BATTLATION COMMAND IN COMBAT - FORWARD EDGE OF COMBAT POWER: A LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS OF SELECTED BATTALION COMMANDERS IN COMBAT IN WORLD WAR

11, KOREA AND VIETNAM WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE COMBAT LEADERS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

RICK MEGAHAN, CPT, USA A.A., New Mexico Military Institute, 1975 B.S., Eastern New Mexico University 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1990

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: Rick Megahan, CPT, USA

Title of Thesis: Battalion Command in Combat Forward Edge of Combat Power: A Leadership Analysis of . Selected Battalion Commanders in Combat in World War 1 1 , Korea and Vietnam with Implications for Future Combat Leaders

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chairman

2 , Member, Consul tin9 Faculty COL Catherine H.T. Foster, Ph.D.

L-CZ.Accepted this 1st day of June 1990 by:

is Sturbois, 111, M.S.

.,z

, Member, Graduate Faculty

, Director, Graduate Degree

hil lip'^. Brookes, Ph.D.
Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT BATTALION COMMAND IN COMBAT FORWARD EDGE OF COMBAT POWER: A LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS OF SELECTED BATTALION COMMANDERS IN COMBAT IN WORLD WAR 11, KOREA AND VIETNAM WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE COMBAT LEADERS, by Captain Rick Megahan, USA, 386 pages. Based on the construction of detailed combat narratives and the application of current U.S. Army leadership doctrine as the assessment methodology, this study conducts a leadership analysis of three Distinguished Service Cross-winning battalion commanders of World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam. The performances of LTC Benjamin Vandervoort at St. Mere-Eglise on 6-7 June 1944, of LTC James H. Lynch at Hill 314 in Korea on 12 September 1950, and of LTC Harold Moore at LZ X-Ray in Vietnam on 14-16 November 1965 are examined in terms of the tasks, the skills, knowledge, and attitudes (SKA), and the leadership performance indicators (LPI) which support the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100, Military Leadership. Foremost among the conclusions which are evident from this study are the following skills of battalion command which contribute to success in combat: rapid battlefield planning is vital to tactical flexibility and situational response; mission orders to subordinates is the most effective approach in combat; the commander must endeavor to maintain the initiative when confronting the enemy; fire support is crucial to infantry success; innovation, based on sound doctrine, is a catalyst for solving situational problems; commanders must coach subordinates during combat; communications is absolutely fundamental to success in combat; pre-battle training and the training conducted between engagements has great impact on soldier performance; casualty evacuation is one of the battalion commander's highest professional obligation; to succeed, the battalion commander must command forward; and, the battalion commander must define success for his subordinates. This study concludes that the leadership competencies and their supporting SKA and LPI constitute a valid assessment tool for analyzing the combat performance of past - and future - battalion commanders. But on the whole, more of the warfighting focus of AirLand Battle doctrine should be incorporated into the performance standards to make the competencies more useful as a leadership evaluation tool during field training exercises or rotations at the National Training Center or the Joint Readiness Training Center.

.
.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The development of this thesis has been a process not unlike the preparation and execution of a tactical operation. As with any mission, there has been an extremely vital support structure of relevant actors who made the project a reality. I would like to take the opportunity to formaliy acknowledge the significant role these individuals played in the completion of the thesis. First and foremost, I would like to extend my most heart-felt gratitude to my thesis committee, who individually and collectively urged me over many hurdles. I would especially like to thank MAJ Mark J. Lavin for his faith and leadership throughout the enterprise. Without his direct, personal involvement, the research effort would not have been completed. From his "overwatch position," COL Louis Sturbois, 111, CAL, provided vision as only a combat leader knows how and I am tremendously grateful for what I learned from his guidance. In terms of research technique and scientific methodology, I am deeply indebted to my consulting faculty, COL Catherine H.T. Foster, R.N.,Ph.D. On numerous occasions, her assistance and coaching was decisive. For sheer volume of work, Mrs. Ann Chapman, NavyIMarine Corps Section, deserves great praise for preparing the thesis document and offering moral support. To Ms. Carol Ramkey, CARL, I am especially grateful for her tireless assistance in the accumulation of mission essential materials. To Staff Group ZD, I am thankful for a year's worth of support and encouragement. And most importantly, I will forever be indebted to my wife, Mary, and my son, Kyle, who endured the sacrifice in true Ranger spirit and gave me my deepest strength to carry on.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

THESISAPPROVALPAGE LIST OF MODELS CHAPTER
1.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1
3
3

. . . . . . . . . Statement ofthe Problem . . . . . . . . . Analysis of the Problem . . . . . . . . . Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Delimitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Importance of the Study . . . . . . . . . . Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organization of the Study . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . LTC Vandervoort . Sources . . . . . . . . . LTC Lynch . Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . LTC Moore .Sources . . . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 . METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . .
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

4
5

6 6
8

11
12

14 16
20 22
34

37
52

. Combat Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . Analysis and Conclusions . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . LTC JAMES H . LYNCH. 12 SEPTEMBER 1950 . . Combat Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . Analysis and Conclusions . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . .
4 LTC BENJAMIN VANDERVOORT. 6-7 JUNE 1944 6

LTC HAROLD G

. MOORE.

14-16 NOVEMBER 1965

. . . . . . . . . . . . Analysis and Conclusions . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Narrative APPENDICES

. . . . . . . . 345 B . Leadership Performance Indicators . . . 352 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
A Leadership Competencies

LIST OF DIAGRAMS/MODELS Page DIAGRAMS

1

Methodology Flow Process Competency Matrix

2.

......... . . . . . . . . . . . .

38
41

MODELS

. 2. 3. 4.
1

Vandervoort Models LynchModels

............

89

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Moore Models . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Comparative Models . . . . . . . . . . . . 311

vii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

It is possible that we study the giants of military history (who may be born rather than made) and too little the performance of the sergeants, captains, and colonels on whose collective shoulders so much rests . l LTG Walter Ulmer The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a study of those "colonels" Lieutenant General Ulmer alludes to officers who have commanded battalions in combat

the

and

determine what they did to be successful light infantry battalion commanders of World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam. The intent of the investigation is to ascertain what demonstrated leadership competencies of these battalion commanders contributed to battlefield success. The battalion commander holds the most important job in the army. He is the vital link between strategic

and operational maneuver and tactical execution of plans at the small unit team level. of tactical command.2 The battalion commander is the closest senior leader to see and fight the battle.3 He synchronizes He His command is the essence

decisive combat power at the forward edge of battle.

skillfully employs the dynamics of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership in a unique environment which must withstand the extraordinary stress of combat.4 Obscure situations, compressed time for decisions which
1

learned from a study of selected combat battalion commanders of the past?

THE PROBLEM
S

The primary purpose of this study was to determine what skills of command of battalions in combat can be learned from a study of selected light infantry combat battalion commanders in World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam.

A secondary purpose was to highlight the requirements for

a more exact definition of success on the battlefield to fill the void in current doctrine. A third purpose was to

identify an existing void in battalion-level leadership literature, and recommend that further research aim at fulfilling this need.

A fourth purpose was to "test fire"

the nine leadership competencies outlined in FM 22-100, Military Leadership, for suitability as historical indicators and as assessment or evaluation guidelines for future leaders. Lastly, this study was intended to

underscore the need for a more thorough, combat leadership intensive training course for battalion command designees. Analysis of the Problem In order to achieve a solution to the research problem, a number of subordinate questions had to be answered:
1. What are the overtly measurable criteria for

success in commanding a battalion in combat?

Could a

historical analysis of past battalion commanders reveal basic tenets of battlefield success? 2. Do the leadership competencies outlined in FM A,

22-100 (approved final draft, 30 June 1989);~ppendix provide a framework for a historical assessment of

battalion commanders in World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam? ASSU~D~~O~S The following assumptions are integral to this study : 1. That the nine leadership competencies of FM

22-100 constitute a valid comparative devise for leadership competencies of light infantry battalion commanders in combat, 1942-1975. 2. That there is consistency among successful

combat leaders regardless of historical period, country, or condition of combat.' 3. That the success of the battalion in

accomplishing its mission is a result of the leadership competency of the battalion commander.8 4. That "the single most important factor in

creating a successful battalion is the leadership of the battalion commander."9

5.

That the application of combat leadership is an

essential ingredient of success on the AirLand battlefield and that AirLand Battle doctrine is leadership intensive.
6.

That the selection of infantry battalion

commanders who have been awarded the Distinguished Service 4

Cross for their superior leadership under fire and the resultant success of their respective battalions in accomplishing assigned missions is an acceptable sampling process for this study.
7.

That the selection of one DSC winner from World

War 11, Korea, and Vietnam will provide a reasonable balance to the study. Delimitations of the Problem The following parameters were established for this study:
1. The study did not attempt to delve into the

personal lives of commanders to find outstanding personality or behavioral traits. Only brief background

information was provided in order to establish context.

2.

The study did not investigate the means by

which the individuals in the thesis were selected for battalion command.
3. World War I commanders were not studied due to

research constraints.
4. Medal of Honor winning battalion commanders

were not studied in order to maintain study selection consistency.

5.

Only recipients oi the Distinguished Service

Cross were studied.

6.

This study did not attempt to examine

pre-command training for the battalion commanders listed in this thesis. In addition, no attempt was made to
5

review tactical doctrine as it may have applied to the period being studied. Likewise, the study did not attempt

to compare or contrast tactics, techniques, or procedures inherent in each of the periods studied.
7.

Only light infantry battalion commanders were

studied. Limitations The overriding limitation to the study of selected infantry combat battalion commanders of World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam is that there are few definitive historical accounts which are focused on battalion level As a result, this limited the selection of commanders to those DSC winners with adequate supporting primary or secondary source material. This field was even further

reduced because of the difficulty in obtaining information on the circumstances surrounding the DSC-winning performance. A fire at the National Personnel Records

Center in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1973, destroyed the records of all officers who departed the Army between 1917 and 1959. As a result, many commanders were selected because they are still living and could be contacted for interviews. Finally, conclusions of this study are relevant only to command of light infantry battalions in combat. Imuortance of the Studv The AirLand Battle doctrine of the U.S. Army is leadership intensive doctrine.
6

It is the battalion

commander who translates operational warfighting doctrine into the realities of fire and maneuver on the modern non-linear battlefield. As the possibility of

low-intensity conflict becomes more and more likely, future light infantry battalion commanders will find themselves conducting missions at the forward edge of contingency operations in support of national military strategy. It is imperative that future light infantry

battalion commanders fully know what it takes to lead successfully in battle. Extended weapons lethality,

rapidity of deployment, and the unforgiving responsibility for insuring that the light infantry battalion is extremely well trained for combat calls for future leaders who have the right "stuff" to fight and win. Future

leaders obtain the "stuff" which results in success in combat by looking to the past for examples of sound leadership under fire. Then, according to Field Marshall Earl Wavell, future combat corrnanders should take particular situations, and as far as possible get inside the skin of the man who made a decision and then see in what way you could have improved upon it.10 This study is important in that it provides some situations for future light infantry battalion commanders to learn what successful leadership in combat entails. Viewed in the context of the nine leadership competencies, this study may be used to assist in the development of

additional literature on combat leadership for inclusion in focused pre-command training programs. Definitions The following terms are integral to the study and are defined here for clarification: a. Light Infantry Battalion: the essence of

tactical command.

Composed of footmobile fighters who are

organized, equipped, and trained to be habitually employed in close, restrictive terrain. The battalion is organized

with three to five rifle companies, which are normally commanded by captains. The battalion is organized to have

utility at all levels of intensity and is capable of mission accomplishment under all environmental conditions.12 Light infantry battalions have limited

combat support and combat service support but are capable of small-unit independent operations at considerable distances from command and control headquarters. The

tactics of a light infantry battalion are a combination of multiple, small unit operations that capitalize on surprise and attacks on the flanks and rear of the enemy.13
A

close-in fight in urban terrain is perfectly Inclement weather and

suited to light infantry units.14

night operations are normal operating conditions of the light infantry battalion. b. Leadership: FM 22-100 defines leadership as

"the process of influencing others to accomplish the

8

mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. "1 5 c. Combat Leadership: leadership under fire is

characterized by unique demands inherent to the situation which confronts the commander. Combat leadership requires must

the commander to be a combat manager.'-e

prudently employ men and materiel in the economical and effective accomplishment of a mission.17 exercises leadership The commander

iafluencing others by providing

purpose, direction, and motivation

under circumstances

which rarely allow time for detailed planning or elaborate preparations.10 Combat leadership calls for rapid

decision making based on brief, first-hand observations and estimates of the situation, followed by face-to-face dissemination of instructions and reliance on Standing Operating Procedures for covering anything other than the bare essentials.19 d. Senior Leadership: senior leadership is

defined in FM 2 2 - 1 0 3 , Leadership and Command at Senior Levels as "the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired results."20 Though not directly stated in this manual,

senior leadership begins with the battalion commander.2l organization As opposed to the junior leaders in the

the captains and lieutenants

the

battalion commander is a senior leader because "his focus

9

becomes one of building teams and exerting influence through subordinate commanders and staffs."22 imperatives of senior leadership direction, and motivation Th.ese

provide purpose,

are exactly the-same as the

basic definition of leadership found in FM 22-100. However, it is the implementation of these imperatives that differentiates between junior and senior leaders. Vision is how the senior leader effectively implements the imperatives; it is his personal concept of providing purpose, direction, and motivation to the unit at his level of leadership.23 The definition of senior

leadership is crucial to the analysis of battalion commanders in combat because it recognizes that there are different levels of leadership and that it is at battalion-level that we first see the identification of concerns for "organizational leadership." e. Successful Battalion Commander in Combat: for

this study, a successful battalion commander in combat is recognized as the light infantry battalion senior leader who has exercised extremely efficient command and control of his organization in the midst of the extraordinary stress of battle; accomplished assigned missions; was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for conspicuous gallantry and leadership under fire while completing all assigned missions.

Oraanization of the Studv Chapter One introduces the study; states the purpose of the thesis: analyzes the subordinate questions; lists assumptions integral to the study; presents delimitations and limitations to the,thesis; describes the importance of the study; and provides definitions of select terms inherent to the study. Chapter Two presents

a review of the extant literature relevant to the research question. Chapter Three discusses the method used to

collect data and describes the model used for the analysis of selected battalion commanders in combat. Chapter Four

is the study and analysis of the combat leadership of 3TC Benjamin Vandervoort, 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Eastern Theatre of Operations, WWII, 1944. Chapter Five is the study and

analysis of the combat leadership of LTC James H. Lynch, 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cav Division, Korea, 1950. Chapter Six is the study and analysis of LTC

Harold Moore, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 3d Brigade, 1st Cav Division, Vietnam, 1965. Chapter Seven

summarizes the findings of the study and states conclusions deduced from the study. Included are

observations and recommendations for further research in the field of battalion-level combat leadership.

ENDNOTES
1 Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, ed., Challenee of Militarv Leadership, p. xvi.
2

The

Arthcr S. Collins, Jr., "Tactical Cotrmand," The Challenoe of Militarv leaders hi^, p. 4 9 . HAJ Lawrence M. ~teiner,Jr., "A Study of the Individual Leadership Skills and Traits that Armor Battalion Commanders must Possess in Order to be Successful in Combat and Noncombat Situations," p . i.
4

FM 7 - 7 2 , Liaht Infantry Battalion, p. 2 - 2 .

5 MAJ Simonsen, CPT Frandsen and CPT Hoopengardner, "Excellence in the Combat Arms," p. 1.
6 MAJ Samuel C. Endicott and Dr. Earl C . Pence, Army Research Institute, "NTC Leadership Lessons Learned," p. 8 . 7

Combat:
8

LTC K. E. Hamburger, Dir., "Leadership in An Historical Appraisal," p. 1. Steiner, p. 3. Simonsen, p. 36.

1 0 Jay Luvaas, "Military History: Is it Still Practicable?" The Parameters of War, p. 13.

13
1 4

Ibid.. p. i. Ibid.

1 6 COL Samuel H. Hays and LTC William N. Thomas, ed., Takins Command, p. 2 4 7 .
17

Ibid.

19

Ibid.. pp. 2 4 7 - 2 4 8

2 1 Classroom discussions with MAJ Barbie, CAL Instructor, CGSC, September 1989.

2 3 MAJ William G. Butler, "How Should the Brigade and Division Commander Assess Success or Failure on the AirLand Battlefield?" p. 2.

CHAPTER TWO REVIEW OF LITERATURE

While the related literature on leadership is quite extensive, there is no definitive body of source material directly pertaining to the combat leadership of battalion commanders. Consequently, a fairly wide range of sources will be examined to facilitate breadth, scope, context, and content of the study. Initially, U.S. Army doctrinal manuals on leadership and command have formed the foundation for the study. Background information on leadership principles,

traits, attributes, characteristics, and competencies is fundamental to the development of the analysis model used in the study. Worthy of a separate study is the evolution of U.S. Army leadership doctrine, particularly in terms of the emphasis placed on the "be, know, do" of combat leadership. For this thesis, though, a doctrinal

"pyramid" was formed as the framework for source compilation. The chief source document is FM 100-5, Ouerations, without which no examination of past leadership and related AirLand Battle future implications could procede. FM 100-5 forms the base of the doctrinal pyramid of this study. Especially significant to this study is the

treatment in FM 100-5 of the practices of "auftragstaktik" and decentralized decision authority.

14

AirLand Battle

Doctrine is leadership-intensive doctrine.

FM 100-5

describes leadership as the "most essential element of combat power" and states that "no challenge exceeds leadership in importance."l FM 100-5 recognizes that

"leadership requirements differ with unit size and type" and that "leaders at lower levels will play equally important parts in winning the smaller engagements that make up battles ."2 Superior combat power is generated

to win these engagements through a skillful synchronization of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership., As a result, "no peacetime duty is more

important for leaders than studying their profession and preparing for war."' commanders in combat. The second side of the doctrinal pyramid is FM 22-100, Military Leadershiv. FM 22-100 currently exists Hence, this study on battalion

in approved final draft format. FM 22-100 is the specific start point for this study. The leadership campetencies

outlined in Appendix A will be used as the assessment device for combat battalion commanders in World War 1 1 , Korea and Vietnam. doctrine The key elements of Army leadership

leadership factors, principles and competencies FM

have been derived from a study of past leaders.

22-100 addresses applying the time-tested competencies in a direct, face-to-face mode in units. of direct leadership The highest level

and the transition point from

direct leadership to indirect, senior leadership 15

is

generally agreed to be at battalion command level.

This

reinforces the need for a study of command of battalions in combat in association with current leadership doctrine. The third side of the doctrinal pyramid of this study is FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. The focus of this manual is on the leadership of

large organizations where indirect leadership is more prevalent. This takes place primarily at brigade,

division and corps but battalion level is included as well in regard to the commander's ability to promote his vision of success on the battlefield. This manual affords a

different perspective on the nine leadership competencies in that they are examined as they apply to subordinate commanders and staff. LTC Vandervoort The study of the combat leadership of LTC Vandervoort at St. Mere-Eglise, France, 6 June-20 July 1944 begins with Gordon A. Harrison's Cross-Channel Attack (1951). This volume covers invasion planning, the D-Day

assault, and combat operations subsequent to the landings until 1 July 1944. American Forces in Action volume Utah

Beach to Cherbourq (1947) describes the amphibious landings at corps-level and below and the course of VII Corps combat operations culminating in the capture of Cherbourg on 27 June 1944. Two other green books round

out the U.S. Army Center of Military History publications used for the study of Vandervoort at Normandy: 16 Omaha

Beachhead (1945) and St. Lo (1946).

The first volume

handles all U.S. military operations in Normandy from 6-13 June 1944; the latter volume outlines the First Army offensive during the first three weeks of July 1944 which were intended to expand the beachhead and set the stage for the breakout from Normandy. LTC Ben Vandervoort's 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division had the D-Day, 6 June 1944 mission of blocking the approach of German reinforcements from Cherbourg to the key town of St. Mere-Eglise. Events after the parachute assault led to

Vandervoort making some of the best tactical decisions of the war, and certainly crucial to the success of the Utah Beach landings.5 His actions are chronicled in the

505th Regimental Study #4, The Capture of St. Mere-Eqlise, (1945). S.L.A. Marshall assisted in the development of

this study and from it published Niqht Drop (1962), which is a principal source on Vandervoort and his battalion. LTG James M. Gavin describes Vandervoort's phenomenal tactical decisions and courage at St. Mere-Eglise in To Berlin (1978).

on

Gavin's book is important because it

provides a senior leader's perspective on Vandervoort's actions at St. Mere-Eglise. Gavin, as the Assistant

Division Commander of the 82d Airborne Division, commanded Task Force A during the parachute assault into Normandy. Task Force A consisted of three regiments

505, 507, and

508

organized to secure the flank of the Utah Beach He became personally involved in the fight for

landings.

the vital causeways over the Merderet River, and was intimately aware of the significance significance

operational
A5 the

of Vandervoort's performance.

former commander of the 505th Regiment, and veteran of two combat jumps prior to Normandy, Gavin had selected Vandervoort for battalion command.6 well: He knew Vandervoort

Vandervoort had been a company commander and It is not too

regimental S-3 in the 505th for Gavin.7

difficult to discern the amount of influence Gavin had in the development of Vandervoort's training methods and leadership competencies.* Matthew Bunker Ridgway's command philosophy can also be seen in Ben Vandervoort. Clay Blair effectively

articulates this and other essential command perspectives of the Normandy jump in Ridsway's Paratroopers (1985). Ridgway knew his battalion commanders because he was never far from the hottest action. He considered Vandervoort

one of the toughest, bravest combat commanders he ever knew.9 Blair describes Ridgway's view of the enormity

of Vandervoort's decision-making and personal leadership at St. Mere-Eglise, and how the grateful division commander awarded Vandervoort the Distinguished Service Cross. General Napier Crookenden's DroD Zone Normandy (1976) records the actions of the airborne and glider 18

forces engaged in the air assault ahead of the seaborne forces on D-Day, 6 June 1944. His account of Vandervoort

at St. Mere-Eglise is not only flavored by the knowledge of personal experience and the perspective of command, but is based on an extensive interview with Vandervoort while both visited Holland in 1974. Although S.L.A. Marshall's historiography has recently come under attack, his Nisht Drop (1962) is still a venerable source on Vandervoort's performance at St. Mere-Eglise. Marshall provides a grassroots treatment of Vandervoort's use of LT Turner Turnball's platoon and his guidance of LT Waverly Wray's superb fighting at St. Mere-Eglise. At the point of contention comes Ready, a

history of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War I1 written by Allen L. Langdon, a former member of the regiment. Langdon apologizes in his introduction for

being "at least 35 years late"10 in publishing the 505th story, and immediately remarks that because no unit history appeared after World War 11, considerable erroneous history about the regiment was perpetuated in numerous works since 1945.11 Langdon's work is the

principal source for the study of Vandervoort and 2/505 at St. Mere-Eglise. A couple of other additional works round out the source material for the study of LTC Vandervoort. Gerard

Devlin's Paratrooper is a mammoth single volume account of every air assault operation fought in Europe or the 19

Pacific in World War 11.

Devlin devotes five pages to

Vandervoort and the fight for St. Mere-Eglise. No single volume provides the spell-binding emotionalism and individual courage involved in the Normandy parachute operation than Cornelius Ryan's The Lonsest Day. Ryan's short account of Vandervoort's

fighting attitude is instructive because it does give a clue to the core of the combat leadership philosophy of this quiet, soft-spoken leader. The reknowned military historian John Keegan describes the airborne assault into Normandy and highlights the actions of Vandervoort and LT Turner Turnball in his book, Six Armies in Normandy (1987). Keegan sees Vandervoort as "an eighteenth century Spanish general miraculously endowed with a lion heart" as he is wheeled toward St. Mere-Eglise in a small farm cart.12 LTC Lynch The actions of LTC James H. Lynch and his superb 3d Battalion, 7th Cav Regiment in Korea in September 1950 clearly ranks as one of the most amazing accounts of small-unit military history. Formed hastily from former

personnel of the 30th Infantry Regiment at Ft. Benning, and augmented with cooks and truck drivers assigned as infantrymen, the 2d Provisional Battalion was rushed toward Korea. Scheduled to land in Japan and hoping for

time to assimilate the few World War 1 1 veterans with the reclassified riflemen, the battalion was instead sent
20

directly to Pusan, arriving on 30 August 1950. Now designated the 3d Battalion, 7th Cav, this organization of "school troops" and support troops was immediately committed to battle.13 In spite of these disadvantages, By the end

3/7 Cav would prove to be an outstanding unit.

of September 1950, the battalion would be awarded an unprecedented two Presidential Unit Citations for superior combat performance. Its commander, LTC James H. Lynch,

would be awarded two Distinguished Service Crosses in the same time period.14 The basic source for the study of LTC Lynch is Clay Blair's The Forsotten War (1988). There is no doubt that

Blair's 1,136-page work is the best single-volume treatment of the Korean War. Blair and his wife initiated

their research for The Foraotten War with a close study of another great source, Roy Appleman's South to the Naktons, North to the Yalu (1950). Blair leans heavily on

Appleman's papers for the discussion of Lynch's DSC-winning performance in taking Hill 314, north of Taegu, on 12 September 1950. However, the best source for a study of LTC Lynch and 3d Battalion, 7th Cav is Robert J. Best's The Structure of a Battle: Analysis of a UN-UK Action North Not only is this

of Taesu. Korea, Seatember 1950 (1955).

work the most exhaustive account of Lynch and his battalion, it is clearly the standard for battle analysis at the small unit level. Originally intended to uncover a
21

"pattern of battle from which it may be possible to define in measure the part played by certain factors and component relationships, such as terrain, casualties, and firepower, and the cause-effect mechanism by which a battle progresses," this study quantified data "with a view toward the development of computer methods and war-gaming techniques of operations analysis."l5 According to Robert J. Best, "particular attention is given to what is considered to be the key action of the conflict

the capture of Hill Mass 314 by the 3d

Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. "1 6 LTC Moore Source material pertaining to DSC-winning infantry battalion commanders and their units in Vietnam is nowhere near as prevalent as for World War I1 and Korean War units. The notable exception to the lack of sources is

the amount of material available on LTC Harold G. "Hal" Moore and his 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cav Division. Moore is famous for his successful "stand-up"

fight with the NVA regulars at LZ X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley, Pleiku province, Vietnam, 14-16 November 1965. The chief source used in the study of Hal Moore's combat leadership at LZ X-Ray is Seven Firefiahts in Vietnam written by John A. Cash, John Albright, and Allan W. Sandstrum. The first chapter of this book is dedicated to This

an accounting of LTC Moore's fight at Ia Drang.

22

segment is written by Cash, an infantry major who commanded a company, served on brigade staff, and participated in the action at Ia Drang with the 1st Cav Division.17 Cash delves nicely into Moore's leadership

and decision-making during the three days at LZ X-Ray. An equally vital source for Moore's fight at LZ X-Ray is J. D. Coleman's Pleiku (1988). Coleman, a

retired lieutenant colonel who served with the 1st Cavalry Division "from start to finish,"la has written about "the development of the airmobile concept and the ultimate testing of that concept in the crucible of combat."L9 Coleman's book describes the 1st Cav Division's Pleiku campaign. Coleman used not only his own after-action report on the Pleiku campaign (he wrote the official 1st Cav Division AAR as a captain with the division) but he cited heavily from John A. Cash's monograph on LZ X-Ray.20 In Anatomy of a Division (1987), Shelby L. Stanton writes that the 1st Cav Division was designed and destined for offensive action and no single engagement demonstrated the validity of the air assault concept as strikingly as the action at LZ X-Ray. One slightly contentious source is George C. Herring's chapter "The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley, 18 October-24 November 1965" in America's First Battles. 1776-1965 (1986). Herring brings an interesting He

perspective to the study of LTC Moore and LZ X-Ray. 23

writes that the unusually bloody, savage, and close-quarter fighting in the Ia Drang Valley was the first head-on clash and classic blood bath between two very different types of armies.21 Beginning his study Airmobilitv 1961-1971 (1973) with a poignant dedication to airmobile battalion commanders killed in Vietnam, LTG John J. Tolson writes that Moore had every reason to be proud of the performance

of his unit at LZ X-Ray.22

To Tolson, though, Moore

deserves high praise for his actions as battalion commander at LZ X-Ray, as his unit killed 634 NVA ("actual body count") and did not leave a single U.S. soldier dead or alive

behind on LZ X-Ray.23

One other source of interest for the study of Hal Moore at LZ X-Ray is Infantrv in Vietnam: Small Unit

Actions in the Earlv Davs, 1965-1966, edited by LTC Albert N. Garland of Infantrv magazine. In a short chapter

entitled "Isolated at Ia Drang", SSG Clyde E. Savage describes his combat experience as member of 2d Platoon, Company B, of Moore's battalion. Lastly, an interesting source is LTC David R. Campbell's monograph "Fighting Encircled: Army Leadership" (1987). A Study in U.S.

Moore is considered encircled at Campbell grades Moore and his

LZ X-Ray in November 1965.

battalion "very effective" in chain of command, leadership, troop morale, casualty handling, communications, fire support, and resupply.24 24 Campbell

counts the encirclement of 1st Bn, 7th Cav at LZ X-Ray as "a resounding tactical and operational success in all phases."25 To Campbell, "leadership was paramount in

the success story", and it is strong leadership by the encircled commander which accounts for success.26
A large number of monographs have been consulted to

round out the research and provide a perspective on leadership in combat. For example, the papers presented

at the eleventh general working meeting of the Military Conflict Institute at the U.S. Army War College, 12-15 October 1988, deal with command, control and leadership. Lieutenant General Dave R. Palmer's paper "On Command and Combat" emphasizes the leadership techniques of battalion and division combat commanders. Colonel Frederick
W.

Timmerman's paper "Leadership and Command at Senior Levels" focuses on the development of team, unit and organizational capabilities through vision. The

presentation is clearly an encapsulation of FM 22-103. Colonel Howard J. Prince's "Leadership in Combat" views combat leadership as a "gap-closing exercise" in which the leader assimilates the organizational goal with individual needs at the performance of mission tasks.27 Colonel

(Ret) T. N. Duguy's excellent presentation "In Search of

an American Philosophy of Command and Control" points out

that mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates is the essence of the command and control concept. This thought-provoking paper also highlights
25

such key topics as communications (when does data become information?), feedback (the tendency of high level commanders to interfere with low-level leaders), and delegation of authority (an expedient for the senior leader who cannot, unfortunately, do everything himself?)
.28

A fair amount of School of Advanced Military Studies monographs have been instrumental in the formulation of the thesis outline. MAJ William G.

Butler's work "How Should the Brigade and Division Commander Assess Success or Failure on the AirLand Battlefield" provides thoughts on the commander's obligation to define success in battle and make decisions during the course of battle which are based on an accurate assessment of the indicators of success or failure. Butler's proposed method of assessment MAJ

the commander's

identification of the critical element of the battle29 will be useful as a tool for analyzing the combat

situation assessment processes of the battalion commanders in this study. SAMS monographs by MAJ Robert W. Mixon, Jr., MAJ Leon H. Rios, MAJ David M. Cowan and MAJ John M. Vermillion concentrate on aspects of command and control which are salient to any review of combat leadership. "Taking the Ultimate Risk: Commanding and Controlling
In

Maneuver Forces in Tactical Deep Operations", MAJ Mixon uses the examples of Darby at Cisterna, Patton at
26

Hammelburg, Rommel at Bir Hachem

Gazala, Clarke and Wood

at Nancy; Stilwell at Myitkyina, and Sharon at Abu Agheila to point out that commanders on the AirLand Battlefield need an "intent-command" system to orchestrate the fighting.34 "Intent-command" calls for subordinate

commanders to be "virtual shadows" of the senior leader in terms of doctrinal thinking. A definition of success must be articulated by the senior leader and understood by all subordinate commanders.31 The senior leader must insure

his subordinate commanders understand and implement, at their respective level, the same technique of assessing the combat situation. Personal example is the standard technique for command.32 Trust among members of the

chain of command must be achieved if operations are expected to continue when communications are disrupted. Imaginitive and improvised tactics, divorced from many routine methods, enables the commanders at every echelon to position themselves to assess the facts and possibilities of the moment and act quickly.33 Mission

orders are delivered "face-to-face", where feeback is instantaneous. As Major General John S. Wood of the 4th Armored Division explained about his frequent absence from division headquarters, "If you can't see it happen, it's too late to hear about it back in a rear area and meet it with proper force."34 But can this type of command

really be implemented at battalion level?

MAJ David M. Cowan thinks it can. "Auftragstaktik:

In

How Low Can You Go?" Cowan points out

that the philosophy of auftragstaktik is not a phenomena of high command. At battalion level, communication of orde.rs, confidence in leaders and subordiantes, and command climate are contributors to success.35 These

points may very well be additional criteria in the analysis of combat battalion commanders. the commander's intent Transmission of

the "INTCOM" of Mixon's paper

remains of paramount importance. exercised in battalions?

But how is INTCOM best

MAJ Leon H. Rios writes in "Will, Technology, and Tactical Command and Control" that the Army is becoming increasingly dependent on technical command and control systems which seem to subvert the notions of decentralized control and mission orders of AirLand Battle doctrine. Command and control is seen by MAJ Rios as the arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures by a commander into a system to gather and provide information, direct, plan, synchronize and control the force in combat to accomplish a mission in accordance with his intent. To be effective, all elements must function before, during and after battle.36 Rios then integrates this definition of command and control into a process which incorporates the tenets of AirLand Battle: a) a credible assessment of a situation

including the environment, friendly forces and enemy forces (read METT-T); b) an objective description of the commander's will to suit several contingencies (read
28

clearly articulated intent and definition of success); c) the communication and selection of several courses of action (read assessment of the indicators of success); d) the communication of situation, decision and orders; e) the focusing of combat power to achieve the commander's will (intent) which is the end product (defined object of success) in an AirLand Battle.37 Thus, the commander's

Cz system must help him perform four interdependent

functions:

assessment, objective decision to focus will, The bottom line is that

planning, and execution.38

commanders should not rely on technology to "communicate" these functions. Auftragstaktik, subordinates mirroring the commander's doctrinal thinking and assessment techniques, and trust and confidence are essential gadgetry.39

not

Rios' command and control definition is

helpful in the analysis of combat battalion commanders.

MAJ John M. Vermillion believes commanders should

employ auftragstaktik to the maximum extent possible in their command and control philosophy. He remarks that

decentralized tactical control is no longer a matter of choice, but a combat imperative.40 But Vermillion only

uses examples of auftragstaktik at division and corps level and thus escapes any definitive solution to the question of decentralized command and control at battalion level. Nevertheless, his argument that commanders must

know the talents of subordinates, train them to grasp intent and act independently, and never fail to give them
29

the freedom to act sounds like a leadership competency worth examining.41 Achieving excellence in training and in combat has been well described in the 1984 Naval Postgraduate School study by MAJ Jerry H. Simonsen and CPTs Herbert L. Frandsen and David A. Hoopengardner. "Excellence in

Combat Arms" is an essential source for this study on combat battalion commanders because it highlights the key to success

the battalion commander

and identifies the

"pillars of excellence" which define success on the battlefield.42 Success starts with enlightened, The

power-down, personal-example type leadership.''

focus of excellent battalions is on combat; every soldier in the battalion has a stake in mission accomplishment and is involved in the creation and consistent attainment of high standards of discipline and performance. "Excellence

in the Combat Arms" is a good yardstick for measuring the level of excellence in the combat battalions analyzed in this study. A complimentary work to "Excellence in the Combat
Arms" is the Center for Army Lessons Learned paper, "Fort

Hood Leadership Study1'.

Prepared in 1985, this paper

describes how LTG Walter Ulmer, I11 Corps Commander, had implemented the "power down" leadership Fort Hood, Texas. philosophy at

The power down objective was to create

a command climate that would produce and support a force ready to go to war quickly and effectively; a command
30

climate that would encourage and ensure the development of leaders able and willing to show initiative and to use common sense in achieving their commanders' objectives; a command climate that would tap the potential of all the soldiers, would enhance morale and commitment, and thereby would promote the readiness of the organization to operate as a whole when possible, and as independent elements when necessary.4 4 The Fort Hood Leadership Study provides another look at the effort of enlightened, AirLand Battle, auftragstaktik-style leadership on an organization. From

the perspective of this study of battalion commanders in combat, the Fort Hood Study points out the absolute requirement for leaders at all levels who are technically proficient and who are willing and able to exercise initiative on future battlefields.45 "The Fort Hood

Study" helps to address any potential correlation between the performance of combat battalion commanders of World War 1 1 , Korea, and.vietnam and the performance demanded of AirLand Battle leaders. While it is not within the scope of the thesis to discuss peacetime training programs and how they can, or cannot, contribute to success in combat, many superb papers were reviewed which discussed leadership training. The study of these papers provided an idea of what conclusions may be drawn from a look at combat battalion

commanders and how the conclusions may be translated into effective leadership training programs. One such paper was prepared by the Chief of Military Psychiatry at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Dr. David H. Marlowe. Entitled "Leadership Training

Considerations", Dr. Marlowe expresses the basic point that the American corporation adversarial model has taken hold in the Army and that officers, NCOs and soldiers see each other as different interest groups with different objectives. He then makes a sound argument for organizational leadership called "the professional teamW.46 The professional team is a well-bonded collection of professional and technical experts which focuses on the real end-product, performance in combat. Dr. Marlowe also asks some interesting questions which are worthy of consideration in the study of combat battalion commanders: What leads to combat success? What Does "unit

does an effective combat unit look like?

culture" create behavioral stability and effectiveness in combat? How does the leader teach subordinates to think

for themselves, lead for themselves, and take over for him in combat? Significant other sources have served the research plan. Cecil B. Currey's Follow Me and Die: The

Destruction of an American Division in World War I 1 and John G. Smyth's Leadership in War, 1939-1945: The

Generals in Victory and Defeat provide examples of

32

unsuccessful battalion commanders.

The 1983 Army War Theory and In

College text Army Command and Manaqement:

Practice has been useful. Militarv Leadership:

Pursuit of Excellence edited by Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach and Leadership on the Future
t

Battlefield, edited by James G. Hunt and John D. Blair offers critical insights into organizational leadership.

..

Senior Leadership:

An Annotated Biblioara~hvof the

Military and Non-Military Literature is indispensible in locating source material. MG Aubrey Newman's Follow Me

and LTG Edward Flanagan's Before the Battle are the basic building blocks for any study of leadership. Of course,

the entire collection of COL Mike Malone's writings are essential to leadership studies. Especially good are his

Small Unit Leadership and his essays contained in The Trail Watcher, FORSCOM Miscellaneous Publications 600-1. The literature review has provided the essential historical parameters, or "sand box", wherein each of the battalion commanders may be analyzd. Next, Chapter 3

discusses the methodology for the analysis of the combat leadership performance of each of the battalion commanders in terms of current U.S. Army leadership doctrine.

ENDNOTES
1
2

FM 100-5, Operations, p . 13.

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. LTG James M. Gavin, On To Berlin, p. 263. Clay Blair, Ridawav's Paratroopers, p. 233n. Gavin, p. 261.

4
5

6
7

9
10

Napier Crookenden, Drov Zone Normandy, p . 8. Allen L. Langdon, Ready, p. vii. Ibid., pp. vii-viii. John Keegan,, p. 95.

11
1.2

1 3 Robert 3. Best, The Structure of a Battle: Analysis of a UN-UK Action North of Taeau. Korea. September 1950, p. 195.
14

Clay Blair, The Foraotten War, p. 244, photo.

1 5 Letter, COL H. W. Mansfield, Chief, Operations and Personnel Research Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, to C o m a n d a n t , CGSC, 4 Mar 1955, Subj: Technical Memorandum ORO-T-261, "The Structure of a Battle".

16

Best, p. 1.

Cash, Albright, Sandstrom, n Vietnam, p. 192.

11

J. D. Coleman, Pleiku, p. xi. Coleman also wrote Memories of the First Team in Vietnam (1969), a precursor to Pleiku.
18
19 20

Ibid., p. ix. Ibid., p. XV.

Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, ed.. America's First Battles, 1776-1965, p. 300.
21

22

LTG John J. Tolson, Airmobilitv, 1961-1971, Tolson, p. 81. A

p. 81.
23

2 4 LTC David R. Campbell, "Fighting Encircled: Study in U.S. Army Leadership," pp. 3-4.
25
26

Ibid., p. 105. Ibid. COL Howard J. Prince, "Leadership in Combat,"

27

pp. 6-9.
2 8 COL T. N. Dupuy, "In Search of an American Philosophy of Command and Control," p. 30.
2 9 MAJ William G. Butler, "How Should the Brigade and Division Commander Assess Success or Failure on the AirLand Battlefield," pp. 3-6.

30 MAJ Robert W. Mixon, Jr., "Taking the Ultimate Risk: Commanding and Controlling Maneuver Forces in Tactical Deep Operations," p. 10.
31

Ibid., P. 36. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., pp. 35-37. Ibid., p. 16. How Low

32
33

34

3 5 MAJ David M. Cowan, "Auftragstaktik: Can You Go?" p. 2.

3 6 MAJ Leon H. Rios, "Will, Technology, and Tactical Command and Control," p. 5.

37

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 28

38
39

4 0 MAJ John M. Vermillion, "Tactical Implications of the Adoption of Auftragstaktik for Command and Control on the AirLand Battlefield," pp. 36-37.

41

Ibid., p. 37

42 MAJ Jerry H. Simonsen, CPT Herbert L. Frandsen, and CPT David A. Hoopengardner, "Excellence in the Combat Arms," p. iv. 43

Ibid., pp. 46-48.

4 4 Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Fort Hood Leadership Study," pp. 18-22.
45

Ibid., p. 1.

4 6 Dr. David H. Marlowe, "Leadership Training Considerations, " p. 1.

CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY

The method used for'answering the research question consists of a two-phase operation. (See Diagram One.)

The first phase is a literature review of historical sources to develop a picture of each battalion commander in one or two combat situations. In all cases, the

DSC-winning performance constituted one combat situation. The procedure for collection of data involved in this phase is composed of a number of steps intended to present each combat situation in much the same way the battalion commander would have perceived it. The first step was to

determine the date and location of the DSC-winning performance. Next, background data was collected to place

the combat situation in the proper tactical, operational, and strategic perspectives. This was accomplished by a

review of Army Historical Series publications and a variety of campaign histories and senior leader (division, corps, and army commanders) accounts. The third step was

to apply the "directed telescopel'l and develop the "vertical slice of combat"2 through the use of first-person narratives, combat after-action reports, photos, maps, diagrams, sketches, awards citations, and personal interviews with the battalion commanders. In

many instances in this step, when objective data was not available, intent and cause and effect were extrapolated.
37

METHODOLOGY F L O Y P R O C E S S PHASE 1 : DATA COLLECTION S T E P TYO STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, TACTICAL SE T T l N G STEP THREE

S T E P ONE DSC COHBAT PERFORHAHCE LITERATURE SEARCH

'DIRECTED TELESCOPE'THE COHBAT NARRATIVE

-m/

\L

PHASE.2:

A P P L I C A T I O N OF THE MODEL AND A N A L Y S I S S T E P TYO STEP THREE

E
I CONCLUSIONS

S T E P ONE APPLICATION OF L E A D E R S H I P COHPETEHCY/ PERFORMANCE INDICATOR MODEL

I AHRLYSIS

OF LEADER SHIP PERFORHANCE lNDICATORS

Also, as is normally the case when the first-person accounts of participants of small unit actions are involved, seemingly objective facts come into contention and require corroboration. In these occurrences, a

reliable factual middle-ground was interpolated. The second phase of the methodology is the application of the leadership cornpetency/performance indicator model. This model is based on the nine

leadership competencies described in FM 22-100, Military

leaders hi^.

These competencies were developed by Army

Research Institute (ARI) as a standard tool for use in assessing leader performance and development in the field and the school house.) to be: a. a doctrinally-determined list of desired The competencies were formulated

skills, knowledge, and attitudes b. generic in nature, applicable to all levels of

leadership in peace and war c. d.

e.

subjective not totally measurable flexible, allowing latitude for a leader's

personal style, dynamics, and personality.4

'

One of the purposes of this study of battalion

commanders in combat is to "test tire" these competencies by applying them in a historical appraisal mode. The

leadership competency/performance indicator model applied in this study does not deviate from the approved mechanism
39

of tasks, supporting skills, knowledge, and attitudes (SKA) and leadership performance indicators (LPI) inherent in the competencies of FM 22-100. These competencies

assimilate the four major factors of leadership from FM 22-100 and the eleven time-honored leadership principles into a broad definition of leader behavior. The leader

must be competent in these areas to successfully lead his soldiers.5 competency.) The nine leadership competencies outlined in FM 22-100 are: (1) Communications; (2) Supervision; (3) (See Appendix A for descriptions of each

Teaching and Counseling; (4) Soldier Team Development; (5) Technical and Tactical Proficiency; (6) Decision Making;

(7) Planning; (8) Use of Available Systems; and (9)

Professional Ethics (see Diagram Two). However, one

column of the model is entitled "other" to allow for the potential identification of a competency which is drawn out in the course of the study. The nine leadership competencies and their attendant skills, knowledge, and attitudes (SKA) and leadership performance indicators (LPI) "roll-up" the factor and principles of leadership outlined in FM 22-100. The SKA and L P I of each competency actual 1 y

provide the indepth checklist items for each battalion commander in combat and help drive the conclusions of the study. For the purpose of assessing the combat leadership

of LTCs Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore, the leadership 40

DIAGRAM TWO

LECFND :

4-Demonstrated to a Superior Degree 3-Demonstrated to a Moderate Degree 2-Demonstrated to a Low Deqree mplied, bit not C)bserved n thi

competency/performance indicator model has been constructed with the SKA as the key analysis categories. Within each of the SKA assessments, the LPI will be used to further describe the combat performance, when warranted.

A simple scoring system was devised to show,

at a glance, how each battalion commander has demonstrated competency in each of the nine leadership functions. The following is an outline of each of the competencies with its required tasks and SKA. Appendix B for the specific and detailed LPI.)
A.

(See

Communication
1.

Task a.

Communicate effectively

SKA

Be a good listener Clearly communicate your intent Communicate nonverbally Communicate enthusiasm Clearly communicate your orders Communicate standards Communicate up, down, horizontally Obtain feedback Stress simplicity

B.
Supervise
1.

Task a.

Effectively supervise subordinates

SKA

Command forward Don't oversupervise

Enforce safety standards Establish controls

42

Establish/enforce standards Follow-up on corrective action Provide feedback

C.
1.

Teaching and Counseling Task a.

Teach and counsel subordinates

SKA

Coach/counsel subordinates Demand action Develop subordinates Teach skills Train for war Use an awards and discipline system

D.
1.

Soldier Team Development Task a.

Develop soldier and leader teams

SKA

Accept honest mistakes Be responsible to the unit Create strong unit identity

- Demonstrate caring - Demonstrate trust - Develop cooperation and teamwork - Develop subordinates to replace you - All display confidence in self and other
team members

- Encourage - Encourage
-

boldness candor

Encourage initiative Encourage innovation Encourage speedy action

43

Generate unit cohesion Include subordinate leaders in decision making Instill desire Provide tough, repetitive, exacting training

E.
1.

Train leader teams

Technical and Tactical Competency Task a.

