G.R. No.

186560

November 17, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. FERNANDO P. DE LEON, Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) seeks the nullification of the Decision1 dated October 28, 2008 and the Resolution2 dated February 18, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101811. Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140, which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. The application was approved by GSIS. Thereafter, and for more than nine years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001, when he failed to receive his monthly pension.3 Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) informed GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910; that the law was meant to apply only to justices and judges; and that having the same rank and qualification as a judge did not entitle respondent to the retirement benefits provided thereunder. Thus, GSIS stopped the payment of respondents monthly pension.4 Respondent wrote GSIS several letters but he received no response until November 9, 2007, when respondent received the following letter from GSIS: Dear Atty. De Leon: This is in response to your request for resumption of pension benefit. It appears that you retired under Republic Act No. 910 in 1992 from your position as Chief State Prosecutor in the Department of Justice. From 1992 to 2001, you were receiving pension benefits under the said law. Beginning the year 2002, the Department of Budget and Management through then Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin already refused to release the funds for your pension benefit on the ground that Chief State Prosecutors are not covered by R.A. 910. This conclusion was later on affirmed by Secretary Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. in a letter dated 6 June 2006. In view of these, you now seek to secure benefits under Republic Act No. 660 or any other applicable GSIS law.

We regret, however, that we cannot accede to your request because you have chosen to retire and in fact have already retired under a different law, Republic Act No. 910, more than fifteen (15) years ago. There is nothing in the GSIS law which sanctions double retirement unless the retiree is first re-employed and qualifies once again to retire under GSIS law. In fact, Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8291 provides for exclusivity of benefits which means that a retiree may choose only one retirement scheme available to him to the exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, we believe that the peculiarities of your case is a matter that may be jointly addressed or threshed out by your agency, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Budget and Management. Very truly yours, (signed) CECIL L. FELEO Senior Vice President Social Insurance Group5 Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits from 2001. He also asked that GSIS and the DBM be ordered to pay him damages.6 In the assailed October 28, 2008 Decision, the CA resolved to grant the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The GSIS is hereby ordered to pay without delay petitioner Atty. Fernando de Leon, his monthly adjusted pension in accordance with other applicable law not under RA 910. It is also ordered to pay the back pensions which should also be adjusted to conform to the applicable law from the time his pension was withheld. SO ORDERED.7 The CA found that GSIS allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910, following precedents which allowed non-judges to retire under the said law. The CA said that it was not respondents fault that he was allowed to avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 910; and that, even if his retirement under that law was erroneous, respondent was, nonetheless, entitled to a monthly pension under the GSIS Act. The CA held that this was not a case of double retirement, but merely a continuation of the payment of respondents pension benefit to which he was clearly entitled. Since the error in the award of retirement benefits under R.A. 910 was not attributable to respondent, it was incumbent upon GSIS to continue defraying his pension in accordance with the appropriate law which might apply to him. It was unjust for GSIS to entirely stop the payment of respondents monthly pension without providing any alternative sustenance to him.8 The CA further held that, under R.A. No. 660, R.A. No. 8291, and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146, respondent is entitled to a monthly pension for life. He cannot be penalized for the error committed by GSIS itself. Thus, although respondent may not be qualified to receive the

retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, he is still entitled to a monthly pension under R.A. No. 660, P.D. No. 1146, and R.A. No. 8291.9 Petitioner GSIS is now before this Court, assailing the Decision of the CA and the Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration. GSIS admits that respondent received monthly pensions from August 1997 until December 2001. Thereafter, the DBM refused to remit the funds for respondents pension on the ground that he was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910 and should have retired under another law, without however specifying which law it was.10 It appears that the DBM discontinued the payment of respondents pension on the basis of the memorandum of the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel that Chief Prosecutors of the DOJ are not entitled to the retirement package under R.A. No. 910. Because of the discontinuance of his pension, respondent sought to convert his retirement under R.A. No. 910 to one under another law administered by GSIS.11 However, this conversion was not allowed because, as GSIS avers, R.A. No. 8291 provides that conversion of ones retirement mode on whatever ground and for whatever reason is not allowed beyond one year from the date of retirement. GSIS assails the CAs Decision for not specifying under which law respondents retirement benefits should be paid, thus making it legally impossible for GSIS to comply with the directive.12 It then raises several arguments that challenge the validity of the appellate courts decision. GSIS argues, first, that the CA erred in issuing a writ of mandamus despite the absence of any specific and clear right on the part of respondent, since he could not even specify the benefits to which he is entitled and the law under which he is making the claim.13 Second, GSIS alleges that it had refunded respondents premium payments because he opted to retire under R.A. No. 910, which it does not administer. Thus, GSIS posits that the nexus between itself and respondent had been severed and, therefore, the latter cannot claim benefits from GSIS anymore.14 Third, GSIS contends that the CA erred in concluding that respondent would not be unjustly enriched by the continuation of his monthly pension because he had already benefited from having erroneously retired under R.A. No. 910. GSIS points out that it had refunded respondents premium contributions. When the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel concluded that respondent was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910, it was implicit recognition that respondent was actually not entitled to the P1.2 million lump sum payment he received, which he never refunded.15 Fourth, GSIS points out that the CA erred in concluding that respondent was not seeking conversion from one retirement mode to another. It reiterates that R.A. No. 8291 expressly prohibits conversion beyond one year from retirement. To compel GSIS to release respondents retirement benefits despite the fact that he is disqualified to receive retirement benefits violates

