, P, Ped, Ked
Pc
; aiva bhinna Ked'c.
26 griihyopiidhz
oO
P, Ked, Ped; griihyopiidt B.
27 aniisviidita em. Sanderson; aniisiidita Ked, Ped, B, P. See Matangav(tti p. 172: ...
sarvadaiva griihyopiidhibhede 'py aniisviiditasviitmabheda!z kiilatraye 'pi ... attention to
which is drawn in note 116 on page 197 of Goodall 1998 in the context of this emendation
by Prof. Sanderson. See also ad 43: ... sarvadaiva griihyopii-
dhibhede 'py aniisviiditasviitmabheda[t kiilatraye 'pi ... (AP 294,28).
28 akampitatadgriihaka Ked, B, P; akampitatattadgriihaka Ped.
29 apy Ked
Pc
, Ped, B, P; vrttyantariile pi Ked'c.
221
iitmapadapratipiidya[t svasmpvedanasiddha[t, iti kim atriinyena
siidhanena.
,
30 Goodall (1998 xxiv) points out that a distinctive feature of Riimakart!ha's writing is
his consistency of expression when treating the same topic in different texts. The fact that
occasionally large sections of text are repeated almost word-for-word in other of his texts
is a great help for an editor, meaning' that corruptions c,an sometimes be easily spotted and
removed. This passage, for example, occurs almost unchanged in the
rikiiv(tti and the Matangav(tti. The most recent edition of the former reads: ... niima tat.
sa [correct to: ... niill111. tat sa] eviinapahnavanfyasvabhiivo nirapyatiim. kilP
purva[t piirva!z [correct to: apurvo 'purva!z, also the reading of MSS] piirvottara-
bhinna!z griihaka!z prakiisata atha [correct, per-
haps, to: lIta] sarvadaiva. bhinna iti tatriiym.n [correct to: sarvadaiviibhinna iti. tatriiym.n]
sthiranlpa[t prakiisa!z sarvadaiva griihyopiidhibhede 'py aniisviiditiitmabheda!z kiilatraye
'pi tirask.rtasvapriigablziivapradhvmpsiiblziiva!z, niiniividhapramii(ziid [correct to: pra-
miilJiid/, also the reading of MSS] anekacittavrttylldayavyayasalJlvedane 'py ekam api
[correct ekam api to: akampita, also the reading of MSS]tadgriihakasthairyavedana!z,
[correct to: also the reading of MSS] apy avilllptajyoti!z,
apy akhalJrjitasvasmpvit, satatam eva svaprakiisatvena gamyatviid iitmapada-
pratipiidya!z svasmpvedanasiddha!z, iti kim atriinyena siidhanena (AP 294,
25-32). Thus putting these two texts side-by-side enables, in the space of three sentences,
improvement of NPP in two places and of PMNKV in six or seven places. The MSS re-
ferred to in this note, and subsequent notes giving passages from PMNKV, are all from
South India. One was collated by me during my doctoral research, and the rest, since then,
by Dominic Goodall as part of our project to critically edit and translate the text for the
first time.
The parallel passage in the Matangav(tti reads, na griihyabhede 'pi griihakiitmii Yll-
gapad iva kramelJiipi bhinno 'vablziisate. api tu sarvadaiva griihyopiidhibhede 'py anii-
sviiditasviitmabheda[t, kiilatraye 'pi tiras!qtasvagatapriigabhiivapradhvm!zsiibhiiva[t, nii-
niividhapramiilJiidyanekacittav(ftyudayasm!zvedane 'py akampitatadgriihakasthairyave-
dana[t, v.rttyantariile 'py avilllptajyoti[t, apy aklza(zrjitasvasm.nvit, satatam evii-
rthiivagamakatvena bhiisaniid iitmapadapratipiidya!z svasmpvedanasiddha!z
sthira eva [sthira eva ii, r, 1'; sthirabhiiva ed.], iti kim atriinyena siidhanena (MatV VP
172,16-21).
KV ad 2.25ab, 53,2-3 reads: iitmii svasmpvedanena svapariitmaprakiisatayii pratipu-
sidhyati, kim anyena siidhanena. Goodall translates the first part of this as 'A soul
is proved to exist in every man by one's own experience as being manifest both to itself
and to other souls.' I cannot see any other 'Yay of taking it, but it does not seem satisfac-
tory. How could I know through self-awareness that I was manifest to another soul? I
would suggest that we emend prakiisatayii to prakiisakatayii. It might be objected that
222
3.1 With regard to that question (tatra), this
3
! stable shining forth,32 which is
ever-present (sarvadaiva), is established for every person through self-
this is not much of an improvement: in what sense do I know my Self through self-
awareness to be the revealer of other selves? But RamakaI).tha makes this claim else-
where. See, for example, Mataligavrtti 6.35b-d, p.' 175,8-9: eValJl svaparatmaprakiisa-
kataya jiianasaktiriipe1}a paramariac catma pratyaka ukta[t. The answer seems to be that
I can know my Self as the inferrer (anumatr) of other SeJves. See for example MatV VP
ad 2.1, p. 22,8-9: sa ca sarvartlzaprakiisakataya paratmanumatrtvena fparatmanuma-
trtvena ed.; paramatma1}ll1natratvena a; paranumatratvena a, e; paratmanumatratvena T,
u, n ca pratyatma,W'Jl svasGlJlvedanasiddho bhinna eva nityo vyapakas ca. The point of
RamakaI;ltha mentioning in such passages that the Self is the revealer of other people's
Selves is to counter the Vedantin rejection of a plurality of Selves.
3! The force of ayal.n is probably: this shining forth which is immediately present for
all of us.
32 The question to which this sentence responds asks whether the perceiver (grahaka)
shines forth (prakiisate) as divided or undivided. Thus it might be best to assume an un-
derstood grahakasya in this sentence to go with prakiisa. (It would be both a subjective
and an objective genitive, for in the constant act of prakiisa that this sentence describes,
the perceiver is both that which illuminates and that which is thereby illuminated.) As fur-
ther support for understanding a grahakasya it could also be pointed out that in a couple
of sentences, at the end of this speech, he refers to that which he has been arguing for as
sthiragrahakaprakiisa. But the various compounds in this sentence agreeing with
prakiisa!l attribute mental functions to it such as sensing, experiencing and self-
consciousness; and it is said to be 'denoted by the word Self' atmapadapratipadya!/.
Would we not expect these to be qualifications of the perceiver itself, rather than of the
way it appears to us, its shining forth? This shows that for RamakaI).tha there is no impor-
tant difference between the perceiver (grahaka) and the shining forth of the perceiver
(grahakaprakiisa). We do not really need to understand a grahakasya because the word
prakiisa itself refers to the Self in this sentence: it is the light of consciousness that illu-
minates objects and itself. (Thus we could even analyse the compound grahakaprakiisa,
when RamakaI).tha uses it, not as a but as a Karmadharaya: 'illumination [i.e.
the Self] that perceives'.)
It might appear strange to some that prakiisa, which here, picking up on prakiisate in
the previous sentence, denotes not a thing but an action, refers nevertheless to the per-
ceiver. This takes us back to the point that for Saivism in general and RamakaI).tha in par-
ticular the Self is envisaged not (only) as a static entity but (also) as a process: it is not
different fromjiianaivijiiana ('cognition'), which are action nouns. How the Self can be
both an unchanging thing and a process or action will be further exanJined in Chapter 4,
. Chapter 2: Self-Awareness
experience,33 not sensing a division of its own nature even though its delimit-
ers, namely objects, do differ; having no sense of its non-existence before it
[comes into being] or non-existence after it is destroyed
34
even in all three
times;35 even though experiencing the rise and fall of many mental events of
various kinds such as means of knowledge,36 its experience of the stability of
the perceiver of those unshaken;37 its radiance uninterrupted even between
thoughts; its self-consciousness unbroken even in deep sleep etc. (= fainting,
coma); being conveyed by the word 'Self' because it is constantly perceived
as the shining forth of oneself/itself. So what is the need of any other means
of proving it?
223
He has not given an argument here; he has just described the way we appear
to ourselves, assuming that it will ring true, and he says there is no need of
any other means of proof. In what follows he moves from description to arg-
ument, claiming that familiar features of the world would not occur at all if
we did not experience ourselves in the way he has just described. But that
does not contradict his last comment that we do not need means of proof to
but it can be noted in passing that one Saiva doctrine that facilitates it is that of the non-
difference between a thing and its powers or properties.
33 There are several other possible ways of construing the general structure of this
sentence depending on what one takes as predicate, what as adjectives to the subject, and
whether one takes some of the qualifiers as dependent on svasGlpvedanasiddha.
34 Literally 'non-existence in it before [it comes into being] and non-existence in it af-
ter it is destroyed being hidden from it'. The parallel sentence in the
rikii actually reads just ... tiraskrtasvapriigabhiivapradhvGl!ISiiblzavo ... (see note 30).
Perhaps the a gata
O
was not in the original. Its entry could almost be explained by dittogra-
phy given that there is a ta only one syllable away and a ga only one syllable away. The
gata
O
does appear in the parallel passage in the MatV VP however.
35 I.e. we never have been nor will we ever be aware of a moment in which our con-
sciousness is yet to exist or has ceased to exist. Yet if, as the Buddhist claims, conscious-
ness not only is, but also appears to us as, momentary, we would expect some awareness
of these two kinds of non-existence. We would feel constantly new, as though what we
were in the last moment had just ceased to exist.
36 RamakaI).tha perhaps has in mind here the list of the five kinds of cittavrtti begin-
ning with pral1lii(w in YS 1.6: pral1lii(w, vipmyaya, vikalpa, nidra, slll!1i. He quotes this
siitra elsewhere in this text (ad 1.66).
37 However varied my thoughts and pe;ceptions etc., I never lose a sense that it is me
doing the thinking and perceiving.
224
establish the Self: the following is not an inference of the stability of Self, but
a consideration that implies we must experience ourselves as stable.
38
tlim eva cliblzilllllim allapliyillfl]l clitmasal]lvidam lisritya sarvai(l klillintara-
plzallilli ka17llli(lY lirablzyante. tll tasyli(z sarvavyavalzlirapratyasta-
maya(z, SarVlillllblzavlilllil]l dhval]lsatlilll
nlintare
39
samblzavliblzlivlit kah pravarteta
40
kutra kimG/1lzal]l vli yata(l. na hi
ksanlitlllavedinah ksanlintare
4i
'Illilzam lla
42
mama' iti pasyata[l pravrttir glza-
. . . . . .
rate.
38 For the point that the Self being established by self-awareness renders proofs point-
less, see KV ad 1.15: yadi vlillublzavasiddlzatvam allelllitmana(l pratiplidyate, allllblzava-
siddlzall lzetillllim allupayoglit. yatlzli glzaro 'yal]l lohita(z parivartula ity atrlillllbhava-
siddlzatvlill Illisya lzetll(l samblzavati, tatlzli grlilzaklitmany api parlitmaprakliSakatayli-
Illlblzavasiddlze(z stlzailyalll anllblzavasiddlzam eva tatlzlivagamlit, iti kim atra lzetunli kli-
I)'alll (17,15-19). Ramak8.IJti1a is there offering an explanation of why the verse under
comment simply states various facts about the Self, such as that it is eternal, instead of ar-
guing for them. Goodall translates, 'Alternatively the fact that the soul is established by
experience is expressed by this [speech of the Lord, in which the various arguments are
not related], since arguments are useless when something is established by experience. An
argument cannot apply, for example, to the assertion 'This pot is round and made of iron',
because in this case this fact is established by experience. And so, because the soul as an
agent of perception is also established by experience as something which makes manifest
other things and itself, its permanence is established by experience, because that is how it
is perceived. And so what could be done with [i.e. what would be the point of] reasons
here?' (I take it that the tatha correlates with the yatha; it is not clear whether Goodall
does. He punctuates with just a comma after anupayoglit and may be linking the yatlzli
clause more closely with what precedes it than what follows it.)
The same point had earlier been made by Utpaladeva (reference supplied by Prof.
Sanderson): kartari jiilitari svlitmallY lidisiddlze malzesvare I aja{llitmli vli
siddlzilll vli vidadlzrta ka(z II (lsPraKa 1.2). Torella translates, 'What intelligent being could
ever deny or establish the cognizer and agent, the Self, Mahesvara, established from the
beginning?'
39 Ked, Ped, B; P.
40 pravarteta Ped; pravartate Ked, B, P. B's reading looks slightly more like pravart-
ate than pravarteta since the right-hand side of the interlinear horizontal line that repre-
sents e falls above the second of the t's. But it is not impossible that the scribe wrote
pravarteta, as in some cases his interlinear markings extend to the right of the sign that
they modify.
41 Ked, B, P; 'pi Ped.
And everyone undertakes actions that have results at a subsequent time rely-
ing on this same undivided and unceasing self-awareness. But if it were mo-
mentary then all action would cease, since who would act, in what circum-
stances (kufra), or for what purpose, because no experience could exist in an-
other moment, perishing [as it would] after the momentary awareness [of it]
For action is not appropriate for someone
who knows their self I themself for [only] an instant, thinking with respect to
another moment 'that is not me [and] it doesn't belong to me.,44
225
The mere fact that we act indicates that our self-experience is stable. If we
felt disconnected from adjacent moments we would not bother to do anything
because it would not be us that would benefit from the fruit.
iti nirfhal]l heyoplideyabuddhivikalam amitlzyli-
jiilillalll viclirabodlzlidyallekajiilillasilnYal!1 jagad etad bhavet, iti sarvlillu-
bhavavirodha(z, sthiragrlihakapraklisapilrvakatvlid evamlider iti.
45
42 nlihal!l Ila Ked, B, P; nlilzal]l Ped.
43 Alternatively, 'after [being] a sensation for an instant.'
44 We could take as inside the iti clause: 'thinking "in another moment,
there will be no I and no mine'''.
45 Again, if the editors of PMNKV had located this parallel passage in NPP they
would have enabled improvement of their texts. The latest edition of PMNKV reads: tlim
eVlitmaSal]lvidam abhinnlim anapliyinfl!l clisritya sarvai(z klillintaraphallini ka17llli{lY lira-
bhyante. tll tasyli(l sarvavyavalzlirapratyastamayam [correct to: pratyasta-
maya(z] sarvajlilinlinlil!l sambhavlibhlivlit
ka(z pravarteta kutra kimartlzal]l vli? yata(z [the editions of both texts wrongly punctuate
after the vli, instead of after the yata(z] na hi [perhaps correct to:
tmavedilla(z, and probably include NPP's 'nlihalJl na mama' iti pasyata(z
pravrttir glzarate. iti Ilirfhal]l praklisamlitralJl lzeyoplideyabuddlzivikalal]l
mitlzylijlilinaviclirabodlzlidy[MSS read blidlzlid/']anekajlilinasilIlYal!1 jagad bhavet. [re-
move punctuation] stlziragrlilzakapraklisapilrvatvlid [correct to: pz7rvakatvlid] evamlide(z
sarvasyetyanapahnavallfyo 'yal!l prakliso vyavahliralzetllblzz7ta(1 klillintarablzliviplzalapra-
vrttiklira{lGl!l sarvadaiva [correct to the reading of the MSS: sarvair eva] syat (PMNKV
294,32-295,2).
a) If bodlzlid/ is the correct reading, then the corruption blidhlid/ has entered
the transmission of both MatV VP and PMNKV. If badhad/ is the correct reading then
the corruption bodhad/ has entered the trl1smission of NPP and PMNKV. This assumes
of course that Ramak8.IJtha wrote the same word in all three texts. The reason I point this
out is given in note 82.
226
Therefore creatures would become desireless/inactive, established in the shin-
ina forth of nothina but their own inner nature, without any idea of things to
'" '"
be abandoned and things to be appropriated, without false knowledge, [and]
devoid of many [other, positive] kinds of cognition such as deliberation and
realization. Therefore [, if we take your view that the perceiver appears as mo-
mentary,] there is an incompatibility with all experience, because things like
this (evalllader) (i.e. desire, action, deliberation etc.) depend upon the shining
forth of a steadfast perceiver.
As we have seen, for Ramakal).!ha the perceiver is simply cognition (jiiiilla,
vijiiiina), not some further entity in which cognition inheres. Since, as he has
just described, the perceiver appears to us pre-conceptually as, and therefore
is, stable and undivided over time, so too must cognition be. It was the norm
in Indian Philosophy to view cognition as momentary; not only was that the
A parallel passage in the Matmigavrtti (ad 6.23) runs: tam eva hi sthirataram atllla-
sa1Jlvidam asritya sarvaib ktiltintaraphaltini kanna(lY arabhyallte. tu tasya(l
sarvavyavaharapratyastalllayat sarvajliananal!l
antare sambhavabhavatab ka(l pravarteta [pravarteta il, r; pravartate ed.] kutra [kutra il,
r, r; tatl'a ed.] killlarthGl!l va. iti nirfha1Jl heyopadeyabuddhivikala1Jlmithyajlianavicaraba-
dhadyanekajlianasllnya1Jl jagad bhavet. iti sGl11avyavaharabhavaprasGligab [sarvavyava-
harabhavaprasGligab corr.; sarvavyavahara bhavaprasGliga(z ed.] sthirabodhaplll1
l
aka-
tvad evalllade(l sarvasyeti atmasiddhib, sthirasyaiva sa1Jlvedanasyatlllatvad ity uktal1l
(MatV VP 158,5-10). In NPP, in PMNKV (according to my corrections), and in the pas-
sage given in the next paragraph, ka(J pravarteta kutra killlarthGl!l va yata(l gives a reason
for sarvavyavaharapratyastamaya(J (and is itself justified by abhavat in the first two
cases and dhvastatvat in the third), whereas in the just quoted passage sarvavyava-
harapratyastalllayat gives a reason for kab pravarteta kutra killlal1ha1Jl va (and is itself
justified by abhavata(l). Each way seems possible.
A second parallel passage in the MatGligavrtti, fifteen pages after the one given in the
previous note, reads: tam eva ca[eva ca il, r, r; eva ed,]tmaSGl!lVidam abhinllal1l anapayi-
nfl!l casritya sarvai(l ktiltintaraphaltini kanna(lY arabhyallte. hi hi
conj. Sanderson; allityatve 'pi ed.; allityatve 'pi a;
'pi il, r, f] tasya(l sal1lavyavaharapratyastal1laya(J, sarvajllananal!l [opratyastalllayab, sar-
vajliananal!l ed.; pratyastal1layasal1lajliananal!1 ail jllanalltarotpattiktila eva dhvastatvat
[okala eva dhvastatvat ed.; kale 'stal1layatvat 5 MSS; kalastal1layasthatvat ail kab pra-
varteta [pravarteta ed.; pravartate 4 MSS] kutra [kutra ed. atab a] killlarthGl!1 va yatab
na ca tato 'nyat salJlvidrI7pm!1 pasyal1la it)' uktal1l. tad ayam anapallllavanfya eva graha-
ktitlllano jlianasya sal1lada sthiran7pa(J praktiso vyavaharahetubhlltab kalantarabhavi-
phalapravrttiktira(lGl!1 sGlllair eva (MatV VP 173,1-7).
227
view of Buddhists, but also of their' Naiyayika opponents. FQr the scholar
who is used to reading the works of these schools, it is thus hard not to regard
Ramakal).!ha's assertion that cognition is one and undivided as bizarre.
This feature of his philosophy will be further examined in Chapter 4. Here it
will just be remarked in passing that his acceptance of the Buddhist picture of
cognition as light, but rejection of the DharmakIrtian idea that perceiver
(griihaka) and perceived (griihya) are non-different, were both relevant. 1)
The metaphor of light was regarded by Ramakal).!ha as a suitable one to illus-
trate how cognition can be unchanging. When a light illuminates a series of
objects in turn, we do not think that the light flashes off between each object.
Rather we think of it as stable in its illumination despite the changing illumi-
nated objects. 2) If one accepts that perceiver and perceived are not different,
then since it is clearly the case that the objects we perceive change over time,
it will be harder to maintain that the cognition that perceives them remains
stable.
*****
The text given in this section (3.1), supplemented by Ramakal).!ha's response
to Buddhist objections to it given in the following discussion, is really the
core of Ramakal).!ha's account of the way in which the Self's existence is es-
tablished. I say this for several reasons. First, because it comes after the cli-
mactic build-up in which Ramakal).!ha gave the reader a sense that he was
homing in on the crux of the matter. Secondly, because he repeats the passage
almost verbatim on several other occasions in other of his texts (see the foot-
notes to the text). When the question of whether the perceiver is momentary
or enduring comes up and he wants to address the problem in some detail,
this passage usually occurs. Thirdly, because when it comes up and he does
not want to address it in detail, for example in the he refers to
this passage. He says there that he has shown in the
prakiiSa how the soul is established by experience to be always undivided
(abhinna) despite being the perceiver of many objects,46 by which I take him
46 sal1ladaiva hi krallle(lG yugapad apyabhinnam
evatl1latattval1l anubhavasiddhal1l iti darsital1l aSlllabhir (KV ad
1.15, p. 18,35-37).
228
to be referring to this passage.
47
And finally because of the huge number of
of the terms anubhavasiddha or svasaJ!lvedanasiddha, through-
out his writing, especially in NPP and the MataJigavrtti, as adjectives to the
Self. If one wanted to explain what he meant by describing the Self as
'proved by experience/self-awareness', and why he held it to be so, one
. would point to the passage in this section.
*****
It should be made clear that when RamakaI!!ha talks of and describes our self-
awareness, he is not talking of anything separate from object cognition. This
comes across more strongly in the parallel discussion in the MataJigavrtti
than in this NPP passage. See for example the following three sentences. 1)
'For there are not two cognitions, one of the object and one of the Self.
Rather it is this very object-awareness that, being established through self-
awareness, 'is the form of the Self. ,48 Thus one and the same cognition, in the
47 Goodall (KV p. 18 and 198) takes him to be referring to NPP ad 1.22, pp. 52-56,
part of a refutation of DharmakIrti's inference of momentariness from existence (sattva-
nl/mana). But that seems less likely than this passage. It does not refer to the Self as
anubhavasiddha; it does not talk in terms of bhillllatva/abhinnatva but
katva; and it does not state that the Self is a single perceiver of many objects. This pas-
sage, by contrast, is the longest explanation in NPP of the way that the Self is anubhava-
siddha; the sentence which introduces it-kil!l pratyarthaJ!1 capfirvo 'pfirva(l
pfirvottarabhyam anubhavabhyal!l bhinna(l grahaka(l praktisata
l/ta sarvadaivabhillna iti-uses in its second, and correct, option-sarvadaivabhinna-the
same wording as the KV sentence (sarvadaiva ... abhinnam); and it begins by making the
precise point that despite its objects changing, it never senses a difference in its nature ..
Furthermore, to understand Ramakargha as referring there to pp. 52-56 would make him
repetitive, for, as Goodall correctly identified, he has referred the reader to those pages
earlier in his commentary on the same verse.
There is one feature of the KV sentence that is not covered explicitly in the passage
of NPP we have just read: its mention of the Self perceiving its several objects sequen-
tially or simultaneously. That is a passing reference to another passage, which we will
discuss in Chapter 4.1, where he argues that since cognition is regarded as single when
perceiving several objects simultaneously, there is no reason why we should not regard it
as single when perceiving several objects over a sequence oftime (27,6-15).
48 na hi dvav l/palalllbhal/ [l/palambhal/ U, [, f; lIpalalllbhau stall ed.], eko 'rthasya,
aparas catmana(z, kil!l tzl tad eva U, [, f;
229
same action, both perceives an object and is aware of itself doing so Gust as a
lamp in one and the same flash illuminates both the objects around it and it-
self); and it is nothing other than that cognition that is the form of the Self.
2) 'And this awareness of objects shines forth as stable. ,49 Thus whereas in
the parallel passage of NPP that which is claimed to shine forth as stable is
the perceiver, here that is replaced by 'awareness of objects'. The two are not
different for Ramakrugha.
3) 'Because
50
this cognition, which is of the nature of both
knowing (pratyayai
1
and-because it is constantly engaged in perceiving ob-
jects-the Self, is established through self-experience as certainly stable, as it
is always52 objects.' Again we. that Ramakargha is not claiming
our awareness of cognition / the Self to be anything different from our aware-
ness of objects; for here he claims that cognition's stability consists in its
constant perception of objects:
I have presented these sentences as throwing light on the passage we have
just read in NPP, but I leave open the possibility that they represent an addi-
tional aspect of Ramakrugha' s thinking on this matter that was not part of it at
the time that he wrote NPP. Now that Goodall has arranged almost all of his
texts into a chronological order on the basis of cross-references within them,53
we can begin to look for signs of his thinking developing when he came to
saJ!lvedallaJJl svasal!lvedallal!l sat ed.] svasa1Jlvitsiddhalll atmano n7pam, nallyat (MatV
VP 157,7-8, ad 6.22cd).
49 sthiran7paJ!1 [sthira rfipal!l u, [, f; sthirasaJ!IVedanan7pal!l ed.] cedam arthasaJJl-
vedanam avabhasate (MatV VP 158,2-3 ad 6.23ab).
50 yata etad [yata etad U, [, f; yata eva ed.] vijiianaJ!l pratyayas casali satatam artham .
avagamayatfty atllla ca sarvadaivartha[sarvadaivartha ed.; sarvapadartha u,
[, fJpraktisakataya stlziratayaiva svasal!lvedanasiddham (MatV VP 158,4-5, ad 6.23ab).
51 pratyayas casau satatalll artham avagamayatfty alma ca is glossing
pratyayatmakalll in the half-verse under comment: nirudhyate niivasthaniid vijiianaJ!1 pra-
tyayiitmakam.
52 This is one of the rare occasions where I have opted for the reading of the edition
against that of the Kashrnirian
53 MatV VP is likely to have been written after NPP since it cites it five times. See
Goodall 1998 xviii.
230
consider the same matter in a subsequent text, and should not always assume
that earlier texts can be interpreted in the light of parallel passages in subse-
quent texts.
*****
After Ramakat}.!ha's triumphant assertion of our continuous and unbroken
self-awareness, the Buddhist changes his ground slightly and admits that the
perceiver does appear as stable. He claims, however, that this appearance is
not trustworthy, being based on our own superimpositon of stability.
3.2 syad etat. asty ayal1l ekariipasthiragrahakaprakasa[z, anapahnavanfya
54
eva. sa plllzar na svasalJ!vedya[z, api tu evanublll7yal1la-
ne tatsadrsyadarsanabhrantair vikalpair adhyaropito 'mbha(lpravahasye-
vaikyal1l iti
55
bhranta eva. ata evasyatmagrahatvat sarvanw1hal1117latvenopa-
samaya bhagavata [Ked p. 15] sllgatena
bhavanakhyo yatna[z56 prarabdha[z.
3.2 [Buddhist] The following may be so. There is this appearance of a stable
perceiver that is of uniform character. 57 That indeed cannot be denied, but that
[appearance] is not experienced by itself.
58
Rather, although all that is actually
experienced is a stream of momentary perceivers, [the appearance of a stable
and uniform perceiver] is superimposed [on to those momentary perceivers]
by conceptual cognitions
59
that are mistaken owing to perceiving the resem-
blance of the [momentary perceivers], just as the oneness of a stream of water
54 'napallllavanfya Ked, Ped, P; 'napallllavfya B.
55 vahasyevaikyam iti Ked, B, P; vahasyavaikyam iti Ped.
56 yatna[z B, Ked
Pc
; yatnaO P; Ked"", Ped.
57 The Buddhist acceptance here of sthiragralzakaprakaia shows that the term
prakaia does not always imply that that which shines forth appears thereby as it object-
ively is. There is a parallel ambiguity in the English word 'appear', between its objective
sense (e.g. 'He appeared at the door') and its subjective sense (e.g. 'It appears to be the
case but it is not so ').
58 If it were self-experienced it would be infallible, as there would be no gap between
experiencer and experienced for distorting factors to enter. But it is not, because, as ex-
plained in the next sentence, on the one hand, it is not so much experienced (salJ!vedyate,
anubhayate) as superimposed, and, on the other, that which 'experiences' it is not a stable
and uniform perceiver but a series of distinct perceivers.
59 According to the Buddhist epistemological school, conceptual cognitions are of the
nature of superimposition.
[is superimposed]. So [this appearance] is nothing but [an] erroneous [cogni-
tion of disparate momentary perceivers]. It is for this very reason that the
Lord Buddha, in order to quell this [appearance], which is the root of every-
thing that is bad, because it is clinging to a Self, undertook effort directed to-
wards Selflessness, in the form of counteracting meditation.
6o
231
The Buddhist admits that we do not experience ourselves as distinct momen-
tary perceivers but as continuous. Is Ramakal}.!ha here misrepresenting his
opponents, having them concur with something to which they would not
agree? Not really, for the Buddhist meditation practice designed to overcome
(see note 60) presupposes that the perception it attempts to over-
come does indeed exist. Otherwise there would be no need of a Buddhist path
at all.
Thus it appears that Ramakat}.!ha, having narrowed down the decisive (and
only) issue that separates Buddhism and Saivism on the question of the Self
to whether the perceiver appears to us as divided or undivided,61 has now set-
tled that question in Saivism's favour.
60 Vasubandhu also describes imagined perception of or belief in a Self as 'clinging to
a Self' and sees it as necessarily leading to vices (klea). kil!! khalv ato 'nyatra
nasti. nasti. kilJ! kara{zam. na hi te skandhasantana evatlllapra-
jiiaptilp vyavasyanti, kilJl tarM dravyantaram evatmanaJ!! parikalpayanti. atlllagraha-
prabhavai ca klea iti (AKBh(BBS) 1189,1-4, quoted at Sanderson 199436). 'Is there
indeed no liberation outside of this [Buddhist religion]? There is not. Why? Because [non-
Buddhists] are immersed in a false view of the Self. For they do not understand that that
to which they apply the term 'self' is nothing more than a series of constituents. Rather,
they imagine themself to be actually a separately existing substance [over and above this
series]. And from [this] clinging to a Self, vices arise.'
For Buddhist's point that mistaken perception of a Self is the root of
all that is bad, see PYa 2.219, quoted in footnote 65; and CandrakIrti's remark: satkayadr-
klealJlS ca ca dhiya vipasyan I atmanam asya ca
bllddhva yogf karot)' eva II (Madhyamakavatara VI, 120, cited at Pr
340,8-11.) 'When the Yogin intuits that all vices and faults arise from the concept 'I'
and realizes that the object of this [concept] is the Self, he should [in order
to eliminate the concept of 'I' and therefore all vices and faults] negate the [existence of]
the Self.' This is the practice of that B"uddhist attributes
to the Buddha.
61 See the final sentence of section 2.
232
Not so, for we have to bear in mind the distinction between infallible, non-
conceptual perception, of which self-awareness (svasa7!lvedana) is an exam-
ple, and conceptual cognition. The Buddhist here accepts Ramakargha's com-
pelling rhetorical description of our seemingly unbroken cognition of a stable
perceiver, but he does not regard that as self-awareness. Rather it is a case of
superimposition of permanence on to separate momentary perceivers by con-
ceptual cognitions which are fooled by the similarity of those perceivers. The
fact that we are seemingly aware of a stable Self is simply a symptom of our
attachment and clinging to our selves.
yad lihu!z62
mithylidhyliropa63hlinlirtha1J1 yamo 'saty api l11oktari
64
I iti.
65
62 PYa 2. 192ab.
63 mithYlidhyliropao KedPc, supported by PYa; mithylidhylillopaO Ked"", Ped, B, P.
64 moktari B, P, PYa; bllOktari Ked, Ped. Since mo in Sarada is virtually indistingui-
shable from bho in Devanagad it is possible that the reading blzoktari arose through edi-
tors used to reading Devanagad misreading their Sarada manuscript(s).
65 The parallel passage in the Matwigavrtti runs: sat yam, asty eveyalll litmaSW!lvittir li
sW!lslirlid sli tu na sW!lvedanlitmikli, api tu [api tu ii, r, r;
catu!z ed.] eva sa1Jlvedyamline sadrsliparliparrotpattivipralam-
bhlid vikalpena sa evliyam ity aikyam adhyliropya praklisyate[prakliSyate 7 of ed.'s MSS
induding ii and r; prakliSate ed.]. yad uktalll, 'mithylidhyliropahlinlirtha1J1 yatno 'saty api
moktari'iti (MatV VP 158,11-159,1). The DharmakIrti half-verse is also quoted at MatV
VP ad 6.19c-21b (154,9).
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: satyalll [satyal1l conj. Isaacson; satya1J1 grliha-
ko 'py ed., MSS] ayam ekan7pasthira[ekan7pasthirao MSS; sthirao ed.]grlihaka- .
praklisa!z 'llapallllavanfya eva, sa plmar na svasa1Jl-
vedyo 'pi tu evlinubhayamline tatslidrsyadarSanabhrlintair vikal-
pair liropya [vikalpair liropya MSS; vikalpenliropya ed.]"praklisyate [prakliSyate 1 MS;
ed.; praklisyeta MSS] alllbha!z[alllbha!z conj. Isaacson; MSS; tata!z ed.]
pravlihasyevaikyalll [osyevaih.'yal1l em.; S)'aivaikyal1l ed., MSS] iti (295,3-5). In PMNKV,
written before NPP and MatV VP, Ramakargha does not give the DharmakIrti quotation.
a) If vikalpair is the correct reading (as is likely because of the bhrlintair), then
vikalpena, the reading of the parallel passage in MatV VP, has entered the transmission of
this text, PMNKV, from there (unless it arose here independently). If vikalpena is the cor-
rect reading, then vikalpair, the reading of the NPP, has entered the transmission of this
text from th<;re (again, unless it arose here independently). The reason I point this out is
given in note 82.
As [DharmakIrti] says:
[The Buddha] strove to destroy false superimpositions even though
. there is no [being] that is liberated.
233
Part of the reason that RamakaI).tha has his Buddhist quote this verse here is
that it responds to his query above as to why we would act if we experienced
ourselves as a separate entity from the adjacent momentary phases of our
stream. Surely only if we appear to ourselves as continuously existing would
we undertake actions that have effects in the future. This verse, as can clearly
be seen from the sentences with which RamakaI).tha introduces it, means for
him that the Buddha acted precisely in order to bring an end to his interpreta-
tion of himself as one thing over time. He was able to intuit that this imagined
perception of a stable subject of our cognition is merely a facet of our at-
tachment to our 'Self', and the root of our faults, and so acted in order to
bring it, and therefore our faults and vices, to an end.
Prajfiakaragupta and Manorathanandin, DharmakIrti's commentators, inter-
pret this verse slightly differently. They do not see it as speaking of the Bud-
dha's actions, but of unenlightened action that does not accord with reality.
It is noteworthy that, in this PMNKV version of the sentence, Ramakal).!ba puts into
the mouth of the Buddhist the additional detail that the superimposed perceiver is capable
of action (vyavahlira). This is a view specifically held by the Madhyarnikas, distinguish-
ing them from the and Sautrantikas. For the former, our construction of the
concept of a Self is so deep-seated that it itself is able to act, despite being merely notion-
al (prajiiaptisat) (see Tillemans 1996). It is not necessarily the case though that Ramaka-
l).tha knew that-primarily Tibetan-Madhyarnika doctrine: he may have been imagining
for himself a way that the Buddhist could explain action given absence of Self.
Ramakal).tha's father, Naray<ll).ak<ll).!ba, can be seen to be the source of this NPP pas-
sage and its parallels in other of Ramakal).!ba's texts. He writes ad MT 1.2.24: sa1Jlvedana
eva jaladhlirlipravlihavat sadrsaparliparotpattibhramlid vikalpena sthail)'am
adhyliropyata ity avidylijanitli tad uktW!1
mithylidhyliropahlinlirtha1Jl yamo 'saty api lIloktari [Illoktari em. bhoktari ed.] I
iti. litmagrahe hi sati tadanyatra paratvlibhillllinlit svaparabheda!z, tatas ca
dyanarthodbhavlid litlllagraho bandha iti bhagavatli sugatena
yad uktam
litlllani sati paraswijlili svaparavibhliglit I
sarve prajliyante II (PVa 2.219)
iti (MTV 85,7-18).
234 The Self s Awareness of Itself
explains that even though there is nothing that is liber-
ated,67 we act prompted by the thought that there is, thinking 'it is me that is
bound and me that will be liberated'. He sees the verse as addressing itself to
the contradiction between these two facts by implying that action proceeds
not only in accordance with reality, but also in accordance with how reality is
judged
68
(na hi yathiivastv eva vyavahiirab, kin tu yathiivasiiya'll ca). To il-
lustrate that action is based on our illusory judgements of reality he gives the
example of acting to avoid a rope when we mistake it for a snake. In each of
these points he is following PrajfHikaragupta's commentary. The latter also
adds the remark that those who realize the truth do not undertake any action
or effort.
69
These two commentators do not, as RamakaIftha does, see the
verse as describing action resulting from a realization of the falsity of the no-
tion 'of a continuously existing 'I', but rather action based on acceptance of
66 mitlzyiidlzyiiropasya sGJ!lsiiritviidhyavasiiyasya lziilliirtlzGJ!l yatllo 'saty api kasmil]l!f
cid iitmiidall moktari. Ila Izi yatlziivastv eva vyavalziiralz, kill tu yatlziivasiiyaii ca. tatlzii Izi
rajjllr api evam a/lam eva baddho 'ham eva
adhyiiropiill muktyaJ1hal]z vyiiyiimalz (pVa(M) 77 ,9-12).
67 Why this is so is clearer from PrajiHikaragupta's commentary. To be liberated imp-
lies that one was first bound. But whatever is bound cannot be liberated because to be
bound is its nature. What can happen is that a mind-stream first exists in an unpurified
state but a subsequent momentary phase of it arises in a purified state out of a specific
complex of causes. The mind-stream is not 'liberated' however, because a stream com-
posed of phases does not exist apart from those phases.
68 avasiiya, if the reading is correct, is being used, unusually, in the meaning of vya-
vasiiya or adhyavasiiya ..
69 PVBh 137,9-16: kim iti hetor ablziyoga!z atra samiidhi!z. yasmiit ...
[verses 191 and 192 (which include mitlzyiidhyiiropahiilliiJ1hGJ!1 yatllo 'saty api moktari)].
atriiyam ablzipriiyalz. yadi tiivat tattvadarsilla!z praty etad ucyate tadii siddhasiidlzyataiva.
Ila hi te kvacit pravartallte yatJlaJ!l vii kurvallti. 'What is the use of causal [actions] for .
wise people?a [Response:] The answer to this [is as Because ... [verses 191 and
192]. This is the intention of [these verses.] If firstly [your objection] is stated with regard
to those who see correctly, then [it puts forward] merely something already established as
that which is to be established (i.e. its point is accepted by both of us). For such people do
not act or undertake effort for anything.'
a) My translation resorts to taking hew in a strange sense. Another, also not per-
fect, construal would be to take kim iti Izetor to mean 'for what reason?' and abhiyogalz as
'striving' .
235
the reality of this notion. In RamakaI}.tha's interpretation the verse is up-
holding a kind of action that should be followed; in Prajfiakaragupta and
Manorathanandin's it simply describes our usual unenlightened motivations
for acting.
RamakaI}.tha mayor may not have known Prajfiakaragupta and Manoratha-
nandin's interpretation. It would have served the purpose of his Buddhist in
the context of NPP perfectly well. It would the charge that if we ap-
peared to ourselves as ceasing in every moment there would be no action in
the world, by responding that although in reality we do cease in every mo-
ment, we judge that reality differently. Because of our attachment to our
. 'Self' we superimpose the notion of continuous 'I', and it is that that prompts
us to action. It is simply the case that action accords with the way we judge
reality and not only with the reality itself.
7o
But RamakaI}.tha did not choose to interpret the verse this way, and there
seem to me to be philological indications that RamakaI}.tha's interpretation
may be closer to DharmakIrti's intentions. The immediately preceding verse
in PYa runs,7l 'As long as attachment to the Self is not abandoned, the
[stream]72 continues to suffer/
3
superimposing suffering [on to itself], and it
does not abide in its authentic state.' Given that the context of this verse (as
accepted by both Prajfiakaragupta and Manorathanandin) is the question of
why we act for liberation when we will not be around for the result, it could
be seen to imply that if we did not act to rid ourselves of attachment to the
Self our streams would be doomed permanently to suffer. If so, then the very
70 We can see here how radical the Buddhist theory of no-Self (or at least its instantia-
tion in the Buddhist Epistemological School) is: all worldly action (vyavahiira), being
prompted by the thought that 'I' will benefit from it, is seen to be the product of.a massive
delusion. Prajfiakaragupta and Manorathanandin both seem to accept claim
that the only reason we act is because we think of ourselves as continuously existing enti-
ties, and thus all action becomes for Buddhism, grounded in illusion.
71 yiivac ciitJnalli Ila hiillilz sa paritasyati I tiivad dulzkhitam iiropya Ila ca
svastho II Harunaga Isaacson did not like the reading dulzkhitam, wondering if
it may be a corruption of dulzklzitvam.
72 Manorathanandin glosses sa with praFyablzimato dulzkhasantiillalz.
73 Manorathanandin glosses paritasyati with dulzkham iiste.
236
next half verse, mithyiidhyiiropalziiniirthar!l yatno 'saty api moktari looks like
a description of action that is recommended, not a description of action based
on selfish motives. PntjiUikaragupta and Manorathanandin's interpretation
that it serves to illustrate that we act not only in accordance with reality but
also in accordance with our judgement of reality may be a red herring. Fur-
thermore, their precise interpretation of mithyiidhyiiropahiiniirtlwl!l does not
seem quite as natural as Ramakru;ttha's. Manorathanandin glosses this as
sGl!lsiiritviidhyavasiiyasya hiiniirtham. By thus stating that we act 'for the
sake of abandoning the judgement that we transmigrate' he must mean that
we are alarmed by the prospect of transmigrating endlessly and so act to bring
that transmigration to an end.
74
But would one really express that as acting in
order to 'abandon the judgement that we transmigrate'? He is here following
Prajfiakaragupta's interpretation. But RamakaI).tha's idea that the verse refers
to action specifically directed at undermining our notion of a permanent Self
is very naturally expressed by the compound mithyiidhyiiropahiiniirtham.
75
4. Is the Idea of Superimposition of a Permanent
Perceiver Coherent?
In section 3 the issue being examined was whether the perceiver appears to us
as undivided or divided, one or many, stable or momentary. But now the is-
sue has shifted slightly, which is why I begin a new section here. Both sides
now agree that the perceiver appears to us as stable, and the question has be-
come whether this appearance is self-awareness or conceptual cognition.
74 Understanding him in that way makes his gloss here consistent with his final re-
mark evam aham eva baddho 'ham eva adhyliroplill muktyarthaJ!1 vyliylima(z.
75 It should be pointed out that in the parallel passage in the MataJigavrtti, given in
note 65, Ramak!lI).tha's Buddhist does not present this verse as speaking of the Buddha's
action.
4.1. Sthiragrlihakapraklisa is Internal, not External
tad ayuktam, asya saJ!lvedalllit.
yadi hy ayam liropita!l sylit, tadliropaklid
77
grlihakantplid bhedella
bhliseta devadattabodha(z sthira itivat. lla caivam ayam allubhava(z,78 api tu
rakliSaka 79tvelllintargrlihakasvabhliva(z. .
[Siddhantin:] That is incorrect, so because in contrast to the [external] object
we experience the [shining forth of a stable Self]81 internally, without it be-
. b' [f .] 8' F S3
f

cormng an 0 0 perceptIon . - or I It were superimposed, it would ap-
237
76 conj.; karmatayli Ked, Ped, B,
P. I discuss this conjecture in note 82.
77 tadliropaklid B, P, Ked
Pc
; liropaklid Ked
ac
, Ped.
78
ayam anllbhava(z Ked, Ped; ayam allablzavah P; allllbhavalz B.
79 . kli' k OK dPc B P' k-,'oK dac'P d .
sa a e , , ; asa e , e.
80 I.e. the shining forth of a stable perceiver is not superimposed.
81 asya refers to stlziragrlilzakapraklisa, which both sides agree to exist, but which the
Buddhist claimed in his last speech to be merely superimposed.
82 I was not at all happy with the reading ka17natayli. ka17natayli
seems very surprising here, given that, as can be seen from the next sentence, the main
point he wants this sentence to make is that the perceiver does not appear like an object
See also in 4.3 below na ca grlilzaklitlllli grlihyfkaJ1111!1 salcyate ... ; and his ac-
ceptance later in the text (38,9-42,1) that the Self does not appear as the object of knowl-
edge (bodhya), both of which run counter to the idea that it is experienced kannatayli. I
was hesitant to emend given that the parallel passage in the edition of PMNKV also reads
ka17natayli; but this has turned out not to be the reading of any of the
four manuscripts of that text that we have collated so far. Three of them read
and the fourth Thus
my conjecture here is not as bold as it might seem. is
not tautologous, since there are examples of things distinct from external objects which
are nevertheless objects of perception (for Ramak!lI).tha), for example concepts' (vikalpas),
objects of determinative cognition (adlzyavaseyas), pleasure and pain.
If ka17llatayli is indeed wrong here, it is not the only example of
the same corruption being shared by two of Ramak!lI).tha's texts, indicating perhaps that a
scribe/editor of one of the texts had parallel passages in others in front of him at the time
of transmission. To render this idea more plausible I have drawn attention in footnotes 45,
65 and 105 to other possible instances of cross-contamination between Ramakantha's
texts. If this, as opposed to the more cross-contamination between
of the same text, can be shown to have happened, then we should not necessarily be afraid
238
pear like an [external] object, as separate from its superimposer,84 the per-
ceiver,85 like [Devadatta's consciousness does when we say]. 'Devadatta's
consciousness is steadfast';86 and this experience is not like that. Rather, since
it is the illuminator of [external] objects,87 its nature is the inner
88
perceiver.
89
4.2. Superimposition Cannot Be Carried Out by Something
Momentary
tatsamliropaklibhimatagrahftJTllpatve ca
90
tadlipi sthira eva sa1Jlvedyate,
tasylipi hi svata!l tatpratibhlisitve
91
hy
liroplinupapatte!1,92 liropasya pz7rvliparaparlimarsan7patvena sthirabodhanir-
va rtyatVlit. 93
to emend against the agreement of two texts. In a passage shared by PMNKV and NPP,
but not looked at in this book (PMNKV ad v. 46, NPP ad 1.46), there are three occasions
on which the two texts share a reading that seems to need to be emended (see forthcoming
critical edition and translation of PMNKV being prepared by Goodall, Sarma and Wat-
son).
83 What follows this 'for' gives a reason not for why we experience the shining forth
of a stable Self internally, but for why the fact that we experience it internally means that
it is not superimposed.
84 The presupposition behind this point seems to be that superimposition implies a
separation between superimposer and superimposed.
85 In order to prevent the English sentences from becoming unnecessarily convoluted,
I sometimes translate grlihakarz7pa (literally, 'that whose nature is the perceiver') simply
as 'perceiver'.
86 To indicate, perhaps, his firm-mindedness.
87 Note that sthiragrlihakapraklisa is here described as re-illustra-
ting 1) that perception of the Self is not a separate action from perception of objects; and
2) that Riimakrugha uses grlihakapraklisa to refer to simply the grlihaka (because
is clearly synonymous with
88 Contrasting with
89 Alternatively, 'it is the nature of the inner perceiver.'
90 n7patve ca conj.; rz7patvena Ked, Ped, B; n7patvenli P.
91 tatpratibhiisitve B, P, Ked
ac
, Ped; tadapratibhlisitve Ked
pc
92 We could consider emending liroplinllpapatte[z to liroplinllpapatti!l: Kashmirian

