Globalization and the politics of identity

Thomas Hylland Eriksen

UN Chronicle, autumn 1999

In a certain, important sense, the present human world is more tightly integrated than at any earlier
point in history. In the age of the jet plane and satellite dish, the age of global capitalism, the age of
ubiquitous markets and global mass media, various commentators have claimed that the world is
rapidly becoming a single place. Although this slightly exaggerated description has an important point
to make, a perhaps even more striking aspect of the post-cold war world is the emergence -- seemingly
everywhere -- of identity politics whose explicit aim is the restoration of rooted tradition, religious
fervor and/or commitment to ethnic or national identities.

It is doubtless true that globalization is a pervasive tendency influencing the lives of people
everywhere -- from the Amazon rainforest to Japanese cities. The concept has recently become a
fashionable one, and as a result, its meaning is becoming fuzzy. I would propose, therefore, a view of
globalization as all the sociocultural processes that contribute to making distance irrelevant. It has
important economic, political and cultural dimensions, as well as equally important ethical
implications. Truly global processes affect the conditions of people living in particular localities,
creating new opportunities and new forms of vulnerability. Risks are globally shared in the age of the
nuclear bomb and potential ecological disasters. On the same note, the economic conditions in
particular localities frequently (some would say always) depend on events taking place elsewhere in
the global system. If there is an industrial boom in Taiwan, towns in the English Midlands will be
affected. If oil prices rise, this implies salvation for the oil-exporting Trinidadian economy and
disaster for the oil-importing Barbadian one.

Patterns of consumption also seem to merge in certain respects; people nearly everywhere desire
similar goods, from cellular phones to readymade garments. Now, naturally a precondition for this to
happen is the more or less successful implementation of certain institutional dimensions of
modernity, notably that of a monetary economy -- if not necessarily wage work and literacy. The ever-
increasing transnational flow of commodities, be they material or immaterial, seems to create a set of
common cultural denominators which threaten to eradicate local distinctions. The hot-dog (halal or
not, as the case may be), the pizza and the hamburger (or, in India, the lamburger) are truly parts of
world cuisine; identical pop songs are played at identical discotheques in Costa Rica and Thailand; the
same Coca-Cola commercials are shown with minimal local variations at cinemas all over the world,
and so on. Investment capital, military power and world literature are similarly being disembedded
from the constraints of space; they no longer belong to a particular locality. With the development of
the jet plane, the satellite dish and more recently, the Internet, distance no longer seems a limiting
factor for the flow of influence, investments and cultural meaning.

Globalization is, in other words, not merely another word for the growing transnational economy. It is
true that it is largely driven by technology and economic interests, but it must be kept in mind that it
encompasses a wide range of processes that are not in themselves technological or economic. Take the
human rights discourse, for example: In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the
ideas and values associated with human rights have spread from educated elites worldwide (and not
just, as some wrongly believe, in the West) to villagers and farmers in remote areas. The rapid
dissemination of human rights ideas is probably one of the most spectacular successes of
globalization.

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At the same time, we have in recent years witnessed the growth, in very many societies in all
continents, of political movements seeking to strengthen the collective sense of uniqueness, often
targeting globalization processes, which are seen as a threat to local distinctiveness and self-
determination. A European example with tragic consequences is the recent rise of ethnic nationalism
in Croatia and Serbia, but even in the more prosperous and stable European Union, strong ethnic and
nationalist movements have grown during the 1990s, ranging from Scottish separatism to the anti-
immigration Front National in France. In Asia, two of the most powerful recent examples are the rise
of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan and the meteoric success of the Hindu nationalist BJP
(Bharatiya Janata Party, "Party of the Indian People") in India; and many African countries have also
seen a strong ethnification of their politics during the last decade, as well as the rise of political Islam
in the north. In the Americas, various minority movements, from indigenous groups to African
Americans, have with increasing success demanded cultural recognition and equal rights. In sum,
politics in the 1990s has to a great extent meant identity politics.

