SEANGIO v. REYESAZCUNA, J.

Facts : Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. Then, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was filed by petitioners. SP. Proc. No. 9890870and SP. Proc. No. 9993396 were consolidated. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings: A perusal of the document termed as will clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court has made its position clear: for respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved. Issues/Held/Ratio: 1. Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. YES A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the p r e s e n t c a s e , s h o u l d be construed more liberally t h a n t h e o n e s d r a w n b y a n e x p e r t , t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect. 2.Was there preterition? NO. With regard to the issue on pre terition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo

Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.

In Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006, there was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated as Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana. The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply because Segundos will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for certiorari was filed where petitioners argued as follows: First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator Segundo; Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana , simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void; Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;

Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and, Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo. Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72

November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In

the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio." The facts of the cases are as follows: On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2 The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows: Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana Tantunin ng sinuman Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw. Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking. At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia. Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana. Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3 (signed) Segundo Seangio Nilagdaan sa harap namin (signed) Dy Yieng Seangio (signed) Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi (signed) ikatlong saksi

On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 99 93396 were consolidated.4 On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6 On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings: A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line. As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (underscoring supplied). WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.7 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999. Petitioners contend that: THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT: I THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW; II

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND, III RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. Petitioners argue, as follows: First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo; Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states,Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void; Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir; Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and, Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo. The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document. The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code: Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate: (1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants; (2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless; (3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator; (4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made; (5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; 8 (7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life; (8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10 Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11 Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. 12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, 13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14 With regard to the issue on preterition, 15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir 16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1wphi1 Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. 17 In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. 18 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED.

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA,

G.R. No. 157451 Petitioner, Present: Panganiban, J., Chairman, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio Garcia, JJ Promulgated:

- versus and JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.

Morales,

December 16, 2005 x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.:

he law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any

discharge this burden satisfactorily.

reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision [2] and the March 7, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and allowing probate to the said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings.[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows: x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. It provides in the body that: LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN: I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and testament: 1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic Church in accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable monument to be

erected and provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my family and friends; 2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the followdescribed properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]: a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila, described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and share alike; 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed materials used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal co-owners thereof;

b.

3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings account bank book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte; 4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond; IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines. The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that: 1. 2. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA; Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them proper notice pursuant to law; Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were not complied with; Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in an advance sate of senility; Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats; Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;

3. 4.

5. 6.

7.

and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of understanding and integrity. At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.

According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though when to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously found it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because despite his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers from their home cooked and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his death. Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will. The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and testified that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the notary public; that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the will was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. And that during the execution, the testators wife, Josefina was not with them. The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the testators physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry. Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely: 1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and

2.

Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility

It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate.[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways [6] did not make him a person of unsound mind.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration: I. Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect. II. Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament. III. Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the subject will.[8]

In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.

This Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit. Main Issue: Probate of a Will

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.[9]

The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. [10] Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:

Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: (1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person; (5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testators state of mind at the time. Existence of Fraud in the Execution of a Will

Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

Petitioner contends that it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado, [11] thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly defies human reason, logic and common experience[12] for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.

We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made. [13]

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. [14] The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. [15] Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.[16] That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years. [17]

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. [18] More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.[19] Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.[20] In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.[21]

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as follows: Atty. Floro Sarmiento: Q A Q A You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his witnesses were supposed to be in your office? Yes sir. On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house? They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town. xxx Q A Q A Q A xxx xxx

The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this the actual date when the document was acknowledged? Yes sir. What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C? On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983. Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the document as well as the attestation clause? Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)

Eugenio Gomez: Q A It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this discrepancy in the date? We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there. When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back? We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed. This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your companions? The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)

Q A Q A

Felisa Gomez on cross-examination: Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times? xxx A xxx xxx

The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time. We went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15 th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9 and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)

Josie Collado: Q A Q A Q A Q A When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired? The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983. And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento? Yes, Sir. For what purpose? Our purpose is just to sign the will. Were you able to sign the will you mentioned? Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)[22]

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. [23] Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.[24]

Capacity to Make a Will

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines: Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution. Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant. Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,[25] which held thus: "Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."[26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, petitioner, vs.JOSEFINA respondent.G.R. No. 157451. December 16, 2005.

C.