R.A. No. 8291, and would subject its officials to possible charges under R.A. No. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Fifth, GSIS contends that respondent is not entitled to the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291 because, when he retired in 1992, the law had not yet been enacted. The retirement laws administered by GSIS at that time were R.A. No. 660, R.A. No. 1616, and P.D. No. 1146. Lastly, GSIS argues that the writ of mandamus issued by the CA is not proper because it compels petitioner to perform an act that is contrary to law. Respondent traverses these allegations, and insists that he has a clear legal right to receive retirement benefits under either R.A. No. 660 or P.D. No. 1146.16 He claims that he has met all the conditions for entitlement to the benefits under either of the two laws.17 Respondent contends that the return of his contributions does not bar him from pursuing his claims because GSIS can require him to refund the premium contributions, or even deduct the amount returned to him from the retirement benefits he will receive.18 He also argues that resumption of his monthly pension will not constitute unjust enrichment because he is entitled to the same as a matter of right for the rest of his natural life.19 Respondent accepts that, contrary to the pronouncement of the CA, he is not covered by R.A. No. 8291. He, therefore, asks this Court to modify the CA Decision, such that instead of Section 13 of R.A. No. 8291, it should be Section 12 of P.D. No. 1146 or Section 11 of R.A. No. 660 to be used as the basis of his right to receive, and the adjustment of, his monthly pension. Furthermore, respondent argues that allowing him to retire under another law does not constitute "conversion" as contemplated in the GSIS law. He avers that his application for retirement under R.A. No. 910 was duly approved by GSIS, endorsed by the DOJ, and implemented by the DBM for almost a decade. Thus, he should not be made to suffer any adverse consequences owing to the change in the interpretation of the provisions of R.A. No. 910. Moreover, he could not have applied for conversion of his chosen retirement mode to one under a different law within one year from approval of his retirement application, because of his firm belief that his retirement under R.A. No. 910 was proper a belief amply supported by its approval by GSIS, the favorable endorsement of the DOJ, and its implementation by the DBM.20 The petition is without merit. Initially, we resolve the procedural issue. GSIS contends that respondents petition for mandamus filed before the CA was procedurally improper because respondent could not show a clear legal right to the relief sought. The Court disagrees with petitioner. The CA itself acknowledged that it would not indulge in technicalities to resolve the case, but focus instead on the substantive issues rather than on procedural questions.21 Furthermore, courts have the discretion to relax the rules of procedure in order to protect substantive rights and prevent manifest injustice to a party.

The Court has allowed numerous meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than to promote substantial justice must always be avoided.22 Besides, as will be discussed hereunder, contrary to petitioners posture, respondent has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for. Thus, the CA acted correctly when it gave due course to respondents petition for mandamus. This case involves a former government official who, after honorably serving office for 44 years, was comfortably enjoying his retirement in the relative security of a regular monthly pension, but found himself abruptly denied the benefit and left without means of sustenance. This is a situation that obviously cries out for the proper application of retirement laws, which are in the class of social legislation. The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is that social legislation must be liberally construed in favor of the beneficiaries.23 Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree24 because their objective is to provide for the retirees sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.25 Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.26 In this case, as adverted to above, respondent was able to establish that he has a clear legal right to the reinstatement of his retirement benefits. In stopping the payment of respondents monthly pension, GSIS relied on the memorandum of the DBM, which, in turn, was based on the Chief Presidential Legal Counsels opinion that respondent, not being a judge, was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910. And because respondent had been mistakenly allowed to receive retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, GSIS erroneously concluded that respondent was not entitled to any retirement benefits at all, not even under any other extant retirement law. This is flawed logic. Respondents disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910 does not mean that he is disqualified from receiving any retirement benefit under any other existing retirement law. The CA, however, incorrectly held that respondent was covered by R.A. No. 8291. R.A. No. 8291 became a law after respondent retired from government service. Hence, petitioner and even respondent agree that it does not apply to respondent, because the law took effect after respondents retirement. Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government employees who were not entitled to the benefits under R.A. No. 910 had the option to retire under either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, or P.D. No. 1146.