This new political scene, difficult to fit into the old left–right divide, is interpreted in very different
ways by the many academics and journalists who have studied them. This is partly because identity
politics comes in many flavors: Some are separatist nationalist movements; some represent
historically oppressed minorities which demand equal rights; some are dominant groups trying to
prevent minorities from gaining access to national resources; some are religious, some are ethnic, and
some are regional. Many writers see identity politics in general as an anti-modern counter-reaction to
the individualism and freedom embodied by globalization, while others see it as the defense of the
weak against foreign dominance, or even as a concealed strategy of modernization. Some emphasise
the psychological dimension of identity politics, seeing it as nostalgic attempts to retain dignity and a
sense of rootedness in an era of rapid change; others focus on competition for scarce resources
between groups; some see identity politics as a strategy of exclusion and an ideology of hatred, while
yet others see it as the trueborn child of socialism, as an expression of the collective strivings of the
underdog.

Neither of these interpretations and judgments tells the whole story, both because the concrete
movements in question differ and because the phenomenon of identity politics is too complex for a
simple explanation to suffice. What is clear, however, is that the centripetal or unifying forces of
globalization and the centrifugal or fragmenting forces of identity politics are two sides of the same
coin, two complementary tendencies which must be understood well for anyone wishing to make
sense of the global scene at the turn of the millennium.

For a variety of reasons, globalization creates the conditions for localization, that is various kinds of
attempts at creating bounded entities -- countries (nationalism or separatism), faith systems
(religious revitalization), cultures (linguistic or cultural movements) or interest groups (ethnicity).
For this reason, a more apt term, coined by sociologist Roland Robertson, might be glocalization. I
shall now present some features that the "glocal" identity movements of the turn of the millennium
seem to have in common.

First, identity politics always entails competition over scarce resources. Successful mobilisation on
the basis of collective identities presupposes a widespread belief that resources are unequally
distributed along group lines. "Resources" should be interpreted in the widest sense possible, and
could in principle be taken to mean economic wealth or political power, recognition or symbolic
power -- although what is usually primarily at stake are either economic or political resources.

Secondly, modernisation and globalization actualize differences and trigger conflict. When formerly
discrete groups are integrated into shared economic and political systems, inequalities are made
visible, since direct comparison between the groups becomes possible. In a certain sense, ethnicity
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can be described as the process of making cultural differences comparable, and to that extent, it is a
modern phenomenon boosted by the intensified contact entailed by globalization. You do not envy
your neighbor if you are unaware of his existence.

Thirdly, similarity overrules equality ideologically. Ethnic nationalism, politicized religion and
indigenous movements all depict the in-group as homogeneous, as people "of the same kind". Internal
differences are glossed over, and for this reason, it can often be argued that identity politics serves the
interests of the privileged segments of the group, even if the group as a whole is underprivileged, since
it conceals internal class differences.

Fourthly, images of past suffering and injustice are invoked. To mention a few examples: Serbs
bemoan the defeat at the hands of the Turks in Kosovo in 1389; leaders of the Hindu BJP have taken
great pains to depict Mughal (Muslim) rule in India from the 1500s as bloody and authoritarian; and
the African American movement draws extensively on the history of slavery. Even spokesmen for
clearly privileged groups, such as anti-immigrant politicians in Western Europe, may argue along
these lines.

Fifthly, the political symbolism and rhetoric evokes personal experiences. This is perhaps the most
important ideological feature of identity politics in general. Using myths, cultural symbols and
kinship terminology in addressing their supporters, promoters of identity politics try to downplay the
difference between personal experiences and group history. In this way, it becomes perfectly sensible
for a Serb to talk about the legendary battle of Kosovo in the first person ("We lost in 1389"), and the
logic of revenge is extended to include metaphorical kin, in many cases millions of people. The
intimate experiences associated with locality and family are thereby projected onto a national screen.