transmissions of texts often confuse e and i owing to non-difference of pronunciation bet-
ween the two in that region. But RamakaI).tha quite often uses tautologous combinations
And if it
94
has the character of being the perceiver that [you] hold to carry out
a superimposition of this [stable appearance],95 then even in that (tadli-
pi)96 it is certainly (eva) sensed as stable, for nor does that (i.e. the supposedly
239
of hi and an ablative. See the previous sentence for exrunple: tasylipi hi svata[z
tran7patvenlipratibhlisalllit.
93 nirvartyatvlit B, P; nivartyatvlit Ked, Ped, parallel sentence in PMNKV.
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: sa [sa conj. Sanderson; na ed., MSS] punar
bhrama eva, MSS;
karmatayli ed.; 1 MS] tadaikyasya Sa1Jl-
vedanlit. yadi hy etad liropita1Jl syiit, tadliropaka[1ooks, from comparison with NPP, as
though text has dropped out here]bhimatasya [tadliropaklibhimatasya MSS; tadliropikli-
bhimatasya ed.] svata!l tatpratibhlisitve hy liro-
plinllpapatte!l [tatpratibhiisitve hy liroplinllpapatte!l conj.; tatpratibhiisitve hy litmatvo-
papatte!z ed., MSS; tatpratibhiisitve 'py litmatvlipatteb 1 MS], liropasya pz7rvlipara-
parlimarsan7patvena sthirabodhanirva,rtyatvlit [Onirvartyatvlit MSS; nivartyatvlit ed.;
nirvatyatvi'it 1 MS] (295,5-8).
94 We have to take 'it' here, not as sthiragrlihakaprakiiSa (for the Buddhist does not
hold of course that that which does th\! superimposing is stable), but simply as
grlihakaprakiiSa.
95 I have emended the text here against the evidence of the editions and the manu-
script. Unfortunately there is no parallel sentence in MatV VP, and in both the edition and
the manuscripts of PMNKV, text has dropped out at precisely this point (see note 93). I
find the transmitted reading, n7patvena, unsatisfactory for two reasons: it makes the tadli
impossible to construe; and it means we cannot break up this string of text, api tll
prakiiSakatvelllintargrlihakasvabhliva!z tatsamliropaklibhimatagrahftrn7patvena tadlipi
sthira eva sa1Jlvedyate. I see that string as making two separate points, of which the move
from one to the other would most likely be marked by a sentence break.
I take the first point to be that it (the stable perceiver that shines forth) must be some-
thing intemal because it illuminates ext(mzal objects. This would be a natural point to fol-
low the immediately preceding contention that if it were superimposed it would appear as
something external. The second point I take to be that if we are talking of this inner per-
ceiver rather than what is superimposed, then for precisely the reason that the Buddhist
holds this to be a superiroposer, it must be sensed as stable. Why that follows is explained
next.
96 I take the tadlipi to mark the change from talking about that which the Buddhist
holds to be superiroposed (of which it has, been said that it cannot be superiroposed be-
cause it is internal) to that which the Buddhist holds to be the superiroposer. The Buddhist
has no problem with the former being stable, but RiimakaI).tha says here that even if we
1 I:
Ii
I
240
superimposing perceiver) shine forth in a merely momentary form of itself,97
for if [it] did shine forth in such a way,98 superimposition would be impossi-
ble, since superimposition must be performed by an enduring cognition in that
it consists of determinate cognition that synthesizes
99
earlier and later [phases
of a phenomenon].
For the Buddhist the perceiver is, and appears in pre-conceptual experience
as,100 momentary, but it superimposes stability on to itself. This superimposed
appearance of a steadfast Self is what fools the Saiva or other Atmavadin into
thinking that the real perceiver is steadfast. Ramakru;ttha here contends that
the supposedly superimposing perceiver, that to which we have access in pre-
conceptual experience, also .appears as steadfast. Another way of stating this
is that it is not only the object of experience of the Self (I the perceiver) that is
steadfast; the experience itself (anubhava) is steadfast. The reason is that
something momentary would be incapable of superimposition. That is the
theme of this whole sub-section (4.2).
na ca ka1)atmallo 'pi sama-
ropakatvam, ayojanatmakatvellavikalpakatvat
lOI
alatacakradipratibhasa-
vat. 102
are talking of that internal perceiver which does the superimposing, that too is sensed as
stable.
97 svatal! emphasizes that we are talking of the thing itself, not the distorted picture
that we get of it after adhyaropa.
98 tatpratibhasitve seems here to mean tathapratibhasitve.
99 paramarsa is used here in the same sense as allllsandhalla/pratisalldhana in Chap-
ter 1. argument is similar to that used by the Naiyayika there.
was not impressed by that argument, for he did not think it was capable of proving a Self
or perceiver beyond cognition. We can now see that agrees with the
Naiyayika that there must be some stable entity whose existence spans the gap between
the earlier and later phenomena that are synthesized; but for him cognition itself is stable,
and thus capable of carrying out synthesis and superimposition.
For parvaparaparamarsa see PYa 3.174 (==PVin 1.8): sa/iketasmara1)Opaya/Jl
salikalallatmakam I parvaparaparamarsasallye tac katham II; NM(M) Vol. 1,243,
3-14; and NM(M) Vol. 2, 5,9-6,10.
100 Cf. evanllbhfiyamane in 3.2.
101 vikalpakatvat Ked, Ped; vikalpatvat B, P.
And [you can]not [say] that [the perceiver / allllbhava], though momentary,
[can] superimpose through having a long range
lO3
that is simultaneously
linked with an earlier and later time, as [such a momentary perceiver] would
be incapable of conceptualization, since it would not [be able to] join [things
together],I04 in the way that [cognition of], for example, the image of a circle
[caused by a swinging] firebrand [can join together the momentary instants of
the firebrand's trajectory].
241
Ramakru;t!ha tries to envisage how it would be possible for a single momen-
tary perceiver to carry out superimposition. Surely for superimposition to take
place the superimposer must exist for long enough to perceive a succession of
phases of an object and spot their similarity. He imagines a Buddhist trying to
get around this problem by explaining that even though a perceiver lasts only
for a moment, it can perceive earlier and later phases of an object. Even so,
102 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: Ila ca 'pi Yllgapatpfirvapara-
samaropakatvam ayojallatmakatvellavikalpakatvat, alatacakra-
dipratibhasavat (295,8-10).
Parallel passage in MatV VP runs: na ca 'pi [6 MSS, not including the
Kashrnirian ones, lack the 'pi] sa evayam iti pfirvaparakalayuktadfrghal1haprakiisakatve-
na vikalpakatvam iti vacyam ayojanamzakatvat, alatacakradipratibhasavat, yojana hi kal-
pana [kalpana r, r; vikalpalla ed.] yatab (160,10-11). The reason I prefer the reading of
those two Kashmirian manuscripts is that, as stated in note 104, Dignaga wrote yojalla
kalpana in the and quotes this later in this text (ad
1.22cd, p. 49,2b-1b).
103 I prefer not to translate this as 'long object', as the Buddhist opponent would not
accept the existence of a long (non-momentary) object. (I do not think is here
thinking of how a Sarvastivadin would explain superimposition: his opponent is a
DharmakIrtian.) It is probable that a Buddhist opponent would also not accept this idea of
a single momentary perceiver having a long range, but it seems a much more likely inter-
nal objection than one involving long objects. The problem to be explained is how mo-
mentary objects (==phasesof an object) can be joined into a unity by a momentary per-
ceiver who is fooled by their similarity.
That having been said it should be pointed out that the parallel passage in the
Mata/igavrtti reads pfirvaparakiilaYllktadfrghal1haO (see previous note). In that case I
think we have to interpret the long object as the stream of several momentary phases of an
object.
104 Dignaga indeed defines conceptual, cognition as joining: yojana kalpalla (prSa
1.3). For Dignaga this joining refers to the process through which an individual
becomes associated with a name, genus etc.
242
The Self's Awareness ofItseIf
RamakaIf!ha says, this momentary perceiver would not be capable of joining
up these different phases. Quite why that would be the case is not obvious ..
Perhaps RamakaIf!ha thinks that one moment would be needed to perceive
these different phases and another to join them up.
The example of the illusory cognition of a circle of fIre just seems to be given
as a case of a conceptual cognition where it is particularly obvious that the
joining of separate but similar phases is necessary to produce it. From Rama-
kaIf!ha's point of view, this joining of different points on the fIrebrand's cir-
cular trajectory cannot take place unless one and the same perceiver perceives
those points.
If the example were intended more specifIcally, then the point would be that
even if a momentary perceiver could perceive several of the point-instants of
light on the firebrand's path, it would not be able to join them together. It
does not illustrate that point, which means it unfortunately does not give us
any clues as to why RamakaIf!ha would have held superimposition to be im-
possible even on the presupposition the momentary perceiver can grasp
several sequential phases.
ata eva 'pi yogijiilillam avikalpakam ity lIktmJl
bhavadbhilz.
105
That is precisely whylO6 you have said that Yogic perception is free of con-
cepts even though it simultaneously takes in word and object.
105 ity lIktm!1 bhavadbhilz Ked, Ped, P; bhavadbhir ity lIktm!1 B.
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: ata eva Yllgapat 'pi yogi-
jiilillam avikalpakakalpam ity lIktam (295,10-11).
Parallel passage in MatV VP continues: ata eva yogijiilillam yllgapac chabdlirtha-
U, [, r; ed.] 'py avikalpakam bhavad-
bhir (160,12). The inclusion of both the reading of NPP, and
the reading of PMNKV, in the manuscripts of this text, indicates that
the manuscripts of two different texts contain the same corruption. That would be the case
whichever reading is correct, assuming RamakaI}Jha wrote the smne in NPP and PMNKV.
Even if he wrote in NPP, and in PMNKV, then
we would still be able to say at least that readings from other of his texts have entered the
transmission of MatV VP. See note 82.
Chapter 2: Self-Awareness 243
For RamakaIf!ha, the Buddhist claim that Yogic perception is non-conceptual
even though it simultaneously perceives both word and object neatly illus-
trates the claim he has just made that simultaneous perception of different
phases would still not be sufficient to enable conceptualisation. yugapaccha-
in this sentence is mirroring yugapatpilrviiparakiilayuktadf-
in the last. The Yogin's perception in one moment of word
and object is equivalent to the hYIlothetical perception by one moment of ear-
lier and later objects. In both cases, according to RamakaIf!ha, conceptuali-
zation could not take place because joining is impossible. If the Buddhist
thinks that mere simultaneous perception of two things on the part of a mo-
mentary perceiver would be sufficient for the fusion of those two things in a
conceptual cognition, why does he not hold that the Yogin's simultaneous
perception of word and object is conceptual? The fact that he does not shows
that conceptual cognition requires something more, namely joining; and this
joining, so the implication seems to be, cannot be carried out in the same
moment as the pre-conceptual cognition on which it is based.
The implication of RamakaIf!ha's remark, 'that is precisely why you have
said' is that the Buddhists, in their view of Yogic perception, have intuited
the truth that something momentary, even if it can perceive in that one mo-
ment several things, is incapable of joining them (though they ignore this in
their view of non-yogic conceptual perception).
. tad iti cet,
[Buddhist:] [Yogic perception] has as its content [things, i.e. word and object]
which are already joined.
One of the implications of the previous statement by RamakaIf!ha was: if you
Buddhists are really convinced that something momentary could simultane-
ously perceive different objects and join them, then why do you hold the case
of Yogic perception to be any different from non-Yogic conceptual cog-
nition? What reason do you have for holding Yogic perception to be non-con-
ceptual other than a recognition of the truth that it would be quite impossible
for something to both perceive and join up several things in one moment?
106 'That is precisely why' means something momentary would be incapable
of joining even if it could simultaneously perceive the things to be joined'.
244
Hence your doctrine of momentariness should compel you to admit the im-
possibility of conceptual cognition for non-Yogins as well as Yogins.
The Buddhist responds here by distinguishing Yogic perception from non-
Yogic conceptual cognition along the lines that in the case of Yogic percep-
tion that which it perceives, word and object, are already joined. That is why
Yogic perception is free of concepts, not because
107
it is incapable of joining
as a result of being momentary.
108 yojaniinupapatter na kil!l cid etat.
109
[Siddhantin:] That [response] is not worth considering, because, since [for
you] everything is momentary, nothing could do the joining.
It is all very well for the Buddhist to take the responsibility for the joining
away from the Yogic perception itself, by claiming that it has already been
done. But done by what? There is nothing in a Buddhist universe that, being
non-momentary, would be capable of such action.
ata eviinekasyiipi kramabhiivino
That is precisely why even several momentary conceptual cognitions in se-
quence could not superimpose.
Buddhism would explain this problem of superimposition on the part of
something momentary through a sequence of cognitions, each passing on in-
formation to the next, such that although it is one cognition that perceives
phase 1 of an object and another that perceives phase 2, the second cognition
has access to memory of the cognition of phase 1 of the object, can thus spot
the similarity between the two phases, and can thus superimpose unity on to
the object. But if, argues RfunakaJ).!ha, individual moments can be shown to
be incapable of joining, how can a sequence help? If every single member of
the sequence is incapable of joining then the sequence too would be incapable
of superimposition.
107 Cf. ata eva in RamakaJ;ltha's assertion. It is that that the Buddhist challenges here.
108. Ked, Ped, P; B.
109 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: tad iti eet,
katvena yojaniinupapatter na kil!l cid etat (295,11-12).
110 Parallel passage in MatV VP continues: niipi ea bal1l71liiIJI kramablziiviniilJz jiiiillii-
lliilJl vikalpakatvm.1l yuktam (160,12-13).
ity iiropiisambhaviid astmigatii vikalpiilz.
111
Thus because superimposition is impossible [on the Buddhist presupposition
of momentariness] conceptual cognitions are doomed.
4.3. Cognition Cannot Fool Itself
Ila ea griihakiitmii griihyfkartlll!l sakyate yena sviitlllany sthair-
yam iiropitam ity ucyeta, 112 sviitmany avikalpako vikalpo yata!I.113
245
III stmigatii vikalpii!z Ked
Pc
, B; stmigatii vikalpa!l P; stalllgatatiivikalpa!l Ked
ac
;
stalJlgatas tava vikalpa!z Ped.
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: ata api kramablziiviniim vikalpa-
niiropakatval7l, ity iiropiisambhaviit astaligatii vikalpii!l [astaligatii vikalpii!z
conj.; tadmigatiivikalpalliit ed.; asalJlgatii vikalpii (with following Ila-see continuation of
this passage below-so we can probably assume a pre-sandhi form of vikalpii!z) 1 MS]
(295,12-13).
112 ueyeta P; lIeyate Ked, Ped, B.
113 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: Ila ea griihakiitl7liipy evmJl grhyeteti [grii-
hakiitl7liipy evalJl grhyeteti 1 MS; griihakiitmany eva ed., MSS] vaktlll.1l sakyate, yena svii-
tmany avikalpako vikalpalz (295,13-14). Comparison with NPP reveals that text may have
dropped out in PMNKV owing to a scribe's eye skipping from one sviitlllani to the next.
Perhaps it is possible to make sense of the PMNKV sentence as constituted above how-
ever: 'And it cannot be said that the perceiver, for its part, could be grasped [by itself] in
this way (i.e. as stable, by conceptual cognition), for conceptual cognition is non-
conceptual with regard to itself.'
Parallel sentence in MatV VP: sviitl7lany avikalpako vikalpa [avikalpako vikalpa r, f;
avikalpiko vikalpa u; na vikalpa ed.] iti ea (161,2).
Marginal comment in B:
{ } = hard to read
_ = 1 missing owing to the end of the line not showing on my copy.
{sv }iitmany avikalpako vikalpa iti II atriiyalll artha!z sviitmani svarfipe sthire iitmani
Ilirvikalpe yo vikalpa!z iiropitam iitmalli [iiropitalll iitmani corr; iiropita Il7liit-
mani MS] sthairyam na tu tiittvikal7l ity eVa/.lln7po bauddlziibhYllpagama!z [bauddhiibhy-
upagama!z em.; baudlziibabhYllpagama!1 MS]. sa(then probably 4 missing)avi-
dyamiina!z vikalpaka!z vikalpakiirf yasya sa!z avikalpaka!z vikalpasyiipi Ilirvikalpaka!l
vikalpakiirf (oka!l vikalpakiirf is circled, possibly to indicate that it should be deleted)
brahman7patviit I sa ea vikalpa!l nirvikalplid [nirvikalpiid corr; nirvilpiid MS] blzinna ivii-
vablziisate na tu tasmiid [tasmiid conj.; tasl7l_ MS] bhedakasyiipi bhedasya nirvikalpasva-
i
II
,I
1'1
!'j
il
'I
II
II
i
I I
I
246
nlpatvlit I punar api bhedaklibhlivlit I vikalpasya yat sahajm!l vikalpamlitranlpmJl tatra
ni{lsandhi!l pratyaya!l anyathlivikalpasyaivli 'sa{ttv}lit I iti pratyaylivea eva nirvikalpa-
kal!l brahmastuta1Jl ca vikalpo svanlpanirvikalpaka iti I yatM srfvatso py
liha I yad ya{d li}vrtikaral.n tena tena kila [kila conj. Sanderson; ki_ MS]
jlijvalfti Ulijvalfti COIT. Isaacson; jlijvatfti MS] ya_Oooks as though the cut off may
end in a viRlima) I bhairavfyam i_m astu vastuva[l {p}rastlltlidvayana{y}aprathm.n vapllr
iti Illtpaladevo py liha I yat kin cid eva blllitlinlil!l bhavadlivarmJ.m.n prati I na kin cid eva
bhaktlinlim pratfti II
Like the last extensive marginal comment, given in Chapter 1, note 52, this is consid-
erably corrupt. The mentions of Brahman indicate that its author is superimposing a
Vedantic slant on to the text. Until the two verses at the end, the first attributed to SrIvatsa
and the second to Utpaladeva, I am unable to attempt a translation.
The metre of SrIvatsa's verse is Rathoddhatli. Prof. Sanderson found it cited (to-
gether with Utpaladeva's) in the Sanskrit commentary on the Old Kashmiri MaMnaya-
praklisa (ad MaPra 1.5, p. 12), in the form: yad yad liv[tikara1Jl prakalpyate tena tena
vata jlijvalfti yat I bhairavfyam idam astll vastllta[l prastlltlidvayanayaprathmJl vapulz II
'Ab (vata) this, which is inflamed by whatever is assumed to restrict it, is the true form of
Bhairava, displaying the non-dualism being expounded.' The author is there unidentified
(kascic ca vipascid liha). Prof. Sanderson informed me that a SrIvatsa wrote the Krama's
Cidgaganacandrikli, which is mostly in the Rathoddhata metre, but that this verse is not
in theTantrik Texts edition.
The verse by Utpaladeva, which is Sivastotrlivalf 16.1, is cited in the MaPra in exact-
ly the same form as in B: 'Anything conceals you from creatures; nothing conceals you
from devotees.' commentary, however (see SiStA 118,3-7), supports lokli-
nlim for bhiltlinlim; and na kin cid eva at the beginning of the first line in place of yat kiii
cid eva. (These two readings are also found in all four editions of the Sivastotrlivalf avail-
able to me.) loklinlim, in the meaning of 'worldly people', provides a better contrast with
'devotees' than creatures in general (bhiltlinlim) does. na kin cid eva at the beginning of
the first, as well as the second, half-verse seems not so good as B's reading, but
raja certainly read it: he explains that through kliku (a change of voice indicating that a
negative word indicates an affirmative) na kiii cid eva in. the first half-verse connotes eve-
rything (viSvam).
What is the connection between these two verses and the claim in NPP that con-
ceptual cognition is non-conceptual with regard to itself? The point is that any awareness,
whatever its object, is awareness of Siva for the illuminated, since every vikalpa is nirvi- .
kalpaka in its immediate essence, when pointed inwards. Both verses are from a non-dual
context of course, where non-conceptual cognition is nothing other than Siva-something
that is certainly not the caSe for RamakaI)\ha and Saiva Siddhanta, for whom Selves and
Siva are eternally separate.
Chapter 2: Self-A wareriess
And the perceiver
114
cannot be made into the perceived,115 as a result of which
one might be able to say that stability is superimposed through superimposi-
tion [by the perceiver] on to itself, for conceptual cognition is non-conceptual
with regard to itself.
247
I begin a new sub-section here, for, having argued for the impossibility of
something momentary being capable of carrying out superimposition, Rama-
kaJ}.tha now moves to the different point that it is impossible for something to
superimpose on to itself. This is related to his first objection to sthiragriiha-
kaprakiiSa being superimposed, given in 4.1, in that that was based on the
presupposition of a duality between superimposer and superimposed, which
could also be seen to be in the background here too. While it was held there
that the superimposed cannot be the superimposer (and must therefore appear
as external to it), the point here could be said to be that the superimposer can-
not become the superimposed.
The specific contention here is that a superimposing cognition's view of itself
must be non-conceptual, and therefore accurate (sviitmany avikalpako vikal-
paM. This view is shared by, and probably derived from, the Buddhist Epis-
temological School. See Dignaga's remark, '[We] hold even conceptual cog-
114 RamakaI.1\ha frequently uses the compou)1ds grlihaklitmall and jlililllitman. They
are ambiguous. The first, for example, could be a Karmadharaya meaning 'perceiving
Self' or 'Self that is the perceiver'; or it could be a BahuvrIhi meaning 'that whose nature
is the perceiver'. It is my impression that in the great majority of cases it is as Bahuvn1ris
. that they are being used. For he uses them in discussions with a Buddhist opponent where
he does not want or need to presuppose an litman, where his argument will be just as valid
whether he is talking of an litman or of something the Buddhist would not object to: the
perceiver / cognition. Furthermore he occasionally puts these compounds into the mouth
of the Buddhist as well (see the first sentence of Chapter 4.2; and NPP 17,3 quoted on
page 355). Thus I tend to translate them simply as 'perceiver' and 'cognition'. I should
warn the reader though that RamakaI)\ha may sometimes have used these compounds
partly because of their ambiguity, in order to remind the reader that for him the perceiver /
cognition is the Self, and that, if so, this sense will be lost in my translation.
115 RamakaI.1\ha makes the same claim later in the text in a different context: na clitmli
svlitmalla eva grli!lyfbhavati svlitmalli kriylivirodhlit, sa hi grlihakatvellaiva pratyagnlpa-
tayli sarvadli bhlisata ity uktam. 'And the Self cannot become the object of itself, because
, .
action directed to oneself is impossible. For as [I] have said, it always shines forth inter-
nally as the perceiver alone.' This sentence is paralleled at PMNKV ad v. 48 (299,2b-lb).
248
nition [to be non-conceptual perception] in its self-awareness, [but] not with
regard to its object, because it conceptualizes that.' 116 There are two aspects
of every cognitive act for the Buddhist Epistemological School ($1.d for
Ramakantha): that directed towards the cognition itself, the perceiver, and
that directed towards its object. In non-conceptual cognition both of these are
non-conceptual, but in conceptual cognition, although the object-'perception'
is conceptual (and therefore for Buddhism not genuine perception), the self-
awareness is, even there, non-conceptual, and therefore a valid case of per-
ception.
Thus it is not possible for the Buddhist to claim that our appearance to our-
selves as stable (sthiragrlihakaprakliSa), which he accepts, is a case of super-
imposition on the part of a conceptual cognition (vikaZpa); for self-cognition
is, even on the part of a vikaZpa, according to his own tradition always valid.
It mayor may not be the case that we are fooled by the similarity and rapid
succession of momentary object-phases into thinking that we are looking at
one long object, but momentary cognitions should not be able to fool them-
selves, given Dignaga's doctrine that, even when engaged in conceptual cog-
nition, they appear accurately to themselves.
ata [Ked p. 16] Ila sambhavati, api tv aham-
pratyayaprakiisan7pataiva tadiipi tena sthiratayaiva bhiisalliit.
118
It is for precisely that reason
119
that the [perceiver] cannot even be the content
of the I-cognition: rather it is the very shining forth of I-cognition, because it
. d d th po th"' PI
appears as stable m ee en too - m at !orm. -
116 PrSa l.7ab (Sanskrit given at Hattori 1968 95, note 51): kalpalliipi svasGlJlvittiiv
niirthe vikalpaniit.
117 Interlinear comment above ata eva in P: ahGl!lpratyayagal1lYo hy iitmeti miinasa-
iinllii jail1lillzyiilliil1l.
118 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: ata Ila sam-
bhavati, api tv ahampratyayaprakiiSan7pataiva, tadiipi tena n7pqza sthiratayaiviihambhii-
saniit [Oiihambhiisalliit MSS; iihamavabhiisalliit ed., MSS] (295,14-15). I am tempted to
delete the ahGlJl in the final compound. The argument flows more smoothly if the object
of bhiisalliit/avabhiisalliit is that which is referred to by asya at the beginning of the sent-
ence, i.e. griihakiitmii, the perceiver. If it were not that but ahal1l, then the contention that
the perceiver is the shining forth ofI-cognition would not follow.
119 I.e. because it cannot be made into an object.
249
I-cognition does not present the perceiver as its stable content. Rather the
perceiver's stability is given as the constant shining forth of the I-cognition
itself. If RamakaJ).!ha's claims about the stable appearance of the perceiver to
itself (= the stable appearance of ourselves to ourselves) were based on it be-
ing the unchanging object or content of I-cognition, then the Buddhist might
have a case for saying that the stability is superimposed. For I-cognition is
conceptual cognition. But RamakaJ).!ha is talking of the stable shining forth of
cognition itself.
Ila hi kiilatraye 'pi griihakiitl1lallo dhvalJlsa!z sGl!lvedyata ity uktal1l. 122 yasya
hi priigabhiiva(l sa utpalllla ucyate, yasya tu pradhvGl!lsa(l sa yasya
pwza!z123 pz7rvottarayo(z ko.tyor niisty abhiivasGl!lvit sa lItpalll10
124
Ilimddho yeti na sakyate vaktulll.
125
120 'Too' here means even in I-cognition, which is conceptual cognition, as well as in
self-awareness, which he described in detail in 3.l.
121 I.e. in the form of the shining forth of I-cognition.
122 ity uktam Ked, B, P; iti yuktam Ped.
1'3
- yasya puna(l Ked, B, P; yasya Ped.
124 Ked, B, P; sa sal1lutpanllo Ped.
125 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: Ila hi kiilatraye 'pi griihakiinllallo dhvGl.Il-
sa(z sGl.llvedyata ity lIktalll. yasya hi priigabhiiva(l sa utpanlla(z, yasya tu [tu MSS;hi ed.]
dhvdlJlSa(l [dhvalJlsa!z MSS; plll!lSa utpatti(z ed., 1 MS] sa ahalllpratyayasya
[ahGl!lpratyayasya ed., MSS; pratyayasya MSS] puna(l pz7rvottarayo!z ko.tyor niisty abhii-
vasGlJlvit [abhiivasGl!lvit 1 MS; abhiiva(l. SalJlvit ed., MSS]. utpallllo Ilim-
ddho [litpallno ninlddho 1 MS; utpanllii Ilimddhii ed., MSS] bhaved iti Ila sakyate vaktlllll
(295,15,...18). The majority of witnesses point to a sentence break before salJlvit, and fem-
inine endings on lItpanllii and Iliruddhii. But the readings I have proposed are those of
what is consistently the best manuscript, in Nandinagan from Mysore, and are supported
by the NPP parallel.
We still have to break what in NPP is one sentence, into two here: 'But there is no
consciousness of the absence of I-cognition at some previous or subsequent extremity. It
cannot be said to arise and cease in every moment.' Thus some may want to adjust
PMNKV further to bring it in line with NPP. To do so would involve emending ahal1lpra-
tyayasya/pratyayasya to yasya and inserting a sa before
If RamakaI)!ha did indeed write ahalllpratyayasya in PMNKV then it is a sign of his
thinking changing between the writing of fMNKV and NPP. For he would be using the
word equivalently to svasalJlvedalla, whereas in NPP, as we will see in the next chapter,
the two are firmly distinguished.
250
For I have said 126 that the ceasing of the perceiver is not sensed in any of the
three times. For something which had prior non-existence is said to have
arisen; something which undergoes cessation is [said to] be destroyed; but
when there is no consciousness of something at some previous or subsequent
extremity of it, it cannot be said to arise and cease in every moment.
RamakaI).tha shows here how thoroughly at odds with the way we experience
ourselves the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of the perceiver is. In
the previous chapter the Buddhist was portrayed as a model of down-to-earth
common sense against the background of Nyaya, and Sfuikhya on-
tology and their imperceptible and eternal Self. The rift that he here describes
between the way we experience ourselves and the Buddhist doctrine of pro-
duction and cessation in every moment is not enough in itself to discredit the
Buddhist theory, but it' places the burden on the Buddhist to come up with a
satisfactory explanation of why our self-perception is so mistaken. The Bud-
dhist no longer has common sense on his side.
d I
'dd! bl - .127 ks - I 128
na ctisvasGl!1ve ya,l SGl!IVI zanno zavatlt! va. yama .1.
And we will teach 129 that something that is not self-cognized cannot be a pro-
perty of consciousness.
The implication here is that if arising and destruction were properties of con-
sciousness, that consciousness would be aware of them.
tat iva parasparaviruddlzal'lcpatvtid
130
ya-
tlzti vidyudtidau sad vytivartay-
ati, eVGl!1 grtilzaktitmany apy tiroptisal7lblzavtit stlzailyam avablztisamtinam
asalJlsayal!1 vytivartayatfti yuktalll. J3J
126 See his remark in 3.1: ktilatraye 'pi tiraskrtasvagataprtigablztivapradlzvalJlstiblztivo
(14,3-4).
127 blzavatfti Ked, Ped, P; blzavablzavatfti B.
128 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: na ctisvasGl!1vedya!1 [ctisvasGl!1vedya!z 1
MS; vti svasGl!lvedya!1 ed.] sGl!lviddlzanno blzavatfti (295,18).
129 I find no passage to which he may be referring. The parallel passage in PMNKV
also ends with iti (see note 128), and there too (a much shorter text the whole
of which I have read several times) I am unable to locate a plausible passage.
130 parasparaviruddlzao Ked, B; paraspaviruddlzao P; parasparao Ped.
J3J Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: tat iva
parasparaviruddlzal'lcpatvtid vidyudtidau sad
Therefore it is correct to say that just as the momentariness of lightning for
example; being established by a means of knowledge, 132 non-
momentariness, because the momentary and the stable, like the gross and the
subtle, have natures that are mutually contradictory, so because of the iffipos-
sibility of superimposition on to the perceiver, J33 [its] stability, shining forth,
undoubtedly excludes momentariness.
251
RamakaI).tha fIrst gives an example where he would be quite prepared to ac-
cept momentariness over stability. He implies that the same reasoning that
leads us to momentariness in that case leads us to stability in the current case.
4.4. Refutation of Self-Awareness?
na ca svasalJlvedanasya tatlztitve btidlzab sal7lblzavati btidlzaktiblzil7latasytipi
tenaiva stlzirtitlllanti sGl!1vedantid
134
allyatlzti btidlzakatvtiyogtid. blzrantyablzti-
vytivGl1ayati yatlzti, evalll atra svtitmtiroptisambhavella sthairyal7l avablztisamtillam aSGl!I-
saYGl!1 vyavacclzinattfti yuktam (295,18-21). We could conjecture svtitmallY
tiroptisambhavena for svtitmtiroptisal7lbhavena on the basis of svtitmany tiroptisalllbhavtit
in one MatV VP parallel, svtitmany tiroptisal7lbhavena in the other (see below) and grtilza-
ktitl7lallY apy tiroptisamblzavtit in NPP. If we retain svtitl7ltiroptisamblzavella, we certainly
have to interpret it as svtitmallY tiroptisal7lbhavella.
A parallel sentence in MatV VP reads: tasl7ltit svtitmallY tiroptisambhavtid grtilzakti-
tmalla!1 stlzairyam avablztisal7ltillam svasalJIVedallasiddlzam [svasGl!lvedallasiddlzam ed.;
salJlvedallam u, [, n evtiblzyupagalltavyam (161,2-3).
Later on in the same chapter (173,7-10) there is an even more similar sentence: tat
iva stlziratvtistlziratvayo!z parasparaviruddlzal'lcpatvtid vidyudtidtiv astlz-
airyalJl [astlzairyGlJl u, [, f; astlzailyatvalJl ed.] siddhalJl sat [sat ed.; om. in [, f; sao a, u]
stlzairyGl!1 vytivartayati yatlzti, tadvad atra svtitmallY tiroptisamblzavella stlzairyam ava-
blztisal7ltinam asalJlsayalJl astlzailYGl!1 vyavacclzillatti, trtfyapraktirtisal7lblzavtid iti.
J32 In this case visual perception.
J33 To add here 'for its part' would probably be to overtranslate the api, which func-
tions here as a focus-particle, and would ch!-tter this already lengthy sentence, so I render
it simply by italicizing the word it qualifies:
134 salJlvedalltit Ped; svasGl!lvedantit Ked, B, P.
452
viic ca. bhriintalll api hi vijiiiillalll sarvalll iilalllballe bhriilltQl.1l Ila sviitlllallfti
135
And it is not possible to refute that self-awareness is thus
l36
[for two reasons:]
1) because that which would be held to be the reason for the refutation would
also be experienced by just that stable thing,137 since it would not be possible
[to see it] as a reason for a refutation otherwise;138 and 2) because of the im-
possibility of error [in self-awareness], for even mistaken cognitions are all
mistaken with regard to some object, not with regard to themselves.
139
We'
will show as much. 140
135 Parallel sentence in MatV VP: Iliipi biidhalz [Iliipi biidhalz IT, r, f; omitted in the
other MSS and in ed.] sarvalll iilalllballe [iilalllballe 4 (non-Kashmirian) MSS; iilalllba-
ltalll ed.] bhriintQlII [bhriilltal]l IT, r, f; bhriilltir ed.] Ila sviitlllalli yatalz [yata!l IT, r, f; kadli-
calla iti ed.] (173,6).
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: Ila ca SVaSQlIIVedallasya blidhalz salllbhavati,
yell a bhriintatii bhaved iti (295,21-22). Unlike NPP and MatV VP, PMNKV
does not give reasons for this claim but just points forward, either to 297,10 (ad v. 46): ...
svasQl]lvittau bhrallllibhliviit; or 302,8-12 (ad v. 49), the text of which is given in note
140.
136 I.e. stable.
137 I do not translate as 'stable Self', but take the compound as a Bahuvrilii, because a
Karmadhiiraya consisting of adjective followed by noun would be unlikely to be formed
unless resulting in some sense transcending that of the same two words with the adjective
inflected.
138 'Otherwise' = if it were not experienced by something stable.
139 The object of a cognition may be wrong, but the shining forth of the subject in that
cognition is never wrong. This principle is related to that of svlitmany avikalpakovikalpalz
above ..
140 NPP 90,2b-9l,3: bhriilltal]lhi vijiilillalll sarvalll iilalllballe bhrlintalll, Ila svlitlllalli.
lilalllballQll1 hy allyatlzii balzilzsthitalll allyatlzli pratfyallllillQl]l lipadyate.
yat pUllar bodlzaikasvablzlivQll1 vastu tad yatlzaiva cakiisti tathaiva sad, atatsvablzlivasyli-
svasal]lvedyatvlit [Olisvasalllvedyatvlit em.; iiSal]lVedyatvlit Ked]. svasalllvedyatve ca tat-
svabhiivatvalll. 'For all mistaken cognition is mistaken with respect to some object, not
with regard to itself. For an object becomes the object of a mistake when it exists exter-
nally in one way and is cognized in a different way. But an object whose single nature is
consciousness exists in precisely. the way that it appears, because something not of that
nature is not self-cognized, and if something is self-cognized, then it has that (i.e. con-
sciousness) as its nature.'
This sentence is paralleled at PMNKV 302,8-12 (ad v. 49): Ila ca [Ila ca MSS; Ila
ed.] tatra blzriillti!l salllbhavati. bhriilltalll api hi [api hi MSS; api ed.] svaplliidivijiiiillQl.n
253
The fIrst reason is perhaps based on the idea that if a potential reason for a
refutation were the content simply of a momentary cognition it would remain
as something isolated, without any bearing on anything else. Only if cognized
sarvalll [sarvalll ed., (MS; satyalll MSS] iilalllballe [lilalllbane MSS; lilalllbate ed., MSS]
bhrlintalll, na svlitlllalli. iilalllballal]l ca bahilzsthitalll anyathli pratfyal1llillQlII
yatlil1l iipatati [lipatati MSS; liplidayati ed.]. yat pUllar bodhaikasvabhlivalll vastu tad
yathaiva cakiisti tathaiva sad [sad MSS; tatalz ed.] asvasQlllvedyasya [asvasQlllvedyasya
MSS; svasal]lvedyasya ed.] tatsvabhlivatviiyoglit. tatsvabhlivatve vii [tatsvabhlivatve vli
ed., MSS; atatsvabhiivatve na 1 MS] svasalllvedyalll eva. iti svasalllvedalle bhrlilltyasalll-
bhavlid litl1labheda(1 pratyekal]l parlitmiillllmiitrtayli svasalllvedallasiddha!l [svasal]lveda-
Ilasiddhalz MSS; svasalllvedallena siddhalz ed., MSS] satya eva.
1) The emendation to lisvasQl]lvedyatvlit in NPP has partial support from the
PMNKV parallel.
2) It is slightly strange that in both versions we have to take sat in the sense of asti.
3) It is quite possible that PMNKV should read iilambanQl]l hy allyathli bahilzsthitalll
allyathli pratfyamiinalll like NPP, instead of iilambanalll ca bahi!lsthitam allyathii pratfya-
miinQl.Il. The hi makes good sense, because we want this to be an explanation of what pre-
cedes; as does the double allyathli, the loss of one of which could be due to the rarity of
having two allyathlis so close to each other.
4) In NPP the reason given for something of the nature of consciousness existing as it
appears is: a) if something is not of the nature of consciousness it is not self-cognized; and
b) the contrapositive of that, namely that if something is self-cognized it must be of the
nature of consciousness. PMNKV's first reason we can assume to be: if something is not
self-cognized it is not of the nature of consciousness-because its edition is clearly cor-
rupt. But for the second reason we could accept either that given in the edition and some
of the manuscripts, that if is of the nature of consciousness it is self-cognized;
or that given in one manuscript, (MI in the critical edition being prepared by Goodall,
Sarma and Watson), that if something is not of the nature of consciousness it is not self-
cognized (atatsvabhlivatve na svasQl.llvedyalll). Thus we have three different pairs of rea-
sons: 1) those given in NPP; 2) those in PMNKV taking the second from the edition; 3)
those in PMNKV taking the second from MI' I am uncertain which is best. NPP has
against it that it leaves open the possibility that something could be of the nature of con-
sciousness and yet not self-cognized, which could be seen to leave open the possibility
that it could appear differently to the way it exists. MI's second reason is not redundant.
The second reason in the other two does not state anything that is not entailed by the first.
I take the general point to be that if something exists external to consciousness then it
can exist in one way and be perceived in an9ther, but if something is of the nature of con-
sciousness then there is no room for distortion to occur for there is no gap between the
thing and its (self-) cognition.
254
by a stable perceiver could it be related to that which it purports to refute and
. d fu 141
thus Vlewe as a reason lor a re tatlOn.
na ca blidhakam matim liva-
. ..,. _ 142
. rjayatl VlpaSCltam.
And if something is proved by a valid means of knowledge, acceptance of it
as otherwise does not win over the mind of wise people without a reason for a
refutation.
He has just said of course that refutations are impossible in the case in hand.
By adding here that the only that could potentially stand a chance of
overthrowing our notion of the stability of ourselves is a refutation, he re-
inforces the conclusion that we really are stuck with that stability:
143 b dl k . . 144 . t -,
sthirasylirthakriylinupapattir eva li za am It! cet, na, tatl-azva asya.l
samutpatter
145
iti 146
If [you say], 'the reason for the refutation is just that a stable [entity] could
not have efficacity,' [we reply, that is] not [correct] for as we will ShOW,147
that (i.e. efficacity) can only arise in a [stable thing].
tad eVa/!1 sarvadaikariipasthiragrlihakapraklislitlnlinliropita
148
eva sarvlirtha-
yena svasa/Jlvedanasiddha[z, tena tlna-
141 This was suggested by Harunaga Isaacson.
142 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: na ca blidhakam vinli-
nyathlibhYllpagamo matim livarjayati vipascitlim (295,22-23).
143 nllpapattir Ked'c, Ped, P; nupattir B, nutpattir Ked
pc
.
144 Interlinear note below iti cet in P: sthiro hy ekasvabhliva[z, arthakriyli hi anekasva-
anekasvabhlivalJl hi eva, Ila tv ity artha[ity ar-
thaO em.; ityatirthaO MS]kriylinllpapattir eva blidhakalJl iti nanasvabhlivo hi
sthiro hy ekasvabhliva iti bauddhli[z.
145 samlltpatter Ked, Ped; samutpattir B; samupapatter P.
146 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: sthirasylirthakriylillllpapattir eva blidhiketi
cet, na, tadallupapattes tatra (295,23-24). He is pointing
forward there to his commentary on verse 46.
147 73,9_74,2; and 81,11-83,3.
148 litlnlinliropita Ked
Pc
, Ped, B, P; litlnli nliropita Ked
ac
149 Ked
Pc
, B, P; Ked'c, Ped.
siinyli!l skandhli iti eva. [Ked p. 17] tad iyatli prati-
jiilisiitrli/
50
jiiliteti pada/!l V);likhylitam. 111.511 .
So because the Self, which is the shining forth of a stable perceiver that is al-
ways of uniform nature, and certainly not superimposed, is thus established
for all people through self-awareness as the wimess of all objects, the position
that the psycho-physical constituents are empty of Self is therefore certainly
refuted by direct perception. 151 Thus with what we have had up to here, the
word 'knower' from the assertion siltra has been explained.
255
In marked contrast to Chapter I, almost the entire passage looked at in this
chapter has parallels, which have been given in the footnotes, in other of
Ramakrugha's texts, most prominently the Matmigavrtti and the
nirasakarikavrtti. Almost every sentence of those parallels has been judged
by me to require departure from the versions of the most recent (and best)
editions. This improvement of the texts, if it is such, has been enabled princi-
pally through simple comparison with the NPP passage; but also through con-
sidering the readings of manuscripts of the and
through re-evaluating the variants reported by Bhatt in his edition of the
Matmigavrtti. I suspect that anyone who reads parts of the Matmigavrtti at all
carefully will come to the conclusion, amply evidenced here, that Bhatt
should have given more weight to the readings of fi, r and f, the three Kash-
mirian manuscripts. I have favoured their readings not only when they are
clearly superior, as is often, but also on occasions when they are equally as
plausible as the alternatives.
150 pratijiilisiitrlij Ked, B; pratijiilisl7trlintal!l Ped.
151 As pointed out in note 9, this sentence is glossing the second half of the verse. The
word tena from the verse is being glossed by sarvadaikariipasthiragrlihakapraklislitlnli-
nliropita eva yell a svasalJlvedallasiddha!l, tena
Ila; bodhablidhitli by and siinyatli bhlivlilllil.1l by litmasiillyli!l
skandhli iti
CHAPTER 3:
Can We Perceive the Self Through 1-
Cognition (Ahampratyaya)?
Background
The last chapter dealt with RfunakaJ.l!ha's account of our apprehension of the
Self through pre-linguistic self-awareness (svasa1Jlvedana). Later in the text
he turns to another kind of perception of the Self namely '1-
cognition' (ahampratyaya). This is the kind claimed by Uddyotakara
l
and
Kumiirila,
2
for example. It -is explicitly brought up by Sadyojyotis in the
verses of NP, unlike self-awareness:
1. 15ab) iitmallY asattvQJ!lllO yuktam ahampratyayagocare I
1.15ab) That the Self does not exist is certainly3 incorrect [since] it is
accessible to I-cognitions.
4
These I-cognitions (ahampratyaya) are any verbal cognition, such as 'I see a
pot', which includes 'I' as one of its elements. Or the word is also used to re-
fer not to the whole cognition, 'I see a pot', but to the cognition of 'I' within
it. How do they differ from the self-awareness (sviinubhavalsvasQJ!lvedana)
with which the previous chapter was concerned?
1) Self-awareness is pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual (avikaZpaka). I-cognitions,
by contrast, are constituted by concepts and permeated by language. They are
1 NVa(NCG) 323,12-324,10.
2 SV(P2) iitmaviida 107-139.
3 I translate the llO as emphatic, but it is possibly used instead of lla simply to create a
metrically-required long syllable.
4 Translated as I take Sadyojyotis to have intended it. For a slightly different transla-
tion, representing RamakaJ.l!:ha's construal, see page 272.
258
instances of 'verbal cognition' (pariimarsalvimarsa), and of 'determinative
cognition' (adhyavasiiya),5 terms which, though having different resonances,
are co-extensive and are opposed to non-conceptual awareness (nirvikaZpaka-
jfiiina), of which self-awareness is an example.
6
2) RamakaJ;l!ha said in the passage discussed in the last chapter that cog-
nition's unmediated experience of itself (sviinubhava) does not differ between
different knowers, because it is established by cognition's own nature alone
(svabhiivasiddha).7 It occurs prior to any application of concepts to it by the
knowing subject. This highlights a further difference between I-cognition and
self-awareness. I-cognition, being the result of conceptualization, is not the
same for everyone. On encountering a pot, one person may have the cogni-
tion, 'I see a pot'; someone else who speaks the same language but is from a
culture that does not use such pots may have the cognition 'I see rounded
baked clay.' So these cognitions, unlike self-awareness, are not established
solely by the nature of their objects. They conform to the nature of the object
that confronts one's senses (according to RamakaJ;l!ha), but they are not de-
termined entirely by it.
3) In the case of self-awareness the directness of the experience is a guaran-
tee of its valiciity. But in cognitions ofT, what we experience is a concept,
not the referent of that concept directly. How then can we be sure that the
referent of the concept is real? Since all we access directly is the concept 'I',
5 For adhyavasliya I avoid the common translation 'judgement', which though fine
for the Buddhist understanding of the term, would not be so good for RlUnakaI)tl!a's. It is
too suggestive of subjectivity (as when one says in English, 'that is a question of judge-
ment' to indicate that there is no fact of the matter). For RlUnakaI)tl!a. adhyavasliya repre-
sents reality faithfully and is not dependent primarily on the mental conditioning of the
cognizing subject. Thus I use 'determinative cognition', conveying simply that what is
taken in by this kind of apprehension is clearly specifiable.
6 In my exegesis, when I wish to use a word to cover both the non-conceptual and
conceptual modes of apprehending objects I use 'cognition'. This corresponds to the San-
skrit word jlilina. But when jlilina is being used to refer specifically to non-conceptual
cognition, as in for example nirvikalpakajlilina, I often use the word 'awareness'. I never
use 'awareness' to refer to conceptual cognition. I alternate freely between the English
'pre-conceptual' and 'non-conceptual' without intending any difference of meaning.
7 13,15-17.
Chapter 3: I-Cognition
259
how can we know that there exists anything corresponding to it outside the
cognition? In order to show that I-cognition provides reliable evidence of
the Self's existence, Ramakru:;t!ha has to answer questions of this kind.
4) Self-awareness, as claimed by RamakaJ;l!ha above,8 occurs all the time,
even in deep sleep, whereas he would not claim that we have I-cognitions in
deep sleep.
What role do these I-cognitions play in his establishing of the Self? As one
can see from the verse, Sadyojyotis' use of them is quite simple. They show
that the Self exists since it is their referent. In other words it is none other
than the Self that we perceive through this kind of cognition, so it must exist.
What RiimakaJ;l!ha does with this verse is more complicated. In order to un-
derstand the meaning that he reads into it we have to know the content of the
preceding section of the text.
We have just had a long section that is not primarily about the Self, but about
the existence or non-existence of objects external to cognition. The opponent
arguing for their non-existence is identified by RiimakaJ;l!ha as a Siinyavadin.
9
At one point this Buddhist put forward a DharmakIrtian argument that is
8 15,2-9.
9 3l,lb. It may seem strange to some that RamakaI)tl!a uses this title to refer to the
proponents not of Madhyarnika arguments, but of YogaciiraJVijfianavadin ones. He does
so consistently throughout the text, for example at 4,lb; 26,1; 28,lb-29,l; 3l,lb; 34,8.
The third of these four references makes it clear that he understands s17nyavlida to be the
view that 'absolutely all cognition is devoid of objects,' aJ1has17nYa1!1 sarvam eva vijlili-
nam. A better-known philosopher with whom RlUnakaI)tl!a's usage of the label Sfinya-
vadin accords is Kumarila: the s17nyavlida chapter of the Slokavlirttika covers vijlililla-
vlida. Kumarila's label derives from the Vrttikiira's remark in SBh(F) ad 1.1.4a: s17nyas tu
[i.e. pratyaya(IJ. katham? artizajlilinayor liklirabhedalJlllOpalabhlimahe.
The rule, saugata(l s17nyavlidini, is quoted in Mallinatha's commentary on verse 6cd
of the Brahmavarga (2.6) of AK(AL). This has actually entered the text of Amarakosa in
at least one edition. It thus appears that sL7nyavlidin was also used simply as a synonym of
Buddhist. But RlUnakaI)tl!a's usage is certainly more specific as he frequently opposes the
Sfinyavadins to Biihyiirthavadins (i.e. Sautrantikas), who hold objects to exist outside
cognition, for example at 2l,lb-22,3; 22,q-l4; 35,lb-36,3; 38,20-22. (Thus in my exe-
gesis I frequently use the label 'Yogaciira' to refer to those that RlUnakaI)tl!a refers to as
Sfinyavadin.)
260
based on 'the necessity of co-perception', sahopalambhaniyama, between
two things: that is to say, the fact that two things are only ever perceived with
each other and never alone. We will have to understand this argument in or-
der. to understand RamakaI),tha's discussion of I-cognition. Ramakargha's
Buddhist laid out the sahopalambhaniyama argument as an exposition of the
following verse-segment by Sadyojyotis:
1.1Oa-c vastu vijiianato bhinna1Jz naiva vijiilinajanlllana[z I
10
[Opponent] An objectis not in fact separate from cognition, because
it is not graSped prior to the rise of cognition.
RamakaIftha explains this as follows:
lJ
[Ked p. 32] yasya yena sahopalalllbho Iliyata[z, tasya tato Illirtlzlilltaratvam, 12
yatlzli dvicandrajlilillapratibhlisamlilllid
13
ekasllllic candralllaso dvitfyasya.
llflajiilinella sahopalambhalliyamas ca nfllideb, tena villli tata[zl4 piirvlipara-
yob sa1Jzvedanlibhlivlit. atas tasylipi tato nlirthlilltaratvam. iti nfllideb sa'lz-
vidrz7patva
l5
siddhito '11lzlid blihyatvanirlisa[z sidhyati. yad lihu[Z:16
salzopalambhaniyamlid abhedo
l7
Ilflataddhiyo[z I iti.
[Silnyavadin:] When the co-perception (sahopalambhalz) of A with B is
fIrmly fIxed (Iliyata[z), IS then A is not a separate entity from B, just like the
second moon [in a cognition of two moons] [is not a separate entity] from
the [fIrst] one appearing in [that] cognition of two moons.
19
And blue and
10 Ked; L;o ligrhyamlillatvlit B, P;
tvlit Ped; agrlihyamlinatvlit M.
II NPP 32,4-12.
12 nlil1hlintaratval!z Ked, Ped, B, L; nlil1hlilltarataratval./l P.
13 Schmithausen wondered if dvicandrajlilinapratibhlisamlinlid may be a corruption
of dvicandrajiiline pratiblzlisamlinlid. I put this forward for consideration, but have not
emended, not regarding the transmitted sentence to be quite problematic enough.
14 tata[z omitted in L.
15 rz7patvaO KedPc, B, P; rz7pao Ked"", Ped, L.
16 PVin 94, note 4.
17 niyallllid abhedo Ked, B, L, P, PVin; lliyallllilllla bhedo Ped.
ISLe. when A is only ever perceived with B and never alone.
19 This second moon is seen, for example, by people suffering from an eye disease. It
serves as an example for this argument because 1) it never occurs except in cognitions of
other [objects that are taken to exist external to cognition] are necessarily
perceived together with cognition of blue,20 because we do not experience
[them] without the [cognition of blue], before or after that [cognition].21
Therefore that (i.e. blue) too is not a separate entity from [cognition of
blue].22 Therefore the refutation of externality is achieved indirectly
(artlzlit) . through proving that blue etc. have consciousness
23
as their na-
ture.
24
As [DharmakIrti] has said:
261
the first moon, and 2) it is not an entity existing independently (artlzlilltara) of the first
moon.
20 Strictly speaking, he should have written nfllidijiilillella for nflajiilillella.
21 The phrase 'before or after that [cognition]' appears a little redundant here. All that
is needed for the conclusion to be secured is that blue is not perceived without cognition
of blue. But adds in 'before or after that [cognition]', tata[z piirvliparayob,
because he is glossing the verse's 'prior to the rise of cognition'. He takes 'prior to', quite
reasonably, as shorthand for 'prior to or after'.
22 The argument has been given in logical form: fIrst the concomitance of logical rea-
son (hetll) and property to be proved (slidhya) (i.e. the invariable co-perception between
two things and their not being separate entities); followed by an example which illustrates
that followed by the application of the logical reason (invariable co-
perception) to the subject (palqa) of the argument (a supposedly externally existing object
such as blue, and cognition of blue) (the upallaya stage); followed by the conclusion (ni-
galllalla).
23 For formal reasons I translate jlilina and vijlilina as and sal.llvit and
sa1Jzvitti as 'consciousness'. The way that here establishes that blue is not
separate from cognition (jlilina) of blue and then describes this as proving that blue has
consciousness (sa1Jzvit) as its nature seems to suggest, however, that these two concepts
are either identical or very close to each other for him. I certainly have not been able to
fInd any fIrm differences between usage of these words. That he does not
for example use jiilina/vijiilina for object-orientated awareness and reserve sal./lvitlsal.nvitti
for inward or reflexive awareness is evidenced by his use of nfllidisal./lvittilnfllidisal.nvit
etc. (e.g. 17,3-4; 28,3b-2b; 29,10). Those cases also illustrate that he does not always use
. the fIrst two for a transitory mental act and reserve the latter two for something more en-
during, for example the potential or capacity to illuminate objects. Thirdly, that he does
not always use the latter two for stating the nature of the Self (according to his own view)
and the nature of objects (according to the view of his Yogaciira opponent) is seen
through the many instances of (vi)jiilinariipa/jlilinlitllla in those roles: 13,5; 21,2b; 33,9;
35,1; 59,3; 89,2.
24 In fact DharmakIrti did not use this' argument to prove the 'refutation of external-
ity'. He intended it to prove that the appearance of blue and the cognition of blue are not
262
Because they are necessarily perceived together, blue and cognition of
blue are not different.
Slight differences can discerned 1) the argument put forward by
Sadyojyotis' in the verse of NP, 2) the argument that Rama-:
krugha lays out by way of exposition of Sadyojyotis' verse, and 3) the argu-
ment stated by DharmakIrti in the PVin half-verse that RamakaI).tha quotes
here as though it encapsulated 2. RamakaI).tha presents all three as though
they are the same argument, first stated succinctly by Sadyojyotis, then ex-
panded by himself and then summarized in the DharmakIrti quote. But the
very next sentences, where RamakaI).tha gives his first response to the, argu-
illustrate that there is a difference between 1 and 3, in that they are re-
sponses applicable to 3 but not to 1. RamakaI).tha writes there that cognition
of blue (nflajiiiina), i.e. the illuminator of blue (nflaprakasaka) exists even
when blue is not there.
25
If the Buddhist means by cognition of blue not the
illuminator of blue, but the determinative cognition (adhyavasiiya) 'blue',
then that too exists when no blue object is there, for example in daydream-
ing.
26
It is clear that neither of these contradict Sadyojyotis' point that we do
not perceive an object prior to the rise of its cognition. They give examples
not of the object without the cognition but of 'cognition' (interpreted in two
different ways) without the object. Thus they are relevant as responses to the
invariable co-perception of blue and cognition of blue as stated in 3, but not
at all to the argument of Sadyojyotis' The difference between 1
and 3 can be represented pictorially for purposes of further clarification. In
the Venn diagrams below, '0' stands for an object such as a patch of blue, and
'c' stands for its cognition. The left-hand diagram illustrates that '0' is never
found without 'c', though there may be cases of 'c' without '0'. This repres-
ents Sadyojyotis' argument (1). The right-hand diagram illustrates that '0' is
different even if there are extemal objects, i.e. to be acceptable both to Vijiiiinaviidins and
Sautrantikas. The argument was taken, however, by both Buddhist and non-Buddhist
authors to be an inference of vijiiaptimatratii (cognition-only). See Matsumoto 1980 26,
note 3.
25 32,13-14.
26 32,14-16.
263
never found without 'c' and 'c' is never found without '0'. This represents
DharmakIrti's argument (3).
Why is 2 different from 3? Did that not also claim that blue and cognition of
blue are invariably co-perceived? In fact it seemed to mean by that only that
blue is always perceived with cognition of blue (one-sided co-perception, as
illustrated by the left-hand not also that cognition of blue is always
perceived with blue (symmetrical co-perception, as illustrated by the right-
hand diagram).27 Whereas 3 talks of the co-perception and non-difference of
blue and cognition of blue, lumping the two of them together in a dual com-
pound, 2 talks of the co-perception of blue with cognition of blue, and blue
not being a separate thing from cognition of blue. On four occasions Rama-
kaI).tha could have given an unambiguously symmetrical formulation, as in 3,
but each time he talks from a one-sided point of view.z
s
That he means by
'co-perception of blue with cognition of blue' simply that blue is always per-
ceived with cognition of blue is also suggested by the fact that he backs this
up with just 'because we do not experience blue without [cognition of blue].'
His phrasing of the two moons example is also strong evidence that a one-
27 Udayana, in the Atmatattvaviveka, makes explicit that claims of sahopalambhani-
yama can either be symmetrical or one-sided. He terms the former samasahopalambhani-
yama (see e.g. ATV 326,3); and the latter asamasahopalamblzaniyama (see e.g. ATV
328,3).
28 yasya yena salzopalambho niyatas :.. tasya tato niirthiintaratval!l ... nflajliiinena
sahopalambhaniyamas ca nfliidelz ... atas tasyiipi tato niil1hiintaratvam.
264
sided co-perception is intended. He does not say that both/either are non-
different from the other (and necessarily perceived with each other), but he
singles out, rather, specifically the second of the twO.
29
Thus 2 claims only
that the second moon-the illusory double image of the real one-is never
perceived without the first, real one. Since an example instantiates both the
logical reason and the property to be proved, we can see that 2 claims only
that blue is always perceived with cognition of blue and that blue is not a
separate thing (arthlintara) from cognition of blue, while allowing that cog-
nition of blue may be perceived without blue and may in some sense be in-
dependent from it, as the real moon does not depend on its occasional illusory
double image.
That DharmakIrti himself intended the logical reason of the argument to be
symmetrical, if not beyond doubt from the isolated half-verse quoted here, is
so from both PVin and PYa. For in PVin, immediately after the half-verse
that RamakaI).tha quotes, DharmakIrti continues, 'Even if blue appears to be
different from [its] cognition (anubhava), it is not a separate entity from it,
because they are necessarily perceived together, like two moons and the like.
For if one out of these two is not perceived, neither is the other. ,30 Thus, al-
though his opening assertion is not symmetrically expressed, he is then ex-
plicit that if either blue or cognition of blue, or either of the two moons, is not
perceived, neither is the other. Similarly in PYa he writes, We do not find
that any object is experienced without cognition, nor that a cognition is expe-
rienced without an object. ,31
29 This is not the way DharmakIrti himself gives the example: see dvicandradivat in
note 30, and indav ivadvaye in note 3l.
30 na hi bhilllilivabhasitve 'py arthantararl7patvalJl [arthlintararl7patvG1p Kas; arthli-
ntaram eva n7pG1p TBV 364,14; arthlilltaram evalJl n7pG1!1 NBhii] nflasylinllbhavlit, tayo!z
sahopalambhaniyamlid dvicandrlidivat. na hy anayor ekli[ekli NBhii; ekasyli BSBha]nu-
palambhe 'nyo[ 'nyo NBhii; 'nyasyo BSBha]palambho 'sti. (The Tibetan translation of this
is given at PVin I p. 94,20-24. The Sanskrit is supplied from fragments reported at PVin I
p. 94, note 5; Steinkellner 1972 206,6-8; and Stern 1991160,7.)
31 The whole passage runs as follows (PVa 3.387-389): sakrt sG1!lvedyamlinasya ni-
yamena dhiyli saha I tato 'nyatvG1Jl kenliklirelJa sidhyati II bhedas ca bhrantivi-
jlilinair" driyetendliv ivlidvaye I sG1pvittiniyamo nasti bhinnayor nflapftayo!z II nlirtho
Chapter 3: I-Cognition 265
How, last of all, does 2 differ from I? A) It introduces the Dharn;takIrtian idea
of sahopalambhaniyama that was not mentioned by Sadyojyotis. This term-
inological difference is not as significant as it could be though, since, as ex-
plained, RamakaI).tha's notion of what is meant by sahopalambhaniyama is
closer to Sadyojyotis' claim in 1 than to what DharmakIrti uses the term to
mean. B) It is more detailed, specifying the general principle that if two
things are invariably co-perceived they are not different, and adducing
DharmakIrti's example of the two moons. It is thus a compromise between
the arguments of Sadyojyotis and DharmakIrti.
*****
RamakaI).tha outlines a one-sided co-perception argument because the Sadyo-
jyotis verse that he is expounding makes only the one-sided claim. But such
an understanding of sahopalambhaniyama is not unattested in Buddhist
sources. It is found in account of the argument. He too singles
out the second of the two moons specifically rather than treating them both as
interchangeable: 32
'sG1Jlvedana!z kas cid anG11halJ1 vlipi (anG11hasylipi PVBh) vedanam I salJlvedya-
mlinG1p tat tayor nlisti vivekitli II 'In what way can an object, [since] it is experienced si-
multaneously [and] exclusively with cognition, be proved to be different from this [cog-
nition]? And those whose perception is in error see a difference [between object and cog-
nition], like [those with an eye disease see double when looking] at the single moon.
Things which are different, [such as] blue and yellow, are not necessarily experienced
[together]. We do not find any object experienced without cognition, or a cognition expe-
rienced without an object. Therefore [object and cognition] are not separate.'
a) PVa(M) reads bhrlilltavijlilinair but Iwata 1991a prefers bhrlilltivijlilinair on
the basis of the distribution of readings in nine other editions, commentaries and quota-
tions of the verse (given in Teil II, p. 149, note 72).
RamakaJ?!ha must have been aware that Dha:rmakIrti's co-perception claim, unlike
his, was symmetrical, for why else would he have begun his response to the co-perception
argument with what are counter-examples to a symmetrical co-perception of blue and
cognition of blue, but which do not contradict at all the co-perception that he himself has
laid out?
32 TS(BBS) 2029-2030 eva sylid yasya salJlvedanalJz dh11lvam I tas-
mlid avyatiriktG1Jl tat tato vli Ila vibhidyate II yathli nfladhiya!z svlitmli dvitfyo vli yathOl;lu-
266
When the experience of A is necessarily the experience of B, then A is
not different from B, or cannot be separated from it, just like the own
nature of a cognition of blue [from that cognition of blue] or just like
the second moon [from the fIrst]. And this experience of the image of
blue is the experience of the cognition of blue.
interpretation of A being co-perceived with B is that the per-
ception of A is also necessarily the perception of B. This holds in two differ-
ent kinds of case, which is why he gives two different examples. In the first
kind, exemplified by A equalling the own nature of a cognition of blue, and B
equalling the cognition of blue, it is also true that the perception of B is the
perception of A (symmetrical co-perception). In the second kind, exemplified
by A equalling the illusory second moon and B the first, real moon, it is not
also true that the perception of B is the perception of A. The conclusion that
follows in these two kinds of case is not the same, since in the first case nei-
ther A nor B are different from each other, whereas in the second case though
A is not different from B, B is, in a sense, different from A.
chooses two different expressions, avyatiriktalJ1 and na vibhidyate, to express
this difference.
33
*****
It was mentioned that RamakaI).tha responds to the opponent's sahopala-
mbhaniyama argument by claiming that cognition of blue, interpreted in two
pa?l I nrladhfvedana1Jl cedQ/!l nrllikiirasya vedanam [vedanam TS(BBS), Tib. ?le 89a7; ve-
danlit TS(GOS)] II
33 Note that though DharmakIrti, the originator of the sallOpaiambhaniyallla argu-
ment, explains it as based on a symmetrical co-perception between blue and cognition of
blue, his follower feels the need to include the possibility of a one-sided co-
perception. One reason for this was perhaps a desire to accommodate the view (found
even in Vijfianavada contexts) that the object or form (likiira) of a cognition is not identi-
cal with the cognition itself. (For more on this see page 276 and note 64.) Another was
probably deliberation on the exact implications of the two moons example. DharmakIrti
seems to have intended cognition of two moons as an example of a false cognition since
one is in fact looking at something single, in the same way that seeing an object as sepa-
rate from cognition is false since one is in fact looking at something single. But as soon as
one of the two moon,s is regarded as the real one and the other as its illusory double-
image, then a one-sided co-perception is exemplifIed, not a symmetrical one.
267
different ways, does occur without blue. He thus rejects the sahopalambhani-
yama argument on the grounds that its logical reason, the invariable co-
perception of blue and cognition of blue, is unestablished (asiddha). This is
only the first level of RamakaI).tha's response to the argument. He continues
to discuss it for the next eight pages.
34
Next he argues that even if the logical reason is established, the non-
difference of the two co-perceived entIties is not entailed, i.e. the argument is
inconclusive (anaikiintika). His explanation of why that is the case is his exe-
gesis of the next Sadyojyotis verse.
35
Sadyojyotis there responds to his oppo-
nent's claim in the previous verse that objects are not different from cognition
because we do not grasp them prior to the rise of the cognition,36 with the
point that colour is not grasped prior to the opening
37
of the eye or to light,
yet colour is not held to be non-different from the opening of the eye or from
light. RamakaI).tha restates this in his commentary as a co-perception claim:
'colour is necessarily co-perceived with the [opening of the eye] and light'38
followed by a reiteration of the verse's point that in this case there is clearly
no non-difference, colour not being of the nature of the opening of the eye or
oflight.
39
The co-perception of colour with light despite their difference is a pertinent
example to bring up in response to DharmakIrti's sahopalambhaniyama ar-
gument. But the case of colour and the opening of the eye is not. It illustrates
a further difference between the discusssion in Sadyojyotis' verses and
DharmakIrti's sahopalambhaniyama argument (in addition to the issue of the
symmetry of the co-perception). The fact that we do not perceive colour prior
to the opening of the eye is an apt response to Sadyojyotis' Buddhist, paral-
34 32,16-40,17.
35 1.11: piirva1Jl prakliSlic ca na grhyate I riipal!l loke na tat tli-
bhylim abhilllla1Jl salllpratfyate II
36 In 1.10 a-c given on page 260.
37 I . th
am assurmng at gloss of vyliplira (,activity') in the verse's caksll-
rvyliplira (,activity of the eye') as visphlirlivasthli 'the state of being open I opening; is
correct.
D '
33,6-7: tella lilokena ca sahopalalllbhalliyalllo rfipasya.
39
33,7: lla ca lilokal'l7patva1Jl vli.
268
leling exactly his claim about cognition and object
40
without sharing its con-
clusion of non-difference; but it is not a case of invariable co-perception in
the sense intended by DharmakIrti and his followers. The opening of the eye
(or the eye being open) is not something that we perceive. DharmakIrti's ar-
gument concerns two things that are always co-perceived. He contends (in
PVin and PYa) that cognitions perceive themselves as well as their object.
The co-perception of object and cognition means for him that whenever we
perceive an object we also perceive the cognition that is perceiving it. If cog-
nition of blue always occurred together with blue but was not itself simulta-
neously perceived, DharmakIrti would not consider that co-perception, and
would hence not regard his conclusion of non-difference as following.
But RamakaJ?tha understands co-perception slightly more loosely, as meaning
simply that the two things occur together (or that one occurs always with the
other). That he does so is evidenced by 1) the fact that in the following dis-
cussion he uses sahabhava (co-existence/co-occurrence) synonymously with
sa/zopaZambhaniyama;41 2) the way he stated his fIrst level of response to the
argument. He did not say that we perceive the illuminator of blue or the deter-
minative cognition 'blue' without blue, but rather that these two exist/occur
when a blue object does not exist / is not there;42 3) the way that he describes
the opening of the eye as being co-perceived with light.
It is not clear whether the reason for this difference in usage is simply that
RamakaJ?tha is trying to adapt the DharmakIrtian argument to fIt the Sadyo-
jyotis verses, or whether he was not fully aware of the expressly perceptual
requirement of the two candidates for co-perception.
43
The fact that the two
40 In his last verse-segment, 1.10 a-c given on page 260.
41 E.g. 38,19-20; 39,1; 39,3.
42 33,13-17: Ilfllibhlive 'pi Ilflaprakiisakasadbhlivasya pratipliditatvlit ... asaty arthe
... tasya (=adhyavasliyasya) blzliVlit.
43 Once it is understood that both blue and cognition of blue are claimed to be per-
ceived, an extra dimension to the two moons example becomes apparent. In Ramaka-
l}.!ba's version of the sallOpalalllbhalliyallla argument, where co-perception simply means
occurring together, the salient feature of the example is simply that the second moon is
never found without the first. For DharmakIrti though, the point is also that just as those
269
must be simultaneously perceived for DharmakIrti's sa/zopaZambhaniyama
argument to go through means that the argument is more potent against
RamakaJ?tha than it would be against a Naiyayika,44 a or a Kau-
manIa MImarpsaka.
46
Since cognition is not simultaneously aware of itself
with correct vision see only a single moon, so those with correct understanding see only
cognition of blue and not also a blue object ali separate from that.
As stated in the introduction, although Ramakal}.!ba interprets Sadyojyotis' verses that
articulate and attack Buddhist positions as directed at DharmakIrti, the verses are invari-
ably more primitive than the DharmakIrtian arguments that Ramakal}.!ba uses to elucidate
them. They betray no knowledge of DharmakIrti. How about thefact that Sadyojyotis re-
counts and then argues against something resembling DharmakIrti's sahopalalllbhallrja-
ma argument? Does this provide firm evidence that he was writing after DharmakIrti?
Weighing in favour of a negative answer to this question is the fact that he does not even
mention the term sahopalambhaniyama, or its characteristic example, the two moons; that
in his argument the co-existence between object and cognition is one-sided; and that in his
argument it is merely co-existence and not co-perception that is claimed. The last two of
these reasons are perhaps not significant given that in PYa, having stated the co-
perception argument (text given in note 31), DharmakIrti concludes it as follows: 'there-
fore, [since] the object appears at the [same] time as [its] cognition, its non-difference
from cognition is hard to oppose'. (PVa 3.390abc tasmlid arthasya durvliral!l jlilinakiilli-
vablzlisilla(l Ijiilinlid avyatirekitval!l.) Thus he summarises his sallOpalalllbhaniyama argu-
ment in a way that is one-sided, that makes no reference to the fact that the cognition, like
the object, is itself cognized, and that stresses, as Sadyojyotis does, that object and cogni-
tion appear at the same time. A yet more striking parallel is that DharmakIrti's opponent
in PVin (ad 1.55ab) uses the counter-example of colour and light to illustrate that the ar-
gument is inconclusive, as Sadyojyotis does. Whe$er this implies that Sadyojyotis knew
DharmakIrti obviously depends on whether or not DharmakIrti was drawing on earlier
Buddhist arguments resembling sahopalambhalliyama that had already elicited this ex-
ample as a response, either in in Buddhist texts or in non-Buddhist texts.
44 For Naiyayikas cognition is cognized by an independent subsequent cognition. See
for example NBhil 139,20-21: jiilillalJ! svavyatiriktavedallavedYal!1 vedyatvlit, n7plidivat.
45 Similarly, for V philosophers cognition is not cogrrized by itself but is
grouped together with pleasure, pain and the like in being cognized by the internal organ.
See for example NK 232,4: tv antabkara(zagrli-
hyli(z (and we know that buddhi is used in the sense of cognition/perception by the author:
buddhir upalabdhir jiilillal!l pratyaya iti paryliyli(l [410,7]).
46 For Sabara perceiver and perceived ,cannot be perceived simultaneously. See SBh
(F) 30,2-3: tatra yaugapadyam allUpapallllam. After the object is cognized the cognition
is known, according to Sabara through inference, and according to Kumarila through
270
for these three, the co-perception of object and cognition does not hold for
them in the way that DharmakIrti intends it. Blue is cognized for them with-
out a simultaneous awa"reness of the cognition of blue. This way out is not
open to RfunakaJ?!ha, for whom cognition is self-illuminating.
Returning to NPP: RamakaJ?!ha uses the two examples in the verse to argue
that even if the logical reason (invariable co-perception) were to hold of blue
and cognition of blue, it would be inconclusive (anaikiintika). Thus he con-
cludes this second level of response with the words:
47
'[Light, eye-activity
and colour] are indeed necessarily co-perceived,48 and yet they are not non-
different so the argument is indeed inconclusive. ,49
He then ceases to mention the sahopalambhaniyama argument explicitly for a
few pages and expounds some verses that give a general argument for the dif-
ference of objects and consciousness. But DharmakIrti's argument seems to
have a certain hold over him for he keeps returning to it. He presents the few
pages just mentioned, and the verses on which they commented, as a further
refutation of it, even though they have made no mention of it, by concluding
them with: 'Therefore [object] and [consciousness] are not, merely through
arthiipatti. But for the Priibhakaras, or for Slilikaniitha at least, cognition is self-illuminat-
ing. See, for example, PPafic 189,1-3: na ciirthajiiiinasya jiiiinii[ii COIT.; a ed.]ntariidhf-
nam avabhiisanam, ... tasmiid arthajiiiilWl!Z eViibhyupetavyam.
47 34,6-7: sahopalambhaniyamo 'sty eva na ciibheda ity anaikiintika eva.
48 By which he means, 'light and eye-activity are both necessarily co-perceived with
colour'. He is not of course claiming that light' and eye-activity are co-perceived.
49 RiimakaIgha first responded to the co-perception of blue and cognition of blue by
adducing instances of cognition without object. A parallel move here on the part of the
Buddhist opponent would have been to respond to these supposed examples of co-
perception by pointing out that the opening of the eye does occur (in the dark) without the
perception of colour. Perhaps RiimakaJ;l(ha did not regard that as a relevant objection since
these co-perceptions (of colour with light and the opening of the eye) are, following Sad-
yojyotis' verse, only one-sided co-perceptions, claiming only that colour occurs always
with light and the opening of the eye but not vice versa. But that would not be consistent
with his response to the Buddhist co-perception, since even though he seemed to present
that one-sidedly he did not refrain from pointing to instances of the cognition without the
object as refutation.
271
being co-perceived, non-different. ,50 Thus it becomes clear that he intended
the arguments of these pages for the separateness of consciousness and object
as a third level of response to the sahopalambhaniyama argument: given that
objects and consciousness can independently be shown to be separate, the
mere fact of their being co-perceived indicates nothing. This is similar to the
second level of response in that they both demonstrate that the argument is
iriconclusive (anaikiintika). But the former does so through citing examples
other than the proof subjects (blue and cognition of blue), and this one
through the example of the proof subjects themselves. Furthermore the tone
of the previous level of response was, 'even if the proof subjects were in-
variably co-perceived', they would not be non-different; and the tone of his
conclusion to this level is 'merely through the fact that they are co-perceived'
(sahopalambhamiitre1}a) their non-difference does not follow.
Next follows his exegesis of the half-verse (l.I5ab) quoted at the beginning
of this chapter (page 257) about I-cognitions. Instead of seeing it as simply
stating that the Self exists because it is the referent of I-cognitions, he wants
to build into it a continuation of the theme of necessary co-perception.
1. The Co-Perception of Self and I-Cognition
1.0 [Ked p. 38] kiqz ca sahopalambhaniyamiid ablzede 'pi niitmiiblziiva!z.
1.0 Moreover even if non-difference did follow from necessary co-peFception,
there would be no lack of a Self.
This is his fourth and final level of response: even if the non-difference of
two things does validly follow from their being invariably co-perceived, the
Self's existence is not negated. But DharmakIrti did not argue (either as he
has been presented in this text, or in his own texts) that the Self's existence is
negated owing to invariable co-perception. What does the Self have to do
with this argument? The answer is that RfunakaJ?!ha envisages the argument
from necessary co-perception being applied, instead of to cognition and blue,
50
38,6-7: tanna sahopalambhamiitre1j.iisyiismiid abhedalz.
272
to cognition (specifically I-cognitions) and Self; and argues. that the result is
actually the Self's reality. He presents Sadyojyotis as making this point.
ity iiha
1.15ab) iitmany asattvaJ!z51 no yuktalll ahampratyayagocare I
ahalllpratyayasya asty evii-
dhyavaseyeniitmanii sahopalambhaniyamalz, iti dvayor api salJzvidn7patvasid-
dhe[z satyatvam iti nairiitmyiibhiiva[z.
This [Sadyojyotis] states:
1. 15ab) Because the Self is accessible to I-cognition, the non-existence
[of Self and I-cognition] is incorrect.
52
Because I-cognition, in that it is a verbal cognition of an enduring perceiver,
has the Self as its referent,53 [I-cognition] is in fact (eva) invariably perceived
together with the Self, the referent of the determinative cognition (adhyavase-
yena).54 Therefore because both are established to be of the nature of con-
sciousness, both are real, so there is no absence of Self.
This is the argument that forms the subject matter of the whole present sec-
tion (Section 1) so it needs to be looked at in detail. It can be presented as
containing four stages. 1) I-cognitions have the Self as their referent in that
they consist of verbal cognition of a stable perceiver (sthiragrahakaparama-
ria). This would seem to be enough in itself to prove the Self, but he is put-
ting forward a sahopaZambhaniyama argument of which this is only the first
stage. On the basis of this first stage he asserts 2) that Self and I-cognition are
necessarily perceived together; from which it follows 3) that they are both of
the nature of consciousness; from which it follows 4) that they are both real.
51 asattvaJ!z Ked, Ped, B, L, P; asatyatvan M.
52 Translated as I understand Ramakm;ttha to have taken the verse.
53 I tend to translate as 'referent' or 'content' in order to distinguish it from ka-
mIa, which I translate as 'object'. Thus in the cognition 'I see a pot', its referents are the
Self (according to Sadyojyotis and Ramakm;ttha), the action of seeing and the pot; but its
object is onlY the pot. The pot could also be referred to as its artha, which I also translate
as 'object'.
54 This sentence illustrates what was mentioned above on page 257, namely that 1-
cognitions are instances of 'determinative cognition' (adhyavasiiya) and 'verbal cog-
nition' (pariimarsa).
273
Why does he bother with the last three stages? They' make his cOl;nmentary on
this verse far more complicated and unwieldly than it need be. Why he
not simply conclude the reality of the Self from stage 1, which would seem to
be a more accurate portrayal of the half-verse's intention? The answer to this
question does not become evident until close to the end of this section
55
(Sec-
tion 1). At that point the Buddhist points out that the application of the saho-
paZambhaniyama argument to Self and I-cognition entails a consequence
56
contrary to doctrines. responds that he himself
does not accept the presupposition of sallOpaZambhaniyama; the whole point
of his using it was simply to show what should follow for the Buddhist if one
accepts it. Thus although in the intervening section the reader could be for-
given for interpreting to be himself adopting this modified ver-
sion of the sahopaZambhaniyama argument, in order to put forward a positive
line of reasoning (that analysed in the four stages above) that he accepts, it
turns out that the line of reasoning is intended simply as an unwanted conse-
quence for the Buddhist. It becomes clear that he has only been arguing from
co-perception to the reality of the Self in order to show that Buddhists who
use the logic of the co-perception argument in other contexts should be com-
mitted to the consequence here of the reality of the Self. Thus one answer to
the question posed above is that he wants to show not only that the Self is
real, but also that the Buddhist's own presupposition should commit him to
accepting it as such.
After the end of this section continues to discuss I-cognitions,
and the evidence they present for the Self's existence, for two more sections
(2 and 3), but makes no further mention of the sahopalambhaniyama argu-
ment. Thus its inclusion in this section can be considered partly as a transi-
tional device. The beginning of this section marked the end of a long discus-
sion about the status of supposedly external objects, and the beginning of a
discussion about I-cognitions. As a bridge over this change in subject matter,
continues the subject of sahopaZambhaniyama for the first part
of the new discussion. The reason he does so is because even though sahopa-
lambhaniyama normally has nothing to do with I-cognitions and the Self, he
55 40,5b-4b.
56 The non-dualist conclusion that everything is of the nature of the Self.
274
sees a way of adding one more nail to its coffin by so applying it. How can it
be of any use to the Buddhist, the implication seems to be, if, when applied to
the Self, it commits him to accepting the Self's reality?
Looking more closely now at the four stages: why does each of them follow?
The first one, that the referent of I-cognitions is the Self, will be defended by
RamakaI}.t
ha
in the course of the ensuing discussion. The second one, that
Self ap.d I-cognition are co-perceived, does not mean for him that each time
we perceive the Self we also perceive the I-cognition that perceives it. Rather
it means not much more than that I-cognition always occurs with the
Self as its referent.
57
It is only these first two stages that are challenged by ob-
jections in the following discussion. The opponent takes the remaining two
for granted.
Skipping now to the fourth stage: why does the Self's reality follow from it
being of the nature of consciousness? RamakaI}.tha would regard it as follow-
ing both on Y ogacara presuppositions and on his own. He frequently argues
that, unlike Bahyarthavadins, Yogacaras cannot claim that something of the
nature of consciousness is not real, for consciousness is precisely what is real
for them.
58
I presume that he has the same in mind here. From his own point
of view, if external objects were shown to be of the nature of consciousness
(as the original sahopalambhaniyama argument claims) then their reality
would be threatened, but if the Self is shown tobe of the nature of conscious-
ness, this only confirms its reality, since consciousness is exactly what he has.
argued the Self to be repeatedly throughout the text. 59
57 For evidence that this is the case, see p. 297 below, where Rfunakru;ttha regards the
Self's co-perception with I-cognition as more or less synonymous with the Self being the
referent ofI-cognition.
58 For variations of this argument see 22,1-3; 22,11-14; 59,1-5.
59 For example 13,5-14,5b; 15,1b-16,1; 17,3-20,11. For a Naiyayilca the Self's real-
ity would of course not follow from its being reduced to consciousness. While such a re-
duction would nullify an litman conceived as a substance in which consciousness inheres,
it is claimed to prove a Saiva one. As in Chapter 2, Rfunakru;ttha's attitude is that his posi-
tion is invulnerable to Buddhist lines of thought capable of destroying the litmavlida of
the Brahmru;tical realist traditions.
The stage that requires most comment is stage 3. Why does it follow from the
fact that Self and I-cognition are co-perceived that the Self is of the nature of
consciousness? In one sense this is easy to answer: it follows by analogy with
the fact that the co-perception of blue and cognition of blue led to the con-
that blue is of the nature of consciousness. But that conclusion only
because of the intermediary step that blue and cognition of blue are
not different. It is non-difference (abheda, anarthantaratva) that is the prop-
to be proved (sadhyadharma) of the sahopalambhaniyama argument, not
bemg of the nature of consciousness. Thus, if Ramakantha derives the con-
clusion that the Self is of the nature of consciousness it can only be be-
cause holds that the Self is not different from I-cognition. But significantly
he ormts to mention this middle stage. Indeed such non-difference could be
problematic for RamakaI}.tha since (as he has stated earlier in the text)60 1-
cognition is determinative cognition, and determinative cognition is not sin-
gle and unchanging, but plural.
Could RamakaI}.tha not argue that though the non-difference of Self and 1-
cognition is necessary for the line of argument here to go through, he is not
to it himself because he does not accept the basic assumption that
non-difference follows from necessary co-perception? Though he does inde-
pendently accept that the Self is of the nature of consciousness, and claims
that it is incumbent on the Buddhist to accept such a Self through this argu-
ment, he does not himself have to accept its stages since it is intended as an
unwanted consequence for the Buddhist.
There would be a problem with such a reply though. If he himself were resist-
ing the equation of Self and I-cognition on the grounds that I-cognitions are
transitory and the Self is not, then to claim that it is the Buddhist alone who
should accept that would be equally damaging. For if the Buddhist were
forced to accept that the Self is simply I-cognition, he would not be troubled.
I-cognition is momentary for the Buddhist, and thus he would see the argu-
ment as reducing the Self to discrete moments of cognition-not a conclusion
that would threaten him at all.
60 28,12-17.
276
The Self"s Awareness of Itself
There are certainly signs that Rfunakru;ttha is resisting the non-difference of
Self and I-cognition. The wording of his conclusion to the co-perception is
. that both are of the nature of consciousness and so both are real.
61
This hardly
seems parallel to the Y ogacara version of the argument according to which
blue simply is cognition of blue. In the following discussion also he seems to
retain the duality between I-cognition and the Self as the referent of 1-
cognition, between the adhyavasiiya and the adhyavaseya. The conclusion he
aims to reach through the argument is that the Self as referent of I-cognition
is real,62 not that it is real as something non-different from I-cognition. The
only non-difference between Self and I-cognition that he sees as following
from the argument-to judge from the sentence above in which he lays out the
four stages-is that they both have consciousness as their nature
(sar[lvidrilpa). To this extent he gives his argument the appearance of the re-
ductionism that sallOpalambhaniyama demands, but he does not seem to let
go of the distinction between the I-cognition and a stable Self which is the
referent of that I-cognition. In his application of the argument there is no re-
duction of two things to one. Thus it seems open to the Yogacara to object
that in his own argument about blue and consciousness of blue, there are, by
contrast, no two things that are real. If Ramaka1).tha applied the argument in
an exactly parallel manner, the reality of the Self should not be preserved,but
rather dissolved into discrete I-cognitions.
It should be noted, though, that if Ramakru;ttha is resisting; the complete iden-
tity of the two co-perceived entities, there are in fact plenty of Buddhist
authors who did the same in their interpretation of DharmakIrti's sahopalam-
bhaniyama argument. DharmakIrti's followers were divided over whether the
property proved by the sahopalambhaniyama argument, the non-difference
between objects and cognitions, means the identity of the two (tiidiitmya), or
the mere negation of the difference Dharmottara,
for example, opts for the latter on the grounds that if the two were identical,
then, since the object is unreal, so too should the cognition be; and if the two
moons were identical then the unreality of one should mean the unreality of
61 iti dvayor api sG/Jlvidrtipatvasiddhe?! satyatvalll.
62 I argue on page 285 that after RfunakaI]tila has answered objection 1.1.3 we can
deduce this to be the conclusion of his argument.
the other.
63
For him non-different means here neither completely the same,
nor completely separate. By contrast, for Prajfiakaragupta and Deveridrabud-
dhi any difference between blue and cognition of blue belongs. only to the
level of illusion.
64
in his presentation of the sahopalambhani-
yama argument that I gave on page 266, expressed the non-duality in two
ways: ' ... a is not different from b,65 or CanrIot be separated from it,66 just like