Be technically and tactically proficient

SKA

Standards are in accordance with those prescribed by/in field and technical manuals, MOS/MQS guides, ARTEP manuals .LL

F.

Decision Making
1.

Task

Make sound, timely decisions at the lowest practical level

a.

SKA

Accept prudent risks in subordinates Be assertive Be creative Delegate authority to match responsibility

Implement a plan Improvise Include all leaders in decision making Take appropriate action (within commander's intent) in the absence of specific orders
44

Take calculated risks Take decisive action Use and expect good judgement

G.

Planning
1.

Task. a.

Plan effectively

SKA

Adjust according to the situation Be adaptable Establish clear goals and objectives Establish a sense of common purpose forthe unit Establish courses of actions to meet goals and objectives

- Organize - Plan beyond

H.

initial operations

Use of Available Systems

1.

Task a.

SKA

Effectively employ management technology

Appropriately filter information to subordinates

I.

Actively seek needed information Manage resources (time, people, info, things )

Professional Ethics
1.

Task

Exemplify and foster the professional Army ethic

a.

SKA

Accept responsibility Be a role model Be candid

45

Be physically fit Demonstrate bearing Demonstrate compassion Demonstrate courage Demonstrate integrity Demonstrate maturity Demonstrate self-discipline the professional Army ethic in

- Develop
-

subordinates Demonstrate selflessness

Before this study can proceed, however, something must be done to address the profound absence of SKA and LPI to support the Technical and Tactical Proficiency competency. Technical and Tactical Proficiency is nothing less than the keystone competency of all of the leadership competencies.
FM 22-100 clearly articulates the fact that

the leader must know his job, must know how to train his soldiers and maintain and employ his equipment, and must know how to provide combat power to win battles. Without

Technical and Tactical Proficiency, all other competencies are invalid. If the leader is not technically and How Or

tactically competent, what good is Communication?

could a leader Supervise without knowing his craft? how could a leader Teach and Counsel, or Plan, Make Decisions, or Develop Soldier Teams?
46

The complete lack of SKA and LPI for this competency is a glaring doctrinal deficiency. Without

concrete standards for assessing or evaluating a leader's technical and tactical proficiency, there is n o performance standard for the most vital ingredient of the way the Army prepares itself for future combat. Without

adequate performance standards, how can future battalion commanders readily assess and/or improve themselves FM 22-100 stipulates Proficiency?

as

in Technical and Tactical

In a larger sense, how can the tasks, SKA,

and LPI of the leadership competencies be used in the field, as they were intended to be used? More importantly, this major gap in doctrine signals a distinct disconnect between the military leadership doctrine of FM 22-100 and the Army's warfighting doctrine of FM 100-5. This disconnect is

significant because it fails to demonstrate the vital linkage between leadership combat power combat power:

the most dynamic element of

and the other three operational elements of maneuver, firepower, and protection. If

there are no performance standards for assessing or evaluating a leader's technical and tactical competency in military leadership doctrine, how can there be assessment and evaluation standards for leadership in AirLand Battle doctrine? How are leaders and commanders assessed or

evaluated at the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, or the Combined Maneuver
47

Training Center?

Could generic SKA and LPI be established

for "field" assessment and evaluation of the technical and tactical proficiency of a leader? commander? For the purpose of this study, a set of tasks and SKA were developed, in association with AirLand Battle doctrine, for use in the analysis of the technical and tactical competency of each combat battalion commander:
1.

For a battalion

Task: a.

Conduct successful combat operations Skills, Knowledge, Attitudes:

Apply the tenets of AirLand Battle Doctrine (agility, initiative, depth, synchronization) Implement the AirLand Battle imperatives: Ensure unity of effort Anticipate events on the battlefield Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities Designate, sustain, and shift the main effort Press the fight Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly Use terrain, weather, deception, OPSEC Conserve strength for decisive action Combine arms and sister services to compliment and reinforce Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and leaders
48

- Employ

battlefield operating systems

Maneuver Fire support Command, control, and communications (C3)

Combat service support Air Defense Artillery Intelligence Lastly, the five characteristics of successful combat leaders found in LTC K. E. Hamburger's report on combat leadership were "tracked" to determine their potential value as SKA or LPI. LTC Hamburger's study group arrived

at five personal characteristics of leader success which were present in every case of success on the battlefield and conspicuously absent during failure.' The

characteristics of successful combat leaders, according to the study group, consisted of five personal traits: terrain sense; (2) sinele-minded tenacity;
(3) ferocious audacitv; (4) physical confidence; and

(1)

(5) practical. practiced iudaement.8

Terrain sense was

demonstrated as the intuitive ability to judge the terrain and visualize how the battle would develop and how weapons could best.be employed within the given landscape. Sinale-minded tenacity was seen as the imaginative, driving intensity of the leader to use every asset at his disposal to accomplish the mission. Ferocious audacitv

was viewed as a proclivity toward taking enormous but 49

well-reasoned risks which bordered on inspired desperation. This audacity was fueled by the leader's Phvsical

self-confidence and his belief in his mission.

confidence was demonstrated by regular physical activity by leaders which contributed not only to physical well-being and self-image but also to the perception, by subordinates, that the leader exuded the image of success. Lastly, practiced. practical iudaement is best Successful combat leaders were

described as common sense.

seen as those capable of rapidly sifting through large quantities of often conflicting data to arrive at "the bottom line"., These five personal characteristics were

assimilated into the analysis of each of the battalion commanders and assessed in the "other" category of the competency matrix (see Diagram Two). Using the methodology outlined in this chapter, the combat leadership performance of the selected World War
11, Korea, and Vietnam battalion commanders will be

narrated and assessed in separate chapters.

First,

Chapter 4 will analyze the combat battalion command of LTC Benjamin Vandervoort at St. Mere-Eglise on 6-7 June 1944. Next, the Korean war combat leadership of LTC James H. Lynch will be examined in Chapter 5. To round-out the

study, the combat performance of LTC Harold G. Moore in Vietnam in 1965 will be assessed in Chapter 6. Finally,

Chapter 7 will address conclusions and recommendations concerning the skills of command of battalions in combat, 50

and how Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore successfully exercised leadership at the forward edge of combat power

ENDNOTES
1
2

Martin Van Crevald, Command in War, p . Robert J. Best, The Structure of a Battle,

p. 7.
3 Fact Sheet dtd 12 July 1989, Subj: Warfighting Leadership Performance Indicators (LPI), Enclosure 2 to FM 22-100, Military Leadershin (AFD).

4
5

Ibid. FM 22-100, Military leaders hi^, p. A-1. Fact Sheet, 15 pages (unpaginated). Hamburger. P. 1. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 1.

6
1

CHAPTER 4 LTC BENJAMIN VANDERVOORT. 6-7 JUNE 1944

The fundamental concept of General Omar Bradley's plan for the use of airborne forces in the invasion of France was beachhead security. To insure the success of

the American landings at Utah Beach, he needed his airborne divisions to seal off the Cotenten Peninsula from German reinforcement. His plan was to drop the 82d and

lOlst Airborne Divisions astride the Douve River, a natural obstacle at the neck of the peninsula. The

paratroopers were to put a stranglehold on the huge peninsula, severing likely avenues of approach into the beachhead and disrupting lines of communications between Cherbourg and Carentan.1 Airborne forces would land

five hours before amphibious assault forces attacked. General Bradley's plan called for the lOlst Airborne Division to land by parachute and glider behind Utah Beach. Major General Maxwell D. Taylor's Screaming

Eagles were then to capture the town of St. Mere-Eglise, attack enemy coastal defenses from the rear, seize crossing sites over the Merderet River, and seize and secure four vital causeways that spanned over the large flooded areas directly west of Utah Beach.2 The

seaborne force landing at Utah Beach had to have secure passage over the causeways in order to carry out its operational mission of pushing inside the Cotenten
53

Peninsula and capturing the port of Cherbourg from the rear. 3 General Bradley's intent in the deployment of the 82d Airborne Division was oriented on destruction of the enemy forces just inside the neck of the peninsula. A

three-regiment task force, led by Brigadier General James M. Gavin, Assistant Division Commander of the 82d Airborne, would drop twenty miles west of Utah Beach near St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte. BG Gavin's Task Force A would

conduct a vertical envelopment of German forces around St. Saveur-le-Vicomte to cut off the closest potential enemy reinforcements against the Utah Beach landings. Gavin's

task force had the toughest mission, and he would have to hold out until the Utah Beach forces moved inland over the Screaming Eagle causeways. On 26 May 1944, the missions for both airborne divisions changed. Intelligence reports indicated that

the 91st German Infantry Division had arrived in the Cotenten Peninsula to join the 243rd Attack Division and the 709th Coastal Division.4 Airborne planners now

realized that a fresh enemy division was positioned between the drop zones of the lOlst and 82d Airborne Divisions. With only ten days remaining before D-Day, the

airborne planners not only feared that the parachute missions had been compromised, but now had to make sweeping changes in a plan that had been rehearsed and studied for nearly six full months.'
54

On 26 May 1944, General Bradley informed Generals Ridgway and Taylor that the scheme for the airborne assault had been changed. Bradley wanted to avoid the

possibility of having the airborne units defeated in detail by a strong German division positioned between the two objective areas. The 91st German Infantry Division

could conceivably strike either force immediately after their parachute assaults, when the units were most vulnerable. A failed airborne assault would clearly

jeopardize the success of the Utah Beach landings. Consequently, General Bradley announced to his airborne commanders that both divisions would be dropped side-by-side behind Utah Beach.6 This momentous eleventh-hour change caused very little shift in the lOlst Airborne Division plan, but the mission and location of the 82d Airborne Division was radically altered. The new plan called for the lOlst

Airborne Division to conduct parachute assaults into DZs A, B, C and glider assaults into LZ E. All landing zones

were moved a few hundred meters closer to Utah Beach.' The 82d Airborne Division would now land on both sides of the Merderet River, assume the lOlst mission of capturing St. Mere-Eglise, establish defensive positions along the Douve River, facing south, and would be prepared to attack west to complete the stranglehold on the neck of the Cotenten Peninsula.8

BG Gavin would still lead the three assault regiments of the 82d into the new objective area, now 20 miles east of the original site. Though positioned

snuggly up against the lOlst, the objective area straddled the narrow, unfordable, and deeply swamped Merderet River. Two drop zones were situated on the west side of

the river

DZs N and T

and Drop Zone 0 and Landing Zone

W were on the east bank of the river and closest to the

lOlst and Utah Beach.9

The 508th Parachute Infantry Both units would establish

Regiment was slated for DZ T.

defensive positions and get.ready to attack westward to seal off the Cotenten Peninsula.lo The veteran 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment previously led by Jim Gavin into the combat jumps at Sicily and Salerno and now commanded by COL William Ekman

was to jump into DZ 0 and accomplish four key missions.

First, Ekman's troopers would capture the stone bridges which spanned the Mederet River at La Fiere and Chef-du-Pont. These two bridges were to be seized intact

in order to facilitate contact between the division drop zones on both sides of the river. Second, 505 would

establish a blocking line north and northeast of St. Mere-Eglise at the towns of Neuville-au-Plain and Benzeville-au-Plain. Third, the regiment would link-up

eastward with the lOlst Airborne Division which would be concentrated between Utah Beach and St. Mere-Eglise. Last, and most important, Ekman's 56 regiment would assume

the lOlst mission of taking the town of St. MereEglise.11 St. Mere-Eglise was the cornerstone of the entire 82d Airborne Division mission.12 Situated strategically

on the major north-south artery between Carentan and Cherbourg, St. Mere-Eglise was an extremely important communications center at the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula. Telephone trunk cables which connected

Cherbourg with Carentan and with the coastal towns ran through St. Mere-Eglise. St. Mere-Eglise was also the hub

of a highway net of metal-surface roads which connected with all parts of the peninsula.13 The town itself was

compact, and its houses were strongly built and surrounded with stout stone walls. Sited on ground which rose

perceptibly above the hedgerows beyond the town, St. Mere-Eglise dominated the approaching roads which converged into it.14 The importance of St. Mere-Eglise was not lost on the German commanders. As early as March 1944, Hitler

began directing forces into the Cotentin Peninsula even though he believed the seaborne assault would strike at Pas de Calais.15 By the end of May, the proposed

objective sites of the 82d and lOlst Airborne Divisions were reinforced by a mixed bag of German forces which had the specific mission of destroying airborne landings.16 South of Carentan lay the full-strength 6th Parachute Regiment. Six miles north of Utah Beach was the 919th
57

Grenadier Regiment, part of the 709th Coastal Division. The 919th Grenadiers had a battalion strongpoint at Foucarville, twelve companies covering Utah Beach, and an anti-aircraft battery and the regimental supply troops located at St. Mere-Eglise. The 795th Ost Battalion was

in a strongpoint on the high ground at Turqueville and Ecoqueneauville, a few miles southeast of St. Mere-Eglise. The 1057th and 1058th Infantry Regiments of

the 91st Attack Division were situated in the vicinity of DZs N and T. The 100th Panzer Battalion, equipped with

Russian and French light tanks but considered only slightly combat effective, was in positions three miles west of St. Mere-Eglise.16 The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment plan assigned only one battalion to capture St. Mere-Eglise

the 3d

Battalion, 505th, commanded by the flamboyant, abrasive LTC Ed Krause.1' 3/505 would drop on DZ
0,

assemble

close to St. Mere-Eglise, attack and capture the town, then mop-up and establish roadblocks to the east and south to repel counterattacks.18 The 1st Battalion, 505, commanded by MAJ Fred Kellam, would conduct a parachute assault into DZ 0, assemble, proceed west immediately and seize the stone bridges over the Merderet at La Fiere and Chef-du-Pont. 1/505 would hold these crucial connecting links to the 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments to the east, and would defeat enemy counterattacks toward St. 58

Mere-Eglise from the west and southwest.'9

Kellam had

assumed command of 1/505 in England after LTC Walter Winton injured a knee while playing football with the troopers. 2 0 The mission of LTC Benjamin Vandervoort's 2d

Battalion, 505th, was to secure the northern flank of the VII Corps seaborne assault area by occupying a defensive line running from Neuville-au-Plain eastward to Bandienville. Vandervoort's position would link with the 502nd Parachute Infantry

lOlst Airborne Division's

Regiment which would extend southwest from Foucarville. Vandervoort would orient on rising ground bracketed by two meandering eastern forks of the Merderet River. His

battalion would patrol to the west from Neuville-au-Plain and defend St. Mere-Eglise from potential enemy threats coming in from the north along the Carentan-Cherbourg highway. 2 1 Ben Vandervoort was no stranger to the 82d Airborne Division or the 2/505. He commanded a company and was He assumed

505th Regiment S-3 for Gavin in Sicily.

command of 2/505 when LTC Mark Alexander was promoted to 505 XO after Gavin's elevation to Assistant Division Commander in October 1943.22 Quiet and soft-spoken,

Vandervoort was a tough trainer and disciplinarian.23 At approximately 2320 hours, 5 June 1944, the lead serials of the 82d Airborne Division's Task Force A were enroute to Normandy. Leading the division serial were the 59

seventy-one aircraft of the 316th Air Group which carried LTC Krause's 31505 and LTC Vandervoort's 21505. At 15

minutes past midnight, the first pathfinders landed to set up Eureka beacon lights to mark the drop zones for the approaching air armada. Fortunately for the inbound

paratroopers, the German forces inside the objective areas had not received the message to go to Alarmstuffe 11, as had all other units in France, when German radio intelligence operators intercepted the invasion alert transmission intended for the French Resistance. In the

peninsula the evening of 5 June had been no more alarming that any other night in occupied France. Normal night

guards and sentries were posted but no instructions for heightened anti-airborne measures were disseminated.*' The 505th serial followed the same "back door" route to the Cotenten Peninsula as had the pathfinders and the lOlst aircraft. The 505 aircraft were closely packed

and had clear flying as they reached the western shore of the peninsula. Provided visibility remained clear, DZ 0 Bounded on the leading, or

would be easily spotted.

western, edge by the Mederet River, on the trailing, or eastern, edge by the Carentan-Cherbourg highway and by a country lane to the south, DZ
0

consisted of oval fields Bright

and hedges one mile long and one-half mile wide.

moonlight would enable each aircraft jumpmaster, situated in the jump door, to clearly identify the landmarks on the ground and sight the Eureka beacon marking the DZ.25 60

As the formation headed inland, it encountered heavy, turbulent cloud banks. between aircraft was great. The danger of collision Many aircraft ascended to

1500 feet above ground level (AGL) to maintain a safe course. Inside the aircraft the jumpmasters had their

sticks standing and hooked up, a lesson learned in Italy regarding a fast exit if the aircraft was hit by flak.26 Despite the fact that the aircraft of the

pathfinders and the lOlst had already alerted German anti-aircraft crews, the dense clouds concealed the approach of the 505th serial and flak was subsequently light and erratic.27 Jumpmaster in the lead aircraft of the regimental serial was LTC Vandervoort, 21505 commander. Vandervoort

had the jump door opened as soon as the serial reached the coast of France and now, standing in the door, he could recognize the key terrain features along the flight route.28 Having just cleared the cloud bank,

Vandervoort's aircraft was still flying too high and too fast for drop conditions when the pilot mistook the Douve River for the Mederet River and switched on the green light for "GO!" Vandervoort reacted quickly, yet calmly.

Checking the terrain, he realized the error and directed the pilot to turn off the jump light.29

As jumpmaster

in the lead aircraft of the formation, Vandervoort was responsible for pinpointing DZ 0 and initiating the mass parachute drop. Once the lead jumpmaster exits the
61

aircraft, a green DZ confirmation flash is signalled from the astro-dome of the lead aircraft to all subsequent ships.30 Had Vandervoort exited on the pilot's

pre-mature signal, the entire regiment could have been deposited ten to twenty miles west of DZ 0 , on virtually the same objective sites as the original assault plan. errant drop of this magnitude could have caused a monumental shift in the conduct of the mission to secure the Utah Beach landings. A few minutes further on in the flight route Vandervoort spotted the beacon lights of DZ a "T".
0,

An

arranged in

He ordered the pilot to descend to the drop

altitude of 600 feet and reduce the aircraft speed to 120 knots required for a safe exit. About the same time

Vandervoort spotted the Merderet River, the leading edge of the drop zone. Once more the pilot switched on the

green light, but was still flying too high and too fast for jump conditions.31 At about 0200 hours, Vandervoort

led his stick out of the aircraft.32 Vandervoort's stick was followed by 117 sticks of the 505th Regiment, totalling 2090 men. high and fast. All sticks exited

"The opening shock popped lights in the

back of your eyeballs and tore off musette bags, field glasses, and anything else that wasn't securely," Vandervoort remembered." tied down As he landed,

Vandervoort broke his left leg "one inch or so above the ankle."34 In pain, he watched the remainder of his
62

battalion jump.

"They were well spread out," he recalled, In

due to the speed and altitude of the aircraft.35

spite of the fact that some of his paratroopers fell into the marshy areas of the Merderet River and into St. Mere-Eglise, the 505th Regimental drop had been, according to Vandervoort, the division's best combat jump. right on the button. It was a great delivery."36 "We were

The 505th drop had indeed been a great one. Thirty-one of the 118 sticks in the regiment landed on or within a few hundred meters of DZ landed within two miles.
0.

Twenty-nine sticks

This drop pattern enabled over By first light on

1000 men of the 505th to assemble.37

D-Day, Ekman's 505th was the only regiment functioning as a three battalion force, with all of its battalion commanders in place.38 This was crucial to the

successful accomplishment of the 505th mission, because airborne combat is small unit fighting at battalion level. The fight for St. Mere-Eglise was a battalion commander's fight. Its capture ensured the success of the

Utah Beach landings, just as General Bradley had planned. The fight for St. Mere-Eglise was LTC Benjamin Vandervoort's fight.,)

LTC Ben Vandervoort was more than equal to the

task.

Serious by nature, Vandevoort had never been

awarded a popular nickname by his men, as had "Jumpin' Jim" Gavin. He ran a tight battalion of paratroop

veterans who had made two tough combat jumps and slugged
63

it out against some of the best units the German had to offer. He had not developed the close, easy-going

relationship with his battalion that was characteristic of other commanders in the regiment. Normandy was his first He very much

combat operation as a battalion commander.

wanted the approval of the men whom he led out of the aircraft above DZ 0 . His conduct as a leader and

commander in Normandy would earn him the respect and admiration of superiors and subordinates alike. He would

fight his battalion for fourty days on his broken ankle. Such an exhibition of leadership would make him, as MG Ridgway recalled, "one of the bravest, toughest battle commanders I ever knew. " 4 0 Just after 0400 on D-Day, LTC Vandervoort made the decision to begin his movement from DZ 0 to capture Neuville-au-Plain and establish his defensive line to the north. Vandervoort felt he had sufficient force assembled All of the

after the jump to accomplish his mission.

battalion (less two platoons from E Company, which had been misdropped) had closed into the planned assembly area on the north side of DZ 0. This most rapid and complete

assembly of 2/505 was greatly aided by Vandervoort, who began firing green flares approximately fifteen minutes after he landed. Vandervoort continued to fire these

flares at specific intervals as a guide for his troopers as they "rolled up their sticks," and recovered bundles and equipment while moving toward the battalion assembly
64

area.41

In the meantime, the 2/505 S-2, LT Eugene A .

Doerfler, confirmed the assembly area location and march orientation for the move to Neuville-au-Plain by checking with a nearby resident.42 Of all the airborne units

dropped into Normandy on the night of 5-6 June, no other battalion-size unit had assembled as quickly and completely.4J This no doubt occurred because the 316th

wing dropped the 2/505 segment of the 505 serial right on target and the fact that Vandervoort's exacting and hard-driving training of the battalion in England had paid off .44 Shortly after 0400, as Vandervoort was ready to issue the order to move out to Neuville-au-Plain, MG Ridgway appeared at the 2/505 CP.45 Ridgway had jumped

from the last aircraft of the 505 serial bound for DZ 0 and was making his way off the drop zone toward his division command post, which was to be established just a few hundred meters northwest of 2/505. Ridgway's arrival

occurred shortly after Vandervoort's left ankle had been examined by the 2/505 battalion surgeon, CPT Putnam. Putnam recalled that Vandervoort was sitting under a poncho, reading his map by flashlight. Vandervoort

. recognized his surgeon, and quietly asked him to examine

his left ankle by removing his left boot with as little demonstration as possible.46 Putnam told Vandervoort

that his left ankle was definitely broken, but Vandervoort insisted that the surgeon replace his jump boot and lace 65

it up as tight as possible.

Vandervoort then decided his

rifle would make an appropriate crutch." Ridgway and Vandervoort talked briefly over Vandervoort's map. The division commander then continued

on toward the planned location of his CP, just a few hundred meters northwest of the 21505 assembly area.48 There is little evidence to suggest that the two leaders discussed anything more than a map orientation with the ground and the status of Vandervoort's battalion. If

anything, Vandervoort may have articulated his move-out schedule and may have reported to Ridgway that while his radios worked, he had not yet had communications with 31505, 11505, BG Gavin, or COL Ekman, the regimental commander. It is also conceivable that he assured the

division commander that he was capable of accomplishing his mission at Neuville-au-Plain given the status of his battalion. Ridgway apparently arrived at his CP group a short time after leaving the 2/505 assembly area as Vandervoort next received a radio transmission from Ridgway ordering him to stand fast until the status of the 505 Regiment and the 82d Airborne Division as a whole known.49

was better

Ridgway still had not heard from any of his

assault echelon battalions and he sensed that the divisions had been wildly misdropped, a repetition of the Sicily experience.50 Vandervoort postponed his move-out

order, and the battalion resumed work to recover weapons bundles and confirm personnel accountability. In about two hours (about 0545, just after first light), Vandervoort got the "go ahead" order from Ridgway to move toward Neuville-au-Plain. At some point between

the time Vandervoort had been ordered to remain at DZ 0 and this updated directive, a runner from 3/505 happened upon Ridgway's CP and delivered a message that was actually intended for the 505 commander, COL Ekman. message stated that 3d Battalion had occupied St. Mere-Eglise at around 0500." Ridgway now had no need The

to use Vandervoort in case 3d Battalion did not seize St. Mere-Eglise. St. Mere-Eglise was foremost in Ridgway's

mind because he knew that a solid base had to be established in the town, so vital to the security of the whole VII Corps front.52 Now that he had clearance to proceed on to his D-Day mission, Vandervoort had to solve a more personal and immediate command and control problem: unless he

discovered some means of being transported, hopping along at the head of his battalion column on its one and one half mile cross-country "dash" to Neuville-au-Plain would not be conducive to rapid battlefield accomplishment. Not

a small man, Vandervoort would be an overwhelming burden to any paratrooper brave enough to attempt to carry him. Vandervoort's problem was solved when he spotted two misdropped sergeants of the lOlst Airborne Division in the
67

2/505 Battalion column, pulling a collapsible ammunition cart. Vandervoort was able to persuade the two NCOs to

give him a lift in spite of their remarks about "not having come all the way to Normandy to pull any damn colonel around."53. Now posed aboard the cart like an eighteenth century Spanish general, endowed with a lion heart," Vandervoort quietly gave the order to move out to Neuville-au-Plain.54 Around 0615 Vandervoort and his battalion were on the outskirts of Neuville-au-Plain when COL Ekman, the regimental commander, and MAJ Norton, the 505 5-3 met the column. Both had been misdropped well off DZ 0. Ekman

ordered Vandervoort to halt short of Neuville-au-Plain until the regimental situation was sorted out.55 Ekman

had run into MAJ Kellam who reported 1/505 had been badly misdropped 1000 meters north of DZ 0. But there had been As a result,

no reports from Krause and St. Mere-Eglise.

it appeared that the two key division objectives

the

bridges at La Fiere and Chef-du-Pont, assigned to 1/505, and the town of St. Mere-Eglise, the mission of 3/505 were far from being accomplished. Vandervoort and his

battalion was the only force in the regiment capable of achieving its proposed objectives. With this situation

facing him, Ekman left Vandervoort and hurried south toward the proposed site of the regimental CP, hoping to get more information on 3/505 and St. Mere-Eglise.56

At his CP, Ekman took charge of his regiment. Worried about the capture of St. Mere-Eglise, Ekman tried to reach Krause by radio. Unable to communicate with

Krause, and unaware that Ridgway had received two messages from Krause, intended for Ekman, which announced the capture of St. Mere-Eglise at 0500, Ekman could only assume that Krause was probably in big trouble.51 At

0800 he radioed to Vandervoort that he had heard nothing from 3d Battalion.58 At best, this message may be

considered as a warning order, for at 0810 Ekman directed Vandervoort to turn south and capture St. Mere-Eglise.59 Vandervoort now was subjected to a classic order counter-order battlefield.60

disorder episodes endemic to a fluid In the seven minutes that passed after

the receipt of Ekman's 0810 transmission to capture St. Mere-Eglise, Vandervoort was ordered at 0816 to continue on to Neuville and then at 0817 this directive was countermanded and 2/505 was charged to move on to St. Mere-Eglise.61 Vandervoort's judicious response to this flurry of

contradictory instructions resulted in one of the best tactical decisions of the war.62 Vandervoort

instinctively felt that Ekman's orders neglected to take the original 2/505 mission into full account and without a blocking force on the rising ground at Neuville, St. Mere-Eglise would remain vulnerable to German counterattack from the north. 69 On his own initiative then,

Vandervoort detached a 41-man platoon from D Company under the command of LT Turner B. Turnball and told Turnball to do his best to carry out the original battalion mission. Turnball would first clean out the small group of Germans believed to be located in the outlying houses of the hamlet. Next, he would mine Highway Nationale 13 north of

Neuville at the intersection of the main highway and the Houbec-Le Brot road which ran east to west. With this

accomplished, Turnball would establish his combat outpost line on the most favorable high ground overlooking his obstacles, taking advantage of the buildings and hedgerows for cover and concealment. If Turnball's platoon was hit

with a larger force than it could handle, it was to hold as long as it could, cause the Germans to conduct an expensive flanking enterprise, then fall back to St. Mere-Eglise and link-up with the rest of the battalion. With these instructions to Turnball, Vandervoort reversed his column and headed south for St. Mere-Egli~e.~' Turnball wasted no time in implementing his battalion commander's directive. Known as "Chief" in the

battalion in reference to his Cherokee Indian ancestry, and much respected as a solid soldier, Turnball led to his paratroopers toward Neuville at a jog-trot. Turnball

found Neuville clear of Germans, so he quickly moved to establishing his defense. Neuville was nothing more than

a hamlet, with its east-west axis short enough to be covered by the platoon. West of Neuville was an orchard
70

bounded by open fields.

In the east, at right angles to

Highway 13, was one of the high-banked hedgerows indicative of the Norman field system. To the north, the

ground rose enough to meet Turnball's requirement to find "high ground"

he would have 600 meters of observation Turnball positioned

and fields of fire from this locale.

a squad of ten men with a machinegun next to the orchard, its flank resting on a manure pile. An outpost was placed Two

in a group of barns 200 meters beyond the orchard.

squads were placed in the east along the hedgerow to take advantage of the fields of fire across the most likely German avenue of approach. A bazooka team was placed

about 40 meters to the rear of the platoon, in the shadows of some of the houses of Neuville, where they had good cover and an excellent shot straight north "down" the highway.64 Turnball was content with his dispositions,

set to defend by 1000. Back at St. Mere-Eglise, it turned out that Ekman's precautionary movement of Vandervoort to the town was a correct decision. At about 0930 Krause's position had

been heavily counterattacked from the south by two companies of the 795th Georgian Battalion. Supported by

three light tanks, two self-propelled guns and mortars firing from Hill 20, the Germans came up on each side of the main road.65 The approach of this force was

tipped-off by an intense concentration of machinegun and mortar fire directed against Krause's southernmost 71

roadblock outside the town.

Krause immediately went to

the southern roadblock, assessed the situation, and then shifted the bulk of Companies G and I from the center of town to the southern outskirts. About this time Krause

was hit in the lower leg by a shall fragment, his first wound of the day. 3/505 slowed this attack, but the

Germans maintained pressure on the roadblock.66 Vandervoort arrived at St. Mere-Eglise via ammunition cart shortly after 3/505 had fought off the first German counterattack. Vandervoort and Krause

conferred about the situation and the need for a strong defense of St. Mere-Eglise. Vandervoort remarked to

Krause that the simplest plan would be one which Krause outlined his needs and then communicated his instructions directly to Vandervoort's company commanders. As far as

Vandervoort was concerned, St. Mere-Eglise was Krause's town, his mission. Krause would call the shots.67 With

this command arrangement settled, 2/505 units were directed to man the northern and eastern sections of town. While the addition of Vandervoort's men was still

not enough to form a 3600 perimeter around the town, both commanders felt that by keeping E and I Companies, 3/505 as a reserve in the center of town, they could quickly shift combat power to any threatened sector.sa By 1130, the German counterattack from Hill 20 had completely stalled, in spite of the attempt by the Germans to herd cattle toward the roadblock to detonate Krause's
72

mines.69

But there was no diminishing of indirect fire

from Hill 20 and Krause was convinced he was being shelled by two German artillery batteries. Krause ordered I

Company to attack Hill 20 and remove the indirect fire threat. CPT Harold Swingler was directed to seize Hill 20 After about two

by assaulting it from the western flank.

hours of inconsequential maneuvering, I Company walked into an ambush that the repulsed Georgian battalion had laid for them. In the ensuing firefight, CPT Swingler and
I Company then retraced

seven other troopers were killed.

its steps to St. Mere-Eglise to reorganize.

By this time

the 21505 mortar platoon was set up and, while the platoon leader observed the mortar fire from the church tower, the 81mm gunners fired 35 of the 1000 rounds they would fire on 6 June right on top of Hill 20.70 Although the I

Company assault was inconclusive, this attack and LT Wilson's mortar fires apparently convinced the commander of the 395th Georgian battalion that an overwhelming force of Americans held St. Mere-Eglise and a withdrawal was necessary. Now the pressure was off Krause's southernmost

roadblocks, and he could breathe easier. In the meantime, Vandervoort had been busy upgrading his mobility and firepower. Somehow,

Vandervoort managed to receive one jeep and two 57mm anti-tank guns, complete with crews, from the 80th Antiaircraft Battalion, which had landed by glider on DZ 0 after the last paratroop serial. 73 He placed one of these

guns at the northern end of St. Mere-Eglise to overwatch the roadblock there. After consulting with his ad hoc XO,

MAJ Maness, from 1/505, and ensuring that 2/505 defensive positions were set and the CP was operational, Vandervoort took the other 57mm gun and its crew and headed north to check on Turnball at Neuville-au-Plain.72 It was nearly 1300 when Vandervoort reached Neuville-au-Plain with his recently acquired firepower. When he arrived at Turnball's position on the northern fringe of the hamlet, Vandervoort had the antiaircraft gun positioned near a low building on the east side of the highway. As the gun crew man-handled the 6-pounder near

the building, Turnball met with Vandervoort and began to brief him on the platoon's dispositions. While they were

talking, a "mysterious" Frenchman rode up to the pair and announced (in English) that some American paratroopers were moving south along the highway with a large "bag" of German prisoners. Vandervoort and Turnball looked to the

north and spotted a column of troops, marching in good order down the middle of the highway. There appeared to

be paratroopers on each side of the formation, waving orange flags. There was nothing extraordinary about this

until Vandervoort noticed two tracked vehicles travelling behind the column. The column was 800 meters from

Turnball's position when Vandervoort, now suspicious of a German ruse, ordered Turnball to have his machine gunner

fire a short burst to the right side of the approaching formation.73 The fire from Turnball's machine gunner uncovered the German ruse. "Prisoners" and "guards" both dove for The two self-propelled

the ditches and returned fire.

guns ignited smoke canisters, threw them forward, and then began to move behind the smoke screen.74 Vandervoort

and Turnball had forced the deployment of an advance guard of the German 243d Division's 922d Regiment which was rumbling south out of Montbourg to recapture St. Mere-Eglise. As he kicked over this beehive, Vandervoort

discovered that the greatest threat to St. Mere-Eglise was developing in the north, not the south, as had been the prediction.75 Turnball's platoon instantly opened fire. The two

Browning Automatic Rifles and the .30mm machinegun were initially effective in pinning the 191-man German force to the ground. But the two self-propelled guns continued to

press forward and opened fire when they were within 500 meters of Neuville-au-Plain. One of the first rounds took

out Turnball's bazooka team, situated behind the roadblock. Another round narrowly missed the 57mm gun,

causing th crew to seek cover in a nearby house. Vandervoort extricated the crew from the house with some "encouragement" and the gunners soon disabled both German guns through fast and accurate shooting.76 While the

work of the antiaircraft gunners ended the threat to

75

Turnball's front, platoon-size groups of Germans moved back out of range and began to maneuver against both of his flanks. Vandervoort, watching this action from the

roadside, was anxious to know if Turnball was capable of handling this development. He sent a runner to Turnball Turnball

to ask how he was doing and if he needed help.

sent the runner back with the message "Ok, everything under control, don't worry about me."77 Still concerned

about Turnball being outflanked and overwhelmed, Vandervoort instructed Turnball to continue to hold on as long as possible while he returned to St. Mere-Eglise to organize a force to cover Turnball's withdrawal.7a fight at Neuville-au-Plain now settled down into an infantry small unit engagement. Upon his return to his CP at St. Mere-Eglise, Vandervoort directed his E Company Commander, CPT Russell, to immediately send the battalion's reserve north to Neuville to cover the withdrawal of Turnball. The 2/505 The

reserve consisted of the one and only platoon from E Company, the 1st Platoon, led by LT Theodore L. Petersen.79 Petersen was briefed that he was going up

against a German company of about 180 men and there was a very distinct possibility that Turnball had already been overrun. Armed with this information, Petersen quickly

moved out - 8 0 Meanwhile, Turnball's infantry fight was beginning to turn sour. Outnumbered and outgunned, "the Chief" was
76

rapidly losing the advantage of his position in the hedgerows as the Germans methodically worked around his flanks and into his rear. The vigilant, resolute Turnball But by Nine of

did not make it easy for the Germans to flank him. mid-afternoon his position was close to collapse.

his troopers were killed and eleven were badly wounded. Turnball's 23 remaining riflemen, now subject to a steady stream of mortar fire, could easily see that the left and right jaws of the pincers were only two hundred meters apart, threatening to cut off Turnball from St. Mere-Eglise. Turnball had to decide whether to charge the

center of the attacking force, or withdraw.81 Petersen's platoon was close at hand, though. Moving from St. Mere-Eglise, Petersen had kept his platoon off to the left of the highway to take advantage of as much of the cover as possible. The platoon reached

Turnball's position at about 1600, just in time to flank the right arm of the German pincers moving against Turnball. Petersen then concentrated his fire against a

German machinegun emplacement that was responsible for many of Turnball's losses. Turnball's withdrawal. This flurry of gunfire covered

Sending a runner to Petersen to

announce his withdrawal, Turnball and his remaining sixteen effectives backed out of Neuville. Petersen

maintained his high volume of fire until he was sure the survivors were safe, then executed a neat, textbook withdrawal by tactical bounds.82
77

Clearly, Turnball had accomlished much more in his stand at Neuville than Vandervoort had anticipated. In

fact, Vandervoort had fired a signal flare much earlier in the afternoon for Turnball to conduct his withdrawal to St. Mere-Eglise.03 Outnumbered four to one, holding out

for eight hours under intense mortar attacks, Turnball had saved St. Mere-Eglise from a simultaneous attack from the north by the 922 Regiment when the 795th Georgian Battalion was counterattacking from the south. Vandervoort had made the enlightened decision to position "the Chief" at Neuville to give St. Mere-Eglise some breathing space, but it was Turnball, at the cost of over half of his platoon, that executed that decision. Killed

on 7 June, Turnball would never realize his heraic stand at Neuville helped save the invasion.84 With Turnball's survivors and Petersen's platoon safely back inside St. Mere-Eglise, the northern approach to the town was wide open. Intermittent artillery fire

and dulsatory sniper fire maintained an even, but low, pressure on the northern sector of St. Mere-Eglise. On In

the southern edge of town the situation was different.

the late afternoon (prior to Turnball's return to St. Mere-Eglise), Krause's southern roadblock defeated a tentatively launched limited attack by the Georgian Battalion. Then, just before dark, a column of German

ammo trucks came barrelling up the highway, exploding in great sheets of flame when they hit Krause's landmines.
78

Next, the German artillery batteries and mortars on the Turqueville-Fauville ridge began to plaster the 3/505 positions, and the fire continued after dark. At 1700, Krause was hit in the left calf by a sniper bullet, his third wound of the day. Turning his command over to his

XO, MAJ Hagan, Krause checked himself into the combined

battalion aid station in a little red schoolhouse in the northern part of town.85 Krause was deeply depressed,

no doubt by the psychological impact of being wounded three times, in steadily increasing severity. Convinced that his mission was doomed to failure, Krause stayed overnight in the aid station.86 he resumed command of 3/505.8' In contrast to Krause, Vandervoort was a mountain of calm optimism.88 Just before dark the northern The next day, though,

roadblocks reported that a strong German force, supported by several armored vehicles, was posturing for an attack. Vandervoort turned to the Navy Lieutenant in charge of the USN Shore Fire Control Party which had jumped with 2/505 and asked for naval gunfire on the enemy column. While the Navy Lieutenant worked to contact the battleship USS NEVADA, sitting twelve miles off shore, the Germans kicked off their attack. Vandervoort's troopers held their positions, raking the approaching column with small arms fire. Vandervoort was in the midst of this onslaught by the German 1058 Regiment, maneuvering around St. Mere-Eglise, with difficulty, on his broken ankle.89
79

Just before dark the 82d Airborne Division reinforcement unit gliders made their approach toward their designated landing zone on LZ N. Since the 795

Georgian Battalion was in control of the intended LZ, pathfinders scrambled to divert the incoming serials by emplacing panels, lights, and smoke cannisters on DZ 0, a more secure LZ. Most pilots failed to spot the pathfinder

signals and the gliders were released right over the top of the 1058 Regiment, near Neuville. Immediately the

Germans peppered the gliders with antiaircraft and small arms fire, forcing the glider pilots to seek the first available landing field. a crash. Every landing appeared to end in

One glider narrowly missed the combined aid Vandervoort directed his

station in St. Mere-Eglise.

reserve platoon, Petersen's 1st Platoon, to move out and begin the task of rescuing the glider troops and their precious cargo. Petersen augmented his platoon with 30 or

35 strays from the lOlst who had attached themselves to 21505. Petersen's men quickly recovered sorely needed

ammunition and medical supplies and delivered injured glidermen to the aid station.90 Meanwhile, the Navy Lieutenant succeeded in arranging for naval gunfire from'the USS NEVADA. At 2145

the first salvo of 18 rounds of 14-inch "high concussion" shells impacted right on top of the German armored force. Vandervoort recalled that it was "absolutely awesome" shooting, and that the armored vehicles "looked like big, 80

fat waterbugs as they scurried into lanes and fields in their haste to get off the highway and into cover."91 The smoke and dust from the salvo completely obscurred the 21505 sector. At about 2202 the naval liaison officer As

registered a second salvo on the fleeing survivors.

this force withdrew Vandervoort contented himself with the supervision of increased combat patrols to maintain the line of communications with the 505 CP on DZ 0.92 The fight for St. Mere-Eglise on D-Day was not yet concluded as one more German counterattack occurred at 2300. Vandervoort's northeastern roadblock, manned by LT

Thomas J. McClean's 1st Platoon of D Company, came under moderate small arms fire. The attackers were the members

of the battalion of the 922d Regiment which had fought against Turnball at Neuville-au-Plain. McClean shifted

his BARS forward and engaged the Germans at a range of 150 yards. This caused the German battalion to bounce away

from McClean's roadblock and west toward LT Oliver B. Carr's 2d Platoon, D Company, straddling the highway. Carr opened up and drove the attackers to the west again, this time into the Headquarters Company's positions, commanded by LT Shmees. At this point the Germans found a

gap between D Company and HQ Company and they penetrated within a hundred meters of Vandervoort's CP. Schmees

directed the fire of two 50 caliber machineguns (scrounged from the glider wreckage) into this column, decimating the

penetrating group and forcing the Germans to slip west again. This time the German battalion ran successively into two H Company positions which strong-pointed the west side of St. Mere-Eglise. By midnight, this battalion of

the 922d Regiment was rendered combat ineffective, and would not be a factor in subsequent fighting.93 This

concluded the fight for St. Mere-Eglise on D-Day, but the worst fighting was yet to take place. Unknown to Vandervoort and Krause, the Germans were gearing up for a series of moves to seal off the 82d Airborne Division airhead line and destroy the paratroopers. Pre-invasion intelligence had placed the

organic elements of the German 91st Division west of the Merderet River, but the bulk of the 1058th Regiment had been positioned just south of St. Mere-Eglise. As soon as

General Oberst Dollman, commander of the German 7th Army in the Cotentin Peninsula, discovered that no airborne attacks were intended for Montebourg and that St. Mere-Eglise had been captured, he directed the convergence of the 709th Division, the 91st Division, the 6th Parachute Regiment, the 922d Regiment, the 100th Panzer Replacement Battalion, and the 7th Army Sturm Battalion on St. Mere-Eglise.94 Attacks would commence at dawn on

the morning of 7 June. At about 0800, 7 June, Vandervoort got news about the status of the amphibious landings. 82 Ridgway had

dispatched his assistant G-3 with a patrol to link-up with the 4th Infantry Division on Utah Beach. Ridgway wanted

General Raymond 0. Barton to know that St. Mere-Eglise was under attack from the north, south, and west and that the status of causeways east of the Merderet was in question. This information was to be passed to the VII Corps Commander, MG Collins. Ridgway's patrol stopped in St.

Mere-Eglise at 0800 7 June on their way back to DZ 0, informing Vandervoort that both the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division and COL Edson Raff's "Howell Force" would reach St. Mere-Eglise in the afternoon.95 Not long after he received this information, Vandervoort was in the middle of the renewed German counterattacks from the north. This time, the commander

of the German 709th Division was sending significant combat power to get the job done. General Leutnant von

Schlieben's force consisted of the 1st Battalion, 1058th Regiment, the 7th Sturm Battalion, and two motorized heavy artillery battalions and a company of ten self-propelled guns from the 709th Anti-Tank Battalion. Schlieben

attacked with two battalions abreast, with the 1st Battalion, 1058th Regiment on the east side of the highway and the 7th Sturm Battalion on the west side. Schlieben

weighted the 7th Sturm Battalion with the ten SP guns.96 On they came, determined to oust the paratroopers from St. Mere-Eglise. The 1st Battalion made little

initial progress, but the 7th Sturm Battalion, a specially 83

trained attack unit, pushed in some of the D Company positions and reached the outskirts of town. One of the

SP guns got within 50 meters of Vandervoort's CP before PVT John E. Atchley, single-handedly manning the 57mm gun positioned by Vandervoort on D-Day, destroyed that vehicle and disabled a follow-on gun.97 In spite of these

gains, the commander of the 7th Sturm Battalion opted to await the arrival of the 1st Battalion before continuing. To the D Company Commander, CPT Taylor G. Smith, the 1st Battalion appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough in his sector. Smith, incapacitated with a

back injury, dispatched his XO, LT Waverly W. Wray, to the battalion CP to request help. Wray, a junior officer very

much respected by the officers and men of 2/505, explained the D Company situation to Vandervoort. Vandervoort had

no reserves to commit to the D Company sector, so he suggested that Wray take a D Company platoon not heavily engaged with the Germans and counterattack the force which penetrated the company positions. Wray quickly returned

and informed Smith of the battalion commander's response. Wray then went on a personal reconnaissance to better formulate the counterattack he would lead. For his

subsequent actions, Vandervoort would describe Wray as "the 82d Airborne Division's undiscovered World War I1 equivalent of SGT Alvin C. York."99 Wray had gone about 300 meters when he ran into an eight-man German patrol. When the patrol attempted to
84

outdraw him as he tried to capture them, Wray killed them all. This brought the attention of two Germans about 100

meters from Wray, who slightly wounded Wray with Schmeisser machine-pistol fire. Wray ducked behind a

hedgerow, reloaded his M1, then killed these two Germans. Wray then continued his reconnaissance right into the center of the German positions. Stealthily making his way

back to D Company, Wray gathered the spare platoon and headed back to the spot where he felt the Germans were the most vulnerable. Stopping short of the intended point of

attack, Wray had the platoon set up their 60mm mortar. The mortar squad then fired as fast as they could, with Wray personally calling corrections as the rounds blasted the German positions. fled. The 1st Battalion now broke and

Wray had killed the battalion commander and staff

in his earlier exchange with the eight Germans, and now the 1st Battalion ran leaderless into adjacent D Company positions.
D Company inflicted significant slaughter on

this force, causing a German officer to wave a white flag and ask for a one-hour truce to remove the wounded. turned out to be a strategem for the Germans to cover their withdrawal. When "negotiations" concluded, an This

artillery barrage impacted on the platoon and the rest of the battalion made their getaway.100 "Wray shattered The 1st The 7th

the battalion," Vandervoort recalled.lOl

Battalion lost 50% of its strength due to Wray.