Sixthly, first-comers are contrasted with invaders. Although this ideological feature is by no means
universal in identity politics, it tends to be invoked whenever possible, and in the process, historical
facts are frequently stretched.

Finally, the actual social complexity in society is reduced to a set of simple contrasts. As Adolf Hitler
already wrote in Mein Kampf, the truly national leader concentrates the attention of his people on one
enemy at the time. Since cross-cutting ties reduce the chances of violent conflict, the collective
identity must be based on relatively unambiguous criteria (such as place, religion, mother-tongue,
kinship). Again, internal differences are undercommunicated in the act of delineating boundaries
towards the frequently demonised Other.

***

Identity politics is frequently dismissed as an anachronistic survival from a time when kinship ("blood
relations"), religion or local belonging formed the basis of politics. Against this view, it has been
argued many times, always correctly, that although identity politics tends to be dressed in traditional
garb, beneath the surface it is a product of modernity. The strong emotions associated with a
tradition, a culture or a religion can never be mobilised unless people feel that it is under siege. To put
it metaphorically: A fish knows nothing of water as long as it is surrounded by it, but the moment it is
pulled out into the air, it develops an intense interest in the water and nostalgia for it. Indeed, it could
be said that the fish discovers the water only the moment it is removed from it.

Viewed in this way, the collective emotions identity politics depend on reveal themselves to be deeply modern
emotions associated with the sense of loss experienced in situations of rapid change. Ethnic nationalism,
minority movements and politicized religion offer a larger share of the cake as well as a positive sense of self,

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and like it or not, these movements will remain influential in most parts of the world until something better
comes along.

Manuel Castells
Globalisation and identity
A comparative perspective

Globalisation and the strengthening of various cultural identities (religious, national, ethnic,
geographic, and gender, among others) have occurred over the last fifteen years. In my view,
this is no coincidence but rather the product of a systemic relationship between the two
phenomena.

1. TWO SIMULTANEOUS PROCESSES

It is not immediately because the idea has taken root that globalisation requires a global,
cosmopolitan culture. Their are several variations on this theme. Some talk of unification and cultural
homogenisation of the world and criticise the process. Others consider that globalisation will overcome
local and historical identities, supercede some ideologies, and produce an undifferentiated universal
human culture. I believe that both the quest for a new universal cultural to sweep away historical cultures
is misguided, while fear that “Americanisation” will wipe out historically-based cultural identities is
unfounded.

This vision of economic development and globalisation is really no more than an extension of the two great
rationalist movements providing the cultural and ideological foundations of the contemporary world —
Liberalism and Marxism. Both schools of thought are based on a negation of historical, religious, and ethnic
construction of identity, and stress new ideals (the Citizen of the World or Soviet Man, respectively). Each
of these models has its own traits but they both coincide in considering any other distinction as artificial. I
emphasise this because at the moment this is the dominant ideology in our society and in Europe as a
whole. It is the rationalist approach, in both its Liberal and Marxist guises. These ideologies consider
identities as dangerous and, most likely, fundamentalist, whether they be religiously, nationally, or
ethnically based. I believe this is an extremely important issue because it goes to the root of the problems
of the modern world.

2. THE PERSISTENCE OF IDENTITIES

Let us now examine the reasons for the foregoing situation. In has been empirically demonstrated that
culturally constructed identities are fundamental to the way people think about things. Evidence for this
comes from various questionnaires administered in universities over a longish period of time. The main
source of this data comes from the
World Values Survey, the greatest impetus for which has come from Prof. Inglehart of the University of
Michigan. For many years, he has demonstrated both the persistence and the transformation of these
identities. In this respect, one should also take into account the data analysed by Prof. Norris of Harvard
University.

