SPE 27095 The Development of Goal-Setting Safety Legislation Following The Cullen Report
SPE 27095 The Development of Goal-Setting Safety Legislation Following The Cullen Report
SPE 27095 The Development of Goal-Setting Safety Legislation Following The Cullen Report
SPE 27095
The Development of Goal-Setting Safety Legislation Following the
Cullen Report
R.J. Ledsome, Health & Safety Executive
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ABSTRACT
The Cullen Report into the Piper Alpha disaster
recommended a new approach to regulating
health and safety on the UK Continental Shelf
based on a goal-setting philosophy.
The UK health and safety authorities have been
developing new legislation to implement Lord
Cullen's recommendations.
This paper sets out how a goal-setting approach
towards health and safety legislation has been
developed in the UK. It describes the key
elements of the goal-setting philosophy; outlines
the new goal-setting regulations which have been
put in place or which are in the course of
development; and describes other actions being
taken to promote a stronger safety culture
offshore.
INTRODUCTION
On 6 July 1988 an explosion and fire occurred on
the Piper Alpha platform on the United Kingdom
Continental Shelf (UKCS). 167 men lost their
lives in that disaster. The death toll was the
highest of any accident in offshore
operations.The UK Government set up a public
inquiry into the disaster, headed by Lord Cullen.
Lord Cullen's Report
1
was published in
November 1990. He made 106
recommendations for
143
immediate improvements to safety practices on
the UKCS; a major safety research programme;
and, not least, fundamental changes to the
regulatory regime.
These changes involve:
a change in responsibility for regUlating
offshore safety. This responsibility,
previously vested in the UK Department
of Energy, was moved to the UK national
health and safety authorities - the Health
and Safety Commission and Executive
(HSC/E) in April 1991;
the development of new offshore safety
regulations; and
a new approach to regulation, based on
a goal-setting philosophy.
GOAL SETTING PHILOSOPHY
The Health and Safety Commission and
Executive were established in 1974. Since then
the Commission and Executive have pursued a
programme for reforming UK health and safety
legislation, based on a goal-setting philosophy.
2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOAL-SETTNG SAFETY LEGISLATION SPE 27095
FOLLOWING THE CULLEN REPORT
The goal-setting philosophy derives from the
main conclusions of a major report into the UK
health and safety system - the Robens Report
1972
2
Robens concluded that a system of
self-regulation provided the most effective way
forward for improving occupational health and
safety: that those who created and worked with
the risks should be responsible for controlling
them - not government authorities.
Inquiries into recent major accidents in the UK
have reinforced this message
3
,4.5. They have
found that organisational failings were as much,
if not more, the cause of the accident as
individual error, or equipment failure. The
conclusions and recommendations of the
inquiries have emphasised the importance of the
effective management of health and safety and
the development of positive safety cultures
within organisations.
Lord Cullen reached similar conclusions and he
recommended that the health and safety regime
for the UKCS should be based on a goal-setting
philosophy. The key elements of this approach
are:
responsibility for health and safety rests
with the operators and owners of
offshore installations - not the regulatory
authority (ie HSC/E);
the development of a positive safety
culture is a vital factor in safety
achievement. All involved in working
offshore should own health and safety
rather than feel that all that is needed is
to comply with externally imposed
measures C'a compliance culture"). The
regulatory authority should seek to
promote and facilitate the safety culture;
the regulatory authority should therefore
set objectives to be achieved; but it is
for the operator and owner to determine
what is needed to be done to achieve
those objectives;
the achievement of objectives should be
based on a process of hazard
identification and risk assessment.
There is a role for regulation under this
philosophy. To quote the Robens Report:
''There is a role in (the field of health and
safety) for regulatory law and a role for
government action. But these roles
should be predominantly concerned not
with detailed prescription for
innumerable day-to-day circumstances
144
but with influencing attitudes and
creating a framework for better safety
and health organisation and action by
industry itself'. (Robens Report,
paragraph 28).
Health and safety legislation prepared by HSC/E
since 1974 has followed this philosophy. This
was not, however, the case with offshore health
and safety legislation. Lord Cullen concluded
that existing regulations did not properly address
the need to promote the effective management
of health and safety, which he considered was
critical to ensuring the safety of persons of
offshore installations:
"Many existing regulations are unduly
restrictive in that they are of the type
which impose "solutions" rather than
"objectives" and are out of date in
relation to technological advances .