Sturm Battalion, with its left flank unprotected, also

85

withdrew to the north in disorder.

The repulse of these

two battalions enabled D Company to restore its positions astride Highway 13. Nevertheless, German artillery fire

continued to pound 2/505 positions.102 Vandervoort's sound and savage def,ense once more saved St. Mere-Eglise from being overrun.103 At about

noon, Van Fleet's 8th Infantry entered the southern outskirts of St. Mere-Eglise. In fairly short order, the

764th Tank Battalion arrived, followed by Edson Raff's "Howell Force". In the midst of another German artillery

barrage, COL Van Fleet and MG Collins rolled through St. Mere-Eglise, bound for Ridgway's CP west of town. Ridgway

and Van Fleet immediately planned a coordinated attack to destroy the remaining elements of the 7th Sturm Battalion and the 1058th Regiment outside Neuville-au-Plain.104 Van Fleet's troops ran into trouble trying to extricate the 795th Georgian Battalion from the Turqueville-Fauville ridge south of St. Mere-Eglise, so the coordinated attack with Ridgway's paratroopers did not kick off at 1700, as intended. Stepped-up German

artillery, mortar, and small arms fires indicated the Germans were going to try another counterattack. The 505

Regimental Commander, COL Ekman, improvised a spoiling attack which consisted of Vandervoort's D and E Companies and some tanks from COL Hupfer's 764th Tank Battalion brought forward by Vandervoort's indominitable S-2, LT Doerf ler . l o 5 86

Vandervoort sent these companies forward along the Highway 13 axis, and then pushed McClean's platoon from D Company into the attack when it returned from a mission to find Van Fleet's missing attack echelon. McClean

doubletimed his platoon back from St. Martin de Vaneville in time to be met by Vandervoort, who issued "one of the fastest attack orders in 505 history."los Vandervoort

told McClean that E Company was already attacking along the east side of the highway, and that McClean should rapidly advance in order to cover E Company's right flank. McClean moved out, again at the doubletime, and

soon closed in on a large German element maneuvering to outflank E Company. In a matter of minutes, after a

severe firefight, the combined combat power of Vandervoort's companies and the tanks brought forward by Doerfler overwhelmed the Germans. Hupfer's tanks, moving

ahead of the paratroopers, knocked out the remaining SP guns at Neuville-au-Plain and liberated Turner Turnball's wounded from the day before. D and E Companies then

captured all surviving members of the 7th Sturm Battalion and the 1058th Regiment.107 Vandervoort's knockout blow on the German force north of St. Mere-Eglise brought the action around St. Mere-Eglise to a close. Vandervoort's resolute battalion

had destroyed one German battalion and decimated three others. This forced General von Schlieben to withdraw the

demoralized remnants of his battered command 1500 meters 87

north of Neuville-au-Plain to establish a hasty defensive line. For his cool and magnificent performance, Ridgway awarded Vandervoort a Distinguished Service Cross. Vandervoort continued to lead with valor and fight with determination as his battalion participated in the engagements at Montebourg Station, St. Sauveur le Vicomte, and Hill 131. Vandervoort epitomized the spirit,

tenacity, and calm professionalism of Ridgway's type of airborne battalion commander. He was, as Ridgway later

wrote, "one of the bravest, toughest battle commanders I ever knew. "1 0 8

L TC COHPETEHCY BE A GOOD LISTENER COHHUHICATE INTENT CLEARLY COHHUHICATE HOHVER BRLLY COHHUHICATE ENTHUSIASH COHHUHICATE ORDERS CLEARLY COHHUHICATE STANDAR D S COHHUNICATE UP, DOUN, HORIZONTALLY OBTAIN FEEDBACK STRESS SIHPLICITY VAHDER YOORT

LTC LYNCH

LTC HOORE

1
4

I
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3
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LTC SUPERVISE COHHAHD FORMRRD DON'T OVERSUPERVISE EHFORCE SAFETY. STANDARDS ESTABLISH COHTROLS VAHDER VOOR T

LTC LYHCH

L TC MOORE

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FOLLOM-UP OH CORRECTIVE ACTIOH PROVIDE FEEDBACK

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COflCH/COUNSEL SUBORDIHRTES DEHRHD R C T I O H DEVELOP

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LTC COHPETEHCY ) E V E L O P H E H T ACCEPT HOHEST MISTAKES BE R E S P O N S I B L E TO THE U H I T C R E R T E STRONG UHIT IDENTITY DEHOHSTRATE CARIHG DEHONS. T R U S T D E V E L O P COOP. AND TERHUORK D E V E L O P SUBORD. TO R E P L A C E YOU SHOU C O N F I D E H C E I H SELF/TEAH E HCOUR AGE BOLDHESS E HCOUR AGE VAHDE R VOOR T

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EHCOUR AGE SPEEDY RCTIOH GENERATE U N I T COHESIOH INCLUDE SUBORD. LEADERS I N DECISION-HAKING INSTILL DESIRE PROVIDE TOUGH, REPETITIVE EXACTIHG TNG.

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TRAIN LEADER TEAMS

LTC COHPE T E NCY APPLY T E N E T S OF AIRLAHD BATTLE DOCTRINE I H P L E H E N T THE AIRLAND BflTTLE IMPERATlVES VAHDERVOORT LYNCH MOORE

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1
II

Analysis and Conclusions Vandervoort clearly stands out as an exceptional leader under fire. His performance at St. Mere-Eglise has But

been touted as "the stuff of instant legend."lo9

what skills of command of battalions in combat can be learned by examining Vandervoort's performance with the leadership competency/performance indicator model? COMMUNICATIONS Vandervoort appears to be an effective communicator. While it is difficult to really assess

whether he was a Good Listener, it is obvious that he displayed knowledae of information bv ~ r o ~ e r l ~ imulementinq the commander's intent. that Vandervoort knew There is no doubt

and properly implemented

the

intent of COL Ekman, the next higher commander, and the intent of the division commander, KG Ridgway. In fact, a

case can be made that Vandervoort implemented Bradley's intent to secure the flanks of the VII Corps landings at Utah Beach. There is no way to assess the indicators

back-brief information and provide feedback on what was briefed unless one analyzes Vandervoort's performance during the initial mission planning sessions for Operation Neptune. routinely But, it is easy to see that Vandervoort did

s He relied . on

information from his S-2, LT Doerfler, for a variety of decisions, and he obviously took great stock in the

situation estimates of his junior officers like Turner Turnball and Waverly Wray. Vandervoort Clearly Communicated His Intent. All

of the 2/505 company commanders on the perimeter in St. Mere-Eglise understood Vandervoort's intent to hold the decisive town. LT Turnball definitely understood the

action necessary to accom~lishthe mission desired by Vandervoort. Vandervoort clearly communicated his intent

throush ooerations orders and other forms of direction when, for example, he issued mission guidance to LT Petersen before the battalion reserve moved out to cover Turnball's withdrawal from Neuville-au-Plain. His

"fastest combat order in 505 history," given to Petersen as the Lieutenant joined the two company attack on 7 June is another example of clear intent. Vandervoort's strong suit appears to be Communicate Nonverbally. By denying overt medical

attention for his broken ankle and by getting wheeled around the battlefield on a portable ammunition cart, Vandervoort nonverbally underscored the dynamics of taking care of leader business in combat: no obstacle short of

incapacitating injury should preclude the leader from

'

mission accomplishment; a leader has the obligation to maintain a presence in the fight; a leader must not be too humble in combat, but must draw some attention to himself to communicate resolve and tenacity; and the leader should realize the vital impact of a sense of humor on the morale 102

of the battalion when faced with a difficult situation. Accounts by 2/505 veterans all point to the dramatic impact achieved by Vandervoort as he travelled to St. Mere-Eglise "like an eighteenth century Spanish general." There is no doubt Vandervoort nonverbally communicated he was "endowed with a lion heart"

the troopers and junior

leaders of 21505 were all affected by Vandervoort and they consequently endured the trials of artillery barrages and armor-heavy counterattacks because of his example. Vandervoort's actions com~lemented/reinforcedunit standards which he established on training exercises in England and reiterated at DZ 0 and St. Mere-Eglise. Vandervoort set a leadership performance standard on 6 June which would drive 21505 until the end of the war. He

A-

he was

taking care of business, checking on Turnball, bringing forward 57mm guns, directing patrols, coordinating with adjacent commanders. Vandervoort Communicated Enthusiasm by "persuading" the lOlst NCOs to pull him around in the ammo cart so he could get the job done; by "encouraging" the 57mm gun crew to engage the German SP gun at Neuville; by "urging" Turnball to hold out as long as he could; and by "suggesting" that LT Wray counterattack the penetration in
D Company's sector.

Another Vandervoort strength was that he Stressed Simplicity. He relied on s u ~ ~ l e m e n t ainstructions l to 103

c o m ~ l e t euniaue missions in the case of Turnball at Neuville, but did not overburden his lieutenant with anything other than COMMON SENSE COMBAT INSTRUCTIONS. He

achieved simplicity by stressing the "why" of his orders rather than how to the degree that subordinates two echelons below fully understand the instructions/mission. Vandervoort simplified his combat orders by DEFINING SUCCESS for subordinates. Turnball knew what the final

outcome of his delaying action was to be at Neuville. Petersen knew that success would be a textbook withdrawal by bounds from Neuville to cover Turnball. Wray knew that
D

success meant the restoration of the D Company line.

and E Companies knew that success for their 7 June attack would be the destruction/capture of the remains of the German battalions near Neuville. In the course of fluid

combat conditions there is no room for philosophical

interpretation/interpolation/extrapolation of intent; the

commander has an obligation to clear away potential misconceptions of what must be accomplished by describing what the end-state must look like for the operation to succeed. Three paragraph intent statements, so much in

vogue in current operations orders, does nothing more than complicate subordinate execution of whatever intent was described. Battalion commanders especially should spell

out for subordinates which tasks must absolutely be accomplished in order to meet not only the battalion intent, but the regiment intent
104

or the division intent,

as in Vandervoort's case.

As the U.S. Army orients itself

more and more to rapid deployment contingency operations, it is vital that senior leaders insure that the intent is simple enough and directly stated so that small unit leaders can achieve that intent on the ground. Lastly, Vandervoort Communicated Up, Down, and Horizontally. Vandervoort maintained contact with the 505

CP via radio and runner throughout the fight for St. Mere-Eglise. He routinely communicated to his

subordinates FACE-TO-FACE

a technique crucial to H e met with

successful transmission of orders under fire.

Krause immediately after arriving in St. Mere-Eglise, stressed a simple command arrangement, and continually worked with Krause to shift reserves to threatened sectors. SUPERVISE Vandervoort's performance at St. Mere-Eglise epitomizes a battalion commander's supervision of subordinates in combat. Vandervoort Commanded Forward,

personally inspecting selected tasks Neuville

like Turnball at He led by He led

being accomplished by subordinates.

example, moving continuously among his battalion.

his battalion column toward Neuville on 6 June; he did not establish a CP on DZ 0 and await reports. Vandervoort Did Not Oversupervise. mission-type orders H e used

auftragstaktik

when assigning His

tasks to subordinates, like Turnball or Petersen. 105

mission orders to subordinates reiterated his trust and confidence in them. He set the ultimate goals, defined

success, and allowed subordinates to take charge and employ the tactics, techniques, and procedures. He

allowed Turnball to make his own dispositions in Neuville and fight his own engagement. He allowed Wray to

determine how and where to conduct his own counterattack. Petersen chose his own tactics in covering Turnball's withdrawal. Doerfler roamed the battlefield on his own in

search of intelligence and, in a true spark of combat initiative, he brought some tanks to St. Mere-Eglise. He

fully accepted subordinates plans designed to accomplish the mission. There is not enough source material available, interviews notwithstanding, that describes how Vandervoort Enforced Safety Standards. Realizing that this is an

important factor both in peacetime training and in combat, this SKA would really be more applicable if it addressed "fire control measures", "command and control of direct and indirect fires", and "protection of troops". very difficult to assess the enforcement of safety standards in combat unless there is evidence to suggest fratricide or leader failure to take adequate measures to protect troops from enemy direct and indirect fires. Neither of these conditions apply in Vandervoort's case. Establish Controls, Establish/Enforce Standards, Follow-Up on Corrective Action, and Provide Feedback are
106

It is

SKAs in the SUPERVISE competency which have LPIs that have more of a training orientation than combat focus. applied toward an analysis of Vandervoort's When

leadership in

combat, the LPI seem to overlook the urgency of combat and the unforgiving cost of mistakes. Conductina ~ e r f o r m a n c e

evaluations and unannounced reviews of standards of c o m ~ l i a n c eare LPI more conducive to peacetime training management than supervising combat activities. TEACHING AND COUNSELING This in another competency which, at face value, is difficult to use to assess Vandervoort's performance in combat. analysis. First, source material does not support an Second, most LPI are too ambiguous to The SKA are good,

adequately address combat performance.

but the absence of AirLand Battle tenets, imperatives, and elements of combat power takes the strength out of the competency. Did Vandervoort Coach/Counsel Subordinates? He

"coached" Turnball about making sound dispositions and employing delaying tactics at Neuville. H e "coached" MAJ

Maness, his ad hoc XO, on the requirements of the battalion command post before he visited Turnball on 6 June. He "coached" Wray on counterattacks. He

"counseled1' the 57mm gun crew about performing under fire. He "counseled" LT Doerfler about making too many

individual patrols (Vandervoort forbade Doerfler from leaving the CP after he awarded his S-2 a DSC for his
107

episode with Hupfer's tanks) and making himself too vulnerable. Vandervoort Demanded Action but it was more in the context of exvectina and rewardins subordinate initiative than reauirins corrective action on shortcominss. As for

Developing Subordinates, Teaching Skills, and Training for War, the actions of Vandervoort's subordinates is indicative of his successful influence in the areas.

1 is any easy one to

assess: Vandervoort recommended Turnball for a DSC (he was awarded a Silver Star), Wray for a Medal of Honor (awarded a DSC), Doerfler for a DSC (awarded a DSC), and PVT Atchley for a DSC (awarded a DSC). SOLDIER TEAM DEVELOPMENT Ben Vandervoort was leading his battalion into combat for the first time. By Providing Tough,

Repetitive, Exacting Training in England before the invasion, Vandervoort inculcated the essence of soldier and leader team development into his battalion. Vandervoort was Responsible to the Unit in that both he and his subordinates placed the needs of the unit over self needs. orders. Subordinates willingly obeyed his

He Created Strong Unit Identity by impressing the

common goal of the defense of St. Mere-Eglise upon his subordinates. Vandervoort maintained sub-unit integrity Turnball's entire platoon went to

for all missions:

Neuville; Petersen's entire platoon went to Turnball's

108

and; all of E Company was placed in reserve; all of Wray's platoon conducted the counterattack. Vandervoort Demonstrated Caring and Trust throughout the St. Mere-Eglise defense, as has been shown. He Developed Cooperation and Teamwork by Leading

by Example and beins with subordinates in the most difficult times. Vandervoort's conduct at St. Mere-Eglise

shows how a combat leader Encourages Boldness, Candor, Initiative, Innovation, and Speedy Action. His battalion

demonstrated it was a highly cohesive unit, that morale and esprit were high and the battalion considered itself a winner. Much of the supporting SKA and LPI for this competency seems to describe the development of soldier and leader teams in training. But how does a battalion While some SKA and

commander develop his teams in combat?

LPI apply to a combat situation, and continuous combat operations, a more specific set of leader tasks and indicators needs to be developed. TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL PROFICIENCY Ben Vandervoort's performance at St. Mere-Eglise was technically and tactically competent. SUCCESSFUL COMBAT OPERATIONS. He CONDUCTED

As has been described,

Vandervoort demonstrated exceptional intiative in the conduct of his operations. An offensive spirit of

improvisation, innovation, and aggressiveness, tempered with intelligent and prudent decision-making, was evident
10 9

in assignment of Turnball to Neuville and his defense of St. Mere-Eglise. As previously mentioned, subordinates

like Turnball, Petersen, Wray, and Doerfler acted independently within the context of Vandervoort's overall plan. Vandervoort gained the tactical initiative

immediately and by outposting Turnball to Neuville he acted within the German decision cycle. the initiative, he maintained it. he counterattacked north. aailitv. Once he seized

When it was appropriate

Vandervoort demonstrated

It has been mentioned that his rapid movement

off DZ 0 to Neuville and then to St. Mere-Eglise occurred faster than the German ability to react. Vandervoort's

decision to outpost Neuville is the epitomy of a combat leader quickly adapting to fluid situations and acting without hesitation. Vandervoort's command and control

mechanism was flexible primarily because of his presence at decisive locations. Vandervoort used the full depth of

the battlefield to keep the Germans "at arm's length" from St. Mere-Eglise, and his small but judiciously employed reserve

Petersen's platoon

allowed him to concentrate

or shift assets to apply force where necessary. Vandervoort fought the Germans throughout the depth of his defense. He used Turnball in a security operation

to keep the Germans away from the main battle area in St. Mere-Eglise. Vandervoort took advantage of limited

visibility to move, reorient defenses, and maintain pressure on the enemy. He achieved depth in defensive
110

actions by attacking the 1058 Regiment battalion throughout their entire formation to delay, disrupt, and ultimately destroy them. He used mortars, anti-aircraft

guns, and naval gunfire to inflict damage along the length of the German armor column. Vandervoort maintained a small reserve, capable of flexible action. Vandervoort svnchronized all available combat power in the defense of St. Mere-Eglise. He took advantage of

misdropped lOlst Airborne Division paratroopers to augment his force. He used anti-aircraft guns to supplement his lack of anti-tank weapons. He called in naval gunfire while his paratroopers raked the German column with direct fire. He protected his men by keeping them tucked into hedgerows and buildings during artillery bombardments. Vandervoort's actions at St. Mere-Eglise provide an exceptional example of the Implementation of AirLand Battle Imperatives in a combat situation. He ensured unity of effort by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to his battalion to limit the effects of friction in the operation. He set the example, as has

been repeatedly shown, and he took risks, decisive action, and made sure subordinates like Turnball and Wray understood his.intent. His instructions to his junior leaders are examples of clear and concise battlefield orders. His plans were simple in every instance,

including his coordination with Krause for a command scheme for the overall defense of St. Mere-Eglise. 111

Vandervoort antici~atedevents on the battlefield. He got inside the German decision cycle by moving quickly and reacting to opportunities to exploit his agility and intiative. His ability to sense the flow of the battle his "fingerspitzengefuhl", or "sixth sense"

enabled him

to make the monumental decision to outpost Neuville and thereby save St. Mere-Eglise. initiative once he seized it. Vandervoort concentrated his combat Dower aaainst enemv vulnerabilities in the sense that he created vulnerabilities by maintaining pressure on the Germans and acting faster than they could. He did not have overwhelming combat power but there is no denying his execution of the dynamics of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. Vandervoort desianated. sustained. and shifted the main effort. Turnball was the main effort in the early And he maintained the

stages of the defense of St. Mere-Eglise. Vandervoort sustained him by reinforcing him with the 57mm gun and crew. Vandervoort shifted the main effort to the main battle area after Turnball returned, and then the 7 June counterattack by D and E Companies became the main effort. Vandervoort fought aggressively and pressed the fiaht to a successful conclusion. He was able to do so because his battalion was physically fit and mentally tough and his soldiers mimicked his calm professionalism and sinsle minded tenacity to fight in spite of injuries.
112

Vandervoort moved fast. struck hard. and finished rapidly in the close, restritive terrain around St. Mere-Eglise. His movement from DZ 0 to Neuville was rapid, and his companies hit the German attackers as violently as they could in every brief engagement, using the hedgerows and buildings to achieve surprise. Wray's counterattack is a

clear example of this imperative, as is the D and E Company counterattack on 7 June. Vandervoort

vsed

terrain, weather, deception. and OPSEC to win at St. Mere-Eglise. H e used his terrain sense to protect his

troopers, moved at night, and deceived the Germans into thinking his force was large by outposting Neuville and incorporating aggressive patrols around the town. Vandervoort conserved strenath for decisive action by keeping his troopers under cover during bombardments, maintaining security by aggressive patrols, and sustaining their high morale through his personal example. Vandervoort used combined arms and sister services to c o m ~ l e m e n t and reinforce his battalions' weapons systems. His use of the 57mm guns and naval gunfire are His troopers used land mines

examples of this imperative.

at roadblocks which posed a real dilemma for the attacking Germans. Vandervoort understood the effects of battle on

soldiers. units. and leaders and compensated for the affects of fatigue and fear by the force of his presence and by instilling in every man in the battalion the

absolute necessity of defending St. Mere-Eglise in order to save the invasion. DECISION MAKING Vandervoort made some of the best tactical decisions of the invasion and of the war. He did so by

makins sound, timely decisions at the lowest practical level. He Accepted Prudent Risks in Subordinates. He

allowed subordinates to take the initiative as in the case of Turnball's stand at Neuville, Wray's counterattack, and Doerfler bringing forward Hupfer's tanks. also show Vandervoort's decisions while operatins within commander's intent. Vandervoort was an assertive leader. He These examples

took

decisive action, as in sending Turnball north while he took the battalion to St. Mere-Eglise. He demonstrated

moral couraae to stand by this decision by not sacrificing Turnball at Neuville. The move to send Turnball to Vandervoort was

Neuville was ferociousl~audacious.

extremely candid with Turnball about the prospects of success at Neuville. Vandervoort was Creative in his attempts to upgrade his individual mobility and the firepower of his battalion.
He travelled by ammo cart and then jeep.

He

scrounged .30 and .50 caliber machineguns and ammo and two 57mm anti-aircraft guns for his defense. He used orisinal

thouaht to request naval gunfire on advancing German armor. He constantly used practiced. practical iudaement.
114

He exploited ovvortunities by taking advantage of his rapid assembly in the first hours after the jump to move on Neuville. He used the Turnball outpost as a

method to imvrove current overations up to the operational level of war. He was fully prepared

as a veteran of

Sicily and Salerno

to overate autonomouslv and Vandervoort

isolated without loss of unit effectiveness:

had assumed not only the regimental mission but the division mission as well when he began his move on Neuville and St. Mere-Eglise. He Took Calculated Risks by

outposting Neuville and strongpointing the northern sector of St. Mere-Eglise with roadblocks. He took decisive Vandervoort

action, Using and Expecting Good Judgement.

was conspicuous for his estimate of the situation entire division situation

the

after the jump; his analysis

of courses of action; his implementation of a plan; and

his supervision of the mission until it was accomplished. He did not hesitate to make decisions in the absence of clear guidance from COL Ekman or MG Ridgway. His actions

at St. Mere-Eglise not only pass the test of "the actions of a reasonable man," but establish the performance standard for airborne battalion commanders. PLANNING The lack of available source material on Vandervoort's plan to execute the original 2 / 5 0 5 battalion mission at Neuville-au-Plain precludes a thorough review of his deliberate planning techniques.
116

However, the

supporting SKA for plan effectively may be applied to an examination of his rapid battlefield planning for the defense of St. Mere-Eglise. This is absolutely no doubt that Vandervoort was

quite able to Adjust According to the Situation. timely and a ~ ~ r o ~ r i achanses te to plans when added information dictates as seen in assessment of the

He made

regimental and division situations while he was still on

DZ

0.

While there is no evidence to suggest that Ridgway

directed Vandervoort to assume the 3/505 mission, it is certainly clear that Vandervoort had enough information and intuition to know that an abrupt departure from his original mission was imminent. Vandervoort was Adaptable. H e made not only an

a p ~ r o ~ r i a tadjustment e in the fluid situation he encountered enroute to Neuville, he rapidly im~lemented chanaes with minimal loss of effectiveness. His decision

to send Turnball to outpost Neuville actually enhanced the effectiveness of his defense of St. Mere-Eglise. plans for continaencies. Vandervoort was able to He had

establish Clear Goals and Objectives in his adjusted plan. For Turnball, the objective was the defense of

Neuville; the goal was to delay the German approach to St.

Mere-Eglise as long as possible.

For the company

commanders of 2 / 5 0 5 the objective was the defense of St. Mere-Eglise; the goal was to hold the vital division objective until reinforced from Utah Beach.
117

The

simplicity of Vandervoort's scheme and the logic and common sense of his subsequent actions ensured that his subordinates understood the soals and the sequence and timinss of tasks. None of his actions deviated from the

express intent of Ekman or Ridgway. Vandervoort Established Courses of Action to Meet Goals and Objectives. available He considered the resources

his battalion

and considered METT-T.

He

then orsanized rapidly, prioritized his tasks, and allocated resources: Turnball to Neuville, battalion(-)

to St. Mere-Eglise; one 57mm gun to Turnball, one to St. Mere-Eglise. He Planned Beyond Initial Operations by

alerting, then sending, a relief force to Turnball at Neuville, maintained Petersen's platoon as the battalion reserve throughout the operation, and then was flexible enough to promptly kick out D and E Companies for the 7 June attack to seize Neuville. All of his planning Undeniably

actions supportd the intent of his superiors. Vandervoort's

compressed, or rapid, battlefield planning

competency is worthy of emulation and is a superb "how to do it" study. USE OF AVAILABLE SYSTEMS Analysis of Vandervoortas performance with this competency is not entirely appropriate. Vandervoort

cannot be evaluated for comouter literacy, for example, and examining his ability to effectivelv e m ~ l o v manaoement technolosv seems to miss the focus of combat
118

leadership. An argument'for a revised competency more fitting for analysis of combat leadership with AirLand Battle Doctrine conclusions to the thesis. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Vandervoort's performance at St. Mere-Eglise provides one of the most shining examples of the application of the professional Army ethic in combat. Better yet, his actions form a model of what a light infantry battalion commander should demonstrate under fire (or at NTC/JRTC). Pre-command course officers should be

in association

will be presented in the

required to study his combat performance at St. MereEglise. Ben Vandervoort Accepted Responsibility for not only his actions and decisions, he assumed responsibility for fulfilling the mission of his regiment, his division, and the VII Corps. Ordinarily, battalion commanders don't

find themselves faced with such an awesome predicament or opportunity. As the Army continues to conduct

contingency operations, it is conceivable that future light infantry battalion commanders may find themselves in the middle of a similar situation. Vandervoort's performance validates every SKA of this competency. He was a role model.
He led bv example:

he stayed Wheeled

in the action in spite of his broken left ankle.

about on the ammo cart, he exuded the tangible, infectuous attributes of a commander in charge of the
119

situation.

His

Turnball taking charge at Neuville and holding out until almost completely surrounded, "saving the invasion"; Wray taking charge of a counterattack force which decisively repelled the German penetration into St. Mere-Eglise and led to the subsequent destruction of four German battalions. Vandervoort's D Company commander, CPT Taylor

Smith, mimicked his battalion commander's refusal to be evacuated as he endured a debilitating back injury, commanding his company while lying in the prone position. Even LTC Krause came back into action after one night in the aid station. Scores of 21505 men refused to be

evacuated for wounds due to Vandervoort's example and the fact that he had so overtly demonstrated the ultimate importance of holding St. Mere-Eglise. Vandervoort was Candid. honest with his subordinates. He was frank. open, and He told Turnball just how He articulated

tough his mission at Neuville would be.

the great responsibility for holding St. Mere-Eglise to his company commanders. His instructions to Wray

accounted for the shortage of reserves to handle the penetration of D Company. His succinct "combat order" to

Petersen as the 7 June attack was initiated was unvarnished fact. His coordinations with Krause were a

model of simplicity and honesty. Vandervoort was Physically Fit. He demonstrated

phenomenal endurance after long operations 120

his broken

ankle was not set in a cast until the middle of July.

He

led his battalion out of St. Mere-Eglise on the division's attack west after St. Mere-Eglise had been reinforced. The "eighteenth century Spanish General" Demonstrated Confidence in himself and his battalion. This attitude was apparent in his actions throughout the fight for St. Mere-Eglise. Vandervoort Demonstrated Compassion. He checked on Turnball after 1200 on D-Day, He fired

concerned for the safety of the exposed platoon.

a flare at 1500 in an attempt to signal Turnball to withdraw. He sent Petersen's platoon to cover Turnball's He constantly moved around St.

retrograde movement.

Mere-Eglise, by jeep or by foot, checking on his troopers. Vandervoort Demonstrated Courage. He was tenacious in the face of adversity. He shared the hardships of the

repeated counterattacks and the continuous artillery bombardments with his men. He exposed himself to fire to

deliver a 57mm gun to Turnball and then "encouraged" the crew to disregard German fires and engage the self-propelled guns. He braved artillery fires to return

to St. Mere-Eglise to improvise a relief force for Turnball. He stayed in the fight with a broken ankle, clearly demonstrating phvsical confidence. Vandervoort Demonstrated Integrity in his candid dealings with subordinates, peers, and superiors. was nothing selfish, unethical, or dishonest in his performance. He obeyed the law of land warfare by
121

here

collecting wounded Germans and evacuating them to his aid station. He Demonstrated Maturity in his logical, He was "a mountain of calm He Demonstrated

professional decisionmaking.

optimism" in comparison to Krause.

Self-Discipline by doing what was correct while under fire. He made one of the war's best tactical decisions.

He definitely did not take the easy way out because of his injury. He displayed enormous strength of will and His example

positive control over the situation.

influenced the behavior of his battalion. Finally, Vandervoort was absolutely Self-Less. He

was concerned for the safety of the entire invasion, not his own well-being. fact, to his division His loyalty to his organization

in

is best seen as he attaches his

battalion to Krause's, insisting Krause "call the shots".

ENDNOTES
1
2

Gerard M. Devlin, Paratrooper, pp. 356-358. Ibid. Ibid., p. 357. Ibid., pp. 370-372. Ibid., p. 372. Ibid., p. 370. Ibid., p. 371. Ibid., p. 372. Ibid., pp. 372-373. Ibid., p. 373. Ibid.

3
4

5
6

7
8

10
11

505th Reqimental Unit History, "The Capture of St. Mere-Eglise," p. 3.

12 13
14

Ibid., p. 4 . Ibid. Napier Crookenden, DroD Zone Normandy, p. 73. Ibid., pp. 74-76. Clay Blair, Ridaway's Paratroopers, p. 286. 505th Regimental Unit History, p. 5. Ibid., p. 5. Blair, p. 230. 505th Reqimental Unit History, p. 5. Blair, pp. 607-608. Cornelius Ryan,
A

1s
16

17
18

19 20

21
22
23
24

Bridqe Too Far, p. 463.

Crookenden, pp. 77-78.

25
26

I b i d . , P. 1 1 1 .
LTG James M. Gavin, O n t o Berlin, p. 8 .

27
28

B l a i r , p. 267. Crookenden, p . 113. B l a i r , p. 267. Crookenden, p. 113.

29
30

31
32
33
34

Blair, p . 268.
Ibid. Crookenden, p . 1 1 3 . B l a i r , p. 268. Ibid. Crookenden, p . 113. B l a i r , p. 271. I b i d . , p. 278. John R . G a l v i n , Air A s s a u l t , p p . 143-145. Cornelius Ryan, The Lonsest Day, pp. 127-128. A l l e n Langdon, Ready, p . 5 5 . Ibid. Ibid. Gavin, p . 9 7 . B l a i r , p. 270. Ryan, The Lonaest Day, p . 127. Ibid. B l a i r , p . 285. I b i d . , pp. 285-286. I b i d . , p. 250. 505 Reaimental Unit Study, p . 1 1 .

35

36
37

39 39 40
41 42
43

44

45
46

47
49

49
50

51

52
53

Blair, p . 287. Langdon, p . 55. John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy, p . 95. Crookenden, p . 118. Langdon, p. 55. Blair, p . 287. Crookenden, p. 118 and Keegan, p . 95. Ibid. Keegan, p . 95. Ibid.

54
$5

56

57
58

59
60

61

6 2 Langdon, p . 56; Gavin, p . 123; Keegan, p . 95; 505 Reqimental Unit Study, p. 12 and Blair, p. 287. 63

Blair, p . 287.

6 4 Langdon, p . 56: Keegan, p . 96 and 505 Reqimental Unit Study, pp. 12-13.
65

Crookenden, p . 118. 505 Reaimental Unit Study, pp. 13-14. Ibid., p. 14. Langdon, p . 56. 505 Reqimental Unit Study, p. 14. Langdon, p . 54. Blair, p. 288. Langdon, p . 56. Ibid. Ibid. Blair, p . 288. Langdon, p . 56. Keegan, p . 97.

66
67
68 69

70

71

72
73
74

75
76

77

78

Langdon, p. 57.

7 9 The remainder of E Company had been dropped wide of DZ 0. The 2d Platoon assembled and fought with the 508 and the,fd Platoon attached itself to Edson Raff's "Howell Force" which landed a segment of the 82d on Utah Beach. 80

Langdon, p. 57.

8 1 Ibid. Turnball left his ambulatory wounded behind, but they were freed from the Germans on the night of 7-8 June.
82

crookenden, pp. 119-120. Keegan, p. 98.

83

DSC.

8 4 Ibid. Vandervoort recommended Turnball for a Turnball received a posthumaus Silver Star.
8s

Langdon, p. 55n. Blair, pp. 288-289. Langdon, p. 55. Blair, p. 289. Ibid. Langdon, p. 58. Ibid. 505 Reaimental Unit Study, pp. 38-40. Langdon, pp. 59-60. Ibid., p. 59. Blair, pp. 297-307. Langdon, p. 60.

86

87
88 09
90
91

92
93

94

95
96

9 7 Ibid., p. 60n. Atchley was awarded a DSC for this action under constant fire. He was killed in the Ardennes. A swimming pool at Ft. Bragg is named for him.
99
100

Ibid., p. 61n. Ibid., p. 61

1 0 1 Blair, pp. 307-308. Wray was nominated for a Medal of Honor, but was awarded a DSC. He was killed in Holland. 102 103 104

Langdon, p. 61. Blair, p. 308. Ibid.

1 0 5 Langdon, p. 61. LT Doerfler received the DSC for his actions in this fight. 106 107

Ibid., p. 63.

Ibid., p. 6 4 . Vandervoort curtailed Doerfler's future activities as he was so valuable as 2/505 S-2.
100

Blair, p. 289.

CHAPTER 5 LTC JAMES H. LYNCH, 12 SEPTEMBER 1950

The operational picture fbr the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea in August, 1950, was exceedingly bleak. In just

over a month of combat on the Korean peninsula, Lieutenant General Walton Walker's forces had been steadily pushed backwards by the over-powering attacks of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA).
By the end of August, Walker's

troops had been pressed into a semi-circular defensive perimeter at the southeastern-most tip of South Korea.

In

spite of his successes in thwarting the NKPA drive, Walker was forced to "circle the wagons" around Pusan, the Eighth Army's logistic base in Korea and the reinforcement and resupply lifeline to theatre support in Japan. Hard

fighting by U.S. divisions had momentarily stabilized the Pusan Perimeter.1 but Walker was on the verge of being pushed into the sea by the powerful NKPA assault echelons. Fortunately for LTG Walker and his weary U.S. divisions, the NKPA was also facing a vexing operational situation. Generalissimo Kim I1 Sung's invasion of South

Korea had been based on a "quick, easy victory" over the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces, but the American intervention forced the "once fast-moving and victorious NKPA troops" into a stalemate of "costly, indecisive, and discouraging positional warfare."2 The NKPA in late

August was a "desperately tired and ragtag army" which had

128

been in continuous, bitter combat for two months.

Far

from its own logistics bases, the NKPA was hampered by "acute shortages" in everything from rifles, ammunition, and food to trained replacements.3 Even though Kim I1

Sung conscipted 35,000 "fillers" to reconstitute his battered attack divisions, the NKPA were in danger of "losing the logistical and manpower" advantage over the U.S. forces.' Worse than that, the NKPA high command was aware that General Douglas MacArthur was poised to execute a bold strategic amphibious envelopement of the rear of the NKPA positions. With all of its forces positioned to

overrun the Pusan Perimeter, the NKPA lacked sufficient resources to counter MacArthur's potential war-winning attack.5 Unsure as to the location of the American

amphibious assault, Kim I 1 Sung was pressured to arrive at a maneuver that would not only provide for the defense of the NKPA rear area but would also decisively defeat the Americans in Korea.6 Consequently, Sung planned to

"make one last do-or-die attempt to crack the Pusan Perimeter and overrun Eighth Army.le7 A monumental NKPA

offensive against Walker's thinly-held positions "would almost certainly force a cancellation" of MacArthur's amphibious strategem.8 Better yet, by decimating

Walker's Eighth Army, Kim I1 Sung would be in a position to claim both military and political victory over the South Koreans.9
129

The NKPA began its offensive on the night of 31 August 1950. 98,000 fanatic NKPA troops struck Walker's

perimeter in four separate attacks designed to affect simultaneous breakthroughs across the entire front of Eighth Army.10 For. six days the fighting raged in

increasing severity, with Walker's perimeter contracting and then expanding in a maddening see-saw of attacks and counterattacks. The key terrain of the perimeter

the

ubiquitous Korean hills changed hands daily.11

was bitterly contested and

One of the most critical sectors of the perimeter was the northwest sector, held by the over-extended 1st Cavalry Division. Just inside the front lines of the

defense lay the town of Taegu, a key road junction and site of Eighth Army headquarters. Major General "Hap"

Gay's 1st Cav Division was responsible for securing Taegu and maintaining control of a wide, flat corridor of open "tank country" northeast of Taegu known as "the bowling alley". An NKPA breakthrough near Taegu would not only

endanger Eighth Army command, control and communications, it would provide the NKPA with a high speed avenue of approach into the rear of ROK forces holding the northeastern sector of the perimeter.12 To insure Gay's

division could handle the tough assignment, Walker rapidly shifted three fresh battalions to the 1st Cav sector. Reinforcing the sector and bringing the 1st Cav Division to authorized strength were the 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry 130

Regiment, commanded by LTC Edgar J. Treacy; the 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, commanded by LTC Harold K. "Johnny" Johnson; and the 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, commanded by LTC James H. Lynch.13 The 3d Battalion, 7th Cav had been hastily organized and activated at Ft. Benning, Georgia in response to Eighth Army's requests for additional combat troops.14 Principally composed of former personnel of

the Infantry School's demonstration troops from 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, LTC Lynch's provisional battalion had more veterans of infantry problems than it did of World War
11.15

Rounding out the authorized

strength of the battalion were scores of Ft. Benning's cooks and truck drivers, reassigned as riflemen.16 Alerted immediately for overseas movement to Japan, Lynch had only "about two weeks" time to conduct combat training for his ad hoc unit.17 Once underway to Japan, Lynch

was notified that his battalion would instead be shipped directly to Pusan, Korea, to reinforce Walker's beleaguered perimeter. Lynch, who had not commanded

troops in combat in WWII, made the most of the training opportunities presented by the lengthy sea movement to Korea. H e innovatively rigged field telephones between

staterooms and rehearsed his officers in command post exercises. Topside, the combat experienced

noncommissioned officers directed rifle marksmanship for the unskilled cooks and truck drivers.18 131

LTC James H. Lynch's new and untested 3/7 Cav arrived at Pusan at the same time three NKPA divisions moved into position to attack the 1st Cav Division sector. Totalling 22,000 men

a third of whom were

green, untrained fillers

the combined manpower of the

lst, 3d, and 13th NKPA divisions were staged to slice Walker's perimeter in half and drive to Pusan.19 But

Walker's intelligence staff had intercepted and decoded NKPA radio traffic and Walker now knew when and where the NKPA would strike.20 In keeping with U.S. A m y doctrine

and his own strong, personal, George Patton-like belief in offensive combat, Walker directed Gay to launch a spoiling attack to disrupt the NKPA offensive.21 After much

discussion with his staff, Gay agreed to attack from the center of his sector with Colonel Cecil Nist's 7th Cavalry Regiment.22 For LTC Lynch and his inexperienced

battalion of cooks and school troops, their first combat mission would occur within two days of their arrival in Korea. 2 3 Nist's plan of attack was poor and "everything that could go wrong did."24 The well-entrenched NKPA

decisively repulsed Nist's two battle-tested battalions 1/7 Cav and 217 Cav

who spearheaded the attack.

Next

came Lynch's combat debut.

Replacing 1/7 Cav, Lynch's 3/7

Cav made a "second, ill-advised attack" against strong NKPA positions on Hill 518 on 2 September 1950.25 Meeting the NKPA for the first time only days after 132

completing the voyage to Korea, and enduring highly accurate NKPA 82mm and 120mm mortar fires, Lynch's 3/7 Cav fared no better than ~ist's veteran battaIions.26 MG Gay's "futile spoiling attack" now placed the entire division in a poor position to meet the NKPA attack.27 Sensing an opening, the three NKPA divisions

smashed into the 1st Cav Division's defective dispositions. The 1st Cav "reeled in disarray," unhinged Nist's 7th Cav came

by the NKPA flanking movements.2s

apart at the seams when it discovered hundreds of NKPA soldiers on hills to its rear.29 Forced to fight back

toward its original line of departure, the 7th Cav "disintegrated," abandoning weapons, ammunition, and vehicles.29 In the midst of the chaotic fighting

withdrawal through the hills north of Taegu, Lynch's 3/7 Cav experienced two days of repeated enemy attacks and disorganizing night actions.30 "Though casualties had

not been high, morale was shaken and large amounts of materiel had been lost."3l Lynch led his battalion in a

14-mile foot march back to Taegu to be re-equipped.32 For the youngest son of a West Point general and former chief of infantry,33 the initial experience of commanding a battalion in combat was vastly different from the staged tactical scenarios at Ft. Benning. Even though

3/7 Cav was off to an inauspicious start, it was destined to never repeat such a performance. In fact, within the

space of three weeks, Lynch's 3/7 Cav would demonstrate 133

such a remarkable turn-around in combat achievement that it would have the rare distinction of being awarded two Presidential Unit Citations. Clearly indicative of his

rapid maturation as a combat battalion commander and representative of his superior leadership under fire, thirty-six-year-old LTC James H. Lynch would be awarded an unprecedented two Distinguished Service Crosses in fourteen days. The amazing achievements of LTC Lynch and

his intrepid battalion would go a long way toward inspiring other battalions in the 1st Cav Division, and the Eighth Army, to higher levels of performance.34 The NKA successes against the 1st Cav Division jeopardized the security of Taegu. In response to

mounting NKPA pressure in the Taegu area, LTG Walker ordered MG Gay on 5 September to withdraw the 1st Cav to positions in an arc just eight miles north of Eighth Army headguarters.35 As a precaution since "evacuation

seemed almost a certainty," Walker ordered "most of the Eight Army staff" and the 1st Cav's ammo trains to Pusan.36 Without much apparent coaxing on Walker's

part, the neighboring ROK Army headquarters also followed the Eighth Army staff to pusan.31 For the next five days in the region just north of Taegu, the 1st Cav Division was compelled to "fight for its very e~istence."~e The NKPA, flushed with success, swarmed over and around the hills, infiltrating behind positions, seizing high ground, and isolating small 1st 134

Cav units.

Once they were in possession of commanding

terrain, the NKPA began an incessant campaign of 120mm mortar fires to unhinge the next U.S. position. "They had

to be rooted out, hill by hill, in an endless succession of company and platoon attacks."39 Losses on both sides

were ghastly, yet the NKPA continued to inch closer and closer to Taegu. LTC Lynch and 3/7 Cav remained on stand-by in Taegu as part of the 1st Cav Division reserve and were not initially committed to the vicious combat north of Taegu.40 However, on 9 September 1950, MG Gay opted to

move one of his reserve battalions closer to the fighting to establish a blocking position astride the Taegu-Tabu-dong Road.41 assignment. LTC Lynch and 3/7 Cav drew the

Temporarily attached to the 8th Cav Regiment,

Lynch moved his battalion into the positions specified by the division commander, a mere seven miles from Taegu. Lynch placed Company L astride the Taegu-Tabu-dong Road to physically block the highway, and situated Company K on high ground to the west left flank.

Hill 181

to cover Company L's

To cover Company L's right flank, Lynch

positioned Company I on high ground to the east of the highway

Hill 184.

Rearmed, somewhat rested, 3/7 assumed

its mission, anxious to prove itself.42 The situation continued to deteriorate in the 1st Cav sector. By 11 September the NKPA had seized control

of Hill 314, a 1000-foot promonitory which gave them 135

excellent observation of all 1st Cav movements around Taegu. The NKPA immediately began to shell Taegu with Repeated attacks by COL Ray Palmer's

120mm mortars.43

8th Cav Regiment failed to dislodge the NKPA from their strong positions.f' Unless the NKPA could be ousted

from the commanding heights of Hill 314, "the fall of Taegu seemed inevitable."4s The "dire threat" now posed by the NKPA caused LTG Walker to order "a loosely coordinated but all-out" counterattack by the 1st Cav and ROK 1st divisions.46 MG Gay's 1st Cav Division had the mission to recapture Hill 314. The ROK 1st Division would attack to recapture

the walled city of Kasan 314.

Hill 901

due north of Hill

At the same time, Walker shifted elements of the 5th

Infantry Regiment to Taegu to backstop the counterattack.47 On 11 September MG Gay directed COL Nist to move his 7th Cav Regiment into position to relieve Palmer's 8th Cav and assume responsibility for the capture of Hill 314. Due to its close proximity to the 8th Cav front

lines and its manpower strength, Nist selected Lynch's 3/7 Cav to be the regimental main effort for the attack on Hill 314, scheduled to commence at 121100 September 1950.48 Nist also ordered 2/7 Cav to make a supporting

attack to seize Hill 660 and secure Lynch's eastern flank. 117 Cav was directed to move to Taegu to become the base unit of the division reserve.49 136

To assist in the 7th Cav attack on Hill 314, COL Palmer assigned his 1st and 2d Battalions to hold their defensive positions west of the highway on Hill 624 to protect Lynch's left flank. Also, 3/8 Cav, relieved by

Lynch for the main attack, would move backward from its exposed positions and occupy an assembly area on a finger which ran southwest from Hill 660. For all intents and

purposes, LTC Harold K. Johnson's 3/8 Cav would follow and support Lynch from its position as 8th Cav reserve.50 Lastly, Nist arranged for an ROK training battalion, already operating with 8th Cav, to act as an "intermediate" reserve behind Lynch in much the same role as it played during Johnson's unsuccessful assaults on Hill 314.51 The neighboring ROK 1st Division would

resume its attack to recapture the walled city of Kasan on Hill 902, due north of Hill 314.52 In the meantime, the NKPA were not idle. During

the latter part of 11 September and the early morning hours of 12 September, elements of the NKPA 19th Regiment, 13th Division and 2d Regiment, 1st Division reinforced the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment already dug in on Hill 314. This reinforcement brought the total number of NKPA troops on Hill 314 to 700.53 NKPA artillery and mortar fires

increased in intensity during this period, registering on the southern approaches to Hill 314.54 Unknown to the

Americans, the NKPA 13th Division was girding itself for a hard-hitting, 12 September attack against the U.S. 5th 137

Infantry Regiment in the Bowling Alley east of Hill 314.53 Upon receipt of his mission statement from COL Nist, Lynch immediately developed a plan and briefed his subordinate commanders.56 The plan called for 3/7 Cav Phase 1 was the 0630

to conduct a two-phase operation:

move up from the current battalion blocking position to as assembly area at the base of Hill 314; Phase 2 was the climb up the ridge toward the line of departue and the commencement of the attack no later than (NLT) 1100 on 12 September.57 The battalion would attack with two

companies abreast (Company L on the left and Company I on the right) and one company moving behind and centered on the lead companies, as battalion reserve (Company K).58 Lynch intended to prep the objective with air strikes, artillery, and mortar fire. Heavy machineguns, recoilless

rifles, and tanks would support by fire from the line of departure (LD).s9 Once the objective was secured,

Companies I, L, and K would establish a battalion-size defensive perimeter and prepare for the inevitable NKPA counterattacks. Flame thrower teams made up from the

battalion admin section would augment each company sector.59 The battalion would consolidate its gains and

"hold at all costs" as Hill 314 constituted "the key to the defense of Taegu."So Lynch also planned to use only the minimum essential communications and heavy weapons vehicles in the 138

attack.