She used the data contained in the World Values Survey that compared identities at world, national, and
regional levels, and with Mankind’s cosmopolitan identities in general. With regard to data taken from the
beginning and the end of the 1990s, Prof. Norris calculated that for the world as a whole, 13% of
respondents primarily considered themselves as “citizens of the world”, 38% put their Nation-State first,
and the remainder (i.e. the majority) put local or regional identities first. One should note that the Basque
Country and Catalonia appear in this database as regional identities. Moreover, a breakdown of world
geographical zones reveals that the area where local and regional identities are strongest is Southern
Europe (61%).

This reveals the need to begin with observations regarding the persistence of these identities.
Nevertheless, one has to begin with more than just the combination of globalisation (i.e. processes
producing power, wealth, and information on a worldwide scale) and identities drawing on unique cultural

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and local traits. In recent times, these two processes have led to a crisis in the Nation-State, which was
invented as an institutional tool for managing societies and their problems. However, the world is facing
problems that cannot be managed within the national sphere. This creates a crisis of political
representation in which the State fails to enshrine multiple sources of identity (not least because we live in
a multicultural world). It is worth briefly looking at the trends before dealing with this complex issue in
greater depth.

3. GLOBALISATION AS A STRUCTURAL PROCESS

First, it is worth recalling that globalisation is not an ideology but rather an objective process of structuring
economy, societies, institutions, cultures, etc. One should also remember that globalisation does not mean a
set of undifferentiated processes. For example, we speak of globalisation to refer to the kind of economy
capable of operating in real time at the everyday level. However, one should note here that not all economies
can be considered global in scope. The world economy operates in accordance with its central functions, which
span capital and financial markets. These financial markets are globally interdependent regardless of
whether they operate in true market economies or in Capitalist ones. In both cases, capital is global in
nature.

3.1. Economy, Science, Technology and Communication

At root, economy is global in nature. It is interdependent and global when it comes to world trade, which
increasingly plays a decisive role in economies worldwide. It is also global with regard to the production of
goods and services. However, while the economy’s core is global, the rest is not. For example, most of the
labour force is not global. Multinational companies and their ancillary networks only provide work for some
two hundred million workers. This may seem a great many but in fact it is only a drop in the ocean
compared with a world workforce of three thousand million workers. However, these two hundred million
workers, employed in some fifty three thousand multinationals, make up 40% of the world gdp and two
thirds of world trade. Therefore, what happens in this system of production shapes economies as a whole.
Science and technology, the basis of wealth creation and military power, and of States and countries, are
global in
scope and are articulated on a worldwide scale. Science and technology networks operate globally and are
based on local
nodes of varying size.

Communication is also basically global in nature. Financial and technological control of communications
also operates on
a world scale. Here, one should note that 50% of the world’s audiovisual material and news is controlled by
just seven communication groups. However, this does not necessarily mean that the culture of these
media is a globalised one. What can be seen is a process of globalisation with regard to business and
information management but with content tailored to local tastes. For example, Murdoch produces classic
American series for us audiences, while Sky Channel in the uk broadcasts British series. Sky Channel in
India broadcasts in Hindi for Northern India, and in Tamil in Madras, using local characters. Broadcasts in
Southern China are in Cantonese, and the series are locally-based. By contrast, broadcasts in Northern
China are in Mandarin and series employ different storylines. In other words, communication strategies are
global in business terms but are tailored to specific cultures and identities for marketing reasons.

3.2. Global public goods The concept of globalisation has gone hand in hand with the development of a
set of international institutions that are playing an increasingly important role in dealing with world
problems. The notion of global public goods requiring worldwide management is one that continues to gain
ground. The environment is a case in point, despite the Bush Administration’s refusal to accept
overwhelming expert consensus on global warming. Human rights are also considered to be universal and
fall under the aegis of the International Criminal Court. Likewise, health also has a global dimension, as
shown by the aids epidemic and sars (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), which reveal that disease is
catching and that the wealthy have a vested interest in the health of the poor. The policies and workings of
the United Nations also indicate that interdependence goes far beyond bilateral relationships between
countries.

