Flores vs.

Layosa

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing

the Decision[1] dated May 2, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 15, 2002
of the Sandiganbayan in SCA No. 009.[2]

On December 16, 1991, respondent Benigno Montera (Montera) of the

Enforcement, Investigation and Prosecution Department of the National
Food Authority (NFA) filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging Judy Carol L. Dansal and Ronaldo Vallada, together
with petitioners Rafael T. Flores, Herminio C. Elizon and Arnulfo S. Soloria,
with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document.

After conducting a preliminary investigation, the Office of the

Ombudsman filed an Information charging petitioners with the offense of
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC). The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-96-66607 and raffled to Branch 217 of the RTC.

The Information reads:

The undersigned accuses JUDY CAROL L. DANSAL,

Department Manager, RAFAEL T. FLORES, Asst. Department
Manager, HERMINIO C. ELIZON, Division Chief III, ARNULFO S.
SOLORIA, Security Officer, RONALDO VALLADA, Security Guard,
all from the National Food Authority Central Office, Quezon City, of
the Crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as
defined and penalized under Article 315 in relation to Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:

That sometime in or about July 1991 in Quezon City,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused taking advantage of their
respective official positions, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously falsify the Daily Time Record of the said
accused Ronaldo Vallada for the month of July 1991, by
making entries therein to make it appear that Vallada reported
for work as Security Guard at the National Food Authority,
 when in truth and in fact said accused very well knew that
Vallada never reported for work for the month of July 1991
and with the use of said falsified Daily Time Record, accused
were able to collect the corresponding salary of Vallada
amounting to Two Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Four Pesos
and Four Centavos (P2,244.04) which the accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously appropriated and converted to their
own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of NFA in
said sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Subsequently, the prosecutors filed a motion to suspend the

accused pendente lite.[4] Petitioners opposed the motion. On January 17,
2001, the RTC issued an Order suspending petitioners pendente lite for a
period of ninety (90)-days. The trial court held that Republic Act No. 3019
(R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, mandates that a public official charged under a valid information for
an offense under said Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property shall be suspended from office while the criminal prosecution
against him is pending in court.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the January 17,

2001 Order but the same was denied by the RTC in another Order dated
June 8, 2001.

Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari with the

Sandiganbayan, alleging that the RTC erred in ordering their
suspension pendente liteeven though the crime charged in the Information is
within the ambit of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.

On May 2, 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated

its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It affirmed the trial
courts suspensionpendente lite of the accused because the offense for
which they are charged is included in the offenses referred to in Section 13,
R.A. No. 3019. It further stated that the Information is valid because it
sufficiently informs the accused that they are being charged for estafa
through falsification of public document even though the word fraud or
deceit is not used therein.[5]
 Petitioners moved to reconsider the aforementioned decision but their
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated August 15,
2002.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners contend that the Sandiganbayan erred in affirming their

suspension pendente lite by the RTC since the offense for which they are
charged does not fall under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, and in ruling that
the trial courts order of suspension is valid although it was issued upon
motion of a person who had no right to intervene in the criminal case. [6]

While petitioners concede that the Information sufficiently alleges the

elements of the offense of falsification of public document, they assert that
it does not contain an averment of fraud or deceit on their part. Hence,
they claim that the Information does not charge them with estafa but only
falsification of public document. Accordingly, they claim that their
suspension from office during the pendency of Criminal Case No. Q-96-
66607 is not warranted under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019.[7]

Petitioners further contend that the Sandiganbayan disregarded

settled doctrines in criminal procedure[8] when it affirmed the RTCs order
suspending them pendente lite even though the motion for their suspension
was filed not by the prosecutor but by the private complainant Montera. [9]

In their Comment, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of

the Special Prosecutor, argue that the Information sufficiently alleges the
elements of estafa through falsification of public document under Article
318 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. [10] According to the
People, this complex crime is an offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property under Section 13, R.A. 3019. Thus, the
suspension pendente lite of petitioners is justified under the
aforementioned provision. [11]

The People also point out that the other ground raised by petitioners in
support of their position that the RTCs order of suspension is invalid, i.e.,
that the order was issued upon motion of the private complainant, not the
prosecutor was raised by them before the Sandiganbayan and cannot
therefore be pleaded for the first time before this Court. In any case, the
People explained that the filing by Montera of the first and second motions
for petitioners suspension pendente lite was with the conformity of the
public prosecutor.[12]

In reply, petitioners assert that the Information states that they are
being charged with estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315, not Article
318, of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, they maintain that
the Information is invalid because it does not sufficiently allege the elements
of estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315. [13]

The issues presented by the petitioner are (i) whether the offense
charged in the information falls within the coverage of Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019, and (ii) whether the motion for suspension filed by the counsel for the
government agency concerned in this case, with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, sufficed to enable the lower court to issue the
suspension order pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.