This poses a clear danger that
compliance takes precedence over wider
safety considerations; and that sound
innovations are discouraged". (Cullen
Report, paragraph 21.51).
Cullen therefore recommended that new offshore
health and safety regulations:
"should take the form of requiring stated
objectives to be met rather than detailed
measures to be taken". (para 21.67).
The goal-setting approach does not rule out that,
in certain some detailed requirements
may be appropn1rte. Lord Cullen recognised this.
There is a balance to be drawn. The
goal-setting nature of UK legislation is also
different from tne approach taken in legislation
from the European Communities applying to
offshore industries, which tends to be more
detailed and prescriptive. But what is clear is
that the balance in the existing regime had been
weighted too much towards a prescriptive
approach. HSC/E's aim is to redress that
balance, in order to meet the objectives so
clearly defined by Robens and Cullen.
A further aspect of the goal-setting approach is
that all sides of the industry should be involved
in the development of legislation, and share
ownership of it with the regulatory authority.
Therefore, HSC/E develops proposals for
legislation only after full consultation with
interested parties. The new offshore regulations
to be described later in this paper have been
developed following intensive discussion in a
series of joint working groups with industry and
trades unions.
SPE 27095 RJ LEDSOME 3
GOAL-SETTING LEGISLATION
What, then, has been done to develop
goal-setting legislation on the UKCS?
Lord Cullen recommended two elements to the
new regime:
first, a requirement for operators and
owners of offshore installations to
prepare a safety case for each
installation to be'submitted for
acceptance by HSE;
second, development of new goal-setting
regulations to reform existing,
prescriptive offshore legislation, leading
to the rationalisation and simplification of
offshore health and safety legislation.
Safety Case Regulations
The first element was achieved with the making
of the Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
Regulations 1992
6
.
These Regulations form the keystone of the new
offshore health and safety regime. They require
that, from May 1993, all new installations must
submit a safety case to be assessed and
accepted by HSE before they can operate on the
UKCS. Operators and owners of existing
installations had to submit safety cases for their
installations by 30 November 1993. HSE will
assess and accept safety cases over the period
up to 30 November 1995. After that date no
offshore installation will be able to operate on
the UKCS unless its safety case has been
accepted by HSE.
The main aspects of the Safety Case regime are:
the life cycle approach. Safety cases
have to be prepared at concept design
stage (for fixed installations); before first
operations (for both fixed and mobile
installations); and abandonment (for a
fixed installation). Safety cases also
have to be prepared and submitted for
combined operations; at 3 year
intervals; and if major modifications are
made to the installation;
the integrated approach. The safety
case must cover the full range of
activities on or in connection with an
offshore installation including those in
particular which could give rise to a
major accident;
the demonstration, in the safety case
that:
the operator or owner has an effective
safety management system; and
that major accident hazards have been
identified; risks assessed; and
measures taken to reduce those risks to
as low as is reasonably practicable
HSE has received some 230 safety cases, and is
now engaged in the major task of assessment
and acceptance.
New Goal-setting Regulations
The second element is the programme of new
goal-setting regulations. HSC is planning new
regulations on:
prevention of fire and explosion and
emergency response;
management and administration; and
design and construction.
The new regulations are intended to :
complement the safety case
requirement, in line with Lord Cullen's
conclusion that goal-setting regulations
were required to set intermediate safety
goals ''to give the safety case regime a
solidity which it might otherwise lack"
(Cullen report, para 17.63). The new
regulations will therefore provide building
blocks, by way of safety goals in key
areas, to underpin the overall safety
case goal that risks from major accident
hazards have been reduced as low as is
reasonably practicable;
be genuinely goal-setting, with
prescriptive requirements exceptional,
though some prescription might be
necessary in particular to implement the
EC Extractive Industries (Boreholesf
Directive, which will be described later in
this paper;
consistent approaches will so far as
practicable be pursued onshore and
offshore. Many UK health and safety
regulations are designed to apply to all
industries - including the offshore oil and
gas industry. Distinct offshore
regulations should only be introduced
where justified by the special
characteristics of the offshore workplace
or hazards; and
the new regulations are to be taken
forward as rapidly as practicable, to
minimise uncertainty.
145
4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOAL-SETTNG SAFETY LEGISLATION SPE 27095
FOLLOWING THE CULLEN REPORT
Programme for Goal-setting Regulations
Three sets of new goal-setting regulations are
planned.