3.3. Infrastructure and causes Globalisation rests on a technological infrastructure. However, this
infrastructure is not the cause of globalisation, which is driven by economic strategies, cultural

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developments and markets. Even so, it would not have happened without the economic infrastructure. In
other words, capital has always been global but now thousands of millions of Euros can be shifted from one
investment to another in a matter of seconds. Today’s globalisation is quite different from that of
yesteryear because it is based on ict (Information and Communication Technology), which renders
distances between countries irrelevant.

Moreover, this globalisation is both inclusive and exclusive. It includes everything that has monetary value
and excludes everything else. Thus economic globalisation is selective by nature. This is why national
governments and companies try to position themselves in the global network because exclusion from it
means no growth, no economic development, and no wealth creation. Failure to attract capital and
technological investment can make economic outcasts of whole countries or sectors of the population.
Accordingly, it is not so much a question of a “North-South” divide but rather of those within the network
opposing those outside it. Evidently, a much larger proportion of people in the “North” belong to the
network compared to those in the “South”. Even so, there are groups of population in the South that
belong to the network yet remain isolated from their host societies.

This kind of exclusion has led to public opinion questioning the benefits of globalization in recent years.
Great swathes of society have been left on the fringes by globalisation, while its beneficiaries have reaped
vast rewards. One cannot see globalisation in black and white terms as either “good” or “bad”. It depends
on one’s criteria, who is being considered and the subject under consideration (for example, globalisation
may be beneficial in economic terms but harmful in environmental ones). In any case, Nation-States are
pushing ahead with globalisation in order to shape and benefit from the process. It is simply untrue to say
that multinationals are the only parties driving globalisation. Nation-States have taken an active role by de-
regulating and furnishing the technological infrastructure supporting globalisation. Put another way,
globalization of capital and international trade does not just depend on technology or on corporate
strategy. It also depends on Nation-States de-regulating activities, privatising, and doing away with frontier
controls —which is precisely what they have done.
3.4. The crisis in political representation Nation-States have been the main agents of liberalisation
and globalisation. In carrying through these changes they have distanced themselves from their voters and
lost political legitimacy. A prime example of this is the European Union, which has organised its affairs to
have a greater say in the world. In this context, it is worth noting that not even the us is in a position to
control world financial markets, investments, and corporate strategies. First, the eu has established what I
would call a “Networked State”. Here, political management is exercised through institutions in which
national governments work together, negotiating, and sharing sovereignty in order to preserve some
autonomy vis-à-vis the aforementioned global networks. Second, a superstructure of international
institutions (nato, who) and treaties (Kyoto) has been established. Third, the issue of Nation-States’ waning
political legitimacy has been addressed by decentralising powers to the regions and even to ngos – a trend
that is particularly marked in the eu. Thus the Nation-State no longer performs its traditional role but
rather merely acts as a node within a super-national network. In such a network, political decisions are
negotiated. Thus, while Nation-States have not vanished in the globalisation process, they have to cede
sovereignty to survive. Moreover, in so doing they move one step further away from their electorates.
Their citizens not only have to accept that the Nation-State is run on different lines from their own regions
but also that the way the State is run has changed a great deal. This makes political representation much
more distant. Here, it is worth recalling a slogan of what is wrongly-labelled the “antiglobalisation
movement”. The slogan was “No globalisation without representation” and was heard for the first time at
the wto in Seattle. It echoed the one used in The American War of Independence (“No taxation without
representation”). Although the slogan might be considered slightly inaccurate (the wto does not represent
multinationals but States, some of which have democratically-elected governments), the sentiment behind
it is unambiguous.

This kind of reaction points to a loss in popular representation when it comes to political decisions
regarding world economic policy. On the one hand, radical movements argue that ordinary citizens are
powerless in this respect. Others argue that new political mechanisms are required to properly represent
citizens. What it boils down to is that the emphasis on political management comes at the expense of
legitimacy and popular representation.