These vehicles would displace forward to the Lynch reasoned that

battalion assembly area before dawn.

this technique would aid in deceiving the NKPA to the place and time of the attack and would protect his vehicles from observation and direct fire.

~ l supply l

vehicles were to remain in the blocking position until the attack commenced. Additionally, the supporting tank

platoon would rendezvous with his vehicles in the battalion assembly area before daylight on 12 September .61 With the time of attack set by the regimental commander for 1100, Lynch backward planned to give his battalion plenty of time to move from the blocking position to the assembly area and then climb the ridge to the line of departure to initiate the attack. He opted to

begin the two-mile foot movement from the blocking positions to the assembly area at 0630.62 The battalion

would move in column formation, order of march Companies

I, L, Headquarters, M, and K.63

Lynch carefully planned

the route of march to take maximum advantage of streambeds, irrigation ditches, and low lying areas to conceal his approach.64 Heavy ground fog, so typical of

warm September mornings in Korea, would add to the concealment of 3/7 Cav.65 Once at the assembly area,

Lynch would shift his battalion from its extended column formation into its V-shaped attack formation. The

battalion would then begin its torturous two-hour climb up 139

the ridgeline under cover of residual morning haze and artillery fires and airstrikes.66 Lynch and his battalion operations officer, CPT James B. Webel, designated specific control measures in order to coordinate ground maneuver with fire support. The control measures for the attack

in this case the

line of departure, intermediate objectives, phase lines, and final objective

were drawn on the map to coincide

with the four overtly identifiable knobs which were the essential features, and key military terrain, of Hill 314. The battalion had to capture each of the four pieces of key terrain from south to north.

the four knobs

in succession

Hill 314 could only be considered

secure when the battalion had seized Knob 3, the last peak of the ridge, and controlled all intermediate knobs. Consequently, 317 Cav had to make the two-hour climb from the southern tip of Hill 314 to reach the Line of Departure (LD), sited on Knob 0 (the second peak south of the saddle on the ridgeline). At 1100 the battalion would

move across the military crest of Knob 0 and, under artillery concentrations and airstrikes, commence the attack. Company M heavy machineguns and recoilless rifles

would support the attack from the LD.61 Continuing to climb, for 200 meters, with the lead assault Companies L and I moving, respectively, left and right of the spine of the ridge, 317 Cav would attack the NKPA outpost on Knob 1.68 Phase line 1, drawn through 140

the northern tip of this knob, delineated the rear boundary of the battalion's first intermediate objective.

Once Knob 1 was captured, the formation would descend into a saddle (40 meters in altitude) and then climb up and out of the saddle (160 meters in altitude) to attack the second intermediate objective, Knob 2. The actual

distance travelled for this movement would be more than 700 meters.69 Here at Knob 2 the battalion expected to

meet heavy resistance as the bulk of the 700-man NKPA defense was anchored on this peak. Phase line 2 was drawn

just behind Knob 2 to coordinate the battalion assault on the final objective, Knob 3. "Once the hurdle of Knob 2 was passed,""J
3/7 Cav

would have to fight its way through 500 meters of NKPA defenses to seize Knob 3. The battalion limit of advance,

shown as Phase line 3, was penciled-in on the northern slope of Knob 3 at the point where the contour lines of Hill 314 begin to descend to the valley floor. With the

capture of Knob 3, the battalion would consolidate into a three-company defensive perimeter and prepare for the anticipated night counterattacks by the NKPA. For

bunker-clearing and as a potential deterrent to enemy probing attacks, Lynch task organized three flame thrower teams from soldiers of the 3/7 admin section and attached them to each rifle company.71 With these control

measures and fire plans, Lynch felt confident he could accomplish his mission.lz 141

At first light on the morning of 12 September 1950, a heavy fog lay like a shroud over Hill 314 as LTC James
H. Lynch ordered his battalion to begin its movement from

the blocking positions to the assembly area at the base of Hill 314.73 The first phase of the operation seemed to The battalion's conununications

be proceeding as planned.

and mortar vehicles made the pre-dawn run to the assembly area without response from NKPA artillery.74 The

supporting tank platoon from Company C, 70th Tank Battalion arrived at the assembly area before daylight and linked up with Lynch's vehicles.75 Lynch's 500-man

column had made the first mile of the foot movement along the streams and irrigation ditches without incident. If

good luck and the ground fog would hold out, the column would traverse the last mile of open low ground without interference from NKPA artillery observers. At about 0700 Lynch saw his best laid plans flash before his eyes when a single flat trajectory concentration from a NKPA 76mm self-propelled gun straddled the battalion route of march.76 No casualties

occurred from the enemy fire and in the absence of any additional concentrations, the battalion continued its snake-like advance to the assembly area, with an appreciably quickened pace.77 Companies I and L arrived at the battalion assembly area at 0800 without drawing additional NKPA attention.78 "Somewhat ahead of schedule," these lead 142

companies quickly reconfigured into their respective assault formations and began the ascent to the line of departure.", Lynch and his scaled-down Tactical

Operations Center (TOC) staff also moved rapidly through the assembly area and climbed the ridgeline behind Companies I and L.80 At about 0950, high up on Knob 3,

eleven Air Force F-51 aircraft spotted two exploding artillery white phosphorous marking rounds and, according to Lynch's plan, rocketed and strafed Hill 314 and dropped napalm cannisters for nearly forty-five minutes.81 By 1015, the 3/7 Cav command group and the two lead assault units had reached the line of departure at Knob 0. Much to his amazement, Lynch discovered that Company L

of LTC Harold K. Johnson's 3/8 Cav had not yet withdrawn from Hill 314 and was manning positions astride Knob 0 Now that his proposed LD was defended, Lynch

decided to take advantage of the unprogrammed security afforded by Company L to rapidly pass his battalion through these positions and proceed with the attack.63 Establishing his TOC in the shallow dip that had been the site of the 3/8 Cav command post, Lynch ordered Companies
M and K to hustle to the
LD.84

At 1018 the 5-3, CPT

Webel, had contacted the supporting tank platoon and it began to rumble forward through the assembly area and up the ridgeline, quickly catching up with the rear element of Company K.83 All units were ahead of the time

schedule.

To Lynch, the first phase of the operation was

being executed to near perfection.86 At 1030, as Company K and the tanks continued their climb to the line of departure, Lynch and his TOC staff turned their attention toward the coordination of preparatory fires for the 1100 attack. As they anxiously

awaited the pre-planned artillery barrage that was scheduled to follow the airstrikes at 1030, Lynch was notified by regimental headquarters that the artillery mission had been cancelled due to ammunition shortage.87 As partial compensation for the lost

artillery support, 7th Cav Air Liaison Officers diverted a flight of four F-51's from Tabu-dong to Hill 314.88 These aircraft arrived within minutes and began a thirty-minute rocket and napalm attack on Knobs 1, 2, and 3. The time it took to sort out the artillery dilemma now

forced the 3/7 Cav 81mm mortars to delay their preparatory fires until the F-51's were out of the objective area. The ten-minute mortar prep, scheduled to be the last indirect fire concentration prior to the attack, was now set to commence at 1100.89 Consequently, Lynch had no

choice but to adjust the time of the attack to 1110.90 At the same time Lynch and his staff were working out the fire support problem, the NKPA on Hill 314 gave indications that they were aware of the impending attack. Between 1030 and 1100 highly accurate NKPA 120-mm mortar fire rained in on the battalion assembly area at the base 144

of Hill 314.

Apparently, the presence of the supporting

tank platoon, not the airstrikes, alerted the NKPA to Lynch's attack.91 In spite of its accuracy, 317 Cav

suffered only one casualty from the enemy mortar fire: virtually all of Lynch's units had moved out of the assembly area and onto the ridgeline, according to his instructions, just prior to the mortar a t t a ~ k . ~ Z
Up on Hill 314, the NKPA moved into battle

positions as the mortar fire impacted below.

The potent

13th NKPA Division had reinforced the battered 1st NKPA Division on Hill 314 during the night and now the 700 defenders were organized for combat. Twelve to fifteen

NKPA troops, armed with two machineguns and two automatic rifles, occupied an outpost at Knob 1. Over 400 NKPA troops now re-occupied log bunkers and foxholes along Knob 2 that they had vacated during the preparatory airstrikes. The remainder of the NKPA force returned to

foxholes and bunkers around Knob 3 and just off either side of the spine of the ridge forward toward Knob 2. NKPA 5 0 m , 82mm. and 120mm mortar crews set up their guns in shallow depressions between Knob 3 and Knob 2, prepared to fire pre-registered concentrations on Knobs 0, 1, and 2.93 Precisely at 1100 the 317 Cav mortars fired successive volleys of preparatory concentrations onto Knobs 1, 2, and 3.94 From their positions at the line

of departure, the four heavy machineguns of Company M 145

"laid down intense fire on the enemy outpost at Knob l."95 Lynch had installed a two-gun section on the left

side of Knob 0 to support the advance of Company L and positioned the second section of heavy machineguns to the right of Knob 0 to fire in support of Company I. As the

mortars and machineguns blazed away, the lead assault companies made their final formation adjustments prior to the attack.96 At 1110 the mortars and machineguns lifted their supporting fires and Companies L and I crossed around Knob 0 in two parallel columns. On the left side of the

ridgeline, Company L moved in column with 2d Platoon in the lead, followed in order by 1st and 3d Platoons. On

the right side of the ridgeline, Company I moved with 3d Platoon in the lead, followed by 2d and 1st Platoons. Point men moved 100 meters ahead of each company formation.,' LTC Lynch and his staff watched closely

from the command post at Knob 0.98 Almost immediately the assault companies come under heavy, but largely ineffective, small arms fire from the enemy outpost at Knob 1. In good order and with great

speed, the leading platoons of each company conducted fire and maneuver and by 1130, Knob 1 was overrun.99 All

enemy soldiers were killed in the exchange except one, who somehow emerged unscathed and ran to warn the positions at Knob 2 of the American advance.100 The assault The lead

companies paused momentarily to reorganize. 146

platoons for the 150 meter movement to Knob 1 Platoon, Company L and 3d Platoon, Company I

2d

were now

positioned on each side of Knob 1 as supporting platoons for their respective companies. order of movement Company I The platoons second in

1st Platoon, Company L and 2d Platoon,

temporarily assumed flank positions to secure The two trailing platoons of

the supporting platoons. each company Company I

3d Platoon, Company L and 1st Platoon,

moved through the supporting platoons to take Lastly,

up lead positions for the advance on Knob 2.

members of the supporting platoons cleared the foxholes and bunkers of Knob 1 of enemy dead, throwing the bodies out of the holes.lol As the assault companies were reorganizing, the NKPA reacted to the capture of Knob 1 with scattered small arms fire from Knob 2 and a pre-registered 120mm mortar salvo onto the line of departure and Knob 0.102 The

1 2 0 m mortar concentration wounded some of the Company L, 3/8 Cav troopers at Knob
0.103

NKPA rifle fire into

Knob 1 wounded the Company I radio operator and destroyed his radio.104 Several walkie-talkies were also Company I now had no

destroyed by the enemy rifle fire.

radio communication.with the battalion commander and no internal walkie-talkie comunications with its platoons.los Within minutes, Company L also had its

internal walkie-talkie net destroyed by NKPA sharpshooters.lo6 147

Within five minutes of the capture of Knob 1, the companies jumped off for the assault on the heavily defended Knob 2. At the same time, 1st Platoon of the

battalion reserve, Company K moved into Knob 1 to assume responsibility for its security.107 The Company K

weapons platoon, constituting a "mortar battery" made up of its own 60mm mortars and the mortars of Companies L and

I, established a firing position behind Knob 0, outside of

the bursting radius of the incoming NKPA mortar rounds.108 The 2d and 3d Platoons of Company K inched

closer to the line of departure but also stayed beyond the range of enemy indirect fires. LTC Lynch and his TOC

staff escaped injury during the enemy retaliatory mortar strike on Knob 0 and continued to monitor the progress of the attack from the command post. Runners were dispatched

forward to the assault companies to compensate for the interrupted radio net.109 With the ridgeline acting as the boundary between them, Companies L and I began their descent into the saddle which led to Knob 2. The lead platoons of each

company were configured in a V-shaped formation, with two squads forward in a skirmish line and third squad trailing in a modified.wedge formation. The flanking platoons of

each company, echeloned and extended slightly to the rear of the lead platoons, moved out in conjunction with the advance elements. As the lead platoons continued to move

down into the saddle, the support platoons picked up from

148

Knob 1 and flared out and down over each side of the ridge. As the assault companies disappeared from his line of sight, Lynch displaced the 60mm mortar platoons of both companies forward to the rear of Knob
1.110

Shortly after the move-out from Knob 1, the Company

L skirmish line began taking fire from what appeared to be

NKPA outposts in the bottom left cut of the saddle. Quickly returning fire, the skirmish squads flushed four NKPA soldiers from their concealed observation post. Three of the soldiers made it safely back to Knob 2, but the fourth observer was killed. The time was 1138. Off

on the right side of the ridgeline, the sweep squad from the Company I support platoon had likewise uncovered an enemy outpost. In a brisk, one-sided exchange of gunfire,

the squad killed all members of the NKPA machinegun crew in their concealed outpost.111 Swiftly moving through this tentative resistance, the commanders of Companies L and I got their units to the bottom of the saddle by 1143. Suddenly, the assault

companies were hit by a vicious fusillade of NKPA automatic weapons fire and a well-placed bombardment of 5 0 m , 8 2 m . and 1 2 0 m mortar fires from Knob 2. The

intensity of the fire-storm indicated that the two companies were astride the enemy's final protective fire line for Knob 2.112 Both companies were able to

continue to maneuver forward another two hundred meters to positions which not only moved them out of the mortar
149

fires but also placed them on the incline of the exit from the saddle. Here both companies were pinned down by another heavy eruption of NKPA small arms fire. The sheer weight of this fire briefly disorganized the lead platoons of both companies. In an attempt to re-establish order,

3d Platoon, Company L moved to its right and became intermingled with 1st Platoon, Company I. The

conglomerate group continued to receive heavy fire from the dense underbrush to its front.113 Based on very incomplete radio reports from Company

L and the observations of the weapons platoons on Knob 1,

Lynch quickly called for the Company M 81mm mortars to fire an immediate suppression mission on top of Knob
2.114

The volume of fire from the saddle reverberated

up the slopes, rolling over Knob 1 and engulfing Lynch and his staff at the LD. While Company M was priming the mortar charges, a group of about 400 NKPA were spotted on the left side of Knob 2, apparently preparing to counterattack into the saddle. Within minutes after initiating mortar fires on Knob 2 , Company M adjusted rounds onto the mass of NKPA, dispersing the enemy.115 By 1145 the lead platoons of Companies L and I were able to return sufficient fire to force the NKPA in the underbrush to their front to withdraw to the reverse slopes of Knob 2.116 However, the enemy fires

particularly those of Browning Automatic Rifles (BARS) captured from the 8th Cav

further damaged radio and 150

walkie-talkie communications between the lead assault platoons and the company command posts vicinity Knob 1. "Authority to resume the attack" on Knob 2 now rested with the platoon leaders who were acting in the absence of orders from their company.commanders.118 To their

credit, the platoon leaders of 3d Platoon, Company L and 1st Platoon, Company I had managed to reorganize their units under cover of Lynch's counter-mortar fire, and at 1155 "the first assault" on Knob 2 was underway.119 Appraised of this development, Lynch displaced the Company M heavy machineguns forward to Knob 1 with directions to engage the enemy on Knob 2 while the attacking platoons advanced. The heavy machineguns fired

a continuous arc of overhead fire as the two lead platoons and the two adjacent flank platoons fought their way up the steep slope to Knob 2. At 1200, Lynch received a

report that elements of the 3d Platoon of Company L had succeeded in gaining the crest of Knob 2 and were pushing across Phase Line 2 toward Knob 3.120 But the attack had actually been stopped cold by brutal enfilade fires from enemy positioned in the underbrush on 3d Platoon's left flank. As the 3d Platoon

continued its forward movement it was hit by a strong enemy contingent which had shifted from its positions in front of Company I to the "nose" of Knob 2. Wicked small

arms fire laced 3d Platoon as enemy grenades detonated at close range. Hand-to-hand combat broke out.
151

3d Platoon,

Company L moved back down the slope, shocked by the sudden counterattack.121 Artillery Forward Observers (FOs) with Company L immediately requested 77th Field Artillery Battalion direct support to 317 Cav

in

to fire Variable Time

(VT)-fuzed 105mm rounds to pre-empt any NKPA exploitation of the repulse of the first assault.122 At the same

time, Lynch directed a second 81mm mortar concentration on the northeast side of Knob 2 to further dissuade the NKPA from additional counterattacks.123 As these fires were

being adjusted, the commanders of Company L and I moved forward from Knob 1 to the location of 3d Platoon, Company
L.

Finding the troops "stunned", both began throwing

fragmentation hand grenades into the underbrush as an example for the reeling soldiers of 3d Platoon. In a

matter of minutes, 3d Platoon members were also throwing hand grenades, and this forced the dispersal of the remaining NKPA in the bushes on Knob 2. Immediately, the

commander of Company L, in possession of the only operable radio, contacted Lynch and reported his unit had been decisively repulsed in its assault on Knob 2 and was now disorganized. Lynch directed him to refrain from resuming

the attack and to have his men dig in as an airstrike had been requested.124 About this time, Lynch had also At 1215

managed to get the tank platoon into the action. the tanks marked the airstrike target with white

phosphorous rounds and continued to fire high explosive 152

rounds at Knob 2 and 3 where the aircraft made their approach.125 Unfortunately, Lynch's airstrike did not Instead, the F51's pasted Knob 3 and

impact on Knob 2.

the northern slopes of Hill 314.126 CPT Walker and 1LT Fields got their units reorganized during the errant airstrike so that by 1230 they began to move out on a second assault of Knob 2. During the reorganization, the 3d Platoon of Company I moved in behind the remnants of 3d Platoon, Company L, while 2d platoon, Company L moved forward to take the lead in Company L.127 For all intents and purposes, CPT

Walker, the commander of Company L on the scene

the senior commander

assumed command of both companies to unify His plan called

the maneuvers of the second assault.128

for the 1st Platoon, Company L and the 1st Platoon, Company I to lead the advance up to Knob 2 and establish a base of fire while 2d Platoon, Company L worked around the left flank and the 2d Platoon, Company I worked around the right flank. As the attack kicked-off, the platoon

leaders of 3d Platoon, Company L and 3d Platoon, Company I, were killed by mortar fire.129 By 1245 both 1st Platoons had established a heavy base of fire against Knob 2 and both 2d Platoons had made their flanking movements. As enemy small arms and mortar

fires began in earnest, Lynch, positioned at Knob 1, directed renewed 105mm and 155mm field artillery concentrations onto Knob 2. As the artillery fires 153

impacted, both 1st Platoons gained access to a revetment on Knob 2 called "the shallow". 2d Platoon, Company L,

meanwhile, was struck by enemy 7 6 m self-propelled gun fires and withering small arms fires and grenades. Taking

heavy casualties, the platoon was stopped in its tracks. On the right side of Knob 2, though, 2d Platoon, Company I had also reached the top of Knob 2 and had moved forward to secure the northern tip of Knob 2. Both company

commanders took up positions in "the shallow", where the four-foot high stone walls of a Korean burial site afforded them the necessary protection to withstand the incoming NKPA 120mm mortar bombardment. Within minutes

the entire assault force was pinned down by mortar fires which caused one casualty about every two minutes. Still,

Lynch's troops were in tentative control of Knob 2 and had, for the first time, direct observation on the final objective, Knob
3.131

Once he was notified that the second assault had been "partially successful", Lynch rallied his fire support assets to secure his gains. The 9th and 77th

Field Artillery Battalions fired an estimated 36 VT-fuzed rounds just to the north of Phase Line 2. Company M 81mm

mortars worked feverishly to sustain a maximum rate of fire against Knob 2. Two additional artillery

concentrations, adjusted by FO's positioned in "the shallow", prompted the NKPA to withdraw from Knob 2 Informed of the situation, Lynch directed his FO to 154

request an airstrike for 1 3 3 0 - t o hasten the withdrawal of the enemy. 1 3 2 The situation confronting Lynch and 3/7 Cav was still urgent, and the success of the attack as still very much in doubt.133 To his great dismay, the requested

airstrike did not occur at 1330 and Lynch was forced to decide whether or not the leave his battalion in its exposed position on Knob 2 while the airstrike communications problem was solved. At about 1345 the

enemy mortar fire decreased in intensity and became sporadic.134 The assault companies stood fast, shooting Lynch

at anything that moved north of "the shallow". opted to hold his battalion in

position, apparently

intending to consolidate on Knob 2 and establish a night defensive perimeter.133 Shortly after 1410, Lynch's long-awaited close air support appeared over Hill 314.1s6 For fifteen minutes

the three F51 aircraft dropped napalm and general-purpose bombs and rocketed and strafed the hill. Flying unusually

low, the planes began strafing the ridgeline with .50 caliber fires a mere 75 meters beyond "the shallow" where the assault element commanders and FO's were positioned.13' Two napalm cannisters blasted almost

directly on top of a large group of NKPA who had taken cover in the brush just beneath Knob 3.136 The NKPA in

the vicinity of Knob 3 dispersed in disorganization and began to flee down the slopes of Hill 314. 155 Enemy mortar

fires decreased sharply and the assault companies on the crest of Knob 2 were taking only occasional small arms fire. By all appearances, the avenue of approach along

the ridgeline to Knob 3 was generally free of NKPA.139 Watching from his command post at Knob 1, Lynch observed that enemy resistance was crumbling.l40 Reports passed

from Knob 2 through the fire support radio net confirmed Lynch's assessment.141 Sensing that the most decisive

point of the battle at hand, Lynch ordered CPT Walker of Company L to assault Knob 3 at 1430.142 Emmediately after the airstrike, CPT Walker gave the signal to attack. When the troops on Knob 2 did not

instantly respond, CPT Walker began to "lead the charge" himself, closely followed by the commander of Company I and about a dozen other soldiers.143 By the force of

his example and energy, CPT Walker got the assault troops moving. After enduring horrendous mortar bombardments and

incessant automatic weapons fire while they awaited the airstrike, the troops swept up over the crest of Knob 2 in "a moment of emotional release."l44 Lynch could hear

the yelling of the assault troops back at Knob 1.145 The assault companies "continued to advance along the ridgeline at a moderate, steady pace."l46 At 1500

Lynch ordered the Company M jeep-mounted recoilless rifles forward to Knob 2 along with the battalion reserve, Company K.147 As these units passed over Knob 1, Lynch

displaced his battalion command post forward to Knob 2 for 156

a better view of the attack on Knob 3.146

From Hill

570, west of Hill 314, NKPA 76mm self-propelled gun fires and automatic weapons fires impacted among the Company L assault elements. Advanced units of Company L shifted to

the right side of the ridgeline to avoid these fires while continuing forward.149 NKPA mortar fires started up

again in response to the assault, but almost all concentrations landed on Knob 2 and caused significant casualties to the recently arrived Company K.150 At 1530, Lynch saw the lead elements of the assault companies climb up over Knob 3.151 NKPA troops were

"slipping down the slopes in all directions" in their haste to evacuate Hill 314.152 The NKPA 82mm mortars at

the base of the north slope of Hill 314 had been abandoned by the enemy, but 120mm and 60mm mortar fires from Hill 570 continued to cause casualties as 317 Cav moved between Knob 2 and Knob 3. Around 1540, Lynch directed Companies

I, L, and K to consolidate into a defensive perimeter atop

Knob 3.

Concurrently, he requested an artillery Lynch then

concentration onto the escaping NKPA.153

moved his battalion command post up to the northeast side of Knob 3.154 By 1545, a lull had set in over Hill 314. As his

assault companies reorganized and accounted for personnel, Lynch took stock of the situation. Although his battalion

had suffered 229 casualties in about five hours of fighting, it nevertheless captured a regimental-size NKPA 157

position which had withstood three previous attacks by

U.S. battalions.156

The mission had been accomplished

in a minimum of time because of the unrelenting aggressiveness and skill of 317 Cav. His battalion and

all supporting arms had inflicted nearly 900 casualties on the NKPA 1st and 13th Divisions.157 LTC James H. Lynch had much to be proud of: his

battalion had achieved a spectacular success in its second combat mission. 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment was no

longer a "green" battalion veterans.

the troops were now combat

With this in mind, Lynch radioed his assessment Calling directly

of the situation to higher headquarters.

to the G-3, 1st Cav Division, at 1545, Lynch, in classic understatement, reported that "Objective hill-ours."l5a

COHPETENCY

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Analvsis and Conclusions "The recapture of Hill 3 1 4 on 1 2 September 1 9 5 O W , according to one author, "would prove to be the turning point in the battle to save Taegu."l59 Another analyst

called the capture of Hill 3 1 4 by 3 / 7 Cav "the key action" in which U.S, forces "seized (and then were in a position to hold) the tactical initiative" and turn the tide of the battle.160 The 3 / 7 Cav victory, which brought them a

well deserved Presidential Unit Citation, "inspired others."lsl For his superior leadership in "the

brilliantly planned and executed attack on 1 2 September," LTC Lynch was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.162
3/7

Undeniably, the performance of LTC Lynch and

Cav on Hill 3 1 4 was a dramatic turn-around from their

previously dismal combat debut. What did LTC Lynch do to

3/7 Cav to make it so courageous that it relentlessly

drove up the steep approaches of Hill 3 1 4 and violently dislodged a superior enemy force? How did he keep his

battalion going after it has absorbed such terrific punishment? What skills of command of a a battalion in

combat are evident in Lynch's performance on Hill 314? What skills, knowledge, and attitudes can future combat battalion commanders take away from an examination of Lynch's performance to develop their own combat leadership performance indicators?

COMMUNICATIONS Given the depth of the combat narrative, it is especially difficult to pinpoint the degree of LTC Lynch's communications competency during the fight for Hill 314. Consequently, virtually every task, supporting SKA, and performance indicator must be liberally interpreted from the sequence of events. While there is no evidence to suggest that LTC Lynch was a Good Listener, it is relatively apparent that he was especially capable of Clearly Communicating His Intent and Clearly Communicating His Orders. Lynch had

issued a fragmentary order to his major subordinate commanders after receiving his mission from COL Nist, the regimental commander. Although there was not a great deal of time until he planned to execute his 0630 Phase I movement to the base of Hill 314, Lynch seems to have relied on sound doctrinal formulation of his orders to insure that his subordinates understood the actions necessary to accomalish the mission. The smooth movement

of the battalion from its blocking positions to the assembly area at the base of Hill 314 bears this out. The actions of CPT Walker, commander of Company L, during the attack, when communications were interrupted, is a perfect example of how well Lynch had Communicated Intent. How well Lynch Communicated Nonverbally is hard to assess but accounts state that his decision to locate his command post at exposed positions during the course of the
172

battle greatly enhanced the morale of the battalion.

His

actions com~lemented/reinforcedthe unit standards he felt were vital to successful accomplishment of the mission. He demonstrated a sense of uraencv without panic by displacing his CP forward during the most intensive periods of action. In this way he clearly Communicated The

Standards of leader performance on the battlefield.

assault company commanders apparently picked up on this nonverbal communication as is evidenced in their personal gallantry on Knob 2. At first glance, Lynch does not appear to have done well in his requirement to Communicate Up, Down, and Horizontally. Beginning with pre-mission planning and

coordination, Lynch and his staff failed to make the most of 3d Battalion, 8th Cav's attempts to take the objective. Sources do not mention any interface between

LTC Lynch and the 318 Cav commander, LTC Harold K. Johnson. Nor is there mention of inter-staff liaison. This communications failure would therefore account for the "discovery" of Company L, 318 Cav at the LD. Also, Lynch and his staff do not score well in their coordinations for fire support. The 3/8 Cav 4.2

inch mortar platoon remained completely out of action during the battle even though it was in position to support 3/7 Cav and seemingly alerted to do so. The

platoon of tanks from the 77th Tank Battalion was significantly under-utilized

another offshoot of

173

incomplete communications.

Other than acting as a radio

relay to the battalion rear and marking airstrike targets with WP rounds, the tank platoon and its leader languished for most of the battle without instructions from the staff

.
Looking at the communications competency from a

purely technical standpoint, it was extremely fortunate for Lynch that his plan and intent were so well known by subordinates that the loss of radio and walkie-talkie communication did not hamper the attack. This could have

resulted in a major problem for the assault companies. Indeed, the loss of effective electronic communications nearly doomed the battalion when it was struck by the NKPA counterattack at Knob 2. The inability of either assault

commander to make a timely request for an airstrike

except through the already heavily over-burdened fire support net units.

was very nearly cataclysmic to the exposed

The dilemma was then compounded by the failure of By the time

the staff to process the airstrike request.

the close air support arrived on station, the assault companies were hanging on by a thread, disorganized and battered by NKPA mortar fires and "banzai" counterattacks. Fortunately, the airstrike "came in right

over the deck1' and was decisively effective in turning back the NKPA from Knob 2. The outstanding lesson to be learned from this episode is that future battalion commanders must make a
17 4

concerted effort to ensure combat communications are working before attacks, during attacks, and that the communications plan stipulates an appropriate back-up scheme to redress combat losses. NTC and JRTC

after-action reports indicate that many battalions begin an engagement with the erroneous assumption that communications will remain intact throughout the operation. Certainly, no commander can possibly evision

every conceivable contingency, but when viewed hand-in-hand with leader location on the battlefield, subordinate knowledge of intent and initiative, and simplicity of plans and rapidity of response to unexpected developments, effective communications in combat assumes an enormous significance. Effective combat communications

is fundamental to the essential application of the battlefield operating system command, control, and communication. Next, Lynch is not described as having effective, continuous communications with his immediate superior, COL Nist. Robert Best in The Structure of a Battle remarks

that daily operational journals of the 7th Cavalry Regiment contain few entries pertaining to Lynch and 317 Cav. COL Nist is recorded as having had only one dialogue

with Lynch, and that was logged as having occurred just prior to Lynch's order to attack Knob 3. By the same

token, there is no mention of the 7th Cav Regiment commander making a visit to Lynch's command post during 175

the battle.

In the absence of solid empirical data, it is

reasonable to assume at this point that the communications link

both technical and personal

between Lynch and his In complete

regimental commander was seriously flawed.

contrast to this is the extremely professional communications enjoyed by Lynch and LTC William
A.

Harris,

appointed to command 7th Cav Regiment when Nist was relieved by MG Gay just a few days before Lynch's second DSC-winning performance. Although the weakness of the

Lynch-Nist communications link had no adverse impact on the conduct of the fighting on Hill 314, it is likewise reasonable to believe that it could have had detrimental affect on the course of the battle had the situation turned sour for 3/7 Cav. For future battalion commanders

in combat, the Lynch-Nist relationship serves as a reminder that the battalion must reauest information from su~eriors, maintain open communications with superiors, and keep su~eriorsinformed. Lastly, Lynch Stressed Simplicity during the battle for Hill 314. He kept his concept of the operation and

scheme of maneuver especially simple and basically fool-proof. He was able to do so because his battalion was well-versed on the doctrinal fundamentals of light infantry combat; the fact that his battalion was a tactical demonstration unit for the Infantry School gave Lynch a tremendous advantage on Hill 314. There is ample

evidence to point out that his subordinate leaders fully

17 6

understood the mission and his supplemental instructions during the course of the fighting. By keeping the plan to

an elementary and fundamental level of simplicity, Lynch reinforced the capability of his subordinate units to react to unforeseen circumstances with their initiative and within his intent. The salient feature of Lynch's plan of attack and the subsequent execution of that plan is virtually axiomatic: simple plans, well-grounded in the

fundamentals, facilitate simple solutions to tactical problems on a complex battlefield (conversely, complex plans tends to require complex solutions). Simplicity

gives the combat commander the much-sought-after flexibility required for success on the battlefield.
A case may be made that Lynch simplified his combat

orders by Defining Success for his subordinates: Hill 314.

capture

The actions of CPT Walker, commander of Company

L, clearly show that the assault commander knew what end-state needed to be achieved to meet the battalion commander's definition of success. The relative ease in

which NCO's assumed command of platoons and continued the mission also indicates an understandina of the mission and intent two echelons below the battalion commander. SUPERVISE Lynch achieved success in his mission not only because he had rebuilt his soldier teams but because he had effectively su~ervisedhis subordinates. 177 He did so

primarily by Commanding Forward, by Not Overi~upervising, and by Establishing Controls. In Commanding Forward, Lynch placed his command post where he could best observe the battle and, if required, influence the action. He moved near the head of He kept

the battalion column as it approached Hill 314.

his TOC close to the assault companies as they began the two-hour climb up the ridgeline to the LD. He

subsequently displaced his command post to exposed, forward locations during the critical stages of the battle. Minutes after Knob 3 was secure, Lynch was there. Lynch Did Not Over-Supervise his subordinate commanders. Once the attack was underway he demonstrated

trust and confidence in the abilities of his subordinates by givina mission-tv~e orders. Considering the tenuous

state of morale and technical competence of the battalion, Lynch was taking a substantial calculated risk by conducting the battle in this manner. But 3/7 Cav had to

prove to itself and the rest of the 1st Cav Division that it could fight. Lynch had decided to supervise the attack

in a way that would concurrently reinforce soldier team development and accomplish the mission. He kept the plan

simple, set the ultimate goals, clearly defined success, and then positioned himself where he could overwatch as his subordinate commanders took charge and employed tactics, techniques, and procedures.

When the situation became critical below Knob 2, and the battalion was in a desperate position, Lynch resisted the temptation to micromanage the action. From

his command post on Knob 1, Lynch was more involved in coordinating resources for the ground maneuver elements in this case mortar, artillery, and close air support

than in issuing instructions to the company commanders. Though supporting evidence is not adequately detailed, Lynch seems to have deleaated authority to CPT Walker to sort-out the confusion and resume the attack, on Walker's command, after the battalion stymied the NKPA counterattack below Knob 2. Even though Lynch was toying

with the idea that the battalion might not be successful in seizing Hill 314, and would have to stop after taking just Knob 2, he kept his faith in his subordinates. This

is a prominent example of Lynch's tenacity, moral courage, and ability to effectivelv supervise subordinates. Lynch effectively supervised his subordinates on Hill 314. He Established Controls, or parameters, within

which his commanders were to operate. As has been mentioned, Lynch used a level of control that did not hinder the a ~ ~ r o ~ r i a flexibility. te innovation. or initiative of his subordinates. The actions of CPT Walker and the commander of Company I, LT Fields, clearly show that Lynch had articulated operative boundaries to his assault leaders. Inside these boundaries the company

commanders could exercise initiative and were free to

179

innovate as long as their actions were conditional to Lynch's definition of success and were within his intent.
It must be remembered that the mission, enemy

dispositions, terrain, status of friendly troops, and time (METT-T) pretty much confined the subordinate commanders to operations within a long, narrow, undulating "sand-box" on Hill 314. Of course, this all played into Lynch's plan

to conduct a simple, successful attack to boost the confidence of the battalion. While the unforgiving cost of mistakes and unsafe acts in combat must always be addressed, the leadership performance indicators describing Enforce Safety Standards do not seem to take into account the real tactical measures of combat safety. In assessing how well LTC

Lynch enforced safety on Hill 314, it is more appropriate to examine "fire control measures", command and control of direct and indirect fires and close air support," and "protection of troops". The real questions at hand are

whether or not fratricide occurred on Hill 314 or whether or not Lynch

or any of his subordinates

failed to take

adequate steps to insure the protection of friendly troops from enemy direct and indirect fires. These questions are

extremely important in combat and in training exercises: "Protection'* is one of the dynamics of combat power of AirLand Battle Doctrine outlined in FM 100-5, Operations. Did Lynch enforce safety on Hill 314, in the terms which it has just been described?
180

First of all, there is

no evidence to suggest that fratricide occurred on Hill

314.

The emplacement of the Company M heavy machineguns,

echeloned left and right on the LD to cover the advancing companies with overhead fire, did not produce friendly casualties. Nor did the aggregate 60mm "mortar battery"

or the battalion 81mm mortar platoon wound friendly troops. No 3/7 Cav soldiers are recorded as having been killed or wounded by artillery fires or tactical airstrikes. Therefore, Lynch scores well on his ability

to establish adequate fire control measures and command and control direct and indirect fires and close air support. Lastly, under protection of troops, the terrain

on Hill 314 is important to the assessment. Given the barren nature of the knobs, and the fact that 3/7 Cav troops had to move astride the open, exposed spine of the ridgeline, the best that Lynch could do in the circumstances was protect his troops by launching counter-battery fires on NKPA mortars and by directing airstrikes to suppress NKPA machineguns. Without a doubt,

had Lynch failed to employ these techniques his troops would not have been protected as well as they were and the attack would have failed. TEACHING AND COUNSELING Did LTC Lynch coach and counsel subordinate leaders during the fight for Hill 314? Probably the most fair answer to this question is that Lynch did some coaching and counseling in the hours
181

before the battalion movement toward Hill 314.

Although

it may be inferred that Lynch "coached" CPT Walker during the critical firefight for Knob 2, no other examples of "coaching" of subordinates are evident. As in the Vandervoort assessment, the depth of evidence precludes sound judgement on coaching and counseling during combat. In his relentless drive to capture Hill 314, Lynch most certainly Demanded Action. When success was not

achieved he Required Corrective Action by subordinates so that he could continue to press the fight against the NKPA and maintain the momentum of the attack. Lynch seems to have been positive in his demands for action, not negative: he seems to have taken care to insure that subordinate initiative was expected and rewarded in order to meet his goal of achieving soldier team development as a product of a successful attack. As has been frequently addressed, Lynch saw the attack on Hill 314 as an important opportunity to Develop Subordinates. The attack had to succeed because the

battalion had yet to establish a combat performance success standard. Accomplishment of the Hill 314 mission would provide the battalion with the purest form of feedback on their tactical competency, morale, and leadership. Teach Skills and Train for War are SKA with a pre-combat orientation, but it is apparent that Lynch had done the right things to enable his battalion to succeed
182

in combat. Although the training experiences of his battalion are not examined in this study, it is important to note that Lynch's reliance on the fundamentals of light infantry tactics

the "blocking and tackling" of combat

was instrumental to his eventual success on Hill 314. When a "team" fails to execute the fundamentals to standard, the advantage shifts to the team who does, and the "contest" is "lost1@. This is an analogy that should not be lost on future battalion commanders. SOLDIER TEAM DEVELOPMENT The real story behind the success of 317 Cav on Hill 314 lies in the dramatic soldier team development which occurred between the battalion's failed first mission and 12 September attack. The architect of that

effective soldier team-building was LTC James H. Lynch. No commander wants to go into combat for the first time and suffer defeat or failure. But when failure or mistakes occur, there is no more critical time for the battalion commander to exert a positive, caring, and trusting influence on the unit. The commander must

quickly move in and use the mistake or failure as a develo~mentalvehicle to rebuild the confidence, cohesion, morale, and competence of the unit. job of the combat leader. LTC James H. Lynch seems to have performed that most difficult of leader tasks to near perfection. Although the source material does not provide the details
183

It is the toughest

of the "rebuilding" of 3/7 Cav after its unsuccessful debut in combat, an interpretation of several of his actions just prior to and during the battle for Hill 314 provides prominent clues to the extent of his soldier team rebuilding effort. As has been frequently stated thus far in the analysis, Lynch seems to have placed a premium on sound fundamentals and doctrinal warfighting. He appears to

have returned to the fundamentals and the basic tactical doctrine to develop his soldier teams. He used a simple plan, with the successive knobs and phase lines acting as incremental, logical mini-objectives, as a vehicle in which he could insure at least partial success of the attack. He used his entire battalion to assault each knob

to create a strong unit focus toward each progressive stage of the attack. This technique fostered unit/team

intesritv and gave all leaders and teams a common aoal. He then enabled his subordinate commanders to take the initiative, oDerate independently, and innovate within his intent while he remained in a position close to the action to overwatch his unit. As much as possible, Lynch

was Demonstrating Trust in his subordinates,

disPlavins

confidence in his unit, and Encouraging Boldness, Initiative, Innovation, and Speedy Action. It seems that the scope of Lynch's deliberate techniques for soldier team development was intentionally small and simple because he believed that the "return to
184

the basics" approach would Generate Unit Cohesion, Instill Desire and result in success. His scheme worked, and "the

emotional release" of the battalion when it attacked toward Knob 3 was a prominent indicator that he had given his battalion the means to develop itself and achieve the success it so desperately needed. The extent to which

Lynch was successful in rebuilding his soldier teams is manifest in his battalion's performance ten days later, for which it was awarded a second Presidential Unit Citation. TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL COMPETENCY LTC James H. Lynch conducted a successful combat operation on Hill 314. His "brilliantly planned and

executed attack" is especially instructive when analyzed in terms of AirLand Battle Doctrine. Lynch achieved success on Hill 314 because he Applied the Tenets of the AirLand Battle Doctrine to the battlefield. In comparison to Vandervoort's initiative.

aqilitv, depth, and svnchronization at St. Mere-Eglise, Lynch's Application of the Tenets of AirLand Battle Doctrine is more modest and understated. But the

difference between these two cases lies in the foundation of every tactical situation

the factors of METT-T.

While there may be similarities between two tactical scenarios, no two situations are exactly alike. Consequently, every situation must be sized up according to its own merits

the factors of METT-T

and the

commander must apply his tactics to the circumstances.

185

Basically, Lynch was faced with a fairly straight-forward situation where there was little call for finesse or innovation at the battalion-level and great demand for action along a narrow corridor of compressed frontage. Lynch had to conduct a daylight frontal attack straight against a well-entrenched enemy of superior strength. This must be taken into account when the analysis of Lynch's application of the tenets and imperatives of AirLand Battle reveals something less than an overwhelming demonstration of maneuver warfare. LTC Lynch demonstrated initiative during the battle for Hill 314 primarily by judicious planning and violent execution of the attack. Opting to keep the bulk of his vehicles at the blocking positions, and to send the required mortar and recoilless rifle jeeps forward before dawn, Lynch took the initiative which virtually guaranteed an unopposed battalion foot movement to Hill 314. He took

the initiative and used a "VW-shaped formation in the assault which was a departure from the formation used by
318 ~ a in v the previously unsuccessful attacks.

Most

importantly, Lynch gained and maintained the initiative on Hill 314 from the beginning of the attack to the end of the fight for Knob 3. Considering the enemy situation and

the state of his battalion, controlling the tactical initiative was a tremendous achievement.

Lynch does not demonstrate remarkable asilitv on Hill 314 unless the collective abilities of his assault echelons to reconfigure themselves for renewed attacks and Lynch's own performance in orchestrating fire support are taken into consideration. Again, there was no gradiose Lynch, not unlike a

maneuvering taking place on Hill 314.

boxer in the opening rounds of the bout, was going for a "knockout": he landed two strong "jabs" against the NKPA

at Knobs 1 and 2 and then delivered a "combination" on Knob 3 which "knocked" the NKPA "out of the ring". Lynch did not have much d e ~ t hin his operation on Hill 314. Aside from his airstrikes, which may fit the

category of vertical depth, the entire battle for Hill 314 was confined to the hill mass itself. No fire support

assets ranged beyond 600 meters from friendly positions; in fact, the bulk of the napalm, mortar rounds, and artillery rounds were adjusted well inside minimum safe distance to 3/7 Cav soldiers. Lynch was also somewhat weak in svnchronizinq available combat power against the NKPA. The

communications breakdown, which caused a late request for an airstrike, nearly doomed the battalion at Knob 2. Lynch could have employed the 3/8 Cav 4.2 inch mortar platoon at this critical time but he and/or his staff had not affected complete coordinations for their support. Likewise, the platoon of tanks from the 77th Tank Battalion could have been used in a direct-fire mode 187

against Knob 2, but remained mal-utilized for most of the battle. Because of the situation at Hill 314 confronting Lynch, the analysis of the Implementation of AirLand Battle Imperatives is not dynamic. There is no question

that Lynch insured unity of effort during the battle, and that he provided purpose, direction, and motivation to his battalion to facilitate success. He set the example by leading from the front and emplacing his command post at critical, and exposed, locations on the battlefield. His plan and his instructions to subordinates were deliberately simple. By fighting to gain, and then stubbornly maintain the initiative, Lynch seems to have done virtually all that he could to to anticinate events on the battlefield. He knew from the beginning that the NKPA had been reinforced on Hill 314 and he anticipated a tough fight to dislodge them. As a result, he anticipated the need for

heavy artillery, tank, and close air support, plus the requirement to get the battalion to the base of Hill 314 without getting chopped to pieces. Lynch concentrated his combat Dower aaainst enemy vulnerabilities through the use of deception, a sound tactical formation, and decisive fire support assets. Lynch was outnumbered when he climbed Hill 314, but his "V1'-shaped formation, which maintained pressure against the NKPA and restricted their maneuver, and his
188

application of indirect fires, and airstrikes, gave him the advantage. And once he gained the initiative over the

NKPA, he had gained an additional, and decisive, combat multiplier. Lynch really did very little, according to source material, in terms of desianatina, sustaininq, and shiftinq the main effort during the attack. This

imperative was applied almost exclusively by the assault companies when they reorganize for the successive attacks on each knob. Other than continuously applying indirect

fire to increase his combat power advantage and suppress the enemy, and move the battalion reserve closer to the action, Lynch kept the same units as his main effort throughout the course of the five-hour battle. This seems

to have been a conscious move on Lynch's part to stay with the basic plan while pressins the fisht with his two assault companies. Lynch must be credited with accomplishing his mission in minimal time and with violent execution of his plan. To defeat the enemy in five hours, and inflict 900

casualties, Lynch most certainly had to move fast. strike hard. and finish rapidly. That's what makes the

accomplishment of Lynch and 3/7 Cav all the more outstanding. To achieve this decisive victory Lynch made

the most of terrain, weather, deception. and OPSEC. He kept the signs of the impending attack to a bare minimum, and convinced the NKPA that his movement to Hill 314 was
189

no different than 8th Cav traffic in that direction. Until the LD was crossed, Lynch had succeeded in deceivinq the NKPA as to the true nature of his movements on Hill
314.