the own nature of a cognition of blue [from that cognition of blue] or just like
the second moon [from the fIrst].' The fIrst way of stating the non-difference
and the fIrst example were intended by to express identity; and
the second way of stating the non-difference and the example of the two
moons were intended to express the negation of difference.
67
Hence Rama-
kru;ttha would be quite able to resist the complete identity of Self and 1-
cognition and at the same time claim that he was being faithful to Buddhist
lines of interpretation of the sahopalambhaniyama argument.
But even if he were to resist complete identity, he must accept at least a quali-
fIed identity of Self and I-cognition. There are two contentions he makes else-
where that offer partial explanations of how he could have held that. 1) In the
sentence looked at in the last chapter (section 4.3) he wrote: 'And the per-
ceiver cannot be made into the perceived ... that is why it cannot be the ref-
erent of I-cognition; rather it is the very shining forth of I-cognition.-,68 So
there he does indeed equate the perceiver, i.e. the Self, with the shining forth
of I-cognition, if not with I-cognition itself. 2) In the next section of the text
63 Matsumoto 1980 18-20.
64 Iwata I99Ia Teil 1, p. 241. Which view one took was closely connected with
whether or not one was a Niriikllravlidin or Siikllravlidin. Prajfiiikaragupta an!i Devendra-
buddhi's denial of any difference in level of reality between the subject-aspect and object-
aspect of cognition is enabled by the fact that they adhere to siikiiraviida, the view that the
form of the object within cognition is, like the cognition itself, real. This line was not
open to Dharmottara, who, denying that cognition contains in reality subject and object
aspects, was a Niriikllravlidin.
65 tasmiid avyatiriktG/Jl tat.
66 - 'bl 'd
tat tato va na VI !I yate.
67 See Matsumoto 198020.
68 na ca g riihakiitlllii griihyfkartll1Jl ... ata na
samblzavati, api tv ahampratyayaprakiisarl1pataiva.
278
(section 2 of this chapter) he argues that every single verbal cognition (vima-
rsa) contains an I-cognition, even such examples as 'this is a pot', where 'I'
does not explicitly appear to be part of the content of the cognition. Thus as
long as we are having verbal cognitions, I-cognition never ceases. Though
this does not get over the problem of I-cognition ceasing when we are not
having any verbal cognitions (in deep-sleep for example), it at least shows
how RamakaI.1!ha could consistently have envisaged it as enduring for long
periods of time rather than lasting only as long as it takes to have a cognition
such as 'I see a pot'. Hence the gap between Self and I-cognition is narrowed.
Now we have three objections that I group together as 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.3.
The fIrst two claim that the Self is not actually the referent of I-cognitions
and the third one points out that the Self should not be perceived only as the
referent of I-cognitions for RamakaI.1!ha, since it is perceived by us through
self-awareness (svasal.nvedana) according to him.
1.1.1 nanv iitmano vikalpiitftatvenoktatviit, molqakiirikiisv buddhi-
bodhyatvalliriisiic ciihampratyayagocaratvalJl viidyasiddham eva.
1.1.1 [SUnyavadin:] Because the Self has been said to be beyond concepts
69
and because the master (i.e. Sadyojyotis) in his has refuted that
it can be experienced through the buddhi, it is surely not established for the
disputants [in this discussion] that the Self is accessible to I-cognitions.
Buddhism of course neither accepts a concept-transcending Self, nor regards
the assertions of Sadyojyotis as an authoritative guide. So this objection
draws not on the opponent's own beliefs, but concerns the consistency of the
verse under discussion with claims made by Sadyojyotis elsewhere, and with
RamakaI.1!ha's claims, earlier in this text, that the Self is non-conceptual.
There indeed seems to be some oscillation in Sadyojyotis' thinking between
the and this verse on the question of whether the Self is or is not
the referent of I-cognitions. If it is, then surely it is indeed experienced by the
buddhi (buddhibodhya), in that the buddhi is the instrument that produces
69 For example 26,7b--6b: SVal1lpalJ1 hy asyiil1haprakiisiitmakatvelliivibhimzarilpaJ!1
sarvadii vikalpiitftalJl prakiisate.
70 MoKa 102-105. Sadyojyotis there argues against tile SliIikbya position that the Self
is experienced through being reflected in the buddhi. I translate these verses in the
Introduction in the section entitled, 'Knowledge of the Self. '
279
cognition. RamakaI.1!ha is not afraid to expose this contradictioI}, drawing at-
tention to it here, through the words of his opponent. 71
satyam, iitmiidipratyayavat tu
72
kathalJlcid so 'pi v);avahii-
riil1haJ!1 'bhyupagamyate, iti Iliisiddhilz.
[Siddhantin:] True, but [we] hold that even the [Self]73 is their referent some-
how, by a close approximation for the purposes of
everyday linguistic usage (vyavahiira), just like cognitions of the Self
75
and
the like,76 so it is not unestablished [for the disputants that the Self is access-
ible to I-cognitions].
71 There has been one other occasion so far in NPP, which RamakaJ;ltha does not have
his opponent refer to directly here, that contradicts even more explicitly this verse and his
explanation of it so far. That is the sentence that I gave on p. 277, note 68, where he as-
serted that the Self is not the referent of I-cognitions. na ca griilzakiitmii griihyfkartll1!1
sakyate ... ata na samblzavati, api tv alzampratyayaprakii-
sarilpataiva. Presumably the answer he is about to give to the objection just articulated is
the same answer he would give if asked about this contradiction.
72 tu Ked, B, L, P; omitted in Ped.
73 I.e. even that which is in a sense beyond vikalpas, and the reach of the buddhi.
74 Lit. 'by/with a not-far distance/separation'.
75 RamakaJ;ltha does not expand on these 'self-cognitions'. Presumably they are deter-
minative cognitions whose verbalization includes / consists of the word iitmall. Since they
too apprehend the Self proximately, is there any reason why RamakaJ;ltha focuses exclu-
sively on I-cognitions and not at all on self-cognitions in his proof of the Self, other than
that I-cognitions are what are mentioned in verse? As mentioned above
(page 278), RamakaJ;ltha argues in section 2 of this chapter (= 41,6-42,8 of NPP) that
every single verbal cognition (vimarsa) contains an I-cognition, even such examples as,
'this is a pot', where'!' does not explicitly appear to be part of the content of the cogni-
tion. Thus the constancy of I-cognitions makes them better suited to establishing a stable
Self.
76 It is not immediately obvious what the iidi could be referring to. One possibility
(suggested by Prof. Sanderson) is Siva-cognitions. Cf. verse 101 of MoKa, buddhibodha-
prakiiSyatvaJ.1l sivasyiinyaill samfhitam I saivamiinam avindadbhi[l pasumiiniinuviisitai[l II,
a verse which would be in his mind at this point since his Buddhist opponent has just re-
ferred to it and the verses which follow it. Thus cognitions of Siva would be analogous to
I-cognitions and Self-cognitions in that they only to some extent grasp their referent,
though their referent is of course not the Self. Alternatively the iidi here could refer to
I _
mamapratyaya and other cognitions that are of'!' but in some case other than the nomina-
tive singular ('of me' / 'mine', 'by me' etc.).
280
Faced with the inconsistencies he has mentioned, RamakaI).!ha tones down the
claim of the verse. The Self's concept-transcending nature was of crucial im-
portance for his earlier overcoming of the Buddhist arguments against the
Self.77 The referents of determinative cognition (of which I-cognitions are an
example) are, on the other hand, concepts. But RamakaI).tha cannot ignore
this verse claiming that the Self is the referent of I-cognitions and (whether
for this reason alone or for independent reasons also) he does in fact hold that
I-cognitions cognize the Self and will argue in the course of this chaper that
they provide independene
s
proof of its existence. His-perhaps slightly un-
satisfactorily vague and brief-explanation of how I-cognitions can have the
Self as their referent despite the Self being beyond concepts and ungraspable
by the buddhi, is to qualify in three ways the extent to which it is actually
their referent: it is so 'for the sake of linguistic usage', 'somehow' and 'by a
close approximation'. Much hangs on this qualification, for it is the only indi-
cation he gives of how to bridge the gap between two opposing tendencies of
his in this passage: one, to claim that the Self is the referent of I-cognition,
and the other, to claim that that which is perceived through self-awareness is
., 79
not the same as that perceived through I-cogmtlOn.
1.1.2 IWIllI aSllliikam adhyavaseyena
80
salza-
blziivo na siddlza[z.
1.1.2 [Silnyavadin:] But because determinative cognition
81
does not have a
real referent [for us], its occurring together with
82
the object of the determina-
tive cognition is not established for us.
77 8,lb-14,5b. The potency of the Buddhist arguments there derived from the claim
that no stable Self, but rather a momentary stream of cognition, is given to us non- .
conceptually. Only through insisting on the reverse could Ramakru:Itha surmount all of the
Buddhist refutations of inferences of the Self.
78 Independent from self-awareness.
79
39
,2-11.
80 adhyavaseyena Ked
Pc
, Ped; adlzyavasiiyena B, L, P, Ked"c.
81 Of which I-cognitions are an example.
82 This is one of the cases, mentioned in note 41, where Ramakal,lthauses the term
salzablziiva (co-occurrence) as though interchangeable with salzopalalllblza (co-percep-
tion). The other two are on pages 281 and 284. As explained on page 267, this termino-
As noted above, the sahopalambhaniyama argument that RiirQ.akaI).tha puts
forward depends on a first stage that consists of the claim that I-cognition has
the Self as its referent (cf. aJzampratyayasya sthiragrilJzakaparilmarsarupa-
The Yogacara implicitly rejects that here by stating that
no determinative cognition has a real referent. Thus he blocks the co-
occurrence of I-cognitions with the Self through the more general blocking of
the co-occurrence of any determinative cognition with its referent (adhyava-
seya). Both the 'idealist' (Yogacara) and 'realist' (SautrantikaIBahyarthava-
din) strands of DharmakIrti's Buddhism distinguish sharply between percep-
tion and determinative cognition (adhyavasilya), the former alone
constituting valid knowledge. Perception is said to consist only of the initial
pre-conceptual encounter with an object. As soon as a verbal cognition,
which determines this, follows, for example 'I am seeing blue', one has
moved out of the realm of perception to determinative cognition. The refer-
ents of determinative cognitions are not the real individuals en-
countered in the pre-conceptual perception, but universals such as the concept
'blue', which we superimpose on the individual. So, because for the Buddhist
opponent referents of determinative cognition (ad/zyavaseya) are not real, that
which corresponds to the word'!, in I-cognitions is not real, and is thus not a
suitable candidate for invariable co-perception.
YlIktam etat kadiicid biilzyiirtlzaviidillo vaktulIl, blzavatas tv abodlziitmallo
'sal!lvedyatviid adhyavaseyasyiipi
83
sQ/!lvedyatvella bodlzan7patayiidhyavasii-
yasyeva
84
sattvam, iti Iliisiddhis tella salzablziivasyeti.
[Siddhiintin:] It might be correct for a Bahyfuthavadin to say this, but because,
for you, anything not of the nature of consciousness is not experienced, the
referent of determinative cognition, just like the determinative cognition it-
self,85 exists, because it has consciousness as its nature since it is experienced.
So the co-existence of [the I-cognition] with that [i.e. with the Self, the ref-
erent of the determinative cognition] is established.
86
logical variation is symptomatic of a significant difference between DharmakIrti and
Ramakal,ltha over what is required for salzopalamblzalliyama to apply to two things.
83 adlzyavaseyasyiipi
O
Ked"C,.Ped, B, L, P; adhyavasiiyasyiipl.Q Ked
pc
.
84 dlzyavasiiyasyeva Ked"C, Ped, B, L, P; dhyavaseyasyeva
85 Which you Yogacara do accept to real.
86 I.e. it is established even on your presuppositions.
282
RamakaJ?!ha's argument here has two assumptions, the first argued for by
stating its contrapositive, and the second implied: 1) for the Yogacara any-
thing that is experienced is of the nature of consciousness; 2) for the Yoga-
cara consciousness exists. Owing to these two the Yogacara should accept
that referents of determinative cognition, since they are experienced, exist. In
fact he wants to confine real existence to the determinative cognition itself
and deny it to its referent. RamakaJ?!ha does not think that he can consistently
maintain such a distinction, since both are, on his own presuppositions, of the
nature of consciousness, so both should be equally existentlreal.
87
87 The way that Ramaka:gtha has responded to the charge that determinative cognition
has unreal referents (38,4 llanu ... ) by answering that
those referents should exist (adhyavaseyasya ... sattvam) shows that here, as commonly in
Indian Philosophy, unreality is not distinguished from non-existence and reality is not dis-
tinguished from existence.
RamakaI)tha's contention here that the Yogaciira opponent is precluded from holding
referents of determinative cognition to be unreal involves a conflation of two different
senses of unreal. Ramaka:gtha assumes that the Yogaciira would hold adhyavaseyas to be
unreal on the grounds that they do not exist as an external object. If that were the sense in
which they were held to be unreal then their unreality would indeed be difficult to defend.
For nothing external to consciousness exists for the Yogaciira, so how could he distin-
guish the real from the unreal?
The sense in which a DharmakIrtian Yogaciira would hold adhyavaseyas to be unreal
can be clarified by considering the case of a determinative cognition of silver with regard
to what is actually mother-of-pearl. This example is representative of all determinative
cognition for DharmakIrtian Buddhists given that determinative cognition consists, fo.r
them, in superimposition. The referent of the determinative cognition, the silver, is 'un-
real' in the sense that there is not a proper correspondence between it and that to which it
is directed, the mother-of-pearl. This is precisely the sense in which all referents of de-
terminative cognitions are unreal for DharmakIrtian Buddhism. It is true that the Yoga-
ciira, unlike the Sautrantika, cannot distinguish the silver from the mother-of-pearl on the
grounds that the former is mental and the latter external, for the mother-of-pearl is pro-
duced by a trace of consciousness. But he can still distinguish them; for the mother-of-
pearl is a unique individual and the silver is a concep,t that is superimposed
on to that. It is this lack of correspondence between the superimposed and that on to
which it is superimposed that constitutes the unreality of adhyavaseyas for both the
Sautrantika and Yogaciira strands of DharmakIrtian Buddhism. Their unreality is not con-
nected with whether they are external or mental. I am very grateful to Birgit Kellner for
1.1.3 [Ked p. 39] tarhi viidyasiddho 'yam, alzampratyayiiblziive 'pi svasa1Jlve-
dallelliitmopalambhiibhyupagamiit.
1.1.3 [Siinyaviidin:] In that case,88 this
89
is unestablished for the disputants,
because [you] accept that the Self is perceived through self-awareness, even
without the I-cognition.
283
Like the first objection (1.1.1), this one comes not from the point of view of
Buddhism (which would obviously not accept that the Self is perceived
through self-awareness), but points to an internal problem with RamakaJ?!ha's
position.
9o
Unlike the first two it challenges the co-perception not by chal-
lenging that the Self is the referent of I-cognitions, but by pointing to the fact
that the Self is perceived elsewhere than through (according to Rama-
kaJ?!ha). The first two could be characterized as asserting the absence of per-
ception of the Self in the sphere required by the argument ('I-cognitions');
and this one as asserting the over-extension of perception of the Self beyond
the limits required by the argument. In the Yogacara version of the sahopala-
mblzaniyama argument it is crucial that we never experience blue independ-
ently of consciousness of blue, otherwise it clearly is not established that blue
just is consciousness of blue. So similarly here, if the Self is experienced in
any other context than in I-cognitions, then it does not follow that it is of the
nature of consciousness, and hence real.
Of course the appearance of the Self outside of the sphere of I-cognitions
would be evidence, of a different kind, for its existence, but it is of use to the
opponent here because it blocks the co-perception under discussion, and so
releases him from the unwanted consequence of the Self's reality.
explaining this to me (e-mail 6.10.01). As she wrote, 'Ramaka:gtha's argument mixes the
'relational unreality' of conceptualization-it construes a false relation between two enti-
ties-with the 'relatum unreality' of an entity qua external or mental.'
88 I.e. even if we grant that the Self is the referent of I-cognitions.
89 I.e. the invariable occurring together of Self and I-cognition.
90 I label it in the translation as having been put by the Buddhist however, because
that is who Ramaka:gtha sees as its given that in the reply he writes, 'It has also
been said by you' and then quotes DharmakIrti.
284
Ramakantha defends the necessary co-occurrence of Self and I-cognition by
drawing a fIrm distinction between the Self as known through svasa1Jlvedana
and the Self as known through I-cognitions (alzampratyaya), and excluding
the former as irrelevant.
satyam. ahalll iti tv adhyavasliyena sahabhlivo 'dhyavaseyatlitra hetulz, sli ca
tadlinflJl nlistfti tena sahopalalllbhaniyamo nlisiddhalz. anyli hy adhyavasliya-
parlilllrsyatlinyli ca saJJlvidrt7pateti buddhisa1Jlvitpraviveka91prasaJigena92
pradarsita1Jl sVliyambhuvoddyota eva. iha tv allupayoglillnocyate.
[Siddhiintin:] True, but co-existence with the determinative cognition 'I', i.e.,
being the referent of determinative cognition, is the logical reason here, and
that (i.e. being the referent of determinative cognition) does not occur then,93
so invariable co-perception with it (i.e. the determinative cognition '1') is not
unestablished. For it is one thing to be verbally cognized through a determina-
tive cognition, and another to have as one's nature consciousness, as was
shown when the matter came up (oprasaJigella) on the occasion of [the section
dealing with] the distinction between the intellect and consciousness in [my94
91 pravivekao Ked, Ped, B, P; pravekao L.
92 When reading this passage together, neither Prof. Sanderson nor Harunaga Isaac-
son were completely happy with the transmitted reading, pravivekaprasaJigena. Isaacson
suggested emending to pravivekaprasaJige, after which Sanderson suggested praviveke
prasaJigena. Isaacson later pointed me to the following sentence in the YBha ad YS 1.8:
ete cittalllalaprasaligelllibhidhlisyallte. There, though cittamala is embedded in a (similar)
compound, it must mean, 'on the occasion of [the section dealing with] the impurities of
the mind'. Then Sanderson presented me with two more similar examples: pt7rvasz7travyli-
khyliprasaJigella ... vylikhylitaprliyalll etat sfitram (Pratyabhijiilihrdaya ad Sutra 13); and
jiililllidvaitadaiallaprasaJigella. dllrliclira1Jl ity ala1Jl vistare{la
(NM(M) Vol. 1, 189,5-6). So it seems that we do not need to emend here.
93 In the case you point to of self-awareness.
94 We know that this text is by because of the way he refers to it on
pages 88-89: ... iti vipaiicitam asmlibhi!l svliyalllbhllvoddyote tata eVlivadhliryam. It has
not come to light however, which is a pity because the section he refers to here might
have thrown light on the tricky question of the relationship for between un-
changing consciousness (sa1J1vit) and transitory determinative cognitions produced by the
buddhi (intellect). Furthermore it would have been useful to see whether in that section
his account of the difference between being verbally cognized through a judgement and
being consciousness left room for the latter being the former or gave any clues as to how
he would have regarded that as being possible. (Since if the Self is the referent of 1-
cognition it must of course be possible.)
285
commentary on the SVliyambhuvatantra, the] illumination of the Svliyambhll-
va.
95
But here it will not be stated because it is not useful. .
For sahopalambhaniyama to be applicable here Ramakantha must show that
the referent of I-cognitions does not occur outside of the context of 1-
cognitions, in the same way that blue does not occur other than in cognitions
of blue. Thus he must draw' a distinction between the referent of I-cognitions
and that which is apprehended through self-awareness. He does so on the
grounds that the former is an adlzyavaseya (referent of determinative cogni-
tion), while the latter is not. This distinction enables him to apply the argu-
ment only to the Self as referent of I-cognition, rendering the Self as it ap-
pears in self-awareness, svasa1!lvedana, irrelevant. The co-perception as ap-
plied in this narrower way, is indeed invariable since the Self as referent of 1-
cognition does only ever appear in I-cognitions.
If the two things co-perceived are more restricted than previously apparent,
then so too must the conclusion be. The conclusion can no longer be the real-
ity of the Self, but must simply be the reality of the referent of I-cognitions,
i.e. the Self as adlzyavaseya.
96
Having said that, Ramakru:)!ha never expressly
articulates this narrowing down of the conclusion. In fact he gives the impres-
sion that the argument proves the reality of the Self per se.
97
This illustrates
95 Translation of the second half of this sentence supplied by Harunaga Isaacson: Let-
ter 12/9/99.
96 The restriction of the two co-perceived entities constitutes a disanalogy between
the argument in its Yogacara usage and its application by here. The Yogaca-
ra argument was not restricted to blue as perceived by one particular category of cogni-
tion, but was about blue per se. One could also identify a more subtle difference. The
Yogaciira asserted the necessary co-perception of blue and cognition of blue in order to
conclude something about the nature of blue. by contrast, as becomes clear
from this limitation to the Self as adhyavaseya, is not really using the argument to con-
clude something about the nature of the Self. After all the nature of the Self is more
closely and directly apprehended through self-awareness than I-cognitions. Rather he is
using it to conclude something about the nature of I-cognitions, namely that their referent
is real. (Or strictly speaking-bearing in mind his future distancing of himself from the ar-
gument at 40,5b-4b-that their referent should be considered to be real by Yogacaras.)
97 See his conclusion dvayor api ... 38,13-14, where dvayor refers to 1-
cognition and Self.
286
The Self s Awareness ofItself
what will be elaborated below,98 namely that though the referent of 1-
cognition and that which is known through self-awareness not completely
identical for RamakaJ;ltha, as he insists here, neither are they completely dif-
ferent. They are both the Self. So if the referent of I-cognition is proved to be
real, the Self is effectively proved to be real.
*****
RamakaJ;ltha's application of the sahopalambhaniyama argument appears to
be circular. Its conclusion is that the referent of I-cognition is the real Self,
but only if that is established to 'be the case do I-cognition and Self qualify for
the sahopalambhaniyama argument at all. No further conclusion appears to
be reached through the sahopalambhaniyama argument than what was al-
ready established in stage one,99 before it was applied. He gives the impress-
ion that the principle of sahopalambhaniyama is relevant to the securing of
the conclusion, in order to convey that it is incumbent on the Buddhist to ac-
cept the conclusion, but the latter seems to be smuggled into the assertion of
the stage that the referent of I-cognition is the Self.
Perhaps we should assume however that RamakaJ;ltha would not be gUilty of
such an obvious flaw. If so, it is possible to rescue his argument from this cir-
cularity by assuming that stage one claims only that we apprehend what
seems to be a stable perceiver; that its reality is not assumed at that stage, but
derived from the fact that it is invariably co-perceived with I-cognition. Al-
ternatively, one could admit that the claim of stage one-that the Self is the
referent of I-cognition-already contains the conclusion, but point out that
stage one is not unargued for. The sahopalambhaniyama between Self and 1-
cognition does not establish anything extra, but it shows that whatever we
perceive in I-cognitions must be real for the Yogacaras. Stage one already
claims that to be the Self, so the argument shows that they had better take
stage one seriously and direct their attention to refuting it. That is exactly
what they do (in 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and in Section 3).
*****
98 Page 292.
99 38,12-13: ahal1lpratyayasya
287
The distinction that RamakaJ;ltha mentions in his second sentence, here ('For it
is one thing to be ... ') is useful as a summary of the two ways that the Self
appears to us according to him. It is sometimes the referent of a particular act
of consciousness-adhyavasaya, paramarsa-and it is at all times conscious-
ness appearing to itself. When we are aware of it as the first we can capture it
in language. But our awareness of it as the second-svasamvitti svasamveda-
. , .
na-is beyond language. That is what he seeks to illustrate by quoting the
in the next sentence.
bhavadbhir apy lIktal1l
100
as' ky 101 I -tl - t - - 102 bl k I
a asal1layo ly a na ce ananam ananya Iii
ata!z svasaJ!zvittir II iti.
Even you have said:
For the nature of instances of consciousness 103 is not amenable to a
linguistic convention, [since] 104 it is unique. Therefore their awareness
of themselves (svasaJ!zvittiM is not connected with language. 105
100 PYa 3.249, and PVin 1.21 (p. 62, notes 2 and 3). See note 102 for variants.
1010 K d 0
sal1layo e, Ped, B, P; sal1laye L, kha.
Marginal insertion above samayo in B: salJzketa.
102 cetaniiniil1l Ked, Ped, B, L, P; riigiidfniil1l PYa 3.249; sllklziidliliil1l PYa 3.249 (ac-
cording to the Tibetan translation of the verse and according to Devendrabuddhi's and
Ravigupta's commentaries), PVin 1.21 (judging from bde in the Tibetan translation),
MatV VP ad 6.23, IPVV Vol. 1, 116,lb; nfliidfniil1l TS(BBS) 1263.
Because cetaniiniil1l is picked up by it must be the genitive plural of cetanal1l,
not cetanii. I have not encountered a neuter cetanal1l in the meaning of consciousness
elsewhere, but it is not impossible that we have a pair of nouns, not necessarily different
in meaning, cetanal1l and cetanii, just as we have for instance vedallal1l and vedanii or
iilocanal1l and iilocanii.
103 As can be seen from note 102, the occurrences of this verse in DharmakIrti's writ-
ings read either riigiidfniim or sllkhiidfniil1l in place of cetaniiniil1l. The verses immediately
following this in PYa argue that pleasure and the like (i.e. caittas, mental factors associ-
ated with cognition/consciousness) are not of a different nature from cognition. This verse
is intended to give evidence to that effect by showing how pleasure/craving and the like
are aware of themselves rather than apprehended by a cognition that is other than them.
Thus DharmakIrti would not have been able to substitute a word for conscious-
ness/cognition here for riigiidilsllklziidi. 1: word for consciousness rather than plea-
sure/craving and the like is, however, more or less demanded by the context in which this
verse is quoted here. A verse about the' self-awareness of pleasure/craving and the like
288
Ramakantha's Buddhist opponent, DharmakIrti, contends three things in this
verse: 1) The nature of instances of consciousness is unique, therefore 2) it is
not capturable by linguistic conventions, therefore 3) these instances' aware-
ness of themselves is not arrived at through the medium of language. Rama-
kaJ.l!ha quotes him as support for the idea that the Self, when we experience it
simply as consciousness, through self-awareness, is different from that which
becomes an object of our awareness in I-cognitions, which can be described
in language by the word '1'.
What does it mean that the nature of an instance of consciousness is unique,
and therefore language-defying? Manorathanandin's commentary on this
verse
106
justifies the uniqueness of the nature of craving, for example, on the
107 b . ..
grounds that it 'does not partake in anything else, ecause It rests III Its own
nature alone.' Things which can be denoted by language, he continues, are
would not have served RfunakaJ).tha's purposes nearly so well, since he wants this verse to
illustrate the point he has just made, that having as one's form consciousness (sa/Jlvit) is
different from being the referent of a determinative cognition. Thus it is not unlikely that
it was RamakaJ;ltha himself who changed that word in the verse. From RamakaJ).tha's
point of view the phrase litmli cetanlinlim also happens to be nicely ambiguous (though I
do not suggest that this motivated him to change it): as well as 'nature of instances of con-
sciousness' it can mean 'Self of conscious beings'. The latter meaning would of course
lead to the verse being highly un-Buddhist.
104 Dharmottara, Manorathanandin and the Tibetan translator of this verse all take
ananyablzlik as a Izetau
105 The Tibetan of PVin 1.21ab (gian fa brtenmin bdag iiid phyir I bde sogs mams fa
brda nus min I) construes sukhlidfnlim primarily with asakyasamaya(l as though the San-
skrit read asakya(l samaya(l; and it takes hy litmli ananyabhlik as yasmlid litmli ananya-
bhlik giving the reason for asakya((l)samaya(l sukhlidfnlim. The English would thus run
something like: 'because [their] nature is unique, linguistic conventions for craving etc.
are not possible.' But as Vetter (1966 104, note 37) points out, it is unlikely that PVin
originally contained a different half verse from that of PYa. Rather its Tibetan translation
seems to have been influenced by Dharmottara's interpretation. As Vetter mentions, PVin
and Dharmottara's commentary on it were translated into Tibetan by the same person.
106 PVV 194,5-9: rliglidfnlim litmli svan7pam ananyabhlik nlinya/!l blzajate, svariipa:
mlitrlivastlzite(l. tasmlid asakya(l samaya(l sGliketo 'smin ... vlicya/Jl vlicakena SGl!lyojyeta,
na ca rliglidylitmli vlicya(l, tatas tatprakliso na sabdasa/igata(l.
107 In saying that, he is merely dissolving the word that I have been translating
'unique' (ananyabhlik) into a verbal form (nlinya1J1 bhajate).
.289
things which can be linked to denoters/signifiers (i.e. words). And craving
(and other mental factors) are not such things.
But he does not make clear precisely why unique things cannot linked
signifying words. Another passage from the PramiilJaviirttika clarifies thiS:108
A particuiarlO
9
which is seen in one (place and time) is not seen any-
where else (or at any other time). [Therefore] a universal which is
separate from this (particular) does not exist, since the (perceptual)
cognition is not differentiated (as grasping both individual and univer-
sal). Therefore, all cognition that arises from the senses has a particu-
lar for its 'object. It is not possible for words to apply to particulars, lIO
because a linguistic convention cannot apply to particulars, since they
do not range over [anything else]; and only the object of words [, not a
particular,] would be connected with them.
We see from this passage that what DharmakIrti said of pleasure and the like
(or instances of consciousness in RamakaJ.l!ha's version of the verse), namely
that being unique, they are ineffable, applies to all particulars. The pot-
moment in front of me has never been seen before and will never be seen
again, so to use a word to denote it that refers also to every other pot-moment
will not capture its specific nature. Sense-perception presents things as parti-
cular, not as general; and yet the conventions that determine word meanings
do so by connecting the word with something general. Words are suitable for
properties that occur in a range of individual instances, but they cannot apply
108 PVa 3.126--128:
ekatra blzedo hi kvachl nlinyatra I
na tasmlid bhinnam asty anyat slillllinYGl!1 buddhyablzedata(l II
tasllllid sarvaivendriyajli mari(l I
na sabdlinlil!l pravrttliv asri samblzava(l II
ananvaylid sa/iketasylipravrtrita(l I
yas ca sabdlinlil!l Sa/!lyojyeta sa eva tai(l II
This passage was drawn to my attention by Birgit Kellner, who was, in tum, pointed
to it by Tosaki's notes to his translation ofPVa 3.249.
109 blzeda is used here in the sense of Birgit Kellner sent me a translation of
these verses, which I am following here. ;
110 The text as embedded in PVBh reads prav!1ter for pravrttau. The genitive is per-
haps smoother.
290
to a collection of momentary particulars, since that collection will always be
heterogeneous. A linguistic convention would only be able to apply to parti-
culars if were a different word for every single particular. This is not the
case in practice, and unfeasable in principle.
The verse under comment was quoted with approval by Ramakru:).!ha to illus-
trate a point that he himself had made. We can thus expect that he would
agree to its main points. How then would he explain that the uniqueness of
consciousness means that it is ineffable? For him it is not true, as it is for
DharmakIrti, that each moment of consciousness is distinct from the previous
and subsequent moments. For RamakaI!tba the nature of consciousness (i.e.
the Self), does not vary over time. Far from being constituted by irreducibly
separate point-instants, it shines forth constantly without interruption. Thus
its ineffability would not be explained by RamakaI!tha as by DharmakIrti in
the three verses just looked at.
The verse also occurs in the PramiilJaviniscaya,. and since three Sanskrit
manuscripts of this text have recently come to light (and are being used by
Prof. Steinkellner to produce a critical edition), we can consult DharmakIrti's
own prose surrounding the verse. Some explanations given here by Dharma-
kIrti are in accord with RamakaI!tba's views. Perhaps it was these that Rama-
kaI!tb
a
had in mind when he cited the verse with .approval. DharmakIrti
writes:
lll
For conceptualization is not possible in the self-experiencing of pleasure and
the like, because:
111 The following was made available to me by Birgit Kellner and Prof. Steinkellner. I
thank Birgit Kellner for her help, without which I would have struggled to derive sense
from it.
na hi sukhiidfniim iitmasa/Jlvedane vikalpa[l sambhavati, yasmiid
asakyasamayo hy iitmii sukhiidfniim ananyabhiik I
niinudita[l pratiniyatall sukhiidyiitmii sa/!lvittyii, tasyiis tadiitmarijpatviit.
nainam iyam abhiliipena sa/.nsrjati, tathiivrtter iitmani virodhiit, tadn7pasya priig adarsa-
niid, abhiliipiibhoge ca tadavivekena sa/Jlvido 'py, agriihyagriiha-
kasya ca samayasyiibhiiviit, anyeniipy atftariipasyiisa/Jlvedaniit, apunarbhiivini samaya-
sya vaiyarthyiic ca.
atall svasa/.nvittir II
The nature of pleasure and the like is after all (hi) not amenable to.a
linguistic convention, [since] it is unique. .
The nature of pleasure and the like, not having arisen [ever before], and in
each case restricted [by the causes and conditions that in individual
pleasure as opposed to pain], cannot be made into an object by
awareness, because the [awareness] is the nature of the [pleasure]. This
[awareness] does not link the [nature of pleasure] with language, because to
occur in such a way is contradictory with the nature [of pleasure]. For it is not
the case that [any pleasure] of that particular nature has been experienced be-
fore; and [at the time] when the word ['pleasure'] is experienced, the object
(i.e. the pleasure itself) has [already] ceased, and so has the awarenessl12 [of
pleasure] because it is not separate from it. [Its awareness does not link it with
language] also because there can be no linguistic convention without a per-
ceiver and a perceived object, because a past [object] cannot be experienced
by a further [cognition], and because a linguistic convention is without pur-
pose with respect to something that does not arise again.
Therefore their (i.e. pleasure and the like's) self-awareness is not con-
nected with language.
291
I will not attempt to further analyze this rich and complicated passage, but
will just note that while much of it assumes momentariness, like Dharma-
kIrti's explanations in PYa 3.126-128, not all of it does. It asserts that the na-
ture of pleasure cannot become an object of awareness because awareness is
its very nature; and that since there is thus no relation of perceiver and per-
. ceived, no linguistic convention can apply. Though RamakaI!tha would not
actually agree that this is so of pleasure, since for him pleasure is an object of
perception, he would agree that it is so of consciousness, the topic of his ver-
sion of the verse. So perhaps he would have used such ideas if .asked to ex-
plain why the nature of consciousness is ineffable.
ata evopayogabhediid1l3 asya niitra grhftagriihitvam.
That is precisely why, because of a difference of use, this (i.e. I-cognition)
does not grasp here what has been grasped [already through self-awareness].
112 This slightly surprising syntactical interpretation, with the the genitive samvidah
being taken as dependent on opratyastamaYlit follows the Tibetan translation. . .
. 113 evopayogabhediid Ped, v.1. in Ked, B, L, P; evobhayabhediid Ked.
292
I-cognition uses determinative cognition to grasp the Self as roughly approxi-
mated to, and self-awareness (svasa1!lvedana) uses consciousness' pre-
linguistic and pre-conceptual apprehension of itself to grasp the Self directly.
So Ramakru;t!ha has two explicit motivations for distinguishing self-
awareness and I-cognition here. One is that for his sahopalambhaniyama ar-
gument to work, he cannot have the Self being perceived outside the context
of I-cognitions. But he has the problem of our perception of it in self-
awareness. By distinguishing self-awareness from I-cognitions in the way
that he does, he can at least maintain that the Self as referent of determinative
cognition is never perceived outside the context of I-cognitions. His second
reason for distinguishing them is that he does not want I-cognitions to grasp
what is grasped through self-awareness (grhftagrlihitva) because that would
make Sadyojyotis susceptible to the charge of going over th,e same ground as
earlier in his text. By distinguishing self-awareness and I-cognition, any over-
lap between this verse (15) and verse 5, which Ramakru;t!ha expounded as
about self-awareness, is avoided. These two reasons are not of course why
Ramakru;t!ha adopts the distinction as part of his system, but they are the two
reasons why the distinction is of importance to him at this point in the text.
api tu ttivanmtitrqJa iti
Rather, as we will ShOW,114 [I-cognition] is an [independent] means of know-
. 115
ledge up to a certam pomt.
Throughout the whole of Ramakru;t!ha's response to this third objection
(1.1.3) he has been maintaining a fIrm distinction (for both of the reasons
mentioned in my previous comment) between that which is apprehended
throucrh self-awareness and the referent of I-cognitions. But he cannot afford
I:>
for this difference to be too strong, for that which is apprehended through
self-awareness is the Self; and the whole point of this section of the text is to
show that the referent of I-cognitions is also the Self, albeit proximately. The
tension is evident. When he states that it is one thing to be consciousness and
another to be verbally cognized in a determinative cognition, and then sup-
114 In his commentary on the next verse (16).
115 It does not grasp the Self directly, but 'up to a certain point', i.e. in its own terms,
through concepts.
293
ports this with a verse stating that consciousness's nature defIes linguistic
conventions, it is tempting to conclude that that which is verbally cognized in
the determinative cognition 'I' is not consciousness, i.e. not the Self. Rlima-
kru;t!ha would certainly not want us to draw such a conclusion, so we should
not understand the distinction he draws to be between two completely differ-
ent things. The content of the two types of perception differ, for Ramakru;t!ha,
not in that one is the real Self and the other not, but in that one is the Self in
its form as consciousness and the other the Self as ver"\:>ally perceived through
a determinative cognition.
1
16
The source of this tension is the strong influence on the philosophy of this pe-
. riod of the Dharmaldrtian distinction
l17
between non-conceptual (nirvikalpa-
ka) cognition (of which self-awareness is an example) and determinative cog-
nition (adhyavasliya). DharmakIrti bestowed the title of direct perception
on the former alone,118 arguing that the referents of the latter
(concepts as opposed to unique individuals) are postulated by us, and do not
accurately reflect that which appears to our senses. Ramakru;t!ha wants to pre-
serve determinative cognition (or most instances of it) as direct perception,
but he feels he cannot but acknowledge Buddhism's distinction between non-
conceptual cognition and determinative cognition, and its tendency to see the
former as a more reliable guide to reality than the latter. His strategy is thus
to adopt the distinction, even to make much of the. differences between the
two, but to refuse to give up the view that determinative provides a
reliable representation of the world outside the cognition. For Ramakru;tt
ha
the referents of determinative cognition are not mentally constructed; they are
close approximations to the referents of the corresponding pre-conceptual
cognition. The referent of the determinative cognition 'blue', for example,
corresponds to the initial pre-conceptual cognition of the patch of blue. Simi-
larly the referent of an I-cognition is nothing other than the Self for Rama-
kru;t!ha. The Buddhist distinction he has adopted forces him to qualify this
116 I write that in view of the fact that the distinction he makes before the DharmakIrti
verse is between adhyavastiyapartimrsyatti and saJJlvidn7patti. One could understand an
titmanalz to go with the two abstracts.
117 Introduced, in fact, by Dignaga.
118 As already mentioned under objection 1.1.2 on page 281.
294
slightly by saying that it is so 'somehow, by a close approximation ... for the
purpose of language,119and that I-cognition is a means of knowing the Self
'up to a certain point' .120 But he does not see why his adoption of the Bud-
dhist distinction should force him to hold that the referent of an I-cognition is
completely unrelated to and unrepresentative of the non-conceptual Self.
Buddhism, for Ramakargha, has latched on to a valid distinction between
conceptual and non-conceptual referents but has made too much of it, seeing
. .' . 121
the two as radically unconnected and lacking any contlllUlty.
Objections 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.3 exhibit a logical progression. The first chal-
lenged the basic assumption of RamakaI).tha's four-staged sahopalambhani-
yama argument (stage 1), namely that the Self is the referent of I-cognition.
The second allows for a Self appearing as the referent of I-cognition, but
states that such referents of determinative cognition are unreal. The third al-
lows for the Self being the real referent of determinative cognition but points
to a problem that arises even if that is the case (it being perceived in another
kind of cognition).
I do not label the next objection 1.1.4, but group the next three objections to-
gether as 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3; the logical progression of the last three has
stopped, the next one going back to the beginning as it were, by focussing
again on the first stage of RamakaI).tha's sahopalambhaniyama argument. It
forms a group with the following two, because the three of them mirror, in a
sense that will be explained below, the pattern of the first three objections.
119
3
8,17-18: kathalJ1cid ... vyavahiiriirtham.
120 In the sentence under comment:
121 Ramakru;t.tha was of course not the first philosopher to both accept the distinction
between non-conceptual and conceptual cognition and maintain that the latter constitutes
valid perception. Among Naiyayikas see Vacaspati Misra's NVrr ad Nyiiyasatra 1.1.4;
and Jayanta Bhana's NM(M), Vol. 2, 515,14: savikalpakal!l Jay-
anta holds that the object of the non-conceptual perception is the same as that of the con-
ceptual, except that the former lacks any connection with a name: tasmiid ya eva vastv-
iitmii savikalpasya gocara[z I sa eva nirvikalpasya sabdollekhavivarjita[z II (NM(M), Vol.
1, 256,5-6). Considerably earlier, Kumlirila had already adopted the distinction and ar-
gued for the validity of determinative cognition. Rlimakru;t.tha quotes him later in this
chapter on that point.
1.2.1 nanu 'gauro 'hal!z 1qso 'ham' ity aniitmani sarfra eViihampratyayasya
vintddho hetu[z.. .
1.2.1 [Sfinyavadin:] Because we find that I-cognition [refers] only to the
body, which is not the Self, in such cases as 'I am fair, I am slim', the iogical
reason is surely contradictory.
iti ata iiha
1. 15cd) na ciinyasminn 123 ahambllddhi[z kvacid til nirgwJii
124
II
Therefore (atab) [since one might object] thus '(iti) he says,
1.15cd) And I-cognition when not qualified is never seen [to refer] to
anything else.
295
This translation represents Ramakargha's understanding of the half-verse as
inferred from his commentary below. Filling it out slightly, it means: cogni-
tions of 'I' that are not qualified by adjectives such as fair or slim never refer
to anything other than the Self. He explains in his commentary why those that
are so qualified are not relevant. This translation is a highly unnatural con:"
strual of the Sanskrit. It is almost impossible, for example, to translate both of
the two particles, ea and tu, if we understand it as a single proposition in this
way. The syntactic markers indicate that Sadyojyotis would have wanted us
to break after ahambuddhilz: 'And I-cognition does not refer to anything other
[than the Self]. But it is sometimes seen to be unqualified.' This way the 'but
sometimes' (kvacit ... tu) in this verse leads naturally on to the 'and some-
times' (ea ... kvacit) in the next half-verse. Thus Sadyojyotis seems to have
held that no I-cognition ever refers to anything other than the Self; Rama-
kaI).tha, by contrast, that unqualified I-cognition never does so. RamakaI).tha
wants to narrow down that which refers to the Self to a subset of I-cognitions,
not all of them, thus enabling him to neutralize the common Buddhise
25
ob-
jection that 'I' can be observed to refer to the body. By construing the verse
in the way that he does, he can represent it as taking on board that objection,
1" 0 0
-- pratyayasya dmer Ked, Ped, B, P; pratyayadmer L.
123 ciinyasminn Ked, Ped, B, L, P; ciinyasminy M.
124 ttl nirgwJii Ked, Ped, B, L, P; M.
125 And Clirvlika. Buddhism would of often say that'!' refers rather to the five
psycho-physical constituents of the human being (skandhas).
296
by excluding I-cognition that refers to the body as irrelevant. Thus the differ-
ence between the two arises because Sadyojyotis has not bothered to concern
himself with this group of I-cognitions at all, whereas sees them
as a possible counter-example to the Saiva view that must be dealt with. What
would Sadyojyotis' response to them be? Since he regards all I-cognition as
referring to the Self, presumably those qualified by bodily attributes would
not count as proper I-cognitions for him at all.
As to how this half-verse (15cd) relates to the last half-verse (l5ab): the cen-
tral assertion of l5ab was conditional upon the Self being the referent of 1-
cognition (ahampratyayagocara); for Sadyojyotis, l5c confmns that that is
always the case, for l5cd asserts the extent to which that is the
case.
na, gaurlidibhi{z padlirthlintarair hy ahampratyayo mli-
,1'6 ." .
1)avakiidau si1Jzhlidipratyayavad sanre - vartate, talr til
mukhyataylitmany eva. sa eva [Ked p. 40] clitra hetur ukto na ity
aviruddha eva.IIl.1511
[Siddhantin:] No [I-cognition does not refer only to the body] because [the 1-
cognitions in the cases you cite] are qualified: 127 for an I-cognition qualified
by other meanings such as 'fair' applies figuratively to the body
just like a cognition of a lion or such like [referring] to a student. 128 But [an 1-
cognition] unqualified by [such ideas] [refers] in its primary meaning to the
Self alone. And it is [such an unqualified I-cognition] that is taught to be the
logical reason here, not one which occurs with qualification, so [the logical
reason] is not contradictory.
126 sarfl'e Ked, Ped, B, L; sarfra/p. P.
127 He uses here as an antonym of nirgu1)a in the verse.
128 To say 'I am fair' is like saying of a young student that he is a lion. Just as a per-
son is not literally a lion, so the Self is not literally coloured (and therefore material). The
lion example is much referred to in philosophical and ala/ikiira literature as an instance of
figurative usage. (I thank Somdev Vasudeva for providing many references.) To take an
example from DharmakIrti: sa litmli kalpanlisamliropita[l sylit, sil.nhatlidivan
iti (PVSV 127,3b-2b ad 1.248cd). Uddyotakara tells us that it is sauryam,
bravery, that the metaphor expresses: yathli si1Jzho iti silp.ha iva sillzhalt. kim
punar atra upamfyate? sauryam (NVa(NCG) 231,12-13).
297
To respond to the objection that 'I' refers to the body by clairniI).g that it only
does so metaphorically is a standard Atmaviidin move. 129 In the Abhidharma-
Vasubandhu's opponent offers an explanation of why (in such
sentences as 'I am fair', 'I am dark' etc.) this metaphorical usage occurs. He
says that in such cases the Self is figuratively equated with the body to ex-
press the fact that the body is at the Self's service, as when someone equates
themself with their servant.
130
The servant example aims at a deeper parallel-
ism to the case of Self and body than the lion example, in that the Self-body
relationship is mirrored by the master-servant relationship. ex-
ample is parallel simply in that it is of metaphoric usage.
Note the way that writes, 'and it is that that is taught to be the
logical reason here', where 'that' refers to unqualified I-cognition. Whereas
before he has given the impression that the logical reason is the co-existence/
co-perception of Self and I-cognition, 13I and named it explicitly as such on
one occasion,132 here he says it is (unqualified) I-cognition.
133
This.is partly
owing to his attempt to do more with the verses than they actually state. Here
he is probably being truer to the verses when he says the logical reason is just
the unqualified I-cognition, but his superimposition on them of a continuation
of the theme of co-perception has led him elsewhere to identify it as co-
perception/co-existence.
129 One of the earliest examples is perhaps that in the sandigdhas tzI-
paclira[z (VS(C) 3.2.12).
130 AKBh(BBS) 1226,10-1227,1. The same idea is put forward by Uddyotakara
NVa(NCG) 324,6-8, and by Candrananda in his interpretation of 3.2.12
(VS(C),30,14-16).
131 38,9; 38,19-20; 39,l.
132 39,3-4.
133 In fact it is hard to see how he could construct an inference in which the logical
reason was simply 'unqualified I-cognition'; presumably a fuller expression for the hew
would be something like 'being the of unqualified I-cognition',
tyayagocaratvam (see ahampratyayagocaratva1J1 vlidyasiddham eva [38,19], not that
ahampratyayagocaratva/p. was there referred to as the logical reason).
298
The Self s Awareness ofItself
This alternation also shows that the Self being the referent of (unqualified) 1-
cognition and the Self with (unqualified) I-cognition are more or
less synonymous for RamakaJ).!ha in this passage.
1.2.2 yady evam, kasya cid iitmana?z pratyeya-
syii
134
nllpalabdlzer vaniidyekatvapratyayavad alzampratyayo 'pi
evety asiddlzo Izetllb
1.2.2 [Siinyavadin:] If that is the case,135 [then we will try another objection,
namely,] because we don't experience some other Self
136
that is the referent of
[I-]cognition, separate from the cognition, [it follows that] I-cognition, just
like a cognition of the unity of a forest and the like, is without a referent (nir-
so the logical reason is unestablished.
It would be natural to assume that 'logical reason' here denotes the same as
when RamakaJ).!ha just referred to it, namely 'unqualified I-cognition' .137 That
is possible. Weighing against that possibility, however, is the fact that in
RamakaJ).!ha's response to this objection, he writes,
iti na vaniidyekatviidipratyayavan tan niisiddlzi!l priigllktasya sa-
Izopalamblzasyeti.
The way that closely mirrors the opponent's charge here,
vaniidyekatvapratyayavad alzampratyayo 'pi evety asiddlzo Izetub,
indicates that here hetub (logical reason) should mean priiguktab sahopalam-
bhalz (the earlier mentioned co-perception). This reinforces the impression,
just commented on above, that RamakaJ).!ha oscillates freely between these
two ways of designating the logical reason as though the difference were in-
significant.
Whereas the previous charge was contradictoriness (viruddhatva), i.e. that if
something is the referent of I-cognition / if something is co-perceived with 1-
cognition, then it must be simply the body, not the Self, the charge here is
134 pratyeyasyii Ked, B, L, P; pratyayasyii Ped.
135 I.e. even if we grant that 'I am fair' and the like are metaphorical and outside the
scope of your logical reason.
136 The phrase 'some other Self' does not mean some second Self, but some Self out-
side the cognition. The 'other' is somewhat redundant in English.
137 Or something like, 'being the referent of I-cognition'.
299
-
that the logical reason is unestablished (asiddhatva). In other words even if 1-
cognition that seems to refer to the body can be explained away and we re-
strict ourselves to I-cognitions unqualified by bodily attributes, nothing is es-
tablished to exist as the referent of such cognition / to be co-perceived with
such cognition.
The Self is no more the referent of I-cognition, according to this objection,
than the unity of a forest is the referent of a cognition of a group of trees.
Cognitions that we take to be of a forest or a Self do not accurately reflect the
reality outside the cognition. Though we may think we perceive a unitary for-
est we can analyze it further down into individual trees, and those in turn
down to a number of shapes and colours, which are what actually appears to
our senses. The concept of a unitary forest is something we impose onto
those. Similarly we may think that we experience the Self in I-cognitions, but
for the Buddhist these 'I's are just like trees both in that they themselves can
be further broken down, and in that taken together they form no really exist-
ing greater entity. With regard to the first: any instance of 'I' occurring in
cognition can be further broken down for the Buddhist in that it refers not to
anything single but to a particular association of the five ever-changing
stituents of personality (skandha). With regard to the second: different 1-
cognitions across time perceive something different, not the same Self every
time. They take in distinct momentary perceivers which when taken together
do not add up to a Self, just as different trees taken together do not constitute
a forest except as our own mental construct. 138
The tone of this objection is not necessarily Yogacara. The forest example,
common in Sautrantika contexts, allows that there are things out there impin-
ging on our senses from outside, to which we then apply concepts that are our
own. A non-Yogacara background to this objection can also be discerned
138 Th l' . . th
e exp IClt companson e opponent makes is between I-cognitions and cogni-
tions of the unity of a forest, neither of having a referent. But in elucidating that I
have compared 'I's not with the unity of a forest but with trees; and the Self with the unity
of a forest. I take it that this does not really distort the meaning of the passage.
300
through its seeming assumption that if something does not exist separate from
its cognition it is not a real referent.
139
atriipy iiha
1.16) kartrkarmiivabhiisii ca
140
kvacin matilz I
aham etat prapaSyiimfty atalz
142
siddhGl!l Sphll!Gl!1143 dvayam II
[Siddhantin:] And on this point he says,
1.16) And sometimes the clear cognition, 'I see this', is seen, in which
agent and object shine forth. From it both of them are clearly estab-
lished.
I take it that the wording of this translation would represent equally well
RamakaJ;l!ha's and Sadyojyotis' construal of the syntax of the verse. But what
it means for each of them differs. This is partly because it follows a half-verse
that was construed completely differently by the two of them. We saw that in
piMa d of the last verse Sadyojyotis introduced the first of two possibilities,
this verse giving the second. Sometimes I-cognition can be unqualified (15d)
and it can be of the form 'I see this' (16). This contrast for Sadyo-
jyotis seems to be between 'I' appearing alone and 'I' appearing with an ob-
ject, as the p-erceiver of that object. For RamakaJ;l!ha 'unqualified' I-cognition
does not mean unqualified by an object of the cognition, but unqualified by
139 A distinction has to be made though between the tradition whose ideas are put for-
ward in the objection, and the tradition of the speaker by whom R1imakaIJ.!:ha regards the
objection as stated. The whole of this section is directed against the Sunyavadin who used
the sahopaZambhaniyama argument to establish the non-difference of blue and cognition
of blue. It would thus be reasonable to assume that R1imakaJ}.!ha regards all of the objec-
tions in it as being put by the Sunyavadin. This is supported by his usage of 'you' in re-
marks made by his siddhiintin and 'us' in objections, spread over the whole passage
looked at in this chapter, without any indication of a change of opponent. Thus although
the flavour of this objection is perhaps Sautrantika rather than Yogacara, and although the
objections in the remainder of the passage looked at in this chapter are not specifically
from a Yogacara point of view, I label them all as said by the Sunyavadin.
140 0iivabhiisii ca Ped; iivabhiisiic ca Ked, B, L, P, M. It is not impossible that Ped's
reading arose through corruption and that iivabhiisiic ca is original; but I marginally pre-
fer the meaning of Ped's reading.
141 Ked, Ped, B, L, P; M.
142 atall Ked, Ped, B, L, P; ati M.
143 sphll!GlJl Ked, Ped, B, L, P; SpilU!a M.
301
bodily attributes. Furthermore there is not such a contrast, for him, between
the kind of I-cognition talked about in 15cd and the kind of talked
about in this verse. Both verse-sections are about the unqualified kind, in
which 'I' is used in its primary meaning. Because the word nirgUl}a (unquali-
fied) in 15d is not analysed by RamakaJ;l!ha in accordance with Sadyojyotis'
intentions, 'I see this' cognitions are 'qualified' for Sadyojyotis, but 'unquali-
fied' for RamakaJ;l!ha.
That difference is of little consequence, but there is a more significant differ-
ence between the two authors with regard to verse 16. Sadyojyotis sees the
mere occurrence of cognitions such as 'I see this' as capable of establishing
the existence of both subject and object. Ramakantha on the other hand seems
to see this as naive and so presents verse 16 as putting forward a subtler
point. He regards it as a response to the Buddhist objection that I-cognition
can no more be taken as evidence of a Self than cognitions of the unity of a
forest can be taken as evidence for such a unity. That he does so is clear from
the way that immediately after that Buddhist objection, he states atrapy aha
and then gives the verse. How the verse can be regarded as responding to that
objection is far from clear. That it requires hermeneutical sleight is evidenced
by the fact that in the first sentence of RamakaJ;l!ha's explanation of the verse
he makes a point that is unrelated to anything stated explicitly in the verse:
satyam, syiin yady iitmii sarviirthaprakiisakatayii
l44
svato niivabhii-
seta, sa tll svasGl]lvedanena vikaZpiitfta
145
eva sarvadii bhiisata ity !Iktam.
It is true, [I-cognition] would be without referent if the Self did not shine forth
by itself as the revealer of all objects, but as we have said
146
it shines forth at
all times through [its] self-awareness, beyond conceptualization.
If we experienced the Self only in I-cognitions, then RamakaJ;l!ha admits that
it might be just a mentally constructed concept, not a real referent of cogni-
tion (pratyeya). But unlike the unity of a forest, the Self does actually appear
to us directly, prior to our imposition of any concepts (vikaZpatfta), in self-
144 prakiisakatayii Ked, Ped, B, P; prakiisatayii L.
145 K d 1 . 1 d' .
e wrong y mc u es a hyphen at the end of the line after vikalpiitfta.
146 14,2 ff.; 26,15-17; 28,15-16.
302
awareness (svasaYflvedana). Hence we are experiencing a real referent in 1-
cognition, not some product of our own minds.
We can see how important the self-awareness mode of perceiving the Self is
for RfunakaJ).t
ha
. Without it I-cognitions too would be able to prove noth-
ing,147 so perception would be doomed as a means of establishing
the Self. But the assertion that the Self does appear to us independently of
concepts through its spontaneous awareness of itself both
constitutes evidence of its existence in itself, and validates the other mode of
perception of the Self, I-cognitions, enabling us to know that they are not de-
void of a referent
Note that, for RamakaJ).tha, while a cognition of an object would lack a real
referent if the object did not exist independently of consciousness, that is not
so of cognitions of 'I'. Their referent does not exist separate from conscious-
ness but it is real. In its case it can be known to be real because it exists out-
side of I-cognition, namely in pre-conceptual cognition, not outside of con-
sciousness altogether.
ciiyaJJl proktanayeniihampratyaya!z kvacid aham etat prapafyiimf-
tyiidau susphu!iinubhava eva iti na vanii-
dyekatviidipratyayavan
150 . f . th
, And this
l49
I-cognition [can be known to] have that as Its re erent ill e
way that has been stated,151 [since it] is sometimes seen to be clear (kvacit ...
147 I mentioned on p. 293 the strong influence on the philosophy of this period of the
DharmakIrtian distinction between non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) cognition and determi-
native cognition (adhyavasiiya), the latter not being a means of knowledge. That Ramaka-
ntha admits here that in themselves I-cognitions are evidence of nothing shows he has
on from DharmakIrtian Buddhism a reluctance to see determinative cognition as
straightforwardly valid. Even if this is just his strategy for overcoming DharmakIrtian arg-
uments, it shows that he at least perceived them as powerful and best refuted through ac-
cepting scepticism of determinative cognition to some extent.
148 Ked, B, L, P; splzu!alz Ped.
149 'This I-cognition' just means I-cognitions in general. The ,'this' seems to be inclu-
ded simply because having just been talking about self-awareness he is now returning to
the main topic ofI-cognition.
150 I.e. that which shines forth permanently through self-awareness.
'" [where sometimes means] when there is a particular verbal
cognition in such a form as 'I see this', [and where clear means that] the expe-
rience of it is very acute. 152 Therefore it is not-like cognitions of the oneness
etc. of forests and the like-without referent. '
303
151 Thi' , th h
s way at as been stated refers back to Ramakal.l!ha's point that 'for the
purp?ses of linguistic usage' (vyavahiira) the referent of the I-cognition must be accepted
to be the Self 'somehow' and 'by a close approximation' (38,17-18).
152 My translation is admittedly forced. Looking at the syntax alone one would per-
haps translate, 'And this I -cognition, having that as its referent in the way that has been
stated, is sometimes seen to be clear ... '. This takes kvacit '" ... as predi-
cate and as an adjective to the subject. But bearing in mind the context and the
main point therefore wants this sentence to be making, it seems better if we
could take as the predicate. Ramakal.l!ha is in the process of answering the ob-
jection that I-cognition lacks an object; he has just stated that the Self appears in self-
awareness; thus we need him here to assert that that is also the object of I-cognition. It
would not be appropriate or justified for him to slip this point in adjectivally as though it
were uncontroversial. Also, if it were not explicitly asserted here that that is the object of
I-cognition, it would be hard to see what the 'therefore' in the next sentence (Therefore it
is not ... without referent') was referring back to. For both of these reasons I prefer to
treat Ciiya'll proktanayeniihampratyayalz as the main sentence.
This leaves the problem though that kvacid aham etat prapafyiimftyiidau pariimarSa-
sllsphll!iillllbhava eva now seems unconnected to what comes before
(and what comes after). To solve this problem I take as an adjective that gives a
reason (hetall for the preceding. Given that Ramakal.l!ha introduces the verse
as addressing the problem that I-cognition lacks an object, we would indeed expect him to
hold that the claim of the verse (which is here being glossed) gives a reason for 1-
cognition having an object (as claimed in ciiyal!l proktallayeniihampratyaya!l).
Nevertheless it should be said that the Sanskrit syntax and word order here does not
lead naturally to my construal. Therefore we should consider the alternative that the sen-
tence should indeed be translated in the way that I mentioned at the beginning of this
note: 'And this I-cognition, having that as its referent in the way that has been stated, is
sometimes seen to be clear ... '. In this case, since we want the phrase 'having that as its
referent' to be an uncontroversial claim, we should not take 'that' as 'that which shines
forth in self-awareness' but as 'that which reveals objects', i.e. as picking up sarviil1ha-
prakiisaka or iitmii sarviirthaprakiisakatayii, This is not so controversial because in the
cognition 'I see this' can be seen to be referring to the revealer of the object denoted by,
'this'.
304
The first of these two sentences is another reminder of the tension described 0
on p. 293. In order to overcome the present objection RfunakaJ).!ha claims that
that which is perceived through self-awareness is the referent of I-cognition.
But in his response to 1.1.3 he had to claim that the two are different.
This sentence is not a simple contradiction of the earlier one though, for it
contains the qualification 'in the way that has been stated'. Thus we have to
understand this sentence to mean that 'I' in such cognitions as 'I see this' has
as its referent the same thing as that which we apprehend in self-awareness,
by a close approximation and for the sake of language. 'I', being a word, does
not denote exactly the content of the language-transcending self-awareness,
but it certainly does not represent something completely different from it, as
the Buddhist epistemologists would have it.
*****
As pointed out above, RamakaJ).!ha introduces this verse (16) as though it an-
swers the objection that I-cognitions, like cognitions of the unity of a forest,
lack an object. Immediately under the verse he begins to answer that objec-
tion without making any reference to the verse. Here finally he inserts words
from the verse and glosses them before concluding his response. Thus we
would hope that by now it is clear how he sees the contention of the verse as
answering the objection that I-cognitions lack an object. Unfortunately that is
not the case. What is clear (from the first sentence after the verse) is that
RamakaJ).!ha regards the appearance of the Self in self-awareness as relevant
to safeguarding the reality of the referent of I-cognition; and (from the way he
introduces the verse and from the text-piece under discussion, whether trans-
lated in either of the two ways given in note 152) that he regards the occur-
rence of the 'clear', 'I see this' kind of I-cognitions as also relevant. What is
not clear is precisely why clear 'I see this' I-cognitions enoable us to know that
As for the second difficulty, the 'therefore' in the following sentence would, on this
construal, be picking up the fact that 'I see this' cognitions are seen to be clear. For what
RamakaI).!ha's reasoning may have been in this case, see below.
305
I-cognition has the Self as object and is not like cognition of the unity of a
forest. 153 0
Perhaps we simply have to accept a weakness in RfunakaJ).!ha's argument
here. Having stated the Buddhist objection that cognitions of 'I' are just like
cognitions of the unity of a forest, he does not give a good reason why cog-
nitions of the form 'I see this' enable ous to see that they are not. Perhaps this
weakness results from the tension between, on the one hand, accepting a firm
difference between I-cognition and self-awareness, and, on the other, holding
the former to perceive the same as the latter. Having separated the two, he
may be having difficulty here bringing them together.
I suggest two possible alternatives. First, we could infer that RamakaJ).!ha
would have argued as follows. If 'I' only occurred in kinds of I-cognition
other than those of the 'I see this' type, e.g. when qualified by bodily attrib-
utes, or completely alone, or as the agent of bodily actions, it would be diffi-
cult to know if it referred to the same thing as that which reveals itself in
svasaf!lvedana. But since self-awareness involves apprehending the illumina-
tor of objects (see sarvarthaprakasakataya in the sentence before the one un-
der discussion), and since in the cognition 'I see this' 'I' can clearly be seen
to refer to that which illuminates the 'this', cognitions of this form allow us to
know that the 'I' -part of them has as its referent the same as is grasped
through self-awareness. The Buddhist objection that I-cognitions lack a refer-
ent because a referent is not seen anywhere outside of those cognitions can be
seen to be false in the case of 'I see this', for the agent of the seeing of objects
is exactly what we apprehend constantly through self-awareness.
A second explanation is that RfunakaJ).!ha is here doing two separate things
that he only half-heartedly tries to bring together. On the one hand he wants
to articulate and reply to the Buddhist objection that there is no Self outside
of I-cognition, just as there is no unitary forest outside ot"cognition. His reply
153 In th d'f .
o er wor s, 1 we translate this text-piece in the way given in my main trans-
lation, it is mysterious why gives a reason for ciiYGlJl proktanayeniiham-
o pratyaya!z; and if we translate it in the way that I suggest in note 152 to be more natural to
the syntax and word order, it is mysterious why gives a reason for na vaniidyeka-
tviidipratyayavall
306
is that the Self does appear outside of I-cognition, in self-awareness, so we
can know that I-cognition has a real object. On the other, he needs to gloss,
and explain the argument in, the verse. In fact the verse does not really con-
tain an argument. It simply takes the fact that sometimes cognitions are for-
mulated as containing distinct subject and object words as proof of a subject
and an object. Thus Ramaka:Q.tha introduces the verse as answering the spe-
cific Buddhist objection, and glosses the verse in the middle of his response
to the objection in order to give the impression that the verse is more sophis-
ticated than it is. But he in fact gives no clues as to how precisely the claim of
the verse fits into his argument.
tan nlisiddhi!l prliguktasya salwpalambhasyeti.
Therefore the earlier stated co-perception (of I-cognition and Self) is not un-
established.
1.2.3 yady eVaJ.n salwpalambhaniyamlid litmlidvaitasiddhir
1.2.3 [Si1nyavadin:] If that is the case, because of co-perception [of
'1' and 'this', Self and object], it is proved that [objects] are not different from
the Self. Therefore there is an obstruction of what [you] accept.
Up to this point all the objections have tried to block the co-perception of Self
and I-cognition. Now that Ramaka:Q.tha has dealt with them and secured the
co-perception he is faced with the converse problem of the Self spilling over
into the realm of objects. Why this unwanted consequence is deemed to result
is not made entirely explicit in the text, but it must be through applying saho-
lf d I
.. 154 F
palambhaniyama to Self and object rather than Se an -cogrutlOn. or
the sahopalambhaniyama argument in its original Yogacara form stated that
since objects are always perceived together with consciousness they must be
non-different from consciousness. So similarly, if objects and the Self are al-
154 Hence the manner in which I have filled in the square brackets in my translation. It
is a little surprising that the change from co-perception of Self and I-cognition to that of
Self and object is not made explicit in the text. After all the sahopalambha referred to in
the immediately preceding sentence, tan nlisiddhi!l prliguktasya sahopalambhasyeti, is
that between self and I-cognition. Perhaps the mentions of lmrma in lmrtrlmnnlivabhlislit
(in the verse); of 'etat' in 'aham etat prapaSylimi'; and of the Self being cognized 'sarvli-
rthaprakiisalmtayli' in the first sentence under the verse, are enough to indicate that ob- ,
jects could be seen to be co-perceived with the Self.
307
ways perceived together, as seen in cognitions such as 'I see tl:).is', then ob-
jects should be non-different from the Self (iitmiidvaita).155 This is the non-
dualist Saiva or Vedantin position, but for Ramaka:Q.tha of course. the Self is
simply the illuminator of objects not their source. His response is not to deny
that iitmiidvaita follows from invariable co-perception, but to distance him-
self from the sahopalambhaniyama argument.
na, 'py evlitmasaJ.nvedanam ity evamparatvlid
asya.
[Siddh1intin:] No, because the [putting forward of the sahopalambhaniyama
argument] (asya) was intended to show that, even in your position, experience
of the Self cannot be denied.
He implies here that he does not himself believe in the logic of the sahopala-
mbhaniyama argument, so he saves himself from iitmiidvaita. But why then
did he use the argument in order to prove the existence of the Self? His re-
sponse is that it was in order to show that even in the Buddhist view iitma-
saf!lvedanam must be accepted. I explained at the beginning of my commen-
tary to this passage (p. 273) that this was his attitude to the sahopalambhani-
yama argument, and I have occasionally reminded readers of it in the course
of expounding the passage. On the first time of reading this passage through,
though, his comment here comes as something of a surprise, as Ramakantha
has not given many clues in the preceding discussion that he did not actually
regard the argument as a valid proof of the Self.
ISS In this sentence I assume that the co-perception is based on objects always appear-
ing with the Self in instances of detenninative cognition such as 'I see this'. I hinted at the
possibility in my previous note though (through referring to the first sentence under the
verse containing sarvlirthaprakiisalmtayii) that the co-perception is between the 'Self as
revealed in self-awareness and pre-conceptual objects. If it is the latter that the text envi-
sions then it is certainly true that whenever we perceive pre-conceptual objects we also
perceive the Self through self-awareness, since self-awareness never ceases. But if the
former, why is it that a determinative cognition of an object must necessarily include de-
terminative cognition of the Self? In fact it does do so for RamakaQ.!:ha: we will see in sec-
tion 2 that for him even such cognitions as, 'this is a pot' include an elided determination
of'!'.
156 P . 0 'ks 0 ki fr k
OIllltS pratl . epya --eyes p om one to the next.
308
But when one looks back over the passage, one sees that he did signal at the
outset that the argument is based on Buddhist presuppositions. The sentence
with which he introduces this entire passage, 'moreover even if non-
difference follows from invariable co-perception there is no absence of a
Self' (kiY[l. ca sahopalambhaniyamiid abhede 'pi niitmiibhiivab)157 states as the
condition for the Self existing something which he had himself argued against
in his second and third level of response to the sahopalambhaniyama argu-
ment. Furthermore sahopalambhaniyamiid abhede 'pi ('even if non-differ-
ence follows from invariable co-perception') in that sentence mirrors in the
present sentence 'py ('even in your position'); and niitmiibhiiva!z
('there is no absence of a Self') there mirrors eviitmasa1!lve-
danam ('experience of the Self cannot be denied'). (Thus by 'even in your
position' 'pi) he means, 'even if one accepts that non-difference
follows from sahopalambhaniyama'.) Therefore the present sentence is not
an ad hoc departure from Ramakru;J.tha's earlier intentions but in fact a simple
restatement of his introduction to this passage. His point in both places is that
if you happen to be committed to the logic of this sahopalambhaniyama ar-
gument, you will find it hard to deny the Self (because the former can be used
to prove that the Self exists in the form of consciousness just as it can be used
to show that blue exists in the form of consciousness). Since he does not hap-
pen to be committed to its logic himself, he is not forced to accept iitmiidvaita
as a result of objects always appearing with the Self.
We do not need to conclude however that Ramakru;J.tha does not believe that
Self and I-cognition are co-perceived. All of the moves he makes to establish
that involve claims that he himself would adhere to. But he does not accept
that it follows from that that the Self is non-different from I-cognition, and
that the Self is of the nature of consciousness. He accepts these-or certainly
the latter-for other reasons, but he does not accept that anything follows
from the co-perception. Only the Buddhist opponent is committed to accept-
ing that.
*****
157
38
,9.
309
It may appear strange that that which RamakaJ;ltha claims the Buddhist carinot
deny is iitmasa1!lvedana, since saY[l.vedana, or at least svasamvedana, was ex-
cluded by him from being relevant to the co-perception of Self and 1-
cognition in his response to objection 1.1.3, where he restricted the argument
to only adhyavasiiya and adhyavaseya. Is not Ramakru;J.tha therefore only en-
titled to claim that that which the Buddhist cannot deny is iitmiidhyavasiiya?
Is he avoiding such an expression here because adhyavasiiya alone is not
enough to prove anything for the Buddhist, and instead claiming something
that does not follow from the preceding argumentation ? We do not need to
conclude that Ramakru;J.tha is being devious or inconsistent here, for though
the term svasa1.nvedana is always used by him to refer to (a particular kind of)
non-conceptual cognition, that is not so of sal.nvedana. He sometimes uses it
to refer specifically to non-conceptual cOgnition;158 but he also uses it in a
more general sense. 159 An illustration of general usage that is particularly per-
tinent to the present point is an earlier sentence in this very chapter:
l60
yuktam
etat kadiicid biihyiirtlzaviidino vaktum, blzavatas tv abodlziitmano 'saY[l.vedya-
tviid adhyavaseyasyapi sa:rp.vedyatvena bodlzarupatayiidlzyavasiiyasyeva
sattvam. The fact that he there, when talking of adhyavasiiya, refers to the
adhyavaseya as being sa1.nvedya is evidence that he sometimes uses the verb
sa1.nvid and its derivatives in a wider sense, to cover also adlzyavasiiya, i.e. to
cover conceptual as well as non-conceptual cognition.
The claim there that Yogacaras should accept saY[l.vedana of adhyavaseyas,
because they are of the form of consciousness is exactly parallel to the claim
here that they should accept, as a result of the sahopalambhaniyama argu-
ment, sa1!lvedana of the referent of I-cognition, i.e. of the Self. I take him to
be using iitmasw.nvedana here as a general word for an experience of the Self
which is valid, but which he is not concerned in the present context to specify
as either non-conceptual or conceptual. We have to remember that the
158 For example in the next section in objection 2.1.2.
159 For example in section 5.1 of Chapter 4 he uses it in a sense that, as is evident
from the context, must include pariimarsa.
160 His response to objection 1.1.2: 38,21-22.
310
difference between the two modes of perception is anything but unbridgeable
for RamakaJ?tha.
*****
This concludes RamakaJ?tha's remarks on sahopalambhaniyama. I have al-
ready attempted to answer why he expounded these verses (15 and 16) in
terms of it, in spite of the verses' making no mention of it. 161 Perhaps another
factor is related to the point that both verses take I-cognition as firm evidence
in itself of the Self's existence. Their mere assertion of the Self's existence on
the basis of I-cognition was thought to be too simplistic by RamakaJ?!ha, so
he interprets them differently: as putting forward not a positive argument but
one that the Buddhist should be committed to given his presuppositions.
Now he gives an actual positive reason for why Self and objects are distinct,
glossing atalz siddha1Jl sphu!a1!l dvayam, the last piida of the verse.
paramlil1hatas tv ata ity aham etat prapayiimfti pariimarsabuddher apy
asyii!z sakiisiid iitlnii sarviirthaprakiiSakatvella 162 sarvadii pariimarsallfya!z,
arthas tu tatprakiiyatayii
l63
pratfyate. ity atyalltabhimzam adhyava-
sfyamiillatviit [Ked p. 41] spllll{am etad dvaya/!z siddham, iti Ila bhedo
l64
'py
ayukta!z. iti
But in reality 165 from it, i.e. from this (asyii!z sakiiSiit)166 verbal cognition [of
the type] 'I see this' as well,167 the Self is every time (sarvadii)168 determin-
161 On page 273.
162 0prakiisakatvella Ked, Ped, B, P; prakiisatvella L.
163 Interlinear gloss above tatprakiisyatayii in P: tella sarviirthaprakiisakelliitlnallii
prakiiyo b/ziisyas tasya bhiivas tattiitayii.
164 Ila bhedo Ked, Ped, B, L; Iliibhedo P.
165 I.e. forgetting now about what follows from Buddhist presuppositions and concen-
trating on what is actually true.
166 He glosses ata!z with the words aham etat prapayiimfti pariimarsabuddher apy
asyii!z sakiiSiid. The point of sakiisiit is to show that he takes the tas suffix as denoting an
ablative; and one not of cause for example, but in the sense of 'from'. According to this
long sentence, Self and object are cognized (iitmii ... pariimarsallfya!z, a/1has tu ...
pratfyate) not, for example, 'because of' such cognitions as 'I see this', in the sense of
cause and effect, but rather 'from them'. The pariimarsa 'contains I they are ex-
tracted out of it I it can be analyzed as containing them.
able as [single, steady] revealer of all objects [which are different and
changing], while [from that same verbal cognition]169 [different] objects are
successively cognized as being revealed by that [Self]. So because they are
determined completely separately, both of them are clearly establislied, so
duality is not incorrect either.
170
Therefore there is no obstruction of what
[we] accept.
311
While different objects are seen in different 'I see this' -type cognitions, the
Self is seen in all of them. This contrast seems to be what, for Ramakantha .. ,
enables these cognitions to prove both agent and object, and prove them to be
separate. That which is common to all of them, remaining the same through-
out, is the agent, and that which is different in each case is the object.
In his commentary to each of the three verse-segments so far looked at in this
chapter, RamakaJ?!ha has read more into them than they actually state.
Broadly speaking this is because he wants to derive from them a more sophis-
ticated rebuttal of the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self than the verses themselves
present. This pattern is found fairly consistently throughout the Nare-
One feels sometimes that the gulf between the two
authors is very large. It is not only that Sadyojyotis' arguments are more pri-
mitive, but frequently that his verses consist not of arguments but of asserti-
ons. That certainly seems to be the case here. The verses themselves take the
167 If this api is indeed original, it most likely signifies 'as well as from self-
experience'. The point would be that despite what he said earlier about the I-cognition
only having the Self as its referent by a close approximation, and despite the recently
voiced Buddhist worry that I-cognitions are devoid of a referent, these kind of verbal cog-
nitions too, as well as self-awareness, embrace the Self.
168 I h . 1" .
eSltate to trans ate as always, as RamakaJ)!ha would presumably admit that
there are times when we are not having I-cognitions I 'I see this'-type cognitions (deep
sleep is an obvious example). So here sarvadii seems to mean 'in every "I see this"-type
cognition'; it contrasts with kramelJ.a in the next part of the sentence.
169 It is necessary to understand again 'from that same verbal cognition' because,
given that the ata!l in the verse governs the proof of both Self and object (ata!l siddha/Jl
SphU!a/!l dvayam), its gloss in the commentary must cover the commentary's explanation
of the proof of the object.
. 170 Perhaps the sense of the 'either' here is: just as the Self's non-existence is not cor-
rect (cf. iitmallY asattvam IlO yuktam, neither is its difference from objects incor-
rect (ayukta).
312
mere fact that I-cognitions occur, as decisive evidence for the existence of a
Self. One can appreciate Rfunaka.!!!ha's reluctance to settle for that. After all
Buddhists have no probiem admitting that we have cognitions of 'I'. The
point at issue is rather whether that 'I' refers to anything, whether it is a valid
representation of something existing outside of itself. In order to decide that
question, the mere occurrence of I-cognitions is not enough.
Ramaka.!!!ha recognizes this and even acknowledges it explicitly in his fIrst
sentence under verse 16.171 Thus he fIrst adduces self-awareness as valida-
tion; and then adds this consideration that that which is common to all 'I see
this' cognitions is the Self, and that which changes, their objects.
Perhaps because he is writing at a different stage of the history of Indian Phi-
losophy, and perhaps because he was better read in Buddhist sources, Rfuna-
ka.!!!ha regarded much of the material that he inherited from Sadyojyotis as
insufficient for the articulation of an adequate response to Buddhist chal-
lenges. One can observe him modifying the stream of Saiva Siddhanta philo-
sophy as a result and adding more detail to it.
tad IIktam172
ayam eva hi vijlieyo bhedo bodharthayolz sphllfam I
pfirvas tv anubhaviikiira uttaras ciinubhilyate II iti.
Therefore it has been said:
For you should understand clearly that the difference between cogni-
tion and object(s) is just this: the former is of the form of experience,
and the latter is what is experienced.
The progression of objections 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 mirrors the pattern of ob-
jections 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3. In both trios the fIrst tackles the basic assump-
tion of Rfunaka.!!!ha's sahopalambhaniyama argument-that I-cognition refers
to the Self. In both, the second allows for a Self appearing to be the referent
of I-cognition, but states that it is not a real referent. In both, the third allows
for the Self being the true referent of I-cognition but shows that even granting
that, a further problem arises.
I7I satyam, syiit yady ... , 'It is true, [I-cognition] would be without referent
if ... '.
l72 Verse 9 ofNP.
2. The Constancy of I-Cognition
2.1.1 nanv aya/.Il ghafa ityiider vimarsasya darSaniid atrii-
naikiintikatii.
2.1.1 [Sunyavadin:] Surely, because we also see verbal cognitions which have
a singular referent,173 such as 'this is a pot', [the attempt to establish both sub-
ject and object from cognition] is inconclusive.
tad ayuktam ity iiha
1. 17ab) sarvam eva hi vijliiillal!l kartrkal7lliivabhasakaml
[Siddhantin:] He claims that that is not right:
1. 17ab ) For absolutely every cognition manifests agent and object. 174
aya/.Il ghafa ityiidy api vimarSavijliiina/!1 na eva Yllk-
tam, sviitmano vimarsiibhiivena paravimrsyasyeva tadn7patviisiddhelz.
Even such a verbal cognition (vimarsavijliiinam) as 'this is a pot' cannot
have
175
as its referent only the mere object that is [explicitly] verbally cogni-
zed (vimrsya),176 because as a result of there being no verbal cognition of
one's own Self [in it] (sviitmano vimarsiibhiivena), [even this verbally cogni-
zed object (vimrsya)] WOUld, just like someone else's verbally cognized object
(vimriya), not be established [for me] to have the form [that it does]
(tadn7patva- ).177
313
So even verbal cognitions like 'this is a pot' must verbally cognize not only
the pot but also one's own Self. Only if this is the case can the pot be estab-
173 I.e. which represent the object (artha, karma) but not the subject.
174 In the preceding (15d-16d) Sadyojyotis has subdivided I-cognition into that which
is unqualified (in which 'I' appears alone) and that which takes the form 'I see this'.
When he states here that all cognition involves the appearance of subject and object, an
obvious question arises: how about unqualified I-cognitions? How do they manifest an
object? Perhaps in that case it is 'I' that is both subject and object (suggested by Prof.
Sanderson).
175 Literally, 'is not logically possible as having'.
176 I h . . d I 1 ,.
.e. suc cogmllons 0 not on y represent thIS pot', aya/!l ghafalz.
177 I thank Prof. Schmithausen for his help with this sentence.
314
lished as anobject for me as opposed to for someone else. The cognition of
the Self, though verbal, is not explicitly articulated here (as it is in the case of
'I see the pot'). But although it is silent it is still a verbal cognition (vimarsa).
In sub-section 2.2 RamakaIftha calls it a 'silent verbal cognition' ( ... asabdmrt
vimarsam ... ).
Now we have an imagined objection, not from a Buddhist point of view but
to do with a potential inconsistency with what RamakaIftha has said about the
Self appearing in self-awareness.
2.1.2 svlitmanlipy asya tadlinf1!1 sQ/!lvedanlin
I78
nlisiddhir
179
iti eet,
2.1.2 If [you, Siinyavadin,] say: '[The verbally cognized object] is not
unestablished [for the particular cognizer] because, [according to you Saivas,]
it (i.e. one's own Self) is experienced at that time by one's own Self (svlitma-
nii),180
The point is that the self-awareness that we have all the time should be
enough to establish the object as cognized by me rather than by someone else.
na, sal!lvedanasylipy gaeehatlilll 181
[then we reply:] No, because even consciousness, if it is not made the referent
of [either explicit or silent] verbal is not established,
in the way that objects like grass [on the side of the path are not established]
for people going along.
If we only had non-conceptual awareness of our Self (i.e. our consciousness)
in cognitions like 'this is a pot', the Self would not be sufficiently represented
to bestow on the pot, as it were, the quality of being sensed as seen by me in
particular. The fact that, in cognitions such as 'this is a pot', the pot is recog-
nizably the object of my perception means that I must definitely and know-
ingly determine the Self in them, even if '1' does not appear explicitly in their
articulation.
178 tadlinf1!1 sal!lvedanlin Ked"", Ped, B, L, P; tadlinfm aSQ/llvedanlin Ked
pc