4. THE EMERGING OF IDENTITIES : In the context of globalisation, this reaction by States and the gap
opening up between the State and its representatives is driving efforts by growing numbers of people to
establish their collective identities. This is because they feel alienated from a State that no longer

6
represents them or helps them build meaning in their lives. They therefore tend to build these identities on
historical foundations.

Identity is way of constructing meaning in people’s lives at a time when the raison d’être of modern States
seems to be vanishing. In this respect, people crave much more than just market economics. Indeed, the
State can be said to be an agent of globalisation rather than of the people. The reaction to this is an
alternative construction of meaning based on identity. At this juncture, it is worth recalling what we mean
by identity, given that it is a word that means different things to different people. In the Social Sciences,
identity is the process whereby people draw on a cultural attribute to build meaning in their lives. People
create a cultural construct in referring to something that lies beyond them as individuals but which also
defines them as such. However, one should note that such a cultural construction may be purely
individual, given that individuality is also a form of identity. For example, one could express identity in the
following terms: “I am the be-all and end-all of existence”, or “I and my family are the be-all and end-all of
existence”. This is a kind of identity, although we generally consider identities to be based on historical
elements. Sociologists, social scientists, and anthropologists argue about whether identity is constructed or
not. I consider that identities are constructs and that all cultural phenomena are the product of such
construction.

What are such constructs built with? Evidently, I cannot awake one morning and suddenly decide to be a
Hutu. Becoming a Hutu is a much more complex affair. One could draw on post-Modernist theories in which
everything is possible and identities are mere inventions. According to this approach, being a Muslim or
being a Catalan, being a woman or hailing from Manresa are simply part of the same process in which
everything is constructed. While there is an element of truth in this, identity is built upon personal
experience, which in turn draws on a history, a culture, and has linguistic and geographic components.
Even so, one can ask how an identity is constructed, who constructs it, and how it can be pinned down.
The process of constructing identity is where the problems begin and thus where one needs to hone one’s
analysis.

4.1. Legitimising identity : I distinguish three types of identities, which I have empirically observed in
groups. I have termed the first legitimising identity, which is constructed by institutions in general and by
the State in particular. Thus, taking French national identity (which happens to be one of the strongest in
Europe), it is the French State that has constructed the French Nation, and not the reverse. At the time of
the French Revolution, less than 13% of the territories now forming France spoke the language of the Île de
France. Indeed, I would go further and say that France is the only example of a European national identity
that was effectively forged by the State. This was mainly achieved through repression, as is the case of all
State-constructed entities. However, repression was also used elsewhere but to much less effect. The
schools inspired by Jules Ferry during the Third Republic were to prove decisive, constructing the petit
citoyen français as a cultural model. Unlike the French case, another revolutionary nation —the United
States— built a strong national identity without drawing on traditional components but instead, built one
based on the State, the Constitution, and multicultural and multi-ethnic elements.

4.2. Resistance-based identity : The second type is the resistance-based identity. In this case, groups
who feel they are pushed to the fringes of society in cultural, political, or social terms react by constructing
an identity that allows them to resist assimilation by the system that subordinates them. They do this by
drawing on history and self identification. For example, there is currently an extraordinary upsurge in
Indian movement throughout Latin America. This identity has lain dormant and it is only recently that it
has been strongly asserted. The reason for this lies in resistance to certain kinds of globalisation that have
pushed Indians to the fringes of society. Not all kinds of globalisation provoke such resistance but some
social groups take this path precisely because they cannot resist as citizens, or because they are in a
minority and cannot exercise their political rights.