There is no merit in the petition.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 provides:

Suspension and loss of benefits.Any incumbent public officer

against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and
in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him. (Emphasis supplied)

It is settled that once a court determines that the information

charging a public officer with an offense under R.A. No. 3019 or Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, [14] or any other offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property is valid, it is bound to issue
an order of preventive suspension of the accused public officer as a matter
of course.[15]

The order of suspension pendente lite, while mandatory in nature, is

by no means automatic or self-operative. Before such suspension is
imposed, a determination as to the validity of the information must first be
made in a pre-suspension hearing. There is no hard and fast rule as to the
conduct of such hearing, as the Court has previously explained in several
cases:

No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-

suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be
given a fair and adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings
against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the Revised
Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a
motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided
for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court

. . .

Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety

of his prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is
charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of
the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the
right to present a motion to quash the information on any
other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.

However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal

proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the accused
is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised
Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a
challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to
 quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., thatthe facts charged do not
constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the
challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such
ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts
alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep.
Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code (Emphasis supplied).[16]

It therefore suffices that the accused is afforded the opportunity of

challenging the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him and
that the information charging the accused of any of the offenses mentioned
under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019 is found to be valid before the court
suspends the accused pendente lite.

In the present case, the record shows that petitioners were given the
chance to dispute the validity of the Information against them and the
January 17, 2001 Order suspending them for ninety (90)-days while their
case is pending when they opposed Monteras motion for their suspension.

More importantly, both the RTC and the Sandiganbayan found that
the Information alleges the elements of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document and that the offense falls within the ambit
of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, thereby making their suspension pendente
litemandatory.

Parenthetically, it would seem that the averments in

the Information allege the complex crime of estafa under paragraph 2(a),
[17]
Article 315, through falsification of public document. Under paragraph
2(a), the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) the accused uses a fictitious
name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs
other similar deceits; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to
part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.[18]

The Information against petitioners alleges that petitioners took

advantage of their respective official positions and, conspiring with one
another, falsified the daily time record (DTR) of accused Ronaldo Vallada for
July 1991 to make it appear that he reported for work during that month
when, in truth, he did not, and used the falsified DTR to collect Valladas
salary in the amount of P2,244.04 for July 1991, and thereafter
appropriated and converted the said amount to the damage and prejudice of
the National Food Authority (NFA). Petitioners acts of falsifying Valladas
DTR prior to the collection of his salary for July 1991 from the NFA, using
the same DTR to collect Valladas salary, causing the NFA to release
Valladas salary on the basis of the falsified DTR and to suffer losses of
P2,244.04 satisfy the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315.

Still, any error in the Information, with regard to the specification of

the particular mode of estafa, allegedly committed by petitioners will not
result in its invalidation because the allegations therein sufficiently inform
petitioners that they are being charged with estafa through falsification of
public document.

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information

shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the designation of the
offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as
constituting the offense.[19] However, the Court has clarified in several cases
that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing, it is not controlling; what actually
determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts
alleged in the information.[20] The Courts ruling in U.S. v. Lim San[21] is
instructive:

Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between

caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold that the
characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the
information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts
stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of
which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be
tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code
 of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common
sense and with the requirements of plain justice.

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no

concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable the
accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of
justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth
in the body of the information and proved in the trial is not the
crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the
information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in
which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the
facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given
in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the
acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein
set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law
denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The
designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information
from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of
law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused
never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and
complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It
is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial
rights. The real and important question to him is, Did you perform
the acts alleged in the manner alleged? not, Did you commit a
crime named murder? If he performed the acts alleged, in the
manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is
and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone
to say what the crime is or what it is named.[22]

Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the mode of

commission of the estafa as alleged in the Information (which states that
petitioners committed estafa under Article 315), or as claimed by the People
in their Comment (that petitioners committed estafa under Article 318) and
the absence of the words fraud or deceit in the Information, the Court
agrees with the Sandiganbayan and the RTC that the factual allegations
therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting their
purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa in general
committed through the offense of falsification of public document. [23] As
the Sandiganbayan correctly held:
 Every element of which the offense is composed must be
alleged in the complaint or information by making reference to the
definition and the essentials of the specific crimes. This is so in
order to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him and for
him to suitably prepare his defense since he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. It is
not necessary, however, that the imputations be in the language of
the statute. What is important is that the crime is described in
intelligible and reasonable certainty.

Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. All that
is required is that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense of which the accused is alleged to have committed and will
enable him to intelligently prepare his defense, and if found guilty, to plead her
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense [Balitaan v. CFI of
Batangas, 115 SCRA 729].

In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a

person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is
meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the
inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not
necessary to follow the language of the statute in the
information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the
crime defined by law.