His preparatory fires fit into the deception story

because they were not significantly different from the static defensive concentrations fired by 318 Cav earlier in the week. Lynch used the terrain by his advantage by initially moving his battalion in column along a twisting two-mile route that took advantage of all available cover and concealment between his blocking positions and Hill
314.

He moved his battalion just after dawn to make use

of the heavy ground fog to obscure his march from NKPA observation. His attack time was also calculated to coincide with the time that the fog normally lifted, thereby insuring that close air support would be employed. He used the terrain to structure his

incremental attack plan so that each knob was seized in succession to afford the battalion key terrain from which to proceed toward the final objective. Lynch conserved strensth for decisive action by withholding the employment of his reserve company and by using the emvlovment of combined arms and sister services to off-set his manpower disadvantage. Though his

synchronization of mortars, artillery, tanks, and tactical air was not the model of perfection, it was decisive. The

well placed airstrike near "the shallow" on Knob 2 broke

190

the back of the NKPA resistance and Lynch rapidly exploited the opportunity with an attack on Knob 3. Finally, there is no denying the fact that Lynch completely understood the effects of battle on soldiers, units. and leaders. The narrative of LTC James H. Lynch

in the battle of Hill 314 is really the validation of this imperative.

In three weeks of combat in September, 1950, LTC

James H. Lynch led his battalion to two Presidential Unit Citations and was awarded two Distinguished Service Crosses. This is a record of continuous combat operations

worthy of emulation by future light infantry battalion commanders. DECISION MAKING Because he had a simple plan, Lynch was able to make sound. timely decisions at the lowest practical level on Hill 314. Positioned well-forward in order to observe

the decisive action, Lynch was able to accept prudent risks in subordinates and allow his subordinates to take the initiative when a~oropriateand make loaical decisions to accom~lishthe mission for which they are res~onsible. CPT Walker took the initiative and assumed command of both assault companies and ordered a second assault on Knob 2. He also made independent decisions in rearranging combat power for the second assault on Knob 2, and Lynch accepted these decisions because they were within his (the commander's) intent.
191

Lynch was an assertive leader on Hill 314.

He was

relentless in his tactics to capture Hill 314 and this assertiveness was emulated by the subordinate leaders of
3/7 Cav.

He decisivelv took action and ordered renewed

assaults or requested timely fire support to reinforce the attacks on Knobs 2 and 3. Though 30 minutes late, his

airstrike just beyond "the shallow" of Knob 2 turned the tide of the battle and enabled Walker to push the assault echelons onto Knob 3. He demonstrated the moral couraae

to stand bv his convictions when he made the tough decision to drive on to Knob 2 even though the battalion had to withstand heavy mortar fires and took many casualties. He demonstrated audacitv (darins) first by

attacking an enemy regiment on Hill 314 and then by never letting-up in his efforts to push the NKPA off the objective. Lynch relied heavily on the fundamentals of tactical doctrine in his planning and execution of his attack but he also was creative in his minor tactics. Instead of attacking as 3/8 Cav had done with a battalion column formation, Lynch used a battalion "V" formation, with a two company-level assault echelon. Whereas 3/8 Cav

had the combat power of just one company advancing along the ridgeline, Lynch's formation gave him the combat power, flexibility and security of two companies moving on a wide frontage on either side of the ridgeline. At

large, the attack was necessarily a frontal attack against 192

a well-entrenched, superior enemy force.

The reason Lynch

did not attempt a flanking maneuver to the east or west of Hill 314

a really creative plan

must be attributed to

the fact that the NKPA held Hills 570 and 660, which flanked Hill 314 to the east and west, respectively, and to the basic consideration that Lynch was commanding a battalion that was not yet prepared to conduct a sophisticated infil tration and flanking maneuver in the face of the enemy. In the final analysis, Lynch

Implemented a Plan that was simple, effective, and took rnitations and capabilities of his into account the li: battlion. Lynch does not stand out as a creative, innovative commander during the action on Hill 314, but it is abundantly evident that he Used and Expected Good Judgement and that he positioned himself to make r e s ~ o n s i b l edecisions. Throughout the battle Lynch made

decisions which eventually resulted in the successful defense of Taegu. H e seems to have done so largely on his

own, without guidance from COL Nist. PLANNING As has already been mentioned, Lynch's success on Hill 314 shows that he planned effectively. What makes

LTC Lynch's plan, so notable is that he really was not required to Adjust His Plan According to the Situation after the attack commenced. H e had Established Clear

Goals and Objectives and a Sense of Common Purpose for His 193

Unit in his simple plan.

Then, circumstances on Hill 314

actually only caused subordinate leaders to implement minimal internal changes in order to adapt to local situations.. Basically, Lynch's oraanization, course of action, and use of available resources were very sound and he was not forced by the NKPA to surrender the initiative or deviate from his plan. This is not to suggest that

Lynch's plan was the model of military perfection; rather, it was just a simple plan with a solid doctrinal foundation and a clearly articulated statement of success which was violently executed and accomplished in a minimal amount of time. In many ways it is a standard worthy of

emulation by future combat battalion commanders. USE OF AVAILABLE SYSTEMS The LPI of this competency do not readily support an analysis of Lynch's USE OF AVAILABLE SYSTEMS during the battle on Hill 314. It is categorically argumentative as

to what degree Lynch emuloved manasement technolosv on Hill 314. It is difficult to assess information

filterinq, and manaae resources (as opposed to Battlefield Operating Systems) is not an entirely appropriate SKA for combat leadership assessment. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS LTC Lynch's demonstration of professional ethics in combat was as simple and straightforward as his plan of attack. In a very low-key manner, Lynch Exemplified and

Fostered the Professional Army Ethic. 194

First and foremost, Lynch unhesitatingly Accepted Responsibility for the conduct of the battle on Hill 314. Regardless of his relationship with his regimental commander and his general shortfall in communications with COL Nist, Lynch stands out as a leader who fullv acknowledaed ownership of the failures and successes of his subordinates and accepted res~onsibilitv for his decisions on Hill 314. Operating in virtual autonomy

during the battle, Lynch was the Role Model for his subordinates. He was the senior leader on the battlefield. mission. He was responsible for execution of the

He Demonstrated Bearing, Courage, and Maturity

to such a high degree that subordinate leaders Walker

like CPT

mimicked his actions. he moved near the front of

Lynch led bv example:

the battalion column as it wound its way on foot from the blocking positions to the assembly area; he kept his command post as close to the assault companies as possible while he maintained observation of the entire battlefield; and he moved up to the final objective on Knob 3 nearly as soon as it was taken. He showed physical confidence by

sharina the hardships of enduring NKPA mortar fires with his men. He showed sinale-minded tenacity as he drove his

battalion forward from peak to peak, pressina the fiaht. He made logical decisions, based on practiced, practical judsement. He capitalized on the battalion's "moment of
195

emotional release" to catapult it forward to Knob 3 and accomplish the mission. The manner in which LTC Lynch exemplified and

f o s t e r e d on

Hill 314 is a

dramatic example of the significance of the actions displayed by a battalion commander when his unit is under fire. Lynch and 3/7 Cav were at a decisive point in their

collective organizational combat performance when they climbed Hill 314. The battalion's first experience in

combat had been a failed attack and an ignominious night withdrawal from the battlefield. Weapons and equipment

had been lost, morale had taken a beating, and the unit self-esteem had sunk as low as the Korean rice paddies. Fortunately for Lynch, 317 Cav was relegated to division reserve and got a chance to collect itself; a second tough assignment so soon after its disastrous baptizm to combat may have unhinged the "green" battalion of "Infantry School troops." As the battalion commander, Lynch had his

work cut-out for him, but he proved to be more than equal to the task. In a turn-around in performance equivalent

to a baseball manager leading his last place team to a World Series championship, Lynch led 317 Cav to a victory and a Presidential Unit Citation on 12 September 1950. It was a remarkable achievement for a battalion that had been fighting in the Korean War for only twelve days. But more importantly, it was an achievement

directly attributed to the professional Army ethics of LTC

196

James H. Lynch.

The couraqe. maturity, and intesritv he

demonstrated on Hill 314 were infectuous; his subordinate leaders acted as if they had been directly influenced by Lynch's behavior.

ENDNOTES
1
2

Clay Blair, The Forqotten War, p. 2 3 9 . Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p . 2 4 0 . Ibid., p . 2 6 2 . Ibid., p . 2 5 4 . Ibid., p . 2 5 5 .

3
4

5
6

7
8

9
1 0

11
12

13

1 4 Robert J. Best, The Structure of a Battle: Analysis of a UN-NK Action North of Taequ, Korea, September, 1 9 5 0 , p. 1 9 5 .

1 5 Ibid. LTC Lynch commanded 2d Bn, 30th Inf at Ft. Benning before it became 317 Cav.

17

Blair, p . 2 5 5 . Ibid. Ibid., p . 2 5 6 . Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 2 5 6 - 2 5 7 . Best,

p.

10
1 9 20

21
22

23
24

196.

Blair, p . 2 5 7 .

25 2 6 27
28

B e s t , p . 196 and B l a i r , p. 257.

B l a i r , p. 257. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. B e s t , p. 196. Ibid. Ibid. B l a i r , p . 255. I b i d . , P. 259. Ibid., Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. I b i d . , pp. 258-259. B e s t , p . 196. Ibid. Ibid. B l a i r , p . 259
B e s t , p. 196.
p . 258.

29 30 3 1 32 33 34 35 36 37 3s 39 40 4 1 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

B l a i r , p . 259. Ibid.

B e s t , p . 171.

I b i d . , p . 339. 3/7 Cav numbered 535 men. It f i e l d e d more combat t r o o p s t h a n e i t h e r 117 o r 2/7 Cav, and were more r e s t e d .
49

Ibid.

5 0 LTC ( l a t e r GEN) Johnson would be awarded a DSC f o r h i s g a l l a n t l e a d e r s h i p of 3/8 Cav d u r i n g t h e

horrendous fighting of 2-5 Sep 50. In that fighting, Johnson lost 400 casualties out of his 700-man battalion. A few months later, Johnson would replace Palmer as commander of 8th Cav Regiment. Blair, p. 259.
5 1

Best, p. 187. Ibid. Ibid., p. 339. Ibid., p. 169. Ibid., p. 187.

52

53
54
55
56

There is no evidence to suggest the time Lynch received his mission or how long he took to plan his operation. It is conceivable that Lynch conferred with LTC Johnson of 318 Cav after the latter had been repulsed from Hill 314, but there is no mention of this in any source. Certainly, Lynch could not have performed any reconnaissance of Hill 314 while Johnson was still battling for it. NKPA fires (noted in Best, p. 167) were so heavy in many of the locations from which Lynch may have wanted to observe Hill 314 that he would necessarily have been precluded from doing so. It is reasonable to assume that due to his service at the Infantry School, Lynch was firmly grounded in tactical doctrine and would have taken the requisite steps in troop leading procedures to insure his mission was successful. The end product speaks for itself.
57
50

Ibid., pp. 198 and 339. Ibid., pp. 168-171 and 339. Ibid. Ibid., p. 340. Best, p . 198. Ibid. and p. 340.

59
60

61 62

6"bid.
64
65

Ibid., p. 198. Ibid., p. 200. Ibid. Ibid., p. 340.

66
67

68
69

Ibid., P. 200. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 340. Blair, p. 259. Best, p. 200. Ibid., p. 198. Ibid. Ibid. and p. 197.

70

71 72 73

74
75
76

77 Ibid., p. 198. Best indicates that if it was observed U.S. movements which caused the 76mm gun to fire, the NKPA reluctance to register more intensive artillery fires on the movement indicates that they believed Lynch's column was the type of routine 8th Cav traffic they had harassed for many days.

79
80

Ibid. Ibid.

81 Ibid. Residual ground haze delayed the airstrike set for 0930.

83
84

Ibid., p. 199. Ibid., p. 198. Ibid., p. 199.

8s

8 6 Ibid., p. 202. For the purpose of flow and clarity of the narrative, the exceedingly confusing change in control measures brought on by the discovery of Company L, 8th Cav on Knob 0 is not discussed. Instead, the description of the battalion commander's plan has already incorporated this change in coordinating instructions. Even though 3/7 Cav leaders were informed of the adjustment in control measures, after-action narratives clearly indicate that the interviewees were neither conversant nor comfortable with the change. Lynch learned a valuable lesson here that he did not repeat in his

second DSC-winning performance as "Task Force Penetration" commander in the Inchon-Eighth Army link-up nine days later (see Edwin P. Hoyt, On to the Yalu, pp. 162-166.
87

Ibid., pp. 200-201.

89 Ibid. 3/7 Cav 81mm mortars were configures in "split section": two guns were set up in the battalion assembly area and two guns were positioned halfway up the ridgeline between the assembly area and the LD. The two mortars on the ridgeline took over several hundred rounds of ammunition from 3/8 Cav instead of attempting to transport its own ammo up the ridge. 90

Ibid.

9 1 Ibid., p. 199. Airstrikes had been common on the objective site for a number of days and had been viewed by the NKPA as active defense measures of the 8th Cav

92
93

Ibid. Ibid., pp. 187, 199, 203 and 204. Ibid., p. 201. Ibid. Ibid., p. 200. Ibid., p. 203.

94
95

96

97

99 Ibid., p. 203. There is no record of casualties taken in the fight for Knob 1.

103

Ibid., p. 215 Ibid.

104

106

Ibid.

107

I b i d . , p . 214. Ibid.
bid., p . 215.

108
lo9

110
111 112

I b i d . , p . 203. Ibid. I b i d . , p . 204. I b i d . , p . 227. Ibid.

113 114

11s I b i d .
116

Ibid. I b i d . , p . 229. I b i d . , p . 205. Ibid. Ibid. I b i d . , p . 231. I b i d . , p . 206. Ibid. I b i d . , p . 207. I b i d . , p . 208. Ibid. I b i d . , p . 235. I b i d . , p. 208. I b i d . , p . 233. I b i d . , p . 237. I b i d . , p . 210. Ibid. I b i d . , p . 211.

117
118

119
120

121

122
123
124 125

126
127

128
129
130

131
132

133

134 135 136 137 13s 139 I40 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155

I b i d . , p. 212. Ibid. Ibid. I b i d . , p . 239. Ibid. Ibid. I b i d . , p . 212. I b i d . , p p . 216-218. Ibid., p. 212.

I b i d . , p . 241. I b i d . , p. 212. Ibid. Ibid. I b i d . , p. 241. Ibid. I b i d . , p. 241. Ibid. I b i d . , p . 245. I b i d . , p. 341. I b i d . , p . 214. Ibid.

Department of t h e Army, General Orders No. 33, p r e s i d e n t i a l Unit C i t a t i o n f o r 317 Cav, d t d 31 March

1952.
156 157 158 159

Ibid. Ibid.

B e s t , p . 243.
B l a i r , p. 259.

160 161 162

Best, P.

6.

B l a i r , p . 259

Ibid.

CHAPTER 6 LTC HAROLD G. MOORE, 14-16 NOVEMBER 1965

In a nationwide address on 28 July 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced "I have today ordered to Vietnam the airmobile division ..."I The 1st Cavalry

Division (Airmobile), activated on 16 June 1965 after an extensive period of experimentation and training in the fledgling airmobility concept, was to be the U.S. Army's first division-size unit to deploy to Vietnam.2 Within

90 days of its activation order, the 1st Cavalry Division closed into its base camp at An Khe, prepared to conduct combat operations.3 At the time of the arrival of the 1st Cav Division at An Khe, the North Vietnamese government was putting the finishing touches on its "Dong Xuan (Winter-Spring Campaign) of 1965-66." The campaign called for an "army (1) destroy

corps" to achieve four specific objectives:

all U.S. Special Forces camps in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, thereby removing the long-standing impediment to North Vietnamese Army (NVA) operations; (2) seize the city of Konturn, site of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 24th Special Tactical Zone headquarters;
(3) destroy the Le Thanh District Regional and Popular

Force (RFPF) headquarters at Thanh Binh, a village mid-way between Pleiku City and Duc Co; and (4) seize Pleiku City, the site of the ARVN I 1 Corps headquarters and the 206

location of the ARVN reserves for all of the western plateau.' By 12 October 1965, BG Man's 32d and 33d Regiments

had completed the planned infiltration from North Vietnam to the Field Front assembly area at ANTA Village. Sited

on the eastern slope of the Chu Pong Massif, a 450-squarekilometer mountain mass just inside the Cambodian border, ANTA enabled Man's regiments to stage at a location virtually equidistant from the campaign's first targets the Special Forces camps at Plei Me and Duc Co.

With the

32d and 33d Regiments assembled, and the 66th Regiment due to arrive in late October or early November, BG Man opted to initiate his campaign in mid-October with a two regiment attack on Plei Me. Located twenty-five miles

south of Pleiku City, this garrison of Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) troops guarded the southern flank of Pleiku City

Man's real objective

and

overwatched the principal NVA infiltration route from Cambodia. Man's attack on Plei M e would directly result

in the momentous clash at LZ X-Ray on 14 November 1965.5 At 2300, 19 October, the 33d Regiment began the Field Front's three phase attack on Plei Me. Hammering

the camp with intensive mortar, small arms, and recoilless rifle fire, the commander of the 33d Regiment sent barely enough NVA riflemen and sappers in the assault to make the Montagnard defenders believe they would soon be overrun. The 33d Regiment was applying just enough human pressure 207

to "lure" a relief column from Pleiku City for the second phase of the operation, the 32d Regiment's arnbush.6 However, the anticipated relief column did not present itself as rapidly as expected. Unable to close

the trap, the 4th Field Front limped back to the Chu Pong staging area on 25 October. BG Man's first offensive had

been repulsed, with severe losses.' The 1st Cav Division had initially conducted restricted reinforcement missions in support of the ARVN relief of Plei Me. On 26 October GEN Westmoreland visited

the forward command post of the division's 1st Brigade and after a short conference with MG Larsen, First Field Force Commander, and MG H.W.O. Kinnard, 1st Cav Division Commander, Westmoreland dramatically changed the scope of the 1st Cav mission. Instead of reinforcing ARVN I1 Corps

operations, the 1st Cav now had the freedom of unlimited offensive operations to seek out and destroy the remains of the NVA 4th Field F r o n t . 9 r d e r e d by Westmoreland to conduct a classic cavalry pursuit of the retreating NVA, Kinnard dispatched LTC Harlow Clark's 1st Brigade into the Ia Drang Valley on 28 October.9 The Ia Drang Valley consisted of about 2500-squarekilometers of "no-man's-land". Thickly jungled, with

trees 100 feet high, and "open" areas covered by elephant grass almost six feet high, the valley contained no passable roads and no inhabitants. Bordered on the west

by the Chu Pong Massif, the valley was viciously cross208

compartmented by the Ia Drang, Ia Meur, and Ia Tac rivers which flowed from northeast to southwest. Along the Ia

Drang River, within the vicinity of the Chu Pong, the area was eerie, haunting, and "spooky beyond beliefW.l0 Blazing daily heat and frigid night temperatures produced sinister, contrary mists which kept the best of soldiers "perpetually and increasingly on edgel'.ll LTC Clark's 1st Brigade fanned out to the west of Plei Me, operating on a broad front in the hope of regaining contact with BG Man's illusive 32d and 33d Regiments. During the last two days of October, Clark's

troopers began to find and engage the NVA in frequent but widely separated contacts.12 MG Kinnard was generally satisfied with the results of 1st Brigade's operations in pursuit of the NVA. LTC Clark's troopers "had been flying and fighting continuously for over two weeks", so Kinnard pulled the brigade out of the line for a few days' rest and sent in COL Tim Brown's 3d Brigade to continue the pursuit.13 COL Tim Brown's "Garry Owen" brigade consisted of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Cavalry, and the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, attached from 2d Brigade. LTC But

Harold G. Moore commanded 117 Cav, LTC Robert A. McDade commanded 217 Cav, and LTC Robert B. Tully commanded 215 Cav.14 COL Brown deployed these three fresh infantry

battalions on 10 November in vigorous saturation

patrolling south and southeast of Plei Me, in accordance with MG Kinnard's instructions.l~ When Brown's patrols failed to make contact with the NVA, MG Kinnard directed his 3d Brigade commander to turn westward toward the Cambodian border. MG Larsen's

Field Force intelligence staff believed that the NVA were still concentrating along the Cambodian border. Brown

opted to reinvestigate the heavily jungled Ia Drang valley at the base of the Chu Pong Massif, a spot where previous combat had occurred but where no follow-up ground sweep had been conducted.16 To Brown this location might

contain the staging area for the 32d Regiment, so far unaccounted for after Plei Mei.17 In addition, Brown

had seen "a big red star" on the division G-2 situation map indicating a possible assembly area for NVA regiments infiltrating through Cambodia.18 Brown also knew this

site had been a Viet Minh bastion during the French Indochina days and it was likely to be "recycled" for the current NVA operations.19 Meanwhile, BG Chu Huy Man was also making an estimate of the situation. Interpreting the change of

Kinnard's brigades as the beginning of a 1st Cav Division withdrawal from the central highlands, BG Man decided to resume operations.20 Though he had failed with his

initial lure-and-ambush tactics against Plei Me, and had incurred heavy losses, BG Man decided to conduct a second assault against Plei Me. This time, he would employ the 210

remnants of the 33d Regiment with the 32d Regiment and the slightly bloodied 66th Regiment in a coordinated, division-size attack on Plei Me on 16 November.21 By 11 November BG Man had staged his assault echelons in the Ia Drang Valley. The depleted 33d

Regiment had formed into a single, composite battalion and was assembled in the valley between the Ia Drang river and Hill 542, the most prominent peak of the Chu Pong mountains. Thirteen kilometers to the west, along the

northern bank of Ia Drang was the formidable 32d Regiment. The 66th Regiment, spoiling for a fight, had

its three battalions sited astride the Ia Drang River just a few kilometers west of the 33d Regiment. One 120-man

mortar battalion and one 14.5mm antiaircraft gun battalion were still infiltrating on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia, but were due to close in to the Field Front assembly area before 16 November.22 Around midnight, 12 November, the NVA "conveniently confirmed their continued presence west of Plei MeW23mortaring COL Brown's brigade command post at the Catecka Tea Plantation, a few miles southwest of Pleiku. Although the attack proved inconclusive,24 was shaken up by the close call. Brown's CP

This action added

impetus to Brown's decision to move a battalion into the fifteen-square-kilometer, oval shaped zone named Area Lime

the foot of the Chu Pong Massif.25

At 1700 on 13 November COL Brown met with LTC Harold G. Moore, Commander of 1/7 Cav, at the Company A, 1/7 Cav command post about seven kilometers south of Plei Me. Brown ordered LTC Moore to execute an airmobile

assault into AREA LIME and conduct search-and-destroy operations around the Chu Pong Massif from 14 November through 15 November.26 Brown's guidance to Moore

included the precaution of keeping rifle companies within supporting distance of each other during the search and destroy mission because of the great possibility of landing in the middle of a NVA assembly area. Brown

allocated sixteen of the brigade's twenty-four helicopters for Moore's insertion. Fire support would come from two

105mm howitzer batteries of 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, firing from LZ Falcon, nine kilometers east of the Chu Pong mountains. Lastly, Brown shared with Moore his

concern that 1/7 had yet to be tested in battle against a large enemy force.2' After receiving his brigade commander's guidance, Moore returned to his command post at Plei Me to issue warning orders and conduct a careful, doctrinally sound mission analysis.28 Working with his 5 - 3 , Captain

Gregory "Matt" Dillon, Moore began a thorough map reconnaissance of AREA LIME and tentatively selected three potential landing zones he named "Tango", "Yankee", and "X-Ray"
29

For the tactics of this operation, Moore decided to deviate from the normal techniques employed thus far by the 1st Cav Division. Instead of landing each company in

a separate LZ, he opted to land his entire battalion in one LZ and conduct the search and destroy mission from that secure LZ. This plan was simple, took into account

COL Brown's guidance about enemy contact, and provided Moore with enough flexibility to react to unforeseen circumstances. To find an LZ large enough to accommodate

ten helicopters at one time, Moore arranged for a first light leaders' reconnaissance of the tentatively selected LZ's at first light on 14 November. This would be Moore

followed up by an operations order at 0830.30

radioed a warning order to his company commanders, issuing instructions for Companies
A

and C to recall their

saturation patrols and concentrate for pick-up for the air assault. Company B, having just spent a sleepless night

securing COL Brown's CP, would be shifted from Catecka Plantation to Moore's CP at Plei Me to begin the operation. Company commanders would fly with Moore on the

leaders' recon at dawn to confirm the battalion LZ.31 By 2200 Moore had supervised the accomplishment of as many of the details of the operation as could be done prior to the reconnaissance. He had two primary concerns. First, his mission in the Chu Pong area would

be conducted with his battalion at only two-thirds strength.32

1/7 had been hard hit by malaria and

213

individual rotations back to the United States. Fortunately, almost all of Moore's twenty officers going into the operation had been with the battalion since its air assault testing days at Ft. Benning.33 Second,

Moore wanted to make sure that every available fire support asset was coordinated to back up the air assault. Air Force close air support, air cav aerial rocket gunships, and field artillery preparations would give him the combat power advantage if he ran into big trouble. 14 November dawned bright and clear and promised to be another typically scorching day in the Central Highlands.34 Company B had been repositioned from CH-47 Chinooks were

Catecka to Plei Me by 0630.

consolidating Batteries A and C of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery at LZ Falcon to support 1/7 Cav. LTC Moore

finished his briefing on the mission and flight route of the recon party and the group boarded two UH-1D Hueys. "Few units that have a rendezvous with destiny have an inkling of their fate until the historical moment touches them. So it was with the 1/7 Cav on the morning of 14 Twenty-three kilometers to the west,

November."35

elements of the NVA 32d Regiment uncoiled from their base camps at the foot of the Chu Pong Mountains and began moving east. The 66th Regiment and the remnants of the

33d Regiment remained in ANTA, preparing to move on Plei Me the next d a ~ . ~ 6 Moore's rendezvous with destiny was only two hours away. 214

The leaders recon revealed that only two of Moore's three map-selected LZs were large enough to land a platoon and a half in the initial lift. Deciding on LZ X-Ray as

the tentative battalion LZ, Moore directed the scout section leader from C Troop, 9th Cavalry, to conduct another over-flight to confirm LZ X-Ray. This time, the

reconnaissance would be at low-level and would search the slopes of the Chu Pong mountains for NVA.3' Back by 0 8 5 5 , the scout section reported LZ X-Ray as capable of accepting ten UHls in trail formation. Also, the section had spotted communications wire running along an east-west trail a few hundred meters north of the

LZ.

Moore decided on LZ X-Ray as the primary battalion

LZ, with Yankee and Tango as alternates to be employed only with his permission.38 Hal Moore was well aware that he could be in a serious firefight shortly after landing.39 Consequently, he integrated a deception plan to keep the NVA guessing as to which of the three likely LZs he would land. Briefing his operations order to his major

subordinates around 0 9 0 0 , Moore outlined his scheme of maneuver. First, the 21st Artillery would fire an eight

minute divnrsionary preparation on LZs Yankee and Tango to deceive the enemy. The 105mm batteries would then shift

to LZ X-Ray and fire a twenty minute preparation, concentrating on the slopes of a finger that extended from the Chu Pongs just to the northwest of LZ X-Ray. 215 Lifting

fires at H minus one minute, the artillery would enable the aerial rocket gunships to place fires on the northern and western borders of the LZ, closest to the mountains, and on the tree line that sliced into LZ X-Ray from the north. With the lift aircraft about to touch down the gunship escorts of Company A, 229th Aviation Battalion would lace the elephant grass of LZ X-Ray with rocket and machinegun fires.40 Company B, commanded by CPT John D. Herren, would be the initial assault company, going in with sixteen helicopters right behind the gunship prep. Herren's unit The

would quickly secure the LZ for the follow-on lifts. rest of the landing plan called for Company
A,

commanded

by CPT Ramon A. "Tony" Nadal, to be the second unit to land. Company C, commanded by CPT Robert Xi. Edwards, was CPT Louis R. LeFebvre's

third in the order of movement.

Company D would the last unit into the LZ.41 Once into the LZ, Companies and search north and northeast.
A

and B would move out

Company A would move on

the right of Herren's company. Company C, the battalion reserve, would assume Herren's LZ security mission and would be prepared to move north and northwest to search the'foothills of the Chu Pongs once Company D landed. LeFebvre's Company D would form the "mortar battery" on LZ X-Ray. Companies A, B, C would bring in one 81mm mortar each and a maximum ammo load and place their guns under Company D control. Priority of fires, all platforms,
21 6

would be to Company B initially for the air assault, then to Company A for the sweep to the west.42 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery commenced its preparatory fires at 1017. At 1030, Herren's four Moore was going in with

platoons lifted off from Plei Me. the initial assault element.

He felt confident of the His battalion was

prospects for success on the operation.

part of "the best trained, best disciplined division to go into combat since the Airborne Divisions of WWII."43 knew he had created a strong, cohesive unit. He had He

encouraged unit cohesion by directing his lieutenants to seek out the NCOs who were Korean War combat veterans to learn as much as possible from these experts. Likewise,

his NCO's were charged to help the new officers. Now it was time for the payoff. The twenty minute

artillery prep concluded with a white phosphorous round (WP), and this signalled the approach of the aerial rocket gunships. The formation of sixteen helicopters carrying

LTC Moore and the first lift of Company B were on "short final approach" as the gunships expended half their ordnance and then orbited near the LZ, on call for another run. Moore glanced out of his chopper as these gunships

pounded the LZ and "had a renewed instinct that contact was coming."44 In a matter of seconds the assault ships Snap firing at likely enemy positions

flared for landing.

on the landing zone, Moore led the first lift of Company B across LZ X-Ray . 4
5

Once on the ground, Moore saw LZ X-Ray from a different perspective. The terrain offered both The

advantages and disadvantages to the assault troopers.

landing zone was covered with hazel-colored elephant grass over five feet high, ideal for concealing crawling soldiers but detrimental to good connnunications between defensive positions.46 oval-shaped LZ. Sparse scrub brush ringed the

A grove of trees in the middle of the LZ

forced the air assault aircraft to land in two side-by-side mini-landing zones.47 Numerous anthills

which dotted the LZ were excellent cover for crew served weapons positions.48 The western edge of the LZ was

creased by a waist-high, dry creek bed, a potential site for a defensive position.49 The trees along the western

and northeastern edges of the LZ signalled the beginning of the slopes of the Chu Pong Massif. The mountain,

thickly vegetated, cast an imposing shadow across the LZ. A fight to extricate the NVA from the mountain, which rose five hundred meters above the LZ, would be a physically punishing mission.so As the lift helicopters began their thirty minute turn-around flight to Plei Me for the second serial of the battalion, Herren's troopers implemented Moore's new technique for securing the LZ. Retaining the balance of

his force on the clump of trees in the center of LZ as a reaction force, Herren directed his 1st Platoon to sweep the tree line in squad size patrols.51
218

This

technique would enable Herren to make contact with the enemy with a small, economical force and then pile on with a heavy maneuver element. Moore saw that the air assault "Although not visible,"

was running smoothly so far.

Moore recalled, "the enemy could be sensed. feeling he was definitely there."52 The enemy was there.

I had the

On the morning of 1 4

November, BG Man's division-size force had initiated its movement toward Plei Me for the scheduled 16 November strike on the Special Forces camp. troopers caught BG Man by surprise. ANTA, the base camp The arrival of Moore's The Chu Pong Massif

was considered to be free from U.S.

attack. With Moore right in the middle of the 66th Regiment's assembly area, Man immediately radioed the lead elements of the 32d Regiment to turn back. As he readied

the 66th Regiment to pounce on the small Air Cav Division force, Man sent word to the H-15 Main Force Viet Cong Battalion, operating south of the Chu Pongs, for assistance.53 By noon, Man intended to hit Moore with

two battalions of the 66th Regiment, coming down from the mountain side, and the composite battalion of the 33d Regiment, who would attack from their positions just west of LZ X-Ray .54 As the squads of 2LT Alan E. Deveny's 1st Platoon, Company B swept the perimeter of the LZ, Moore established his command post in the center of the LZ at the edge of the grove of trees. Moore selected a giant anthill, ten
219

feet high and twelve feet round which had withstood the artillery prep fires.55 From this central location,

Moore could command his companies as they fanned-out from the LZ and he could control incoming air assault lifts as they approached LZ X-Ray. At 1120, with Company A enroute to the LZ, CPT Herren notified Moore that an NVA soldier had been captured by 2LT Deveny's platoon in the brush just fifty meters off the LZ. Moore immediately moved to Herren's

location with his intelligence officer, CPT Metsker, and his Montagnard interpreter, Mr. Nik. The prisoner, a

deserter or straggler, announced that there were three NVA battalions on the Chu Pong mountains "anxious to kill Americans."56 To Moore, this piece of news confirmed

his belief that the "long jump" executed by his battalion, instead of the "short airmobile moves" which would have inched toward the NVA, had been "the way to go for the enemy". "If he had been near Plei Me on the 13th," Moore

later reasoned, "and moved west, I estimated we would hit him. "5 7 Moore was "elated" and "exhilarated" by the news that contact with the NVA was imminent.50 But the

reality of being struck by an enemy at least three times the strength of 1/7 Cav caused Moore to turn his attention back to the air assault operation. He now had to get the

rest of his battalion quickly and safely into LZ X-Ray.

To Moore, additional security precautions involving the force currently on the ground would be imperative. Moore then gave CPT Herren new instructions for Company B. Due

to the close proximity of the NVA, a buffer needed to be established between the Chu Pongs and the LZ. Moore

directed Herren to intensify his reconnaissance efforts outside the LZ and to be prepared to assume the Company C mission of exploring the terrain at the foot of the mountains. In the event Herren was ordered to switch to

the Company C assignment, he would orient his attention on two pieces of key terrain: the finger which emanated from

the slopes of the mountains and pointed at the heart of the LZ; and the draw northwest of the LZ.59 As Moore was issuing these instructions to Herren CPT Tony Nadal's Company A landed on the LZ. When CPT Nada? found Moore on the LZ, the battalion commander directed him to assume the Company B mission of LZ security until Company C arrived. Moore then ordered CPT

Herren to execute his "be prepared" mission and proceed toward the finger at the base of the Chu Pong mountains.60 Other than the incident with the deserter, things remained quiet around LZ X-Ray. At 1220, Herren began his

movement to the northwest, with 1st and 2d Platoons abreast and 3d Platoon in reserve. The troopers of

Company B "were tensed for an approaching fight."61

At 1245, Deveny's 1st Platoon ran headlong into elements of the 66th Regiment who were hurrying down the mountain.62 The lead elements of the NVA regiment,

about platoon-size, quickly pinned down the 1st Platoon and began placing withering small arms fire on Deveny's front and flanks. Deveny immediately contacted Herren and reported he was taking heavy casualties and needed help.63 Herren directed 2LT Herrick to move his 2d Platoon to regain contact with 1st Platoon and relieve the pressure against the right flank of Deveny's platoon. Herrick got underway but almost instantly ran into a squad of NVA who were headed for LZ X-Ray. As the NVA reversed

course and headed back up the mountain side, Herrick gave chase. In a matter of minutes, Herrick's 2d Platoon was The NVA

engulfed by enfilade fire from the right front.

fire was especially vicious and included mortars and rockets . 6 4 Herren now had a new situation on his hands. Having just ordered Deal's 3d Platoon to go to beveny's aid, it became apparent that the enemy was concentrating its efforts in an attempt to decimate Herrick. Herren

called Moore with a situation report and then, as his lone

8 1 m mortar fired all of the forty rounds that were

brought in on the air assault, he ordered Deveny to await Deal's arrival and then conduct a movement to reach Herrick.65

At 1330, the third troop lift arrived at the LZ with the last platoon of Company A and the first elements of CPT Robert H. Edwards' Company C. The lifts were now

fragmented into smaller serials of four to six aircraft because of the scattered pick-up zones of the follow-on companies.66 A steady rain of NVA mortar rounds began In the

to "feel out" the battalion's defenses on the LZ.

midst of "geysers of red dirt" and "the thick pall of dust and smoke,"67 Moore issued instructions to his A and C

Company commanders. Nadal would move instantly to assist Herren. He would do so by sending one platoon out

immediately to push through to Herrick's isolated unit, then move with the remainder of Company A to secure Herren's open flank. CPT Edwards would take what he had

of Company C and assume Nadal's previous mission of LZ security. Edwards' force would strongpoint positions

within the treeline to the west, southwest, and south of the LZ. Edwards would also cover Nadal's left flank as Moore was taking

Company A moved out to help Herren.68

a colossal risk by sending his only reserve the western end of the perimeter.

Edwards

to

Moore gambled that in

order to stave off the mounting threat from the northwest, he could take a chance with LZ security until the'next troop lift arrived. Unknown to Moore, the thin defensive

screen of the LZ had already been breached by 66th Regiment scouts.69

About the time Nadal and Edwards moved out on their respective missions, Moore's CP came under fairly heavy small arms and automatic weapons fires. Moore promptly radioed Dillon, flying above the LZ in the command and control helicopter, to request and coordinate artillery, aerial rocket artillery, and close air support around the LZ. Moore directed Dillon to arrange for fires to be concentrated intially on the lower slopes of the Chu Pongs. On order, fires were to be directed "to ring the Priority of fires would

LZ with a curtain of steel."70

go to units in contact. A few minutes later, U.S. Air Force AlE's from Pleiku were dropping five hundred pound bombs on the Chu Pongs. Artillery fires impacted just as quickly but it took some time before the artillery forward observers in the rifle companies could "walk" the rounds close enough to their beleaguered perimeters to be effective. Simultaneous with Moore's call for fire, COL

Brown arrived "on station", orbitting above the LZ. It was apparent to Moore that he had tripped a hornet's nest and that the NVA were out to destroy him. While the situation confronting Moore was serious, it was by no means desperate. At the time, Moore did not feel "The PAVN

compelled to request reinforcement from Brown.

(Peoples' Army of Vietnam) were reacting violently," Moore recalled. "And we were trying our best to retain and

maintain the momentum of our air assault and tactical

224

initiative by carrying the fight to the enemy off the LZ while simultaneously keeping him away from it."7l Meanwhile, Nadal was maneuvering to assist Company B's imperilled platoons. 2LT Walter J. Marm's 2d Platoon

soon linked up with 2LT Deal's 3d Platoon of Company B. Shortly afterward, a sharp firefight broke out. Marm and

Deal had apparently uncovered the NVA force which had initially outflanked Herrick and was now enroute to envelope all of Herren's unit. After a brisk exchange of

gunfire which brought casualties to both sides, the NVA broke contact and headed toward the dry creek bed in an attempt to include Marm in the encirclement.72 In the dry creek bed behind Marm the company-size
NVA

pincer movement ran straight into Nadal's follow-up 2LT Robert E. Taft's 3d Platoon engaged the The

platoons.

enemy in extremely savage and close-range combat.

remnants of the NVA company then broke away from Company A and continued their movement toward the LZ.73 As the firefight escalated in the creek bed, the first eight UH-1s of the battalion's fifth lift touched down on the LZ. This lift carried the remainder of

Edwards' Company C and CPT Louis R. LeFebvre and his lead elements of Company D. The LZ was under such tremendously

heavy enemy fire, Moore waved off the second set of eight aircraft . 7 4 Company C was next to feel the wrath of the NVA attack. Edwards now had all of his troops except three 225

aircraft loads which were diverted from the LZ by the battalion commander. Following Moore's instructions,

Edwards had quickly moved his platoons into a blocking position adjacent to CPT Nadal's right flank. At this time, Company A's firefight in the creek bed had reached full fury. Edwards had just completed the positioning of

his platoons when he was attacked by the NVA company which was attempting to outflank Company A and overrun the LZ. The North Vietnamese soldiers, wearing full combat gear (unlike the Viet Cong) and extensive camouflage, were stopped in their tracks, with heavy losses.?s The time was 1400. Moore's timely decision to position Edwards south of Nadal rather than north had thwarted the enemy attempt to overrun the LZ. In shifting

Edwards to Nadal's flank, Moore exposed the rear of his battalion. To consolidate his security on the LZ, Moore

ordered Edwards to tie-in and coordinate with CPT LeFebvre and Company D to his left. The perimeter around LZ X-Ray

now extended south and southeast into the brush.76 When Edwards linked-up with Company D, he found that LeFebvre had been evacuated with severe wounds. Staff Sergeant George Gonzales, leader of the battalion anti-tank platoon, had assumed command of Company D. Edwards got Moore's permission to move Gonzales into a gap on Company C's left flank.77 Also, Edwards learned that

the battalion's mortars had not yet been consolidated according to the operations order.
226

He then received

Moore's approval to establish a mortar "battery" under the operational control of his mortar sergeant until the battalion mortar platoon leader and fire direction center air-landed. In short order Edwards' battery was firing in Unfortunately, the noise,

support of units in contact.

smoke, and confusion around the LZ precluded company forward observers from adjusting effective fire on enemy targets. Still, Edwards' clear thinking gave the

battalion an additional fire support "organization" for the afternoon combat.'* By about 1500 an uneasy lull had set in around LZ X-Ray. Moore took this opportunity to call for the last elements of his battalion to air-land. Judging that a

small section of the eastern edge of the LZ would be the most secure site for the next lift to touch down, Moore brought in the last squads of Company C and the reconnaissance platoon of Company D. Moore personally directed this landing and all future helicopter approaches to the LZ.79 The temporary lull was shattered when the

66th Regiment's anti-aircraft company fired its 12.5mm heavy machine guns on the approaching helicopters. The

troopers unloaded without casualties, but two choppers were disabled.80 Moore reconstituted his battalion

reserve from these fresh troops.81 As concerned as he was with getting all of his battalion into the fight at LZ X-Ray, Moore was equally aware of the need to evacuate his more seriously wounded
227

troopers.

The battalion casualty collection point had

been set up not far from Moore's CP near the center of the LZ. In the early afternoon, the battalion surgeon and

four aidmen landed on the LZ to take charge of casualty treatment and evacuation. Rather than expose unarmed

medical evacuation helicopters to the brutal NVA anti-aircraft fire, Moore personally arranged with the lift helicopter commander for departing choppers to quickly load wounded for a short ride to LZ Falcon, a secure LZ where medevac birds could land. This

arrangement "worked exceptionally well and did a great deal to bolster morale."s2 Based on the situation reports from his company commanders, Moore felt reasonably certain his battalion was up against 500-600 NVA regulars. Taken in the context

of the pre-operation intelligence picture, the possibility existed that at least two more NVA battalions were converging on LZ X-Ray. Moore realized it was time to ask for help. Shortly after 1500 Moore called COL Brown and

requested reinforcement with at least one additional rifle company . a 3 COL Brown was firmly convinced that the NVA were closing in on LZ X-Ray to annihilate Moore. In

anticipation of a request for help from Moore, Brown had alerted LTC Robert B. Tully's 2/7 Cav to prepare to go to Moore's aid. When Moore's call for a rifle company

reached him, Brown responded by directing the attachment

228

of Tully's Company B, 2/7 Cav to Moore, effective 1528. Company B, commanded by CPT Myron Diduryk, would air assault into LZ X-Ray immediately after it was assembled at Catecka Plantation. Tully would then assemble the rest of his battalion as rapidly as possible at LZ Victor, three kilometers southeast of X-Ray. Brown's plan was for

Tully to conduct a foot movement from LZ Victor commencing at first light on 15 November. Tully's lead elements Brown

would conceivably reach Moore by mid-morning.

wanted Tully to move overland in daylight instead of using helicopters at night because he "didn't relish the idea of moving a steady stream of helicopters into an LZ as hot as X-Ray". In addition, Brown felt "a foot move would be

unobserved and the battalion might come in behind the enemy ."a
4

At 1600 Moore had his full battalion on the ground.05 His troopers had thus far succeeded in Moore

defeating the NVA attempts to overrun the LZ.

conceded that the NVA were aggressive, well-trained, and highly motivated. He also saw that they could shoot But

extremely well and were not afraid to die.06

Herrick's 2d Platoon of Company B was still isolated within the sea of disciplined, well-led NVA. Moore had to

rescue this lone platoon before it was completely wiped out . 8 7 Moore was going to try one more attempt to reach Herrick before dark. Now that Marm's 1st Platoon, Company 229

A, had linked-up with Deveny's 1st Platoon and Deal's 3d Platoon, Company B, Moore directed this force to withdraw back down the finger to the dry creek bed. The withdrawal

would be covered by the battalion mortar battery plus artillery fires. The platoons would withdraw to the creek bed with all dead and wounded troopers. At the creek bed,

Companies A and B would prepare to conduct a coordinated attack to reach Herrick's platoon.aa What Moore did not know, but could surely expect, was that Herrick's platoon was making its last, desperate stand. During.the course of the afternoon, the NVA maintained relentless pressure against Herrick's tiny perimeter. The platoon chain of command had been mowed

down, virtually one after the other, until control rested in the hands of the 3d Squad Leader, Staff Sergeant Clyde

E. Savage.89
Within minutes of assuming command of the beleaguered platoon, Savage had called for and adjusted artillery concentrations to ring the perimeter. He

continued walking the highly accurate artillery fires toward his position until the rounds impacted as close as 20 meters from the platoon. With seven effectives out of

the original twenty-seven-man platoon, Savage and his group continued to exact a deadly toll on two NVA companies whose attention was solely concentrated on the reduction of Savage's "Bastogne in Microcism."9o These

two NVA companies never joined in the attacks against LZ 230

X-Ray.

Had they been involved in the flanking maneuvers

around the LZ, it is conceivable that Moore's thinly stretched perimeter defenses would not have held out against the additional combat power. Also, there is some

question as to why the NVA "concentrated sources all out of proportion to the strength of the tiny American outpost."9L The answer is found in the NVA

"lure-and-ambush" tactic; the NVA were maintaining constant pressure on Herrick's platoon, just like it had a Plei Me, while an ambush, or assault force, attempted to destroy Moore's "relief column". Moore's two company coordinated attack would use the dry creek bed as the line of departure and would be preceded by artillery and aerial rocket fire. At 1620 the two company attack commenced. The artillery prep, designed to secure the front of the attacking force from ambush, was impacting too far in front of the companies. Not 50 meters beyond the creek bed, the attack ran into a hail of fire from NVA who had infiltrated and had dug themselves into "spider holes" and anthills and had tied themselves in trees. Blending perfectly with the

honey-colored elephant grass, the khaki-uniformed NVA the "ambush" segment of the lure-and-ambush tactic inflicted severe damage on the assault companies.92

Nadal realized that his company was now postured in an extremely vulnerable position, susceptible to being systematically reduced by the NVA ambush force.
231

All of

Nadal's platoon leaders were dead or wounded; his artillery forward observer and his communication NCO had been killed right next to him. The attack had stalled It was just a few

after an advance of only 150 meters.

minutes past 1700 and the shadows were already lengthening on the eastern side of the Chu Pongs. Accepting the fact

that he would not be able to break through to Herrick before it got dark, Nadal called Moore and requested permission to withdraw to the dry creek bed.,' Monitoring Nadal's call to Moore, Herren had reached the same conclusion about his chances for success. By 1700, Herren had lost 30 casualties, and his

depleted company had barely moved beyond the creek bed before it was halted by the stinging NVA fire. In spite

of his unit's collective desire to rescue their isolated bretheren, Herren realized it was pointless to continue to send his understrength platoons against a dug in enemy .94 Moore made the tough decision to withdraw the exposed companies. In reality, Moore had little choice.