4.3. Project-based identity The third kind is project-based identity. This is based on self identification,
albeit drawing upon cultural, historical, and geographic components for this purpose. Such a project may
be of a national or a generic nature. For example, the feminist or ecological movements reflects this kind
of process. These three kinds of identities differ greatly from one another and it would be a mistake to
think that one can slip easily between them. For example, it is unlikely that one can jump from a
resistance-based identity to a project-based one. If this were the case, these identities would simply
become one and the same. Legitimising identities involve ideological manipulation. If the project for
building a nation based on the State merely serves the interests of the latter, it means that anyone who
disgrees with what the

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State does is automatically pushed to the fringes of society. Resistance-based identities may (but do not
necessarily) lead to extremism in the absence of bridge-building and communication. If project-based
identities are not fleshed out with historical materials, they become purely subjective and hence unlikely to
be adopted by society as a whole.

5. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY : How can one empirically consider the
developments seen over the last few years? Instead of considering all possible cases, we confine ourselves
to religious identity and to national identity.

5.1. Religious identity : Religious identity in Western Europe (and indeed Europe as a whole) is
relatively unimportant nowadays. Our studies of Catalonia reveal that less than 5% of the country’s
population are regular church-goers. This does not mean that religion is unimportant in Catalan culture,
merely that it does not represent an element of identity for the majority of Catalans. Many European
intellectuals write off religious identity. However, this attitude stems from ignorance, given that religious
identity is of great importance elsewhere in the world (not least in the us). This is also true of Arab
countries along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Religion provides an identity that is
very different from one based on State legitimacy. The former is based on the believer as a member of a
community of faith. Talking specifically about the Muslim world, the project of building an Arab State runs
counter to the principle of Uma, which is a community of believers which is not expressed in the State.
Indeed, the State is only legitimate insofar as it embraces Islam and represents the interests of God on
Earth. From this point of departure, interpretations may be more or less fundamentalist. However,
nationalism is anathema to Uma. That is why when Saddam Hussein seized power (aided and abetted by
the us and France), he gained support for defending Iraq as a key Islam country. When Hussein was
toppled, together with the extreme nationalists who supported him, it was Islam —the bedrock of Iraqi
society— that filled the vacuum. This particularly benefitted the Shiites but Sunni Moslems agree on
broadly the same principles. Put baldly, Saddam Hussein was the mortal enemy not only of the Shiites but
of Islam in general. The construction of a religious identity in the Muslim world has arisen from: the failure
of Nation-States to manage globalisation; the failure of Arab nationalism in the long-running dispute over
Israel and globalisation in general; the failures of Arab or other kinds of nationalism in other parts of the
Muslim world; and religious reconstruction excluding the State. It is also possible that such reconstruction
is not the fruit of a project-based identity but rather represents the resistance of a community and thus
tends towards fundamentalism.

5.2. National identity : National construction is the point of departure for the Nation- State, usually
based on the State as expression of the nation. In most cases, it is the State that creates the nation rather
than the other way round. There is currently a growing separation between State and nation. This can be
observed when one speaks of values —national values differ from those of the State. The latter are
instrumental and now go beyond the Nation-State, being used to manage globalisation and its
accompanying networks. By contrast, national values are ones that affirm identity. Nations denied the
opportunity of forming their own States —Catalonia, Scotland, and Quebec— but also strong States like
France feel lost in an increasingly globalised world. They perceive a loss of autonomy in State terms and
see the influx of immigrants as an invasion that is culturally alien. Last year, Europe experienced politics
based on fear —whether of globalisation or of invasion by hordes of foreigners. This expressed the idea of
the nation being betrayed by the State. As a result, there has been an upsurge in support for extremist
political movements, of which the Dutch and French far-right parties are good examples.