In his Comment, respondent implicitly indicated his preference to retire under P.D. No. 1146, since this law provides for higher benefits, and because the same was the latest law at the time of his retirement in 1992.27 Under P.D. No. 1146, to be eligible for retirement benefits, one must satisfy the following requisites: Section 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who: (1) has at least fifteen years of service; (2) is at least sixty years of age; and (3) is separated from the service. Respondent had complied with these requirements at the time of his retirement. GSIS does not dispute this. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to receive the benefits provided under Section 12 of the same law, to wit: Section 12. Old-Age Pension. (a) A member entitled to old-age pension shall receive the basic monthly pension for life but in no case for a period less than five years: Provided, That, the member shall have the option to convert the basic monthly pensions for the first five years into a lump sum as defined in this Act: Provided, further, That, in case the pensioner dies before the expiration of the five-year period, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the balance of the amount still due to him. In default of primary beneficiaries, the amount shall be paid to his legal heirs. To grant respondent these benefits does not equate to double retirement, as GSIS mistakenly claims. Since respondent has been declared ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910, GSIS should simply apply the proper retirement law to respondents claim, in substitution of R.A. No. 910. In this way, GSIS would be faithful to its mandate to administer retirement laws in the spirit in which they have been enacted, i.e., to provide retirees the wherewithal to live a life of relative comfort and security after years of service to the government. Respondent will not receive --and GSIS is under no obligation to give him --- more than what is due him under the proper retirement law. It must be emphasized that P.D. No. 1146 specifically mandates that a retiree is entitled to monthly pension for life. As this Court previously held: Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.

In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service. Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country. Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.28 It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910, following jurisprudence laid down by this Court. One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on petitioners interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to administer the governments retirement system. He had the right to assume that GSIS personnel knew what they were doing. Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent, he cannot be prejudiced by the same.1avvphi1 His right to receive monthly pension from the government cannot be jeopardized by a new interpretation of the law. GSIS argument that respondent has already been enormously benefited under R.A. No. 910 misses the point. Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employees loyalty and service to the employer, and are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of having to worry about his financial support or upkeep. A pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for a dual purpose: to entice competent people to enter the government service; and to permit them to retire from the service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.29 Surely, giving respondent what is due him under the law is not unjust enrichment. As to GSIS contention that what respondent seeks is conversion of his retirement mode, which is prohibited under R.A. No. 8291, the Court agrees with the CA that this is not a case of conversion within the contemplation of the law. The conversion under the law is one that is voluntary, a choice to be made by the retiree. Here, respondent had no choice but to look for another law under which to claim his pension benefits because the DBM had decided not to release the funds needed to continue payment of his monthly pension.

Respondent himself admitted that, if the DBM had not suspended the payment of his pension, he would not have sought any other law under which to receive his benefits. The necessity to "convert" was not a voluntary choice of respondent but a circumstance forced upon him by the government itself. Finally, GSIS would like this Court to believe that because it has returned respondents premium contributions, it is now legally impossible for it to comply with the CAs directive. Given the fact that respondent is ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910, the refund by GSIS of respondents premium payments was erroneous. Hence, GSIS can demand the return of the erroneous payment or it may opt to deduct the amount earlier received by respondent from the benefits which he will receive in the future. Considering its expertise on the matter, GSIS can device a scheme that will facilitate either the reimbursement or the deduction in the most costefficient and beneficial manner. The foregoing disquisition draws even greater force from subsequent developments. While this case was pending, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 10071,30 the Prosecution Service Act of 2010. On April 8, 2010, it lapsed into law without the signature of the President,31 pursuant to Article VI, Section 27(1) of the Constitution.32 Section 24 of R.A. No. 10071 provides: Section 24. Retroactivity. - The benefits mentioned in Sections 14 and 16 hereof shall be granted to all those who retired prior to the effectivity of this Act. By virtue of this express provision, respondent is covered by R.A. No. 10071. In addition, he is now entitled to avail of the benefits provided by Section 23, that "all pension benefits of retired prosecutors of the National Prosecution Service shall be automatically increased whenever there is an increase in the salary and allowance of the same position from which he retired." Respondent, as former Chief State Prosecutor, albeit the position has been renamed "Prosecutor General,"33 should enjoy the same retirement benefits as the Presiding Justice of the CA, pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 10071, to wit: Section 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. - The Prosecutor General shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments, and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and shall be appointed by the President.34 Furthermore, respondent should also benefit from the application of Section 16 of the law, which states: Section 16. Qualifications, Ranks, and Appointments of Prosecutors, and other Prosecution Officers. x x x.