179 nlisiddhir Ked"", Ped, B, L, P; na siddhir Ked
Pc

180 I am not sure about the api. Perhaps it is out of order (bhinnakrama) and should be
taken to qualify the asya: ' ... because it too (i.e. the Self as well as the object, the pot) is
experienced ... '.
181 evlisiddhe?l Ked"C, B, L, P; eva siddheb Ked
Pc
, Ped.
315
The verbal cognition of 'I' in such cases is one in which the has
been elided or is latent. But it would not be correct to regard it as a non-
verbal cognition, for RamakaIftha is firm here that what must be postulated is
not merely self-awareness (svasal.nvedana), but an actual verbal cognition (vi-
marsa) of the Self. One could perhaps characterize the difference between
this 'silent verbal cognition' and self-awareness as that, unlike the latter, the
former contains an aJzam that though not seen is not absent.
yad lihll?1182
SQ/llvittir aparlimarslid vidyamlinlipi vastlltab I
tJ1:llidivittivad ylitllb
l83
siddhaivlividyamlinavat II iti.
As they have said,
Consciousness, because it is not the referent of a verbal cognition
(aparlimarslit), even though it really exists (vidyamlinlipi vastuta?z), is
established to be as good as non-existent just like consciousness of
grass etc. for someone going along.
'This example is helpful for understanding how self-awareness was envisaged.
In self-awareness consciousness / the Self is like this grass by the side of the
road, just beyond the fringes of determinative perception but nevertheless
there.
One might infer from RamakaIftha's last point, and from this verse that he
uses to substantiate it, that self-awareness (the principal means of knowing
the Self according to the passage looked at in the last chaper) would not be
enough on its own to establish the Self. The Self would seem to be 'as good
as non-existent' if we only knew it through self-awareness. 'This may be true
for RamakaIftha, but he would point to the fact that we do have the subse-
quent verbal cognition of it. Since the latter requires self-awareness for us to
know that it is not objectless, is there a circularity? Probably not a vicious one
because we do actually have a genuine verbal cognition of the Self, for
RamakaIf!ha. I-cognition is not fake without self-awareness, rather it is con-
firmed by it.
182 Source unknown.
183 Interlinear gloss above ylitub in P: gaeehatab.
316
tasmiid iitmakartrka eva telliisau
l84
vimarsallfyalz, iitmakaJ1rke ca vi-
sviitmiipi tadupasarjallfblzilto eva siimartlzyiid bhavati.
Therefore it (i.e. the object) has to be verbally cognized by the [verbal cogni-
tion] as necessarily (eva) having the Self as the agent [of its cognition], and
since the object is verbally cognized as having the Self as the agent [of its
cognition] one's own Self too, having become an accessory of it, becomes (I
turns out to be) in fact verbally cognized by implication (siimartlzyiit).185
Objects are apprehended as having been perceived by a certain agent. Hence
the agent attaches, as it were, to the object and is itself also verbally cognized.
Thus any cognition of an object by a Self is also necessarily a cognition of the
Self.
iti sarvam eva vimarsajiiiillaJ.ll eveti lliillaikiillti-
katii.
So absolutely every determinative cognition encompasses two things, i.e.
agent and object. Therefore there is no inconclusiveness.
2.2 [Ked p. 42] allllmiillelliipy etat siddhal1l ity iiha
1.17 cd) traym!l salJlslllaryate yasmiit tad ahalJl iti II
2.2 He says that this is also established through inference:
1.17 cd) because three things are remembered, [as illustrated by the
cognition,] 'I saw that'.
aym]! gha!a smrtirl87 bhavalltf
iva pilrvm!l kartllr apy asabdaJ!1 vimarsaJ!1 galllayaty
eveti sarvo villlarso eveti.
Even when memory refers to verbal cognitions such as 'this is a pot' it is seen
to encompass agent, object and instrument. 188 Therefore it does (eva) enable
184 iitmakartrka eva telliisall Ped, B, L, P, kba, ga; akartrka eva telliisall Ked.
185 I have used the translation suggested by Preisendanz/Schmithausen in their exam-
iner's report, which greatly improves on my previous attempt.
186 L omits eva vimarsajiiiillm!l (eyeskip from one ev to an-
other).
187 pi smrtir conj. Sanderson; sl1lrtir Ked
Pc
, Ped; visl1lrtir Ked
llC
, B, L, P.
188 I.e. it takes the form 'I (agent) saw (instrument) that pot (object)'. It seems that
RamakaIgha regards 'saw' as indicating, not, as one might expect, the action,
but rather the instrument, the faculty of sight. On the other hand, since the faculty of sight
one to know [that there was] a silent verbal cognition previously, of agent
as well as of the object and instrument. So all verbal cognition actually (eva)
encompasses both [agent and object].189
317
The point is that a cognition of the form 'this is a pot', though explicitly re-
ferring only to its object, is enough to enable us later, when remembering the
cognition, to say '/ saw a pot', where we describe the earlier cognition as
having three elements not one. This shows that the earlier cognition 'this is a
pot' must actually have encompassed all three elements of the later one, so it
must have included a silent verbal cognition of the 'I'.
At the beginning of this sub-section (2.2) RamakaI).!ha introduced Sadyojyo-
tis' half-verse and his commentary thereon as an inference. 190 It is not a direct
inference of the Self's existence, but an inference to determine whether we
are aware of the Self in certain verbal cognitions. It is another example of in-
ference being used to clarify what we experience directly through
A previous instance of this was 14,9-18, in section 3.1 of Chapter 2. In that
case, after a long and self-assured description of how illumination / the per-
ceiver (prakiisa/griihaka) presents itself to us as always the same, Rama-
kaI).!ha added an inference to that effect simply as extra evidence. Here, on
the question of whether or not 'this is a pot' includes a silent verbal cognition
of '1', one imagines that description derived from inward observation would
be less capable, and that inference would be required to work out the answer.
But here too RamakaI).!ha presents the inference as a second line of support-
ing evidence. His fIrst evidence was the claim that it is only through the silent
verbal cognition of 'I' that the object of the cognition is recognizably one's
own and not someone else's. The way that he then introduces the present ar-
gument with the words 'this is also established through inference' implies
that he does not take the fIrst reason as inference but rather as direct percep-
tion.
is not sensed and so would surely not be remembered, it may be that Ramakru;t!:ha is using
here in the sense of action, kriyii.
189 He has slipped from claiming a referent to a twofold one because that is
what is relevant in the wider context. .
190
42
,1.
318
This may seem surprising, as it does not seem like a simple adducing of direct
perception or description of that, but rather a consideration that suggests-
through unwanted consequence-that we experience these cognitions in a cer-
tain way. Why then does he consider it to be in a different category from
what he introduces as inference (17cd)? Perhaps he would distinguish them
along the following lines: 17cd infers something about 'this is a pot'-type
cognitions from something other than them, namely the form that memories
of those cognitions take; the first argument, by contrast, does not involve
considering anything other than them and could be presented as principally
pointing to the way that they appear as 'ours'.
To what extent is RamakaI).!ha's exegesis of verse 17 faithful to Sadyojyotis'
intentions? It does indeed seem that Sadyojyotis intended to make the point
that even cognitions such as 'this is a pot' manifest an agent. In the previous
two verses (15 and 16) Sadyojyotis was talking of I-cognitions, and thus his
mention of 'absolutely all. cognition' in 17ab is likely to be extending his
conclusions to include cognitions which do not contain an explicit 'I', such as
'this is a pot'. Whether or not Sadyojyotis would have characterized the
manifestation of the agent in such cognitions as a wordless verbal cognition
(asabdo vimarsall) is not certain, but RamakaI).!ha's claim to that effect
smacks more of filling in detail than distortion. Where he could be seen to be
slightly distortive is in his account of the evidence for this claim. Whereas
Sadyojyotis' single evidence is the inference from the form that our memories
of cognitions take (17cd), RamakaI).!ha, as noted above, gives a twofoldjusti-
fication. He seems to see Sadyojyotis' assertion in 17ab as containing an in-
dependent justification of itself, which he articulates as the claim that it is
only through the silent cognition of 'I' that the cognition's object is recog-
nizably ours and not someone else's.
What motivates Ramakantha (and seemingly Sadyojyotis) to argue that even
in 'this is a pot' the Self is verbally cognized? Perhaps it was thought that if
the Self is consciousness it should be equally present in all cognition. Perhaps
it was also held that if 'I' were cognized sporadically, interspersed with peri-
ods of absence, that would constitute dubious evidence of a stable Self.
319
3. Do Verbal Cognitions Have Real Referents?
RamakaI).!ha now turns to the question of whether the referents of verbal cog-
nition are real and stays with it for the whole of this section. The relevance of
this question to the wider context is, of course, that unless they can be relied
on as real, the evidence of I-cognitions for the existence of the Self is unde-
rmined. In the background is the Buddhist view that the referents of verbal
cognition are mental constructs. RamakaI).!ha did address this question briefly
in section 1. He there (40,2-14, section 1.2.2) countered the charge that 1-
cognitions have no real referent outside themselves, with the response that we
know the real referent directly, through non-conceptual self-awareness. In
this section his focus is not I-cognitions specifically but verbal cognitions in
general.
3.0 ata eva vimarsalz vastvanvayavyatirekiinuvi-
dlziiniit.
3.0 That is why verbal cognition does not have things that are unreal as its
referents, because, like direct perception, it conforms to positive and negative
concomitance with real entities.
The concomitance that he claims between verbal cognition and real entities
means that, given the presence of an agent and an object, a verbal cognition
will occur that refers to that agent (silently perhaps) and that object; but if ei-
ther are absent, a verbal cognition will not occur. The 'that is why' with
which the sentence begins refers back, presumably, to the point just establish-
ed that all cognition, even that in which the agent is not explicitly articulated,
includes as its referents both agent and object.
191
How does that bear on the
point made in this sentence? In a sentence of this structure, namely, 'that (A)
is why B because C,' we normally find that A implies C which implies B.
Thus we would expect the fact that the agent and object appear in all cogni-
tion (A) to be relevant for establishing positive and negative concomitance
(C). Perhaps RamakaI).!ha's thinking was that if the agent appears in 'I see a
pot', but not in 'this is a pot', the concomitance is broken, since in the world
191 And instrument-but having mentioned that once he ceased to be interested in it.
320
outside the verbal cognition, which it is supposed to represent accurately, the
agent is equally present at the time of both. 192 .
. 193 . 194
anyazr apy uktam
asti hy lilocanlijiilinw!1195 prathamW!1 nirvikalpakam I
blilamuklidivijiilinasadrsalJl suddhavastlljam II
tatalz parw.n punar vastu dhannair jlitylidibhir yayli I
bllddhylivasfyate slipi sammatli II iti.
And someone else
l96
has said:
For there is seeing-cognition which [arises] first, lacks concepts, is
similar to the cognitions of children, dumb
l97
people and the like, and
is produced from the pure object. 198
The determinative cognition,199 by which after that the object is further
determined through its properties such as [the] class [to which it be-
longs], is also held to be direct perception.
192 This suggestion is only plausible on the assumption that the concomitance referred
to here means not just that given the presence of agent and object a cognition will occur,
but further that the resulting cognition will represent that agent and object. That is perhaps
more than what is usually meant by concomitance.
193 Marginal insertion above anyair in B: mfmlil!lsakailz.
194 SV(P2) 1.1.4 chapter) 112 and 120.
195 lilocanlijiililIaIJl B, P, SV(S), SV(U I), SV(P
1
), SV(P2), SV(P3), ad Mat VP 17.2 (p.
383), v.l. ad Mat VP 1O.6-13b; lilocalIaI!1 jiilinwJl Ked, Ped, L, NPP ad 32cd (64,20-
65,2), ad Mat VP 6.35bcd (pp. 174-5), ad Mat VP 1O.6-13b (p.312), v.l. in SV(P2) and
SV(P3); lOCanW!ljiililIaIJl v.l. ad Mat VP 6.35bcd; liiocanajiililIaI!1 v.l. ad Mat VP 6.35bcd.
196 Kumarila.
197 In the sense of those who cannot talk.
198 'Pure' in the sense that it is characterisable only by itself and uncontaminated by
its qualifiers, which mark it as belonging to the same class as other objects, e.g. its 'pot-
ness'.
199 Had RamakaJ:.llha been writing this verse himself he would probably not have used
the term bllddhi but rather vimarsa or adhyavasliya. It is clear-both from the contents of
the verse itself and from the surrounding context within which RamakaJ:.llha decides to in-
sert it-that that which Kumarila describes with the former term is regarded by Rilmaka-
I}lha as precisely that which he has been denoting with the latter two. Hence I translate
bllddhi here with the same word that I use to adhyavasliya.
321
Ramakru;t1ha quotes these verses very frequently in his works.
2oo
Their
vance here is of course that the status of 'determinative cognition' (buddhif:z)
referred to in the second verse is precisely the problem to which Ramakru;ttha
has turned in this section (section 3). Kumarila here includes determinative
cognition as a kind of direct perception (i.e. as having real objects), brack-
eting it with the initial dumb encounter with a thing characterisable only by
itself. For the Buddhist of course-to whom this verse is directed-these two
are of irreducibly different nature, only the initial encounter constituting di-
rect perception.
3.1.1 nanv asaty api vastuni gha!lidivimarso manorlijylidall
3.1.1 [Buddhist] But even when a real entity is not there we find verbal cog-
nition of things like pots in [states] such as daydreaming.
201
satyam, ata eva tayor iva
bhedalz
[Siddhilntin:] True-that is precisely why there is a difference between
[pseudo verbal cognitions such as daydreaming and genuine verbal cognition]
based on whether they refer to real entities or unreal ones, just as .[there is a
difference between] direct perception and pseudo perception.
The Buddhist is prepared to accept a difference between genuine perception
and pseudo perception, but he lumps all verbal cognition together as false.
Why does he not allow for the same distinction among verbal cognitions?
If Ramakru;ttha admits that we have verbal cognition when there is no object
(as indicated by his flrst word, 'true') is the concomitance not spoilt? His ans-
wer, I assume, would be that the concomitance is between the presence of an
object and genuine verbal cognitions, just as in the case of perception the
concomitance is between presence of object and genuine perception. Does
this not mean, though, that one has no way of knowing whether a verbal cog-
nition is genuine or not? Perhaps Ramakru;ttha would respond that that is no
200 For example at NPP 64,20-65,2; ad Mat VP 6.35, pp. 174-5; ad Mat VP 17.2, p.
383; and (112 only) ad Mat VP 1O.6-13b, p. 312.
201 And thus it is wrong to state that is positive and negative concomitance be-
tween the presence of an object and a verbal cognition of that object; and hence wrong
that verbal cognition has something real as its referent
322
reason to claim that all verbal cognitions are false. And perhaps he would say
that, in case of daydreaming and the like, subsequent events enable us to
. know that they were false, unlike in the case of genuine verbal cognitions.
3.1.2 nanu sa eviiymJl gha!a ity evamiide!l
vimarsasya pravrtteb, adhunii ea purvadarsaniiblziivena tada-
samblzaviid 202
3.1.2 [Silnyaviidin:] Surely verbal cognitions such as 'this is that pot',203
though they are held [by you] to have real referents, have non-real referents,
because they function through the property of having been seen before
204
and
205 206 th . .
because that [property] does not exist now smce e prevIous no
I
. '07
onger eXIsts.-
na,208 priigdarsaniiblziiviisiddheb, iitmaprakiisa eViirthadarsanm.n tae ea sar-
vadiistfty uktam.
[Siddhiintin:] No, because it is not proved that the previous seeing no longer
exists. The seeing of objects is simply the Self's [activity of]209 illumina-
tion,210 and that,211 as we have said,212 exists all the time.
202 Interlinear speaker-indication above in P: purvapalqa.
203 I.e. recognitions.
204 I.e. they grasp an object as something seen before.
205 I am taking asambhava to be used synonymously here with abhiiva.
206 I.e. at the time of the recognition.
207 We can infer that this objecti<:>n regards recognition as based on two things: the pot
that exists now in front of one's eyes and the property/fact that it has been seen before.
For the recognition to have real referents the property must be existent now as well as the
pot.
208 Interlinear comment above na in P: uttaram.
209 I include the contents of these square brackets to make clear that the genitive
iitmaprakiisa!l must be construed as denoting a subjective and not an objective
genitive. It cannot mean 'illumination of the Self in the sense that the Self is that which is
illuminated, for to equate that with the seeing of objects would be the non-dualist Saiva
position, and certainly unacceptable to Saiva Siddhiinta. For the latter (as we saw, for ex-
ample, in section 1.2.3 above) the perceiver and the perceived are irreducibly separate.
210 Worth considering is the possibility that the pre-Sandhi form of iitmaprakiisa is iit-
maprakiise. In that case either a subjective or an objective genitive would be possible: 'the
seeing of objects [takes place] when the Self is manifest / when the Self illuminates'. I re-
ject this possibility on the grounds that only the equating of the seeing of objects with the
323
Ramaka:J;ltha could have responded to the objection by accepting that the pre-
vious seeing no longer exists but denying that that entails that the property of
having been seen no longer exists.
213
But he decides to challenge that the pre-
vious seeing no longer exists. He does that by construing 'seeing' not as an
individual finite cognition here, but as the never ceasing illuminative power
of the Self. He has already argued that over time, as an illumination of a pot
gives way to an illumination of a smell and so on, the illumination: itself does
not change or cease. All that change are the individual determinative cogni-
tions and the objects of illumination. 'The power that illuminates is always
constant. It is not a great step to identify the seeing of objects with the illumi-
nation of objects, so it is consistent with his earlier views to claim that as we
see different objects over time the seeing itself does not change. Hence he can
arrive at the slightly strange sounding contention that my previous seeing of
an object is the same as my current seeing. .
atab tatra vastv eveti
Therefore the property of having been seen previously is als0
214
something
real now in the [Self]. So [verbal cognition of this kind, i.e. recognition] does
not have unreal referents.
illumination of the Self is enough to guarantee the conclusion that the previous seeing of
an object still exists.
211 The gender of the tat is odd. We would expect it to be the gender of prakiisa!l.
'1' H h . .
- - e as SaId as much on countless occasions. The two main passages where he ar-
gues for it are 13,20-14,18, translated in section 3.1 of Chapter 2, and 27,7-28,20, trans-
lated in Chapter 4.1.
213 His response accepts the opponent's view that for the property of having been seen
before to exist now, the previous seeing must exist now. This is a little surprising. If the
property in question was then it is easy to accept that whenever that prop-
erty exists in an object, seeing (darsana) of that object must exist. But given that the
property in question is why should the original seeing, which gave rise to that
property, have to continue to exist for as long as the property exists? In Sanskrit, verbal
nouns sometimes have to be taken to be equivalent to abstracts of the past participle for
the sentence to yield sense. For example iisraya or iisraya1J.a are sometimes used synony-
mously with iisritarv.a. If, sinlilarly, dartanfl is used as equivalent to then ob-
viously the darsana must exist for the drstatii to exist.
214 A 11 th . . ...
s we as e prevIOUS seemg.
324
Since the 'previous' seeing of the pot is in essence exactly the same as the
'current' illuminative activity of the Self, and so exists now, so too does the
property that the pot has been seen before. I said in note 213 that there is
something a little strange about the assumption running through this discus-
sion that the property that the pot has been seen before can only exist when
the seeing of the pot exists. It is also slightly strange that, as stated in this sen-
tence, the property exists in the Self (as opposed to in the pot). Perhaps that
results from a parallel assumption that the property must exist not only when
the seeing exists but also where it exists. Perhaps this is further evidence for
what I suggested at the end of note 213, that in this passage may
be being used as an actual synonym of purvadarsana.
na, gha!iidmp
s
[Ked p. 43] iti valqyiima!l.
No, because as we will explain,216 it is not proved that pots and the like are
momentary.
Fitting this point into the present context is difficult. The text cannot be cor-
rect as it stands because it begins with a 'no' implying that it is a Buddhist
objection to the previous sentence of the Siddhantin, but then supports this
'no' with a reason that is definitely stated by the Siddhantin. One solution is
to take the reading of Ked's corrigenda, which omits the na. But we are still
left with a non-sequitur: why does the fact that pots are not momentary sup-
port the previous point about recognition having real referents owing to the
property of having been seen before existing in the Self at the time of the rec-
ognition? Perhaps one could try to answer this by claiming that tatm in the
215 na gha!iidall Ked
ac
, Ped, B, L, P; gha!iidall Ked
Pc
.
216 RfunakaIflha will devote a great number of pages to refuting momentariness. 48,6-
,56,11 deals with DharmakIrti's sattviillumiina. 56,12-57,8 argues that on the Buddhist
model of momentariness continual rebirth should result with no possibility of liberation.
66,1-74,10 gives arguments for non-momentariness through, among other things, recog-
nition (pratyabhijiiii) and the impossibility of a cause-effect relationship (kiiryakiira(za-
bhiiva) between momentary entities. RamakaIflha also argues for the existence of uni-
versals, siimiinyas (74,11-76,14), as an example of something non-momentary. 76,15-
85,12 discusses Vasubandhu's viniisitviinllmiina. If RfunakaIflha has a specific passage in
mind here it is perhaps 66,8ff., since he makes it clear there that he regards the previous
discussions as establishing that the perceiver is stable and that he there turns to the stabil-
ity of objects.
325
previous sentence meant not 'in the Self' but 'in the pot,.217 If the claim there
was that the property of having been seen before exists in the pot at the time
of the recognition then the point about pots not being momentary could be
seen as necessary to the truth of the previous sentence. But the flow of the ar-
gument strongly indicates that tatm should mean 'in the Self' .
Thus the best solution seems to be the following suggestion made by Prof.
Sanderson. Some text has dropped out immediately prior to the na, which
probably consisted of a Buddhist objection to which the na responds. If it be-
gan with nanu then eyesldp from the first letter of that word to the na that is
in our text could provide a possible explanation. Harunaga Isaacson suggest-
ed that the content of the objection may have been along the following lines:
because of the momentariness of pots, the pot that is being looked at now is
different from the one that was seen earlier; hence the property that this pot
has been seen before does not exist because it is false that this pot has been
seen before; hence the verbal cognition, 'this is that pot' does not have real
referents.
3.2.1 evalJl tarlzi santamase sPTsato 'py ayalJl giza!a ity riipadfnam
avamarsiid
218
manasa smano
220
vika/pa iti.
3.2.1 [Siinyavadin:] Even granting that, because even someone touching [a
pot] in extreme darkness has a verbal cognition of the unseen colour and the
like [of the pot] namely 'this is a pot', this must be mental conceptualisation,
lacking a real referent, based on memory.
The person experiences a representation of a pot's colour that he is not act-
ually seeing. It is memory and his own mind that must therefore provide the
contents of the representation, not a currently apprehended colour. This goes
against the claim made in Kumarila's verse that verbal cognition is a branch
of perception, accurately reflecting real referents that are presented t6 it.
217 In Jayanta's explanation of recognition the earlier seeing (or past time according to
his other explanation) qualifies the pot not the Self (NM 334,7ff).
218 .'-dK dac P d B P ---dL '-dK d
Pc
avamaJ sa e , e, , ; avamarssa ; aVllllarsa e .
219 Ked, B, L, P; eva Ped.
220 smalto Ked, B, P; santo Ped, L, ka, gao
326
na, ekasiimagrfpratibaddhatvena liligiid
api tadiinfm anumiiniit.
[Siddhiintin:] No, because we infer those [features of the pot-its colour and
the like], even though they are not directly perceived at that time, from an in-
ferential mark, namely tangibility, which is qualified by the fact that it is in-
variably connected with the same causal complex [as colour and the like].
Ramakat).!ha responds that this example is not the kind of verbal cognition so
far discussed, which is a type of perception, but inferential verbal cogni-
tion.
223
As support for this example being based on inference, he points to the
fact that DharmakIrti himself analyses it in this way.
yad uktalJl bhavadbhir api224
ekasiilllagryadhfnasya n7piide rasato gatilz I
hetudhanniillUlIliillena dhamendhanavikiiravat II iti.
As you too have said:
Through inferring a property of the cause [of taste] from the taste [of
an object], we come to know [the object's] colour
225
and the like,
which are dependent on the same [causal] complex, just like [the in-
ference of] the transformations of fuel [, such as ashes or coal,] from
smoke.
These everyday inferences require careful explanation by DharmakIrti for two
reasons. First, he cannot infer an <;>bject's colour from its taste simply on the
grounds that they necessarily exist simultaneously as related to the same
whole, since he does not hold that there is a whole in addition to the indivi-
dual taste, colour and the rest. Thus he infers a cause of the taste, and from
that infers the colour. The cause of the taste is a causal complex consisting of,
among other things, taste in the previous moment, which is its main cause
(upiidlinakiiralJa), and colour in the previous moment, which is one of its
auxiliary conditions (sahakiiripratyaya). The colour in the previous moment
is the main cause of the colour in the present moment (that which is being in-
our.
221 Interlinear gloss above in P: n7parasiidfniil!1.
222 Interlinear gloss above in P: n7piidfniilJl.
223 He calls it anulIliinavimarsa below (43,8).
224 PYa 1.11.
225 From tasting a mango, for example, we have a verbal cognition of its orange col-
327
ferred), for which taste in the previous moment is one of the condi-
tions. So this causal complex can be inferred from taste in the present
ment, and can then itself allow us to infer another of its effects, the colour in
the present moment.
But this leads to the second potential problem. Inferences of effects from
causes are inconclusive. Causes are not one of DharmakIrti' s two kinds of
valid logical reason, namely essential property (svabhiiva) and effect (kiirya).
DharmakIrti writes in the verse quoted that we come to know the colour (in
the present moment) through inferring from the taste [in the present moment]
a property of the cause [of that taste]. What is this property? It is the causal
complex's fitness (yogyatii) to produce colour. This fitness is essentially the
same as the causal complex itself so it can be inferred through a svabhiivahe-
tu (logical reason based on essential property).
This is still not quite enough to complete the inference though, since accord-
ing to DharmakIrti one cannot infer from the past to the future. The fitness in
the previous moment cannot give certain knowledge of the colour in the pre-
sent moment by either a svabhiivahetu (since the two things are not identical)
or by an inference based on effect (since obviously the fitness in the previous
moment is not an effect of the colour in the present moment). This problem is
avoided thr0ugh DharmakIrti's insistence that the logical reason of this infer-
ence allows us to infer both things in the past (its material cause,/taste, and its
auxiliary conditions, colour and the rest) and things in the present (colour);
but nothing in the future.
226
Thus the whole inference is carried out from the
point of view of the present time, when the-object of the inference is not an
effect to be produced but an effect already produced. It is not two inferences,
one to the past and then one from the past back to the present, but rather one
inference with one logical reason. This logical reason (which is a kiiryahetu)
allows us to infer the causal complex in the past directly and the colour in the
present indirectly.
226 PVSV 8,6-8: tatriipy atftaikakiiliiniilJl gatilz, niiniigatiiniilll, vyabhiciiriit.
328
How about the example of infering ashes and coal from smoke? In this case
the main cause of smoke is fire, its auxiliary condition wood-fuel, the main
cause of ashes and coal the wood-fuel, and their auxiliary condition frre?27
RamakaI).ti1a has admitted that this cognition is not an instance of direct per-
ception and argues that it is based on inference. Is that enough to preserve his
conclusion that all verbal cognition has real referents? He now addresses that
question.
3.2.2 lla ClillulIllillavilllarso 'py vastvanvayavyatireklinuvidhli-
nella pramli(zatvlit
3.2.2 And neither does verbal cognition [based on] inference have unreal ref-
erents, because it is a means of knowledge since it conforms to positive and
negative concomitance with real entities,228 just like [pre-conceptual] percep-
tion and verbal cognition [based on] that.
Three kinds of cognition have now been mentioned as valid means of know-
ledge for RamakaI).tha: pre-conceptual perception an initial pre-
linguistic encounter with an object; verbal cognition based on perception
(tadvimarsa = for example 'this is a pot'; and verbal cog-
nition based on inference (anumiinavimarsa), for example 'this is a pot' said
by someone in the dark This illustrates that though RamakaI).tha can be said
to regard the second of these as a kind of perception, following Kumanla, he
also sometimes uses the word perception on its own in a more re-
stricted sense to cover only pre-conceptual perception. Perception
and verbal cognition (vimarsa) are certainly not synonymous for RamakaI).ti1a
but they overlap. Perception includes pre-conceptual perception which is cer-
tainly not verbal cognition; and verbal cognition includes that which is based
on inference and (as we will see presently) that which arises from scriptural
statements, neither of which are perception. Where they overlap is in the sec-
ond of the three categories listed above, verbal cognition based on perception,
which could be described either as perceptual verbal cognition, to bring out
227 My explanations in these paragraphs are based on PVSV 7,12-8,11, with much
clarification from a letter from Prof. Steinkellner (3/412001) and from the translations and
explanations in Iwata 1991b 89-92.
228 Le. inferential verbal cognition occurs when the object of the inference (such as
the pot's colour in the example) is there and never when it is not.
329
that it is verbal cognition, or as conceptual perception, to bring .out that it is
perception.
Ram8kaI).tha's point in quoting the DharmakIrti verse that follows is to give
the impression that it is because these three categories meet DharmakIrti's
own criterion for something being a valid means of knowledge that Rama-
kaI).tha holds all three to be valid.
tad Ukta/.ll bhavadbhir apP29
arthasylisambhave 'bhlivliP30 pratyalqe 'pi pramli(zatli I
pratibaddhasvabhlivasya taddhetutve samdl.n dvayam II iti.
Thus you too have said:
Perception is also a valid means of knowledge because it does not ex-
ist when no object is there. Both [perception and inference] are the
same in that their cause is that whose nature has an immutable connec-
tion.
The import of the verse is: 1) the reason that perception, as well as inference,
are means of knowledge is that they do not occur when no object is there; 2)
both arise in dependence on an immutable connection between two things. In
the case of inference an example of such a connection would be the cause-
effect relationship between frre and smoke. In the case of the con-
nection is between, on the one hand, the presence of an object plus the other
factors that are necessary such as sense-faculties, and, on the other, the rise of
perceptual cognition.
3.2.3 lllipy arthada-
ra
231
vartillas tatsambhavato 'llaiklintikatvlit.
3.2.3 Neither does it follow from it not appearing clearly that [inferential ver-
bal cognition] has unreal referents,232 because this is inconclusive since direct
perception also can [appear indistinct] for someone who is far from the object.
229 PVin, p. 38,6 (1.3). Vetter gives the exact form in which this verse occurs here as
the Sanskrit original of PVin 1.3, based on three citations in the Tattvabodhavidhliyinf,
one in the Pramli(zamimli'lISli and one in the Tattvasa/igrahapaiijikli. He does not mention
its occurrence here.
230 sambhave 'bhlivlit Ked, Ped, B, P; 6 salllbhavlibhlivlit L.
231 arthadara
O
Ked
ac
, B, L, P; arthasya darao Ked
Pc
, Ped.
330
3.3 iigamottho
233
'pi vimarias vastuni prati-
baddhatviid avaiicakapitriidiviikyasnltijanitavimarsavad yathiirtha eva.
3.3235 A verbal cognition which arises from scripture also certainly accords
with [real] objects because it is connected to real entities by means of the
cognition of the composer of that.text, just like a verbal cognition produced
by hearing a sentence from a trustworthy father or [other elder].
tad uktalJz bhavadbhir ap?36
'yam artha!z sakyeta jiiiitlllJZ so 'tisayo237 yadi II iti.
,Thus even you have said:
[We] accept this idea if (Le. when) that excellence can be known.
This translation distorts the literal meaning of the verse in order to reflect
RamakaI).tha's reading of it. RamakaI).tha uses this verse to support the view
that verbal cognitions arising from the hearing of scriptural statements can be
accepted when we know mat their composer has that quality of excellence
that indicates trustworthiness.
238
This is a Naiyayika view. In fact Dharma-
kIrti's intended meaning would be better conveyed by the more literal transla-
tion: '[We] would accept this idea if that excellence could be known.'
DharmakIrti is being disingenuous because he does not think it is ever possi-
232 On touching the pot in the dark, or tasting a mango, the colour of the pot orthe
mango do not appear to us as vividly as they would if we were actually looking the col-
ours.
233 iigamottho Ked"", Ped, B, L, P; iigamokto Ked
Pc