First, on the Prevention of Fire and Explosion,
and Emergency Response (the PFEER
Regulations). A Consultative Document
containing proposals for regulations and a
supporting Approved Code of Practice was
published in September 1993
8
.
The PFEER Regulations are designed to set
safety goals for the prevention of fire and
explosion and emergency response. These
cover:
a general requirement for owners and
operators of offshore installations to
make suitable and sufficient
arrangements for the control of fire and
explosion hazards (including preventive
and protective measures) and for
emergency response;
in support of the general duty, duties to
. achieve more specific safety goals, and
to maintain an emergency response plan
requirements to undertake fire and
explosion and evacuation, escape and
rescue analyses which should feed into
the safety case for the installation (the
Safety Case Regulations will be ;
amended to require summaries of the
analyses to be included in the safety
case); and
duties to consult with appropriate
persons in drawing up the emergency
response plan, and for persons to
co-operate with operators and owners to
enable them to fulfill their obligations
under the regulations.
The PFEER Regulations will revoke existing
relevant prescriptive legislation; implement
wholly in part, or confirm implementation of,
some 39 specific recommendations made by
Lord Cullen, and implement relevant parts of the
EC Extractive Industries Directive.
The second set of offshore regulations concern
Management and Administration. A Consultative
Document is planned to be issued at the turn of
the year.
The objectives of these regulations are to:
clarify legal requirements on the role and
responsibilities of offshore installation
managers;
simplify and rationalise requirements on
such matters as record keeping; written
instructions; and permits to work;
revoke existing prescriptive regulations
covering these matters;
implement relevant requirements of the
Extractive Industries Directive.
Two other projects associated with these
regulations include clarifying the definition of an
offshore installation, and reforming the legal
requirements on the notifying of accidents and
incidents to HSE.
The third set of regulations cover Design and
Construction. They are intended to:
set safety goals to be achieved to assure
the initial and continuing integrity of
offshore installations, through the life -
cycle of the installation;
reform the existing arrangements for the
certification of offshore installations.
Lord Cullen recommended that HSE
should review in the light of the safety
case, the arrangements whereby
offshore installations must be granted a
certificate of fitness by an independent
Certifying Authority before they can
operate on the UKCS;
implement provisions in the Extractive
Industries Directive on matters relating to
the workplace environment.
A Consultative Document for these regulations is
currently being prepared.
Table 1 sets out the key stages in the preparation
of these regulations.
HSE is also currently considering what reforms
are needed to regulations on well operations and
pipelines, and how these can be implemented
through the legislative review. A review is also
being conducted of the regulations on Safety
Representatives and Safety Committees.
OTHER ACTION TO PROMOTE THE
OFFSHORE SAFETY CULTURE
As previously mentioned, the HSC/E's aim is to
promote a framework of regulation which will
146
SPE27095 RJLEDSOME 5
Industry has already done much to promote the
safety culture by way of improvements to
platforms, improved procedures, operational
approaches and training.
Other action taken to promote the safety culture
includes, for example:
the development by the UK Offshore
Operators Association of industry
guidelines on: medical fitness for
offshore work; survival training; and
emergency drills and exercises;
the development by the HSC Oil Industry
Advisory Committee of guidelines on
workforce involvement which are
expected to be published shortly.
. WIDER IMPACT
We recognise that the UK is not alone in its work
to reform offshore safety. The Cullen Report has
been influential world wide and examples of the
report's influence beyond the UK offshore sector
include:
provisions in the Extractive Industries
Directive
7
, adopted by the European
Community in November 1992, which
reflect many of the main
recommendations made by Lord Cullen.
This Directive sets out minimum
standards for the safety and health of
workers involved in mineral extraction by
drilling. It provides for a safety and
health document (analogous to the
safety case) to be drawn up for each
workplace. There are requirements
relating to the subject matter of the new
goal-setting regulations described earlier
in this paper. One important factor
which we have had to take into account
is that, in some areas, the Directive sets
out requirements in prescriptive detail,
which sit uneasily with the overall
goal-setting approach;
consideration of the Report at a meeting
convened by the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) to develop
recommendations on "Safety and
Related Issues Pertaining to Work on
Offshore Installations" held in April 1993.
The meeting agreed that ILO should:
"prepare an fLO code of practice or
similar guidelines on health and safety
management systems in offshore
petroleum operations for use by
countries undertaking such operations
for the first time or considering revision
of their safety arrangements; such
guidelines should reflect the principles
for self-regulation as set out in the Cullen
Report which are applicable to all
countries".