The separation of nationalism and State takes various political forms. The idea of rebuilding the State as an
expression of the nation raises the issue of what the national identity is. In the case of Spain, when
President Aznar put forward the idea of the country as an important nation in the world, he explicitly
rejected the idea of a multicultural “Such reconstruction
is not the fruit of a project-based identity but rather represents the resistance of a
community and thus tends towards fundamentalism” society. Aznar invoked the principle of
Spain as a single culture and nation, despite the fact that it is currently neither and both concepts run
counter to the letter and spirit of the Spanish Constitution. Such a project for reconstructing identity was
made in the nation’s name, even though it really served the State’s interests. The project is effectively
State-inspired nationalism rather than nationalism inspired by a nation. One should bear the distinction in
mind, not only with regard to Spain but also as a general principle applicable elsewhere in the world. Once
the State loses its potency as a symbol of identity as a result of limited scope for manoeuvre in a
globalising world, it attempts to re-establish its legitimacy by appealing to national sentiment. However, in
many cases this nation has separated from the State and
8
no longer feels that it is represented by the latter. Latin America is a dramatic case in point but there are
others, such as States built upon several nations (of which Spain is an example). Appealing to the Spanish
nation as if it were a single identity raises grave questions regarding the principles enshrined in the
Constitution – namely a State based on common consent and on its constituent nations. Approaches such
as that adopted by Aznar attempt the impossible, trying to reconcile the State, national identity and
globalisation.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The instrumental processes of power, global wealth, institutions, and the Nation-State no longer represent
the nation and identities built on local autonomy. This lies at the root of the management crisis currently
afflicting the world. Even the most powerful countries are affected by this crisis, of which the post 9/11
United States is an example. Under such circumstances, governments resort to the State’s raison d’être,
namely the ability to legitimise a monopoly of violence, as Weber put it. They resort to the threat of
violence and force in a world which, over the last ten years, has seen any number of experiments in
combinations of States, formulae for joint sovereignty and management, pluralist identities, and a
positively Byzantine relationship between global public goods and the institutions of Nation-States. This
complexity however vanishes when panic assails a country’s leaders and resort is made to military might.
This is the politics of fear on a worldwide scale, not just a national one. In structural terms, we are moving
towards a more complex, plural, interdependent world. But powerful forces are at work to impose their own
will on the planet and wreak profound changes. Here it is instructive to recall the relationship between
structure and agency, in which the first creates the framework
within which problems arise but where agency finally prevails.

The agent does not understand the structure. Bush has decided that despite globalization and cultural
pluralism, he will take his own decisions regardless of the overall context in which he operates. What Bush
and other powerful leaders do is to create a different trajectory. On the one hand, there is the Internet,
globalisation, interdependence, and cultural luralism. On the other hand, there is censorship, military
power and technology, the unilateral use of which is capable of plunging the world into chaos as economic,
cultural and institutional structures are undermined by the misuse of political
instruments. The summit meeting in the Azores brought together the four great Western Christian empires
—or remains thereof— and conveyed a message of a much more dangerous, complicated world. The
leaders at that summit chose to simplify things and present a model of civilisation that is so obviously
superior to all others – their own. Given that they have the power to impose this model, that is just what
they decided to do. The basic idea is that we can make the world more controllable by imposing our will on
it. The corollary is that the world will be made a better place because our civilisation is superior to all
others. Such is the logic of Empire and oil will be part of the spoils of conquest. This should come as no
great surprise —all imperial ventures need to be funded somehow. Imperial thinking means considering
our civilisation is right and justified in using might to drag others out of their misery. Current US political
science is that of the “Bankrupt State”, in which governments that are incapable of relating to citizens, of
managing the planet, and of husbanding the Earth’s natural resources. Recently, a small coterie of
American Political Science experts went so far as to propose a Commission run by Western countries to
manage the world’s dwindling natural resources for the benefit of all. The unpleasant truth is that this
civilising zeal is merely a mask for State realpolitik. This legitimising identity is increasingly facing the
resistance-based identities springing up around the world. Even so, such resistance does not necessarily
aspire to something better since its raison d’être lies in oppposition. Project-based identities need to
supplant resistence-based identities (and in particular, national identities). Only thus can we hope to chart
a course between powerful establishments and fundamentalist commons .

Manuel Castells is emeritus professor of Sociology at the University of California at Berkeley, and senior professor at the internet
interdisciplinary institute at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (Barcelona).