234 pral)etr Ked, B, L, P; prasotr Ped.
235 I have divided this section into three main sub-sections, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. The first
argues that verbal cognition based on perception is a type of direct perception having real
referents; the second shows how inferential verbal cognition is just like these two (i.e.
non-conceptual perception and verbal cognition based on that) in having real referents;
and the third deals with verbal cognitions arising from scripture.
236 api B, L, P; eva Ked, Ped.
PYa 1.220cd, which reads differently from the quote here (but conveys the same
meaning): 'yam arthalz pratyetlllJZ sakya!z so 'tisayo yadi II
237 so 'tisayo Ked"C, Ped, B, L, P; siitisayo Ked
Pc
, v.l. in B.
238 Manorathanandin in his commentary to this verse explains that the quality of ex-
cellence is possessed by someone who 'sees things in accordance with reality and tells
[others] about them', yatlziibhutiirthadarsitadiiklzyiitr [iikhyiitr MS; iiklzyiit PVV].
331
ble to know this, and he is here arguing against the Naiyayika idea. For him
the only way to tell whether a speaker's statement is correct is to see if it con-
forms to reality or not. Hence we might as well just use this empirical test as
our guide and forget about the 'excellence' of the speaker. The fIrst half of
his verse runs, 'Others (Le. Naiyayikas) hold that [statements] accord with re-
ality depending on the excellence of the person [who made them].'239 Thus in
. the half-verse quoted in NPP, 'idea' (artha) should refer to the Naiyayika
view. From the context in which it is quoted in NPP, however, it is clear that
RamakaI).!ha intends it to refer to the contents of a scriptural statement.
tu vimarso manoriijyiidivimarsavad vastu-
pratibandlziibhiiviid 'stu. aham etat [Ked p. 44] prapaSyiimfti tu
vimarsalz kil!z tu proktanayena
prainiil)am evety ato 'py iitmasiddhilz.
But I grant you that (astu) verbal cognitions that fall outside direct perception,
inference and scripture do not have real referents, because they lack invariable
concoznitance with real entities, as verbal cognitions such as daydreams do.
But the verbal cognition, 'I see this', does not have unreal referents, because
its referents are the Self and an object [, both of which are] known directly241
(saJ!zvidita). Rather it is certainly a means of knowledge because it is a parti-
cular kind of perception 242 in the manner that has been stated.
243
Therefore
from this to0
244
the Self is proved.
tatas ca bodhenety etad api pratijiiiipadalJz vyiikhyiitam iti.
And so the word 'bodhena' from the assertion sutra has also been explained.
239 yatlziirtlzam apare vidulz.
240 on kil!z tu proktanayena oznitted in L (eyeskip
from one tvii to the next).
241 I.e. independently of the verbal cognition. Thus we know that the verbal cognition
of the Self and the object is based on direct perception, and thus has a real referent.
242 The conceptual (savikalpaka) kind.
243 This could refer to all the places where he has said recently that it conforms to in-
variable concoznitance with real entities, like direct perception; or it could refer to his re-
mark in section 1 that I-cognition perceives the Self 'by a close approximation', 'for the
sake oflanguage'.
244 I.e. from verbal cognitions of the form 'I see this' as well as from pre-linguistic
self-awareness (svasalJzvedana).
332
It is to be noted tbat though RfunakaIJ.tha is arguing against Buddhist posi-
tions throughout this last section, he conducts his whole defense of tbe valid-
ity of verbal cognition by appeal to Buddhist notions of what constitutes valid
knowledge. He quotes DharmakIrti three times, each time to support his own
not as part of the He takes examples of verbal cognition
that the Buddhist may take to be merely mental constructions (vikalpas), and
shows that according to DharmakIrti' s strictures, they should in fact count as
genuine means of knowledge. For example in 'arguing for the validity of ver-
bal cognitions tbat arise from scripture, it is the Buddhist criterion of prati-
bandha that RfunakaIJ.tha claims they meet. This illustrates a phenomenon
that is repeated elsewhere in Indian Philosophy, namely, the spread of an idea
to an opposing tradition as a result of tbe attempts of the tradition adopting
the idea to overcome other views held by its originator.
CHAPTER 4:
The Equating of Self and Cognition
Preliminary Remarks
For a presentation of RamakaIJ.tha's arguments for the existence of the Self,
the primary aim of this work, NPP is the most important source. That is the
text in which he goes into greatest detail on tbe matter, devoting many more
pages (112 in the KSTS edition) to it tban in any otber of his texts. I have had
to be selective in deciding which passages on which to foclis. First I excluded
passages in which RamakaIJ.tha confronts his Saiva view witb tbat of non-
Buddhists, for example Sankhyas and Vedantins. For there what is at stake is
not tbe existence of the Self but its nature. Left with those passages in which
a Buddhist opponent's views are discussed, I next excluded the very large
number of pages that are devoted not primarily to tbe Buddhist doctrine of
no-Self but to either the doctrine of momentariness or the Yogacara doctrine
of the non-difference of tbe perceiver and the perceived.! The majority of
what that left has been translated and commented upon in tbe first three chap-
ters.2
1 RiimakaJ?J:ha, like Udayana in the Atmatattvaviveka for example, an inde-
pendent refutation of these two doctrines as a necessary condition of the establishment of
the existence of the Self.
2 Not quite all; for there is a section following on from that looked at in Chapter 2,
which begins with the Buddhist asking how, if there is no Self over and above cognition,
and cognition is unchanging, different objects could be perceived. Much of this section is
focussed on refuting the Yogacara doctrin,e of the non-difference of perceiver and per-
ceived. But there is also much that concerns specifically the Self. The most significant
passage that falls into the second category is that looked at in the first half of this chapter.
334
But a central, and somewhat puzzling, feature of RamakaI).tha's notion of a
Self, which leaves the reader wanting more explanation, has still not been ex-
amined in detail. We saw in Chapter 2 that RamakaI).tha, distancing himself
from other traditions that accept the existence of the Self such as Nyaya and
aligned himself with Buddhism in denying the existence of a fur-
ther perceiving entity beyond cognition. RamakaI).tha's Self is of the nature of
cognition/consciousness (jiiiiniitman/salpvidrupa), which enabled his remark
at the beginning of Chapter 2 that the Buddhist, in describing and arguing for
jiiiina, was actually describing and arguing for the Self, just using a different
word. It is also what enabled him, in Chapter 3, to claim that the sahopala-
mbhaniyama argument actually secures the reality of the Self (in that it can be
seen to reduce the Self to consciousness).
But the Self is single and unchanging, whereas cognition is accepted not only
by Buddhists but also by Naiyayikas and to be plural and transi-
tory. Thus the closer RamakaI).tha allows his concept of the Self to come to
simple cognition, the harder it becomes,for him to demonstrate that it is eter-
nal and unchanging. Is not the transitoriness of cognition a fact of experi-
ence? Cognition of a pot ceases and gives way to cognition of a tree. A pain-
ful sensation in my head ceases; a pleasurable sensation that was not present
before comes into being.
Naiyayikas and have no problem acknowledging these changing
instances of cognition as well as an eternal Self, in that they hold the latter to
be something separate from cognitions, in which they inhere. Since Naiyayi-
kas and maintain a distinction between properties (dhanna) and
property-possessors (dhannin), they can hold that the Self, the dharmin, does
not change, while its properties, such as cognition, do. But RamakaI).tha
stands with Buddhism not only on the specific point of denying a further en-
tity beyond cognition, but also on the general point that there is no dharmin
separate from its properties, no possessor of powers (saktimat) separate from
its powers (sakti). For him, if the second changes then the first changes, so it
is not an option to say that cognition, being a power of the Self, can change
without the Self changing. His only option is to hold that cognition does not
change.
Chapter 4: Equating of Self and Cognition
335
RamakaI).tha defends his position that cognition is eternal, in sO,me detail, in
one more passage in NPP, an examination of which will form the first half of
this chapter. But he also tackles it in the Mataligavrtti, in a passage that will
form the subject of the second half.
1. Simultaneous and Sequential lllumination
We will pick up the NPP passage at a point where the Buddhist asks,
1 kas tarhi Ilflaprakiisiit pftaprakiisasya
3
bhedalz?
1 [Yogacara:] What then is the difference between the illumination of yellow
and the illumination of blue?
Ila kas cit, Yllgapatprakiisa iva.
[Siddhaotin:] There is no [difference], just like [there is no difference between
. the blue part and the yellow part of an illumination] when [blue and yellow
are] simultaneously illuminated.
The structure of the following discussion is encapsulated in this one sentence.
It will claim that as cognition
4
of yellow is followed by cognition of blue and
so on, cognition itself does not change; and it will render this plausible by
first arguing that cognition is single at one point in time despite illuminating
more than one object; and then arguing that, if that is the case, there is no rea-
son to regard it as plural over time just because it illuminates different ob-
jects.
So first he gives a justification of illumination/cognition being single at one
point in time by way of an unwanted consequence of plurality.
2 tatra hi tayor bhede
5
tadavayavabhedelliipi bhedalz, iti prati-
paramii(lllbhedatas.Jj citrapa!iidipratibhiisiibhiivaprasmigalz.
3 pftaprakiiSasya B, P, Ked, Ped; pftaprakiisao L.
4 prakiisa is here used synonymously salJlvit or jiiiilla.
5 bhede Ked, B, L, P; bhedao Ped.
336
2 For if the two were different [illuminations] in that case,7 they would be dif-
ferentiated also according to their parts, because there is no difference [be-
tween the differentnesS of the blue and yellow and the differentness of the
parts of those two colours]. So it would unwantedly follow that an image of a
multi-coloured cloth or such like could not exist, because every atom[-like
pixel] [of the image] would be different.
If we hold that illumination at one point in time cannot be single if it contains
both blue and yellow, then why stop at two? The pixels that make up
those two are just as different as those two, being slightly different shades
and occurring at different locations within the image. But then, claims Rama-
kantha we would have thousands of different manifestations completely
.. , -
separate without anything bringing them together into one perceptio-n. This is
the unwanted consequence that is the subject of this sub-section (2).
8
na ca vikalpa[Ked p. 27]glza{ita/!l tad iti viicyam, udglzii{itanetrasya jlza!ity
eva yugapat tadavablziisaniit, tadiinfl!l ca vikalpiisambhaviicf aSa/.nvedaniic
ca.
6 Ked
Pc
, Ped; blzedatas Ked
ac
; pratiparamii-
l}ujiiiinablzedatas B, P; paramiil}ubhedatas L. The jiiiina in B and P's reading could be
correct; but I have judged it more likely to be an interlinear explanatory note, subse-
quently mistaken for part of the text.
7 I.e. when occurring simultaneously.
8 On the problems arising from holding cognition to consist of atom-like parts, see the
following verse by ci ste mam pa[li gra/is biin du mam par ses pa klzas len
na I de tslze rdul plzran [ldrar gyur pa[zi dpyad pa [ldi las bzlog par dka[l (MaAl v. 49). _
This is cited in the Tibetan version of the and translated by Kajiyama in his
study of that text as: 'if knowledge were admitted [by you to consist of parts] as many as
the number of [its variegated] forms, then it would be difficult [for you] to avert the same
kind of criticism which is made regarding [the reality of] atoms' (Kajiyama 1988 150). It
occurs (in the in the context of a Miidhyarnika attack on the Yogiiciira belief
in the reality of cognition. I mention it here simply to show that it was not only Riimaka-
ntha but also Buddhist thinkers, who thought that if we regard cognition at one point of
fune' as divided then its very coherence is threatened. I do not think that
reason-that all the Yogiiciira arguments about the impossibility of objects being com-
posed of atoms can then be turned against cognition-is necessarily RiimakaI).tha's reason.
9 vikalpiisamblzaviid Ked, Ped, L, P; vikalpiisadblziiviid B, but above sadblzii is also
written samblza.
And it should not be said that [even though the pre-conceptual illumination is
different per pixel] an [image of a multi-coloured object] 10 is brought about
through conceptual cognition; because 1) as soon as one opens one's the
[image] is manifest to one at that very moment (jlza{ity eva) and simultane-
ously, and no conceptualizing is possible then;1I and 2) no [conceptualization]
is perceived.
337
RamakaI).!ha imagines the Buddhist asserting the plurality of illumination at
one point in time, but averting the unwanted consequence through appealing
to conceptual cognition as that which unifies the muitiple non-conceptual il-
luminations. He rejects this for the reasons stated.
yad uktam
l2
na cemii[l kalpanii apratisa/Jlviditii
l3
evodayante vyayante vii yena sa-
tyo 'py syu[l, iti.
As [DharmakIrti] has stated:
'Nor do these notions arise or pass away without being sensed at all so
that they might be unnoticed even though they exist.'
The second reason that RamakaI).!ha gave for rejecting conceptual cognition
as a way of averting the unwanted consequence was that conceptualization is
not perceived. He gives this quotation as a defence against the imagined ob-
jection that it could occur without being perceived.
vikaipajiiiinasyiipy ekatviit katlzam anekiitmakas citriivabhiisa[l.
And
l4
because the conceptual cognition is single, how could [it enable] a
multi-coloured image [to appear, if, as you are arguing, that image is] plural
by nature.
10 Because of the gender of tat, it cannot refer to citrapa!iidipratiblziisa, so a more lit-
eral translation would be, 'the fact that there is an image of a multi-coloured object'.
11 Quite how he would justify it being impossible -is not certain. Probably the point is
that, as the Buddhist would also accept, there must be an initial moment of non-
conceptual apprehension immediately after opening one's eyes.
12 PVin 50,20-22 (identified by Stem 1991).
13 apratisa/!lviditii Ped, B, L, P; aSa/Jlviditii Ked. apratisa/Jlviditii is also the reading
of the two other quotations of this sentence found by Stem (1991 156).
14 Taking the api not as a sentence-cornector but as qualifying vikalpajiiiina would
yield good sense: the conceptual cognition is single, as well as (according to us Saivas)
prakiisa, so it does not solve the problem to give up the idea of a single prakiisa and to re-
338
This is a third reason for conceptual cognition being incapable of averting the
unwanted consequence. The unwanted consequence results from assuming
that a plurality of can only be illuminated by a plurality of illumina-
tions. RfunakaIJ.!ha here points out that if the Buddhist were to try to escape it
through appealing to a unifying conceptual cognition, he would in effect be
claiming that one thing can bring about the appearance of many. If the Bud-
dhist is prepared to accept that possibility, why does he not accept that one
prakilsa could do the same? That that is the intention behind this sentence is
made clear in the first half of the next.
Thus far he has substantiated one part of the claim made in the opening sen-
tence, namely that cognition at one point of time is single however variegated
the images cognized. In the following (final) sub-section (3) he argues that
exactly the same holds for cognition over a sequence of time.
k k
' bJ d 15 , bJ - - .16
3.1 tad.yathli tatra nflapftlidyane apra lisya Ie e pyanu Iuyamanasyal -
kasya jiilinlitmano
17
na bheda!l, na ca tadabhedlit tasya nflapftlider arthabhe-
dasylisiddhi!z,18 ekasylinekapraklisanasaktisiddher bhavadbhir
tathli kramapraklise
l9
'py anllbhavasiddhasyaikasyaiva praklislitmano 'neka-
praklisanasaktiyoglit kramavyavasthitlineka
20
praklisakatvam anllbhavasid-
dham na ca tadabhedlid na hi dikkramliva-
bhlislit klilakramlivabhlisasya praklislitmani kas cid bhedo 'nubhilyata iti.
3.1 In that case (of perceiving a multiple thing at one point in time) the one
cognition that is experienced is undivided even though there is a plurality of
several illuminated objects such as blue and yellow, and it does not follow
from its being undivided that thae
l
plurality of objects such as blue and yel-
low is unestablished, because you too accept (in your proposal just stated that
one vikalpa unifies a complex) that one [thing] can be established to have the
power to illuminate several [things].
assign the unifying role to a conceptual cognition. But such a construal would leave this
sentence lacking a connector with the last.
15 prakliiyabhede B, P, Ked, Ped; praklisabhede L.
16 anllbhilyamlinasyaio B, L, Ked, Ped; anllbhilyasyaio P.
17 jiilinlitmano B, L, Ked, Ped;jiilinlitmlino P.
18 siddhilz Ked, Ped, L, P; saddhi[l B.
19 kramapraklise Ked
P
", Ped, B, L, P; kramaprakliso Ked'c.
20 kramavyavasthitlineka B, P, Ked, Ped; kramavyavasthita neka L.
21 Alternatively the tasya could mean, (unestablished) 'for it'.
So in the same way it should be accepted that, in the case of illumination of a
sequence too, it is one illumination,22 known to exist through that
is the illuminator
23
of several [things] arranged in a sequence, because it has
the power to illuminate several [things], [the more so since this fact too is]
proved by experience.
24
And the problem of not establishing a plurality of ob-
jects does not follow from it being one thing. For we do not experience any
difference between an appearance in spatial sequence and. an appearance in
temporal sequence qua illumination (so if a spatial succession of objects can
be revealed by the one illumination, why can a temporal succession of objects
not be?).
339
The first half of the first sentence summarizes the argument so far with regard
to simultaneous illumination: in that case a single cognition illuminates a plu-
rality of objects. Even the Buddhist is prepared to accept this, for he sug-
gested that a single conceptual cognition brings about the appearance of a
multi-coloured object. The second half claims that in the sequential case too it
is established through experience (anubhavasiddha) that a single thing illu-
minates many. That is a reference to the rhetorical passage looked at in Chap-
22 Notice that in this yathli ... tathli sentence one of the differences between the two
clauses is thatjiilinlitmana!z is paralleled by praklislitmana!z. In the first clause, about one
moment, he talks of jiilina but in the second clause, about a sequence of time, he talks of
praklisa. In general RilmakaI)!ha uses praklisa to refer to the kind of cognition that is un-
changing over time; and jiilina to refer either to that kind, or to a kind which, as we will
see in the Matwigavrtti passage in the second part of this chapter, he admits as differing
over time, namely determinative cognition.
23 The thing we experience as always having the same form is, as can be seen from
this sentence, sometimes referred to as praklisa and sometimes as praklisaka. This is par-
allel to, and explainable by, the fact that for RilmakaI).!ha cognition (jiilina) is not different
from the perceiver (jiilitr). praklisa is a convenient word for narrowing the gap between
action and agent given that it can mean either the action of illumination or the thing that
illuminates, light. If RamakaI).!ha were urged to distinguish it from praklisaka he would
say that it is the operation of praklisaka's sakti. But he sees ultimately no difference be-
tween a thing (saktimat) and its sakti, just as, as seen in Chapter 1, he rejects the existence
of a dharmin over and above a dharma.
24 The compound anekapraklisanasaktio could also be translated (both here and in the
description above of simultaneous illumination) 'because it has several powers of illumin-
/
ation " for in the rest of this passage the model is of illumination having several different,
but compatible powers.
340
ter 2, in which RamakaI).tha described our experience of the perceiver as be-
ing always constant despite the appearance to it of different objects. He points
out here that any hesitation the Buddhist feels in having one thing as the illu-
minator of many objects over time can be seen to be misplaced through rec-
ognizing a) that he is prepared to accept the illumination of many by one in
the simultaneous case, and b) that the sequential situation is in no significant
way different from the simultaneous situation. In both cases we have a plural-
ity of objects arranged in a sequence (it just happens to be a spatial sequence
in the first case, and a temporal sequence in the second); and in both cases we
experience the illumination itself to be equally undivided?5
*****
A note on terminology:
I think it is clear from the above passage that that which RamakaI).tha regards
as occurring in a (temporal or spatial) sequence is not prakiiSil itself, but the
objects that are illuminated-for there is nothing that divides prakiiSa itself
into parts of a sequence. Rather it is always 'switched on' ,26 constant and the
same. Thus when RamakaI).tha writes kralllaprakiiSe, he would not want us to
infer that illumination itself is sequential.
27
When I use the expression 'se-
quential illumination' in my exegesis, it is simply as a short way of signaling
that I am talking of illumination over a period of time, not illumination at one
point in time.
RamakaI).tha uses the synonyms pratibhiisa and avabhiisa in this passage not
completely synonymously with prakiisa but to refer to the appearance or im-
age of the object, i.e. to something that in its object-aspect is sequential, but
25 Note how in the cours.e of the text-piece under discussion, anubha or its derivatives
are used four times. They refer here specifically to pre-conceptual, and therefore infall-
ible, experience. As illumination proceeds over a course of time we may think that one
cognition is being followed by another and so on, but if we attend pre-conceptually to the
unfolding of cognition we will sense it to be one unbroken thing.
26 To use an expression more appropriate to contemporary lights than lights in medi-
aeval India.
27 Prof. Sanderson suggested as a grammatical interpretation of the compound, kra-
me{za avablzlislinlilJ1 praklisalz, the genitive being objective.
341
in its illumination-aspect is always the same. That the terms are more object-
oriented than prakiisa can be seen from the way he qualifies dikkrallliiva-
bhiisa and kiilakrallliivabhiisa with the word prakiisiitmani ('qua illumina-
tion'). RamakaI).tha wants to divide the image (prati-/avabhiisa) in two,
where the Buddhistregards it as one.
28
He wants to separate the image itself
from its object, the former being nothing other than the unchanging prakiisa.
*****
Now the Buddhist responds by arguing that the case of sequential illumina-
tion is not parallel to the case of simultaneous illumination.
29
3.2 nanll dikkramapraklise praklislitmano bhedlisalJzvedanlit
30
pradfplider
eka
31
sylinekakliryakartr-
tvena
32
virodhlibhlivlic chaktfnlilJz samuccay033 na virodhalz.
34
klilakrame tu
28 Of course for the Siikaravadin Yogacaras the division of the image into subject and
object aspects was real, but it was nevertheless a division of one thing, unlike for Rama-
krugha.
29 I use 'sequential' and 'simultaneous' as short ways of referring to the two situa-
tions; but the latter is, of course, also 'sequential' in the sense that it involves a spatial se-
quence.
30 bhedlisalJlvedanlit B, P, Ked, Ped; salJzvvedanlit L.
31 vad ekao Ked, B, P; vedakao Ped, L.
32 kartrtvena Ped, B, L, P; kartrkatvena Ked.
33 samllccayo Ked"C, Ped, B, L, P; samllccaye Ked
pc
I prefer the nominative, primar-
ily because of the parallel sentence below, chaktfnlilJz samuccaya eva Yllkto na virodhalz,
where Yllkto means that samuccaya must be a nominative.
34 This passage, and particularly this sentence, is referred to at 82,16-18: pradfpasya
hi svabhlivo 'bhYllpaga-
to bhavadbhilz, na tll klilyabhedena svabhlivabhedalz, iti darsital!z prlig eva. See also
MatV VP 164,1-2 (in the context of whether something non-momentary is capable of
arthakriyli): dhal7nas cliyam [osyaiva f, f; sya ed.; sya vli ti] ghaflidelz
kramel)a pradfplidei ca Yllgapad
ii, f, f; omitted in ed.] siddhalz, iti [iti
ii, f, f; omitted in ed.] na tena salzlisya virodhalz; NPP ad 1.22cd, p. 54: pradfplides ca
Yllgapad drSyate; and PMNKV ad 46cd, p. 298, 5-6: pradfpa-
sya hy ekasyaiva
'bhYllpagato bhavadbhilz. na tll kliryabhedena svablzlivabhedalz.
342
prakilSasaktfnlilll parasparlibhlivarilpatvena
35
ghatapatlidisaktfnlim iva bhe-
dlid vastubhedakatvam.
3.2 [Yogaciira:] Surely in the case of illumination of a spatial sequence, be-
cause we do not experience any division of the illumination, there is no con-
tradiction in one [thing]36 being the agent of many effects,37 just like such [ef-
feCts] as the burning of the wick, the lessening of the oil, illumination and
making itself known of a candle for example?8 Hence the accumulation of
powers [in this case] is not a contradiction.
In the case of temporal sequence, though, because illumination's powers are
different in the sense of mutually exclusive, like the powers of a pot and a
cloth for example,39 they divide the thing.
Although in both cases there is a plurality of powers, they can all belong to
the same thing in the simultaneous case, because we experience no division in
that thing, but they cannot belong to the same thing in sequential illumina-
tion, because they are mutually exclusive (in the sense that they cannot be
present in the same locus at the same time).
yad lihu[140
saktir hi bhlivlibhlivlibhylilll bhidyamlillli vastv api bhillatti, na punalz klirya-
bhedella, [Ked p. 28] iti.
As they say, 'For power, when divided by its occurrence and non-occurrence,
divides the thing [that has the power] too. But [it does] not [do so when divid-
ed] through [having] a plurality of effects.'
This verse articulates the principle that was employed by the Buddhist to ar-
rive at the unity of illumination at one point in time, but its plurality over
time: in the former case all we have is a plurality of effects, so the powers
35 O,upatvena B, P, Ked, Ped; rilpatve L.
36 I.e. the illumination.
37 Dr. Ruzsa suggested that it would be better to assume an elided ca after virodhli-
bhlivlit, understanding two separate reasons bhedlisGl]lvedalllit and virodhlibhlivlit.
38 At one point of time, when all of these effects of the candle are observed to take
place, we do not experience the candle itself to be in any way divided. Similarly, at one
point in time, when a number of different colours spread over a spatial sequence are illu-
minated, we do not experience the illumination itself to be divided.
39 You cannot use a cloth to carry water, or a pot for the purposes that a cloth is used.
40 Source unknown.
343
that bring about those effects can belong to the same illumination; in the latter
case the powers actually cease to exist, so that which has them must cease to
exist.
3.3 tad ayuktam asiddhatvlit. na hi tatrlipi
41
sakter bhlivlibhlivabhedo 'sti
sarvadaikarz7pasyaiva praklislitmano 'llliropitan7pasya sGlIlvedalllid ity uk-
tam. na ca klirylibhlivlic chakter abhlivalz 'nlivaSyGl]l tadvanti bha-
vanti' iti Ilyliylit. tad atrlipi
43
vastll
44
bhedlisiddheh tadvac
45
chaktflllim sam-
.' .
llccaya eva yukto Ila virodha[l.
3.3 [Siddhantin:] That is not correct because it has not been proved. For
power is not divided in the [temporal sequence] either, through its occurrence
or non-occurrence, because, as we have said,46 we experience a constantly
uniform illumination [and one] whose character [as such] has not been super-
imposed [on it]. And just because an effect is absent does not mean that the
power is absent, because of the rule, 'causes do not necessarily have
(i.e. effects)'.47 Therefore because it is not proved that there is a division of
the thing [that has the power] in this case [of temporal sequence] too, it is an
accumulation, not a contradiction, of powers that is correct, as in the [case of
spatial sequence].
According to both the Buddhist and RfunakaJ}!ha, the plurality of powers of
illumination at one point in time does not imply that illumination itself is plu-
ral. But the Bud.dhist maintained that the case of illumination over time is not
analogous, because there the powers are plural not only in that they produce a
plurality of effects, but in the stronger sense that individual powers cease to
41 Interlinear gloss above tatrlipi in B: klilakrame.
42 klirGl)lini Ked, B, P; Ped, L.
43 tad atrlipi B, P, Ked, Ped; tatrlipi L.
44 Interlinear gloss above vastu in B: praklisa.
45 Interlinear gloss above tadvac in B: dikkramavat.
46 He refers here to the text given in sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 2. In section 3 he ar-
gued, and convinced the Buddhist, that we experience cognition as always the same; and
in section 4 he responded to the Buddhist objection that that sameness or stability is su-
perimposed. He summed up with a sentence similar to this one: tad eVGlII sarvadaikarz7-'
pasthiragrlihakapraklislitmlinliropita eva ... svasa1Jlve-
dallasiddha[l.
47 We sometimes have clouds without rain, for example. He is here quoting Dharma-
kIrti: klirylinupalabdhliv api IllivaSyG/II [ed. reads tadvanti bhavantfti
tadabhliva[l kuta[l (pVSV ad v. 4, p. 5,20-21).
344
exist and give way to new ones. Thus they enable us to 'know that illu-
mination itself is plural over time. Ramak3.I).!ha here disputes this, arguing
that the two cases are analogous because even over time the power of illumin-
ation does not cease.
The way he uses the word for power in the singular is striking. Since he ad-
mits that illumination has a pluraljty of powers even at one point of time,
would we not expect him to admit a plurality of them over time? Indeed we
can see that he does accept such a plurality from the way that he concludes
this text piece by saying that illumination's powers over time can be accumu-
lated. I suggest that Ramak3.I).!ha would explain this oscillation by employing
the distinction used in the verse that the Buddhist quoted. lllumination's
power is plural, both at one time and over time, in the sense that it brings
about a plurality of effects. But it is singular, both at one time and over time,
in the. sense that it has no blziiviibhiivablzeda: it never actually ceases to exist.
Ramak3.I).!ha supports this first by referring back to his earlier description of
prakiisa as permanently sensed in the same form (it is only its objects that are
experienced as having qifferent forms) and to his arguments against the pos-
sibility that this results from superimposition. He then cites DharmakIrti's
principle that causes can exist without producing their effects. The implica-
tion is that if the Buddhist applied this principle, he would not need to concl-
ude that the power to illuminate an object ceases to exist when its effect, a
cognition of that particular object, ceases.
api ca kliryabhedad indriyader iva saktibhedatab sva-
ntpabheda?z, na 48 49 tasya hi pradfpader ivaikasya-
nekakliryakal1rtvena bhavadbhir catma,
ity uktam. ato'lla tasyapi saktibhedad bheda?z kalpayitlllJz yukta?z.
Moreover, owing to different effects of an imperceptible property-possessor,
like a sense-faculty or such like, [we can infer] different own-natures from
different powers;50 [but] not [owing to different effects] of something whose
48 svantpabhedo Ila Ked, B, L, P; svanlpabhedena Ped.
49 siddlziibhedasya Ked
Pc
, Ped, B; siddhabhedasya Ked
ac
, L, P.
50 Or alternatively, 'Moreover when an imperceptible property-possessor has different
effects, [we call infer] different own-natures, like [ we do] from the different powers of the
sense-faculties and such like.'
unity is a fact of perception, for you too hold that something [whose unity is a
fact of perception], like a candle or such like, being one thing, is the agent of
many effects.
51
Now, as we have already said, 52 the Self is something whose
unity is a fact of perception. Therefore it is not right to suppose a division of
that to0
53
as a result of its having different powers.
345
Up to this point Ramak3.I).!ha has accepted the general principle, articulated in
the citation, that the Buddhist uses to relate a thing and its power (sakth' Izi
blziiviiblziiviiblzyiil!1 blzidyamiinii vasty api bhinatti).54 But he here points out
that the final part of the citation, na punalz kiiryablzedena, was not in
fact there are cases of kiiryablzeda which allow one to infer a difference of the
thing. Imperceptible property-possessors can be differentiated on grounds of
different saktis, as a result of different effects: we do not think it is the same
faculty that sees and hears.
But difference of effects is indeed not enough in itself to justify the inference
of a difference in the thing that brings them about, because it also happens
that things whose unity is a fact of perception have a plurality of effects, as
the Buddhist himself pointed out to be the case with the illuminator at one
point of time, and with a candle. The Self, RamakaI.l!ha argued in Chapter 2,
is something whose unity can be perceived, so the fact that it can illuminate a
series of different objects in sequence in no way indicates that it is plural.
iti yugapatpraklisa iva na kramaprakase 'py Q/1habhedasiddhib.
Therefore there is no problem with establishing a plurality of objects in the
case of illumination [of objects] in sequence just as [it is not problematic] in
the case of illumination [of objects] simultaneously.
51 This is another example of Riimak8.Q.P1a's seemingly tautologous usage of both hi
and an ablative.
52 Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 2.
53 The 'too' implies: as well as the sense-faculties, where it would be correct. The
Self is parallel, rather, to a lamp in this respect.
54 At least his remark in the previous text piece Ila hi tatl'api sakter bhavabhavabhe-
do 'sti ... tad atl'api vastubhedasiddhe?z ... implied that he did. But the issue has been con-
fused a little by his talk in the previous text piece of an accumulation of powers, and his
acceptance here of saktibheda. The solution I suggested was that he regards these powers
as plural in the sense that they have a of effects, but not plural in the sense that
they cease to exist and give way to other new ones.
346
This concluding remark returns the reader to the wider context at this point of
NPP, which is the Buddhist objection that if cognition is always the same,
then cognition of blue and cognition of yellow should be exactly the same:
the plurality of objects would not be established (arthabhediisiddhi!z). Rama-
kaJ).!ha has shown in the course of this passage that even though there is no
difference between cognition of blue and cognition of yellow on the side of
cognition/illumination itself, that does not mean that there is no difference on
the side of its effects .and its objects. The central point of the passage has been
that since the Buddhist is prepared to accept that one cognition at one point in
time can illuminate several different objects through different powers, he
should accept that over a sequence of time the illumination of different ob-
jects through different powers can be carried out by one illumination.
Philosophical Summary
RamakaJ).!ha and the Buddhist opponent in this passage are in agreement in
their analyses of illumination at one point in time, in so far as they both ac-
cept a relation of one and many there. 55 The issue that separates them is that
RamakaJ).!ha accepts this relation of one and many over a sequence of time
also, whereas for the Buddhist there is no one illumination or illuminator
there, rather a plllrality.
What reasons does the Buddhist give for this position? He argues that illumi-
nation cannot be single over time because the powers of illumination are not
single over time. His reason for holding the latter is that the power of illumi-
nation of one object at one point in time is 'mutually exclusive' of the power
of illumination of another object at the next point in time. By this he means
that when the power of illumination at time t exists, the power of illumination
at time 1+ 1 does not, and cannot exist, and vice versa; or, to state the mutual
exclusion in an object-oriented rather than a time-oriented way, that when a
55 They both accept that in that case one thing (vastu), the illuminator, brings about
several effects, the seeing of the different colours of an object, for example.
347
pot is illuminated for someone, a tree is not and cannot be illuminated for that
person, and vice versa.
But for RamakaJ).!ha this argument is circular. The Buddhist has not provided
any independent criteria for treating illumination over time differently from
illumination at one time. Why does he not hold the illumination of the blue
part of a multicoloured object to be mutually exclusive of the illumination of
the red part of it? The Buddhist holds that these two illuminations are compa-
tible and can therefore be accumulated; but they are just as circumscribed as
illuminations in two consecutive moments or of two consecutive objects. It is
just that they are restricted to different- points of space rather than different
points of time. If the Buddhist cannot provide independent criteria for treating
spatial illuminations as singular but temporal ones as plural, then he is being
indefensibly inconsistent.
If the Buddhist claims that spatial illumination is also plural at one point of
time, but unified by a conceptual cognition, then he is still not being consis-
tent, for he is still accepting a unitary cognition over and above the plural illu-
mination at one point of time, but accepting nothing over and above the plural
illumination over time.
A feature of Buddhism that prevents it from accepting the existence of gener-
al illumination over and above the transitory instances of illumination of blue,
illumination of yellow and so on, is that illumination is differentiated by its
objects. This is as true for a Sautrantika as it is for a Yogacara. For the fOJ;'m-
er, cognition may be different from its object, but it has the form of the ob-
ject, so that it is impossible for the same cognition first to illuminate blue and
then, in the next moment, yellow; for cognition is itself thereby changed. For
RamakaJ).!ha, on the other hand, illumination is unaffected by its objects, in
the way that a light is unaffected by whatever objects pass within its range.
Could the Buddhist perhaps therefore underpin his reluctance to accept one
cognition over time through arguments for the interdependence of objects and
cognitions, given that the plurality of objects over time is disputed by no one?
- ~ ~ --- '-"
348
He does indeed .try this,56 but it will not work, for at one point of time too
there is a plurality of objects, or a plural object; so if he is prepared to accept
a unitary cognition there he should be prepared to accept a unitary cognition
over time.
A second, and even more basic, feature of Buddhism that prevents it from ac-
cepting an unchanging illumination separate from the transitory images of
different objects is, of course, the doctrine of momentariness. For Buddhism
it is simply the nature of a temporal sequence, but not necessarily of a spatial
sequence at one point of time, that its elements are mutually exclusive. It is
Buddhist doctrine that that which exists at time t is not the same thing as that
which exists at time 1+1. Whether we are talking of cognitions or objects,
time divides things into distinct point instants. But Ramakrugha points out in
this passage that though Buddhists uncompromisingly apply atomism to time,
they do not do so to space: two colours occurring simultaneously and close to
each other in space can be perceived by the same cognition; but two colours
occurring consecutively in time cannot.
That cognition is in fact experienced by us as single over time was what
RamakaJ).!ha undertook to establish in his rhetorical passage in Chapter 2. He
ridiculed the idea that we think with regard to our cognition in adjacent mo-
ments, 'that is not me and not mine'. The Buddhist held each cognition to be
different since at any point in time the adjacent cognitions do not exist. But
RamakaJ).!ha would respond that their non-existence at the present moment of
time is exactly analogous to the non-existence of the appearance of the blue
part of an object at the spatial location of the red part of the object. If these
two appearances can belong to one cognition, why cannot two adjacent mo-
ments of cognition be phases of one thing?
56 Which is why the first chapter of NPP, despite having as its primary purpose the
establishment of the existence of the Self, contains so many pages taken up with the Bud-
dhist view of the non-difference of perceiver and perceived. This interconnection of the
issue of the existence of the Self with the question of whether the perceiver is distinct
from the perceived was recognized by other authors, as witnessed by, for example, the
fact that Udayana devotes one of the four chapters of his Atmatattvaviveka to refuting the
non-difference of perceiver and perceived.
349
2. The Self's Cognition and the Buddhi's Cognition
We will pick up the Matmigavrtti passage at a point where the Buddhist op-
ponent objects as follows.
57
1 nanv eVaJJl grtilzaklitmano jiitinariipasyti/qa1)ikatve 'pi 'ptide me vedanti, si-
rasi me vedanti,58 slIklzavedanti, dllbklzantiso 'blziicf
9
, vti' ity lItpa-
ttyapavargayob saJ!zvedantid anityataiva.
1 Objection: But granting all of that (nanv evam), even though the perceiver,
whose nature is cognition, is non-momentary, it is certainly not eternal (an it-
yataiva) because we experience it to rise and cease in [such cases as] 'there is
a sensation in my foot, there is a sensation in my head, there is a feeling of
pleasure, [my] sorrow went away or it will go away'.
How can cognition be eternal when we can easily give examples of it that
arise, endure for a while, and then pass away?
The opponent now quotes the Viikyapadfya to give a further illustration of
different, discrete instances of cognition.
yad tilzllb
60
glza!ajiitinam iti
61
jiitinam glza!ajiitinavila/qa(Iam I
glza!a ity api yaj jiiti1IaI!Z62 tat II iti.
As they say:
The cognition that one is cognizing a pot (glza!ajiitinam iti jiitinam) is
different from cognition of a pot. And cognition of a pot
63
[, unlike
57 Beginning at 172,7, introducing 6.34c-35a.
58 ptide me vedanti, sirasi me vedanti is an old expression. It goes back at least to
MaJf<;lanamisra (BS p. 7), and is found also at NM(M), Vol. 2,469.
59 dllbklzantiso 'b11l7d ed.; dll!zklzastiblll7d ii, r, f.
60 VaPa(I) 3.1.105.
61 iti em.; idam ed. iti is the reading of the Vtikyapadfya, and of the Mataligavrtti
when it quotes this verse at 175,7 ad 6.35b-d.
62 ity api yaj jiitinaJ!z ed.; ity ablzi yaj jiitinal!z ii; ity ablzivijiitinaJ!z r, f.
63 It is fairly clear that the verse (slightiy confusingly) intends gha!a ity jiitinaJ.n in the
third ptida to refer to exactly the same thing as glza!ajiitinao in the second ptida. I thus for
-
350
'The Self's Awareness of Itself
cognition that we are cognizing a pot,] is in immediate contact with64
the object.
We need not concern ourselves with the context of this verse in the Viikyapa-
dfya. Nor is the nature of the difference that is mentioned between the
kinds of cognition-the fact that one 'touches' the object and the other does
not-of importance here.
65
RamakaJ;ltha's opponent quotes it at this point just
to show that jiiiina is not single and eternally unchanging, because there are
different kinds of it.
That concludes the objection, an answer to which will form the subject of all
the four remaining sections of this passage.
2 atrocyate
6.34c-35a) kiiye yeya1JI SalllVic citelz
67
sadii II
iihliide viipy athodvege
'68 . dl , .. --" 69
1 citill griihakiitmii. yad 'cites cit sahaJo !anna ltl. tasya aSlro a-
kaye anekasmin Yllgapad yii sa1Jlvid iihliide
70
viipy athodvege
sii sadii sarvakiilam. yattador nityam abhisam-
bandhiit sety anllval1ate 'tra. tad ayam al1hall, na griihyabhede 'pi griiha-
kiitmii yugapad iva bhinno 'vabhiisate.
2 [Siddhiintin:] To this it is said:
71
6.34c-35a) This cognition
72
that the perceiver has (SalllVic citell) of the
body from head to toe,73 or of joy or fear, is always [there].
the sake of clarity translate the different Sanskrit phrases with the same English ex-
pression.
64 Literally, 'flies down to'.
65 It could just be said in passing that Helaraja describes gha!ajtiiina as 'pot-formed
cognition' (gha!iidyiikiiram jiiiinam); and the other kind as making that into its object
through pariimarsa. This differs from ghatajtiiina in that it is not produced directly by the
object (ViiPa(l) 103,3-5).
66 ed.; ii, r.
67 yeYalJl SalllVic citelz ed.; ye salJlvittis citell ii, r; Yalll sa1Jlvittis citelz f.
68 MatPa, vidyiipiida 6.81ab.
69 iisiro ed.; asiro r.
70 SalllVid iihliide ed.; ciihliide ii.
71 1 translate as interprets it, not the way the author of the Matanga in-
tends. For a suggestion for the latter, see note 76.
citi means the perceiver. As [the Lord] will say, 'cognition is an prop-
erty of the perceiver (citelz), .74 The perceiver's (tasyii[z) cognition is always,
[that is to say,] exists at all times, [whether] with regard to the body, from
head to toe, a plural object simultaneously, [or] sequentially with
regard to such objects as pleasure and pain [which is the meaning of] or of joy
or fear (iihliide viipy athodvege) [in the verse]. Because relative and corre-
lative are always related, sii is brought down here.
76
So this is the meaning:
351
72 In my translation of NPP passages I translated jiiiina as 'cognition' and SalllVit as
'consciousness'. I explained in note 23 of Chapter 3 that 1 could not find any evidence of
difference of meaning, but that 1 used different English words for formal reasons in order
to indicate to the reader that is using different Sanskrit words. In the transla-
tion of this MatangaV!1ti passage, however, I translate both as cognition, for as I will
show, it is quite clear that they are being used completely interchangeably.
73 Literally 'which has as its characteristic [everything] up to the head'.
74 Usually describes consciousness/cognition as the Self or the nature of
the Self. But the scriptures on which he comments sometimes make such claims as that
consciousness is a property of the Self. Since for as I said above, there is no
dhannin over and above its dharmas, he would deny that there is any significant differ-
ence between the two contentions.
I will not attempt to answer the question of whether is correct that the
Matanga means by citi the perceiver / the Self.
75 The gloss expresses that the reason for kiiye being in the locative is that it is
the object of the cognition.
76 There is a sii in the preceding verse but it does not seem to be syntactically related
to this phrase; and the yii here is picked up naturally by the tiim in the next line. So it is
unnatural of him to read again the sii and make sadii the predicate instead of just an ad-
verb within the relative clause. What were the original intentions of the author of the Tan-
tra in 34c-35 kiiye yeya1J1 Sa1Jlvic citell sadii II iihliide viipy athodvege ma-
nabsankalpitii satl I bllbhoja bhoktii tiil!l pasciid aha1J1 bhoktii na ciillyathii II)? Here are
two possibilities: 'The awareness of consciousness in the body from head to toe, being de-
termined by the mind always, whether [in times of] joy or fear, is enjoyed by the enjoyer
(bllbhoja bhoktii tiim) [who only] later [thinks] 'I was the enjoyer'; and [it does] not [hap-
pen] otherwise.' Alternatively one could take 35cd as 'I enjoyed [it], 1 will enjoy it later, I
am the enjoyer [now]; and [it does] not [happen] otherwise.'
This verse is of some significance for attempting to identify the course of develop-
ment of Saiva Siddhiinta teaching about the Self. As we have already seen,
does not think that the Self can be inferryd, arguing instead that it is known directly
through perception. In none of the other Saiddhiintika scriptures that predate
am I aware of a claim that the Self can be perceived. Its existence is either asserted with-
- ---,-
352
just as at one moment of time (yllgapat) the perceiver does not appear differ-
entiated even though it may have different objects, so over a sequence of time
too (kramel)iipi) [even though it may have different objects it does not appear
differentiated] .
reads into this verse-segment the point he made in the NPP pas-
sage we have just looked at. He does so by taking the mention of the body as
giving an exainple of an object of cognition at one point in time; 'from head
to toe' as pointing to its plurality; and the mention of joy and fear as giving
examples of sequential objects of cognition. Because we do not think of cog-
nition as being plural just because it is simultaneously aware of different parts
of the body, so the implication goes, why should it be plural over time when
its objects change from joy to fear for example?
*****
He now defends further the position that cognition / the perceiver does not
change over time, by giving a passage that is almost word-for-word identical
to that examined in sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 2:
3 api tll sarvadaiva griihyopiidhiblzede 'py aniisviiditasviitmabhedalz, kiila-
traye 'pi tiraskrtasvagatapriigablziivapradhvGl!ISiiblziivaf!, niilliividlzapramiil)-
iidyanekacittavrttyudayasa1Jzvedane 'py akampitatadgriilzakastlzairyavedallalz,
vrttyantariile 'py aviluptajyotilz, apy aklzGlpjitasvasGlJlvit, satatam
eviirtlziivagamakatvena blziisaniid iitmapadapratipiidya[z sva-
sa1Jlvedanasiddlzalz sthira eva,77 iti kim atriillyena siidlzallella. Ila hi
'gni[l, sftGl!Z himam' ityiidau
78
siidlzallam upapa-
dyate. tiim eva eii
79
tmaSal!IVidam abhillniim allapiiyinfl!l eiisritya sarvai[l kii-
. 80 hi
81
-I 1 -
liintaraplzaliilli iirabhyante. tasya.z sarvavyava za-
out supporting evidence, or it is supported with inferences. In the Pariikhya the question
of how the Self can be known is explicitly asked, and the response contains only infer-
ences. Does this MatGliga verse put the view that the Self is perceived? Whether the Tan-
tra means by citi the Self is not certain, but this verse does look as though it maintains that
consciousness, at least, is directly perceived.
77 sthira eva ii, r, f; stlzirablziiva ed.
78 himam' ityiidau ii, r, f; Izimam' ityiidiiv api ed.; Izillliidiiv' ity api e.
79 eva eii ii, r, f; eVii ed.
80 conj. Sanderson; allityatve ed.; anityatve a;
dillityatve ii, r, f
rapratyastalllaya[l, sarvajiiiiniilliil.ll jiiiiniilltarotpattikiila eva dhvastatyiit
82
kalz
pravarteta
83
kutra
84
killlarthGl!1 vii yata[l. Ila ea tato 'nyat sGlJlvidrilpa1JI
pafyiima ity uktalll. tad ayam allapalznavanfya eva griilzakiitlllallo jiiiinasya
sarvadii stlziran7pa[1 prakiiso vyavalziiralzetublzilta[l kiiliintarablziiviplzalapra-
sarvair eva. na ea tatriiropa[l samblzavatfty uktalll. niipi bii-
dlza[z85 sarvam iilalllbane
86
bhriilltGl!z87 na sviitmani yatalz.
88
niipi stlzirasyii-
rtlzakriyiillupapattir biidlzakam,89 artlzabhedavyavastlziillupapattir vety uktam.
tat iva stlziratviisthiratvayo[l parasparaviruddhan7patviid
vidyudiidiiv astlzairya1Jz90 siddlzGl.1l sat
91
stlzairyGl!z vyiivartayati yatlzii, tadvad
atra sviitlllallY iiropiisalllbizavena stlzairyam avablziisamiinam aSa1JIsaYGl.ll
astlzairyGl.ll vyavaeelzillatti, trtfyaprakiiriisamblzaviid iti.
353
There are only a small number of extra sentences there that do not occur in
the passage translated and commented on in Chapter 2. The fIrst is na hy
1;lO 'gnib, sftm.n himam' ityadau sadhanam upapad-
yate, which simply underlines the contention that no further proof is needed
to support something known by direct experience, by pointing out that it
would be ridiculous to seek any proof, other than direct perception, of the
facts that fIre is hot or snow cold.
The second is na ca tato 'nyat sm.nvidruPQl.n pasyama ity uktam ('and we
have said that we do not see anything else of the nature of cognition beyond
that). This is just the kind of sentence one fInds repeatedly in Buddhist
sources or Buddhist to deny that there is some other entity over
and above momentary cognitions in which they reside. himself
this Buddhist sounding sentence to assert that he recognises only one
thing, not two (a separate Self or perceiver and cognition) as Naiyayikas and
81 hi conj. Sanderson; 'pi ed.
82kiila eva dhvastatviit ed.; kiile 'stalllayatviit 5 MSS; kiiliistamayastlzatviit ai.
83 pravarteta ed.; pravartate 4 MSS.
84 laura ed.; atalz a.
85 lliipi biidlzalz ii, r, f; omitted in the other MSS and in ed.
86 iilambane 4 (non-Kashmirian) MSS; iilambanGlJl ed.
87 bhriilltal!l ii, r, f; bhriilltir ed.
88 yatalz ii, r, f; kadiieana iti ed.
89 biidlzakam ii, r, f and 5 other MSS; bqdhikii ed.
90 asthairya1JI ii, r, f; astlzairyatvGlJl ed.
91 sat ed.; om. in r, f; sao ii, ii.
354
do. But since it follows a long description establishing that this
one thing is stable rather than momentary, its upshot is that there is no mo-
mentary cognition beyond stable cognition. He turns a Buddhist principle
against them to arrive at a non-Buddhist conclusion.
The third is tad ayam anapalznavanfya eva griilzakiitmano jiiiinasya sarvadii
stlzirarupa!l prakiiso vyavahiiralzetublzutab
lJ.a1Jl sarvair eva, which is no more than a summing up of what has been ar-
gued for up to there. It is worth using this sentence, though, to underline that
RamakaJ).tha has no reservations about using the word jiiiina to refer to that
which shines forth as always the same. One could imagine that in response to
the Buddhist objection that cognition (jiiiina) can be seen to be non-eternal
because we can easily point to transitory instances of it, such as sensations in
various parts of the body, RamakaJ).tha would accept that there are momen-
tary instances of jiiiina, but differentiate them from, and relate them to, an un-
changing cognition for which he reserves another word such as sa1Jlvit. We
will see that he does accept a category of changing cognition, but refers to it
with either the word sa1Jlvit or jiiiina, as he refers to unchanging cognition
with either of these words.
*****
There is one more feature of this passage that is not completely parallel in
NPP. The NPP passage offered, as a possible reason for refuting (biidlzaka)
the stable shining forth of cognition, the impossibility of something stable
having efficacity (artlzakriyii). This passage mentions not only that but also a
second possibility: artlzablzedavyavasthiinupapatti!l, the impossibility of es-
tablishing a difference of objects [if cognition is stable]. RamakaJ).tha devotes
enough time to answering this objection-in NPP principally, but alsoin other
of his texts-to have enabled me to devote a whole chapter to looking into the
problem. Considerations of time and space prevented me from doing so.
Instead I will simply give the first articulation of the objection in NPP.92 It
follows the passage we looked at in Chapter 2.
92 NPP introducing 1.6ab, p. 17,3-9. See also MatV VP ad p. 151,6-9 for
a short statement of this problem.
yady eva1JI griihakiitmanalz sarviirthiin
93
praty nflasyeyaJ.n saJ!lvin na
pftasyeti pratyarthm.1l sm.1lvidbhediisiddhi[z. na hi dviiv lIpalambhall stall, eko
'rthasyiiparas ciihnanalz. iihnopalamblziihllake ca saty iitma-
no tasyiipy tatas asiddher anubhavavi-
rodhalz
If that were the case (i.e. if the Self shone forth always as the revealer of ob-
jects and as nothing other than cognition), then, because the perceiver would
not.differ with regard to each of its objects, one would not be able to establish
[the way that] cognition differs in regard to [different] objects, [as when we
say,] 'this is a cognition of blue, not of yellow'. For there are not two percep-
tions, one of the object and one of the Self. And given [therefore] that percep-
tion of the object is of the nature of perception of the Self,95 [it follows that]
because the Self does not differ, the [objects of perception] too would not dif-
fer. And because, therefore, even a difference of objects would not be estab-
lished, we have an incompatibility with how things are experienced.
355
We came across this Buddhist line of thinking in the first part of this chapter.
For we noted, in the NPP passage being examined there, the. Buddhist ass-
umption that a plurality of objects can only be illuminated by a plurality of
illuminations. In the philosophical summary I pointed out that this is the case
for Sautrantikas, as well as obviously Yogacaras, because for the former cog-
nition has the form of its objects. The idea is that objects would not be per-
ceived unless they modified cognition in some way. How could cognition
register the presence of the object if it remained unchanged and unaffected?
Cognitions differ from each other precisely because they perceive different
objects, and bear the marks of their objects. A Buddhist analogy compares
cognition to fire, which differs according to the kind of fuel that produces it.
This idea that cognition is differentiated by its objects is more threatening to
RamakaJ).!ha than it is to those Atmavadins who accept the. existence of a fur-
ther perceiving entity beyond cognition. For they have a place for both cogni-
tions that do indeed differ with their objects, and a single perceiver. But if, as
93 sarviirthiin B, P; sarviin Ked
ac
, Ped.
94 Ked, Ped, P; B.
95 RamakaIHha does indeed hold that 'perception of the object is of the nature of per-
ception of the Self' in that for him (as for Buddhism) it is the SaIne cognition that reveals
both its object and itself .
..
356
RamakaJ;ltha holds, the perceiver is nothing more than cognition, so that cog-
nition is unchanging, what is left to register objects? And if, as RamakaJ;ltha
holds, cognition of the (Le. of itself) is not separate from
of the object, then given that the perceiver is always the same, how can we
account for cognition of different objects? There is not space here to give a
detailed account of all those parts of RamakaJ;ltha's system that are relevant to
a solution to this problem. I will just mention three points in passing.
1) The NPP passage looked at in the first part of this chapter was to a large
extent an attempt to answer this objection. It did so by pointing out that when
we perceive a multi-coloured object at one point in time, even the Buddhist
accepts that cognition is single. Thus a plurality ofobjects should not have to
mean a plurality of cognitions.
2) For RamakaJ;ltha 'perceiving cognition' (grlihaklitmasQ1!lvit) is not produ-
ced by its objects, as a fire is produced by its fuel. Rather it is the illuminator
of whatever objects happen to come within its range. Thus its relation to ob-
jects is like the relation of a light to objects within its range: it exists. inde-
pendently from them, does not cease even when none are there, and is not
changed by them.
3) The function of 'registering', in the sense of being modified by, objects is
assigned not to perceiving cognition but to the Buddhi. This takes on the form
of the object and presents it to the perceiver, who illuminates it with the help
of a further instrument, Vidya, one of a group of tattvas known as the cui-
rasses (kaiicukas),96 higher up the scale than Buddhi. The Buddhi is an impor-
tant enabler of the unchanging nature of perceiving cognition, as we will see
in more detail presently.
*****
Let us return now to the MataTigavrtti passage. RamakaJ;ltha has thus far ar-
gued that perceiving cognition is unchanging. He has not yet dealt with the
specific question of how seeming instances of changing cognition, such as
pleasure, pain or bodily sensations, can be accounted for on that picture. He
now addresses the problem of the relationship between unchanging and per-
96 For more about these see page 82.
357
manent cognition, Le. the perceiver, and pleasure and pain and t4e like; which
are certainly changing, and which are commonly referred to as cognitions.
4 ata 'eva nilhlildodvegildfnill11 sQ/./lviddhannatvam,97 tadapilye 'pi
9S
SClI./lvido
'napilyilt, api tll sa1Jlvedyatvam eva.
4 That is precisely whl
9
pleasure and pain and the like are not properties of
cognition, because cognition does not cease even though they cease I when
they cease. Rather they are just objects of cognition.
If pleasure and pain were properties of cognition, then, given RamakaJ;ltha's
view that there is no property-possessor over and above properties, the transi-
toriness of pleasure and pain would mean the transitoriness of cognition; so
they are not its properties but its objects.
What the Buddhist encompasses under the single terms jiilina or SQ1!lvit,
RamakaJ;ltha sees as having two components: an unchanging perceiver, and
its objects such as pleasure and pain.
yad api
lOo
'pi bilhyasya prftitilpayo!l I
bhilvanilyil nilrthariipil!l sukhildayalz II
ztl sQ/JlviddhannatvillOlnllmilnam, tad api
ayuktam eva,
thilsiddlzatvilc ca.
As for the inference that they are properties of cognition-
Because pleasure and pain differ [between people]/04 owing to a dif-
ference of mental predisposition (bhilvanil), even when the external
[object] is the same, pleasure and the like are not of the nature of ob-
jects [but rather properties of cognition]-
97 sQ/.nviddlzannatvam ed.; taddlzannatvam a, a, Y, u, e, ai.
9S tadapilye 'pi ed.; tadapilye ai.
99 I.e. because Sa1J1vit is sthira.
100 Pramill)aviniscaya 1.23 (identified in Stem 1991).
101 dlzannatvil
O
ed.; dlzannil
o
a, r.
102 ed.; U, r; e.
103 siddlzyil ed.; siddhil a, U.
104 Perhaps this verse could also mean, that there is a difference of pleasure, pain and
the like in one person when confronted by the same object at different times, not necessar-
ily between different people .
.... _-