VALMONTE,

Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Phil., and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village,Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names. Two years after his arrival from the US and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on Feb 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on Oct8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated June 15,1983 but acknowledged only on Aug 9, 1983. It provides in the body that: LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:xxx2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C.VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]: a. Lot 4-A,Block13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO),situated in Makati, Metro Manila, described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and share alike; b.2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed materials used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal co-owners thereof;3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings account bankbook in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte; 4. Ihereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond; IN WITNESSWHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines. Xxx The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that: Pet failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA; failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them proper notice pursuant to law; Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were not complied with;Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in an advance sate of senility; Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats; and/or Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto; and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of understanding and integrity.Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will,and the instrumental witnesses sps Eugenio Gomez, Jr.and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition,the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified. According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at Salingcob,Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though when to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his lonesome self when the notaria lwill was made. Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms anddispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on Aug 9, 1983, and which they did.Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on Aug 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15,1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will. The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and testified that the testator went alone to the house of sps Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that

during the execution, the testators wife, Josefina was not with them.The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should no tinherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. During that time, the testators physical and mental condition showed deterioration,aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry. TC: held the evidence adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds,namely: 1. Noncompliancewith the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; 2. and Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility It then found these ground sextant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. CA reverse TC, Admitted the will of Placido V. to probate; upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite waysdid not make him a person of unsound mind. Whether the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament.No. We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made. We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of the testator in his twilight years. Moreover, as correctly ruled by CA, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a notarial will xxx be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by 3 or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives Whether Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the subject will.No. According to Art 799, 3 things that testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2)the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that Ca was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will. It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it wassufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the

will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant. PANGANIBAN, J.

Ortega 478 SCRA 247 FACTS:

v.

Valmonte

Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will andtestament written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the notary public who notarized the testators will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. Petitioners no longer of sound argument: mind.

1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was 2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will. ISSUE: 1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time heallegedly executed the will. 2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery. HELD: 1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant. 2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made. The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.

Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, Petitioners, - versus LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 174489

Present: CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: April 11, 2012

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.[1] Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] of the June 15, 2006 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA. SO ORDERED.[5]

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution [6] which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereto. Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia. Factual Antecedents

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3[8] and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.[9] The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause[10] and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,[11] in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public. Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus: xxxx Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since they are the children of the spouses; xxxx [Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x[12]

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.[13] Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin. More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition[14] with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186. There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13, 2000[15] allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra.

Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981. [16] The Will was executed in her fathers (Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino. [17] Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her signatures on all its four pages. [18] She likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing thereon.[19] Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpins present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. [20] The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court.[21] The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition[22] to Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.[23] Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition [24]contending that Paciencias Will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. [25] Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA.[26] Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.[27] Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition[28] asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation[29] reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead. On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[30] denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA while the latters claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet been established. Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. [31] Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his fathers condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court to support this allegation. [32]

For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencias death through Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA when the Will was executed.[33] Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencias signature because he accompanied her in her transactions. [34] Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when the same was executed. [35] On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.[36] As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000. For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. [37] She claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of her service in the said household, Lorenzos wife and his children were staying in the same house. [38] She served in the said household from 1980 until Paciencias departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.[39] On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring something for Paciencia to sign at the latters house.[40] Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that something was as same was placed inside an envelope.[41] However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs them.[42] A few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonios mother and brought with her the said envelope.[43] Upon going home, however, the envelope was no longer with Paciencia. [44] Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. [45] On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was based on her personal assessment, [46] and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.[47] In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. [48] He identified the Will and testified that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia brought the same to his mothers house and showed it to him along with another document on September 16, 1981.
[49] [50]

Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned. According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice

lands,[51] and it was he who explained that the documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death. [52] Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who should]

benefit from my properties. Why should I die already? [53] Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, I know nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them. [54] After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.[55] Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision[56] denying the petition thus: WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala. SO ORDERED.[57]

The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.[58] Ruling of the Court of Appeals On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTCs conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that the state of being magulyan does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will.[59] Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.[60] Petitioners moved for reconsideration[61] but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution[62] dated August 31, 2006. Hence, this petition. Issues Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIAS WILL DESPITE RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT; II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD; III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED[63]

The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate. Our Ruling We deny the petition. Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states: Rule 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY. Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. [65] These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit: Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was magulyan or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration[66] filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only magulyan but was actually suffering from paranoia.[67] We are not convinced. We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. [68] Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states: Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpins house and voluntarily executed the Will. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.[69] More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states: Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden. Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA: A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith

be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee.[70] Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencias signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned. We are not persuaded. We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzos wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy. In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said allegations. [71] Furthermore, a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased].[72] Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides: RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in

the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law. If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living. We cannot agree with petitioners. We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughters name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.[73] Moreover, it bears stressing that [i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling.[74] The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby.[75] This, coupled with Lorenzos established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.