Any increase after the approval of this Act in the salaries, allowances or retirement benefits or any upgrading of the grades or levels thereof of any or all of the Justices or Judges referred to herein to whom said emoluments are assimilated shall apply to the corresponding prosecutors. Lastly, and most importantly, by explicit fiat of R.A. No. 10071, members of the National Prosecution Service have been granted the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, to wit: Section 25. Applicability. - All benefits heretofore extended under Republic Act No. 910, as amended, and all other benefits that may be extended by the way of amendment thereto shall likewise be given to the prosecutors covered by this Act. Hence, from the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 10071, respondent should be entitled to receive retirement benefits granted under R.A. No. 910. Consequently, GSIS should compute respondents retirement benefits from the time the same were withheld until April 7, 2010 in accordance with P.D. No. 1146; and his retirement benefits from April 8, 2010 onwards in accordance with R.A. No. 910. A final note. The Court is dismayed at the cavalier manner in which GSIS handled respondents claims, keeping respondent in the dark as to the real status of his retirement benefits for so long. That the agency tasked with administering the benefits of retired government employees could so unreasonably treat one of its beneficiaries, one who faithfully served our people for over 40 years, is appalling. It is well to remind GSIS of its mandate to promote the efficiency and welfare of the employees of our government, and to perform its tasks not only with competence and proficiency but with genuine compassion and concern. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated October 28, 2008 and the Resolution dated February 18, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101811 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to (1) pay respondents retirement benefits in accordance with P.D. No. 1146, subject to deductions, if any, computed from the time the same were withheld until April 7, 2010; and (2) pay respondents retirement benefits in accordance with R.A. No. 910, computed from April 8, 2010 onwards. In order that respondent may not be further deprived of his monthly pension benefits, this Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 157038

December 23, 2009

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. JEAN E. RAOET, Respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated February 3, 2003 in CAG.R. SP. No. 72820, which overturned and set aside the July 24, 2002 decision3 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-13079-302, and granted respondent Jean Raoets (respondent) claim for income benefits arising from her husbands death. BACKGROUND FACTS The respondents husband, Francisco M. Raoet (Francisco), entered government service on July 16, 1974 as an Engineer Trainee at the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). On July 5, 1978, he was appointed as Junior Civil Engineer, and on April 22, 1981, he rose to the rank of Irrigation Engineer B. On August 1, 1998, he was promoted to the position of Engineer A the position he held until his death on May 5, 2001. As Engineer A, Francisco supervised the implementation of construction activities of Lateral E and E-1. He was also tasked to review and check the structural plan and the facilities.4 In 2000, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease, and he was confined at the Region I Medical Center from July 16 to July 25, 2000.5 As the GSIS considered this a work-related condition, Francisco was awarded 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits, plus reimbursement of medical expenses incurred during treatment. On May 5, 2001, Francisco was rushed to the Dr. Marcelo M. Chan Memorial Hospital because he was vomiting blood.6 He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. His death certificate listed the causes of his death as follows: CAUSES OF DEATH Immediate cause: Cardiac Arrest Antecedent cause: Acute Massive Hemorrhage Underlying cause: T/C Bleeding Peptic Ulcer Disease7 The respondent, as widow, filed with the GSIS on May 24, 2001 a claim for income benefits accruing from the death of her husband, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626 (P.D. 626), as

amended. On August 31, 2001, the GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the respondent did not submit any supporting documents to show that Franciscos death was due to peptic ulcer. On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the GSIS in its decision of July 24, 2002. According to the ECC, it could not determine if Franciscos death was compensable due to the absence of documents supporting the respondents claim. Since Francisco had no prior history of consultation relating to peptic ulcer and no autopsy was performed to ascertain the cause of his death, the ECC could not conclude that Bleeding Peptic Ulcer Disease was the reason for his demise. The respondent elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Review. She cited the following supporting grounds: 1. Employees Compensation Commission failed to consider that peptic ulcer is an on and off disease which does not need confinement in a hospital or clinic or submission to a Doctor of Medicine because it can be cured by self-medication. 2. The Employees Compensation Commission failed to consider also that there were medical treatment of Francisco Raoet of occupational and compensable diseases other than peptic ulcer as shown by the medical findings of certificates, Xerox copies of which are attached to this petition. The CA reversed8 the ECC decision. The appellate court held that while the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation does not list peptic ulcer as an occupational disease, Franciscos death should be compensable since its immediate cause was cardiac arrest. Thus, the CA ordered the GSIS to pay the respondents claim for death benefits under P.D. 626, as amended. The GSIS, this time, appealed through the present petition, raising the following issues: I. Whether or not the CA was correct in reversing the decision of the ECC and the GSIS denying the respondents claim for income benefit under P.D. 626, as amended, for the death of her husband, Francisco. II. Whether or not the ailment Acute Massive Hemorrhage t/c Bleeding Peptic Ulcer Disease, which caused the death of the late Francisco, is work-connected or whether there was any proof to show that the risk of contracting the same was increased by factors attendant to his employment. The GSIS reasons out that since the cause of Franciscos death was peptic ulcer, a disease not included in the occupational diseases listed in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions. The respondent failed to present any such evidence to support her claim apart from her bare allegations. In fact, Franciscos medical records disclose that he did not consult his doctors regarding peptic ulcer. Since no autopsy was performed to ascertain the cause of death, no assurance exists that Bleeding Peptic Ulcer was indeed the cause of his death.