C0"" '(C'"
358
that is also certainly incorrect because it is contradicted by direct experi-
ence; \05 and because their (i.e. pleasure, pain and the like's) difference can be
otherwise established by establishing a difference of buddhis
106
on account of
a difference in mental predisposition.
DharmakIrti's inference points to the fact that some get pleasure from exactly
the same external object that causes others pain, because their mental condi-
tioning differs. One person may find the midday sun pleasurable while an-
other may find it oppressive. This indicates that pleasure and pain are more
subjective than inert objects impinging on cognition from outside, uncon-
trollable by it, and not compromising its unchanging nature. For if something
can be manipulated through conditioning the mind, then it would seem to be
internal to cognition, not separate from it.
RamakaI).tha's second response (his first being to adduce direct perception) is
that, while this consideration may indicate that pleasure and pain are not
firmly connected to the external object, it does not show that they belong to
cognition (saf!lvit), i.e. the perceiver. For there is a third possibility: that they
are connected to the Buddhi and the determinative cognition that it produc:es.
The fact that pleasure and pain differ between people does not reflect any dif-
ference of cognition in the sense of the perceiver, but simply a difference of
buddhis. It is this difference of buddhis that differences of mental condi-
tioning can bring about, not any difference in cognition proper (i.e. the per-
ceiver), which looks on to pleasure and pain and the like without in any way
being changed by them. The perceiving cognition of one person in the mid-
day sun is just the same as anyone else's in the midday sun.
Thus pleasure and pain differ because they are dependent on buddhis, which
means they can be kept out of the realm of perceiving cognition and on the
105 I presume the claim is that pleasure and pain can be directly experienced to be ob-
jects of perception, not properties of the perceiver.
106 The word buddlzi is ambiguous. It can mean the faculty (in which case I either
translate 'Intellect' or simply write 'Buddhi') or that which the faculty produces, namely
determinative cognitions (adlzyavasiiya). Thus what could be being referred to here is ei-
ther that different people's Intellects differ, or that their determinative cognitions differ. In
order to leave both possibilities open I talk, in my exegesis of this sentence, in terms of a
difference of. buddhis.
I
I
. j
359
object side of the divide (sGl.nvedya).107 The Buddhi plays a crucial role for
RamakaI).tha in that it can account for changes and differences in what many
would call cognition (jiilina), allowing cognition in the sense of the perceiver
to remain unchanging. As an intermediary between external objects and cog-
nition proper, it can account for the subjective aspect of things like pleasure
and pain despite them being objects of cognition. 108
107 If the form they take is dependent on buddlzis, how can they be objects? Are not
objects independent from, and therefore unaffected by, the instruments of perceiving sub-
jects? Determinative cognitions, which characterize the Buddhi, have their own objects,
but they are also themselves perceived by the Self according to Saivism, i.e. they are its
objects. Thus Ramaka.I!!ha would be able to hold both that pleasure and pain are objects
and that they are affected by differences in buddlzis in one of two ways. Either he could
hold that pleasure and pain are the objects of determinative cognitions, or that they are
determinative cognitions. In the latter case it is easy to see why they would be affected by
differences in people's Buddhis: the Buddhi would be that which produces them. How
about in the former case? There one could say that the Buddhi causes the determinitive
cognition to rise with a certain kind of object: pleasure if it has been conditioned in a cer-
tain way, pain if in another.
108 In accord with his argumentation here, Ramaka.I!!ha holds at NPP ad 1.72 (110, I 0-
15) that pleasure, pain, passion (riiga) etc. are not qualities of the Self, but belong to pra-
krti. However he seems to have compromised this view elsewhere. For he glosses blzoktii
in MatV VP 6.12a as Similarly he glossesjTiiitii in 6.13cd
as To claim that the experiencer/perceiver is the sub-
strate of passion, aversion and desire conflicts explicitly with he says of passion in
the NPP passage just mentioned; and it seems to conflict with what he says of pleasure
and pain both there and in the passage under comment, for it is natural to assume that
pleasure and pain fall within the same category as passion, aversion and desire-he treats
passion with pleasure and pain in the NPP passage.
This conflict can be partly explained as a result of a difference of context. There he is
arguing not against Buddhists but against the Ciirvaka view that the perceiver is simply
the body. Thus he needs to establish the existence of an immaterial Self. Since passion,
desire and aversion are considered by most to be immaterial, their substrate will also be
immaterial. So to regard them tl).ere as properties of the perceiver, rather than its objects,
serves his purpose well. His motive for claiming pleasure and pain to be objects of cogni-
tion here, namely the need to demonstrate that cognition itself is unchanging, is not pre-
sent there.
It is interesting to note that two or'the Kashmirian manuscripts and a third non-
Kashmirian one omit the iidi in the first gloss. One possible explanation is that a trans-
'.""
The wider context here is still the claim that the perceiver / cognition (grliha-
klitmli jiilinarilpa/:t) is not eternal, because things like pleasure, pain or bodily
sensations can be seen to rise and pass away. Let us briefly cast our eye back
over RamakaI).!ha's response so far. He fIrst argued (through exegesis of the
verse) that sarJlvit, an innate property of the perceiver, is always there (both
simultaneously and sequentially). He then summarised this as making the
point that the perceiver (grlihaklitmli) appears (avabhlisate) as undivided
(both simultaneously and sequentially) despite having different objects. In the
long passage in section 3, which occurred also in Chapter 2, he referred to
this stable appearance of the perceiver (or appearance of a stable perceiver) as
grlihakasthairyavedana, litmasa1!lvit and jiilinasya prakasall. In section 4 he
removed the threat to the unchanging nature of sa1!lvit that would result if
pleasure and pain were its properties. Thus so far he has dealt with the Bud-
dhist objection by interpreting jiilina/saf!lvit to refer to that which perceives,
and by showing that that never changes and that anything that does change
(e.g. pleasure and pain) is not that or its properties, but rather its objects.
He now makes explicit that that is what he has done before moving on to a .
different interpretation of jiilina/sa1.nvit.
5.1 eVa/!1 ca
lO9
jiiiillasabdella bhavatiiqlllO yady atra griihakiit11lasaJ!IVid eva
vivalqitii tadiisiddho
lll
hetub, tatrotpattyapavargayob Sal!IVedalliibhiiviid
l12
yugapatpratibhiisa iva
l13
kra11lapratibhiise 'pi pra11leyabhedella
l14
gha!a
I15
_
jiiiilliidibhedasya
l16
kalpitatviid iti.
mittor of the text removed the iidi because he took it to refer to jiiiilla, something that
denies to have as substrate (iiSraya) the Self many more times than he denies
the same of pleasure and pain.
109 evaql ca ed.; om. a, ii, Y, u, e, ai.
110 sabdena bhavatiil!l ed.; sabde ca bhavatiil!l f.
III tadiisiddllO ed.; tad apy siddho ii, r.
112 iibhiiviid ed.; abhiiviid a, ii.
113 iva ed.; eva ai.
114 bhedella ed.; bhede 'pi ii, r, f.
115 gha!ao ed.; om. a, ii, Y, u, e, ai.
116 bhedasya ii, r, f; bhedasyiitra ed.
5.1 And thus if by the word jiiiilla you intend here actually (eva) perceiving
cognition,117 then the logical reason is unproved;1l8 because we do experi-
ence (saJ!lvedaniibhiiviit) rising and ceasing in that [perceiving cognition], be-
cause the difference between a cognition of a pot and other [cogriitions]
(gha!ajiiiiniidibhedasya) 119 is [falsely] imagined (kalpita) on the basis of a dif-
ference of object of knowledge (prameya), even in the sequential appearance
[of cognition], just like in its appearance at one time. 120
361
Again he alludes to the commonly accepted unity of cognition at one point in
time to render more plausible its unity over time. The things that do rise and
pass away, now the sensation in my foot, now the sensation in my head, are
simply objects of cognition. If we think cognition differs we are mistakenly
extrapolating from a difference of its objects to a difference of itself: we ar-
rive at that judgement not through sa1!lvedana but through kaZpanli.
Having dealt with the possibility that the opponent meant by cognition that
changes, perceiving cognition (grlilzaklitmasaJ!lvit), he now introduces a sec-
ond possibility that determinative cognition (adhyavasliya) was intended.
117 Literally, 'cognition, whose nature is the perceiver'.
118 The logical reason here is the statement from the beginning of this passage that we
experience the rise and passing away of jiiiina (.and the conclusion is that jiiiina is non-
eternal).
119 He could be referring here to the difference between gha!ajiiiina and gha!ajiiiilla
iti jiiiina perhaps, if he is thinking of the Viikyapadfya verse; or the difference between
cognition of a pot and cognition of a cloth or such like.
120 The reading of the Kashmirian MSS-obhede 'pi-is possible and could be trans-
lated as either, 'because we do not experience rising and ceasing in that [perceiving cogni-
tion], because the difference between a cognition of a pot and other [cognitions] is
[falsely] imagined despite a difference of object of knowledge, even in the sequential ap-
pearance [of cognition], just like in its appearance at one time; or ' ... because [we] do not
experience rising and ceasing in that [perceiving cognition] even in the sequential appear-
ance [of cognition], just like in its appearance at one time, even though there is a differ-
ence of object of knowledge, because the difference between a cognition of a pot and
other [cognitions] is [falsely] imagined'. The first of these seems more likely given the
word order of the Sanskrit, but seems to less force than if we accept prameyabhede-
Ila.
atha tadgraha/Jottarakillabhiivinfyiidhyavasiiyiitmikii
l21
sa/!lvit siitra
122
jiiiina-
sabdenocyata iti, tatriipy ucyate
123
mana(lsa/ikalpitetyiidi.
If cognition that is of the nature of a determinative cognition,124 taking place
subsequent to the grasping by that [perceiving cognition], is denoted here by
the wordjiiiina, in response to that [position], for its part (api), the [next verse
segment] beginning, 'determined by the mind', is taught.
6.35b-d) lIlana{zsa/ikalpitii s{1tf I
bubhoja Moktii tiil.n
l25
pasciid aha/!l bhoktii na ciinyathii
126
II
saiva griihakiltmaSalJIVin satf yadii bhavati
tadii tiim eviitmii pasciii
27
bubhoja
128
bhuktaviin.
bhogasya
129
salJlvedaniitmakatviit,130 'gha/am alza/Jl jiiniimi ,131 ityiidiiv iva
132
aha/!l iti pariimarsena ity a/1lza{z. tasya gauro133 'ham ityiidivi-
niinyathopapattir ya-
ta{z.
6.35b-d) The enjoyer enjoyed that [perceiving cognition] later, when
it is determined by the mind, [thinking] I am the enjoyer. And it is not
otherwise.
121 yiidlzyavasiiyiitmikii ed.; yiidhyavasiiyiitmakaO a; yii vyavasiiyiitmikii ii, f; yii vyava-
siiyiitmikaO r
122 siitra ed.; manasiitra a.
123 tatriipy ucyate ed.; tatrocyate a, I, u, ii.
124 The fact that RamakaI).tha uses the word salJlvit here to refer to detenninative cog-
nition should remove any lingering suspicion we may have that, though he uses jiiiina to
refer to both that which changes and that which does qot (detenninative cognition and
non-conceptual cognition), he reserves salJlvit for the latter of these two pairs. Rather both
words can, in different contexts, refer to either.
- 125 bllOktii tiim ed.; bhoktl1iim u.
126 ciinyatilii ii, r, f; ndnyathii ed.
127 pasciid ed.; pasciid iti a, I, u, r, r, e, ai.
128 bubllOja ed.; bub/zojeti ii, r, f.
129 b/zogasya ed.; b/zogyasya ai.
130 sa/!lvedaniitmakatviii ed.; asalJlvedaniitmakatviit ii; sa/Jlvedaniitmatviit r.
131 jiiniimi ed.; vedmi a, I, u, ii, r, f, e, ai.
132 iva ed.; eva ii, r, f.
133 gauro ed.; paro ii, r, f.
134 ed.; a.
135 a, I, u, e, ai; ed.; ii, r, f.
. .
(
As for that very perceiving cognition, being (sam, i.e. when 6'adii) it is, made
into an object by the employment of the mind, the Self experienced
136
it later,
i.e. subsequent to the perception of the object. 137 Because experience is of the
nature of cognition,138 the meaning is that [the Self] made [the
cognition] into an object through the awareness'/, as [a pot or such like is
made into an object] in such cases as 'I am aware of a pot' .139 For that [verbal
cognition'!' when] unqualified 140 is not appropriate except as [referring to the
perceiver], since [only when]141 linked with a qualification as in 'I am fair'
does it have as its object the body or such like.
136 bublzoja is glossed with the synonymous bhuktaviin.
363
137 The English in that sentence is awkward. Part of the reason is an awkwardness in
the Sanskrit; for RamakaI).tha is trying to derive a meaning from the verse that would be
more natural if sa/ikalpitii and satf were in the accusative rather than the nominative. For
suggestions for the original meaning of the verse see note 76. The reason for the nomina-
tives seems to be that they are agreeing with the relative yii sa/!lvit in the previous verse
segment, which is then picked up by the correlative tiim in this verse-segment. But Rama-
kaI).tha wishes to sever that relative from this verse-segment by taking it as going with a
sii from verse 34a rather than with the tiim here.
138 RamakaI).tha states here that bhoga is of the nature of salJlvedana to justify speak-
ing in terms of pariimarSa about what the verse speaks of in terms of blzoga. Thus it is
clear that this is a case where RamakaI).tha uses the term sa/Jlvedana not to refer specifi-
cally to cognition, as he frequently does, but to cognition in general, in-
cluding pariimarsa.
The Saiva concern with equating blzoga and (sa/!l)vedalla goes back to the Sviiyam-
bhuvasiitrasa/igralza: bhogo' 'sya vedallii plll!lsa{z (SvSiiSa
1.12ab).
139 We could accept the variant eva for iva, in which case 'I am aware of the pot'
would be intended as an example of the Self being made into an object, not an object be-
ing made into an object. But I accept the reading of the edition here, and not that of the
Kashmirian manuscripts, for two reasons. First, eva would be completely redundant. Sec-
ondly, according to the definition of I-cognition (aham iti pariimarsa(l) that RamakaI).tha
is giving here, it is something that happens after the perception of an object. What form
would it take? iitmiinam (jsa/Jlvidam) alzalJl jl1iiniimi perhaps. Or simply the phrase from
the verse ahalJl bhoktii.
140 Unqualified here means that it does not occur in apposition with things like fair,
dark, fat, thin.
141 It is possible that this sentence is The only way I can make it yield satis-
factory sense is by adding in this 'only when' in square brackets. RamakaI).tha makes the
---.-.
After cognition perceives an object we can then make that perceiving cog-
nition itself into an object through the verbal cognition 'I'.
Before the verse-segment, Ramakav-tha signalled that the discussion would
now turn to the question of whether determinative cognition (that being a
possible interpretation of jiiiina in the Buddhist objection) changes. He led us
to believe that the verse would address that. But in fact the verse (as inter-
preted by him) is not about determinative cognition in general but 1-
cognition; and not about whether it changes, but about the way in which it
grasps the perceiver. This is a symptom of the fact that Ramakav-tha's agenda
in his commentary at this point is not that of the verses. He is superimposing
on them a discussion of whether cognition changes, cognition being interpre-
ted in two different ways. It would have been extremely difficult and distor-
tive, when glossing this verse-segment, to present it as addressing that ques-
tion, so he interprets it (mildly distortively, but less so) as arguing that the
Self can be perceived through I-cognition, and then returns to the question of
whether determinative cognition changes below (in 5.2). His concern in this
section (5.1), then, is to describe this process whereby subsequent to perceiv-
ing an object the Self makes itself, i.e. makes sal.nvit, into an object, in the
verbal cognition'!'; and to establish that this is a genuine case of direct per-
ception.
sa 'pi ca pariimarsapratyaya!1142 eva.
And that verbal cognition is certainly direct perception too.
yad iihu!1143
asti hy iilacallajiiiilwllll44 prathamallillirvikaipakam I
biiiamz7kiidivijliiillaSadrsaill suddhavastujam II
point made in this sentence (assuming I have interpreted it correctly) and argues for it in
more detail, in section 1.2.1 of Chapter 3.
142 sa 'pi ca pariimarfapratyaya!l ii, r, f; sa 'pi pariimarfaf! ed.
143 SV(P2) 1.1.4 (pratyalqa chapter) 112 and 120.
144 lilacallajliiillalJl ii, r, f; lilaCalWlll jliiilwlJl ed. The former is preferred on the
grounds that iilacalla is not attested as an adjective. The variants of the Siakaviirttika edi-
tions, and of the other quotations of this verse by are given in section 3 of
Chapter 3. In the NPP passage being looked at there, and in a passage in a later chapter of
tataf! paralJl pUllar vastll dhannair jiityiidibhir yayii I
buddhyiivasfyate siipi pratyalqatvena sailimatii II iti.
As [Kumiirila] says: 145
For there is seeing-cognition, which [arises] first, lacks concepts, is
similar to the cognitions of children, dumb people and the like, and is
produced from the pure object.
The determinative cognition, by which after that the object is further
tatas ca ghata 'yam itivad niscayapratyayena
krtatviii
46
iitmiipi pratyalqelJa lliscita
147
eva.
And therefore because [the Self] is made into an object by a determining cog-
nition 148 like 'this is a pot', which comes after a [perceptual] experience,149 the
Self too is certainly determined by direct perception.
365
This sentence is ambiguous because it is not possible to be sure whether
gha!o 'yam itivad is intended as an example of anubhava or niicayapratyaya.
If the former (in which case I would take gha!o 'yam
bhiivinii as all one compound), then I would translate as, 'And therefore be-
cause [the Self] is made into an object by a determining cognition, which
comes after a [perceptual] experience like "this is a pot" ... '. The point would
be that after the non-conceptual perception, 'this is a pot', we foqn a deter-
minative cognition of the form, 'I am looking at a pot', in which the Self be-
comes an object. But it seems slightly more pointed if we translate as I have
done, and assume the implication to be that just as the determining cognition
'this is a pot', which comes after the non-conceptual perception of a pot, is
the Mataligav[ffi that is given on page 370, I judge to have quoted this verse
with the reading iilacalliijiiiillam. But I would not consider it justified to emend to that
here, given the unproblematic reading of the KashmIri manuscripts.
145 I translate these verses in exactly the same way as I did in section 3 of Chapter 3,
and do not bother to repeat the annotation to the translation, which can be seen there.
146 ed.; a, ii, r, u, e, ai.
147 niscita ed.; Iliscfyata a.
148 niscayapratyaya is here synonymous with pariimarsa or adhyavasiiya.
149 allubhava here refers to what verse referred to as iiiacanajiiiilla, i.e. pre-
conceptual experience.
366
readily admitted to directly perceive that which is described in it, namely a
pot, so the determining cognition in which 'I' becomes an should be
admitted to directly perceive the Self. 150
5.2 tasya ca15l pariimarSiitmano jiiiinasyotpattyapavargayogasiddlziiv api
buddhyahmikiiradhal7natvella vyadlzikara1)atviin na
l52
griilzakiitmany allitya-
tvasiidlzalle siimarthyam. yathii caitat tathii
153
buddhyahmikiiraprakara1)ayor
valqyii17la!z.
5.2 And even though that cognition that is of the nature of verbal determina-
tion is proved to rise and pass away, [it] is not capable of proving the non-
etemality of the perceiver, because it occurs in a different locus [from the per-
ceiver] in that it is a property of the Buddhi and the Ahailkiira. And how this
is so we will show in the sections dealing with the Buddhi and the Ahan-
kiira.
154
Here he reverts to the question that he signalled, before the last verse-
segment, would be addressed, namely whether determinative cognition in
general, not specifically I-cognition, changes or not. His response is that it
does indeed, but that, since it is a property of the Buddhi and Ahailkara, it
cannot allow us to infer anything about the perceiver, so it does not help the
Buddhist objection.
ca
gha!ajliiilla17l iti jliiilwl!! gha!ajliiinavilalqa(wm I
ityiidijliiina
l55
bhedo viistava evety avirodha!z.
150 The first of these two interpretations is more suitable if we accept the variant eva
above, and the second if we accept, as I did, iva. See note 139.
151 ca ed.; om. in ii and [.
152 vyadhikara(wtviill na ed.; vyadhikara(!iisiddhatviin Ila ii, Y, u, e; vyadhikara1)a-
siddhatviin nallu ii, [, f; na ai.
153 caitat tathii diagnostic conj. Isaacson; ciisya ed.
154 I.e. the 17th and 18th pa!alas respectively.
155 jliiina ed.; vijliiilla ii, [, f.
And with reference to that,156 the difference of cognition [noted. in] such
[claims] as
the cognition that one is cognizing a pot is different from cognition of
a pot
are indeed real. Therefore there is no contradiction.
157
367
In 5.1 he said that if by cognition we mean perceiving cognition, then the dif-
ference between cognition of a pot and other kinds of cognition is falsely
imagined all that differs is the objects of cognition). This claim admits
that a determinative cognition of a pot is indeed different from determinative
cognitions of other objects and from non-conceptual cognition. Either way
that which changes is not the perceiver, which looks on unaffected.
I58
Having dealt with the question of whether determinative cognition changes,
he now concludes this passage with one sentence that returns to the question
of how the Self is perceived.
eval!! svapariitmaprakiisakatayii jiiiinasaktiriipe(w pariimarsiic ciitmii
159
pra-
ukta!z.
Thus the Self is said to be directly perceptible through [its] power of cogni-
tion
160
as the revealer of Hs own and other people's Selves; 161 and from verbal
awareness.
156 I.e. with reference to determinative cognition, as to cognition in the sense
of the perceiver. .
157 I.e. there is no contradiction between the claim of this Viikyapadfya verse and
Riimakal}!TIa's claim that (perceiving) cognition is the same at all times.
158 To respond to a Buddhist claim about jiiiilla by first interpreting it to mean the
perceiver, and then adhyavasiiya is something we have observed Riimakal}!TIa to do else-
where. In the previous chapter (p. 262), his response to the Buddhist argument that blue
and cognition of blue are not different, because they are invariably perceived together,
was to show first that cognition of blue in the sense of the prakiisaka of blue sometimes
occurs without blue, and then that the same is true of the bauddhiidhyavasiiya 'blue'.
159 pariimarsiic ciitmii ed.; pariimarsas ciitmii ii, [, f; pariithas ciitmii e; pariimarsii-
tmii ai.
160 My translation would perhaps be more natural if the text readjiiiillasaktyii in place
of jliiillasaktin7pe(w. Perhaps it would be J;>etter to interpret the latter as if it read jliiilla-
saktin7patvella: ' ... said to be directly perceivable in the form of [its] power of cognition
368
The Self's power of cognition, which is both single and the illuminator (pra-
kasaka), and this power's perception of itself, are what were described in sec",:
tion 3. The Self's perception of itself through paramarsa-which is not sin-
gle, but plural and changing-was what was described in 5.1.
*****
Reading this subsection (5.2) alone we might wonder how, if common in-
stances of cognition such as gha!ajnana occur in a completely different locus
from the perceiver, Ramakm;t!ha's perceiver is of the nature of cognition? It
would seem to be no more of the nature of cognition than a Naiyayika Self. In
fact the distance between cognition and the Self now seems even greater than
in Nyaya, for whom cognition at least occurs in the Self.
But if we remember that Ramakm;t!ha in this subsection is talking only of de-
terminative cognition, then we can assume that non-conceptual cognition oc-
curs in the Self, and deduce that all Ramakm;t!ha's mentions of cognition as
the nature of the Self, or the same as the Self, refer to non-conceptual cogni-
tion.
That this is the case is stated explicitly in parallel passages in: 1) KV,162
where determinative cognition is distinguished from non-conceptual cogni-
tion and the latter is described as and grahakarupa; and 2) the
BuddhiprakaralJa of the MatV vp,163 to which Ramakm;t!ha has just referred
the reader.
1) atas ca jl1linasylipi gu{zatvlisiddhes tadn7pa evlitmli siddha ity uktam. tarhi
jfilinasylinityatvena sa'llvedanlid anityatvam asya. tad ayuktam, dvividhw.n hi
161 It reveals its own Self in self-awareness (svasw!lvedana) and other people's
through carrying out inference (anumlina). While doing the latter it is aware of itself as
the inferrer (amanlitr). See for example MatV VP ad 2.1, p. 22,8-9: sa ca sarvlirthapra-
kilsakatayli parlitmlinumlitrtvena [parlitmlinumlitrtvena ed.; paramlif1nli{lumlitratvena a;
parlinumlitratvena a, e; parlif1nlinumlitratvena Y, u, n ca pratylif1nlinw.n svasa1!lvedanasi-
ddho bhinna eva nityo vylipakas ca. bhinna!z there does not of course mean that it is plural
over time, but rather that souls are distinct from each other, unlike in the view of Vedanta
or non-dualistic Saivism.
162 Ad 2.25ab, p. 53,10-54,17.
163 Ad 17.2, p. 382,12-1b.
]nanam, adhyavasliylitmakam itarac ca. tatra yad adhyavasliylif1nakw.n tad
buddhidhannatvenlismlibhir apy anityam eva. yad anadhyavasliylif1na-
kal.n sal.nvedanlif1naka'll jfilinam, tasya na kadlicid apy ablzliva!l
sa'llvedyate, sarvadaiva grlihakarupatayaikan7pe{la sa'llvedanlit. nlipi tasya
krame{llirtlzakriylinupapattir itylidi sarval.n darsitam asmliblzir nare.svaraparf-
vistare{leti tata evlivadhlilyam.
Goodall translates, 164
'And so, because knowledge too has not been proved to be a [separable]165
quality, it is established that the soul has the form of knowledge. This is what
is taught.
166
But in that case (tarhi), because we experience knowledge as
transient, the soul (asya) too
167
must be transient. This is wrong. For there are
two kinds of knowledge: that which is of the nature of mental apprehension
(adhyavasliylif1nakam) and other [knowledge]. Of these two (tatra) that which
is mental apprehension we too hold to be transient, because it is a quality of
the buddhi (buddhidhannatvena). That which is not mental apprehension is
knowledge that is of the nature of experience (sa'livedanlif1nakam) and be-
longs to the human condition An absence of that is never experi-
enced, because it is at all times experienced as that which perceives and as
one. Nor is it impossible that it produces effects in sequence-all this we have
shown at length in the and it must be understood
from there.' 168
164 Goodall 1998 253.
165 I would have omitted this word.
369
166 It may be that is there referring back to previous parts of his com-
mentary. Some possibilities are: api tv litmanas ciddhannatvena ... ad 2. 14cd, p. 44,17; ...
tasya ciddhannatvena ... ad 2.16-17, p. 46,2; yady eVal!l cidrupa evlif1nli
pliSyo vyavasthita ... ad 2.22, p. 51,1; or the following sentence at the beginning of his
commentary to the the verse with which he is currently dealing. cit jfilinam eva dharma!l
svabhlivo yasya sa tathlibhuta!l t pumity anubhavati sarvam iti pumlin t. Goodall trans-
lates, 'That whose own nature (svablzliva!z = dhanna!l) is knowledge (jfilinam = cit) is
called soul (pumlin) because he experiences everything,' adding a note that he has not
found a root from which pumiti could derive, and that this belongs to a group of sentences
that may be an interpolation.
167 I would have put 'too' in square brackets.
168 Goodall inserts a footnote at this point saying, 'It is difficult to pick out particular
passages that must be referring to, because these topics are dealt with at con-
siderable length. For the refutation of the view that all things that exist produce effects
370
2) dvividlzo Izi bodho blziiviilliim adlzyavasiiyiitmako 'nadhyavasiiyan7pas ca.
yad iihll!l:
asti Izy pratlzamGl.n Ilirvikalpakam I
biilamlikiidivijfiiinasadrsal!l sllddlzavastujam II
tatal! parGl.n punar vastll dhal7llair jiityiidibhir yayii I
bllddlzyiivasfyate siipi sGlJ1matii II iti.
tatra yo 'nadlzyavasiiyiitmaka!l sa sarvadii griilzakarlipelJaiva blziisal1liina
iitmasvabhiiva evety IIktfll.n pUl1lpiisesvaraprakaralJe. yas tv adhyavasiiyan7-
pal! sa IItpanlliipavargitveniivabhiisamiillo na plllJ1svabhiival!, llityaSYiillitya-
svabhiivatviiyogiit, tatsvabhiivatve vii nityatvaprasGligiit sGl.llvedallasyeva. Ila
ca Ilityo 'Illlbhliyate. tato na plllJ1saf! svabhiival!, iti yasya svabhiival! sii blld-
dhib bhiiviilliil1l adhyavaseyatotpiidikii, Ila tiilJ1 villii adhyavaseyatii
sambhavati yata!l. 169
For there are two kinds of cognition of objects, that of the nature of determi-
native cognition and that not of the nature of determinative cognition. As
[Kumiirila] says: 170
For there is seeing-cognition, which [arises] first, lacks concepts, is
similar to the cognitions of children; dumb people and the like, and is
produced from the pure object.
The determinative cognition, by which after that the object is further
Of these two that which is not of the nature of determinative cognition, shin-
ing forth always in the form of the perceiver itself (eva), is nothing other than
the own nature of the Self. That has been said in the chapter dealing with the
soul, the bonds and the Lord. 171 But that whose nature is determinative cogni-
tion, appearing as having arisen and as passing away, is not the own nature of
and are momentary, and the demonstration that something can produce effects simultane-
ously or in series whether it is or is not momentary, see particularly NPP ad 1.22, p. 52.'
The passage beginning on that page (and continuing to p. 56), occurring in the course
of his refutation of DharmakIrti's sattviillllmiilla, may well have been in Riimakru;ttba's
mind. Another certainly relevant passage is that which we looked at in the first part of this
chapter: it deals not just with whether 'something' can produce effects in sequence, but
specifically with whether cognition can do so. 73,9-14, ad 1.40, is also relevant.
169 AghoraSiva paraphrases this passage, barely changing the wording, in his com-
mentary to BhoKa48 (p. 214,7b-2b), and to TaSa 6-7 (p. 118,20-26).
170 SV(P2) 1.1.4 chapter) 112 and 120.
171 In the passage we have just read.
the soul, since that which is eternal cannot have as its own nature something
transitory; and since, if, on the other hand, it were the own nature of the
[soul], it would undesirably follow that [determinative cognition] would be
eternal, like [non-conceptual] cognition.172 And it is not experienced as eter-
nal; therefore it is not the own nature of the soul. Thus that of which it is the
own nature is the Buddhi, which enables things to become determinatively
cognized; for without it, it is impossible for them to become determinatively
cognized.
371
Thus RfunakaJ).!ha superimposes the distinction between non-conceptual and
conceptual cognition on to the distinction between the soul/perceiver and the
Buddhi. The result is a marked discontinuity between the two kinds of cogni-
tion: one is the perceiver, or its nature, and the other is not; one is eternal and
the other constantly changing; one is located in the soul and the other is loc-
ated in a faculty of a very different nature.
The idea that a kind of cognition can be eternal should be less strange to us
now than at the beginning of this chapter, fQr we have seen RamakaJ).!ha ar-
gue for it in various different ways in the two passages with which this chap-
ter is primarily concerned. But it is a little unfortunate that in this passage
RamakaJ).!ha gives the first of the two Kumanla verses as a description of the
kind of cognition that is eternal. For it is described there as 'produced by the
pure object', and RamakaJ).!ha would not regard something produced as eter-
nal. RamakaJ).!ha regarded the two verses as useful for conveying to the
reader the existence of two kinds of cognition, one non-conceptual and the
other conceptual. But he and Kumanla would disagree with each other over
whether or not non-conceptual cognition is eternal. For Kumanla it is not, but
RamakaJ).!ha would argue that it contains an eternal core, which is identical to
the perceiver, and that that part of it that does change is in fact not cognition
proper, but rather its objects.
The existence of two different kinds of cognition in Saivism is, in a sense,
written into the ontology of its scriptures by the facts that jiiiina features as,
on the one hand, a power of the Self; but, on the other, one of the qualities of
172 Note that here Ramakru;ttba uses where it cannot include determinative
cognition, its function being precisely to contrast with that. Compare note 138.
372
the Buddhi (along with dhanna, vairiigya, aisvarya and their opposites).173 In
a parallel passage in NPP,174 which follows immediately on from the passage
looked at in the first part of this chapter, RamakaJ).!ha brings up the scriptural
acknowledgement of jiiiina as one of the eight qualities of the Buddhi.
kathalJl tarhi
gha!ajiiiinalll iti jiiiinaJ.n
gha!a ity api yaj jiiiinaJ.n tat II
ityiidilaukikajiiiinabhedall. lla griihakiitll1abhediit tasya sarvadaikariipabhe-
da
l76
praki'isiitmatayii saJ.llvedalliit, api tv adhyavasiiyabhediit. adhyavasiiya
eva ca jiiiillaIJ1 buddhigu!zatviij jiiiinasya. yad uktalll, 'buddhir
sll1rtii 'dhyavasiiyena' iti.
l78
[Objection:] How then [if prakiisa is one thing] are everyday differences of
cognition [noted in] such [claims] as
the cognition that one is cognizing a pot is different from cognition of
a pot: and cognition of a pot[, unlike cognition that we are cognizing a
pot,] is in immediate contact with an object'
[possible] ?
[Siddhantin:] It is not owing to a difference of that which perceives, because
we experience that as being always of the nature of a single illumination of a
plurality [of objects]. Rather it is owing to a difference of determinative cog-
nition; and cognition (jliiina), since it is a quality of the Buddhi, is nothing
other than determinative cognition (adhyavasiiya).179 As has been said, 'The
173 What is not so explicit in the scriptures however is the idea that the Self's cogni-
tion is non-conceptual and the Buddhi's conceptual.
174 NPP 28,12-19.
175 Ked, B; Ped, L, P.
176 rupabhedao Ked'c, Ped, B, L, P; rupiibhedao Ked
pc
.
177 Ked, Ped, L; B, P.
178 iti Ked; om. in Ped, B.' L, P. (Ked reads, yad uktalll, 'budd/Iir smrtii I
'dhyavasiiyella' iti. iti the other witnesses transmit only one iti.
The second iti makes good sense to me, picking up what was said before the parenthetical
remark beginning yad llktam.)
179 His claim here that jiiiilla is simply determinative cognition is enabled by the fact
that in this passage he has been using the word praki'isa for the kind of cognition that does
not change.
373
Buddhi has been revealed in scripture to have eight qualities. It is characteri-
zed byl80 determinative cognition' .181 '
The assigning of the second kind of cognition, adhyavasiiya, to the Buddhi,
one of the products of Primal Matter, has two consequences for its nature that
are somewhat strange from the perspective of other traditions of Indian philo-
sophy. Before looking at them, however, we will note the wider importance
in Saivism of the distinction we have just seen manifested.
Excursus on the Distinction in Saivism
The distinction between that which belongs to the Buddhi (bauddlza) and that
which belongs to the Self one that was of importance in Sankhya,
was applied in Saivism not only to jiiiina but also to ajiiiina, ignorance, ilIl-
other of the Buddhi's eight qualities. RamakaJ).!ha utilizes the distinction bet-
180 Or 'recognized by', i.e. known to exist because of the existence of determinative
cognition. This particular verb is commonly used in this context. Corresponding to NPP's
'dhvayasiiyella, for example, is the YD's: tatm vaktaVYaJ!1 pUllar
buddhir iti. ucyate adhyavasiiyo buddhilz.
181 I have not traced this quotation. The scriptures certainly hold the Buddhi to have
eight qualities though. See, for example, MatPa 17.2; PaTa 4.74-75b (where they are re-
ferred to as its 'parts' aJiga). For post-scriptural references to jiiiilla as one of the eight
qualities of the Buddhi (which are also referred to as its rz7pa, bhiivas of it, or viisaniis
within it), see, for example, BhoKa 55 and Aghora.siva's commentary ad loc.; and Sadyo-
jyotis' commentary ad SvSuSa 2.12. Commenting on MatV VP 17.2, RamakaJ;ltba regards
the eight as latent traces (saJ!lski'im), which must be postulated to explain rewards such as
heaven that result from such acts as the performance of the rite well after the
actions that comprise the rite have ceased; or to explain dreams, memories and the like,
which occur when their objects are not present. These traces cannot exist in the Self, he
argues, for that would entail that the Self be transformed: rather they are unconscious
(jaa) and exist in the Buddhi.
Both the Buddhi's definition as adhyavasiiya and its having eight qualities, one of
which is jiiiilla, are inherited from Sfuikhya. See SK 23: adhyavasiiyo bllddhilz, dhamlO
jiiiinaJ!l viriiga aisvaryalll I siittvikalll etad riipaJ.1l tiimasalll aSll1iid viparyastam II (Rama-
kaJ;ltba sometimes quotes this verse, for example when commenting on NP 2.17.)
374
ween the two kinds of ignorance when trying to justify the central Saiddha-
ntika soteriological claim that knowledge is incapable of removing the deep
ignorance that is responsible for our presence in saI.nsara.
NPP ad 3. 148c-149b: iha ajiianam api dvivi-
dham. adhyavasayatmakam eva vi-
parftajiianatmakam utpadyate. iti yuktaiva tasya samyagjiia-
nan nivrttilz, yat punar anadhyavasayatmakal!! tad dravyantarad aI!dha-
kiirader bhavat dravyantarad evadityader nivrttal82svablzii-
VaJ!! siddhaJ!! na anadhyavasayatmakaJJl ca ajiia-
naJ.n iha pt7rva'l! pratipaditam, adhyavasayatmano bauddha-
tvat.
183
Here ignorance too, just like knOWledge/cognition as described in the first
chapter, is of two kinds. It is only [the first type, namely,] that of the nature of
determinative cognition that arises
184
[and does so] as having the nature of in-
correct knowledge of things like silver with regard to [what is in fact] mother-
of-pearl, as a result of not determining the similarity of an object [to other ob-
jects of the same kind]. Therefore it is indeed correct that that kind can cease
through correct knowledge, which is that which opposes it. 185 But [the other
kind], which is not of the nature of determinative cognition, exists because of
another substance, such as darkness. [Therefore] it is a fact that its own nature
ceases only owing to another substance, such as the sun, which is the opposite
of its own cause: not owing to counteracting knOWledge. 186 And the ignorance
that is intimately linked with being a bound soul ajiiana'l!), which
has been explained earlier in this [text] as existing in states of deep sleep, is
not of the nature of determinative cognition, because that which is of the na-
ture of determinative cognition belongs to the Buddhi.
This distinction between and bauddlza ignorance was important for .
non-dualistic Saivas also. It is used by Abhinavagupta, for example, at the
182 nivrttaO em. Sanderson; nivrtti ed.
183 See also MatV VP ad 2.2c-3, p. 27,19-28,8.
184 The other kind has always been there.
185 Its nature being, as stated in the previous sentence, incorrect knowledge.
186 Alternatively, 'not owing knowledge of what counteracts it'. Either way the
point is that in the kind of ignorance that is not of the nature of determinative cognition,
as exemplified by ignorance of what is around us when we are surrounded by darkness,
knowledge of what is causing that ignorance and of what is to remove it is not
enough.
375
very beginning of his Tantrasara in order to counter the Saiddhfultika point
just made by RamakaJ)tha about the inability of knowledge to bring about lib-
eration.
iha jiianaJ!! bandhanimittasyajiianasya virodhakatvat. dvivi-
dhaJ!! cajllanam: bllddhigataJ.n ca. buddhigatam aniscayasvabha-
VaJP viparftaniscayatmakal!! ca. flt vikalpasvabhavasaJikucitapra-
thatmakam. tad eva ca matakiira1)aJ!! saJpsarasyeti malanin.!aye.
tatra ajiial!al!! niVal1etiipi. kil!! tu bllddhigate
'dhyavasayatmake
l87
ajiiane sati na sambhavati heyopadeyaniicayapt7rvaka-
tvat tattvasllddhisivayojanan7paya iti tatriidhyavasayatmakal!! bu-
eva jiiana'l! pradhanam. tad eva cabhyasyamana1J!
apy ajiianaJ!!nihanti, vikalpasaJ!!vidabhyasasyavikalpatmatapalyavasanat.
Prof. Sanderson translates this as follows: 188
In this [doctrine] the cause of liberation is knowledge, for that [alone] opposes
the ignorance'[which we hold to be] the [sole] cause of bondage. Now, ignor-
ance is of two kinds[. There is] that [which may be] present in [an indivi-
dual's] judgements; and [there is the deeper ignorance which is] implicit in
individuality itself. To be ignorant on the level of judgement is to be uncertain
[of something] or else to misconstrue [it]. But the [ignorance] implicit in ind-
ividuality is the light [of consciousness] contracted as differential awareness
[of any kind]. I shall explain below, when I come to analyse Impurity, that it
is this [kind of ignorance] that is the fundamental cause of reincarnation.
Now, it is true that of the two forms of ignorance that which is implicit in in-
dividuality ends [not through knowledge but] through initiation and [the regu-
lar observances and other elements of Saiva discipline that follow it]. But ini-
tiation itself is impossible while there is intellectual ignorance on the level of
judgement. For to initiate is to purify each of the [non-ultimate] levels of real-
ity and [then] to fuse [the candidate at the ultimate level] with Siva [himself].
It therefore depends upon [the guru's] having a firm understanding of the
[various levels] to be transcended and the [final] goal [beyond them]. So in
the ritual of initiation it is intellectual knowledge on the level of judgement
that is the principal factor. Furthermore, when that [knowledge] is con-
tinuously reinforced through repetition it also destroys the ignorance implicit
187 'dhyavasayatmake em. Sanderson; anadhyavasayatmake KSTS ed.
188 In a draft translation of the beginning of the Talltrasara that he gave to those at- .
tending his class in 1996.
376
in individuality. For when any differential awareness is constantly reinforced
it will finally become non-differential.
*****
Returning now to the main thread: RamakaIgha locates non-conceptual cogni-
tion in the Self and determinative cognition in the Buddhi. This has the con-
sequence that determinative cognition is something unconscious (acetana,
jatja). For as in Sankhya, so in Saivism, everything below Primal Matter
(maya), evolving out of it; is unconscious. Determinative cognition is there-
fore also not something that perceives or experiences.
189
For Buddhism cog-
nition is that which perceives, and for their Naiyayika opponents, although
cognition is not the perceiver, it is certainly conscious. The Saiva position
that one kind of cognition is neither is paralleled only in Sankhya, and its pre-
sence in Saivism is a result of its inheritance of Sankhya's cosmological and
ontological hierarchy of principles (tattva).
The second strange consequence to which I alluded above is related, and con-
cerns the relation between the perceiver and the cognition that is located in
the Buddhi. What can their relation be? Determinative cognition cannot be a
quality of the perceiver or inhere in it, because 1) that would mean that, ow-
ing to the Saiva rejection of a substrate over and above qualities, when de-
terminative cognition changes, the perceiver would have to change; 2) some-
thing unconscious could not, for RamakaIgha, be a quality of something con-
scious; and 3) it is anyway a quality of the Buddhi, so cannot be also a quality
of something else. The answer is that it is held to be simply an object of per-
ception for the perceiver. See for eXaIllple Ramakal).tha's comment in the KV
ad 1.15:
190
'The SaIlle is true of the fact that [the soul] is without qualities (Le.
this too is established by experience), because [determinative] cognition,
pleasure, pain and the like are experienced as having the property opposite to
[that of] the [perceiver], i.e. as objects of [rather than subjects of] perception,
189 Commenting on MoKa 104, cites precisely this as an unwanted con-
sequence of an opponent's proposition: buddlzibodhasya bhoktrtvaprasa/igab.
190 eVa/.n nirglllJatvam api buddlzisukhadllbkhiidfniil!l kiidiicitkatveniillllbhavato glza!ii-
der iva griihyatvena tadvintddhadhannatayiillublzaviit (18,33-35).
Chapter 4: Equating-of Self and Cognition
377
like pots and such like, as they are experienced as happening only occa-
sionally.' 191
If cognition in the Buddhi is only an object of perception, and not something
that perceives or is conscious, why is it termed cognition (jiiana) at all? Con-
versely, if it is cognition and is located in the Buddhi, surely it is the Buddhi
and not the Self that is of the nature of cognition. The aIllbiguous nature of
the Buddhi's cognition, presented both as cognition and as nothing more than
an unconscious object of cognition, was something that prompted both the
authors of the Tantras themselves, and the early commentators, to articulate,
and then answer, objections thereto.
192
Thus at PaTa 4.90 the interlocutor
191 For instances in earlier Saiva literature of the view that bllddhi is an object of cog-
nition, see, for example, PaTa 4.93ab: bllddhir yii sii blzogyalJl bllOktllr fpsi-
tam; TaSa 13ab: bllddhir suklziidirt7pii samiisato bllOgyam (these two half-
verses are similar enough to prompt us to wonder if one was composed with the other one
in view-if that were the case, then it would be slightly more likely that the Tantra is bor-
rowing from Sadyojyotis than the other way round: see Goodall 2002 lii); MT 1.10.23':
buddlzitattva/.n tato I para/.n tad iitmano bhogYa/!l
II ('Then [comes] the principle of the Buddhi, characterized by its .many
Bhavas and Pratyayas. It is the Self's supreme object of experience, adorned with the
things that are about to be recounted'); and the two verses by Sadyojyotis given in note
196. See also the article devoted to precisely this topic by Boccio (2002).
AghoraSiva takes on this view that cognition that changes belongs to the Buddhi and
is not the perceiver, only the perceived: asya ballddlzasyajiiiillasyotpattyapavargayogitve-
na bhogyatvalll eva, Ila tu bllOktrtvalll, tasya sarvadii griilzakan7pqza sthirasyaiva sva-
salJlvedanasiddlzatviid ity uktam (ad BhoKa 64c-65b). 'This cognition belonging to the
Buddhi, since it arises and ceases, is just what is experienced, not the experiencer. For the
[experiencer] is established by self-awareness to be always completely (eva) stable in the
form of the perceiver. So we have said.' Here, as elsewhere, he echoes
wording (in, for example, the passage given above from the BlIddhiprakaralJa of the
MatV VP) closely.
192 Such objections had already been made against Sankhya by its opponents. See for
example TS(BBS) 301-302: buddhilllattviit pradhiinasya sarvalll aSYiivirodhf eet I bllddhi-
lIlattvella tu priiptal!l eaitallYa/Jl iva II buddhir adhyavasiiyo hi sa/!lvit sa/llveda-
nalll tatlzii I sa/Jlvittis eetanii eeti sarvalJl eaitallyaviieakalll II If [you say], 'Because Primal
Matter contains the Buddhi, all [this] (i.e. fnowing what is required to be produced for the
soul) is not contradictory for it [despite its insentient nature],' then since[it] contains the
Buddhi, [it] must be conscious, like souls. For [such Siiilkhya claims as that] 'the Buddhi
states that if the Buddhi is that which determines (adhyavasiiyakrt), and has
as its qualities jiiiina and the rest, then it must be the Buddhi, not the soul,
that is conscious.
Also at NP 2.17ab, Sadyojyotis states an argument for the existence of God
along the lines that Pradhana would not be able to commence creation after a
period of cosmic resorption (mahiipralaya) if there were not a conscious en-
tity to prompt it to act. He then, in the next piida, has his opponent object:
nanu jiiiina1.n pradhiine 'sti, 'surely there is cognition in Pradhana.' Rama-
kargha expands this objection as, pradhiinakiilyasya buddher jiiiiniibhyupa-
gamiit pradhiinam api jiiiiniitmaka7.n sidhyatfti kim anyad anumfyate, 'Be-
cause [you Saivas] accept that the Buddhi, a product of Pradhana, has cogni-
tion, Pradhana too is established to be of the nature of cognition, so what fur:-
ther [conscious entity] can be inferred?'
The responses to such objections differ according to context. In the second
chapter of NPP Ramakargha distinguishes two different senses of jiiiina: jiiii-
yate 'neneti jiiiina7!l prakiisiitmakam and jiiaptirupa7.n jiiiinam, that by which
things are cognized, which is of the nature of light, and that which brings
about or causes cognition. He accepts that the fIrst belongs to the Buddhi, and
holds that the second is the own nature of the Self. 193
is determinitive cognition; [and] consciousness (sa1J1vit) and experience (saJ!lvedallam);
[and] knowing (saJJlvittiM and sentience (cetallli)', are all expressive of consciousness.
193 buddhau jiiliyate 'Ilelleti jiilil!al!l praklislitmakam asmlibhir abhYllpagamyate, Ila
tll jiiaptin7pam eva tasya (ad 2.18ab, p. 144,8-10). Is it not
surprising that Riilllak!lI)tha associates prakiisa here with the Buddhi (a Sfuikhya position)
when he usually treats prakiisa as the nature of the Self? Throughout his passages looked
at up to now, the Self has repeatedly been called the prakiisaka, this sometimes being
specified as or such like. In
some passages praklisa has actually been used as a synonym of the Self; for a particularly
explicit example see the first sentence of section 3.1 of Chapter 2, where the word
praklisa!z is qualified by litmapadapratiplidya(l. Thus the present sentence represents
something of a departure, at the very least on the level of terminology. I suggest that he
has in mind here a position more frequently put forward by Sadyojyotis than him, that
prakiisa is associated with the Buddhi (see the two verses by Sadyojyotis in note 196);
and that there is a tension in his system between influence from this view and influence
379
At other places the view that the Buddhi, its adhyavasiiya and its eight quali-
ties are merely obJects of cognition and insentient is stressed; and the claim
that jiiiina and the other seven qualities belong to the Buddhi is downplayed.
Thus for example the PaTa responds to the objection outlined above by stat-
ing that the Buddhi is that which awakens the eight qualities (which pre-
sumably exist until that time as latent traces, viisanii), and they are therefore
metaphorically described as its qualities, although responsibility (adhi-
kiiritvam) for them rests with the soul.
194
In the same passage, the reason that
the Buddhi is described as the locus of cognition is said to be simply that it
takes on the form of the object of cognition.
195
Thus we do not have to con-
clude that it is conscious or a cognizer. It produces adhyavasiiya in this same
sense that it takes on the object's form. It is admitted to determine an object,
but if there were no conscious soul in addition, nothing would be aware of the
object. The function of the Buddhi is to render the object graspable by the
Self. The Self directly grasps not the external object, but rather an object that
from the Buddhist view that the perceiver is the prakiisaka, its own nature being praklisa.
As to how he can hold the Buddhi to be insentient if its cognition is of the nature of
prakiiSa, see note 196.
What is the difference between the two senses of jiilina that Ramaka1)tha attempts to
distinguish here? Is not that by which things are cognized the same as that which brings
about cognition? Light may perhaps be thrown on what Ramaka1)tha had in mind here by
the following passage from the BhoKa: saillikiin vijayliyeha praYlllikte IlTpatir yatha I pra-
Ylllikte mahadlidflli bodhiidyartham a(llIS tatha 115011 saillikasthe jaye riijiia(l kal1!1VaJ!l til
yatha tatha I bllddhyiidisaJpsthe bodhadau plll!lsa(l kaJ1rtvam 115111 sviitmiirthaJ!1
saillikiilliil!l tll vijayo Ileti te yatha I siidhalla1!l tathaiva mahadiidaya(l 115211
'Just like a King in this world marshals his soldiers.for victory, so the soul marshals its
Mahat (i.e. Buddhi) and other [faculties] for cognition and the like. But just as it is the
King (and not the soldiers) who is the agent of the soldiers' victory, so it is the soul that
we hold to be the agent of the cognition etc. that exist in the Buddhi and other [faculties].
The victory is not for the soldiers' own sake. Just as they are held to be the means of vic-
tory, the Mahat and other [faculties] are in exactly the same way [held to be the means of
cognition and the like].' (For these and other verses of the BhoKa concerned with the
Buddhi, see Boccio 2002.) The distinction here between the means of cognition and the
agent of cognition may be what Ramaka1)tha has in mind when he distinguishes between
that by which things are cognized and that whose nature is jiiapti.
194 My choice of English words here follows Goodall's translation.
195 See PaTa 4.93cd given below.
380 The Self's Awareness. of Itself
has been determined by the Buddhi (buddhyadhyavasitam artham). Thus ex-
ternal objects are objects of experience, bhogya, for the Buddhi, but the Bud-
dhi is in tum bhogya in relation to the Self.
This model of perception, derived from Sfuikhya (and adapted by Saiva texts
through the addition of a further role to Vidya, one of the cuirasses (kaficu-
1% .
kas, would seem to fit conceptual perception better than non-conceptual
perception. It thus seems possible that it was taken over by Saivism when the
latter was not much concerned with non-conceptual perception, owing to,
perhaps, not having at that stage begun detailed dialogue with Buddhism. To
investigate this question would require further research. I suggest as a possi-
bility though that RamakaI).tha's contention that non-conceptual cognition be-
longs to the Self and conceptual to the perceiver is an idea that not part
of the Saivism of Sadyojyotis or the scriptures known to RamakaI).tha. When
the PaTa states
197
bhogyiikiirii yato budd/zir bhoktur bhogasamiisrayii, which
Goodall translates as, 'Since buddhi takes the form of the experienced ob-
jects, she is the locus of the experiencer's experience', it seems to me quite
possible that it intended to claim that the Buddhi is the locus of all experi-
ence, not just one kind (determinative as opposed to non-conceptual). This is
also the impression one gets from Sadyojyotis' statement;98 pumbodhavyakti-
bhiimitviid bodho vrttir mater matii: 'The activity [known as] cognition is
196 On the question of why in addition to the Buddhi, a further faculty, Vidya, is re-
quired, see TaSa 14: ravivat praklisarfipo yadi Iliima mahiil!!s tathiipi kannatviit I
ntarasiipelqa!! sakto griihayitum iitmiillam II 'Even if the Mahat (= Buddhi) is of the na-
ture of illumination, like the sun, nevertheless, [only] with the aid of a further instrument
can it perceive itself, because it is an object'; and BhoKa 95cd-96ab pradfpa!! karal)a/J!
plllJlsa!! II dfpopalabdhall calqus ca buddhiiv apy evam
I 'The soul's instrument for its perceptions of objects like posts is a lamp, and for
its perception of a lamp, the faculty of seeing. That is how things should be accepted with
regard to the Buddhi too.' In other words even though the Buddhi is the faculty whose il-
lumination enables objects to be seen, in order to see the Buddhi a further faculty is re-
quired, just as the sun or a lamp, though capable of illuminating objects, are not capable
of seeing themselves. See also Torella 1998, Boccio 2002 and Goodall 2002 235, note
326.
1974.93cd.
198 BhoKa 46cd.
381
held to belong to the Buddhi (mater) because [the latter] is the locus of the
manifestation of the soul's cognition.' If RamakaI).tha used the expression
pumbodha one would expect it to refer to non-conceptual cognition in the
soul (PU/!lS, which he would not hold to manifest in the Buddhi.
Most likely bodha!z in Sadyojyotis'. verse refers to all cognition, so that for
him all cognition manifests in the Buddhi, but has as its agent the soul.
199
*****
To conclude let us briefly return our attention to the Matmigavrtti passage
that was the principal topic of this second part of the chapter. Before the last
section (5) it had seemed that the distinction between that which does not
change and that which does correlated neatly with the distinction between
cognition and its objects. Other traditions make the mistake of regarding cog-
nition as changing because they take what are actually objects of cognition-
pleasure, pain and so on-as cognitions. In fact anything that changes falls on
the object-side of the divide?OO In section 5.2 the picture became slightly
199 Commenting on this verse, AghoraSiva quotes Mrgendratantra, 1.11.8: iti bllddhi-
prakliso 'yalJ! I bodha ity lIcyate bodhavyaktibhfimitayii paso[z lilt
seems fairly likely that one of these verses is the source of the other. (As well as the close
resemblance of the second halves of the two verses, the fIrst half of Sadyojyotis's verse-
prakliso devadviiro na vii kvacit-like the first half of the Mrgendra verse,
contains the word praklisa.) Since the Buddhi is, in the Mrgendra verse, said to be the lo-
cus of the manifestation of cognition for the bound soul, there is room for the view that it
is not the locus of the manifestation of some other kind of cognition, which occurs in the
Self. But Sadyojyotis' verse does not seem to leave room for that view. In that sense the
Mrgendra verse could be seen as intermediate between Sadyojyotis's view and Ramaka-
Iflha's view. On its own this would of course not be enough to count as evidence for the
Mrgendra being later than Sadyojyotis. But it could be mentioned here that Goodall (2002
lii) has pointed to the former's knowledge of illusionist Vedanta and the latter's ignorance
of it as evidence of this.
200 RamakaIflha left just one clue that there was one kind of cognition that he accepts
as changing. In the middle of the long rhetorical passage in section 3, he named cittavrtti
as something which is plural and changing: lliiniividhapramiil)iidyanekacittav{ttyudaya-
sa/!!vedane 'py akampitatadgriihakasthairyavedana!!, 'even though experiencing the rise
of many mental events of various kinds such as means of knowledge, its (i.e. prakiisa's)
experience of the stability of the perceiver of those [mental events] is unshillcen.' In the
light of the rest of the Mata/igav.rtti passage and the other passages we have looked at
382
more coinplicated in that determinative cognition was admitted to change.
Thus it seemed to be only in the realm of non-conceptual cognition that any-
thing that changes is simply the objects of cognition. That is certainly one
way we could characterize the situation. But now we have seen that for
Saivism cognition is itself bhogya, orsQI.nvedya, i.e. an object
of cognition in relation to the perceiver. Thus it is still true in a sense to say
that all that changes, as a stream of cognition proceeds, is its objects.
since, we can now assume that uses cittavrtti to refer to the determinative
cognition of the Buddhi; and that his expression 'the perceiver of those [cittavrttis]'
(Otadgrlihaka
o
), indicates that cittavrttis are objects of perception.
CONCLUSION
RamakaJ;l!ha's refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self has two main
stages. In the fIrst, covered in Chapter 1, he demonstrates that Buddhist argu-
ments are capable of undermining Naiyayika, and Sankhya inferen-
ces of the Self's existence. He shows that each of the features of human life
judged by those schools to be impossible in the absence of a permanent Self
can be accounted for on the exlstence of cognition (jfitina,vijfitina) alone.
The existence of cognition is accepted by all disputants, being directly per-
ceived by everyone. So we should accept it as their explanation, not some im-
perceptible Self.
RamakaJ;l!ha, unlike the three above-mentioned Brii.hmru;rical schools, agrees
with Buddhism that we are not justifIed in positing some invisible entity be-
yond cognition, but he holds that cognition itself is the Self. Thus the second
stage consists in an examination of cognition to determine whether it is mo-
mentary or stable. Both agree that cognition is aware of itself (svasQlJlveda-
nasiddha), so RamakaJ;l!ha focuses on our direct experience of ourselves. His
description of it maintains that though various different thoughts and objects
pass before us, we are never aware of a discontinuity in the perceiver of those
thoughts and objects. We feel as though we are the same thing from moment
to moment. All action is predicated on this sense of continuity, for the fruits
of an action will not come to us until, at the very least, some moments after
the act itself.
The Buddhist agrees that we appear to ourselves as continuous; and that we
undertake action thinking that it will be us who will benefIt from it in the fu-
ture. But he maintains that we are wrong to think that: our appearance to our-
selves as stable is mistaken. In fact what 'I' am in every moment is separate
from and of a different nature than what 'I' am in every other moment. But
each momentary phase succeeds the previous so rapidly and is so similar to it,
that we are fooled into mistaking a plurality for a unity. Driven on by an at-
384
. The Self' s Awareness ofItself
tachment to our own (imagined) identities, we superimpose stability on to
what is momentary.
The rest of this second stage of RamakaJ).tha's refutation argues for the inco-
herence of the idea that our appearance to as stable perceivers (sthi-
ragriihakaprakasa) is false. RamakaJ).tha has three main arguments. First, the
notion that the Buddhist appeals to to explain the falsity, superimposition, in-
volves a superimposer applying an inappropriate concept on to something ex-
ternal to him- or herself.! So if the, stable appearance of ourselves were some-
thing it would appear as external to us. But it does not.
Secondly, a perceiver that existed for only a moment would not have time to
observe several consecutive momentary phases of itself, note their similarity,
and on the basis of that similarity superimpose stability on to them. From
where, furthermore, could it ever acquire the notion of stability when both it
and the objects it encounters last only a moment?
His third argument appeals to a doctrine of the Buddhists themselves, which
the Saivas shared. In maintaining that our stable self-perception is mistaken,
the Buddhist relies on the distinction between non-conceptual perception,
which gives valid knowledge of its objects, and determinative cognition,
which, according to him, superimposes on to objects concepts that do not rep-
resent them faithfully. But the Buddhists themselves hold that even though
determinative cognitions do not give accurate information about the objects
they are directed towards, they do give an accurate picture of themselves
(sviitmany avikalpako vikalpakalz). Thus if the subject of cognition were mo-
mentary, it would appear to itself in determinative cognitions (as well as in
non-conceptual perception) as momentary. Our stable self-appearance, which
the Buddhist accepts, cannot therefore be accounted for except as an accurate
apprehension of our nature.
In texts other thaD. NPP in which he deals with the issue, such as the KiralJa-
vrtti and the his refutation of the Buddhist doc-
trine of no-Self ends there. But in the he has to
1 Or perhaps 'itself' would be more appropriate since it is cognitions that carry out
superimposition.
Conclusion
385
comment on a verse that claims that the Self is the object of I-cognition
(ahampratyaya).Thus, in a passage examined in Chapter 3, he argues that the
Self is validly perceived through I-cognition.
There are three sections in this passage, which give, respectively: 1) reasons
why the Yogacaras' own presuppositions should commit them to the validity
of I-cognition; 2) a reason why all determinative cognitions, even ones in
which 'I' is not explicitly articulated, contain an I-cognition; and 3) refuta-
tions of the Buddhist doctrine of the invalidity of all determinative cognition,
of which I-cognition is an example.
In the first, RamakaJ).tha argues that DharmakIrti's sahopalambhaniyama ar-
gument can.be turned against Yogacaras and used to produce the conclusion
that the Self is real. DharmakIrti and his followers claimed that since one
never experiences the individual objects of pre-conceptual cog-
nition without also experiencing the pre-conceptual cognition itself, and vice
versa, the individual object is not different from the cognition. RamakaJ).tha
applies the principle that if two things are always perceived together they
must be non-different, to determinative cognition, specifically I-cognition,
and its object.
DharmakIrti and his followers would not accept that determinative cognition
and its objects (adhyavaseyas) are co-perceived, because they held that adhy-
avaseyas, unlike the determinative cognition itself, are unreal. RamakaJ).tha
counters this in 1.1.2, and in 1.2.2. In 1.1.2 he argues that though Sautrantikas
could consistently make this claim, it is incompatible with another Yogacara
doctrine. In 1.2.2 he implicitly accepts that adhyavaseyas such as the unity of
a forest are unreal, mental constructs to which nothing corresponds in the
world outside the determinative cognition. But he distinguishes the object of
I-cognition from them, in that the former is indeed found outside determina-
tive cognitions, as the content of self-experience (svasal!lvedana). Whether
these two arguments are strong or not, I would say that RamakaJ).tba's wider
attempt to show that acceptance of the reality of the Self follows undesirably
for Buddhists who accept the sahopalambhaniyama argument is uncompel-
ling. For even if it were accepted that Self and I-cognition were co-perceived,
what should follow is merely that the Self is the same as I-cognition, not that
386
it is real. Since I-cognition is momentary for the Buddhist, he would not be
troubled by the reduction of the Self to it.
In the second section RamakaIJ.tha argues that even such determinative cogni-
tions as 'this is a pot', in which'!, is not explicitly articulated, contain a ver-
bal cognition (vimarsa) of their agent's Self, for otherwise the pot would not
be established as seen by that particular agent rather than by sorn.eone else. If
only the object, not the agent,were verbally cognized, the agent would
not be able to say subsequently 'J saw that pot.'
In the third section he tackles the general DharmakIrtian position that deter-
minative cognition (adhyavasiiya, vimarsa) is not a means of knowledge. The
DharmakIrtian opponent gives daydreaming as an example of determinative
cognition where there is clearly no real object there. RamakaIJ.tha responds
that he does not hold all determinative cognitions to be means of knowledge:
when we dream of a blue object, there is indeed no real object there. But just
as there are false perceptions and real ones, as the Dharma-
kIrtians accept, so for RamakaIJ.tha there are cases of valid determinative cog-
nition, which are genuine means of knowledge, and cases of false determina-
tive cognition. Why should the Buddhist accept that distinction in the case of
perception and yet lump all determinative cognition together as false?
DharmakIrti's criterion for accepting perception as a valid means of know-
ledge is that it occurs when a real entity is there and does not when one is not
(vastvanvayavyatireka), indicating that perception has a firm connection with
a real object (vastupratibandha). He holds that determinative cognition oc-
curs when no real entity is there and so does not depend on a connection.
RamakaIJ.tha adopts DharmakIrti's criterion and shows that in valid determi-
native cognitions there are indeed real entities with which the cognition is in-
separably connected. Thus, for example, in the case of valid instances of re-
cognition such as 'this is the pot that I saw earlier', those entities are the pot
and the previous seeing of it, which is retained in the Self. Or in the case of
determinative cognition based on scripture, the cognition and the object are
connected through the cognition of the composer of the text. In general it
could be said that RamakaIJ.tha's strategy is to take whatever features the
Buddhist attributes to determinative cognition as rendering it invalid, and to
show that that feature can also apply to perception. Thus when, for example,
Conclusion
387
the Buddhist asserts that the unreality. of the objects of inferential determina-
tive cognition is indicated by the fact that they do not appear clearly, Rama-
kaIJ.tha points out that the same is often true of perception, for example when
the objects are far away.
If, as RamakaIJ.tha holds, the Self is nothing other than cognition, then cogni-
tion must be permanent. The fourth chapter presented two passages in which
RamakaIJ.tha defends this position. In the fIrst he counters the Buddhist argu-
ment that cognition, since it would only be able to perceive a plurality of ob-
jects if it was different with respect to each object, must be plural. He fIrst
shows that even at one moment of time, when the Buddhist accepts that cog-
nition is unitary, it sometimes perceives a plurality of objects; and then argues
that there is no reason to assume that this relation of one perceiver to a plur-
ality of objects cannot hold over a sequence of time. In the second passage he
argues that what others take to be fInite, changing instances of cognition,
such as pleasure and pain, are in fact objects of cognition. He does admit that
determinative cognition is changing, but this is located in the Buddhi, not the
Self, and is an object of perception in relation to the real perceiver.
Throughout my presentation of these passages, one of my tasks has been to
place RamakaIJ.tha's ideas within the context of tlle other schools that he was
either opposing or drawing from. The Buddhist Epistemological School was
of central importance to this period of Indian philosophy, especially in Kash-
mir. The perceived power of their arguments led to different strategies of re-
sponse from their opponents. Naiyayikas, for example, often retreated into
entrenched realist positions making little or no concessions to Buddhism.
2
RamakaIJ.tha, by contrast, absorbs many features of Buddhism, for example
the idea that cognition does not inhere in a substrate, that it is simultaneously
aware of itself and its object, and that pre-conceptual (nirvikaZpaka) perce-
ption is a more reliable guide to reality than conceptual perception. Saiva
Siddhanta had more space for innovation because its scriptures did not much
concern themselves with philosophical details concerning the Self and cogni-
2 See Stcherbatsky 198448-49. Their liberation doctrine and certain features of their
logic (e.g. Uddyotakara's lzetucakra) are that show influence from Buddhism
however.
388
tion. Since the evolution of Saiva philosophy into a mature form did not oc-
cur until after the Buddhist epistemological ideas were well-known and un-
derstood, there was much opportunity for cross-fertilization. The present
work demonstrates how, as a strategy to undermine Buddhist arguments, a
Saiva Siddhantin author creatively assimilated certain.features of Buddhism,
thereby strengthening his own armoury, and then used these to overcome
those other features of Buddhism that conflicted with the core essentials of
his own tradition. The philosophy of early Saiva Siddhiinta remains a little-
studied corner of Indology. This is in part due to the fact that RfunakaJ)J:ha did
not succeed in eliciting a tradition of response from the non-Saiva philoso-
phical schools, or in producing a lasting lineage of Kashmirian Saiddhiintika
writers. Saiva Siddhiinta not being known for its philosophy, some may have
assumed that, when it came to deal with a philosophical matter such as the
refutation of Buddhism, it simply borrowed the arguments of the non-
Buddhist philosophical schools. We have seen that this is not the case; Rfuna-
kaJ)!ha's voice in the Self/no-Self debate is a distinct one, and he succeeds in
articulating a sophisticated stance, worthy of taking its place alongside those
found in the better studied philosophical traditions. The philosophical texts of
early Saiva Siddhiinta contain treasures not only for those interested in the
History of Saivism but also for those interested in the History of Philosophy.
TEXT PASSAGES*
CHAPTER 1
1 yady evam, blzedasya satyatviit,1 pratitarfram iva pratyartlzw.n
2