His battalion was fighting three separate engagements: one force was defending the LZ, one platoon was cut-off and encircled, and two companies were attacking to retrieve the isolated platoon. Moore had to arrive at a

coherent scheme of maneuver or risk being defeated in detail by the overwhelming numbers of NVA. Analyzing his

situation, Moore rationalized that the security of the LZ

232

was paramount to the survival of his battalion while it fought outnumbered. He anticipated that other NVA

battalions were converging on LZ X-Ray to destroy him, sometime after dark or at first light the next morning. Instead of playing into the NVA "lure-and-ambush" tactics of attrition, Moore decided to consolidate his base at the LZ. Preparations would be made for a night attack or a Since

first-light attack to relieve the besieged platoon. he still had communications with SSG Savage, Moore

contemplated ordering Savage to exfiltrate back to the LZ. Though a defensive stand painfully reminded Moore of

his Korean War experiences at Pork Chop Hill, Triangle Hill, and Old Baldy, he ordered Nadal and Herren to withdraw their companies to the dry creek bed. Both units

would pull back under cover of an artillery smoke screen, bringing their dead and wounded with them.95 Even though Nadal's request to withdraw had been a simple, common sense approach to the situation, the actually movement promised to be extremely difficult. Both companies were under fire, and were having a tough time conducting the hazardous retrograde maneuver. Moore

called for the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery at LZ Falcon to fire smoke rounds to mask the withdrawal of the two units. When he was notified by the battalion fire support officer that no smoke rounds were available, Moore was faced with another tough decision. He recalled from his Korean War days that white phosphorous (WP) rounds often 233

provided the same heavy concentration of smoke when they detonated as did the conventional smoke shells. If WP was

fired "danger close" to friendly troops, the burning particles of phosphorous would wound the troopers as well as the enemy. Given the gravity of the situation, and the

demonstrated accuracy of the artillery up to this point, Moore decided to go with WP fires as close to the companies as possible. After two volleys, and no friendly

casualties, both companies made it back to LZ X-Ray.96 From a distance, LZ X-Ray "resembled a heavy ground fog with dancing splotches of colors", produced by the exploding WP rounds and "the discharge of dyed smoke grenades . " 9
7

At 1705, as Moore was orchestrating the withdrawal, the 2d Platoon and the command group of Company B, 2/7 Cav landed at the LZ. Amidst cheers from Moore's troopers on

the LZ, CPT Diduryk dramatically reported to Moore for instructions. Minutes later the remainder of Diduryk's 120-man company had closed in on the LZ. Moore initially At about

placed Diduryk's company in battalion reserve.

1800, with Companies A and B back within the perimeter,

Moore directed Diduryk to detach one platoon to Company C to assist Edwards, who had been holding the largest sector of the battalion perimeter. At about 1830, Moore decided

he would need more combat power on the perimeter than in reserve. Consequently, he elected to use his recon

platoon as the reserve, and he directed Diduryk to take 234

his remaining two platoons and occupy the northern and northeastern sectors of the perimeter between Companies B and D. Diduryk would tie-in with Company B on his left, Diduryk placed his two 81mm

and Company D on his right.

mortars in the 1/7 Cav mortary "battery" and dispersed some auxilliary mortarmen on the perimeter. Once in

position on the perimeter, Diduryk's registered artillery and mortar fires in conjunction with the other company commanders.9 s By 1900, Moore's perimeter was secure and all weapons sited and registered.99 Positions averaged five

meters apart and all companies were tied-in with adjacent units.100 The recon platoon was assembled near Moore's At 1915,

CP for its assignnent as battalion reserve.101

just prior to darkness, the day's last lift of dead and wounded were carried out to LZ Falcon and a much-needed resupply of ammunition, water, medical supplies, and rations was flown in. Anticipating Moore's need for a

night landing capability, a pathfinder team from the 229th Helicopter Battalion had flown in during the late afternoon. By dusk the team had cleared a two ship night

LZ at the northern end of LZ X-Ray, complete with lights.L'J2 Just after last light, Moore and his Command Sergeant Major, CSM Basil Plumley, walked around the entire perimeter to visit with troopers, spot-check fields of fire, and verify positions. 235 Moore's personal

inspection of the "foxhole line" confirmed that the morale of his battalion was still high after the day's stiff fight. Facing a large, formidable NVA force, Moore's Moore later

troopers had acquitted themselves well.

remarked that "we know we had and could hurt the enemy badly."lO, Based on his assessment of the status of his

soldiers and his evaluation of the perimeter of the battalion, Moore was satisfied that 117 Cav was prepared for night combat with the NVA. He also believed that with

proper planning, his battalion could rescue Savage and punish the NVA during the next day's fighting. With this in mind, Moore radioed his S-3 to land at LZ X-Ray to initiate planning for offensive operations on 15 November . l o 4 High on the slopes of the Chu Pongs, BG Man was also preparing his unit for further combat with the Americans at the base of the mountain. All units in

contact with the U.S. battalion were to maintain pressure on the Americans by conducting squad-size probes of the defensive positions on the LZ. Once gaps were discovered,

and properly marked, Man would direct the 8th Battalion of the 66th Regiment to attack in the morning. Continued

attempts would be made to entice the U.S. battalion commander to send another relief force to make contact with the isolated platoon. With his units already in

ambush positions, Man hoped his opponent would try a night relief effort. Additional pressure would be exerted on
236

the defenders of the LZ by the arrival of the H-15 Main Force Viet Cong Battalion from the south, sometime on the 15th. As a reserve for the larger scale "lure-and-ambush"

he intended to inflict on the American brigade, Man kept his battle-hardened 32d Regiment safely tucked into its assembly area, twelve kilometers away from the LZ. Man

would patiently await a reinforcement column from the brigade, sent to assist the U.S. battalion on the LZ. would then direct the 32d Regiment to strike and annihilate that reinforcing unit. Such a tactic would He

clearly forecast the complete isolation of the Americans at the base of the mountain, and lead to their destruction.

In preparation for the daylight assault on

the LZ, Man directed the 8th Battalion of the 66th Regiment to depart from its assembly area on the Ia Drang River and move to its attack position on the eastern side of the LZ.105 At 2125 Dillon linked up at Moore's CP. As he

discussed the situation with Dillon, Moore's thoughts were dominated by two things

saving Savage's platoon and Both Moore and Dillon were

holding on to LZ X-Ray.138

convinced that the NVA would simultaneously strike Savage and the LZ perimeter after first light. The flashing

lights Dillon saw as he flew into the LZ clearly indicated the NVA were posturing on the forward slopes of the Chu Pongs for a renewed offensive. This ruled out any In

possibility of reaching Savage with a night attack. 237

addition, since the NVA appeared to be settling into position for an overwhelming push to overrun the LZ, Moore came to the conclusion that a coordinated first-light attack by three companies would not only beat the NVA to the punch, but would regain the isolated platoon. Moore's tentative plan called for the battalion to attack in wedge formation. Herren's Company B, augmented by one platoon

from Company A, would be the main effort of the attack and would be the point of the wedge formation. Echeloned left

and right behind Herren in supporting roles would be, respectively, Nadal's Company A and Edwards' Company C. Moore and his command group would move behind Company B during the attack. Dillon would remain at the battalion

CP on the LZ, maintaining security of the LZ with Company D and Diduryk's Company 8, 217 Cav. Dillon would be

prepared to commit at least Diduryk's Company as the battalion reserve.106 Moore's battlefield planning was not accomplished in a vacuum. During the night, NVA squads probed the

battalion perimeter while up on the finger, platoon size elements attempted to overrun Savage. The probing attacks

on the LZ were repulsed by the registered artillery concentrations and close air support. Many of these concentrations enabled Savage to hold on.10' Savage and the remnants of his platoon were hit three times during the night of 14-15 November by reinforced platoon-size NVA assault groups.
238

The most

vicious attacks came at 0 3 4 5 and 0 4 4 5 , often preceded by bugle calls and shouted commands which seemed to encircle the miniature perimeter. Savage defeated all attacks by

adjusting artillery fires so close to his position that his men were literally lifted off the ground by the concussion of the rounds and then buried by dirt and branches. Following up rapidly with tactical air strikes,
.

Savage ensured the survival of his platoon.108 Ten minutes after first light, Moore radioed all company commanders and directed them to meet him for an orders group at the Company C command post. Moore

intended to brief his commanders on the attack order for reaching Savage. He chose the CP of Company C for his

orders group because it was on the southwestern edge of the LZ and provided an excellent view of the attack route and objective. Outlining the plan of attack, Moore

further stipulated that all companies send patrols forward of the foxhole line to flush out NVA snipers. Also, units

would sweep behind their positions to uncover any infiltrators who may have discovered a gap in perimeter defenses . l o 9 Since the orders group had been held in his CP, the commander of Company C was the first to dispatch patrols forward of his lines.
0640,

Edwards' patrols moved out at about

and had travelled approximately fifty meters when Fortunately, for the

they were hit by heavy enemy fire.

battalion as a whole, Edwards' two patrols had prematurely

239

triggered the assault of an NVA company that had been quietly crawling toward the LZ on hands and knees.110 In between the times he fired his M16 at the attacking NVA, Edwards called Moore and delivered a contact report. The situation in the Company C sector was

quickly deteriorating and Edwards requested that Moore commit the battalion reserve to backstop the crumbling Company C left flank. Moore denied the request on the grounds that he believed that the attack against Edwards was not the NVA main effort. Moore knew that the NVA had

sufficient forces disposed to hit the LZ with two full battalions, but he had to await a more substantial indicator as to which sector of the perimeter these forces would be commited. The best Moore could do was shift the

priority of fires to Edwards.111 Despite the heavy losses inflicted by Edwards' machineguns and the steady rain of artillery and tactical air fires, the NVA closed to hand-to-hand combat range with the Company C troopers. Edwards was badly wounded. In the ensuing melee,

Again, Edwards called Moore

for reinforcements, and this time the battalion commander approved the request. reserve But Moore elected to keep his

the battalion recon platoon

intact, and It

ordered CPT Nadal to send a platoon to Edwards' aid. was now 0 7 1 5 .

The fighting had raged for 4 5 minutes, yet As he waited for the NVA

only Company C was under attack.

to tip their hand as to the location of the main attack,

2 40

Moore believed that reinforcement from Company A would rectify the situation in Edwards' sector.112 A heavy cross fire soon ripped across the entire

LZ.

The NVA had extended the frontage of their attack and

now struck the vulnerable Company D sector with a company size assault. Since Moore's small anti-tank platoon was

the only unit manning the line, the NVA quickly threatened to overrun the battalion's mortar battery. At the same

time Company D came under attack, Nadal sent his 2d Platoon to reinforce Company C, as directed by Moore. Within seconds the platoon was the recipient of a brutal grazing fire which swept the western edge of the LZ, and was pinned down. Nadal's platoon, stopped just a few

meters behind and to the left flank of Company A and directly behind Company C's right flank, was now fortuitously positioned to defend the battalion command post.113 Moore was now under attack from three directions. Artillery concentrations and aerial rocket fires blasted the outer ring of the perimeter. tremendous. To Moore, "the noise was

I have never heard before or since in two

wars such a loud or continuous volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire.114 becoming desperate. The situation verged on

NVA had pressed through the perimeter On two occasions, Enemy RPG or

and were sniping at the battalion CP. Moore engaged the NVA with his M16.115
241

mortar rounds impacted on the LZ in an attempt to bracket the battalion CP. "Lieutenant Colonel Moore exerted a forceful, professional coolness in the midst of the confusion and near panic."ll6 Under simultaneous attack in several

perimeter sectors, Moore feared that the LZ was in danger of being overrun. "It certainly entered my mind that we

were the 7th Cavalry, and by God, we couldn't let happen what happened to Custer."ll7 Moore felt it was time

that each company and each trooper hold his own in the spirit of Savage and his survivors on the finger. At 0745, Moore alerted the reconnaissance platoon to be prepared for possible commitment into either the Company D or Company C sector, in that priority. Next, he contacted Moore also Brown

COL Brown and appraised him of the situation.

requested reinforcement with another rifle company.

replied that he had Company A, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry on strip alert at Catecka Plantation, and that they would air assault into LZ X-Ray as soon as enemy fires slackened enough to permit helicopters to land. Brown also informed

Moore that Tully's 2/5 Cav was enroute by foot from LZ Victor, a mile and a half distant.118 Until reinforcements arrived, Moore would have use artillery and tactical air support to offset his numerical disadvantage. At 0755, Moore directed all units to throw smoke grenades forward of their positions so that all fire support platforms could begin walking concentrations 242

closer and closer to friendly forces.

As supporting fires

and aerial rockets were brought within bursting radius of Moore's troopers, some ordnance landed inside Moore's perimeter. Two misdropped napalm canisters detonated near

Moore's CP, killing one soldier, burning several others, and exploding a resupply load of M16 ammunition.119 "During this maelstrom of activity the NVA continued to press their attack."l20 Caught in the
,

swirling, ferocious cacophony of U.S. fire support, the NVA were following their standard "hugging tactics" in order to keep the Americans from firing final protective fires close to friendly troops. At 0800, the NVA had

gotten close enough to jab at the left flank of Company A and jeopardize all of Company D's sector. The company D

mortarmen were firing their M16s and mortars simultaneously as they desperately battled the approaching NVA. In danger of losing his organic fire support, Moore

committed the battalion reserve to backstop the Company D sector. Moore then reconstituted his battalion reserve by

directing Diduryk to assemble his company command group and one platoon near the anthill in the center of the LZ. The grazing fire which criss-crossed the LZ was so intense the Diduryk's 1st Platoon sustained two casualties before it even began moving toward Moore's CP.121 By 0900 the sheer volume of American firepower around the LZ stalled the NVA advance. With the LZ

reasonably free of NVA direct fire, Moore called his

2 43

brigade commander and asked for the reinforcements to land. As soon as the lead elements of Company A, 2/7 Cav

touched down, Moore directed the company commander, CPT Joel E. Sugdinis, to occupy Diduryk's former position on the perimeter. This move brought Diduryk's remaining

platoon into the center of the LZ to give Moore a two-platoon battalion reserve. Enemy fires around the

perimeter began to slacken proportionally so that by 1000 only sporadic NVA sniping harassed Moore's positions. NVA appeared to be breaking contact and withdrawing.122 With the NVA pressure momentarily abated, Moore made an assessment of his dispositions. The Company C sector, originally a four-platoon slice of the perimeter, was being held by just one platoon. Moore directed The

Diduryk to take his two full platoons and assume responsibility for the Company C sector. Moore then augmented Diduryk's combat power with the 3d Platoon of the newly arrived and fresh Company A, 2/7 Cav. Moore once again reconstituted his battalion reserve by moving the remnants of Edwards' hard-pressed Company C to the center of the LZ.123 At 1205, Tully's 2/5 Cav reached the perimeter at LZ X-Ray. Although the overland movement of Tully's

battalion failed to achieve COL Brown's optimistic plan to trap NVA units between Moore's stationary force and Tully's moving force, the link-up relieved much of the danger at LZ X-Ray.124
244

Now that Tully's 2/5 Cav was completely within the perimeter, Brown made Moore the commander of all ground forces in the LZ. With the command arrangements taken Moore's

care of, Moore and Tully discussed the next move. attention was now focused on the relief of Savage's outpost on the finger.

Since Tully's battalion was still

configured in attack formation, and was reasonably fresh, Moore planned to conduct an immediate sweep to the northwest to reach Savage. Tully would command the relief Moore would remain on

column attacking to reach Savage.

the LZ in overall charge of the operation.125 Preceded by a short but intense artillery and aerial rocket prep, Tully's force departed the perimeter at 1315. Within an hour of leaving the LZ, Herren reached Seventy dead NVA lay in crumpled Unbelievably, the

Savage's perimeter.

heaps around Savage's position.

isolated platoon had not had an additional fatality during the twenty-four hours Savage was in command. The platoon

had been saved, according to Moore, "by guts and Sergeant Savage."1 2 6 With the return of Tully's relief column to the landing zone, at 1500, Moore decided to reposition his combat power on the perimeter. Now in charge of two

battalions, Moore concluded that he needed a simple, logical, and combat effective task organization for the defense of the LZ. With this in mind, Moore bisected the perimeter and placed Tully's 2/5 Cav on the northeastern
245

half while he maintained the southwestern half with his battalion and Companies A and B, 2/7 Cav. This

arrangement ensured unity of effort and tactical integrity of each battalion in the event of renewed NVA attacks. For the rest of the afternoon of 15 November, Moore . directed the evacuation of the dead and wounded and supervised the preparation of night defensive positions.121 Although BG Man's units had suffered heavy losses in the first thirty-six hours of the battle at LZ X-Ray, the 4th Field Front commander was not yet ready to give up the fight. He directed his disciplined soldiers to conduct night time probes of the LZ in order to find gaps in the perimeter for a pre-dawn attack. Man reasoned that

the Americans would not expect any additional attempts to overrun the LZ. Throughout the early hours of the evening, Man's soldiers kept up sporadic sniper fire around the LZ to give the appearance that the NVA force was withdrawing. All night long, the artillery batteries from LZ Falcon kept up an incessant ring of fire around the perimeter. At 0100 five NVA soldiers were discovered as they probed the northwestern sector of the perimeter manned by Herren's Company B. In an abrupt exchange of gunfire the For the next three

NVA fled, leaving behind two dead.

hours there were no additional probes of the perimeter. At 0400, though, a series of short and long whistle
246

signals was heard from out in front of the sector held by Diduryk's Company B, 2/7 Cav

the same sector occupied

twenty-four hours earlier by Edwards' Company C, 1/7 Cav. At about 0422 trip flares were ignited and anti-intrusion devices were sprung approximately 300 meters from Diduryk's position. In the glare of the ground

illumination, a company-size NVA assault struck the entire width of Diduryk's sector. The attack was finally broken

up by a fusillade of small arms fire and the imaginative adjustment of four batteries of artillery shooting high explosive and white phosphorous shells with variable time fuses.128 The NVA attempted another attack at 0530. Coming out of the south and west, the NVA resorted to human wave tactics as they pressed against Diduryk's 3d Platoon. dawn this attack was also defeated. Outside Diduryk's In front By

positions, NVA bodies lay in heaps and mounds.

of one position NVA dead were stacked so high that Diduryk's troopers had to move them to achieve a clear field of fire.129 Well aware of what was happening in Diduryk's sector of the perimeter, Moore was concerned about where the NVA main effort would strike his exhausted troopers. Diduryk had ably handled what Moore judged was a deliberate, set-piece diversionary attack executed repetitively in order to draw attention from an infiltrating main attack. Not unlike the morning of the 247

15th, the skilled, disciplined NVA would take advantage of the terrain bordering the LZ to crawl within hand grenade range of U.S. positions before attacking. To prevent

this, at 0655 Moore directed all units to fire "a mad minute" of all weapons systems at trees, anthills, and bushes in front of their positions. "mad minute" produced results Within seconds the

a forty-man NVA platoon

which had creeped to within 150 meters of the positions of Company A, 2 / 7 Cav was forced to attack prematurely. A

heavy dose of artillery fire decimated the infiltrators. All around the perimeter, snipers fell dead from trees.130 After the mad minute was completed, Moore turned his attention to a matter that had disturbed him for over twenty-four hours: unaccounted for three American casualties were a situation Moore found unpalatable. To

Moore, a commander was responsible for returning from a combat action with every trooper he had taken into the fight. This responsibility included the evacuation of

wounded and recovery of dead soldiers. During the brief lull that followed the mad minute, Moore dispatched the battalion reserve (consisting of the recon platoon and the remnants of Company C) to sweep the interior of the perimeter for the missing troopers. The search, much to

Moore's chagrin, failed to locate the three men.131 At 0930, lead elements of another of C01 Brown's reinforcements reached LZ X-Ray.
2 48

LTC Robert McDade's 2 / 7

Cav, augmented with Company A of LTC Fred Ackerson's 1/5 Cav, reached Moore's perimeter after a five-mile trek by foot from LZ Columbus. The arrival of McDade's battalion signalled that Moore's fight for LZ X-Ray was coming to a close. But Hal Moore still had unfinished business to At 0955 he directed that all units conduct a

conduct.

coordinated sweep to their front to a distance of 500 meters. Moore felt this tactic could accomplish two (1) it would spoil the attack of any

primary objectives:

fresh NVA units which had converged on the LZ during the night; and (2) it would clear out the survivors of the NVA pre-dawn assaults and preclude the vulnerable LZ from being attacked during the relief-in-place between Moore and the Tully/McDade force.132 Company B, 2/7 Cav had swept only 50-75 meters in front of its positions when it was hit by a large volume of fire. In an instant Diduryk lost ten casualties

Under cover of artillery fire, Diduryk withdrew his company back to its perimeter positions. There he was met

by Moore and LT Hastings, the battalion's Forward Air Controller (FAC). In a matter of minutes, Hastings

brought in,two fighter-bombers who unloaded Napalm, cluster bombs, rockets, and a 500-pound bomb on top of the NVA ambush. Diduryk then rallied his company and renewed

the sweep. Moving behind "a wall of artillery fire", Diduryk quickly eliminated the last of the NVA in his sector. Continuing his sweep past the twenty-seven
249

recently killed NVA soldiers, Diduryk came across the bodies of the battalion's missing troopers.133 On the mountain side, above LZ X-Ray, BG Man conceded that the crack."l34
U.S.

perimeter was "a nut too tough to

Just before he had committed the 8th

Battalion of the 66th Regiment in a final assault against the perimeter of the LZ, Man decided to re-orient his combat power onto the highly vulnerable American artillery batteries at LZ Falcon. Late in the morning of 16

November, BG Man ordered the 8th Battalion to march eastward and link-up with the H-15 Main Force Viet Cong Battalion to strike LZ Falcon. To cover this move, NVA

units still in contact with the Americans on the LZ were ordered to maintain just enough pressure on the
U.S.

forces to keep them bottled up at the base of the mountain. For the 4th Field Front, the battle for LZ

X-Ray was over, and it was time to move on to more lucrative targets.135 As the action around the perimeter dwindled to dulsatory sniper fire, Moore consolidated his battalion for its helicopter movement to Pleiku. He had every

reason to be proud of the accomplishments of his battalion in the face of such overwhelming odds. As his men stacked

large piles of NVA weapons and equipment in the center of the LZ, Moore took stock of the cost of the fierce battle with the NVA. Moore's casualties for the three days

fighting, attached units included, were 79 killed, 121 250

wounded, and none missing.

In fighting that was

frequently hand-to-hand and nearly always within hand grenade range, Moore's troopers killed 634 NVA known dead and 581 estimated dead and captured six prisoners.136 At about 1400, LTC Tully assumed operational command of the forces at LZ X-Ray. But Hal Moore and his

battalion were once again encircled, this time by a Chinook

load of reporters, film crews, and news

personalities flown in by the 1st Cav Division's Public Information Officer. In the midst of the media frenzy,

Moore articulated how "brave men and this little black gun (the recently issued M16 rifle) won this victory."l37 For the commander who would not leave the battlefield until every member of his battalion was accounted for, it was the individual soldiers and their incredible skill and determination which defeated the NVA. "I've got men in

body bags today," Moore said, "that had less than a week to go in the Army. These men fought all the way; they

never gave an inch."l3a Late in the afternoon, after his entire battalion had been extracted, LTC Harold G. Moore finally boarded a helicopter for the ride to Pleiku. It was a fitting

gesture for the commander of 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry at LZ X-Ray: very nearly the first man in the battalion to

land on the LZ, he was certainly the last man to leave.139

COHPETEHCY

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Analysis and Conclusions Seven days after the Battle of LZ X-Ray, LTC Hal Moore was promoted to Colonel, awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his gallant leadership of 1/7 Cav at LZ X-Ray, and assigned as Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Cav Division. COL Moore commanded the 3d Brigade through

several major engagements until he returned in the United States in late July, 1966. The performance of Hal Moore and his tough, intrepid battalion at LZ X-Ray is one of the most documented accounts of battalion-level combat in recent military history. There is no denying the fact that

Moore's commandership of his battalion in the bloody cauldron named LZ X-Ray is a tremendous example of a successful leader firmly in control of his unit. For

future combat battalion commanders, the narrative of Moore's leadership during the decisive three-day engagement provides a veritable gold mine of "lessons learned". Especially instructive are the skills of

command of battalions in combat which readily appear in an examination of Moore's performance in conjunction with the leadership competency/performance indicator model. COMMUNICATIONS Moore stands out as an extremely effective communicator. While his style has been described as

flamboyant,140 Moore clearly displayed knowledse of information by properly implementina the commander's
263

intent.

Moore believed the concept of commander's intent

was a fundamental. This is perfect evidence of the philosophy of the 1st Cav Division Commander, MG Kinnard, who routinely articulated his intent along with mission orders to subordinates. Moore and his immediate superior, COL Brown, discussed intent when Brown issued Moore his orders for the air assault into the Ia Drang Valley. Moore passed this intent down to his company commanders during his operations order on 14 November. As in

previous chapters, it is not possible to assess to what degree Moore was a Good Listener. Back brief information

and provide feedback on what was briefed are, as has been shown in the previous leader assessments, particularly difficult indicators to analyze. There is evidence to

support the performance indicator res~ondto subordinates' input. From the start of the planning of the operation,

Moore accepted the opinions of subordinates and used them to formulate plans. He relied heavily on the input of his

S-3, CPT Dillon, during the planning of the three company

attack on 15 November.

He accepted the report of the

reconnaissance helicopter section leader to help him confirm LZ X-Ray. There had even been a discussion about the choice of LZ immediately following the leaders' recon on the morning of 14 November. During the fighting on LZ

X-Ray, Moore took into account the observations and assessments of CPTs Nadal, Edwa'rds, Herren, and Diduryk.

For LTC Moore, it was imperative for a battalion commander in combat to Clearly Communicate His Intent. It

is reasonable to conclude that every subordinate leder on

LZ X-Ray during the three days of fighting knew that Moore

intended to attack the enemy, save the L Z , rescue Savage, and account for all personnel before extraction. Moore

frequently changed the missions of his companies, but regardless of the circumstances, they all knew his intent. Because of his personality type, Moore communicated verbally as opposed to Nonverbally. This does not mean In

that Moore's words spoke louder than his actions. fact, nothing could be further from the truth.

It just

means that because of his general affability, Moore was often prone to expressing himself verbally in order to reinforce his actions. He communicated face-to-face with

subordinates whenever practicable during the fight at LZ X-Ray. It was also the way he preferred to do business

with superiors. Moore's actions within the perimeter of LZ X-Ray during those three days in November 1965 com~lemented/ reinforced unit standards and demonstrated a sense of ursencv without panic. On LZ X-Ray, 14-16 November, there Hal Moore was in

was no question as to who was in charge.

command and his actions, just like those of the combat battalion commanders in the previous chapters, are indicative of a conscious adherence to a type of mental checklist displaying the dynamics of taking care of leader 265

business in combat. Moore demonstrated, by force of personal example, how the standards his unit developed during the training and testing of the airmobility concept would be applied on the battlefield. Airmobile

commanders, Moore showed went into the proposed landing zone on the initial lift and were usually some of the first leaaders on the ground. Commanders directed the

influx of subsequent lifts based on the situation. Commanders called for and orchestrated the employment of combined arms on the battlefield. Commanders situated

themselves at a point from which they could see the entire battlefield. Commanders remained aware of the status of

wounded soldiers and ensured all casualties were promptly evacuated. Commanders never left casualties on the

battlefield; every man into action was brought back out dead, wounded, or, hopefully, uninjured. Along with this, Moore demonstrated a sense of

urgency without panic by exerting a cool, professionalism throughout many instances of potential panic on the LZ. He and CSM Plumley shot and killed NVA who had infiltrated within hand grenade range of the battalion CP. They

helped load wounded on helicopters. Moore was calm and forceful in his radio communications even as heavy NVA automatic weapons fires wounded personnel in his CP and an errant napalm canister exploded stacked cases of rifle ammo near the CP. Moore took care of leader business in

combat. His sinqle minded tenacity and his personal example permeated the ranks of his battalion. Moore Communicated Enthusiasm during his pre-operations planning and troop leading procedures and once he was on the LZ. His excitement at Company B's

discovery of the NVA deserter and the subsequent intel gathered from the prisoner fired the enthusiasm of the entire organization. As seen during his inspection of the perimeter on 14 November, Moore articulated his enthusiasm for the prospects of success to the lowest level as frequently as was practicable. Moore Clearly Communicated Orders in a manner which was fundamentally sound and doctrinally correct. His

pre-operational planning inculcated the intent of both the division commander and the brigade commander and was based on a solid intelligence preparatioon of the battlefield and mission analysis. Moore's plan was simple, took into

account the guidance of his superiors and, perhaps most instructive, it was especially flexible. Moore's plan was devised to Stress Simplicity. Analogous to the football quarterback who calls an audible to change a pre-set play at the line of scrimmage, Moore likewise fashioned his assault plan to enable him to look at the terrain, size-up the enemy, assess his own troops, check the time available, and maintain mission focus. Moore could, and did, call audibles at the line of scrimmage; in fact, he called several, as is evidenced by the change in
267

in missions of his companies once in contact with the NVA

.
To take the analogy a step or two further, Moore

was fortunate to have coaches (superiors) who allowed him to call his own plays in the huddle as long as they complemented the game plan (intent). This attitude was

influenced by MG Kinnard's philosophy of allowing subordinates the latitude to fight the battles and make decisions on the ground. It was a direct product of the

spirit of airborne warfare which demanded that subordinate commanders exercise independence of action. Moore excelled because he knew what end state his superiors wanted him to achieve with his operation and because he was capable of DEFINING SUCCESS for his company commanders: find the elusive NVA, fix them, attack them,

defeat them: rescue Savage, defend the LZ, sweep the perimeter, police the battlefield, win. Moore Communicated Up, Down, and Horizontally throughout the battle. He was in constant radio He was in constant

communications with COL Brown.

communications with his company commanders, issuing orders face-to-face or via radio. He even maintained communications with SSG Savage during the darkest period of that platoon's isolation. He talked constantly with his 5-3, CPT Dillon, who functioned from the command and control helicopter. Lastly, Moore communicated with his

soldiers. As he "trooped the line" with CSM Plumley on

268

the night 14 November, Moore assessed the morale and fighting ability of his unit through his conversations with his soldiers. SUPERVISE How does LTC Moore rate as a supervisor of his battalion in combat? First of all, Moore Commanded Forward. He was

virtually the first soldier of his battalion to land on LZ X-Ray. From that moment on he stayed on the LZ, and did

not leave until all of his battalion had been extracted by helicopter to Pleiku. Throughout the three days of

fighting Moore shared hardships with subordinates. led bv examale. s ~ e n ttime with his soldiers, and personallv inspected selected tasks accomulished bv subordinates. Moore did not hover above the battlefield in a command helicopter. soldiers. In Commanding Forward, Moore located his command post where he could best influence the action and remain in positive control of the fight. He situated his CP He was on the ground, fighting next to his

behind a huge anthill in the center of the LZ, and it remained there throughout the battle. On a couple of

occasions Moore positioned himself at decisive sectors of the perimeter. He moved to Herren's location on the

morning of 14 November in response to the capture of the NVA deserter. There he issued Herren the warning order At dusk on

for a future change in Company B's mission.

269

the 14th Moore and CSM Plubley inspected the perimeter and talked to soldiers. Moore returned to his CP after the inspection tour with the feeling that his soldiers' morale was high and that they were capable of out-fighting the NVA. This assessment formed the basis for Moore's actions

during the next thirty-six hours. On the morning of 15 November Moore called his commanders to an orders group at Edwards' Company C command post. This site was chosen so that the commanders

of the proposed three-company assault could observe the axis of advance and the objective, both plainly visible from the Company C positions. Then on the morning of 16

November, Moore was back in the same location, this time to get a first-hand glimpse of what had occurred in CPT Diduryk's sector at first light. There, in the old

Company C positions, Moore and his Forward Air Controller directed fighter-bomber attacks on NVA infiltrators. Late in the morning of 16 November, after the arrival of Tully's 2/5 Cav, Moore was responsible for commanding and controlling ten companies of infantry. As

Tully moved out to rescue Savage, Moore remained at his CP near the anthill, in overall command of the LZ. Moore Did Not Over-Supervise. He gave subordinates mission-tvue orders, a direct reflection of the confidence Moore had in his subordinates. Without this type of approach, Moore would never have been able to

affect the rapid changes in company missions as he did on LZ X-Ray. When he gave mission orders to his company commanders Moore insured that they understood what success would look like. Herren's assumption of the Company C

mission was predicated on creating a buffer zone between the mountains and the LZ in order to secure the LZ for follow-on lifts. Moore explained this to Herren. Then,

when Herren's Company B was held up on the finger, and Herrick was surrounded, Moore sent Nadal to Herren's aid. Success for Nadal in this mission would be, according to Moore, the recovery of the isolated platoon. In that

Nadal could not accomplish that mission, and recognized that success was beyond his capability, Moore switched to the plan to use Companies A and B in a combined attack to reach Herrick. Success again was the rescue of the platoon. Nadal went to dramatic lengths to insure his

company understood what success would be for the two company attack. When the attack faltered in the face of

overwhelming NVA fires, and could not succeed, Nadal requested permission to withdraw to the perimeter. Moore

agreed and for the rest of the night, success for Hal Moore was LZ security. He articulated success to his soldiers during his twilight inspection of the perimeter. As has been mentioned in previous chapters, Enforce Safety Standards leans more toward peacetime training restrictions than "fire control measures", "command and
271

control of direct and indirect fires", "orchestration of tactical air support", and "protection of troops". Moore's deliberate use of indirect fires within minimum safe distance range to friendly troops was'an enormous risk to his soldiers yet it repelled countless NVA assaults. Savage's employment on artillery 25 meters from

his perimeter demonstrated that accurate artillery fires may be adjusted to within hand grenades range. Moore used

WP rounds to mask the withdrawal of Companies A and B on

14 November, a clear hazard to troops.

Napalm and

500-pound bombs were also incorporated into the fire support and were professionally executed. The issue of Enforcing Safety Standards revolves around training and trust. Moore knew that he could

emplace artillery concentrations within minimum safe distance range because he knew the artillerymen were well trained and that his forward observers in the battalion could handle the task. Moore personally called for and

adjusted numerous artillery concentrations but in most cases it was company forward observers requesting and adjusting multiple fire support assets. For future

battalion commanders, the salient point is that observed fire training is mandatory for forward observers at company and platoon level. In this age of dwindling

resources for artillery and mortar live fire, future battalion commanders will have to be particularly imaginitive in the development of training events which 272

will provide the chain of command with the essential trust necessary for danger-close adjustments. LTC Hal Moore effectivelv suuervised subordinates. In terms of assessing the remaining SKA Establish Controls, Establish/Enforce Standards, Follow-up on Corrective Action, and Provide Feedback, few of the performance indicators seem to apply to supervising combat activities. For example, it may be stretching the point

to say that Moore checked to ensure standard comuliance and conducted ~erformanceevaluations. Indeed, his tour

of the foxhole line on the evening of 14 November was intended to insure the over-arching performance standards for a defensive perimeter were being followed. However,

the leadership competency performance indicators don't focus on critical tasks such as "assess morale of the organization", "assess combat power", or "assess the ability of the organization to execute continuous operations." These tasks were the part of Moore's

inspection trip that night that cannot be considered as segments of an unannounced review of standards of comuliance. TEACHING AND COUNSELING Did LTC Moore coach'/counsel subordinates on LZ X-Ray? In spite of the training orientation of many of

the LPI which constitute the SXA of this competency, it would be fair to assess that Moore did some coaching and counseling on LZ X-Ray. Just how much he did is difficult
273

to judge given the depth of the source material. Certainly, Moore Demanded Action on the battlefield. provided advice and direction to subordinates in many instances during the three days on LZ X-Ray. It is He

arguable as to what degree Moore was able to Develop Subordinates and Teach Skills while in contact with the enemy. These SKA, plus Train for War, are pre-combat Other than

activities and post-combat training actions.

making an adjustment in dispositions or making a decision to change the condition of combat (attack instead of defend, etc.), the amount of corrective action taken on the battlefield, short of relief of a leader, seems to be minimal. There is no mention in the source material of

Hal Moore conducting "footlocker counseling" of subordinates on LZ X-Ray. Moore's situation, not unlike the circumstance confronting Vandervoort and Lynch, was an environment where the time span between recognizing "bad performance" and executing "corrective action" was measured in friendly KIA or WIA. SOLDIER TEAM DEVELOPMENT Hal Moore's story is one of a battalion which fought as it had been trained. Moore was so confident of this fact that he boasted that his unit was as well-trained and well-disciplined as the U.S. airborne divisions in WWII. Accepting Moore's proclivity for

invoking the trditional and philosophical connection between his unit and the tremendous paratroop battalions,
274

it is especially important to examine how Moore trained his unit and developed such a high standard of cohesion. While the objective of this study is not to conduct an in-depth analysis of the training methods of 117 Cav or the 1st Cavalry Division (which in itself is a premise for another thesis), Moore's focus on cohesion requires description. Essentially, Moore created a strons unit identity by emphasizing tradition and pride in the unit and by demanding that leaders and teams have common aoals. It us

absolutely imperative in Moore's battalion that junior leaders actively team up with the NCOs who were veterans of light infantry combat in Korea and seek to learn as much as possible about small unit fighting. The corollary was that Moore's NCOs were also required to "adopt a lieutenant" and train the neophyte junior leaders. For a

combat team to develop and then function under fire, there was no room for an adversarial relationship between officers and NCOs. Nor is there room for such an attitude Moore's philosophy

in today's light infantry battalions.

of cohesion unequivocally points out that the genesis of successful unit performance in combat occurs in the training and garrison environments where cooaeration and teamwork is the standard. The overt demonstration of

trust. caring, and confidence, up and down the chain of command, was mandatory behavior in 1/7 Cav. in the infantry battalions of the 1990s.
275

So must it be

Failure to

implement a Hal Moore style of cohesion-building robs a unit of its potential SSG Savage-type enlisted soldiers. The inability of many infantry battalions to develop subordinates to replace key leaders is no more dramatically demonstrated than at the various CTC's. Frequently, units begin to flounder after the officer or senior NCO is declared a casualty. At risk of overstating the case, how many squad leaders in battalions today can assume command of a platoon as Savage did and repel repeated assaults by two enemy companies? Or how many

NCOs could assume command of a company as SSG George Gonzales did with Company D? Moore developed his soldier and leader teams by Encouraging Boldness, Candor, Initiative, Innovation, and Speedy Action. He relied on his company commanders,

platoon leaders, and squad leaders to boldly execute his plans and orders. He expected his leaders to demonstrate

moral courage and freely inform him when mistakes are made or when operations have failed. Herren's report that

Herrick had been isolated by a large NVA force is an example. Nadal's request to withdraw the two-company

attack force is another instance of subordinate candor. Edwards' radio message that the mortar battery had not yet been formed was another illustration of candor. Initiative was exercised all over the LZ during the three days of fighting. NCOs took charge of units when The actions of SSG Clyde

officers were killed or wounded.

27 6

E. Savage is the preeminent model of initiative. Marm's

personal gallantry in silencing the NVA machinegun that completely halted Company A is one more case in point. Edwards' organization of the mortar battery and his use of
SSG Gonzales' Company D in his defensive sector is another

example.

CPT Dillon's targeting of the blinking lights in

the Chu Pongs on the night of 14 November is a good example of subordinate initiative. Perhaps the most Innovative leader on the battlefield was the battalion commander. Moore's reaction to several situations during the course of the fighting were not only innovative but also indicative of his ability to take speedy action. First and foremost is Moore's imaginative and innovative employment of fire support assets. He integrated every conceivable fire tac air, aerial

support platform into the fighting:

rocket artillery, helicopter gunships, artillery, and his mortar battery. He used white phosphorous rounds to mask

the withdrawal of Nadal and Herren from NVA observation and fire. He directed the execution of the "mad minute"

to clear the perimeter of snipers and infiltrating NVA assault echelons, a technique which paid enormous dividends. Moore was also innovative in the maneuver arena. His air movement plan which called for a battalion LZ was different. His plan for the initial security of the LZ

Herren's one platoon sweep

was a departure from

277

doctrine. His frequent alteration and modification of company missions is not only an example of innovation but points to the exceptional responsiveness of his organization. Moore's innovative scheme of attachment and

cross-attachment highlihghts the interoperability of his platoons and companies

an achievement worthy of

emulation by future battalion commanders. His ability to smoothly assimilate the two reinforcing companies from 2/7 Cav and Tully's entire 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry into his operations is also a remarkable achievement. Moore was also innovative in logistics. First of

all, he deliberately lightened the load of his soldiers going into battle. Emphasizing the absolute necessity to

carry an increased combat load of ammunition, Moore provided his battalion with sufficient resources to fight outnumbered, in the early hours of the battle. This did

not preclude ammunition resupply but it gave his units an advantage in terms of expenditure and replenishment. What

is most instructive in this instance is that Moore did not overburden his soldiers with a "packing list" for combat which included unnecessary items of equipment. While it

may be arguable to what degree Moore's soldiers were light and highly mobile when on the ground, they were certain1.y not outfitted like the jungle-bashing, ruck-sack-laden "pack mules" of infanry battalions in the latter years of the war. Similar to the NVA, Moore confined his

individual soldier loads to ammunition, water, and one

278

day's ration (C rations were stuffed in GI socks and tied-off on a soldier's load bearing equipment). Interestingly enough, no ruck sacks are visible in photos of Moore's soldiers on LZ X-Ray. (For that matter, ruck

sacks or packs are not visible in pictures of Vandervoort's paratroopers or Lynch's infantrymen either). For future battalion commanders of "ruck sack

infantry", Moore's example of simplified combat logistics, driven by METT-T, may be worthy of a "try out" during training exercises. On LZ X-Ray, LTC Hal Moore encouraged and exemplified the dynamic of Speedy Action in decision-making. Crucial to the ability to make rapid decisions on the battlefield is the knowledge that:
(1) decision-making process of the commander and his

subordinate leaders can effectively and rapidly respond to directives from the senior leader during a fluid situation; and (3) subordinates often anticipate the desires of the senior and have already taken steps toward fulfilling the organizational goal. The foundation for

these conditions lies in Tough, Repetitive, Exacting Training. Hal Moore fought at LZ X-Ray with subordinate leaders who had been with him for over a year. For

example, Nadal, Herren, Edwards and LeFebvre had all served with 1/7 Cav during the training and testing days of the airmobility concept at Ft. Benning.
27 9

All were

commanding companies for Hal Moore in 1964. Most of the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants were also veterans of the Ft. Benning train-up. Many squad leaders had been in Moore's battalion for over a year, but assignment rotations had begun to whittle away at junior NCOs prior to the fight at LZ X-Ray. The bottom line is that Moore

had a battalion whose leaders were familiar with one another, had trained one another, and had made decisions together. Cohesive, trained to a very high standard

during the air assault testing period at Ft. Benning, Moore's leadrs were used to making independent decisions and providing input to larger organizational decisions. When bullets began flying on LZ X-Ray, Moore knew he had leaders who clearly understood his thought processes and could rapidly respond to changes in the situation. Moore's "team" had been trained to such a high level of sophistication that he could expect them to know the missions of adjacent units, accept rapid attachment or detachment of units from other companies or battalions, and employ an amazing array of fire support platforms. Simply, Hal Moore trained his 1 eaders and his battalion as he expected it to fight. TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL COMPETENCY LTC Hal Moore conducted successful combat operations on LZ X-Ray. His actions are a formative illustration of a battalion commander Applying the Tenets of AirLand Battle Doctrine, Implementing the AirLand
280

Battle Imperatives, and Employing Battlefield Operating Systems. Hal Moore personally exhibited Technical and

Tactical Competency on a scale which included, one one end, engaging the enemy with an individual weapon and, on the other end, directing the employment of multiple fire support assets. Moore's employment of his battalion on LZ X-Ray demonstrated asilitv. His frequent adjustments in company missions is a solid example of agility on the battlefield. His agility in employing attached rifle companies and a reinforcing battalion is remarkable. Successfully engaging the NVA on three fronts is also indicative of Moore's agility. Moore demonstrated initiative throughout his operation at LZ X-Ray. His air movement plan and his new

technique for securing the LZ are examples of initiatives taken by Moore. He took the initiative to seek contact It is

with the NVA after the discovery of the deserter.

arguable as to what degree Moore maintained initiative in the fight with the N V A . An opposing case may be made that

Moore did not maintain the initiative after the first contact with the NVA and only reacted to situations in which the NVA chose the time and place of the attack. his defense, Moore may be seen as maintaining the initiative in terms of his ability to maneuver on the LZ, conduct spoiling attacks, bring in reinforcements, and eventually police the battlefield.
281

In

The depth of Moore's defense of LZ X-Ray is also subject to interpretation. Moore strongpointed the LZ with a perimeter defense. Units manned positions on the

perimeter line, with no listening posts or observation posts forward in their sectors. Savage and his isolated The

platoon do not constitute a forward-echeloned force.

reserve he maintained near his battalion CP was virtually the only depth he had to his defense. Unless vertical depth is considered. Moore's aerial fire support provided him with the margin of depth that his manpower and dispositions could not give him on the LZ. There is no question that Moore used his vertical

depth to its maximum capability. Moore's svnchronization of available combat power throughout the battle is especially instructive. He orchestrated fire support to synchronize with maneuver of ground troops. He directed air movements to coincide with

fire support. He integrated casualty evacuation with air movements and close air support. He brought in logistic resupply in conjunction with troop lifts. Without a doubt, Moore's ability to synchronize different types of fire support systems and ordnance to form a "ring of steel" around his perimeter stands out as a predominant example of synchronization on LZ X-Ray. Moore's Implementation of AirLand Battle Imperatives at LZ X-Ray was dynamic. From the inception

of the operation, Moore ensured unitv of effort by

282

providing purpose, direction, and motivation to his battalion and his attacked units. Moore was in charge of

the battle from the start, and he only relinquished control of the perimeter when he was convinced the bulk of the NVA forces had withdrawn. Moore was especially good at antici~atinaevents on the battlefield. In the majority of cases, Moore was able

to implement dispositions or make a decision in advance of the NVA activity. His "anti-infiltration" patrols in

front of the perimeter forced NVA units to prematurely initiate their attacks. His "mad minute" compromised a His two-company

major NVA attempt to overrun the LZ.

spoiling attack on 14 November pre-empted an NVA assault. His reinforcement of the threatened Company C sector with Lane's platoon strengthened Edwards at a time just before a two-company NVA attack. Moore concentrated combat Dower aaainst enemv vulnerabilities mainly by directing an incredible array of indirect fire on NVA attacks. Fire support was his

primary combat multiplier in the engagement, and he took advantage of his superiority in this regard. Moore's troop movements at LZ X-Ray is a classic example of the imperative desianate, sustain, and shift the main effort. For the initial air assault, Herren's

Company B was the main effort, reinforced with the requisite priority of fires. Though Herren's mission

changed almost immediately upon touchdown on LZ X-Ray, he

283

remained the battalion main effort. When Herren ran into trouble on the finger Moore sustained him by sending Nadal in to help. During the two-company attack to reach This

Savage, Moore shifted the main effort to Nadal.

remained in effect as the two units withdrew to the perimeter. Edwards' Company C was the main effort during most of 15 November. This remained the case until Diduryk's Throughout the

company replaced him on the perimeter.

night of 15 November Diduryk was the main effort, and was maintained in that posture until Tully arrived on 16 November. At that point, Moore switched the main effort

back to Herren, now in the lead of the three-company assault to reach Savage. Herren remained the main effort

until Tully assumed command of the LZ. Moore clearly pressed the fisht. He maintained contact with the enemy, spoiled enemy attacks, and continued to fire artillery concentrations at night to keep large NVA attack echelons at bay. His

"anti-infiltration patrols" in company sectors and his "mad minute" are examples of forward momentum directed at the enemy. Moore did not move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly in the sense that he became involved in a defensive battle to save his lifeline, the LZ, and fought for three days against a numerically superior foe. His initial air movement to the LZ was fast and caught the NVA
284

off-balance, and his artillery and air strikes hit the NVA hard. But it would not be fair to propose that Moore

rapidly defeated the NVA at LZ X-Ray. For the imperative use terrain, weather. deception, and OPSEC, Moore can be assessed on three of the four categories. He used OPSEC so well that the NVA were

surprised at the American intrusion into their base camp at ANTA. He employed deception through the flight route

of his leaders' recon and the subsequent air assault routes into LZ X-Ray. He also used artillery fires to

confuse the NVA as to which LZ his battalion would actually choose. He used smoke, conventional HE, and WP

rounds to mask the movements of his units from NVA observation and fires. Moore applied his terrain sense n LZ X-Ray. First,

he chose LZ X-Ray because it was large enough to accept sixteen helicopters in one lift. Companies established

defensive positions in the dry creek bed or in the low scrub, carving out hasty fighting positions. Moore used

the massive anthill on the LZ for his CP. Machinegun teams found other anthills in their respective sectors as cover and concealment, as well. Moore was adamant about conservina strenath for decisive action. He reconstituted his reserve several times to build it with sufficient combat power. He kept

the reserve in close proximity to his CP so that he could use it in a hurry. His notion of sweeping the LZ with
285

small patrols after the initial air assault lift was a conscious decision to make contact with the enemy with a small force, then attack with decisive combat power to defeat him. Moore's fight at LZ X-Ray was a combined arms battle. His em~lovmentof combined arms and sister

services, namely the artillery and U.S. Air Force, gave him the necessary edge in combat power to fight outnumbered, and win. Lastly, Hal Moore completely understood the effects of battle on soldiers. units, and leaders. He demonstrated his comprehension of this important imperative when he and CSM Plumley walked the perimeter. His concern for the welfare and well-being of his soldiers was best seen in his methods of evacuating wounded and his near obsession with recovering the bodies of troopers killed in action. Through tough, realistic training at Ft. Benning, Moore produced a cohesive battalion which was psychologically strong enough to enduce the brand of fighting they encountered at LZ X-Ray. Future battalion

commanders should ask themselves, as their units roadmarch, parachute, or air assault into contact to a determined enemy, whether their soldiers, leaders, and units could perform as well as LTC Hal Moore's 1/7 Cav at LZ X-Ray.