CONCLUSION: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
This paper has set out the action taken in the UK
to develop new goal-setting legislation. A
programme of new regulations has been taken
forward since the publication of the Cullen
Report. The UK is now well on the way to
implementing all of Cullen's legislative
recommendations.
What lessons can be learned from the UK's
experience of developing goal-setting
legislation?
Table 2 sets out some lessons in the form of a
SWOT analysis of strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats of the goal-setting
approach. The main conclusion to be drawn are:
a goal-setting approach ensures that
responsibility for health and safety lies
clearly where it should - with those who
create and work with the risks;
goal-setting provides owners and
operators with opportunities to develop
their own solutions to their own
problems; not have these imposed from
outside. This allows for technological
development and cost effectiveness.
goal-setting forces the operator and
owner to develop systems to identify
hazards and control risks, rather than
expecting the regulatory authority to
identify and deal with them;
goal-setting is not an easy option in
particular, Operators and Owners have
to demonstrate that they are reducing
risks as low as is reasonably practicable;
further work needs to be done in
developing performance standards and
guidance on ways to achieve compliance
with regulatory goals. HSE is working
with industry on a number of projects in
this area;
but, above all, and reflecting on the
theme of this conference, goal-setting is
about partnership: between the regulator
and all sides of the industry about the
goals to be achieved. But most
important, between owners and
operators and their workforces in
identifying safety problems and
147
6 THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOAL-SETTNG SAFETY LEGISLATION SPE 27095
FOLLOWING THE CULLEN REPORT
but, above all, and reflecting on the
theme of this conference, goal-setting is
about partnership: between the regulator
and all sides of the industry about the
goals to be achieved. But most
important, between owners and
operators and their workforces in
identifying safety problems and
developing together the solutions to
those problems.
REFERENCES
1 The Hon Lord Cullen: The Public
Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster
(CM1310) (HMSO, London 1990).
2 Robens: Safety and Health at Work.
Report of the Robens Committee (CMND
5034) (HMSO, London 1972).
3 Department of Transport: Herald of
Free Enterprise Formal Report (HMSO,
London 1987).
4 Fennel D: Investigation into the King's
Cross Underground Fire (Department of
Transport, HMSO, London 1988).
5 Hidden A: Investigation into the
Clapham Junction Railway Accident
(Department of Transport, HMSO,
London 1989.
6 Health and Safety Executive: A Guide
to the Offshore Installations (Safety
Case) RegiJlations 1992: Guidance on
Regulations L30 (HMSO, London 1992).
7 Official Journal of the European
Communities: Council Directive of 3
November 1992 concerning the
minimum requirements for improving the
Safety and Health protection of workers
in the mineral-extracting industries
through drilling (92191/EC) (OJ
Reference No L 348, Brussels,
November 1992).
8 Health and Safety Commission: Draft
Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire
and Explosion, and Emergency
Response Regulations and Approved
Code of Practice: Consultative
Document (CD64) HSE Bool<s,
September 1993).
148
SPE 27095 R J LEDSOME
TABLE 1
OFFSHORE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW: KEY DATES
7
....
ct
....
I
. ...
....
. - - .- . .
INFORMAL CONSULTATION FORMAL CONSULTATION REGULATIONS MADE
..
.
PREVENTION OF FIRE AND FROM NOVEMBER 1992 SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1993 SUMMER 1994
EXPLOSION, AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
REGULATIONS
MANAGEMENT FROM MARCH 1993 JANUARY - MARCH 1994 AUTUMN 1994
REGULATIONS
DESIGN AND FROM DECEMBER 1992 JUNE - SEPTEMBER 1994 SUMMER 1995
CONSTRUCTION
REGULATIONS
SPE 27095 THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOAL-SETTING SAFETY LEGISLATION FOLLOWING THE CULLEN REPORT 8
TABLE 2
GOAL-SETTING LEGISLATION: SWOT ANALYSIS
STRENGTHS
WEAKNESSES
Clear responsibility for safety placed on operator
Provides flexibility
Allows technological advance
Promotes effective safety management
Promotes ownership by industry
Fewer exemptions
Uncertainty
Need for agreed interpretation of goals
Not the easy option
.....
01
o
oPPORTlJI\IIflES
Cost effectiveness
Innovative thinking
Full involvement of all parties
Partnership between industry, workforce and regulator
EC legislation
Lack of performance standards