ca biilzyasyiirtlzasyiillalzalikiiriispadasyiilzmikiiriispadm.n vijiiiillm.n
3
blzillllam
eva griilzakam allublzavasiddlzam astu, Iliillyalz kat cid iitmii nama,
4
tasy05pa-
allupalablzyasvanlpasya ca [Ked p.
9] sattii dulzsiidlzyaiva.
9
2.1 satyam.
1O
ata evelldriyiidir iva
ll
kiiryiit so 'p-r
2
cclziitmakiid
13
allumfyata iti
Ilaiyiiyikii!l. tad ayuktam.
14
kiiryiid dlzi kiiral)amiitrm.n sadrsam eviillumfyate.
There is no extra material in this chapter-in either its main text or its footnotes-
that is not in Chapters 1-4. Its only purpose is to print the text uninterrupted by trans-
lations and comments and to include those footnotes of relevance to its constitution.
1 satyatviit P, Ked, Ped; satvatviit B.
Z Interlinear gloss above pratyartlzm.1l in P: pratipadiirtlzm.n.
3 vijiiiillm.n B, P, Ked; vijiiiillal]l Ped.
4 Iliima conj. Goodall; Iliimeti B, P, Ked, Ped. This labelling of the school
of the opponent would be very unlikely to occur halfway through the opponent's asser-
tion. Moreover the very last words of the passage looked at in this chapter, ity iitmatzlllya-
viidillalz, seem to refer to the whole of this passage and thus make this speaker label red-
undant. Most likely then iti was originally an interlinear comment in a manu-
script that a subsequent scribe took to be part of the text. (B and P abound in such inter-
linear speaker-labels.)
5 Interlinear gloss above tasyoO in B and P: iitmallalz.
6 Interlinear gloss above in P: upalablzyasyety artlzalz.
7 priiptasyiio P, Ked, Ped; priiptasya B.
8 See MatV VP 150,3-4: te ca sarva eva Iliinyalz kat cid
iitmiiblzidlziillo 'rtlzo vidyata ity iilzulz, jiiiillavyatirekqza
. Ilupalabdlzelz.
9 dulzsiidlzyaiva P, B, Ked; dulzsiiddlzaiva Ped.
10 Interlinear comment in P above sat yam: etat iti
390
tac ca pilrvakaIJz15 vijiiiinam eva pilrvatarajiiiinajasGl!zskiirasahiiyam ubhaya-
viidi
l6
siddhGl.n nflapftiidijiiliniinlim iviisyli!z kiira1}am astfti
17
kuto visadrsata-
siddhi!l.fad uktam 19
. .'0 bl 'I,?? k I I
yasmlll satl- lGvaty eva yar tato nyasya-- a pane
taddhetutvena sarvatra hetl7niim anavasthiti!z II iti.
2.2 na, nfllidijiiiinliniim
23
iviisyii[l24 kiiryatviisiddhe!z. icchli hi pilrviinubhilta-
sukhaslidhanatv.lidyanusandhiinasiimarthyasiddhatatsamlinakartrtvajiiiina25-
sahabhiivinf. iti jiilitrantarebhya iva sarfravijiiiinlintariidibhyo 'pi kiiryatvena
. vyiivartamiinii jliiitiirGlJl sthiram anumiipayatfty iitmasiddhi[l. na hi
ya eviihGl!z sa etad anyatropapadyate yata[l. 27
11 Marginal comment next to "endriylidir iva in P: yathii hy anupalabhyo 'pfndriylidi!z
kiira1}iinumlinam iti. anupalabhyasya srava1}lidei yathii
tad anllmlinGlJl tathety artha[l.
12 so 'pt P, B, Ked; iitmiipt Ped.
13 Interlinear gloss above so 'pfcchiitmaklid in B: kiiryiit.
14 Interlinear comment above tad ayuktam in B and P:
15 tac ca pilrvakGl!z P, Ked; atas ca pilrvGl!z Ped; tatas ca pilrvakal.n B.
16 Interlinear gloss above ubhayaviidi" in P:
17 Interlinear gloss above asyli[l kiira1}am astfti in B and P: icchiiyli[l.
18 Interlinear gloss above in B: iitmiikhya.
19 PVa 2.24.
20 Interlinear gloss above yasmin sati in B:
21 Interlinear gloss above yat in B: kiiryalJl.
22 Interlinear gloss above 'nyasya in B: anyasya kiira1}asya.
23 Interlinear comment above na nfliidijiiiinliniim ivii in B: etat na nfliidijiiiinliniim i[i
em.; e B]vetylidikalJz naiyiiyikavacanGlJl; in P: pilpa, naiyiiyikavacanam. The first word is
of course an abbreviation of
24 Interlinear gloss above "syii!z in B and P: icchliyli!z.
25 Marginal gloss above anllsandhiinasiimarthyasiddhatatsamlinakart.rtvajiilina in B:
ya eViihGlJl sa RamakaI;l!ha writes ya eViihalJz sa below
(with transmitted in B) as his formulation of the awareness of same agency.
26 P, Ked; B, Ped.
27 Interlinear gloss above anyatra in P: litmani; in B: iitmavyatirikte vijiiiina. Perhaps
the reason that the author did not write vijliline was that if one inserted this phrase into the
text instead of anyatra, sandhi would result in vijliiina. B's gloss seems appropriate, P's
not.
Text Passages
2.3 na,28 asiddhatvlit. na hi tatsamlina29kartrtva30jiiiinasahabhiivitvam asyli!z31
siddham, tatsiddhatve hi eVlitmokta[l syiid iti nityli-
numeyatviibhyupagamavirodhab. nanv
32
ata
33
eva tad app4 sarvlitmaniil!Z su-
khasiidhanatviidyanusandhlinasiimarthyata!z slidhyata ity uktam. kim idalJz sli-
marthYGl!z35 yena tasya siddhi!z? anyathiinupapattir eva. sii kasya? na tiivad
icclzliyii[l, anusandlziinajliiinata evlisyii!z samutpatte[l.36 [Ked p. 10] atlza
37
ta-
syaiviinupapattir
38
iti na, tasyiipi piirviinllblzavasaIJzsklirata39 eva blzavadbhir
apy utpiidlibhyupagamlit.
2.4 tarhi sa eva
40
sGl.nskiiro nityena dlzanni1}ii vinii nopapadyata iti tatas tatsi-
ddhi[l. na, anityiiniim 41 evomnatta 43
mlidinli siddha
44
iti vijiiiinasantatiiv eva kramavatylil!Z sa
45
sidhyati nlinyatrii-
tyantiisiddhe.
46
28 na omitted in P. Interlinear comment above na in B: etat.
391
29 Interlinear comment above asiddlzatvlit na hi tatsamiina in B: sabdavlicye sarfre-
ndriyiidau vii. The intention of the comment is not clear to me. Harunaga Isaacson sug-
gested the following partial explanation. It is intended as a note on (tatsamlina)kartrtva-
(jiiiina). With the Buddhist speaking one might find it slightly problematic who the kartr
is thought to be. sabdavlicye is thus an abbreviation of kartrsabdaviicye.
30 "kartrtva" Ked, B, P; "kartr" Ped.
31 Interlinear gloss above asyli!z in P: icchiiyii[l.
32 Interlinear-incorrect-comment above nanll in P:
33 Marginal comment referring to nanv ata in B: nanv ata naiYliyika.
34 Interlinear gloss above tad api in B: tatsamiinakartrtvajlilinasahabhiivitvGl!z. Mar-
ginal comment referring to tad api in P: tatsamlinaka11rtvajliiinasahablzlivatvasya
parlimarsas tad apfty anena.
sya.
35 Interlinear comment above kim idGlJl siimarthYGl.n in B:
36 samlltpatte!z B, Ked; samlltplidiit Ped; samllpapatte!z P.
37 Interlinear gloss above atha in B and P: yadi.
38 tasyaiviinllpapattir B, Ked, Ped; tasyaivlinupapittir P.
Interlinear gloss above tasyaivli", in B: anusandhiinajiiiinasyaiva; in P: anllsandhiina-
39 "sGl!zskiirata B, Ked, Ped; "salJzskiira P.
40 Interlinear comment above tarhi sa eva in B and P: naiyliyikavacanalJz.
41 Interlinear comment above na anitylinlim in B and P:
42 "vonmatta" B, P, Ked; "votpanna" Ped. Interlinear comment above "onmatta" in P:
dhatl7ra.
43 Marginal gloss of in P: rGlijanal!Z nlima sGl!lskiira!z.
44 Marginal comment in P referring to 'this sentence: datz"lrabfjliniilJl raiijitiiniil!Z vlipe-
eva jiiyante, na tu svetiini, iti loke prasiddham.
392
2.5 iti na vidma!l kasyiinyasya
48
siddhir yena
tad api jiiiinal.n siidhyate.
3.1 etena api
ntaravikiirai[z49 sm.rtyiidibhis eiitmiinumiinal.n pratyuktam. tathii hi tiryaggati-
svabhiivasya viiyor ilrdhviidha[zpreral}al.n nopapadyate, bhastriidhmiiteva kas
cit kalpya[z. eval!l dehiivayaviisritiiniim api yantrapuru-
prayatnayukto jfvanasyiipi dhanniidhannakiiryatayii tad-
gU(liisrayablu7ta[z, manaso 'py iieaitanyiid
50
ratlziider iva prayatnaviin prera-
ka[z, diirjimiidyambla
51
tararasaplzaladarsanena dantodakiitmakarasanendri-
yavikarasya darsanad sarvendriyii111ziinusandlziitii kas cit
kalpya[z. tae ea vijiiiinam eva praviilziitmakalJl sal.nskiiriidivasata!l pilrvoktiise-
ubhayaviidisiddham astfti kuto 'nya[z sidhya
54
ti.
45 Interlinear gloss above sa in B and P: sal.nskiira!l.
46 Interlinear gloss above niinyatriityantiisiddlze in B and P: iitmiikhye
dhanni(li.
47 prayogaO B, P, Ked; prayogff Ped.
48 kasyiinyasya Ked
Pc
, Ped; kasyii B, Ked
ac
; kasya P. In deciding which reading to ac-
cept here, i.e. in deciding whether to regard the inclusion of the anyasya as original, I
have been influenced by the following sentence that occurs shortly: rilparasiidisamudiiya-
vyatireke(liinyasya kasya cid iimraplzaliider dharmil}o 'nupalambhiit. It is not necessary to
translate both vyatirekel}a and anyasya into English, but it is natural to include both in
Sanskrit.
49 VS(C) 3.2.4: sukha-
du[zkhe prayatnas eety iitmaliligiini. On this siitra, and the very similar lists
of liligas of the Self in the Carakasalplzitii, see Preisendanz 1994263-274.
50 iieaitanyiid Ked, pac; aeaitanyiid B, ppc, Ped.
51 The more usual form is amla.
52 vikiirasya darsaniid aO conj. Sanderson; vikiirasyiiO B, P, Ked, Ped. I follow this
diagnostic conjecture-as support for which Sanderson pointed to rasanavikriyiidarsaniid
in the given on page 170-because I do not see anything that vikii_
rasya can be construed with in the transmitted text. Since the genitives that parallel vikii-
rasya in the other phrases in this sentence jfvanasya and manasab)
are all qualified by an api, we could conjecture the loss of one more syllable here: vikii_
rasyiipi darianiid aO.
53 P, Ked, Ped : B.
54 kuto 'nya!l sidlzyaO P, Ked, Ped; not readable in the photocopy I have of B. It has
been inadvertently covered up by a scrap of paper on which is written
samavii ... ' (breaks off there).
Text Passages
3.2 yad apfeehiidfniim rasiidivad saty ayiiva-
ddravyablziivitviie iitmano
56
glll}ino 'nllmiinam/
7
tad api p. ll]ntiisiddher vyiiptyablziiviid anai-
kiintikam.
58
na hi rasiidfniilJl gll(zatvam asmiikalJl
59
siilikhyiiniim api vii pra-
siddham, kasya cid iimraphaliider
dhannil}o 'nllpalambhiit.
6o
ata eviimrasya rasa iti bhedavyapadesa!l samlldii-
yaikadesatva
61
khyiipaniiya vanasya dhava!l sobilana iti
62
vad upapadyata eva.
kasya tarhfyam ieehii? kamzal}o griimiider eva. atha heto!l ka-
syeti, ucyate yato 'nantaralJl dr.syate tasya jiiiinasya pilrvatara-
jiiiinajasalpskiiraparipiikiitmana[z. kathalJl tarhi devadattasyeeehetyiidiko 'tra
kartrtvavyavahiiro laukika[z? kutarkadarsaniibhyiisamiila upabata eva,63 vita-
55 Ped; B, P, Ked.
56 iitmano P, Ked, Ped; B.
393
57 See the parallel in MatV VP (where he attributes' the argument to Naiyayikas, not
nanu jliiinasyotpattimattve sati rasiidivad
ayiivaddravyabhiivitvena ea avasYaJJl gll(linii bhavita-
vyam [bhavitavyam ii, r, r; bhavitavyam ity ed.]. yatra [yatra ii, r; atra ed.] ea
stlzitaJJI tat, sa [glll}atayiivasthitaJ!l tat, sa ii, r, r; gU(litayiivasthitas tatra ed.] iitmeti naiyii-
yikii[z (153,5-7).
58 See the parallel passage in KV ad 2.25ab, p. 53: namt jiiiinaJ!1 tiivad asmadiidipra-
saty rasiidivad gll(za!l. ea dravyiisritena bhavita-
vyam iti. yas tasyiisraya!l sa ajiiiinarilpa eviitmii sidhyati ... so 'py ayu-
kta[z prati siidhyadhanniisiddhatviit.
59 Interlinear gloss above asmiikalJl in B: iitmasiinyaviidinii; in P: iitmasfinyaviidiniil!l.
60 See KV ad 2.25ab, lines 4-8: nanujiiiinasya rasiider iva gll(zatve hetur lIkta eva. so
'py aYllkta[z prati siidhyadhanniisiddhatviit. rasiidayo hi bhiivii!l SaJ!l-
hatii eva jiiyamiinii!l saJJlhatii eva niruddhiis ea, siilikhyasaugatiidibhir iViismiibhir api
pramii(zasiddhatviid arthakriyiikara(lii!l kathyante, na tv anya!l kas cit iisrayablu7tas
tadvyatirekqza tasyiinllpalamblzaniid iti. See also MatV VP 153,8-11.
61 Goodall (1998 252, note 281) conjectures deia in place of deiatva, perhaps
prompted by the parallel in KV The transmitted
reading seems to me to construe naturally however. Furthermore, when the Buddhist, in a
few sentences, comes to extrapolate this remark about expressions such as iimrasya rasa!l
to expressions such as devadattasyeeehii he describes the latter as
sambandhitiipradarsanii11ha[z. The fact that he uses an abstract suffix in this correspond-
ing compound, makes the conjecture hard to defend.
62 sobhana iti Ked, B, P; sobhata iti Ped.
63 mala upahata eva em. Goodall; mii!opahata eva Ked, Ped, B, P. See malo bhrii-
nta eva in the next note but one.
stiiyii[l praviiha itivad Vii
64

Yllkta eva.
65
iitmaviidiniim api vii devadattasya sViitmaiviitra pramii{wm iti ka-
tham asall vyavahiira[z. pramii{leniinllpapadyamiina[z kalpita eveti eet, k.rtalJ!
vyavahiirel)a. pramii{wm eva hi satyetaratvavyavasthiipaniiyiinllsara{lfyam,
tae eetaratriipi samiillam, iti jiiiillam eva ieehii, na tu gll{w[z kasya
cit.
4.1 yad api siilikhyai[z Sal!lhatiilliil.1l piiriil1hyaIJI sayalliidflliim iva kiiryakara-
{liilliil!! parasiddhiiv anllmiillam llpanyastam, tad apy llbhayaviidisiddhalJl vi-
jiiiillam eva siidhayatfti siddhasiidhallam. llan1l
66
tasya
67
anityatviit kramel)a
sa/!lhatatvam iti tato 'py anyo 'salJlhata[z paro
68
'nllmeya[l. satyam, yadi ta"
thiibhz7tena vyiipti[z siddhii [Ked p. 12] bhavet. sa/!lhatiilliil!l hi Sa/!l-
eva piiriil1hyal!1 siddham, iti jiiiinam eva tathiibhiItalJl
sidhyati. ante 'py allavasthiiparihiiriirthalJz kasya cit tathiibhz7tasyaiviibhYllpa-
gamiin niinyo 'tathiibhz7ta[z. Ila hi yad asiddhavyiiptikalJz
vastll, tad dhetll[z69 svasaktyaiva
70
siidhayitzll!l saknoti, jiiiipako 'ya/!l Ila
ki'irako yata[z.
4.2 Ila ea jiiiinam asmiikam asiddham iti viieyam. Q/1hapraki'iso hy aya/.n saka-
lalokaprasiddho 'll11bhz7yata eva. na eiisiiv arthadhal77za[z, 71
Iliidhyiitlllam allllbhaviit, arthasya sarviin praty
prasa/igiie ca. Iliipi plll!zsvabhiivas, tasyiisiddhe[z.73 siddhall eiipraki'isiitlllallo
64 itivad vii Ked, B, P; itivae eii Ped.
65 See KV ad 2.25ab, lines 8-10: katha/.n tarhi prthivyiilJ! gandha ityiidivyavahiira[z.
klldarsalliibhyiisamalo bhriinta eva. yadi vii vana-
sya dhava[z sobhalla itivad Yllkta eveti. See also MatV VP 153,12-13.
66 Ilanll Kedpc, B; omitted in Ped, Kedac; vakra P.
67 tasya B, P; vijiiiinasya Ked, Ped.
Marginal gloss above tasya in B and P: vijiiiinasya.
68 Marginal gloss above paro in B:
69 Above taddhetu[z in B is a marginal' gloss: tasyiinllmiilla. This implies that its
author takes taddhetu[z to be a compound. I have not done so.
70 svasaktyaiva B, P, Ped; svasaktyii Ked.
71 Marginal gloss under na eiisiiv arthadhal77lO: kaumiirilalllata/!z na eiisiiv
arthadhal7lla.
7' -0
- P, Ked, Ped; B.
73 tasyiisiddhe[z B, Ked, Ped; tasyii[z siddhe[z P.
Text Passages
vyatirekiibhiiviit tasyiipy aprakiisarz7patvam ity iiyiitam iilldhyam.
jagata[z.tad llktam
74
prasidhyati II iti. .
pradfpavat svaparaprakiisaikasvabhiivatvena vijiiii-
nam anubhavasiddha/!lniipallllotzll!l sakyam iti. tad idam uktam
75
jiiiiniil1hall saha n7padfpa
76
tlllayii jiitall I
iti iitmanii bhoktrii
77
din7pel)iinyella sLlnyii[z skandhii ity iitlllasz7nyaviidina[z.
CHAPTER 2
1 atriieiilya iiha [Ked p. 13]
1.5) niibhiiva[z sakyate vaktlll!l pratyaye
sz7nyatii tell a bhiiviiniil!l bodhabiidhitii II
2 yady eVa/!1 jiiiiniitlllani griihakasvan7pe pra-
saty abhiivo niitlllana[z sakya[z pratipiidayitum, anllbhavasiddha-
tviit. bhokt!1Va/J! hi jiiiitrtvam ueyate tad eva ea piiramiirthikam iitmano
rL7pam. tae ea bhavadbhir apy anllbhavasiddham ity llktam. ata[z kim allyat
siidhyam iti. nanll ea pratyartha/!l ea bhillllam eVedal!1 griiha-
karL7Pa/!1 vijiiiillam asmiibhi[z pratipiiditam, na tv iitmiibhidhiina[z kas cit sar-
'rtha[z. yadi ea tad eviisiiv ity lleyate, bhavatu niimabheda[l
param, sarve{za tv iitmaviidillii sthiran7po 'sau darsanfya[z iti eet, ueyate nii-
tra bhavadabhyupagamo 'Iigatveniismiibhir ukta[z. Ila hi pratidarsallalJl vya-
vasthiipakiilliil!l sarvapramiitf7.1iim
79
anubhavabheda[l sambhavati, tasya sva-
bhiivasiddhatviit. yad iihu[z80
jliiilzal!l praty abhiliipalJl ea sadrsall balapa{lt;litall II iti.
395
74 PVin l.55cd. Also quoted at NPP 61,1; NVV Vol. 1,209,27-28; TSP(BBS) Vol. 1,
490,5b-4b and Vol. 2, 705,17; NM(M) Vol. 2, 490,10 and 498,7; and by Jayaratha ad
Tantriiloka 1O.96c-97b.
75 Source unknown.
76 rupadfpao Ked, B; bhiivarL7pao Ped.
77 bhoktrii Ked, Ped ; bhoktii B.
78 Ked, Ped, B, P; M.
79 vyavasthiipaki'iniil!l sarvapramiitf7.ziim Ked, Ped; prallliitf7.!iim vyavasthiipakiilliim
B; vyavasthiipaki'illiil!l pramiitf7./iim P. j
80 VaPa ill samballdhasamllddeia 55cd.
tat sa evayalJz sakalalokaprasiddlzalz svanublzavo nin7pyatam. kilJl praty-
artlzalJz capr7rvo 'pr7rvalz pr7rvottarablzyam [Ked p. 14] anublza-
vablzyal!Z blzinnalz
81
gralzakalz prakasata uta sarva-
daivablzill1za
82
iti.
3.1 tatraYal!Z stlzirarz7palz prakasalz sarvadaiva grahyopadlzi
83
blzede 'py an-
asvadita
84
svatmablzedalz, kalatraye 'pi tirask!1asvagatapragablzavapradlzvalJz-
sabhavalz, 'py
akampitatadgralzaka
85
stlzairyavedanalz, ap/6 avilllptajyotilz,
apy satt;ltam eva svaprakasatvena gamyatvad
amzapadapratipadyalz svasalJlvedanasiddlzalz, iti kim atranyena
sadlzanena.
87
tam eva cablzinnam anapayinfi!z catmasal!zvidam asritya sarvailz
81 blzinnalz Ped; omitted in Ked"C; blzinnao Ked
Pc
, B; blzill1zalao P. bhinnalz makes best
sense, and is supported by the parallel sentence in the
82 aivablzinna B, P, Ped, Ked
Pc
; aiva blzimza Ked"c.
83 gralzyopadlzio P, Ked, Ped; gralzyopadiO B.
84 anasvadita em. Sanderson; anasadita Ked, Ped, B, P. See Mataligavrtti p. 172: ...
sarvadaiva gralzyopadlziblzede 'py anasvaditasvatlllablzedalz kalatraye 'pi ... attention to
which is drawn in note 116 on page 197 of Goodall 1998 in the context of this emendation
by Prof. Sanderson. See also ad 43: ... sarvadaiva gralzyopa-
dlziblzede 'py anasvaditasvamzablzedall kalatraye 'pi ... CAP 294,28).
85 akalllpitatadgralzakao Ked, B, P; akalllpitatattadgralzaka,o Ped.
86 apy Ked
Pc
, Ped, B, P; v!1tyantarale pi Ked"c.
87 Goodall (1998 xxiv) points out that a distinctive feature of Ramakrugha's writing is
his consistency of expression when treating the same topic in different texts. The fact that
occasionally large sections of text are repeated almost word-for-word in other of his texts
is a great help for an editor, meaning that corruptions can sometimes be easily spotted and
removed. This passage, for example, occurs almost unshanged in the
rikavrtti and the MataligaVJ1ti. The most recent edition of the former reads: ... nama tat.
sa [correct to: ... nama. tat sa] evanapalznavanfyasvablzavo nin7pyatam. kil!Z
pr7rvalz pr7rvalz [correct to: apr7rvo 'pr7rvalz, also the reading of MSS] pL7rvottara-
blzinnalz gralzakalz prakasata atlza [correct, per-
haps, to: uta] sarvadaiva. blzinna iti tatrayalJz [correct to: sarvadaivablzi1lIza iti. tatrliyal!z]
stlziran7palz prakasalz sarvadaiva gralzyopadlziblzede 'py anasvaditatmablzedalz kalatraye
'pi tirask.rtasvapragablzavapradlzval!zsabhavalz, [correct to: pra-
also the reading of MSS] anekacittav.rttyudayavyayasalJlvedane 'py ekam api
[correct ekam api to: akampita, also the reading of MSS]tadgralzakastlzairyavedanalz,
[correct to: also the reading of MSS] apy aviluptajyotilz,
apy satatam eva svaprakasatvena gamyatvad atmapada-
pratipadyalz svasal!zvedanasiddlzalz, iti kim atranyena sadlzanena CAP 294,
Text Passages
kalantaraplzalani arablzyante. tu tasyalz sarvavyavahara-
pratyastamayalz, sarvanllblzavanalJz dhvalJlsa-
ta'Jl samblzavablzavat kalz pravarteta
89
kutra kimartlzal.1l va ya-
tall. na Izi 'nalzalJl na
91
,mama' iti paSyatalz
pravrttir glzatate. iti nin7zalJl Izeyopadeyabud-
dlzivikalam amithyajiianalJl vicarabodhadyanekajl1anasr7nYalJl jagad etad
blzavet, iti sarvanublzavavirodlzalz, stlziragralzakaprakasapr7rvakatvad evam-
ader iti.92
397
25-32). Thus putting these two texts side-by-side enables, in the space of three sentences,
improvement of NPP in two places and of PMNKV in six or seven places. The MSS re-
ferred to in this note, and subsequent notes giving passages from PMNKV, are all from
South India. One was collated by me during my doctoral research, and the rest, since then,
by Dominic Goodall as part of our project to critically edit and translate the text for the
first time.
The parallel passage in the MatangavJ1ti reads, na gralzyabhede 'pi gralzakatma Yll-
gapad iva blzi1l11O 'vabhasate. api tu sarvadaiva gralzyopadlziblzede 'py anti-
svaditasvatmablzedalz, kalatraye 'pi tirask.rtasvagatapragablzavapradlzval.llsabhavalz, nti-
'py akampitatadgralzakastlzairyave-
danalz, vrttyantarale 'py aviluptajyotilz, apy satatam eva-
rtlzavagamakatvena blzasanad atmapadapratipadyalz svasalJlvedanasiddlzalz
stlzira eva [sthira eva ii, f, r; sthirabhava ed.], iti kim atranyena sadlzanena (MatV VP
172,16-21).
KV ad 2.25ab, 53,2-3 reads: atma'svasaTJlvedanena svaparatmaprakasataya pratipll-
sidlzyati, kim anyena sadlzanena. For my discussion of Goodall's translation and
my suggested emendation, see note 30 on page 221.
88 Ked, Ped,B; P.
89 pravarteta Ped; pravartate Ked, B, P. B's reading looks slightly more like pravart-
ate than pravarteta since the right-hand side of the interlinear horizontal line that repres-
ents e falls above the second of the t's. But it is not impossible that the scribe wrote pra-
varteta as in some cases the right-hand side of his interlinear markings fall to the right of
the sign beneath that they modify.
90 Ked, B, P; 'pi Ped.
91 nalzalJz na Ked, B, P; nalzalJl Ped.
92 Again, if the editors of PMNKV had located this parallel passage in NPP they
would have enabled improvement of their texts. The latest edition of PMNKV reads: tam
evatmasal.llvidam ablzi1lIzam anapayinfiJl casritya sarvailz kalantaraplzalani ara-
blzyante. til tasyalz sarvavyavaharapratyastamayam [correct to: pratyasta-
mayalz] sarvajiiananalJl sambhavablzavat
kalz pravaT1eta kutra kimaT1lzaIJz va? yatalz [the editions of both texts' wrongly punctuate
398
3.2 syiid etat. asty ayam ekan7pasthiragriihakapraklisa!z, anapahnavanfya
93
eva. sa punar na svasGlllvedya!z, api tu eviinubhz7yamii-
ne tatsiidrsyadarsanabhriintair vikalpair adhyiiropito 'mbha!zpraviihasye-
vaikyam iti
94
bhriinta eva. ata eviisyiitmagrahatviit sarviinarthamalatvenopa-
after the vii, instead of after the yata!z] na hi [perhaps correct to:
tmavedina!z, and probably indude NPP's 'niihGlll na mama' iti pa.yata!z
pravrttir gha!ate. iti nirfhGl!z praklisamiitra1Jz heyopiideyabuddhivikalGlll
mithyiijliiinaviciirabodlziidy[MSS read biidhiid/]anekaj1iiinasz7nya1Jz jagad bhavet. [re-
move punctuation] sthiragriihakapraklisapL7rvatviid [correct to: pL7rvakatviid] evamiide!z
sarvasyety anapall1lavanfyo 'yGl!Z prakiiso vyavahiirahetubhL7ta!z kiiliintarabhiiviphalapra-
sarvadaiva [correct to the reading of the MSS: sarvair eva] syiit (pMNKV
294,32-295,2).
A parallel passage in the MatGligavrtti (ad 6.23) runs: tiim eva hi sthiratariim iitma-
sGl!zvidam iisritya sarvai!z kiiliintaraphaliini iirabhyante. tu tasyii!z
sarvavyavahiirapratyastamayiit sarvaj1iiiniiniil!Z
iintare sambhaviibhiivata!z ka!z pravarteta fpravGl1eta ii, f; pravartate ed.] kutra [kutra ii,
[, f; tatra ed.] kimarthGl!z vii. iti nirfhGlJ! heyopiideyabuddhivikalGl.n mithyiijliiinaviciirabii-
dhiidyanekajliiinasI7nYGlJ! jagad bhavet. iti sarvavyavahiiriibhiivaprasGliga!z [sarvavyava-
hiiriiblziivaprasGliga!z corr.; sarvavyavalziirii blziivaprasGliga!z ed.] sthirabodhapL7rvaka-
tviid evamiide!z sarvasyeti iitmasiddhi!z, sthirasyaiva sal!zvedanasyiitmatviid ity uktam
(MatVVP 158,5-10). In NPP, in PMNKV (according to my corrections), and in the pas-
sage given in the following footnote, katz pravarteta kutra kimarthGl.n vii yata!z gives a
reason for sarvavyavahiirapratyastamaya!z, whereas in the just quoted passage sarvavya-
vahiirapratyastamayiit gives a reason for katz pravarteta kutra kimarthGl!z vii. Both seem
possible.
A second parallel passage in the MatGligav[fti, fifteen pages after the one given in the
previous note, reads: tiim eva cii[eva cii ii, [, f; evii ed.]tmasa1Jzvidam abhinniim anapiiyi-
nZl!z ciiSritya sarvai!z kliliintaraphaliini iirabhyante. hi hi
conj. Sanderson; allityatve 'pi ed.; anityatve 'pi a;
'pi ii, [, f] tasyii!z sarvavyavalziirapratyastamaya!z, sarvajiiiiniiniil!z [Opratyastamaya!z, sar-
vajliiiniiniil!z ed.; pratyastamayasarvajliiiniilliilll ail j1iiilliintarotpattiklila eva dhvastatviit
[okiila eva dhvastatviit ed.; kiile 'stamayatliiit 5 MSS; kliliistamayasthatviit ail ka!z pra-
varteta fpravarteta ed.; pravartate 4 MSS] kutra [kutra ed. ata!z a] kimarthGlll vii yata!z.
. na ca tato 'nyat sal!zvidn7pGlll pa.yiima ity uktam. tad ayam anapallllavallfya eva griiha-
klitmallo jliiinasya sarvadii sthirarz7pa{z prakitso vyavalziirahetublu7ta{z kiiliintarablziivi-
sarvair eva (MatV VP 173,1-7).
93 'napalznavanfya Ked, Ped, P; 'napalznavfya B.
94 Viilzasyevaikyam iti Ked, B, P; Viilzasyavaikyam iti Ped.
Text Passages
samiiya blzagavatii [Ked p. 15] sugatena
vaniikhyo yatna{z95 priirabdha!z. yad iilzu{z96
mitlzyiidlzyiiropa
97
lziiniirtlzal!z yatno 'saty api moktari
98
I iti.
99
4.1 tad ayuktam, asya sGl!zveda-
niit. yadi hy ayam iiropita!z syiit, tadiiropakiid
JOI
griihakan7piid bhedena vi-
95 yatna!z B, Ked
Pc
; yatnaO P; Ked'", Ped.
96 PYa 2. 192ab.
97 mitlzyiidlzyiiropaO KedP", supported by PYa; mitlzyiidlzyiillopaO Ked'c, Ped, B, P.
399
98 moktari B, P, PYa; bhoktari Ked, Ped. Since mo in Sarada is virtually indistin-
guishable from bho in Devanagan it is possible that the reading bhoktari arose through
editors used to reading Devanagan misreading their Sarada manuscript(s).
99 The parallel passage in the MatGligavrtti runs: sat yam, q.sty eveyam iitmasGl.nvittir ii
sal!zsiiriid sii tu na sGl.llvedaniitmikli, apitu [api tu ii, [, f;
catu{z ed.] eva sGl.llvedyamiine sadrsiipariiparotpattivipralam-
blziid vikalpena sa eviiyam ity aikyam adhyiiropya praklisyate fprakii.yate 7 of ed.'s MSS
including ii and [; prakiisate ed.]. yad uktam, 'mitlzyiidhyiiropalziiniirthGl!z yatno 'saty api
moktari' iti (MatV VP 158,11-159,1). The DharmakIrti half-verse is also quoted at MatV
VP ad 6.19c-21b (154,9).
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: satyam [sat yam conj. Isaacson; satyGl!z griiha-
ko 'py ed., MSS] ayam ekan7pasthira[ekan7pasthirao MSS; ekarz7pa{z sthirao ed.]griihaka-
prakiisa{z 'napallllavanfya eva, sa punar na svasGl.Il-
vedyo 'pi tu eviinubhL7yamiine tatsiidrsyadarsanabhriilltair vikal-
pair iiropya [vikalpair iiropya MSS; vikalpeniiropya ed.] prakii.yate fprakiisyate 1 MS;
prakli.ya!z ed.; prakiiSyeta MSS] ambha{z[ambha{z conj. Isaacson; ata{z MSS; tata{z ed.]
praviihasyevaikyam [osyevaikyain em.; syaivaikyalll ed., MSS] iti (295,3-5). In PMNKV,
written before NPP and MatV VP, Ramakat;l!ha does not give the DharmakIrti quotation.
Ra:makat;l!ha's father, Narayat;lakat;l!ha, can be seen to be the source of this NPP pas-
sage and its parallels in other of Ramakat;l!ha's texts. He writes ad MT 1.2.24: sa1Jzvedana
eva jaladlziiriipraviihavat sadrsapariiparotpattibhramiid vikalpena sthairyam
adhyiiropyata ity avidyiijallitii seyalll tad uktGl!Z
lIlitlzyiidlzyiiropalziilliirtlzGl!z yatno 'saty api moktari [moktari em. bhoktari ed.] I
iti. iitlllagralze hi sati tadallyatra paratviibhimiiniit svaparablzeda{z, tatas ca
dyanartllOdblzaviid iitmagraho bandha iti bhagavatii sugatena
yad uktam
iitmani sati parasaiijliii svaparavibhiigiit I
allayo{z salllpratibaddlzii{z sarve prajiiyante II (PVa 2.219)
iti (MTV 85,7-18).
400
Ijayavad bhiiseta devadattabodha[l sthira itivat. na caivam ayam anubha-
va [I, 102 api tu viljayaprakiisaka
I03
tveniintargriihakasvabhiiva[l.
4.2 tatsamiiropakiibhimatagrahft[ffipatve ca
lO4
tadiipi sthira eva sm.nvedyate,
bl-. 105,
tasyiipi hi svata[z tatpratz zasltve ly
iiropiinupapatte[I,106 iiropasya piirviiparapariimarsariipatvena sthirpbodha-
nirvartyatviit.
107
na ca 'pi yugapatpiirviiparakiilaYllktadfrgha-
viljayatvata[l samiiropakatvam ayojaniitmakatveniivikalpakatviit,108 aliitaca-
kriidipratibhiisavat.
109
ata eva Yllgapacchabdiirthaviljayatve 'pi yogijiiiinam
100 conj.; kannatayii Ked, Ped,
B, P. I discuss this conjecture in note 82 on page 237.
101 tadiiropakiid B, P, Ked
Pc
; iiropakiid Ked
3C
, Ped.
102 ayam anllbhava[l Ked, Ped; ayam anabhava[z P; anllbhava[z B.
103 viljayaprakiisaka KedPc, B, P; viljayaprakiisao Ked
3C
, Ped.
104 riipatve ca conj.; riipatvena Ked, Ped, B; n7patvenii P.
105 tatpratibhiisitve B, P, Ked'c, Ped; tadapratibhiisitve Ked
pc
.
106 We could consider emending iiropiinllpapatte[z to iiropiinllpapatti[z: Kashmirian
transmissions of texts often confuse e and i owing to non-difference of pronunciation bet-
ween the two in that region. But RamakaIf!ha quite often uses tautologous combinations
of hi and an ablative. See the previous sentence for example: tasyiipi hi svata[z
miitrariipatveniipratibhiisaniit.
107 nirvartyatviit B, P; nivartyatviit Ked, Ped, parallel' sentence in PMNKV.
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: sa [sa conj. Sanderson; na ed., MSS] pwzar
bhrama eva, MSS; vilja-
karmatayii ed.; 1 MS] tadaikyasya sa1Jl-
vedaniit. yadi hy etad iiropitm]l syiit, tadiiropakii[1ooks, from comparison with NPP, as
. though text has dropped out here]bhimatasya [tadiiropakiibhimatasya MSS; tadiiropikii-
bhimatasya ed.] svata[l tatpratibhiisitve hy iiro-
piinupapatte[z [tatpratibhiisitve hy iiropiinllpapatte[z conj.; tatpratibhiisitve hy iit71latvo-
papatte[l ed., MSS; tatpratibhiisitve py iit11latviipatte[1 1 MS], iiropasya piirviiparaparii-
11larsan7patvena sthirabodhanirvartyatviit [onirvartyatviit MSS; nivartyatviit ed.; nir_
vatyatviit 1 MS] (295,5-8).
108 vikalpakatviit Ked, Ped; vikalpatviit B, P.
109 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: na ca 'pi Yllgapdtpiirviipara-
Yllktadfrghaviljayatvata[l samiiropakatvam ayojaniitmakatveniivikalpakatviit, aliitacakrii-
dipratibhiisavat (295,8-10).
Parallel passage in MatV VP runs: na ca 'pi [6 MSS, not including the
Kashmirian ones, lack the 'pi] sa eViiyam iti pz7rviiparakiilaYllktadfrghiirthaprakiisakatve-
na vikalpakatvam iti viicyam ayojaniitmakatviit, aliitacakriidipratibhiisavat, yojanii hi kal-
panii [kalpanii [, r; vikalpanii ed.] yata[z (160,10-11). The reason I prefer the reading of
Text Passages
avikalpakam ity IIktmJ! bhavadbhi[z.11O yojitaviljaym.n tad iti cet, sarveljiil]l klja-
yojaniinllpapatter na kil]l cid etat.
112
ata evlinekasyiipi kramabhii-
vino 113 ity iiroplisa11lbhaviid astmigatli vikal-
pii[z.114
4.3 na ca griihakatmii griihyfkartZll]z sakyate yena svlit11lany
sthaiJ)'am liropitam ity ucyeta,115 svlitmany avikalpako vikalpo yata[z.116 ata
401
those two Kashmirian manuscripts is that Dignaga wrote yojanii kalpanii in the
samllccaya, and RiirnakaIf!ha quotes this later in this text (ad 1.22cd, p. 49,2b-lb).
110 ity IIkta1Jz bhavadbhi[z Ked, Ped, P; bhavadbhir ity IIktm]z B.
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: ata eva Yllgapat sarvlirthaviljayatve 'pi yogi-
jiiiinam avikalpakakalpam ity IIktam (295,10-11).
Parallel passage in MatV VP continues: ata eva yogijiiiinam yugapac chabdiirtha-
viljayatve [chabdlil1haviljayatve fi, [, r; sarvlil1haviljayatve ed.] 'py avikalpakam bhavad-
bhir iljyate (160,12).
III Ked, Ped, P; B.
112 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: yojitaviljaym]z tad iti cet, sarveljlil]z
katvena yojanlinllpapatter na kil]z cid etat (295,11-12).
113 Parallel passage in Mat V VP continues: nlipi ca balu7niil]z kramabhiiviniil]z jiiiinii-
nlil]z vikalpakatva1Jz Yllktam (160,12-13).
114 stmigatii vikalpii[z Ked
Pc
, B; stmigatii vikalpa[z P; sta1Jzgatatiivikalpa[z Ked'c;
staJ]zgatas tava vikalpa[z Ped.
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: ata eviinekeljlim api kramabhiivinlim vikalpa-
niiropakatvam, ity liroplisambhaviit astaJigatli vikalpli[z [astaJigatii vikalpli[z
conj.; tadmigatiivikalpanlit ed.; aSaJ]zgatli vikalpii (with following na-see continuation of
this passage below-so we can probably assume a pre-sandhi form of vikalpii[z) 1 MS]
(295,12-13).
115 llcyeta P; IIcyate Ked, Ped, B.
116 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: na ca griihakiitmiipy evalJz grhyeteti [grli-
hakiitmlipy eVaJ]Z grhyeteti 1 MS; griihakatmany eva ed., MSS] vaktzll]l sakyate, yena svli-
tmany avikalpako vikalpa[z (295;13-14). Comparison with NPP reveals that text may have
dropped out in PMNKV owing to a scribe's eye skipping from one sviitmani to the next.
Perhaps it is possible to make sense of the PMNKV sentence as constituted above how-
ever: 'And it cannot be said that the perceiv.er, for its part, could be grasped [by itself] in
this way (i.e. as stable, by conceptual cognition), for conceptual cognition is non-
conceptual with regard to itself.'
Parallel sentence in MatV VP: svlitmany avikalpako vikalpa [avikalpako vikalpa [, r;
avikalpiko vikalpa fi; na vikalpa ed.] iti ca (161,2).
402
[Ked p. 16] na sa11lbhavati, api tv alwm-
pratyayaprakiisan7pataiva tadlipi tena n7pelJa sthiratayaiva bhlisanlit.
118
na
hi kiilatraye 'pi grlihaklitmano dhvaJ.nsalz salJlvedyata ity ukta11l. ll9 yasya hi
prligabhliva!l sa itt panna ucyate, yasya tll pradhvaJ!ISalz sa yasya Pll-
nalz
l20
p17rvottarayolz kOf)'or nlisty abhlivasaJpvit sa lItpanno
l21
niruddho veti na sakyate vaktllm.122 na clisvasaJpvedyalz saJ!lviddhanno bha-
vatfti
l23
124 tat iva parasparavi-
ruddhan7patvlii
25
yathli vidYlldlidall sad
117 Interlinear comment above ata eva in P: ahaJ!lpratyayaga11lYo hy litmeti mlinasa-
litmli jaiminfylinlim.
ll8 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: ata na sam-
bhavati, api tv ahampratyayapraklisan7pataiva, tadlipi tena sthiratayaivlihambhli-
san lit rlihambhlisanlit MSS; lihamavabhlisanlit ed., MSS] (295,14-15). I am tempted to
delete the ahaJp in the final compound. The argument flows more smoothly if the object
of bhlisanlit/avabhlisanlit is that which is referred to by asya at the beginning of the sen-
tence, i.e. grlihaklitmli, the perceiver. If it were not that but aham, then the contention that
the perceiver is the shining forth of I-cognition would not follow.
ll9 ity uktam Ked, B, P; iti Yllktam Ped.
120 yasya puna!l Ked, B, P; yasya Ped.
121 utpallllO Ked, B, P; sa samutpanno Ped.
122 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: na hi klilatraye 'pi grlihakiitmano dhvaJp-
sa!l saJ!lvedyata ity lIktam. yasya hi prligabhliva!l sa utpannalz, yasya tll [tu MSS; hi ed.]
dhvaJ!lsa!1 [dhvaJ!ISalz MSS; pll1!ISa lItpattilz ed., 1 MS] sa ahampratyayasya
[ahaJ!lpratyayasya ed., MSS; pratyayasya MSS] pllnalz p17rvottarayo!1 ko!yor nlisty abhli-
vasaJpvit [abhlivasalJlvit 1 MS; abhliva!l. saJ.nvit ed., MSS]. lItpanno niru-
ddho [lltpanno niruddho 1 MS; lItpannli niruddhli ed., MSS] bhaved iti na sakyate vaktllm
(295,15-18). All witnesses apart from one point to a sentence break before saJ!lvit, and
feminine endings on lItpanna and ninlddhli. But the fact that the one witness, a Nandinii-
gad manuscript from Mysore, is consistently the best manuscript, combined with its sup-
port from the NPP parallel, weighs in its favour.
We still have to break what in NPP is one sentence, into two here: 'But there is no
consciousness of the absence of I-cognition at some previous or subsequent extremity. It
cannot be said to. arise and cease in every moment.' Thus some may want to adjust
PMNKV further to bring it in line with NPP. To do so would involve emending ahampra-
tyayasya/pratyayasya to yasya and inserting a sa before
123 bhavatfti Ked, Ped, P; bhavabhavatfti B.
124 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: na casvasaJ!lvedyalz [casvasaJpvedya!1
MS; va svasaJ!lvedyalz ed.] saJpviddhanno bhavatfti
125 parasparaviruddhao Ked, B; paraspavirllddhao P; parasparao Ped.
Text Passages
lJikatvaJ.n vyavartayati, eVaJ!1 grahakiit11lany apy aropasambhavat sthairya11l
avabhasa11lanam aSalJIsaYaJJl vyavartayatfti yuktam. 126
4.4 na ca svasaJJlvedanasya tathatve biidha!l sambhavati badhakiibhimatasya-
pi tenaiva sthirlitmana saJ!lvedanai
27
anyathli biidhakatvayogad. bkranty-
abhiivac ca. bhrlinta11l api hi vijlianaJ!1 sarvam iilambane bhrantaJp na svli-
tmanfti na ca pramalJasiddhasya badhakam antarelJli-
nyathabhYllpagamo matim avarjayati vipascitlim.
129
sthirasyarthakriyanllpa-
130 b-dl ka .. 131 -, 132 ks
pamr eva a w m It I cet, na, tatralva tasya.l samutpatter ztz va .-
403
126 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: tat iva
parasparaviruddhan7patvlid vidYlldlidall pra11lalJasiddhaJ!1 sad
vyavartayati yatha, evam atra svlitmliropasa11lblzavena sthairyam avabhlisamlinam aSaJ!l-
sayalJI vyavacclzinattfti yuktam (295,18-21). We could conjecture svatmany
aropasambhavena for svlitmaropasambhavena on the basis of svatmany aropasa11lbhavat
in one MatV VP parallel, svatmany aropasamblzavena in the other (see below) and grliha-
kiitmany apy aropasambhavi'it in NPP. If we retain svatmaropasa11lbhavena, we certainly
have to interpret it as svatmany aroplisambhavena.
A parallel sentence in MatV VP reads: tasmi'it svatmany aroplisambhavad grahakii-
tmanalz sthairyam avabhasamanam SVaSal!IVedanasiddham [svasaJpvedanasiddham ed.;
saJ!lvedanam ii, r, n evabhYllpagantavyam (161,2-3).
Later on in the same chapter (173,7-10) there is an even more similar sentence: tat
iva sthiratvasthiratvayolz parasparaviruddhar17patvlid vidYlldadav asth-
airyalJI [asthairyaJp ii, r, f; asthairyatvaJ!1 ed.] siddhaJ!1 sat [sat ed.; om. in r, f; sao ii, ii]
sthairyaJJl vyavartayati yatha, tadvad atra svlitmany aroplisambhavena sthairyam ava-
bhasamallam aSaJpsaym!1 asthairYaJ!1 vyavacchinatti, trtfyaprakarasambhavad iti.
127 smpvedani'it Ped; svasaJ!lvedani'it Ked, B, P.
128 Parallel sentence in MatV VP: Illipi biidhalz [Ilapi biidha!l ii, r, f; omitted in the
other MSS and in ed.] sarvam iilamballe [alambane 4 (non-Kashmirian) MSS; iilamba-
nm!l ed.] bhralltalJI [bhrantalJI ii, r, f; bhrlilltir ed.] Ila svi'itmalli yata!l [yatalz ii, r, f;
kadacana iti ed.] (173,6).
Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: na ca svasaJpvedanasya badha!l sambhavati,
yella bhrantata bhaved iti (295,21-22). Unlike NPP and MatV VP, PMNKV
does not give reasons for this claim but just points forward, either to 297,10 (ad V. 46): ...
svasaJ!lvittall bhramabhlivat; or 302,8-12 (ad V. 49).
129 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: Ila ca pramalJasiddhasya biidhakam vina-
nyathlibhYllpagamo matim livarjayati vipascitam (295,22-23).
130 0llupapattir Ked'c, Ped, P; llupattir B, nlltpattir Ked
pc
.
131 Interlinear note below iti cet in P: sthiro hy ekasvabhlivalz, arthakriya hi anekasva-
allekasvabhavaJ!1 hi eva, Ila tv ity artha[ity ar-
404
yiima!z.133 tad evalJI sarvadaikarz7pasthiragriihakaprakiisiitmiiniiropita
134
eva
yena svasGl!lvedanasiddha!z, tena
nii
135
tmast7nyii!1 skandhii iti eva. [Ked p. 17] tad
iyatii pratijniist7trii/
36
jniiteti padal!l vyiikhyiitam. 111.511
CHAPTER 3
1.0 [Ked p. 38] kil!l ca sahopalambhaniyamiid abhede 'pi niitmiibhiiva!l ity
iiha
1.15ab) iitmany asattvGl!I137 no yuktam ahampratyayagocare I
ahampratyayasya asty evii-
dhyavaseyeniitmanii sahopalambhaniyama!z, iti dvayor api sGl!lvidn7patva-
siddhe!l satyatvam iti nairiitmyiibhiiva[z.
1.1.1 nanv iitmallo vikalpiitftatvelloktatviit, buddhi-
bodhyatvaniriisiic ciihampratyayagocaratvGl!1 viidyasiddham eva. satyam,
iitmiidipratyayavat tu
138
kathGl!lcid so 'pi vyavahiiriil1haIJI
'bhyupagamyate, iti niisiddhi[z.
1.1.2 IlGllll asmiikam adhyavaseyena
139
sa-
habhiivo Ila siddha!z.yuktam etat kadiicid biihyiirthaviidillo vaktum, bhavatas
tv abodhiitmallo 'salJlvedyatviid adhyavaseyasyiipi
140
salJlvedyatvena bodha-
rz7patayiidhyavasiiyasyeva
141
sattvam, iti niisiddhis tella sahabhiivasyeti.
thaO em.; ityatil1haO MS]kriyiinupapattir eva biidhakGl!1 iti nanasvabhiivo hi
sthiro hy ekasvabhiiva iti bauddhii[z.
132 samutpatter Ked, Ped; samutpattir B; samupapatter P.
133 Parallel passage in PMNKV continues: sthirasyiirthalaiyiinupapattir eva biidhiketi
cet, Ila, tadanupapattes tatra (295,23-24). He is pointing
forward there to his commentary on verse 46.
134 iitmiiniiropita Ked
Pc
, Ped, B, P; iitmii niiropita Ked
ac
.
135 Ked
Pc
, B, P; Ked
ac
, Ped.
136 pratijniisatriij Ked, B; pratijniislitriilltalJI Ped.
137 asattvGl!1 Ked, Ped, B, L, P; asatyatvall M.
138 tzl Ked, B, L, P; omitted in Ped.
139 adhyavaseyella Ked
Pc
, Ped; adhyavasiiyena B, L, P, Ked
ac
.
140 adhyavaseyasyiipio Kedac. Ped, B, L, P; adhyavasiiyasyiipzoO Ked
pc
.
141 dhyavasiiyasyeva Ked
ac
, Ped, B, L, P; dhyavaseyasyeva Ked
Pc
.
Text Passages
1.1.3 [Ked p. 39] tarhi viidyasiddho 'yam, ahampratyayiibhiive 'pi svasalJlve-
daneniitmopalambhiibhyupagamiit.satyam. aham iti tv adhyavasiiyena saha-
bhiivo 'dhyavaseyatiitra hetu!l sii ca tadiinflJl Iliistfti tena sahopalambhaniya-
mo niisiddhab. anyii hy adhyavasiiyapariimrsyatiinyii ca bud-
dhisGl!lvitpraviveka
l42
prasGligena pradarsitGl!1 sviiyambhuvoddyota eva. iha
tv anupayogiillllocyate. bhavadbhir apy uktalll
143
asakyasalllayol44 hy iitmii cetaniilliilll
145
anallyabhiik I
atab svasal!lvittir II iti.
ata evopayogabhediii
46
asya Iliitra grhftagriihitvam api tu tiivalllniitrelJa
prallliilJatvam iti
1.2.1 nanu 'gallro 'hGl!1 Iq-so 'ham' ity aniitmani sarfra eViihampratyayasya
vil1lddho hetzl[z, iti ata iiha
1. 15cd) na ciinyasminll
148
ahambuddhib kvacid tzl llirguIJ
ii149
II
na, gauriidibhib padiirthiilltarair hy ahampratyayo
sil.llhiidipratyayavad sarfre
150
vartate, tair
tzl mukhyatayiitmany eva. sa eva [Ked p. 40] ciitra hetur ukto na
ity avil1lddha eva. 111.1511
1.2.2 yady evam, kasya cid iitlllanab pratyeya-
syii
l5l
llupalabdher valliidyekatvapratyayavad ahampratyayo 'pi eve-
ty asiddho hetu!z.iti na vaniidyekatviidipratyayavan tall Iliisiddhi!l
priiguktasya sahopalambhasyeti. vaniidyekatvapratyayavad ahampratyayo 'pi
evety asiddho hetzl!l, atriipy iiha
142 praviveka Ked, Ped, B, P; pravekao L.
143 PVa 3.249, and PVin 1.21 (p. 62, notes 2 and 3). See note 145 for variants.
144 samayo Ked, Ped, B, P; samaye L, kha.
Marginal insertion above sa mayo in B: salJlketa.
405
145 cetaniilliilll Ked, Ped, B, L, P; riigiidflliim PVa 3.249; sukhiidfniim MatV VP ad
6.23, IPvv Vol. 1, 116,lb, PVin 1.21 Gudging from bde in the Tibetan translation);
nfliidflliim TS(BBS) 1263.
146 evopayogabhediid Ped, v.l. in Ked, B, L, P; evobhayabhediid Ked.
147 pratyayasya Ked, Ped, B, P; L.
148 ciinyasmilln Ked, Ped, B, L, P; ciinyasminy M.
149 tll Ked, Ped, B, L, P; caturgulJii M.
150, - K d P d B L ,- P .
sarzre e, e, , ; sarzrGl.n .
151 pratyeyasyii Ked, B, L, P; pratyayasyii Ped.
406
1.16) kartrkannilvabhasil ea
152
kvacin mati!zl
aham etat prapayilmfty ata!zl54 siddhalTl SphU!alTl
155
dvayam II
satyam, syiln yady iltmil sarvilrthaprakiisakatayil
156
svato nilvabhil-
seta, sa tu svasal!zvedanena vikalpiltfta
157
eva sarvadil bhilsata ity lIktam. tad-
eilYal!z proktanayenilhampratyaya!l kvacid iJham etat prapayilmftyil-
dall 158 sllsphll!ilnubhava eva iti na vanil-
dyekatvildipratyayavan tan nilsiddhi!l prilgllktasya sahopalam-
bhasyeti.
1.2.3 yady eVal!1 sahopalambhaniyamild iltmildvaitasiddhir na,
ks
' 'ks 159 - d' -d
tvatpa . e py apratz . epyam evatmaSal!IVe anam zty evamparatva asya.
paralllill1hatas tv ata ity aham etat prapasyilmfti parilmarsabllddher apy
asyillz sakilsild iltmil sarvilrthaprakiisakatvena 160 sarvadil parilmarsanfya!l,
arthas tu tatprakiisyatayil
l61
krame1J.a pratfyate. ity atyantabhinnam adhy-
avasfyamilnatvilt [Ked p. 41] sphu!am etad dvaYalTl siddham, iti na bhedo
162
'py ayuktalz. iti tad uktam
l63
ayam eva hi vijlieyo bhedo bodharthayolz sphll!am I
purvas tv anubhavilkilra uttaras eilnubhuyate II iti.
2.1.1nanv aYal!1 gha!a ityilder vimarsasya darsanild atril-
naikilntikatil. tad ayuktam ity ilha
1.17 ab) sarvam eva hi vijiiilllam kartrkannilvabhilsakam I
. /'
aYal!1 gha!a ityildy api vimarsavijliillzal!z na eva yuk-
tam, sviltmallo villlarSilbhilvena paravimrsyasyeva tadn7patvilsiddhelz.
152 ilvabhasil ea Ped; ilvabhasile ea Ked, B, L, P, M. It is possible that Ped's reading
arose through corruption and that ilvabhasile ea is original; but I marginally prefer the
meaning ofPed's reading.
153 Ked, Ped, B, L, P; M.
154 ata!l Ked, Ped, B, L, P; ati M.
IS-
o Sphll!aI!1 Ked, Ped, B, L, P; splll/!a M.
156 prakiisakatayil Ked, Ped, B, P; prakiisatayil L.
157 Ked wrongly includes a hyphen at the end of the line after vikalpilffta.
158 Ked, B, L, P; Sphll!a!l Ped.
159 P . 'ks ki fr k
OImts prall . epya -eyes p om one to the next.
160 prakiisakatvella Ked, Ped, B, P; prakiisatvella L.
161 Interlinear gloss above tatprakiisyatayil in P: tella sarvilrthaprakiisakeniltmallil
prakilyo bhasyas tasya b!zilvas tattiltayil.
162 Ila bhedo Ked, Ped, B, L; nilbhedo P.
163 Verse 9 ofNP.
Text Passages
2.1.2 sviltmallilpy asya tadilnu!l sal!lvedaniln
l64
nilsiddhir
165
iti eet, na, sa1Jlve-
danasyilpy gaeehatill!l 166 yad ilhu!1167
sal.nvittir aparilmarsild vidymnilnilpi vastlltalz I
tJ7.lildivittivad Yiltulz
168
siddhaivilvidyalllilnavat II iti.
tasmild iltmakal1rka eva tenilsau 169 vimarsallfyalz, iltmakartrke ea vi-
sviltmilpi taqupasarjanfbhato eva sillllarthyild bhavati. iti sar-
vam eva vimarsajiiillzal!l eveti nilnaikiintikatil.
2.2 [Ked p. 42] allllmilllenilpy etat siddham ity ilha
1. 17cd) traYal!1 salTlsmaryate yasmilt tad ahal.1l iti II
aYal.1l gha!a sIIl[tir171 bhavantf
karmakara1J.ayor iva PUrval!1 kal1Ur apy asabdal!l vimarSal!1 galllayaty
eveti sarvo villlarso eveti.
3.0 ata eva villlarsa!l vastvallvayavyatirekiilluvi-
dhilnilt. allyair
172
apy llktam
173
'
asti hy illoealliljiiilna1J1174 prathamal.1l nirvikalpakam I
billamukiidivijiiilllasadrsal.n suddhavasllijam II
tata!l para1JI punar vastu dhannairjiltyildibhir yayill
buddhyilvasfyate silpi samlllatilil iti.
3.1.1 nanv asaty api vastllni gha!ildivimarso malloriljyildau satyam,
ata eva tayor iva bheda!l.
3.1.2 nallu sa evilyal!l gha!a ity evalllildelz pur-
villlarsasya pravrttelz, adhllnil ea purvadarsanilbhilvena tadasalll-
164 tadilnuTl salTlvedallilll Ked
ac
, Ped, B, L, P; tadilnun aSal!lvedaniln Ked
pc