DECISION MAKING "...the commander," according to Clausewitz, "...finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information, of mistakes committed through fear, through negligence, through haste; of disregard of his authority, either mistaken or correct motives, accidents, which no mortal could have foreseen.

...of
In short,

he is the victim of a hundred thousand impressions, most of which are intimidating, few of which are encouraging."lao This quotation by Clausewitz essentially describes the situations confronting LTC Hal Moore during the three days of combat at LZ X-Ray. When Moore's decisions are

reviewed with the Clausewitzian appreciation for the volatility of decision making in combat, his performance as a commander appears all the more remarkable. Moore's

decision making prowess as a battalion commander in fierce combat stands out as one of the foremost examples of a leader making sound, timely decisions with practiced, practical iudcrement. When viewed chronologically, Moore's key decisions are instructive in the manner in which they are Creative, Assertive, Improvisational, and Decisive. To begin with, Moore had decided to try a new air assault insertion scheme for the operation into LZ X-Ray. Instead of separate, company LZ's Moore decided to approach his mission with one consolidate battalion LZ.
287

This was creative. orisinal thousht on Moore's part which was as ferociouslv audacious as it was innovative. While the source material fails to overwhelmingly substantiate just how innovative Moore was by directing a leaders' reconnaissance of the proposed LZ's, sufficient evidence exists to warrant the conclusion that his decisions pertaining to the flight route demonstrated initiative and the best use of available materials Moore then confirmed LZ X-Ray as the battalion LZ only after subordinates actively save advice and he had included all leaders in the decision makins process. Prior to his operations order, Moore checked with COL Brown to ensure his scheme of maneuver did not conflict with the brigade commander's guidance. He then

began to implement a plan. exercisins the authority and responsibility deleaated bv his superior, COL Brown. His

air movement plan, worked out in detail with his S-3, and his ground tactical plan, a variation of the standard air assault techniques, were both formulated with the understanding that calculated risks were beins taken. Moore believed his surprise air assault at the base of the Chu Pongs by his entire battalion, not separate companies in multiple CZ's, was a prudent risk where the variables IMETT-T) were in his favor. Once on the LZ, Moore's series of decisions in reaction to unexpected situations during 14 November clearly highlights his tremendous ability to make sound
288

timely decisions at the lowest practical level.

Moore was

able to rapidly assimilate raw information (taken from subordinates and based on his observations) to decide upon a course of action. Moore took a~propriateaction

(within commander's intent) in the absence of specific orders. His job was to find the enemy, fix him, and defeat him with combined arms. He was operating within

COL Brown's intent when he exuloited the o ~ ~ o r t u n i t v presented by the capture of the NVA straggler by attacking toward the Chu Pong mountains. Moore frequently

im~rovised,according to METT-T, and switched company missions, cross-attached subordinate units (platoons), or re-constituted his reserve with the piecemeal unit arrivals into the LZ. Moore constantly souuht methods to His imaginative use of white

improve current operations.

phosphorous rounds as a smoke screen, his use of lift helicopters as impromptu air ambulances, and his creative fire support choreography are only a few of the examples of how Moore attempted to make the most imaginative and decisive use of available assets. Moore's entire experience on LZ X-Ray is a definitive example of a leader o~eratinuautonomousl~. conductina a mission as an isolated force without loss of effectiveness. Moore was conducting business on the battleifled in the style of the W W I I airborne battalion commanders to whom he felt an enormous professional and philosophical affinity. The parallels between Moore and
289

LTC Ben Vandervoort are not only educational, but they also point toward the emergency of a brand of combat leadership which seems to breed success on the battlefield: commanders who exude the "airborne

philosophy" and create combat-ready, high-performing units which are aggressive and audacious; and have subordinates who are capable of vigorously executing plans or operating independently, often without orders and often surrounded or faced with a numerical disadvantage. As the U.S. Army postures itself into a light, tough, rapid deployment force whose mission is the vigorous execution of contingency operations, the standards of command of battalions in combat may very well require the "airborne philosophy" as demonstrated by Vandervoort and Moore. PLANNING Moore's planning for the air assault operation into LZ X-Ray is virtually a textbook example of proper mission analysis, effective troop leading procedures, and rapid adjustments to the situation. Visited by COL Brown at the Company A CP at 1700 on 13 November, Moore received his orders to conduct the air assault mission commencing at
0800 on 14 November.

Still in the midst of the saturation

patrolling mission, Moore had to rapidly shift gears to take full advantage of the fifteen hours he would have plan, prepare, and execute his new mission. Although the source material does not elaborate on Moore's mission analysis or troop leading procedures, it
2 90

is still within the parameters of sound scholarship to make an assessment based on general segments of the battle narratives. effectively. The bottom line is that Moore planned It is also especially heartening to note

.
rn

that Moore followed the prescribed doctrine for the formulation of both his deliberate plan and his subsequent rapid battlefield planning. At about 1 8 0 0 on 1 3 November, Moore and his S-3 began the deliberate planning process. First in the order

of business was a thorough map reconnaissance in order to identify possible landing zones. While there is no evidence to indicate how his
S-2

conducted the

intelligence preparation of the battlefield, it must be remembered that Moore and his brigade commander were cognizant of the NVA order of battle and were convinced of the likelihood of a meeting engagement during the operation. The much referred to "big red star on the G-2

situation map" which was drawn next to the Chu Pong mountains must be accepted as an indication that both Brown and Moore knew what the 1 / 7 Cav was going up

.
v

against. Moore's subsequent planning and virtually all of his decisions once combat is joined are predicated on his authoritative knowledge of the enemy force ratios. Moore constantly has his "feelers out" to obtain advance warning of the arrival of the one or two NVA battalions he felt were not yet in contact.

Most important, Moore had a clear-cut idea of what success would look like in the operation. Moore

anticipated, and consequently articulated to his subordinates, that the battalion had a very high probability of making contact on the LZ with a numerically superior force which it would defeat in a pitched battle along conventional lines. Success in this engagement

would be achieved, according to Moore, when the momentum of the air assault was maintained: the initiative was maintained; the LZ was defended; the N V A were punished by the 1/7 Cav attack and all fire support platforms; the N V A were forced out of their Chu Pong sanctuary; and, when Moore extracted from the battlefield with every trooper who inserted into the LZ. Moore's concept of operations was simple, flexible, and innovative. He opted for a battalion LZ as opposed to multiple company-size LZ. He modified his sweep tactics to make contact and fix the N V A with a small force while the bulk of his combat power remained near the LZ, poised to envelope the enemy. He orsanized his plan such that

his widely scattered companies would be sequenced into LZ X-Ray in five, thirty-minute intervals. The sixteen UH-1s

allocated by COL Brown could bring in nearly one entire company on each lift. While it did not exactly turn out according to plan, Moore and his S-3 went into excruciating detail in orchestrating the air movement of the battalion into LZ X-Ray.
292

Moore established priorities for accom~lishina tasks. CPT Herren's Company B was the air assault main

effort, responsible for LZ security priority. priority

Moore's first

Follow-on lifts would accomplish oore's second sweep of the area. Fire support priority was

to Company B initially, then Company A , the sweep main effort. In identifying these priorities, Moore considered He knew he had a well-trained

his available resources.

but understrength battalion of around 450 troopers who could go in to LZ X-Ray in 16 helicopters. He also knew that he had extremely responsive fire support on hand to give him the edge in combat power. In addition, Moore

knew that the two other battalions of the brigade were in close proximity to LZ X-Ray and were a potential source of reinforcement. Finally, Moore got so detailed in his plan

that he stipulated ammunition loads and how many mortars each company would deploy with. While this may smack of

micromanagement on Moore's part, it turned out that these logistics concerns were well justified. Moore lightened

the load of each individual soldier to the minimum essential items: ammunition, water, and food, with Rifleman would

ammunition being the number one priority.

make the attack with 3 0 0 rounds of 5.56mm ammo; machinegunners would take 8 0 0 rounds of 7 . 6 2 ammo; each soldier in the battalion carried two fragmentation grenades and one smoke grenade. Moore had planned for

ammunition resupply, but the initial fighting load was a factor in saving the LZ. Finally, there is no question that Moore's planning enabled him to Adjust According to the Situation. His lightning-like assessments of the battlefield enabled him to make a ~ ~ r o ~ r i a adiustments te in fluid situation. He changed company missions many times, developed impromptu task organizations for immediate missions, and he responded to subordinates' requests for adjustments based on their knowledge of the situation. Moore could not have affected this flexible adaptation scheme without first Establishing a Sense of Common Purpose for the Unit. The

common purpose of 1/7 Cav on the morning of 14 November was to find the NVA and kill a lot of them. By twilight

on 16 November no one would dispute the battalion's claim of "mission accomplished." USE OF AVAILABLE SYSTEMS In parallel with the two previous assessments, the LPI and SKA of Use of Available Systems are not appropriate for analysis of Moore's combat leadership at LZ X-Ray. While there may have been information filtering,

and there certainly was resource manasement, these performance indicators do not have the combat-orientation necessary for application in the study. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Hal Moore's performance at LZ X-Ray ranks as one of the best examples of the application of professional Army
294

ethics in a combat situation.

Moore's actions on the LZ

clearly demonstrate how professional Army ethics are the foundation of moral and physical courage on the battlefield. Hal Moore fully Accepted Responsibility for the conduct of the battle of LZ X-Ray. He was entirely

responsible for his decisions and for whatever his unit accomalished or failed to accomplish. In allowing

subordinates to make decisions at their level, in their perspective, Moore acknowledsed the ownership of the failures and successes of his subordinates. He acknowledged that Herren was initially going to be unable to reach Herrick's isolated platoon. He acknowledged that

the combined attack by Nadal and Herren would not link-up with Savage. He accepted the possibility that Savage He accepted the possibility that

might be annihilated.

his entire battalion might be overrun due to the numerical advantage of the NVA

but he never articulated that

concern to subordinates. Moore was definitely a Role Model. He led bv

example in every way, and his subordinates mimicked his behavior. Moore's excitement at the discovery of the NVA

deserter also exhilarated his company commanders and reinforced their aggressiveness toward the enemy. Moore's

attitude for the air assault was to attack the NVA; his company commanders and platoon leaders showed that they were imbued with the same spirit. Moore "kept his cool"
2 95

and made quick decisions "on his feet".

Likewise, Herren,

NadaI, Edwards, and Diduryk maintained their composure during the roughest moments, personally engaged the enemy, and commanded their units, often in spite of wounds. must be remembered that Diduryk and Sugdinis were two company commanders from another battalion. To Moore's It

credit, these officers seemed to quickly accept his dynamic combat leadership and they mimicked his behavior throughout their period of attachment to 1/7 Cav. Moore was not afraid to admit a mistake or failure but it is important to note that he treated failure as a condition of the battlefield and planned around it. Herein lies the enormous difference between successful and unsuccessfull leaders on the battlefield. Beginning with

the recognition that things will never go according to plan after the first round is fired, the successful combat commander accepts the events of the battlefield as distinct decision points which require expedit: ous
7

assessment, validation, and reaction. The successful commander pre-determines those elements of the battle which will be valid criteria for judging whether or not he is winning or losing the engagement.
By contrast, the

unsuccessful commander neglects to establish criteria for success. He then compounds his error by subjecting himself to a decision-making process which is bombarded by thousands of impressions of the battle. This only serves

to add additional layers of obscuration to the already

296

heavy "fog of war".

The successful commander knows what His professional Army

indicators, or signs, to look for.

ethics enable him to stand firm in the midst of the swirling maelstrom of battle and make informed, intuitive decisions once he assesses the status of his indicators of success. In the case of LTC Hal Moore at LZ X-Ray, it is

evident that he accepted a mistake or failure at face value, as a local condition, not an end state. applying practiced. practical iudsement, Moore Demonstrated Maturity in command under fire. His By

decisions were not emotional yet they accounted for the "can do" attitude of his organization and capitalized on the emotional charge of his unit. Undeniably, the actions

of subordinate leaders like Edwards, Marm, and Savage boldly show to what extent Moore's professional ethics permeated his battalion. Moore Demonstrated Bearing and Physical Fitness. His posture, appearance, and uhvsical movement around the perimeter during the three days of fighting are indicative of his ability to endure stress without rest. It also Moore

highlighted his confidence in himself and his unit.

and his men shared the view that they had, and could, inflict serious punishment on the NVA. Moore's concern for the evacuation of the wounded and dead troopers of his battalion is a premier indicator of his com~assion.selflessness, and intesrity. Moore demanded that all casualties be evcauated as rapidly as
2 97

possible and that every soldier be accounted for at the end of the fighting. In light of the relatively embryonic

nature of the airmobility concept, his use of troop helicopters to evacuate casualties on their exit flights from the LZ was a highly imaginative approach which had great impact on the individual and collective morale of his battalion. His troopers knew that, if they were

wounded, they would be evacuated by helicopter for immediate treatment. They also knew, and were possibly

comforted by the idea, that if they were killed, their bodies would not remain "lost" on the battlefield, that they would go "home". In the training environments of the

peacetime Army, these notions fail to receive sufficient attention. Based on a review of NTC and JRTC "lessons

learned", casualty evacuation procedures for light infantry units, in contact with the enemy, deserve increased interest. As Moore so ably demonstrated,

concern for the well-being of the soldiers includes expeditious casualty evacuation and guaranteed recovery of remains. CTC results routinely reveal that for most

battalions, this concern never progresses past an ambiguous, templated remark in the Personnel Annex of the operations order. Future battalion commanders must

address casualty evacuation as a small unit combat imperative if they expect their soldiers to believe that leaders will take care of them if they are injured while fighting aggressively with the enemy.
2 98

As Hal Moore has

shown, soldiers must know that their remains will be tenderly and honorably recovered by the unit. For future

battalion commanders, this is ethical behavior of the highest order.

ENDNOTES
1 J.
2

D.

olem man, Pleiku, P. 37.

Ibid.

4 Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, ed., American's First Battles, 1776-1965, pp. 304-308.
5
6
7

Heller and Stofft, p. 309. Coleman, p. 77. Ibid. and Coleman, p. 95

11

a LTC David R. Campbell, "Fighting Encircled: Study in U.S. Army Leadership, p. 68.
9

Shelby Stanton, Anatomy of a Division. Michael Herr, Dispatches, pp. 95-97. Ibid., p. 96. John Galvin, Air Assault, p . 293. Galvin, pp. 293-294 and coleman, p. 189. Campbell, p. 69.

lo
11

12
13

14

1 5 John Cash, et.al., Seven Firefishts in Vietnam, p. 2.

16

Stanton, p. 55. Ibid. cash,. P. 2. Ibid. Galvin, p. 294. Heller and Stofft, p. 315. cash, P. 3. Stanton, p. 55.

17
18

19
20

2 1
22

23

2 4 Coleman, pp. 197-198, estimates a battalion size attack by the H-15 Main Force VC Battalion. U . S . casualties were seven killed, twenty-three wounded. cash doesn't mention the attack.
25

Coleman, p. 199.
olem man, p. 199 and Cash, p. 4.

26 27 28

Coleman, p. 200 and cash, P. 5. Campbell, p. 69.

30

Cash, P. 5.

32

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Combat enc 1 osure Cash, p. 6 . Campbell, p. 70. 1st Cav Div (Airmobile), p. 84. Ibid., p. 8 5 and Galvin, p . 294. Ibid., p. 8 and Coleman, pp. 203-204. Cash, P. 8. Campbell, p. 70. Ibid.; Cash, pp. 8-10; and Coleman, p. 207. Ibid. Ibid.

28.
33

34

35
36

37
3% 39
40

4 1

42
43

Campbell, p. 71. From LTG (RET) Harold G. Moore's tape to BG William Kinnard (Chief, Center for Military History), 30 April 1984, Encircled Project Files, CMH, p. 3.
44
4 5

Ibid. cash, p . 11.

46

Campbell, p. 72; Cash, p. 11; and Coleman, coleman, p. 209. campbell, p. 72; Cash, p. 11; and Coleman, Ibid. coleman, p. 209. Ibid. Campbell, p. 73. Galvin, p. 294. Cash, p. 12. coleman, p. 209.

p. 209.
47

48

p. 209.
49

50
5 1

52
53

54

55

5 6 Cash, p. 13, describes the POW as a deserter who had lived on bananas for five days.

57

Campbell, p. 71. Ibid. Ibid.

58
59

6 0 Ibid. All three sources indicate that Moore gave Herren instructions to intensify his search and to be prepared to assume Company C's mission. However, all three sources then indicate that Herren had assumed the Company C mission concurrent with the orders to be prepared to do so. It seems unlikely that Moore would push Company B toward the mountains without first ensuring the LZ was secure. Security of the LZ, in the face of an enormous enemy threat, was paramount. While there is no evidence to corroborate the assumption that Moore subsequently ordered Herren to change missions after Company A landed, it is highly logical that Moore would have done it just about like that.

62
63

Galvin, p. 294 Coleman, P. 211. Cash, p. 14. coleman, p. 213.

64

65

66

Ibid. Stanton, P. 56. Coleman, pp. 213-214 Ibid., p. 214. 'Ibid. Campbell, p. 74 Cash, p. 18. Ibid., pp. 18-19 and Coleman, pp. 215-216.

67
68

69

70
71
72
73

7 4 Campbell, p. 75 and Coleman, p. 217 and First Cav Division AAR, p. 84.

75
76

Ibid. Cash, p. 21. Ibid. and Coleman, p. 218. Ibid.; Cash, p. 21; and Campbell, p. 75 Campbell, p. 76. rbid. stanton, p. 58.

77
78 79

80

81

8 2 Campbell, p. 76. The battalion surgeon, CPT Metzger, loaded wounded all afternoon even though he had been wounded in the shoulder. Late in the afternoon, Metzger was killed by a sniper.
83
84

Campbell, p. 76. Stanton, p. 59 and 1st Cav Division AAR, Coleman, p. 219. Ibid. Ibid., p. 220. Coleman, p. 220; Cash, p. 25; and campbell, Ibid., p. 220.

p. 84.
85
86

87
88

p. 77.
89

90

Ibid., p. 221. Campbell, p. 77.

91

9 2 Ibid., p. 28. It was for his heroic action in this attack that.2LT Marm would be awarded the Medal of Honor.
93

1st Cav Division AAR, p. 84.

Coleman, pp. 233-224; Cash, p. 29; and Campbell, P. 78.

94
95

Stanton, pp. 59-60. Cash, pp. 29-31. Coleman, P. 225. Campbell, p. 78. Ibid. Tolson, Airmobility 1961-1971, pp. 78-79. Campbell, p. 79. Ibid.; Coleman, p. 226; and cash, p. 32. Coleman, p. 230. Ibid., pp. 230-231. Ibid. and 1st Cav Division AAR, p. 84 1st Cav Division AAR, p. 84.

9s
97
98 99

100

101
102
103
104

105
106

107 Campbell, p. 79. Artillery at LZ Falcon fired over 4000 rounds that night.

109

Ibid.

111
112

Stanton, p. 60. Cash, p . 38. Heller and Stofft, p . 318. Stanton, p. 6 0 .

113 114

139

Ibid., p. 10. An

1 4 0 Hamburger, "Leadership in Combat: Historical Appraisal," p. 3.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions The primary objective of this thesis has been to determine what skills of command of battalions in combat could be learned from a leadership analysis of selected light infantry combat battalion commanders in World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam. The study focused on an

historical analysis and leadership assessment of the successful combat performance of three Distinguished Service Cross-winning battalion commanders. What conclusions can be drawn about battalion command in combat? Do the leadership competencies of FM 22-100,

Military Leadershiv, provide a framework for historical assessment of battalion commanders in World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam? Can the nine leadership competencies and

their associated tasks, SKA, and LPI serve as an assessment or evaluation tool for battalion commanders during training or NTC or JRTC rotations? Are there

overtly measurable criteria for success in commanding a battalion in combat? Does an historical analysis of past

battalion commanders reveal basic tenets of battlefield success? Fundamental to any discussion of conclusions of this study is the clear understanding of the intent of the leadership competencies and the supporting tasks, the
307

skills, knowledse, and attitudes, and the leaders hi^ performance indicators. The nine leadership competencies

communications, supervision, teaching and counseling,

soldier team development, technical and tactical proficiency, decision-making, planning, use of available systems, and professional ethics

were developed in 1976

to provide a framework for leadership development and assessment. However, the lack of adequate tasks,

conditions, standards (or valid performance indicators) for evaluating, assessing, and developing leaders during training events (such as ARTEPs and NTC rotations) drove the Army Research Institute and the Center for Army Leadership to develop the leadership performance indicators (LPI). The LPI were based on the nine

leadership competencies and were intended to be subjective, not totally measurable (in order to allow for a leader's personal dynamics), and were to be generic in nature in order to be applicable in the "schoolhouse" and on the AirLand Battlefield. The end product, as seen in

the May, 1989, approved final draft of FM 22-100, Military Leadership, is an Army leadership doctrine which outlines the nine functions in which leaders must be competent if their organizations are to operate effectively. The first conclusion which is evident from this study is that the FM 22-100 leadership competencies are an adequate outline for conducting an historical assessment of past battalion commanders in combat. 308 In general terms,

the assessments of the combat leadership of LTCs Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore have confirmed the Army's doctrinal position that successful combat battalion commanders must "perform" some degree of each of the nine

. .

over-arching competencies if their respective organizations are to operate effectively under fire. Because the competencies are deeply rooted in the eleven time-honored leadership principles

the leadership

doctrine of the 1940's. 501s, and 60's consistent evaluation was attainable.

a fundamentally

In this regard, the

FM 22-100 leadership competencies clearly fulfilled their

doctrinal role as broad, over-arching performance categories. Morever, the study has also clearly indicated that, at least in terms of historical assessment, some competencies are difficult to observe or are not completely applicable to a combat situation (see diagram 5). This conclusion is based on the fact that many of the

required leadership tasks, supporting skills. knowledqe.

,(LPI)

and leadershiu ~erformanceindicators

the subordinate evaluation criteria of each

competency
4

did not have a warfighting focus and were

more germane to "the schoolhouse" than to the AirLand Battlefield.

This conclusion substantiates the existence of a disconnect between Army leadership doctrine and actual field application. Viewed in the context of the FM 100-5

operational doctrine, the "breakdown" has occurred at the

30 9

point where the nine competencies may be effectively used as a leadership assessment tool during training events (CPS, FTX, ARTEP, NTC or JRTC rotation, etc.). At this

point in their development, the leadership competencies are not entirely valid for use in the field. The

application of the leadership competency/performance indicator model in the examination of the combat leadership of Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore highlighted both major and minor incongruities. For example, "Technical and Tactical Proficiency" is the competency which is the keystone to the entire leadership arch, yet there are no tasks, conditions, or standards for assessing this tremendously crucial function during training events. This is a major shortfall. Another example is The

found in the competency "Use of Available Systems."

11

systems" which immediately come to mind are the

"Battlefield Operating Systems" (BOS) of AirLand Battle Doctrine. However, the essential task of this competency is "Effectively Employ Management Technology," and the supporting SKA and LPI deal with information filtering, computer literacy, and the use of technology to garner and process information. There is no mention of BOS. Clearly, some fine-tuning is needed to reconstitute the linkage between the leadership competencies of FM 22-100 and FM 100-5. A more detailed conclusive analysis of the performance standards of each competency follows.
310

'-.
C,OHPETEHCY SUPERVlSlOH TEACHIHG AHD COUNSELlHG SOLDIER TEAH DEVELOPHEHT TECHHICAL AND TACTICAL PROFICIENCY D E C I S I O N HAKIHG PLANNIHG USE OF AVAILABLE SYSTEHS PROFESSIOHAL ETHICS OTHER

L TC VANDER VOORT

LTC LYNCH

LTC HOORE

I
1
1

1
1 1

1
11

4 4 1
0

4
4

4 4
0

4
0

4.
1

COMMUNICATIONS The assessments of the three battalion commanders has clearly shown that without effective communications on the battlefield, the commander runs the risk of losing control of his organizaiton and jeopardizing the success of his mission and that of his parent organization. Included in this is the fact that poor or ineffective communications gets soldiers killed. LTCs Vandervoort and

Moore stand out as extremely effective communicators because of their personal emphasis and involvement in combat communications. Both of these officers

demonstrated to a great degree several of the SKA subordinate to the communications competency: Simplicity; (2) Clearly Communicate Orders; (3) Communicate Up, Down, Horizontally; and (4) Clearly Communicate Intent. The degree to which Vandervoort and
(1) Stress

Moore demonstrated these SKA suggests that these four supporting skills may very well be considered as the imperatives of battalion commander communications in combat. In contrast, LTC Lynch seems to have succeeded in spite of a less-than-stellar rating in the communications category. The research clearly showed that Lynch had

incomplete communications with his immediate superior, COL Nist. Also, Lynch appears to have had minimal

communications with adjacent units and had trouble maintaining solid commo with his supporting arms. 312 While

there are numerous mitigating circumstances pertaining to Lynch's marginally effective communications on Hill 314, two points are especially instructive:

(1) Lynch had his

By

best communications with his assault companies.

stressing simplicity, clearly communicating orders, and by clearly communicating intent to his subordinate commanders, Lynch placed his emphasis on the aspect of communications which deserved the most attention battalion internal communications: and (2) the synchronization of combat power at the decisive point of the battlefield revolves around commnications with supporting arms and services. As a result, the battalion

his

commander must make the synchronization of fires his own pre-battle special interest item if he expects it to work according to plan. Additionally, a back-up

commmunications plan

internal to the battalion as well

as with combined arms elements communications.

is vital to effective

In what may appear to be an abberation, none of the three battalion commanders gave any overt indications that they were a Good Listener or Obtained Feedback. From an

historical perspective, Be a Good Listener is a SKA that is difficult to assess. And unless it is specifically

described in the combat narrative, Obtain Feedback is just as difficult to analyze. This conclusion seems to suggest

that unless more specific LPI are developed for these SKA, it will be just as difficult to assess these SKA during training exercises.
313

But what is most important about these two SKA is that they are both vital and complementary ingredients of effective communications on the battlefield. How well a

battalion commander can Be a Good Listener and Obtain Feedback is best measured in the types of decisions he makes in situations where subordinates have suggested probable courses of action of offered specific tactics or techniques. Using this criteria, there is ample evidence within the combat situations of each of the three battalion commanders to demonstrate the "listener-decision maker" linkage. Vandervoort, for example, is described as having "listened" to LT Turnball's assessment of the situation at Neuville-au-Plain and subsequently "deciding" to not only maintain the outpost in the village but allow Turnball to execute the mission. Later, when LT Wray approached him

with a request for reinforcements, Vandervoort "listened", then "decided" that Wray should instead conduct a counterattack (which produced handsome results). LTC Lynch employed a similar philosophy on Hill
314.

He "listened'* to the situation assessments from his

assault company commanders during numerous incremental stages of the attack. He then "decided" to continue the attack, leaving execution details to the company commanders on the ground. at LZ X-Ray. The same is true of LTC Moore

There are numerous examples of Moore

"listening" to his company commanders' assessments or

314

suggestions and reacting with "decisions" that took into full account the trust and confidence Moore felt in his subordinates' abilities to execute his orders. The assessments infer that fundamental to the "listener-decision-maker" linkage is the assertion that the battalion commander must have an organization based on a deliberately constructed and maintained sense of trust and confidence in the ability of his subordinate leaders. The connection with SOLDIER TEAM DEVELOPMENT, TEACHING AND COUNSELING, AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS is not accidental. COMMUNICATIONS is the cornerstone of the arch of competencies: every competency is based on COMMUNICATIONS or affected by it. The successful battalion commanders,

then, are the ones that "listen to their battalions and obtain feedback on key activities. The whole chain of command then becomes a group of "listeners" and "feedback-gatherers." By the simple act of listening to

his soldiers or quizzing his men about the mission, the battalion commander can establish the groundwork for a cohesive, technically and tactically proficient, and highperformance soldier team. This is the type of unit

required for contingency operations in the 1990's. The final comment on the communications competency deals with the SKA Clearly Communicate Intent. As the narratives of the three battalion commanders have unmistakably articulated, combat at the battalion level is incredibly chaotic and fluid.
315

Vandervoort, Lynch, and

Moore demonstrated that decentralized command, reinforced by the presence of the battalion commander at decisive locations during the action, is the key to success in battalion combat. Because the battalion commander cannot

be everywhere on the battlefield, he must rely on subordinate leaders to use practical, practiced iudsement to solve problems at small arms range. The battalion

commander facilitates the execution of this decision-making by articulating his overall intent to subordinates in mission orders. Statements of intent establish two extremely vital guidelines for subordinate leaders:
(1) the commander

stipulates the parameters, or boundaries, within which the subordinate has flexbility to operate; and (2) the commander focuses the subordinate on the eventual end state of the mission by desribing

in very simple terms

what success will look like at the conclusion of the mission. The importance of commander's intent cannot be The three battalion commanders in this study

over-stated.

clearly demonstrated that intent must be communicated to subordinates if rapid reaction to unforeseen circumstances is expected. Quick response to new developments is just

what battalion-level combat is all about. But the communication of intent cannot be clearly achieved in three-paragraph statements. Intent must be

succinctly and concisely addressed in extremely simple, common sense terms. If it is not, a simple back-brief by
316

subordinates will reveal the confusion.

Statements of

commander's intent must describe what success will look like on the battlefield. Vandervoort "painted" the

picture of success for Turnball at Neuville and the lieutenant executed a mission which was to have operational-level significance. Lynch focused his company commanders on the end-state of fighting on Hill 314 by stating that the capture of Knob 3 would constitute success. Moore's basic intent for the mission into LZ

X-Ray was to find the elusive NVA units and defeat them in a conventional battle. In every case, a straight-forward

picture of success was included in the commander's intent. SUPERVISION LTG (RET) Arthur S. Collins, Jr. writes in his article, "Tactical Command" that "there is no substitute for the physical presence (of the commander) on the ground."l Forward This philosophy is the skill of Command a performance standard clearly demonstrated by "Battalion command is the

Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore.

essence of tactical command," writes LTG Collins, and it is at battalion level that the commander "actively exercises his command responsibility in a most constant, obvious, personal, and effective manner."Z successful battalion commander is: Out where the action is...with one of the lead units, or at a forward observation post where he can see the ground being fought over, or at a critical crossroad or stream crossing, or at the forward collecting point talking to men who have just been wounded in battle. In the course of a day, he will The

have been at several such points. All the time he is weaving a web of knowledge of the terrain, the effectiveness of his unit's firepower, and that of the enemy. He is aware of the hardships and pressures his troops are being subjected to and how they are reacting in a given situation. He is consistently sensitive to his unit, his troops, and the conditions under which his unit is fighting. The same applies in peacetime training and operations.3 As seen in the examples of Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore, Command Forward appears to be an imperative of command and control of an infantry battalion in combat. LTG Collins' description of commanding forward is excellent and clearly shows the importance of supervision and its relationship with other competencies. Appropriately, Command Forward is the first SKA of the SUPERVISION competency. The analysis of the three battalion commanders has revealed that the SKA Enforce Safety Standards has a peacetime slant and does not take into account the more applicable combat safety requirements. There is no

disputing the importance of safety in training or in combat. Where the LPI for Enforce Safety Standards falls apart is that there is no mention of the inherently

dangerous business of direct and indirect fires on the battlefield. In other words, a more relevant LPI would

list indicators such as "apply fire control measures", "effectively command and control direct and indirect fires", "protect troops from fratricide and enemy fires", etc. The remaining three SKA's of the supervise competency were found to be difficult to apply to combat leadership assessments. Establish/Enforce Standards,

Follow-up on Corrective Action, and Provide Feedback have LPI which relate more to garrison activities or structured training events than to dynamic combat situations. To effectively supervise subordinates competency

the key task of the

in garrison or on some training exercises

where there is ample time for after-action review and feedback, these LPI will work well. However, the LPI need

to address such combat critical tasks as "assess morale of the organization", "assess combat power", or "assess the ability of the organization to perform continuous operations". The LPI need to examine such considerations as faced by LTC Lynch before he assaulted Hill 314: how to enforce standards and follow up on corrective action after a failed mission? What type of training should occur

between battles to correct identified deficiencies from the previous combat experience? Or look at Moore's what

reaction to the failed attempts to reach Savage:

319

sort of corrective action and standards enforcement must occur during the course of a battle which must take into account the unforgiving nature of failure in combat friendly casualties? TEACHING AND COUNSELING As each of the three assessments has shown, it is difficult to ascertain what degree of coaching and teaching went on in the combat situations of the battalion commanders. This is an extremely important competency which actually has its full impact prior to and after combat, not during battle. There is no doubt that a battalion commander in combat must demand action, but the LPI defining this SKA is incomplete. While subordinate initiative is mentioned, there is no requirement listed for "operate within commander's intent1' or "subordinate leaders use imagination and initiative to overcome obstacles". of these indicators were prevalent actions of the subordinates of Vandervoort, Lynch and Moore. The SKA Teach Skills and Train for War were found to be present but not observed in all three assessments. Undeniably, these two SKA are the fundamentals of infantry tactical commandership and have the most significant impact on the actions of the unit in combat. Unfortunately, the LPI which support these SKA seem to skirt the importance of such indicators as "subordinates demonstrate knowledge of current tactical doctrine and
320

Both

weapons employment" or "subordinates demonstrate complete understanding of combat leadership requirements." Nor is

there mention of "mastery of combined arms warfighting"

vital to infantry success and demonstrated in each of the three combat narratives. Logically, these SKA should also

address the application of the nine leadership competencies to pre-combat and combat situations.
S

It is a fair assumption to say that each of the three battalion commanders achieved overwhelming success because they had developed cohesive soldier teams prior to entering combat. The SKA for this competency are appropriate and well-developed. Each of the three battalion commanders in the study went into their respective engagements with somewhat different levels of soldier team development. Vandervoort, for example, was making his third combat jump, but it was his first operation as battalion commander. His troops were all seasoned veterans of fighting at Sicily and Salerno, with successful missions under their belts. LTC Lynch, on the other hand, had his work cut out for him. His battalion was hastily moved into combat On his first Thus, after

without adequate collective task training. mission, his battalion performed dismally.

enduring a poor first outing, Lynch had to develop his soldier teams from the point of a morale disadvantage.
321

The manner in which Lynch seems to have turned his battalion around reads like a listing of each and every SKA and LPI of the soldier team competency. Moore had a 'seasoned "training" battalion when he air assaulted into LZ X-Ray. He had almost all of the

subordinate leaders at LZ X-Ray that had trained with him for 14 months at Ft. Benning. Other than dulsatory patrol

action near Pleiku, Moore's battalion was yet to be tested in heavy combat. As the narrative points out, Moore's battalion was a well-developed soldier team because he placed tremendous emphasis on it during the Ft. Benning days. The litmus test of a soldier team occurs when a unit is inserted into the swirling, turbulent hurricane of close combat: it absolutely must train for this "test" in peacetime or, like Lynch's 3/7 Cav, be shipwrecked by the storm. Current U.S. Army contingency operations Future battalion commanders must

reinforces this concept.

have cohesive combat teams before deployment; few opportunities for soldier team development exist at hand grenade range. Perhaps the most vexing issue of soldier team development is trainins subordinates to reolace you. While the Army of the late 1980's seemed to get beyond the "zero defects mentality", the budgetary constraints of the 90's will invariably force units to make the best showing on each high visibility, high-dollar training event.
322

NTC

and JRTC are premier examples where the use of subordinate leaders to replace commanders takes on a risk that is out of immediate proportion to the long-term training benefits. Simply stated, units are afraid to "lose", and

when organizations get only one opportunity to demonstrate their proficiency during a battalion commander's three year tour, the stakes are incredibly high. Many factors

contribute to this attitude and it is not the intended purpose of this thesis to lay them out. But, the bottom line is that combat requires leaders at every level to be trained to replace his superior. Superiors have to take active measures to

ensure that subordinates can step in to run the organization. Though none of the three battalion

commanders in this study had to relinquish command to a subordinate leader, the examples at Hill 314 and LZ X-Ray point out the necessity for NCOs to be prepared to command platoons and companies is blatently evident. What the U.S. Army needs to emphasize is a specific training program for this requirement. This is the highest form of subordinate leader development greatest dividends in combat. TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL PROFICIENCY Because there were no tasks, SKA, or LPI for this competency, a performance standard was developed for use in the leadership/competency performance indicator model.

the one that will pay the

As described in Chapter 3, the SKA and LPI constructed for the study were intended to demonstrate linkage between the Army's leadership doctrine and the warfighting theory of AirLand Battle doctrine. Although it is arguable whether it is fair to assess the three commanders on doctrine which did not exist in their time, it is instructive to observe just how applicable AirLand Battle doctrine is in terms of learning the skills of command of battalions in combat. What comes out of the application of AirLand Battle doctrine in the assessment of TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL PROFICIENCY is not surprising: success on the battlefield

is dependent upon the integration of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. The salient point is that

battalion commanders win on the battlefield because they plan for and orchestrate all available combat systems. This orchestration is seen in AirLand Battle doctrine as synchronization of Battlefield Operating Systems. DECISION-MAKING Unequivocally, each of the three battalion commanders demonstrated exceptional skill in making tough decisions under fire. Several factors stand out as

contributing to the effectiveness of decision-making in combat:

(1) a simple plan facilitates rapid decisions as

events unfold; (2) tough decisions are best communicated face-to-face with subordinate leaders; (3) the commander and his subordinate leaders must subscribe to and apply
324

the same decision-making methods (in training and in combat); and (4) that the "practiced, practical judgement", "terrain sense", "single-minded tenacity", "ferocious audacity", and "physical confidence" highlighted in LTC K. E. Hamburger's study of combat leadership are appropriate SKA for this competency. Of the four factors contributing to decision-making in combat, the five traits of successful combat leaders listed in LTC Hamburger's study deserves some attention. These traits were applied in the assessments of Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore as auxilliary LPI. Interestingly enough, all three battalion commanders exercised these components in decision-making on the battlefield. And of these five components, "terrain

sense" and "practiced practical judgement"

common sense

stood out above the others.

PLANNING The analysis of the three battalion commanders suggests that the simplest plans are the ones that work best in combat. Simple plans facilitate flexibility, thus

providing the battalion commadner with some space (and maybe time) to adapt to fluid situations. There is nothing new in this conclusion (see Infantry in Battle, p. 35) but it bears repeating in this age of complex, multi-layered contingency operations. Several points of interest have come out of the application of this competency in the battalion commander
325

assessments:

(1) the battalion commander must have a It is vital

supervision plan mapped out for the battle.

that he deliberately chart his movement around the battlefield so that he can get the first-hand impressions of the fighting which are essential to combat decision-making and planning: (2) success must be defined for subordinate units. To reiterate, the commander must

style his intent in such a way as to plainly articulate the end-state of the mission: (3) troop leading procedures worked in three wars, and they will work now. Troop

leading procedures and infantry tactical doctrine were the foundation of the performance of Lynch on Hill 314. And Moore went "by the book" as he planned for the air assault into LZ X-Ray. Troops leading procedures must be applied

completely up and down the chain of command; from battalion to squad. Units must rehearse, conduct

back-briefs, have "chalk-talks" like football teams, use sandtables (models, etc.)

but these vital segments of

mission planning are not described in the LPI for planning USE OF AVAILABLE SYSTEMS The task, SKA, and LPI of this competency constitute the largest disconnect between AirLand Battle doctrine and Army leadership doctrine. First, the task

effectively e m ~ l o vmanasement technolosv, has too much of an automatic data processing ring to it. FM 22-100

reinforces this slant by neglecting to include such battlefield-related tasks as "effectively employ 326

battlefield operating systems", "effectively integrate sustainment imperatives", or "effectively employ command and control systems". This competency must be over-hauled In its

to bring it on line with AirLand Battle doctrine.

current configuration, it was universally not applicable as an historical assessment tool. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS The professional ethics competency, and its supporting SKA and LPI, is the best developed competency of FM 22-100. The application of this competency in the

assessments boldly highlighted the monumental importance of professional ethics on the battlefield. Each of the

three battalion commanders examined in this study exemplified the professional Army ethic in such a way as to make leader ethical behavior into something of a combat multiplier. Vandervoort continued on in combat with a

broken ankle and clearly signalled to his soldiers what the leadership standard was as his battalion fought at St. Mere-Eglise. Lynch demonstrated exceptional maturity

during the fight for Hill 314 at a time when his battalion badly needed a strong, self-disciplined leader to emulate. And Moore demonstrated the highest standard of

the professional army ethic by ensuring that every trooper of his battalion was accounted for at the end of the battle. This study has shown that the leadership competencies of FM 22-100 provide an adequate framework 327

for historical assessment of successful battalion commanders, yet need some fine-tuning to achieve a FM 100-5 warfighting focus. But has the study identified

any overtly measurable criteria for successful battalion command in combat? The answer is yes. The examination of Vandervoort,

Lynch, and Moore has shown that the following eleven indicators must appear to produce success: rapid battlefield planning (and simple plans) missions orders maintain initiative fire support (coordination, synchronization) innovation coaching on the battlefield communications training; pre-battle, between battles casualty evacuation and KIA recovery location/presence of battalion commander forward define success for subordinates The following is a brief discussion of each of those eleven performance indicators. R a ~ i dBattlefield Planninq . Although rapid planning almost sounds like a contradiction in terms, on the battlefield it is the "bread and butter" of the battalion commander engaged with the enemy. What Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore have
328

demonstrated is that at the battalion level, the decision cycle must be quickly completed if friendly forces are to retain the initiative and momentum of offensive operations. The outcome of the battle, it seems, depends on the ability of the battalion commander to complete the cycle of acquiring information (through first hand observations), analyzing information and developing responses (orienting on the immediate tactical problem), making a decision, and issuing instructions and supervising task execution. It also necessarily calls for

a command and control philosophy which incorporates commander presence at forward locations, use of mission orders, clear articulation of success, and synchronization of combat power. The most important aspect of rapid battlefield planning seems to be the battalion commander's ability to "read", or assess, the situation confronting his battalion. This assessment "snapshot" may take into

account the full spectrum of the situation from the operational to the squad or individual soldier level. Vandervoort's "read" of the situation after the parachute drop in the early hours of 6 June 1944 stands out as a classic case of a battalion commander recognizing the opportunity for his organization to positively affect the outcome of the operational battle. The recognition of

this opportunity was predicated on the window of opportunity afforded by the German actions (and
329

inaction).

The "key" to this "read"

to use some

football terminology

is the enemy, and the battalion

commander has got to be in a forward position in order to accurately assess the enemy activities.
.

Hand-in-hand with rapid battlefield planning goes

the skill of terrain appreciation, or "reading" the terrain. "The best tactical commanders," according to LTG

Collins, "have a keen appreciation of terrain...such a commander's unit experiences one tactical success after another."( Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore all showed an Vandervoort sited Turnball at

"eye for the terrain."