In the case at bar, although the word deceit or fraud

was not specifically alleged in the information, nonetheless,
the same alleges the manner by which deceit or fraud was
committed; that it was committed by falsifying the daily time
record of accused Vallada; and that it was committed by using
said falsified daily time record to collect the corresponding
salary of Vallada to the damage and prejudice of the National
Food Authority. To our mind these allegations are sufficient to
maintain the validity of the information. The language is clear and
explicit, and is equivalent to an allegation that the crime was
committed with fraud or deceit. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is
that the information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the
manner by which the deceit or fraud was committed. Verily the
purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of
the charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
 Furthermore, the fraudulent intent of the accused can be
gleaned from their act of using the falsified document to draw the
salary of the accused Vallada. The accused would not have made
use of the falsified document except and unless to defraud the
government.

It must be noted that the crime for which the accused are
charged is the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document wherein the falsification of the public document is a
necessary means to commit the estafa. In this type of crime, the
offense of falsification is considered already consummated even
before the falsified document is used to defraud another. The
damage to another is not caused by the falsification of the
document but by the use of the falsified document. Veritably, the
information sufficiently alleges the crime charged. And inasmuch as
the offense imputed falls within the ambit of Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, suspension pendente lite of the accused should
accordingly follow (Emphasis supplied).[24]

It bears stressing that the words fraud or deceit need not be used
in an information for the allegations therein to sufficiently allege the offense
of estafa. It is enough that acts constituting abuse of confidence or deceit,
which are indispensable to estafa, are averred in the information in such a
manner that would sufficiently apprise an accused that he is being charged
with that offense. Whether the act involved constitutes abuse of
confidence or deceit within the technical meaning of the terms as used in
Article 315, it is inescapable that it falls within the common and generic
signification[25]of fraud as used in Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.

In any case, the information in question not only alleges the elements
of estafa through falsification of public document with sufficiency, it also
clearly states that petitioners are charged with having committed fraudulent
acts involving government funds. Thus, whether on the face of
theInformation, the offense charged is estafa under paragraph 1(b), [26] or
paragraph 2(a)[27] of Article 315, or under Article 318,[28] through falsification
of public document, or even only falsification of public document, is of no
consequence. For the purpose of resolving the propriety of petitioners
suspensionpendente lite, it is sufficient that the Information unequivocally
recites that the offense charged involves fraud upon government or public
funds or property.
 Evidently erroneous is petitioners contention that the offense of
falsification of public document alone, which according to them is what is
charged in the Information, would not warrant their suspension pendente
lite. The Information alleges that petitioners falsified Valladas DTR by
making entries therein to make it appear that he reported for work at the
NFA in July 1991 when, in truth and in fact, he did not. What was
purportedly falsified is a DTR which the government agency, concerned
here, as in other government agencies, had to use in determining the salary
to be paid to the accused Ronaldo Vallada as its employee for the period
covered thereby, as well as his earned leave credits. [29] The falsification of
ones DTR to cover up his absences or tardiness automatically results in
financial losses to the government because it enables the employee
concerned to be paid salary and to earn leave credits for services which
were never rendered. Undeniably, the falsification of a DTR constitutes or
foists a fraud involving government funds.

Now, the issue of whether the motion to suspend petitioners filed by

Atty. Montera may validly trigger the assailed suspension order.

As the offense for which petitioners are charged clearly falls under
Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, it follows that their suspension pendente lite is
mandatory pursuant to the said law and pertinent jurisprudence. The trial
court is left with no alternative but to order the suspension of the accused
public official pendente lite upon being convinced that the information
charges the accused with acts of fraud involving government funds. Its
duty to order the suspension of the accused pendente lite is mandatory in
character[30] and must be issued by the court regardless of whether the
prosecution files a motion for the preventive suspension of the petitioners,
or if the motion is filed by the counsel of the government agency concerned,
with or without the conformity of the public prosecutor. In fact, Section 13,
R.A. 3019, as worded, allows the court to issue such suspension order motu
proprio.

The Court in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan[31] emphasized the mandatory

nature of the preventive suspension required under Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019 in this wise:

[S]ection 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the

Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid
information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised
Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
 or property is filed. The Court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty
to determine whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his
prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The
presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his
prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same
way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law
requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law
does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to
escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.[32]

Again, in Socrates v. Sandiganbayan,[33] the Court reiterated the

doctrine that the preventive suspension under Section 13, R.A. No. 3019 is
compulsory, thus:

[I]t is evident that upon a proper determination of the validity

of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court to
immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is
specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is
not within the courts discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension
of the accused officer on the pretext that the order denying the
motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts.

Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and

substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a
matter or course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is
because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed
as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension... . Taking into
consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a
public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of
public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest
of the accused.[34]

The obligatoriness of the task of the trial court and the inevitability of
the suspension from office of the accused pending termination of the case
under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law effectively settle the second issue
and cogently eviscerate petitioners negative position on the question.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against

petitioners.