165 Ililsiddhir Ked
ac
, Ped, B, L, P; Ila siddhir Ked
pc

166oevilsiddhe!1 Ked
ac
, B, L, P; evasiddhelz Ked
Pc
, Ped.
167 Source ullknown.
168 Interlinear gloss above yiltu!l in P: gaedzata!l.
169 iltmakartrka eva tellilsall Ped, B, L, P, kha, ga; akartrka eva tellilsau Ked.
407
170 L omits eva villlarsajiiilllal.n (eyeskip from one ev to an-
other).
171 pi slllrtir conj. Sanderson; smrtir Ked
P
", Ped; vislllrtir Ked
ac
, B, L, P.
172 Marginal insertion above anyair in B: IIlfmill!ISakailz.
173 SV(P2) 1.1.4 chapter) 112 and 120.
174 illoeaniljliillzalTl B, P, SV(S), SV(U
l
), SV(Pl), SV(P2), SV(P3), ad Mat VP 17.2 (p.
383), v.l. ad Mat VP 1O.6-13b; illoeana1J1 jliillzal!l Ked, Ped, L, NPPad 32cd (64,20-
65,2), ad Mat VP 6.35bcd (pp. 174-5), ad Mat VP 1O.6-13b (p.312), v.l. in SV(P2) and
SV(P3); loealzalTljiiilnal.n v.l. ad Mat VP 6.35bcd; illoeanajiiillzal!Z v.l. ad Mat VP 6.35bcd.
bhavlid 175 na,176 prligdarsanlibhlivlisiddhelz, litmaprakiisa
eVliI1hadarsana/J! tac ca sarvadlistfty uktam. atalz tatra
vastv eveti Ila, gha!lidau
177
[Ked p. 43]
iti
3.2.1 evalJl tarhi santamase sprsato 'py aya/ll glza!a ity niplidflllim
avamarslid
l78
mlillasa smlirto
l80
vikalpa iti. na,
ekaslimagrfpratibaddhatvella
api tadlinfm alll/mlilllit. yad uktalJl blzavadbhir api
l83
ekaslimagryadlzfnasya nlplide rasa to gati[l I
hetlldlzal7l1lillllmlillella dlllimelldhallavikiiravat II iti.
3.2.2 Ila clillumlillavimarso 'py vastvanvayavyatireklinuvidhli-
nella tad ukta/.n bhavadbhir api
l84
arthasylisamblzave 'bhlivlit
l85
'pi pramlilJatli I
pratibaddhasvabhlivasya taddhetlltve samalJl dvayam II iti.
3.2.3 Illipy arthadz1-
ra
l86
vartillas tatsambhavato 'Ilaiklintikatvlit.
3.3 ligamottho
l87
'pi vimarSas vastuni prati-
baddhatvlid aVa/icakapitrlidivli!cyasrutijanitavimarsavad yathlirtha eva. tad
ukta/J! bhavadbhir api
l89
175 Interlinear speaker-indication above in :p:
176 Interlinear comment above na in P: uttaram.
177 Ila gha!lidau Ked'c, Ped, B, L, P; gha!lidau Ked
pc
.
178 avalllarslid Ked'c, Ped, B, P; avamarsslid L; avilllarslid Ked
pc
.
179 Ked, B, L, P; eva Ped.
180 smlil10 Ked, B, P; slinto Ped, L, ka, gao
181 Interlinear gloss above in P: n7paraslidfnlilll.
182 Interlinear gloss above in P: n7plidfnlilll.
183 PYa 1.11.
184 PVin, p. 38,6 (1.3). Vetter gives the exact form in which this verse occurs here as
the Sanskrit original of PVin 1.3, based on three citations in the Tattvabodhavidhliyinf,
one in the PramlilJamimlilllsli and one in the Tattvasa/igrahapafijikli. He does not mention
its occurrence here.
185 sambhave 'bhiivlit Ked, Ped, B, P; sambhavlibhlivlit L.
186 arthadz1rao Ked'", B, L, P; arthasya dz1rao Ked
Pc
, Ped.
187 ligamottho Ked'c, Ped, B, L, P; ligalllokto Ked
Pc
.
1.88 Ked, B, L, P; prasotr Ped.
189 api B, L, P; eva Ked, Ped.
Text Passages
'yam al1ha[1 sakyetajfilitulll so 'tisayol90 yadi II iti.
tll vimarSo mallorlijylidivimarsavad vastu-
pratibandhlibhlivlid 'stu. aham etat [Ked p. 44] prapatyli!nfti tu
vimarsa[z killl tu proktanayena
evety ato 'py litmasiddhi[z. tatas ca bo-
dhenety etad api pratijlilipada/J! vylikhylitam itL
CHAPTER 4
1. Sirriultaneous and Sequential illumination
1 kas tarhi nflapraklislit pftaprakaasya
l92
bheda[z? Ila kas cit, yugaparprakii-
sa iva.
2 tatJ'a hi tayor bhede
193
tadavayavabhedelllipi bheda[z, iti prati-
citrapa!lidipratibhlislibhlivaprasa/iga[z. Ila ca vikalpa-
[Ked p. 27]gha!ttaIJ1 tad iti vlicyam, udghli!italletrasya jlzapty eva yugapat
tadavabhlisalllit, tadlillflll ca vikalplisambhavlii
95
asalJlvedalllic ca. yad lIk-
tam
196
409
PYa 1.220cd, which reads differently from the quote here (but conveys the same
meaning): 'yam a/1ha[1 pratyetzllll sakya[l so 'tisayo yadi II
190 so 'tisayo Ked'c, Ped, B, L, P; slitisayo Ked
Pc
, v.l. in B.
191 Il killl tll proktallayella omitted in L (eyeskip
from one tvli to the next).
192 pftaprakaasya B, P, Ked, Ped; pftapraklisao L.
193 blzede Ked, B, L, P; blzedao Ped.
194 Ked
Pc
, Ped; blzedatas Ked'c; pratiparalllli-
B, P; L. The Fililla in B and P's reading could be
correct; but I have judged it more likely to be an interlinear explanatory note, subsequent-
ly mistaken for part of the text.
195 vikalplisalllbhavlid Ked, Ped, L, P; vikalplisadbhlivlid B, but above sadbhli is also
written sambha.
196 PVin 50,20-22 (identified by Stem 1991).
na cemli{l kalpanli apratiSal!lViditli
l97
evodayante vyayante vli yena sa-
tyo 'py anupalakitli{l syu{z, iti.
vikalpajfilinasylipy ekatvlit katham aneklitmakas citrlivabhlisa{z.
3.1 tad yatM tafl'a nflapftlidyanekaprakaiyabhede
198
'py anubhayamlina-
syai
199
kasya jlilinliflnan0
200
na bheda{l, na ca tadabhedlit tasya nflapftlider
arthabhedasylisiddhi{z,201 ekasylinekaprakasanasaktisiddher bhavadbhir apf-
tatM kramaprakase
202
'py anubhavasiddhasyaika"syaiva praklisliflna-
no 'nekapraklisanasaktiyoglit kramavyavasthitlineka
203
praklisakatvam alllir
bhavasiddham na ca tadabhedlid na Iii
dikkramlivabMslit kalakramlivabMsasya prakasliflnani kas cid bhedo 'nu-
bhiiyata iti.
3.2 lzallli dikkramapraklise praklislitmano bhedliSalJlvedanlit
204
pradfplider
eka205sylinekakliryakartr-
tvena
206
virodhlibhlivlic chaktfnlil!l samuccay0207 na virodha(z?08 kalakrame tu
197 apratiSal!lviditli Ped, B, L, P; asalJlviditli Ked. apratisalJlviditli is also the reading
of the two other quotations of this sentence found by Stern (1991 156).
198 prakaiyabhede B, P, Ked, Ped; praklisabhede L.
199 anllbhayamlillasyai" B, L, Ked, Ped; allllbhayasyai" P.
200 jfililllitmano B, L, Ked, Ped;jlilinliflnlino P.
201 siddhi{z Ked, Ped, L, P; saddhi{l B.
'0'
- - kramapraklise Ked
Pc
, Ped, B, L, P; kramaprakaso Ked'c.
203 kramavyavasthitlineka B, P, Ked, Ped; kramavyavasthita nekao L.
204 bhedlisamvedalllit B, P, Ked, Ped; samvvedanlit L.
. . .
205 vad eka" Ked, B, P; vedakao Ped, L.
206 kartrtvena Ped, B, L, P; kartrkatvella Ked.
207 samuccayo Ked'c, Ped, B, L, P; samuccaye Ked
pc
. I prefer the nominative primari-
ly because of the parallel sentence below, chaktfnlil.n samllccaya eva yukto na virodha{z,
where yukto means that samuccaya must be a nominative.
208 This passage, and particularly this sentence, is referred to at 82,16-18: pradfpasya
hi vartidlihatailalqapa!zaprakasasvajlililllidyanekakliryallirvartaka{l svabhlivo 'bhyupaga-
to bhavadbhi(z, na tu karyabhedena svabMvabheda{z, iti darsital!l prlig eva. See also
MatV VP 164,1-2 (in the context of whether something non-momentary is capable of
arthakriyli): dhannas cliyam aka!likasyaiva [osyaiva f, r; sya ed.; sya vli ii] gha!lide{l
'krame!za kfradadhidMra!llidika(z pradfpades ca yugapad vartidlihatailakapa!llidiko
pratyake!za [pratyake!la ii, f, r; omitted in ed.] siddha{z, iti [iti
ii, f, r; omitted in ed.] na tella saMsya virodha{z; NPP ad 1.22cd, p. 54: pradfplides ca
Val1idlihatailakapa!ladikli drsyate; and PMNKV ad 46cd, p. 298, 5-6: pradfpa-
Text Passages
praklisasaktfnlil.n parasparlibhlivan7patvena
209
gha!apa!lidisaktflllim iva bhed-
lid vastubhedakatvam. yad lihu{l
saktir hi bhlivlibhlivlibhylil!l bhidyamlinli vastv api bhillatti, Ila puna{l klirya-
bhedena, [Ked p. 28] iti.
3.3 tad ayuktam asiddhatvlit. na hi tatrlipP
IO
sakter bhlivlibhlivabhedo 'sti
sarvadaikan7pasyaiva praklislitmano 'nliropital17pasya sal!lvedanlid ity lIk-
tam. na ca klirylibhlivlic chakter abhliva{z 'nlivaiyalJl klira!llini
211
tadvanti
bhavanti' iti nyliylit. tad atrlipi
212
vastu
213
bhedlisiddhe{l, tadvac
214
chaktfnlilJl
samuccaya eva yukto Ila virodha{z. api ca parokasya dhal7lli!za{1 kalyabhe-
dlid indriylider iva saktibhedata{z svaI17pabheda{z, na
215
pratyakasiddhlibhe-
dasya,216 tasya hi pradfplider ivaikasylinekakliryakal1rtvena bhavadbhir
pratyakasiddhlibhedas clitmli, ity lIktam. ato na tasylipi sakti-
bhedlid bheda{z kalpayitw!l yukta{z, iti Yllgapatprakasa iva na kramapraklise
'py al1habhedlisiddhi{l.
2. The Self's Cognition and the Buddhi' s Cognition
nanv eVal!l grlihakatmano jlilillaI17pasylika!likatve 'pi 'plide me vedallli,
sirasi me vedanli, sukhavedanli, dll{zkhanliso vli' ity ut-
pattyapavargayo{z sal!lvedanlid anityataiva. yad lihu{z218
gha!ajlilillam iti
219
jlilillam I
gha!a ity api yaj jfililzalJl
220
tat II iti.
411 .
sya hy ekasyaiva vartidahanatailakapa!zasvajlilipalllidyallekaklil}'allivartakaikasvabhlivo
'bhyupagato bhavadbhi{z. na tu klilyabhedena svabhlivabheda{z.
209 117patvella B, P, Ked, Ped; 117patve L.
210 Interlinear gloss above tatrlipi in B: klilakrame.
211 klira!llini Ked, B, P; kara!llilli Ped, L.
212 tad atrlipi B, P, Ked, Ped; tafl'lipi L.
213 Interlinear gloss above vastu in B: p;aklisa.
214 Interlinear gloss above tadvac in B: dikkramavat.
215 svarapabhedo na Ked, B, L, P; sval17pabhedella Ped.
216 siddhlibhedasya Ked
Pc
, Ped, B; siddhabhedasya Ked'", L, P.
217 du{zkhanliso 'bhad ed.; dll{zkhlislibl1l7d ii, f, r.
218 ViiPa(I) 3.1.105.
219 iti em.; idam ed. iti is the reading of the Vlikyapadfya, and of the MataligaV!1fi
when it quotes this verse at 175,7 ad 6.35b-d.
220 ity api yaj jlilillal!l ed.; ity abhi yaj jlilillal!l ii; ity abhivijlililzalJl f,r.
412
2 atroeyate
6.34c-35a) kaye yeyaJ!1 salJlvie citelz
222
sadli II
lihllide vlipy atlzodvege
cirib grlihaklitlllli. yad 'cites cit salzajo dhal71la' iti. tasyli lisiro
224
_
kliye aneknsmin yugapad yli saJJlvid lilzllide
225
vlipy athodvege
krame(la sli sadli sarvaklilam. yattador nityam abhisam-
bandlzlit sety anuvartate 'tra. tad ayam artlzalz, na grlilzyablzede 'pi grlilza-
katmli yugapad iva krame(llipi blzillllO 'vablzlisate.
3 api tu sarvadaiva grlilzyoplidlzibhede 'py anlisvliditasvlitmablzedalz, klilatra-
ye 'pi tiraskrtasvagataprligabhlivapradlzvalJISliblzlivalz, nlinlividlzapramli(llidy-
anekacittavrttyudayaSalJIVedane 'py akampitatadgrlilzakastlzairyavedanab,
vl-rtyalltarlile 'py aviluptajyotilz, apy aklza(ltjitasvaSalJlvit, satatam
eVlil1lzlivagamakatvena bhlisanlid litlllapadaprariplidyab sva-
salJlvedanasiddlza!1 sthira eva,226 iti kim atrlillyena slidlzallena. na lzi
'gnilz, sftalJI himam' itylidau
227
slidlzanam upapa-
dyate. tlim eva eli228tlllaSaIJlvidam ablzinnlilll anapliyinfi!l elisritya sarvailz kli-
'llilltaraplzallini kal7llli(IY lirablzyante. hi
230
tasylilz sarvavyava-
lzlirapratyastamayalz, sarvajfilinlinlilJl jlilinlintarotpattiklila eva dlzvastatvlit
231
kalz pravarteta
232
klltra
233
kimartlzalJI vli yatalz. na ca tato 'Ilyat saJ!lvidn7paJ!1
pasylima ity uktam. tad ayam anapalzllavanfya eva grlilzakatmano jlilinasya
sarvadli stlziran7pa!1 prakliso vyavalzliralzetublziitalz klilli/ltarablzliviplza-
lapravrttiklira(lal!l sarvair eva. na ea tatrliropa!l samblzavatfty lIktam. 1lapl
blidlza!1234 sarvalll lilambane
235
blzrli/ltaJ!1236 na svlitmani yatab.
237
nlipi
221 lisirolalqa(le ed.; asirolalqa(le ii, f.
222 yeyaJ!1 saJ!lvie cite!l ed.; ye salJlvittis citelz ii, f; yaJJl saJ!lvittis citelz [.
223 MatV VP 6.81ab.
224 lisiro ed.; asiro r.
225 salJlvid lilzllide ed.; clilzllide ii.
m stlzira eva ii, [, f; stlzirablzliva ed.
227 lzilllalll' itylidall ii, [, f; lzimam' itylidliv api ed. lzillllidliv' ity api e.
228 eva eli ii, [, f; evli ed.
229 conj. Sanderson; lqa(likatvavad anityatve ed.; anityatve a;
vedinityatve ii, [, f.
230,. 'S d "d
. . II an erson; pI e .
231ka1a eva dlzvastatvlit ed.; kale 'stalllayatvlit 5 MSS; klillistamayastlzatvlit ai.
232pravaJ1eta ed.; pravartate 4 MSS.
?33 . '
-. kutl'a ed.:a!alz a.
234 nlipibadlzalz ii, [, f; omitted in the other MSS and in ed.
Text Passages
sthirasylirthakriylinupapattir blidhaknm,238 arthabhedavyavasthlinupapattir
vety uktam. tat sthiilasiilqmayor iva sthiratvlisthiratvayolz parasparavint-
ddhariipatvlid vidyudlidliv asthairyaJ!?39 siddhaJ!1 sal
40
sthairyalJI vylivarta-
yati yathli, tadvad atra svlitmany liroplisambhavena sthairyam avabhlisamli-
nam aSaJ!lsaYaJ!1 asthairyaJ!1 vyavacchinatti, t.rtfyapraklirlisambhavlid iti.
4 ata eva nlihllidodveglidfnlilJl saJ!lviddlzannatvam,241 tadapliye 'pp42 saJJlvido
'napliylit, api tu salJlvedyatvam eva. yad api
243
'pi blilzyasya prftitlipayo!l I
blzlivanliyli nlirthan7plib suklzlidaya!l II
ltz salJlviddlzal7natvli244mtmlinam, tad api
ayuktam eva,
tlzlisiddlzatvlie ea.
5.1 evalJI ea
247
jfilinasabdena blzavatlil!?48 yady atra grlihaklitmasaJJlvid eva
vivalqitli tadlisiddlzo
249
hetl/b, tatrotpattyapavargayo!l saJ!lvedanliblzlivlicf5
yugapatpratiblzlisa iva
251
kramapratiblzlise 'pi prameyablzedena
252
gha!a
253
_
jfilinlidibhedasya
254
knlpitatvlid iri. atlza tadgralza(lOttarakalablzlivinf ylidhya-
235 lilambane 4 (non-Kashmirian) MSS; lilamba/laJ!1 ed.
236 blzrlintaJ!1 ii, [, f; blzrlintir ed.
237 yatalz ii, [, f; kndlieana iti ed.
238 blidlzaknlll ii, [, f and 5 other MSS; blidlzika ed.
239 astlzailYaJ!1 ii, [, f; astlzairyatval!l ed.
240 sat ed.; om. in [, f; sao ii, ii.
241 saJ.1lviddlzan1latvam ed.; taddlzanllatvalll a, 1i, I, u, e, ai.
242 tadapliye 'pi ed.; tadapliye ai.
243 Pramli(laviniseaya 1.23 (identified in Stem 1991).
244 dlzal7llatvliO ed.; a, [.
245 pratyalqaviruddhatvlid ed.; pratyalqatvlid ii, [; apratyalqaviruddlzatvlid e.
246 siddlzyli ed.; siddlzli a, ii.
247 eVaJJl ea ed.; om. a, ii, I, u, e, ai.
248 sabdella bhavatlil.1l ed.; sabde ea blzavatlil!l f.
249 tadlisiddho ed.; tad apy siddlzo ii, [.
250 liblzlivlid ed.; ablzlivlid a, ii .
251 iva ed.; eva ai.
252 blzedena ed.; blzede 'pi ii, [, f.
253 glza!ao ed.; om. a, ii, I, u, e, ai.
254 blzedasya ii, [, f; blzedasylitra ed.
413
I
414
vastiytitmikii
255
saJ!lvit stitra
256
jiitinasabdenocyata iti, tatrtipy ucyate
257
ma-
na[zsankalpitetytidi.
6.35b-d) lIlana[zsaJikalpitti satf I
bubhoja bhoktti ttil.n
258
pasctid ahaJ.n bhoktti ca ntillyathd
59
II
saiva grtihakiitlllasaJJlvin malla!lpra!zidlztillena satf yadti bhavati
tadti tlim evtitmti pasctid
260
arthagraha!lottaraktilaJ!1 bllbhoja
261
bhuktavtill.
bhogasya
262
saJ]lvedantitJhakatvlit,263 'ghatam ahaJ!1 jtilllimi ,264 itylidliv iva
265
ahalJl iti partimarsella ity arthafz. tasya gauro
266
'ham itytidivi-
Illillyathopapattir ya-
I
,. , 1269 ks d-,,270
ta). so pi ca partimarsapratyaya) pratya. a eva. ya a IU)
asti hy ti!ocanajiilinaJJl
271
prathamalJlllirvikalpakam I
balalllz1kiidivijiilillasadrsaJ!1 suddlzavastujam II
tata!l paraJJl punar vastu dlzannair jlitytidibhir yayti I
buddhytivasfyate stipi saJ!lmatli II iti.
255 ylidhyavasliylitmikti ed.;ylidhyavastiylitmakaO a; yli vyavastiytitmikii ii, f; yti vyava-
stiytitJnikao [.
256 stitra ed.; lIlanastitra ii.
257 tatrtipy ucyate ed.; tatrocyate a, I, u, ii.
258 blzoktti ttil!l ed.; blzokt[tlil!l u.
259 ca nlinyatlzti ed.; na clinyatlzli ii, [, f.
260 pasclid ed.; pasctid iti ii, I, u, [, f, e, ai.
261 bublzoja ed.; bublzojeti ii, [, r.
262 blzogasya ed.; blzogyasya ai.
263 saJ!lvedanlitJllakatvtit ed.; aSaJ!lvedanlitmakatvtit ii; salJlvedanlitmatvlit [.
264 jtinlimi ed.; vedmi ii, I, u, ii, [, f, e, ai.
265 iva ed.; eva ii, [, f.
266 gallro ed.; paro ii, [, f.
267 ed.; ii.
268 ii, I, u, e, ai; ed.; ii, [, f.
269 so 'pi ca parlimarsapratyaya!1 ii, [, f; so 'pi partimarsa!l ed.
270 SV(P2) 1.1.4 chapter) 112 and 120.
271 lilocanajiililzal!l ii, [, r; lilocanaJ.n jiitinaJ!1 ed. The former is preferred on the
grounds that lilocana is not attested as an adjective. The variants of the Slokavlirttika edi-
tions, and of the other quotations of this verse by RiimakaI;llha, are given in section 3 of
Chapter 3. In the NPP passage being looked at there, and in a passage in a later chapter of
the MataJigavrtti that is given on page 370, I judge RiimakaI;llha to have quoted this verse
with the reading lilocalllijiilillam. But I would not consider it justified to emend to that
here, given the unproblematic reading of the KashmIrian manuscripts.
Text Passages
tatas ca gha!o 'yam itivad niscayapratyayena
/q1atvtid
272
litJnapi niscita
273
eva.
5.2 tasya ca274 partimarstitJnano jiilinasyotpattyapavargayogasiddhliv api
vyadhikara!latvlill na
275
allitya-
tvaslidlzane stimarthyam. yathti caitat tathii
276
buddhyahaJikiiraprakara!layor
ca
gha!ajiitinam iti jiitinalJl I
itytidijiitina
277
bhedo vlistava evety avirodha!l. evalJl svapartitJnaprakiiiakatayti
jiitinasaktirz1pe!la partimarstic ctitlnli
278
llkta[z.
272 ed.; a, ii, I, u, e, ai.
273 niscita ed.; niscfyata a. .
274 ca ed.; om. in ii and r.
415
275 vyadhikara!latvtin na ed.; vyadhikara!ltisiddhatvtin na ii, I, u, e; vyadhikara!lasi-
ddhatvtin nanu ii, [, f; na ai.
276 caitat tathti diagnostic conj. Isaacson; ctisya ed.
277 jiitina ed.; vijiilina ii, [, f.
278 partimarslic clitJnti ed.; partimarsas clitJna ii, [, f; partithas clitJna e; parlimarslit-
Ina ai.
GENERAL INDEX
Abhidhannakosa, 55, 67
55, 57, 127,
133,137,158,185,186,191,231,
297
Abhinavagupta, 70, 71, 72,89,115,
374
abhivyaktivlida, 122
174, 176
Action (kriyil)
directed to oneself (sviltrriani
kriyil) impossible, 247
Action (prav,m)
impossible given .
momentariness, 225, 233
not undertaken by the wise,
234
Adachi, T., 61, 62, 63
adhanna, 168
173
adhyilropa, superimposition
cannot be carried out by
something momentary, 238-
45
of the stability of the Self,
230-36
the nature of conceptual
cognitions (vikaZpa), 230
adhyavasilya, 258, 272-311, 365, 367,
369,370,372,379
difference from svasaJ.nvedana,
284-94
adhyavaseya, 237, 272-311
64, 168
ilgama, 330, 331
Agamaviveka, 50
ilgantuka, 66
Aghorajyotis, 114
AghoraSiva, 71, 73, 77, 79, 114,370,
373,377
ahampratyaya, 76,100, 127,257-332
difference from svasaJ.nvedana,
284-94
ahankilra,62, 127, 193,366
in Saivism, 127
in Siiilkhya, 127
one of the three mental
faculties, 82
responsible for the vital
breaths, 79
ahankilratattva, 78, 79
aiSvarya, 372,
ilkilra,56,266
aZankilra, 296
Alper, H., 70
Amarakosa, 259
anadhyavasita, 176
anaikilntika, 174,267,270,271
Ananta, 81, 82, 83
anapadesa, 176
anilnnavilda,51-60
liberation is impossible without
it, 231
anattil,54
anavasthiti, 136
61
418
anublzava
-distinguished from conceptual
cognition, 218,365
identical in all people,
regardless of their
philosophical views, 218
anubhavavirodlza
(incompatibility with
experience), 226
anumiina, 87,331,368
anumiitr, 222, 368
anupalabdlzihetu, 129
anusandhiina, 172, 240
anuvyavasiiya, 100, 163
anvaya, 319, 328
anyathiinupapatti, 142
apiina, 79, 166
Arcata, 113
artlzabhediisiddhi, 346
arthakriyii
impossible in something
momentary, 254, 354
artlziipatti, 204
asamasalzopalambhaniyama, 263
asiddha, 176,203,267,299
iisraya, 157
iisrayiisiddhatii, 157
iisrayavyiipi, 66
asti
. as copula?, 134
iitiviilzikasarfra, 65
iitmiidvaiia,
AtIDaSunyavadins, 207
.A.tmatattvaviveka, 132,263,333,348
iitmaviida
RamakaJ.l!ha's
compared with that of the
BrahmaJ:).ical Schools, 102,
214
Index
aviicya,59
iivara1J.a, 86
iiveaviida, 122
avikalpaka, 257
63
avyakta, 82, 193
iiyatanas,79
ayiivaddravyabhiivi, 174, 178
biidlzakapramii1J.a, 120
Bahyiirthavadins, 259, 274, 281
bauddha,373
Bhairava, 88, 246
Bhakti,71
Bhartrhari, 187
Bharqprapanca, 112
Bhatt, N.R., 114
Bhana VadIndra, 166
Bhattacharya, K., 53, 66
Bhiivaciirjiima1J.i, 73
blziivanii,94,230,357
276
bhoga,81
Bhogakiirikii, 73, 79, 99, 370, 373,
377,379,380
bhogasankara, 85
Bhoja, 73
blzuvanas,98
Boccio, F., 99, 377, 379, 380
Bodhicaryiivatiirapaiijikii, 59
aodhisattvas, 120
Bodlzisattvayogiiciiracatulzsataka.tfkii,
59
Borody, W., 99
Brahma,202
60, 72, 78, 97, 122, 125,
130
Brahmasiddhi, 125,349
264
Brhatr, 102
Brlzat{ikii, 113
Bronkhorst, J., 62, 66, 88, 90,186
1
bublzulqu,84
Buddha, 52, 53, 54, 231, 233
buddlzi, 62, 63, 68, 95, 100, 178, 358-
82
its Bhavas and Pratyayas, 377
its role in enabling cognition to
be unchanging, 356
faculties, 82
producer of determinative
cognition, 284
buddhibodlza, 101, 102,279,376
buddhfndriya, 62, 82
Buddhism
as represented by Sadyojyotis,
112
doctrine of momentariness,
120,324,333
inference of momentariness
from perishability, 121,324
non-difference of perceiver and
perceived, 333, 348
objection to I-cognition, 295
Pramfu)a School, 55-58, 87
piirvapalqa in Saiddhantika
scripture, 75
view of liberation, 97,122
view of the identity of cognizer
and cognition, 93, 214
Buddhists. See Mahayiinikas. See
Madhyamikas. See Sautrantikas.
See See
Vijfianavadins. See Yogacaras
their paramalp padam, 78
buddhitattva, 78, 127,216
buddhiv[fti, 79
caitanya, 95, 96
Index
difference fromjiiiina, 95
caittas,94
CandrakIrti, 231
Candrananda, 166-69, 175,297
Carakasalphitii, 166, 167
Carvakas, 174, 183,359
objection to I-cognition, 295
Cataract, 80
Catubsataka, 187
Causal complex. See siimagrf
Chakrabarti, A., 183
Chakravarti, P., 66
Chandra, P., 54
Chattopadhyaya,K.,66
Chau, T., 60
Cidgaganacandrikii, 246
85
citta, 185
cittav.rtti, 381, 382
Cognition
a perceiver by nature, 213
a process that requires a bearer
of that process, 219
. a quality of the Self, 92
a quality that requires a
substance, 166, 174, 185,
219
an action that requires an
agent, 219
as synonymous with the
cognizer, 214
as the witness of only one
object, 217
cannot stabilitY
on to itself, 236-55
equated with the Self, 213-:16,
226-27,333-82,
419
420
established by direct
perception (pratyalqa-
siddha),213-16
established by experience
(anubhavasiddha), 130,
213-16,218
its uncontroversial existence in
contrast to that of the Self,
130,135,203,214,218-19
must be differentiated by its
objects, 355
the nature of the Self, 92, 93
witness of all objects, 213
Cognizer
as synonymous with cognition,
214
Collins, S., 52, 53, 54
Conceptual Cognition. See vikalpa
Contradiction (virodha)
by experience, 226
mutual, 251
of action on oneself (svlitmani
kriyli),247
. with tradition, 102
Correspondence principle, 91
Resorption, 83
Counteracting meditation
(pratipalqabhiivanli), 231
Cousins, L., 60
Cuirasses, 78, 82, 85, 86, 95, 98
Das,R.;189
datura, 158
Davies, J., 196 .
Davis, R., 76'
de la Vallee Poussin, L., 185
cognition: See
adhyavasliya .
Devendrabuddhi,.1l3
Index
interpretation of
sahopalambhaniyama, 277
dhanna,56,168,202,372
Dharrnruarti,55,87,129,241,330.
See Pramli1}aviniscaya. See
Pramli1}avlirttika
date, 112, 113
distinction between pratyalqa
and adhyavasliya, 281, 293,
302
idealism, 119
inference of momentariness
from existence, 120, 324
two kinds of valid reason, 327
DharrnapaIa, 112, 187
dhannin, 157
not separate from its dhannas,
334,339
Dharrnottara, 87, 113,288
. interpretation of
sahopalambJzaniyama, 276
dhylinas, 79
Dignaga,55,159,241,247,293,401
dravatva, 65
dravyasat, 56
Duerlinger, J., 60
Early Buddhism, 52-55
Ejima, Y., 57
Ekantavadins, 210, 212
Faddegon,B., 61, 62,63
Filliozat, P.-S., 76
Firebrand (swinging), 241
Franco, E., 58, 160, 184
Frauwallner, E., 53, 54, 60-68, 76,
112, 113, 180
Funayama, T., 113
Garu<;ia, 74, 75
1
I
Gau<;iapada, 63. See

192-202
Gengnagel, J., 73
Go rams pa, 59
gocaras, 114
God
in NP and NPP, 117
refuted by Dharrnruarti, 136
Gombrich, R., 54
Goodall, D., 50, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76,
77,78,79,81,82,83,105,110,
115,143,185,188,190,216,220,

380,381,396; 397
grliJzaka,317
its usage to facilitate the
equating of self and
cognition, 214
Index
grlihaklitman, 224, 247, 248, 249, 250,
349,350,353,354,355,356,360,
362,366,372
Grammarians, 67
78, 193
78, 82
Guru, 83
his role in initiation, 80, 83,
375
gurutva,64
Halbfass, W., 61, 64, 65
Hamilton, S., 52
Hannotte, L., 112
llaravijaya,113,210
Hattori, M., 248
Helaraja, 350
hi
in combination with an
ablative or yata!z, 143,239,
345
Houben, 1., 61
Hrdayasiva, 74
Hulin, M., 186,211
I-cognition, 76, 119. See
ahampratyaya
421
Impurity, 80,81, 82,83,86,98, 122
a physical substance, 85
beginningless connection with
the soul, 85
Impurity (mala), 80
Inada, K., 54
Indra, 74
indriylintaravikiira, 166
indriyas
as levels of the universe, 79
Infinite regress, 199
Inherence, 176
Integuments, 82
Isaacson, H., 50, 131, 135, 149, 166,
232,235,246,284,285,366,399
i.fvarapratyabhijiiliklirikii, 90, 100,
224
isvarapratyabhijiiliviV[fivimarsinf,
287
Iwata, T., 265, 328
Jains, 62, 66, 67, 69, 89, 210
their paramm!z padam, 78
Jayammigalli, 194
Jayanta Bhana, 51, 103, 115, 132, 175,
182, 211. See NyayamafijarI
explanation of recognition,325 '
Jayaratha,206
jfvana,166
jiilina
as synonymous withjiilitr, 214
relation to sm!zvit, 35i, 354,
362.
synonymous with prakiisa, 335
422
translation of, 258, 261, 351
two kinds, 339
jnanaunan,247,334
jnatata, 205
jnatr
as synonymous withjnana,
214
jnatrtva
as synonymous with bhoktrtva,
213
as synonymous withjnana,
213
as the nature of the Self, 213
Johnston, E, 63
Jyotis
name of an initiation lineage,
114
373
186
Kajiyama, Y., 336
kala
one of the kancukas, 82
kiila
one of the kancukas, 82
Kalottara, 73
Kamalaslla, 186, 197
. kancukas, 78, 82, 356, 380
Kano, K., 183
Kapalikas, 87
view of liberation, 122
Kapila,187
Kapstein, M., 1.73
kiirakas, causal factors involved in an
action, 118,210,211
Karma
one of the three bonds, 80, 81
stored in a subtle body, 83
Index
translation of, 272
kannasamya, 83
kamlendriya, 62, 82
kiiryahetu, 327
kiiryakarm:za, 194
kiiryakiirar;zabhava, 324
Kashmir, 111
Kashmiri pronunciation, 169,238
Kasikii
commentary on the
Slokavarttika, 264
Kataoka, K., 45, 50, 159, 194
Kafhaka 61
Kaul, M., 104, 111
Kaumarilas
perception of the Self, 100
view of cognition, 204
Kellner, B., 129,282,289,290
73, 74,75, 80, 81, 82, 94, 115
Kirar;zavrtti, 49, 81, 87, 88,92, 137,
174,184,188,190,221,224,227,
228,397
ad 1.15, 376
ad 2.25ab, 216, 368
ad 3.9ab, 135
Krama, 246
Krishan, Y., 51
70, 114, i 15,246
202
Kumar, S., 66
Kumarila, 112, 113,257,269,294,
320,325,371
Kuncitanghristava, 185
kilfasthanitya, 70
Laine, J., 161
Uikulas
their paramm!l padam, 78
view of liberation, 76
1
Lal, M.B., 104
Larson, G., 62
Latent impressions (salJlskiira), 63,
167,179,185,373
Laukayatikas, 120
Lee, J., 57
Liberation
as omniscience and
omnipotence, 97
in Buddhism, 97, 122
in Nyaya, 95, 96, 122
in Pliiicaratra, 97, 122
in Saiva Siddhanta, 122
. in Siiilkhya, 68, 95,96
in 68, 95, 96, 122
in Vedanta, 97, 122
Riimakargha's view, 96
requires bhoga, 81
the level attained by rival
traditions, 216
Lightning, 251
Lindtner, C., 112
lingam,63
lingavacana,176
Lokayata, 97, 121
in Saiddhantika
scripture, 75
Madhyamakiilmikiira, 336
Madhyamakiivatara, 231
Madhyarrrikas,59,127,233,259,336
Mahabharata, 61, 63
134, 186
mahabhutas, 62, 82, 194
Mahanayaprakiisa,246
Mahaprajnaparamitasastra, 173
mahapralaya, 80, 378
mahat,193
Mahayiinikas,127
Index
Mainkar, T., 196
Majjlzimanikiiya, 52
mala, 80, 81, 86, 122
malaparipaka, 83
Malava, 73
Mallavadin,186
Mallinatha, 259
manas, 62, 65,92, 175
conscious entity, 121
faculties, 82
manastattva, 79
Magganarnisra, 113, 125,349
manogati, 166
423
Manorathanandin, 136, 137,233-36,
288,330
Mantras, 83, 85
Mantra-souls; 98
Mantravarttikaffkii, 50
Matangaparamesvara, 73, 75, 76,77,
82,98
argument from pararthya, 202
Verse 6.81ab, 350
Verse 17.2,373
Matangav.rtti, 49,110,115,126,174,
184,190,195,210,216,335,339,
341,377
ad 2.1, 368
ad 2.2c-3, 374
ad 6.12a, 359
ad 6.13cd, 359
ad 6.18c-20, 192
ad 6.19c-21b, 354
ad 6.21ab, 135
ad 6.23,287
ad 6.34c-35, 349-68
ad 1O.6-13b, 320
424
ad 17.2,368
ad kriyiipiida 1.2-3b, 80
dialogue with other traditions,
77,79
improvement of the text, 255
parallel passages, 220-52
superiority of the Kashmirian
manuscripts, 229, 255
62
Mii!haravrtti, 194
Matsumoto, S., 262, 277
miiyii, 76, 78,80,81,376
controlled by Siva, 83
one of the three bonds, 81
required for liberation, 81
Meru, 164
Meulenbeld, 189
MImiiI]1sa, 60, 88, 113, 159. See
Kaumarilas. See Prabhi'ikaras
in Saiddhiintika
scripture, 75
view of perception of
cognition, 269
Mirror analogy, 100, 101
73; 101,376
Verse 101, 279
Versesl02-105,278
100, 101, 102,
103,104
treatment of other traditions,
79
Mrgendra, 73, 74; 75, 76, 77, 78,83,
211,212,233,377,399.
Verse 1.11.8,381
argument from piiriil1hya, 202
Mrgendrav!1ti, 73, 77, 99,100,135,
233,399 ..
Index
mlldriis, 50
Mz7lamadhyamakaklirikli, 59
. 84
Niidaklilikii, 49
Nagarjuna, 59, 173
Nagesa, 186
naisargika, 66
Namikawa, T., 60
nanll
in combination.with iti cet, 217
78, 97,122
73, 77, 78, 89, 99,
100,114,135,211,233,399
argument from piiriirthya, 202
73
dialectical content, 76
Verses 1.1-6ab, 209-13
Verse 1.1 Oa-<:, 260-65
Verse 1.11,267
Verse 1.15ab, 257-59, 272-92
Verse 1.16,300
Verse 1.17cd, 316-18
Verse 2.17,373
Verse 2.17ab, 378
49, 70
relation to other Saiddhiintika
texts, 74-89
selection of passages, 333
Nenninger, C., 177
nigamana, 261
166
Niri'ikaravadins, 277
84
nirvikaipakajiiiina, 242, 247, 258, 293,
320,364,370,384,387
NisviisatattvasaJphitii, 73, 74
niyati
one of the kaiicllkas, 82, 85
Nyaya, 49, 88,91, 113, 119,215,216,
219,274
atomic origin of the world, 92
Inference of the Self, 130-65
in Saiddhiintika
scripture, 75
refutation by Buddhism agreed
with by 215,
334
view of cognition as an
adventitious quality, 92
view of liberation, 96, 122
view of perceptibility of the
Self, 100, 131
cognition, 99,269
view of the body, 144
view of the difference of
cognizer and cognition, 93,
214,368
dharmin and dhannas, 334
view of the validity of
scripture, 330
65, 66,131,141,144,
169,170,180,211
135, 264, 269
Nyiiyabindll, 193
Nyiiyakandalf, 269
Nyiiyamaiijarf, 51, 65, 66, 103,132,
138-65,175,180,206,211,240,
284,294
Nyiiyapravesa, 193
Nyiiyasatra, 146, 170
3.2.24, 181
Index 425
3.2.47, 178
. Nyiiyaviirtikatiitparyapkli, 127
Nyiiyaviirttika, 100, 127, 131, 141,
175,192,194,257,296,297
Nyiiyaviirttikatiitparyapkli, 66, 132,
294
Oberhammer, G., 160
Observance
section of a scripture thereon,
74
Oetke, C., 52, 141, 161, 166, 168, 171,
174,180,181,182,201,219
piidas
the four divisions of a Tantra,
75
160
Pili canon, 52, 53, 54
Plificaratra, 78
Sarphita, 121"
121
194
Pariikhya, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 86, 127,
373,377,379,380
defence of the existence of the
Self,352
pariimarsa,240,258,272,287,302,
315,350,363,365,368
Pararnartha, 185,194
73 .
diale.ctical content, 76
49, 110,
247
ad verse 43, 98,220-54
dialogue with other traditions,
77,79
. improvement of the text, 255
426
174
parispanda, 67
Pfuthasarathimisra, 69
Particulars, 176
Pasupatas, 87
their paramal.n padam, 78
. 368,373
185
73, 74
Perceiver (griilzaka)
equated with cognition, 226-
27
not different from the shining
forth of the perceiver
(griihakaprakiisa), 222
Perez-Remon, J., 53
Philosophy of nature, 61, 64, 219
Phukan, R., 195
Piligaliimatav!1fi, 50
Pleasure and pain, 68, 94, 237, 351,
387
Power. See sakti
Prabhakaras, 100, 102, 270
prabhatas, 62
pradhiina, 194, 378
pradhval.nsiibhiiva, 220
priigabhiiva,220,249
Prajiiakaragupta, 87, 113, 136,233-
36. See
interpretation of
salzopalamblzaniyama, 277
prajfiaptisat, 56, 59
Prakarar;zapaficikii, 270
prakiisa, 317, 335-48,378
ambiguous, 230 ..
not different from prakiisaka,
339
Index
used to refer to the perceiver,
222
Prakasa (proper name), 74, 75
prakiisaka, 339, 367, 368,378
priika.tya, 205
pralqti, 81, 194
pralqtitattva, 78
pralayiikalas, 81
pralayakevalins, 81
Pramiir;zamimiil.nsii, 329
Pramiir;zasamllccaya, 241, 248, 401
Pramiir;zasamuccayaVTffi, 192
Pramiir;zaviintika, 264, 288
svavrtti, 58, 113, 296, 327, 343
Verse 1.11,326
Verse 1.229cd, 330
Verse 2.22, 137
Verse 2.24, 135,390
Verse 2.48bc, 58
Verse 2.192ab, 230-36
Verse 2.219,231,233
Verses 3.126-128,291
Verse 3.174,240
Verse 3.249,287
Verses 3.387-389, 264
Verse 3.390abc, 269
Verses 4.29-33, 193
Verse 4.33, 197
136, 265
Pramiir;zaviintikav!1fi, 193,234,330
Pramiir;zaviniscaya, 197,260,290,337
ad 1.55ab, 269
Verse 1.3, 329
Verse 1.8, 240
Verse 1.21, 287
Verse 1.23, 94, 357
Verse 1.55, 99
Verse 1.55cd, 206
priir;za,166
8 kinds, 79
Prasannapadii,59,231
PraSastapada, 166-82,219
61, 64, 65, 66
pratibandlza, 331, 332
pratijfiiisiitra, 117
pratipalqabhiivanii, c01:!nteracting
meditation, 231
pratiparamiir;zu, 335
pratisandlziina,240
pratyablzijfiii, 324
Pratyabhijfiiilzrdaya, 284
pratyalqa, 87, 149,222,281,293,
302,317,328,329,331,357,364,
367
prav!1fi, action
impossible given
momentariness, 225, 233
Priiyascittasamuccaya, 74
prayatna, 67,173
Index
Preisendanz, K., 14,61,62,64,65,66,
79, 103, 128, 134, 139, 160, 161,
166,169,174,316
preraka, 173
Priestley, L., 60
Primal Matter, 62, 68, 78, 80, 81, 82,
83,97,122,373
one of the three bonds, 81
required for bhoga, 81
Prthivf, 175
prthivftattva, 72, 83
pudgala, 59, 69
pudgalaviida, 60
PUI).yaraja, 187

the top SiiIilchya tattva, 82
78
riiga
one of the kafiCllkas, 82
RamakaI.1tha
cross-contamination between
his texts, 237
his consistency of expression,
221,396
his overlap with Buddhism,
215-16,217,219,334
his thinking changing over .
time, 229
humour, 218
RamakaI.1tha I, 77
Ratnakara, 113
Ratnatrayaparflqii, 73
Raurava,50,82,87
Rallravasatrasaligraha, 73, 74
Recognition, 322,324
Ritual
. section of a scripture thereon,
74
IJjllvimalii, 66, 103
Rope and snake analogy, 234
Rudra-souls, 81, 98
rz7pa,52
Ruzsa, F., 102, 195,342
Sabara, 204
269
siidhakapramiir;ziibhiiva, 120
Sadhakas, 84, 98
427
Sadyojyotis, 50, 73, 77,96,97,99,
101,102,111,113,114,117,311,
312,318,377,378,380,381. See
Nareivaraparflqii. See
See Sviiyamblzuvasfitrasaligraha-
!fkii
428
knowledge of DharmakIrti?,
269
philosopher/theologian, 76
84
Sagar, K., 104
sahabhliva, 268, 280
sahakliripratyaya, 58, 326
sahopalambhaniyallla argument, 119,
334
Saiva Siddhanta
twenty-eight scriptures, 72, 75
attitude to other traditions, 77-
79
relation to Sfuikhya, 78,81,82,
83,90,92,97,123
South Indian, 185
view ofliberation, 122
Saivism
Agamic, 70
ilitiation,72, 80,83, 85,92,98
. Kashmir, 70
Krama, 71
non-dualistic, 49, 307,368
Northern, 70
overlap with Buddhism, 215-
16,217,219,334
personal practice, 71 .
Pratyabhijiia, 71, 88
public worship, 71
Spanda, 71
Tarilll, 70.
Tantric,70
Tantric ritual, 71
temples, 71
Trika, 71, 88
Siikaravadins, 277
Index
sakti, 338-48
non-different from saktimat,
223,334,339
saktiplita, 83
Siikyabuddhi, 113
S1ilikanatha, 66, 103. See
Prakara1}apaficikli
slilllagrf, 58, 210, 326
samiina, 79
siimiinyagu1}a, 179
siimiinyas, 324
salllasahopalalllbhaniyama, 263
142, 146
saJJlsiira
release from, 81, 83, 91
saJJlvidriipa, 276
salJlvit
synonymous with praklisa, 335
translation of, 261
sa'llvitti
translation of, 261
saJ.nyoga, 179
Sanderson, A., 50, 71, 72, 73, 74,82,
84, 88, 100, 112, 113, 114, 115,
127, 133, 135, 167, 185, 186,220,
224,226,231,246,284,313,340,
352,353,374,375,398
sandigdha,176
SaIikara. See See
Vedanta
name of Siva, 101
SaIika Misra, 166
Sailkarasvlirnin, 113
salikhyii, 179
Sfuikhya,49,60,88,119,215,216
argument from pliriirthya, 192
delial of souls' agency, 76, 81,
122
its hierarchy of tattvas, 78
perception of the Self, 100, 102
in Saiddhantika
scripture, 75
relation toSaiva Siddhanta, 90,
92,97,333
view ofliberation, 96
view of substance as a
collection of qualities, 185
view that anything modified is
insentient, 94
view that sentience is the
nature of the soul, 94
Siilikhyaklirikli, 62, 192-202,373
Sfuikhyas
their paralllalJl padam, 78
Slilikhyasaptativrtti, 194
Slilikhyasiitras, 192
Slilikhyavrtti, 194
saJikrlintivlida, 122
186, 197,266,336. See
Tattvasaligraha
176, 177, 178
Slirdhatrisatiklilottara,74
Slirdhatrisatiklilottaravrtti, 49
Sarma, S.L.P., 115, 238, 253
Sarvligamapriimii1}yopanylisa, 50, 78,
79,216
Sarvajlilinottara, 73, 74
Sarvastivadin,241
Sastri, 185
Sataratnasaligraha, 185
satkliyadmi, 231
sattvlinumlina, 157, 324
Sautrantikas,55, 127, 159,233,259,
262, 355. See Blihyarthavadins
Index
Savitra
114
429
Schrnithausen, L., 52, 53, 54, 55, 56,
59,60,128,134,313,316
Self
a dynamic process, 222
a 174
a symptom of attachment, 231,
232
according to Saiddhantika
theology, 80-84
an asiddha entity, 218
an agent, 65, 67, 90, 142, 146
an iisraya, 142, 166, 185,360
by nature a perceiver, 213
cannot become an object of
perception, 248
difference from Siva, 80
equated witll cogilltion, 213-
16,226-27,333-82
established by direct
perception
siddha),213-16
established by .experience
(anubhavasiddha),213-16,
218,228,339
established through self-
. .awareness (svasaJ.nvedana),
224-55
. experienced through the
Buddhi?, 278
how is it known?, 98
inferred from coglition, 219
its equality to Siva, 85, 86
its pqwers of cogilltion and
action, 82, 98
430
its qualities, 167
-
its size in V 60-68
its stability superimposed,
230-36
its treatment in NPP, 84-86
knower and doer, 68, 91, 210
omniscient and omnipotent, 80,
85,86,122
one or many?, 60, 85, 90
required for the Agamas and
Vedas to be meaningful,
123
root of all evil, 231
Saiva denial of a Self beyond
cognition, 93,215
substrate of mental
occurrences, 65, 142
superimposition of its stability
is impossible, 236-55
the cause of cognition, 219
the revealer of other Selves,
222
vikalpiitfta, 278
witness of all objects, 213, 255
Self-awareness. See svasG1!lvedana
Sense-faculties, 329
consCious entities, 121
the revealers of cognition, 92 I
Shastri, AM., 114
SiddhiilltaSiirapaddlzati, 73
siddlzasiidhana, 196
. siddhis, 91
Sikha
114
SiJphasuri, 186
Index
Siva
agent of the soul's blzoga, 123
author of scriptures, 74, 75
bestower of bondage, 83
bestower of liberation, 83, 123
creator of the universe, 202
difference from souls, 80
his agency minimalized, 83
his role in initiation, 83
inferable as cause of universe,
75
114
112
Sivagupta Biilfujuna, 114
Sivajiiiinabodlza, 185
Sivajfianayogin, 185
sivasamatva, 122
Sivastotriivalr, 246
skandlzas, 52, 53,55,255,295,299
Slokaviirttika, 69, 100, 112, 113, 192,
257,259
pratya/qa chapter 112 and 120,
320,364,370
sinrti, 166
Snake and rope analogy, 234
Snake/gold analogy, 69
Somananda, 70, 89, 112
Somasambhupaddlzati, 73
Speijer, J., 103
SrIdhara, 166, 177, 182
SrIka.I).!ha, 73, 82
SrIvatsa, 246
SteinkeIIner, E., 113, 264, 290, 328
Stem, E., 94, 264, 337
Stream of water, 230.
Subtle body, 63, 65,83,98
suddhavidyii, 83, 98
62
sunyatii, emptiness, 59, 126, 184,207,
209,212
of Self, 255
refuted by direct perception,
255.
Sunyavadin, 259
Superimposition (adlzyiiropa)
cannot be carried out by
something momentary, 238-
45
of the stability of the Self,
230-36
the nature of conceptual
cognitions (vikalpa), 230
svablziivalzetu, 327
svabhiivasiddha, 258
241
sviinubhava,258
svaprakiisa, 101
svasG1!lvedana, 257, 278, 368
cannot be refuted, 251-54
difference from adhyavasiiya,
284-94
difference from alzampratyaya,
284-94
means of knowing the Self, 99,
119,224-55
not separate from object-
awareness, 228-29, 238
SViiyamblzllvasutrasangralza, 73, 74,
80,363
Sviiyamblzllvasl7trasangralzafikii, 112,
113,143,373
Sviiyamblzllvavr!ti, 73, 76
SViiyamblzllvoddyota, 50, 284
svayiitlzya, 149, 165
Synthesis (all11sandhiina),240
Index
Taber, J., 113, 161
tiidiitmya,276
Taittirfya 60
Tamil Nadu, 70
tanmiitras, 62, 82, 188, 194
Tantriiloka, 115, 206
Tantrasiira, 375
Taranatha, 112
336
Tattvabodlzavidhiiyinr, 264, 329
Tattvakaumlldr,192-202
Tattvaptakiisa, 73
tattvas
above the Siiilkhya universe,
87
hierarchy of, 78-79, 82-83, 93,
95
of Siiilkhya, 82, 376
TattvasGligralza
by Sadyojyotis, 73, 76, 82,
370,377
by 63, 94, 135,
193,194,197,265,277,
287,377
431
Tattvasangralzapaiijikii, 196, 197,206,
329
Tattvatrayanin.zaya, 73, 76, 81, 83
Tativatrayani17)ayavivrfi,49,50
Teleology, 93
Thrasher, A., 125
Tillemans, T., 59, 112, 187, 193, 197,
233
ToreIIa, R., 82, 88, 114, 224, 380
train/pya theory, 178
Trika, 89
Udayana, 162, 163. See
Atmatattvaviveka
432
Uddyotakara, 127,131, 141, 149, 150,
- 159-65, 170,201,257. See
Nyayavarttika
Ugrajyotis, 114
Ui, H., 61
Umapati Sivacarya, 185
Universals, 121, 175
166
Uno, T., 69
58, 142, 326
129
261
upanaya,160,261
53, 60, 63, 72
Utpaladeva, 70, 89, 90, 114, 224, 246
utpattivtida, 122
Vacaspati Misra, 144, 146, 160, 161,
163, 182. See Tattvakaumudf. See
Nyayavarttikatatparya!fkti
Vtidavidhi, 193
55, 56, 127, 159,233
Vaidikas, 72
vaiktirika, 79
vairagya, 372
49, 60,88, 91, 119,215,
216,219
argument for Self as
174
atomic origin of the world, 92
attacked by Sadyojyotis, 76
philosophy of nature
arguments, 166
refutation by Buddhism agreed
with by 215,
334
view of cognition as an
adventitious quality, 92
Index
cognition, 99, 269
cognizer and cognition, 93,
214
dhannin and dhannas, 334
61, 62, 63, 64, 131,
146,297
2.2.28, 175
. 3.2.4, 166, 167, 179
9.22, 166
Vakyapadfya,187,217,349,361,367
Vasubandhu, 55, 56, 127,193,231,
324. SeeAbhidhannakosa and

Vasudeva, 296
Vatslputrlyas, 59, 69
Vatsyayana, 66,131, 146, 149, 150,
159-65, 171, 180,211. See

vedana, 52
Vedanta, 49, 60, 71, 85, 88, 125, 127,
130,211,212,214,222,246
attacked by Sadyojyotis, 76
illusionist (vivartavada), 75,
76, 112,381
only one soul, 121,368
pz7rvapalqa in Saiddhantika
scripture, 75
relation to Saiva Siddhanta, 90,
333
sarvaikatva, 118
transformationist
76, 112,
121
Vedantins
their parama1!1 padam, 78
Vedas, 72
Vetter, T., 52, 206, 329
viblztiga, 179
206
vidya
one of the kaficukas, 82, 95,
356,380
Vidyabhusana, 112
I, 77
II, 73
VidyapuralJa, 114
vidyas,83
Vidyesvaras, 81
vijfiana
translation of, 261
vijfianakalas, 80
vijfianakevalins, 80
vijfianavtida,259
Vijfianavadins. See Yogacaras
vijfiaptimtltrata, 262
vikalpa, conceptual cognition 152,
230,237,240,244,247,248,325,
331,332,337,375,384
non-conceptual with regard to
itself, 245-48
vikalpatfta, 301
vimarsa, 258, 279
wordless, 314-18
79
vinasitvanumana, 324
VinItadeva, 113
176, 177
vipratipanna, 192
vintddha, 176
Index

translation of, 272
179
62
Vital breaths, 79
Vpnkara, 154, 159-65,259
vyaptismara1:za, 160
vyatireka,319,328
vyavahara, everyday activity and
language, 125,210,211,233
grounded in delusion, 235
Vyomasiva, 177
Vyomavatf, 65
Vyomavyapistava, 49
Watson, A., 93, 95, 115, 238, 253
Wezler, A., 61,62, 64, 186
Xuanzang, 112, 185
Yasomitra, 137, 185
yatab
sentence-final, 85, 143,225,
252,370,397
Yauga
meaning 66
yavaddravyablztivi,66.
Yoga
meaning Nyaya-V 66'
section of a scripture thereon,
74:
284
. Yogacara, 333
433
Yogacaras, 55, 77,119,259,335-48,
355,' See Sunyavadins. See
Siikaravadins. See Niriikaravadins
Yogasz7tra,96
Yogic perception, 131,242
Yogins, 176
yogyatti, 327
Yuktidfpikti,79, 192-202

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