Neuville because he was conscious of the observation and fields of fire afforded by the wide, flat ground leading north to Montbourg. Lynch ascertained the tactical

significance of each of the Knobs on Hill 314 and battled for control of them. And Moore immediately saw the

advantages and disadvantages of the terrain of LZ X-Ray and he shaped his tactics appropriately. "There is no doubt in my mind," continues LTG Collins, "that a commander's ability to see the advantages and disadvantages in terrain for attack or defense is a major contributing factor to his unit's success."s The

absolutely imperative nature of this skill of command in combat is also reiterated in Infantry in Battle in clear, performance oriented prose: In the absence of definite information small infantry units must be guided by their mission and by the terrain... The intelligent leader knows that the terrain is his staunchest ally, and that it virtually

determines his formation and scheme of maneuver. Therefore, he constantly studies it for indicated lines of action... The ground is an open book. The commander who reads and heeds what it has to say is laying a sound foundation for tactical success.6 Mission Orders This study has clearly highlighted that the battalion commander in combat must, as a rule, employ mission orders to achieve success. Vandervoort's success at St. Mere-Eglise is directly attributed to his use of mission orders with LT's Turnball and Wray. Lynch, in a

somewhat different predicament in terms of the battlefield maturity of his organization, used mission orders to demonstrate his trust and confidence in his subordinates to get the job done. Moore's use of mission orders to

CPT's Nadal and Herren is an example of practiced, practical judgement on the battlefield. Moore was

fighting three separate engagements on LZ X-Ray and he had to rely on his subordinates to fight their own battles within his overall intent. The use of mission orders in combat is one of the fundamentals of AirLand Battle doctrine. This study has

not only shown historical precedent for mission orders as a standard for success, but it has also suggested that the nine leadership competencies prescribe the use of mission orders in combat. Future contingency operations involving

the U.S. Army will require that success on the battlefield be achieved by aggressive, intelligent, speedy, and decisive action. The exercise of initiative by
331

subordinates on the modern battlefield can only be facilitated by decentralized decision-making and mission orders. The "tradition" of mission orders demonstrated by

vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore calls for future battalion commanders to coach their subordinate leaders about mission orders, tolerating mistakes in training while engendering a command climate which is based on the trust and confidence found in the application of the leadership competencies. Maintain Initiative Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore were all successful because they seized the intitiative from the enemy and maintained it throughout the course of the battle. The

main point here is that battalion commanders must be conscious of the impact of retention of the initiative on the outcome of the battle. Hand-in-hand with gaining and

maintaining the initiative are rapid battlefield planning and mission orders. Fire Sumort (Coordination/Svnchronization) Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore were successful in large measure because of their use of fire support in their operations. Vandervoort had to rely on mortars

until naval gunfire was available, but then he took maximum advantage of this firepower to blunt a German armor attack. Lynch had a more varied array of ordnance

at his disposal, bringing into play tanks, artillery, mortars, and fighter-bomber aircraft. Moore employed
332

a massive display of firepower on LZ X-Ray, orchestrating everything from aerial rocket fires to B-52 strikes. Clearly, fire support is vital to infantry survival and success on the battlefield. Equally as important is the coordination and synchronization of fire support assets in conjunction with infantry maneuver. In this regard both Lynch and Moore

are instructive. Lynch had trouble synchronizing his platforms with the assault on Hill 314 and very nearly placed his attacking echelons in jeopardy because of poor communications with the air support assets. Lynch also

failed to completely integrate all available fire support assets, neglecting to incorporate the 8th Cav Regiment heavy mortars and the tanks into a coherent fire plan. Moore's performance, in contrast, seems to set the standard for orchestrating and synchronizing multiple fire support assets with the ground tactical plan. Finally, a

review of both cases shows that the successful application of fire support is significantly dependent upon communications. Innovation The old saying that "necessity is the mother of invention" is as true in battalion-level combat as it is in any other pursuit. Successful battalion commanders

must be able to innovate on the battlefield in order to solve tactical problems; they must be opportunists. Innovation on the battlefield dramatically contributes to
333

the success of the mission because the use of imagination, tempered with liberal doses of audacity, tenacity, and practiced, practical judgement, provides opportunities for friendly troops. Vandervoort's innovative outposting of Turnball in Neuville gave the 505th Regiment the advantage of forward power projection and defense in depth. Lynch's innovative

use of his battalion headquarters company as an additional maneuver element and his imaginative assault formations gave his troops the additional combat power and security necessary to take Hill 314. And Moore's innovative air assault tactics and his "mad minute" gave his battalion the advantages of surprise and close-in protection from infiltration. Innovation stands out as a catalyst of success, or even a combat multiplier of success. But innovation is

based on sound doctrinal principles and the ability of the battalion commander to see the battlefield and envision the possibilities. Coachins on the Battlefield The study of Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore strongly implies that coaching on the battlefield is one of the battalion commander's most important roles. Coaching, in

essence, is teaching, and the battalion commander constantly teaches his subordinate leaders about combat performance standards. Teaching, aside from the larger

competency, Teachinq and Counselins is more a professional

334

ethic than anything else.

In fact, the philosophical

concept of the battalion commander as a teacher has as its fundamental the practical application of the nine leadership competencies to the coaching and mentoring 'of his subordinates. Coaching should focus on terrain appreciation, mission orders, battlefield operating systems, communications, and combat leadership. The battalion commander has a professional obligation to coach and teach his subordinate leaders. Coaching on the battlefield is basically as relevant and realistic as coaching a football or basketball team during a conference title game. The

football coach does not stop teaching his assistant coaches during the game, and he does not stop teaching the nuances of offensive or defensive strategy to his unit captains on the sidelines. The same seems to have been

true of Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore on their respective battlefields; they coached their subordinates to improve combat performance. Communications The overwhelming conclusion drawn from this study is that without effective communications the battalion mission is doomed to failure. many forms Communications takes on

from the technical to the personal

but it

is such an important factor to success that a failure in any one of its various aspects jeopardizes mission accomplishment.
335

Communications is justifiably at the top of the list of leadership competencies because without effective communications, the other eight functions are hollow and impotent. Communications has got to be the priority interest item of the battalion commander because of its enormous influence on every other competency. Trainina: Pre-Battle. Between Battles

This indicator of success is logically deduced from the analysis of the combat performance of the battalions of Vandervoort, Lynch, and Moore. Vandervoort, for

instance, seems to have conducted extremely high standard training for his battalion in between its action at Salerno and Normandy. The reason this is so instructive

is that training during war is as important as training for the first battle. More remarkable is the training

Lynch conducted after his battalion's first combat mission and the successful assault on Hill 314. Available evidence suggests he succeeded so dramatically because of his insistence on the fundamentals of infantry doctrine. For Hal Moore, the fight at LZ X-Ray was the logical and long awaited culmination of almost eighteen months of pre-battle training. His battalion's superb

performance unquestionably validated the superiority of his training program. Moore's stateside training program,

incidentally, had as its foundation the development of technically and tactically efficient and cohesive soldier teams

.
336

c
As Moore so poignantly demonstrated, a battalion commander has no greater moral obligation than to care for his wounded soldiers and guarantee possible

as much as is humanly

the recovery of the remains of his soldiers

killed in action. Casualty evacuation is a difficult problem in battle because a unit has to thin its lines to detail litter carriers or "sweep" teams. In order not to lose

momentum and sacrifice the initiative, the battalion commander has got to be innovative in collecting and evacuating his casualties. He has got to be inventive in

balancing the requirement to protect his troops while he is conducting fire and maneuver to accomplish the mission. Casualty evacuation and KIA recovery is a

performance indicator of success because a poor or inadequate evacuation plan can adversely affect the unit's morale and aggressiveness. Location/Presence of the Battalion Commander-Forward The absolute criticality of this performance indicator to the success of the mission is clearly evident from the study of the three battalion commanders. While the circumstances of each situation and METT-T considerations influence the battalion commander's actual location on the ground, the successful commander positions himself well forward to be able to rapidly assess and influence the battle. For the battalion commander,
337

commanding forward is an imperative of his command and control philosophy. Define Success for Subordinates The battalion commander must "paint the picture" of success for his subordinates before combat so they may execute his intent to accomplish the end-state of the task. Without an overtly recognizable "picture" of

success, neither the subordinate leaders nor the battalion commander would have the necessary criteria to judge whether the unit is succeeding or failing. Without established criteria to assess the conduct of the battle, leaders up and down the chain of command deprive themselves of vital decision points for making adjustments which ultimately affect the outcome of the battle. More importantly, this definition of success provides the subordinate leaders with sufficient guidance and intent to operate without orders. The definition of success is a must for mission orders. It also insures

that subordinates don't commit their units toward the task in a manner which reduces the capability of the unit to conduct continuous operations. Lastly, the definition of

success, described by the battalion commanders to his subordinates, gives the'commander the opportunity to make sure that his plan is adequate enough to achieve the stated condition on the terminal end. In summary, the conclusions of the study clearly point out the validity of the use of the nine leadership
338

competencies as broad performance functions for historical assessment. But the supporting SKA and LPI are

considerably inadequate for use as a leader assessment tool during training exercises such as an NTC or JRTC rotation. The following recommendations address the steps necessary to correct this major deficiency. Recommendations The principal recommendation of this study is to close the existing gap between the Army's operational doctrine and its leadership doctrine. According to FM
100-5, leadership is considered to be the most essential

of the four dynamics of combat power, but the leadership performance indicators supporting the nine leadership competencies are missing the AirLand Battle warfighting focus and spirit. proportions. The key point in this recommendation is that if the Center for Army Leadership intends to use the leadership performance indicators as a standard tool for leader assessment during training events, the tasks, SKA, and LPI must reflect current Army tactical doctrine. This is especially true of the "Technical and Tactical Proficiency" competency This is a shortfall of major

the keystone competency

of the nine overarching functions. Perhaps the tasks, SKA, and LPI developed for this study should serve as a start point for the detailed development of this competency. By enlisting the assistance of the Center for
339

Army Lessons Learned and the various branch schools, a standardized leader tasks, conditions, and standards may be devised for evaluating leaders at NTC, JRTC, or CMTC. The "Use of Available Systems" competency also needs revision. The emphasis on employing management

technology is relevant and well intended, but the lack of battlefield-related tasks, SKA, and LPI detract from the focus of the competency. To align this competency with

AirLand Battle doctrine, two additional tasks should be incorporated: "Effectively Employ Battlefield Operating

Systems", and "Effectively Employ Command and Control Systems". Accordingly, this is fertile ground for a joint

Center for Army Leadership and Center for Army Lessons Learned project. This study has shown several other areas which need refinement along the lines of AirLand Battle doctrine. Battlefield coaching should be considered for incorporation as an SKA in either the "Supervision" competency or the "Teach and Counsel" competency. The application of the "supervision" competency demonstrated that the adjustments.
SKA

Enforce Safety Standards needs

Safety is the responsibility of every

leader, and every leader should be taking active measures to protect his troops, in all circumstances. To make the

LPI of this competency more applicable as a training

assessment tool, consideration must be given to adding such indicators as: "employ fire control measures";
340

"command and control of direct and indirect fires"; "orchestrate tactical air support"; "protect troops from enemy fires"; and "protect troops from fratricide". One of the subsidiary purposes of this study was to underscore the need for a more exacting definition of battlefield success as it pertains to battalion combat leadership. Even though the concept of commander's intent

is firmly entrenched in current operational practice, there are indications that the statements of intent in operations orders are not used by commanders to convey a realistic, overtly measurable "picture" of the required end-state of the mission. For Vandervoort, Lynch, and

Moore it was absolutely crucial that the end state of the mission was described just as specifically as the means to achieve it. What future battalion commanders need is a

mental "checklist" by which they can monitor the valid indicators of success at battalion level which will then facilitate opportunities for exploitation. But it is difficult to find any overtly measurable criteria for success in combat outlined in U.S. Army doctrinal manuals. The closest definition of success

found thus far has been one proposed by MAJ William G. Butler in a 1986 School for Advanced Military Studies Monograph. MAJ Butler postulated that: "Success is

defined in relationship to the ends desired when an armed force engages in combat. Before combat the commander

establishes the criteria by which the success or failure

341

of an engagement is to be judged."'

MAJ Butler preceded

to point out that success is based on the ability of the commander to recognize clearly "those elements of the battle which relate directly to the established criteria."g The ability of the commander to recognize

"these elements" drives his subsequent decisions in combat and ultimately effects the outcome of battle. If the

commander neglects to establish criteria for success and then compounds his error by not being able to recognize "the indicators of the valid criteria", he runs the risk of losing the fight.10 Without a doubt, the subject of assessing the valid criteria of battlefield success is interwoven with the
U.S. Army philosophy of command and control and with

AirLand Battle doctrine. How these criteria are established for battalions at the National Training Center, for example, is a subject which should be studied by the Center for Army Tactics, the Army Research Institute, and the Center for Army Leadership. The development of these criteria may very well become some of the most important and far-reaching performance indicators of the 1990's. Recommended that the Center for Army

Leadership integrate the contributors of success from LTC

K. E. Hamburger's combat leadership study into current

leadership doctrine: tenacity:

(5)
(3)

(1) terrain sense: (2) single-minded

(4)

ferocious audacity;

physical confidence;

practiced, practical judgement.

342

In summary, this study consists of an analysis of three battalion commanders who were successful in leading their organizations under fire. LTC's Vandervoort, Lynch,

and Moore dramatically demonstrated that leadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power o n the battlefield. officers By analyzing the performance of these

on whose shoulders so much rests in combat

this study has shown that the battalion commander is indeed the vital link between operational maneuver and small unit tactics. Recent contingency operations reinforce the fact that future battalion commanders must be capable of successfully leading their units into intense combat, with little or no prior notice of the impending operation. And

just like LTC Vandervoort at St. Mere-Eglise, LTC Lynch on Hill 314, and LTC Moore at LZ X-Ray, future battalion commanders must personify the most essential dynamic of combat power and lead at the forward edge of battle.

ENDNOTES
1 LTG Arthur S. Collins, Jr., "Tactical Command," The Challenae of Military Leadership, p. 55
2

Ibid., p. 49. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., p . 54. Ibid. "Infantry in Battle," The Infantry Journal,

4
5
6

pp. 69-78.

MAJ William G. Butler, "How Should the Brigade and Division Commander Assess Success or Failure on the AirLand Battlefield, pp. 3-6.
7
8

Ibid. Ibid.

APPENDIX A

m 2-loo
AP?.ENDIX A ! S D S S H I P COMPZENCIES

The l e a d e r s h i p
I

frctors

and

principles education place

addressw and

i n Chanter 2 a r e t n e
This

s for

the

Army's training

leadership must take

t r a i n i n g framework.

education expefience
8

and and

i n a l o g i c a l o r c e r , build an past
focus.

trqining,
r

and have a warfight:ng

The nane leaoersai:

competmcin They

provide broad

frammork f o r l e a o w s h i p dcvelopmcnt and assessment. categorin of

skills,

establish

knowledge, and a t f z t u o e s :hat

d e f i n e leader behavior.

They a r e a r e a s where l e a d e r s must be competent.

LERDERSHIP COMPETENCIES

m 22-100
The

leadership

competencies were of c0r;roral

devsloped

in

:976

frcm a study of
The s t u c y

l a d d e r s from identified

t h e rank

t o t h a t of general o f f i c e r .

nine functions

a l l l e a o e r s must perform i f an arqanization is t a

operate effectively.
#

&lthouqh a l l l e a d e r s e x e r c i s a t h e competencies, t ? e i * the leader's position in

the

application example, the

depends on amount

organizattm.

Far
'

and d e t a i l of supervf sion a squao i e a a s r normal: y g v e s

*
'

ta
his

his

s o l d i e r 3 k u l d be i n a p p r o p r i a t s + o r a b a t t a l i o n commander ts give -.a Like t h e p r i n c f p l e s of leaders hi^. t h e competmc:es t o memorize.

Use them t o a s s e s s yourself and your

company coauaandars. simply a list

are not

subordinate8 and develop & aetidn plan t o impiove y o A d i l i t y ' t o l a i d .

COMPr(lNICX1CNS

Cummunicatims to what are mother.

you

is t h e

exchange of information and i d e a s from one person

E f f e c t i v e communications occurs when o t h e r s undcrstana e x a c t l v t o t e l l t k a s ' a n d when you understand a x a c t l v ukat tkev you.
Yau

are t r y i n g

trying

to

tsll

communicate t o d i r s c t , i n i l u a n c a , c:orlinatl,
You

encourage,
Ca

superv:se,

t r a i n , teach, coack, and counsal.

need t o

be

ad*

understand and think through a prorrlem and f r a n s l a t a t 3 a t i d e a i n a measured and fashaon.

be
Your

. : : P F .

cancise,
the

message should +or v o w

be

easy t o understand, serve

3:s

?urpose,

approoriate

audiencs.

camoetencv

; ;

addressed f u r t h e r an O a p t e r 3 of t h r s manual.
SUPSVf.SiON

YOU

must

control,

e i r s c t . e v a l u a t e , coordinate. ane ?:an :3e s''cX1 you can msur* t 2 e t a s k i p accomolisnel.

a+

subordinates s o t h a t
~ s u r ut h e

fuoervisacrr
' c

e f f i c f e n t use of materiel and +qua:ment

and t h e ef+ec:xvsnc=s

? r
'

=-LO0

operational
skiils.

procedures. Supervising in
lets

It

includes

establishing

~ o a l e and

cvaluat?ng

you know i f your o r c e r s are understood m e si~ows

the

your

interest

s o l d i e r s and and

mission.

Remember t h a t c v e r ~ u p e r v i s i o r ; 8y considertng

causes resentment your soldiers' judge the

undersucervision

causes f r u s t r a t i o n .

COmPRtenC., amount

motivation, and commitment t o perform a t a s k , ycu This comoetmcy is d i e c u s s d

can

a+ supervision needed.

f u r t h e r i n Chapters'S and b of t h i s manual. TEACHING W D COUNSELING Teacking problems, and counseling

reef

to

improving

performance by overcoming persoectives and sitills.

increasing

knowladge,

or

gaining new
nay

Teaching your and survive in

s o l d i e s is t h e only combat.
YOU

you can t r u l y prepare tkem t o succesr; take a dir&

hand

must

i n your s o l c i g r s '

professional t h e Army.

and personal d w e l o p a m t .

Counseling is e s o u i a l l y imoartant i n

Because of t h e Army's mission, l e a d e r s must 9e conclrned u i t 3 t3e soldiers' rather a than welI-being. an Personal counseling should adoat a aporoacn. 'Lou a l s o n e w -.ne

e n t i r e scope of prcbl-olving, judgment agsnr;

UP

advising,

t o reier
if
this

situation

t o your l e a d e r , t h e c2aolain. o r a serv:ca hand1.e. ! 'o u

w i l l . of c x r a e , fcl!2w
,

i t 3s beyond your a b i l i t y : a

on

actaan.

Performance counseling iocuses on r o l c i w ' s 5shavlor i s m i l i t a r y counsaling is dis=ussed iurtr.ar

is devoted s n t i r r l y t q t?e suo:es'-.
:?

it

relates

Co duty periarmance.

m a p t a r b of t h x 3 manual, and F?I =-I91

S O U I R F 3 irEVE1OPRENT

You must unit teams

c r e a t e s t r o n g bonds betnean you and your s o I d l e r s so t5ac your Since combat is a t a n ac::vity, conesive s ~ i c : e r

f u n c t i a n s a s s team.

are a battle+ield r e w i r m n t .

You r u s t t a k e c u e of v o w s c l l ~ w s a x and ccnf ideecz t o

f 3 C ~ Y

consw.ve

and build t h e i r s o i r i t , eneurancs. s k i : l l

2 l 2-100

tnevitable cohesive, confidence.

hardships disciplined

and unit

sacrfficrn

of

comaat.

The

r i i e e t i v e n e s s of a

is b u i l t on bonds of mutual t r u s t , respect, and

how peers, s e n i o r s , and s u b c r d i n a t s s work S o l d i e r tean develooment i s s i c n i f i c a n t i n to of new t a s k s and units. t h e organi:atiar! You can h e l p neu

Good l e a d e r s recosni:. produce successes. soldiers

rwrMers

together training soldiers

to and

orienting

beearn

cammitted

i f you nark hare a t

making

thw

m.rn0eis

of

your tram.

This competency i s discussed f u r t n e r f n

FM 2-102 and Chaptw 6 of t h i s aunual.

TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL PROFICIENCY You maintain battles. programs, and

mst

know

your

You must b e a b l e t o t r a i n ycur s o l d i e r s . and provide comhat power t o 3elp win

employ

your gain aid

equlpmsnt, technical on-the-job

You

wilI

proficiency erprimca.

in

iornul

Army = r a i n i n g

self-study,

You have t o know yaur loo

sa t h a t you can t r a i n yaur s a l d i n s , employ your mapons systsms, and hela

y w leadsf employ your unit. Tactical competence rscures you t o 2ncw

warfighting uin
battles

d o c t z i n e s o t h a t you can understand your 1 e a d w : s i n t e n t and he:^ by understanding t h e mission, memy, Terrain, treoos. and ! : m e a r c diisi:ul
3f

available. separate. manual.

b

Technical This

proficiency and tactical prof ic:ency is dis~uss~d in detail

t -.c
:fils

competency

in Ckaoter 5

DECISXN ?lPK:NG Decision problems. and Level execute mere way naking Your

refers, t o

skills

you

need

t o maKe -3or:es

a a sol.;+

goal is t o make high-quality d e c i s i o n s you- l o l d i e r s ac:rcr Decisions should b e made a t t h e lswsst organi=at:onai
L i k e planning. declslon naking :s ar:

quickly.

information is s u i f i c l e n t .

excellrnt

f o r you t o develop your 1 e a o u s h 1 ~ team.

Incluce s u b o r c i n a t s s

r 7 1 22-100

in

t h e declsian-making and have

process that

i f time is a v a i l w l r and i i t k e y s n a r e yaur

w i l l h e l p praducr higk-quality b e r i s i o n s .

goals

information

Decision making is d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r i n B a p t e r b of t h i s manual. PUNNING Planning argani:atian and

is
can

intended

to

suppart

caurse of

action

so

thit

an

meet an a b j e c t i v e .
develaping

I t i n v o l v e s farecast:ng,

sattinq gaalt

objecfives,

strategies,

e s t a b l i s h i n g p r i o r i t i e s , secuencinq procsdurw. Soldiars

m d . timing,
like

argmizing,

budgeting,

and standardi:ing

a r d e r i n t h e i r l i v e s , so t k e y depend an you t o keep them informed and f o training in the and operations t o ensure
SUCCPSS.

plan

Including yaur s u b a r d i n a t s

leaders

planning p r o c e s s is an e x c e l l a n t nay f a r you t o develop yaur Remember, a n e a+ your tasks is t o p r e g a r s your s u b a r d i n a t o s Planning is d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r i n C h a a t w
6 cC

leaduship t o replace t h i s manual.

tea.

you, i f n r e s s a r y .

LEE OF CVAIUBLE NSTEI'!S

You you that and

must yaur knaw

be

f a m i l i a r with techniques. mer'hacs, and t a a l s t h a t n i l :

the

give

saldiws

edge.

IJse of a v a i i a n l e systems ! i t s r a l l y

neans

you

hau t o u s e c m p u t e r s , a n a l y t i c a l tee!miques, means

anb c t 5 ~ r meeern
v=rr

tscknalagical and vaur

t h a t a r s a v a i l a b l e t o manage i n i o r m a t l a n and t a ne!a

saldiers uoan
yaw

better

perform

the

mission.

T h i s =amoeterrcv may .,arv hcwever.

'.?it

dwendent

leader5hip position. technalaqical

Yau l u s t rsc0qn;:o.
is
wi1:

understanding *very

computw

advancss that

impartmt. 5eneiit

Yau ,nust use

Chc

availaEla

system or

technique

=!ancia.?:,

exacutiun, and assessment af t r a i n i n g .

Military e t h i c s

i n c l u d e s l o y a l t y t o t h e nation. t h e Army, and your nunit:

duty; your
b

selfless service: and i n t e g r i t y .

responsibility to behave

;his l e a d e r s h i p comoetencv r s i a t e s ts

i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r o f e s s ~ o n a i

Army e t h i c and t o set t h e examole f o r your subordinates. As

a leader, you to yau must l e a r n t o be s m s i t i v e t o t h e e t h i c a l eicmenes of as

situations
B

face, use

a s t o y w o r d e r s , plans. and ao1icl.s.

You

must

learn and

an

informmd, r a t i a n a l d u i s i o n - m a k i n g process t o reason

through the

resolve

e t h i c a l dilemmas and then teach your subordinates t o dc ethics

same.

Prefasianal

is

discussed Cur:her

i n Chanter 4 of t h l s

manual.

APPENDIX B

THE FOCLOWINQ ARE T H E COMPETENCIES* TASKS, AND

USEO

EVEL LOP THE LEAOERSHIP PERFORMANCE

SLWPORTING S K I L L S * KNOWLEOGE* A N 0 ATTI[TUOES INOTCATIOAS

( L P I I

COMPETENCY: COMMUNICRTION
S V

BB a good listener

Cleulp communicate your inlent

- Display Provide feedback on v h a t w u briefed. knowledge of information by properly implrmenting (he commander's intent. Bo able back brief inform.(ion received, in own wordr. Back brier should include a11 key elements of informrrion of the communication. - Re~pondto subordinala's inpul. -informalion Majority of your subordinales understand the pu9ed by the comm.nder/leuJer. -~Throulh operations orderr and other form# of direction, u b o r d i n a u understand s the action necessary lo rccomplhh (br
IO

mission desired by the loader. o dercriba/delinr the comm.nder'm Subordineles are able t Intent in h e i r own words. Subordinales are able t o deseribr actions Lhey will need to lake in order t o meal the commander's inlent.

CommunicUn nonverbdly Communicale enthusiasm

- Leader actions complemenr/reinforce unil r m d u d s . Leader domonstrples sonre of urgency without panic.
Bv verbal and nonverbal mesuner/actionr. lhe le&er displays genuine inlarest &d enLhus&rn. Subordinates mimic the leader'a inlensily of inhresl.

Clruly communlc.(* your ordorm

- Ordrra complement &.(of higher headquul.rr. - Orden conlda the errenlib1who, vhat. vhen. how. where. why. - Subordinbtes are able to describe Ihe explicit and implied l u k s be accomplirhed.
(o
.-

rccrp(.ble level of performmce urrtsbliahed by Iho I r d r r . Subordin#wr are able lo dercribr unit r m d u d r .

Comnrunicato up, down. and horizontally

-The leader pusor inform*rion t o rubordlnalrr lo keep them informed. .nd u k r for Iholr lnpulfor dociaionr. -Tho loader requeru information from ruprriorr md p m s informrcion. T h e leader sharer information and idem with peerr md other oqud type uniu. The leader coordinator horLonlal1y m d vertically. Plulr/orders complameni md/or rupplamenl (bow of hlahrr bedquulars urd adjrcenl uniu.

,Wn feedback

-ucortain Leader quortionr soldier8 two echelona below to if information is being puwd.
- Loader u k r questions ofaubordJa~ro8 during
briefinss to enruro they underrtsad (be miuton. -Leader oliciu feedback from superiors lo ensure clarity of communication.

5 v . u simplicity

- Larder uses established SOPSfor conduclinp miuionr.

Leador uses rupplemenlrl inrlructionr (o complob unique .. missions. Subordlnalas two echelons below fully underatsad

COMPETENCY: DEGISION MRKING

D.Ie#ah authority lo match responribilily

Larder decisively bker aclion. Lerder is candid. Larder demonslrabs tho mom1 courasa to r b n d by b b convicrions. - Leader demonstrates rudrcily (daring). - Ledor Leader is not bound by buriars whon making now moIhoda. mekr advice of rubordinalor. Leader uses original thougbl. - Leader uoes imagination. -loval Leader rllowr decioionr be mulo at tho lowart pmcticd. -mSubordinates mdte logicd drcislonr rccomplirh tha i u i o d d for which (hey are responsibla. -- Subordinates take tbe inilirtivo ~ c o m p l i s h lha miuion. Leader communica~s boundaries for rubordinalos' aulhorlty.
Subordinates mdte Indrpendrnl daclrlonr whlla oparrtlng within lha commrndrr'a lnlanl. Subordinates demoartrate that making honor( m i s u e r doer not mean failure.
lo lo
lo

-- Subordinalas Subordinatas take tbe iniliativo whon rppropri&. uw innovalive malhodr.

-.Leader acccpu decisions from rubordinaus for which (hey bar. rorponsibility Lerder delegates work not necesrory for him lo do.

Implrmont a plan

- Subordinales are able

lo accomplirb

lo drscribr

what acUonr must be W o n

- Leader cbockr vilh ruporiors. rubordina~es,u r d p o r n to onsum

the plan vill not conflicl/inlerfere with o t h m . -brine Leader chock8 on subordinator lo r n r u n sprciflc action#u e r i d oul. - L o d cwuconlinually chacL# w r If Iho plan nrrds djuutmoolr. L Lordor &or best use of avdlrblr material. -- Unit Lendor sookr advico of subordinalor. accomplishes tho mission a k e n very liUlo o r

a mission.

no p r e p d o n .
Include .I1 l r d r r r in kcision making

- Loador n o k r out input from subordinUer prior lo

making a dociriaa (limo permilling). Lordor shares the problem with s u b o r d h a k r and looks for solutions with rubordinatas' help.

Subordinales actively give advice.

~rdarr

. i J e appropriate u U o n r i c b i n commmdor'r i n t o n 0 n (he a b r o c a of spmcific

-- Loader oxploiu opportunilirr. Loader rooks methods improvr current oprmtions.

Lo - L e d o r operater aulonomourly/isolalod wilhout Ions

~f uoit offoclivenosa.

hkr e~culaled riskr

-i n Loader accepts risks v h e o tho v u i r b l e s u r wrlghled his favor.

- Larder domonscirles iaitiaUvo. Lordor domoarlrrbar i n a o v d o n . - Loader accepts responsibility.

c o u m r of action. implrmenli a plan. 8nd auprninr/evduuor until mirrion is wcomplirhrd. When appropriate. leador make# decirlonr in Lhe a b m c e of c l s u guidmcr . Leader doer no1 delay decirionr UIU can be m d r e u l y . Whrn appropriate. ledor decidrr, although he h u only part of w e information he wm(r/nrods. L o d r r accepb ro~pooaiblllly for hlr drcirionr. Lodor oxercirer the authority and rrrpooriblliiy drlr&r(.d by tho ruporior.

- Leader gathers in formation. urdyzor UIe riludon, a a l l y u r

-Uso .od orpocl good

iud@mrni

- Loador usor .)I rvailablo informallon wbon making dechbn. Leader mekr d v i c e of ruperiorr and rubordinUer. if sppropriate. AcUonr p u r tho tes1oT"the acUonr of a reuonable mra." Decirionr/aclionr are conrirtent with UIO profosrionll Army ethic rmd tho Lawr of h d Wufrro.
8

'ETENCV: USE OF 1 VRILRBLE SYSTEMS ]

mnagamont Technology
Pli.cW.ly E W U
Appropriably filler o rubordinalor ioformalion t hctivdy wok needed ~nlormJion

- Loader &ares oraenlial olemenu of information

o accomplish the mirrion vhllo d l 1 required t mainlaining commander's intent.

-inform.tion Loader lakes the inilialive to reek perlinen1 mmagrmeni which will assist ia dreirion making and/or
rccomplishing lbe mission (limo pormilting). Leader uses lochnology 6 0 g w ' e r and procorr informuion. Loader is compulor literalo.

Id.nwe mources (lime, people, i n f o r d o n , lhin~s)

- Leader identifier resources required lo recomplish the miadon. are used vith mview -over Lha horhon." - Resourcar Leader considers resource consemuion meuurer.

- Leader dl0~8te9 resources lo accomplish the mirsion.

COMPETENCY: PLRNNING
Adjust recordin# t o the miiuuion

Leader mskes timely and appropriuo chrnler lo plans vhen added informalion dictator. When necessary, leader is villing lo make changes. Subordinates are able lo implement c h ~ g edirected s by the leader.

--

-- Subordinates Leader mskes appropriate djurtmmts in fluid situuionr. implament changes with minimd loas of affectiveness.
- Leader p
l ~ lor r con(ingencies. Establish c l s u #ads and objactives

Establish a w n n of common purposa for the unit

-- Leader's Subordinates underslmd/cm express unit goals 8nd ob/ecliws. goals and objectives u e within (ha inIenLo1 Lhe higher commmder's goals and objec~ver. - Leader determines tasks and milertones meet #od# and objectives. - Subordinates underslmd sequencing and rimin# of (ukr. - Leader er(.blishes priorities for .ecomplirhing mitsionr. -the Subordinates at least two echelons below understand overall mission.
lo

- Leader's purpose complemen(s superior'# purpose. - Leader eslablishes lough, achievable gods and objeclivos.

Establish c o u m s of .ellon lo meet gods uid objrclives

-backvud Leader effectively wqurnces 8nd Urnor e v m b using -- L e d w wtablisbes prioritiel for accompli~blag Luka. Loader identifies urd dlocrcrr rerourcea,lo 8ccompUah lbe misalon. -- Resourcar Contingency plans developed. .re dlocabd vilh con(inuous oprrrllons in mlnb.
pluming.

- Leader ir able to dercribe the actions nscerury specific courws of action. Leader considers MEIT-T - Leader considers resources avdlable.

O I

accomplbb

are

-- Flexibllily t o than#* quickly is built into lhe plm. Loader's plur is conrisbnl witb commmd*r's intool.

COMPETENGV: PROFESSIONRL ETHICS

Leader fully acknowledge8 ownenhip otlha frilurer sod successes of his subordinates. Leader is respoosihle for whr(aver lhr uniidors or f& to do. Leader acceplr responsibility for his decisions.
& r rob model

Leader leads by erample. - Subordinates mimic the leadrr's actions.

8

the professional Army elbic.

- Leader demonstraler proper rtbicd behavior at d l Lime#. - Subordinates view the leader u a role model who exrmplifyr

- Leader is not afraid lo admit mislrke/failurr. -(hey Leader tolls both superiors and subordinates when he faoh are wrong. u well u when they rra right: -- Leader does not tolera(d half-truths by subordinates. Leader is frank. open. and honest.

DomonrrrJ. bearing

o compwioa n ~

- Loader demoorwales physical e n d u ~ c &r e long o p o d o n r without rest. - Loader actively participates in physical mmluionr vitb -rubordinrtes. Loader ir rblo to meet APRT rlmduds. -rLoader's posture. appearance, m d phyricd movrmont postray parson who h u confidence In hlmwlf a d him unit. -d Leader displays confidence lhrough fatigue, slress. urP v e r u weather condition#. - Leader d e m o n s ~ t oa r geauiae concern forthe well-be&# @f his s~bordinatm. - Leador ompalhirer with his subordinetor. - Subordlnatar perceive lhe leader u having UIeirwell-be&# in mind. -- Leader ir honest. oven in ibe most adverso conditionr. -- Leador a c u othicrlly correct even when no one is obrorvlng. Loader doer not (olerato unethical behavior by superiom rubordinilcs. -- Loader doer not (rko short cub t o o b W selfish #ria#. Leader obeys the Law of Lurd Warfare.
3r

Loader overcomer forr of physicd h u m in order b rccomplbh h e mission (sharer hardships). Subordinates describe lhe lerder u couryoou#. Loader doer what ir morally corract in the f u o o f d v e d t y . Leader demonrlrales lonacily ( p r a m s the fight).

kmonstrato maturity

- Leader maker decisions based on avdlablo informalion

rnd logic. Lorder uws cmolion to the orgmiution'r rdvurhgo.

Loader does not mako cmotionrl decisions.

TASK

u SKA

- Leader shows habit of doing what is correct even under the

Dovelop (he profeuiond Army elbic in subordinmtee

-self-interest. Leader places (he mlssion of che unit above his ovn -- Leader places well-belng of his roldiers above his own. Loader shows a genuine concern for his subordinater. - Leador shows loyalty tho organhuon.
lo

has sirong(h of will).

- Leador does not lake (he easy way out for (he u k r of comfort. - Leader is &lo lo poritively control his acUonr and emocionr (he

most adverse conditions.

Subordinates display loyalty t o (he n d o n . their unit. rad their chain of command. Subordinakr are sensitive lo olblcd implicalionr of behevhr. Leader r h u e r ethical rewonlng procerr with rubordlrrater. Leader leads by proper example. Leader croatos appropriate common r d u o r for (he unit.

I COMPETENCY: SOLDIER TERM DEVELOPMENT ] I *ccept honeat mistakes

ILoader places nedds of unit over self. ~ubordihalor participate in decisions vhon approprimlo. willha place needs of (he unit over I- Subordinates are
lo . -

Subordinates understand that mistakes don't d v a y s mom failure. Loader encourages subordinates to take cdculr(4d. prudent o accept less than prrfoct results. risks. and is willing t Leader uses subordinate mirlaker u ederolopmenial vehicle.

thqir own needs. Subordinator villingly oboy leulor's ordrrs.

l~r..cnr (CuumwU

&ash stma8 unit

identity

h d o g cooparr;(ion and teuuvork

- Subordinalor demonslrate pride la sppeumce. Lodor enforces unillterm inte&riiylor .I1 miuionr. - Subordinales demonrtrak pride in unit. Subordinates c u r describe vays in which (he l e d o r e m 8 for (heir well being. -- Safety practices are observed.. Leader sharaa hudrhipa vilh rubordlnaks. -- Loader considerr and taker action t o c u e lor mldler'a f d l y . Leader enforces hoallh and velfara slandudr. - L e d e r showstake confidence i n subordinatas. the initiative. I-Subordinates parlicipato in decision#. - Subordinwar Subordinalor are allowed lo ooerab IndapendmnUy when Iappropriate. L e d e r communicales trust lhrough him action#. -Subordinates feel frob t o innovate within (ha commurder'r intent. make decision# in the absence of Ule cornmindor. - Soldiem Leader &rnonrtrales decision making to the lovert level. - Subordinales rctively vork together toward common unit objectives. - Le'aden and aubordinales dercribe unit gods u lhoir own. moks inpul from rubordiaates on unit goals. -- Leder 00th ledera and subordinates deacribe unit valuer
I

- Leaden and learns have common godr.

lhvelop subordinates lo n p l u e you .

Leader delegates authority whenever posrible. --- Subordinales Logical chain of command is established . n d used. continue the mission during b m p o r u y absences of the leadar. - Leader dlows subordinates to l e u n from mistake#.

u their own (courage, cmdor. comrniUmont,compotenee). Ledor l e d r by example. Subordinales indicate lheir brder is with them in most difficulltimes.

All dbplay confidence in

n u a n d other term members

Encouraae boldnea

Encouraee candor

Eacouwe innorstion

Subordinates demonstrate trust. confidence, and rerpect for their leader and peers. - Leader demonstrates trust and reapact for rubordinator. -- Subordlnates demonstraln moral courage. Leader expecb subordinates lo tell him when rnirtaker . nnu&. - Subordlnaus fael free lake prudent rirkr. -- Subordinates Subordinates openly dircuar mirionr with leaden. demonstrate freedom r d w objectionr wilh lhe leader. - Leader encourages subordinates' advice in mission plannin#. (.Be appropriate uUon in che .bwnce of orden. ---Subordinates Subordinetor actively aasurne rerponribility for their utionr. Leader mwards initi&ive. -- Subordinates actively exploit opporlunilier. Leader encourages subordinates lo lake calculated riikr. - Leader expecb subordinates ure Lhelr imaglnalion In completing new missions. - Subordinetes demonstrate willingoerr to uw new metho& without fear of reprisal. -- Leader Leader rewards innovation. allows subordinates lo (.ke calculued rirkr. - Subordin~tes are d w y r on the lookout for improved wrym t o
lo
(o (o

-- Subordinates demonstrate confideno In their own rltillr. Leader demonstrates competence. -Leader l e d by example.

'

rccomplirh the mission. Encourage rperdy action

- Leader and subordinales make timely docisionr and Wrr

decisive action, using good iudgment. Subordinates demonstrate a senee of urgency wilhout panic. Subordinmres are time-sensitive Lo mirrionr.

--

lirnr~~ unil & cohosion

- Esprit dr corps rod motivation u e hlph. - Olhrnouuide the o r g u r h t i o n roe the unit- avinnrr., - Subordinates cloarly roo lhoir unit u awinnar. - Subordinbbs indicate a sense of bolonping. Leader usor che buddy rysbrn. --- L o d w d j u r u loam gods md prioriuor u n r c e u u y . Ledor actively communicator with rubordinator. -Loadrr c u e s for roldior nredr (Lnininl. supplier.
porwnd naada). lndividud goals are (ha rsmr u team m d unil god*.

- Subordinator havo bigh regard for (halr unit identhy.

Includr subordinate l a d r r r in drcision making

- Subordlnabs Leader provider feedback to aubordin.0 lebdrrr on drcirloor. -advice indicato chat (he loador u k r for their on dscisionr. - Soldiers demonrtra(. compelsnca In individud and collrcUve rkills. -- Subordinstos Loador osL.blishes high but au.inabla rkndrrdr. display confidence in their abillcles. -toLederr demand chat soldiers and unit8 train u ;hay rrprcl fight. -misrion L e d a n focus training sad unit activities on lhr wufigblio8
-Subordinales exhibit the v i l l b win. Subordinales place mission ovrr self: Loador teacher rod coachor rubordinrlos. Leutor and subordina(as live Ute profeuiond Army elhb.

- Loader u k r for rubordinam input on drcirionr.

'Provide tough. npoiiiiva. ~ucrlng dning"

- Leader trains subordinates to usume higher levels of responsibility. - Leader encourages/revuds initi.(ire. Leader cleuly specifies responsibilities of subordinam lerdm. -- Subordinate leaders demonstrate #hued responrlbilily for
mission accompli~hment.

COMPETENCY: SUPERVISE

Don't orenupervise

- Leader shares hudships with ~ubordinrks. -- Leader leads by example. Leader spends lime with his soldiere. -byLeader permnally inspects s e b c t d l u t e accomplished subordinrles. - Leader lives mission-type orders. Leader demonstrrles confidence in rubordlnrtes. Leader delegates authority equal to responsibility. Leader accepu subordinate plans which accomplirh lhe mission. even if different lhan leader would have prepmd. Leader provides the rlnnduds and d l o r s the methods be sot by subordinates.
(4

Enforce d e t y slmdudr

Leader considers and integrales safely meuures into every 8cli0Il. Subordlnales adhere lo safely #(.atlards vhen operating alone. Shorl culs are no1 taken in favor of Lime over rafeiy. -Leader makes use of buddy rystem. Unnecewary safety slnndards are challmped if lhey might interfere with training realism.

Subordinales demonstrate an under#knding of the p u M e t m within which lhey can operate.

Leader user level of control c h . ( does not hinder appropristo flexibility. innovation. and/or inilialive.
-

Provide feedback

- Subordinator expect corrrctivr ution/punirhmmi for r u b s m d u d performurcr. - Loder I e d r by emample. - Leder checks enrure rtandud compllracr rod conducu performance evaluation#. L r d e r urea feedback detormlnr/lnlUato cornctivr action; -- Subordlnator understand urd lailiato corrective action. L r d e r conducts peraond inrpectionr of corrrcUvr action. L e d e r nquirer-feedback from rubordinator on cornctivr rctionlakm. Ladar conducts unumounced rrviow, of rlm&PI of complirocr. - Leder checks ensure lhalinformUIon h u been d h m W I 1 lo (be lowert level. understand corrrctivr acion required. - Subordin.tor Subordinabr understand when rtandudr u e met or exceeded.
lo lo
,

- Subordinator demonrtrrk their knovledgr of unit r u n d u b .

lo

- Leader keeps superior informed.

WMPETENGV: TEACHING AND GOUNSELING

Couh/counwl rubordinuos

- Leder provider advice and direction lo rubordlnrws.

- Leder provider active feedback lo rubordinator .bout

ution. --correcllvr Subordinetor ruccersfully mrke correction#on rhortcomingr. Leder counrelr rubordinate l e d e r r in private. Domurd action

- Leder requires corrective action on rhortcomings vithin

r prescribed time period.

-- Subordinate initiative is expecled and rrwuded. loaction or substandard performurco is uldrotwd quickly.

TASK

I
Dovelop rubordinator

- Leader rllows rubordinator lo pulicip.(r

-

in drcirion makina

process. Leader allows subordinator lo make independent decisions within &air u e u of responribility. Leader provider aclive feedback t o rubordinates o n their performmce, good and bad. Subordinates 81-0 able lo describe aclionr requirrd lo i m p r m (heir performancr w penoratad by the feulor.

reach skills

Train for w u

Subordlnator demonslnld knowledge of unil r t m d u d s . - Subordinator understand whataclion will be rovudod. - Leader prriser rubordinrto b d e r s in,public. - Subordlnator understand what action will be punished. Leader chutiser subordinate leaders i n private. Leader h u and user rsl8blirhed a w u d s m d punishment system based on erlnblished rlmduds.
M

slandudr. Leader focuses unil on wufighting mission. Leader prepares soldiers menldiy and physically f o r w u .

- Larder does not lake short c u b for lhe sake of r u e of comfort. - Subordinalos understand i h d (he purpose of Wainin# &a r e h e u u l for war. Loader establisher and requirrs adherence lo lough but r e J W c

g d e level. -their Leader provider continual feedback o n performancr.

Leader lrads by example. - Subordinates demonstrate comprtoncy i n rrqulrrd rkillr

-Leader acknowledper and rewards good judgment i n subordinates.

[COMPETENCY: TECHNICRL and TRCTICRL COMPETENCY)

S t a n d a r d s are in accordance w i t h those prescribed b y h field and technical manuals, MOWMQS guides. ARrEP Manuals ...

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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."

Schneider, LTC Robert J. and Barton, CPT Paul T. "Unit Replacements: Still Lost on the Road." Washington, D.C.: Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Hospital, 8 July 1987. Simonsen, MAJ Jerry A.; Frandsen, CPT Herbert L. and Hoopengardner, CPT David A. "Excellence in the Combat Arms." Monograph, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1984. Steiner, MAJ Lawrence M. Jr. "A Study of the Individual Leadership Skills and Traits That Armor Battalion Commanders Must Possess in order to be Successful in Combat and Non-Combat Situations." Research project, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987. Stewart, Nora Kinzer. "The South Atlantic Conflict of 1982: Cohesion and Lessons Learned." Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute. Paper prepared for the Center for Army ~eadershipConference on Leadership and Research, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 June 1988. Stock, CSM Walter D. "Influencing Combat Behavior." Ft. Lewis, WA: 2d Battalion 75th Ranger Regiment, no date. Tashjean, Dr. John E. "American Generalship: Classical Formulations and Future Considerations." Arlington, VA: Conflict Morphology, Inc., no date. Timmerman, COL Frederick W. Jr. "Leadership and Command at Senior Levels." Paper presented at TMCI Tenth General Working Meeting, West Point, NY, 4-8 May 1987. Twohig, Paul T. and Tremble, Trueman R. "Measuring Leader Performance in Simulated Combat in the Field." Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute, no date. U.S. Army Engineer School. "General Bruce C. Clarke's Thoughts on Leadership." Ft. Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Engineer School, no date. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. "The Leader Requirements Survey Package." Research project, 87-21, July 1987.

Vermillion, MAJ John M. "Tactical Implications of the Adoption of Auftragstaktik for Command and Control on the AirLand Battlefield." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2 December 1985. Zais, MAJ Mitchell M. "Generalship and the Art of Senior Command: Historical and Scientific Perspectives." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, May 1985.

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