The GSIS further argues that Franciscos other ailments, i.e., his hypertension and coronary artery disease, had already been awarded the maximum benefits commensurate to the degree of his disability when he was granted 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits, plus reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in the treatment of these illnesses. Thus, no death benefit for the same diseases can be claimed. The GSIS also points out that the employees compensation trust fund is presently empty, and claims on this fund are being paid by the GSIS from advances coming from its other funds. Accordingly, the GSIS argues that the trust fund would suffer if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. In contrast, the respondent claims that the issues the GSIS raised are essentially questions of fact which the Court is now barred from resolving in a petition for review on certiorari. Thus, she posits that the petition should be denied. THE COURTS RULING We deny the petition for lack of merit. The Procedural issue A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court opens a case for review only on questions of law, not questions of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt is on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.9 In raising questions regarding Franciscos cause of death and its compensability, the GSIS, at first blush, appears to be raising a basic question of fact the actual cause of Franciscos death. Its question, however, is not on the truth or falsity of the claimed cause of death, but on whether evidence exists supporting the claimed cause of death. Posed in this manner, the question is not purely a factual one as it involves the appreciation of how evidence is to be viewed, and whether such evidence supports or rejects the claimed cause of death. Thus, it is a question we can rule upon in this petition. From the perspective of the CA decision, the issue is not so much the actual cause of death, but a reading of the cause of death from the point of view of compensability. This is essentially a legal issue, touching as it does on the issue of compensability. Hence, it is likewise within the power of this Court to review in this Rule 45 petition. Factors determining compensability of death P.D. 626, as amended, defines compensable sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions."

Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation implements P.D. 626 and requires that for sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, it must be an "occupational disease" included in the list provided (Annex "A"), with the conditions attached to the listed sickness duly satisfied; otherwise, the claimant must show proof that the risk of contracting the illness is increased by his working conditions. In plainer terms, to be entitled to compensation, a claimant must show that the sickness is either: (1) a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation under the conditions Annex "A" sets forth; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.10 Based on Franciscos death certificate, the immediate cause of his death was cardiac arrest; the antecedent cause was acute massive hemorrhage, and the underlying cause was bleeding peptic ulcer disease. The GSIS maintains that the respondents claim for income benefits should be denied because she failed to present any proof, documentary or otherwise, that peptic ulcer was the underlying cause for Franciscos death. We disagree with this position, as we find that the respondent submitted sufficient proof of the cause of her husbands death when she presented his death certificate. In Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. CA,11 we held that death certificates and the notes by a municipal health officer prepared in the regular performance of his duties are prima facie evidence of facts therein stated. A duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the entries found therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing a contrary conclusion. We also ruled in People v. Datun12 that a death certificate establishes the fact of death and its immediate, antecedent, and underlying causes. Since neither the GSIS nor the ECC presented any evidence to refute that cardiac arrest was the immediate cause, and peptic ulcer was the underlying cause of Franciscos death, we accept as established, in accordance with the death certificate, that the underlying cause of Franciscos demise was peptic ulcer. The CA decision and Peptic Ulcer as Compensable Illness In the assailed decision, the CA focused on Franciscos immediate cause of death cardiac arrest and ignored the underlying cause of death peptic ulcer. According to the CA, Franciscos death is compensable even if peptic ulcer is not a listed occupational disease, since Francisco died due to a listed cause cardiac arrest. The CA is apparently wrong in its conclusion as it viewed in isolation the immediate cause of death (cardiac arrest), disregarding that what brought about the cardiac arrest was the ultimate underlying cause peptic ulcer. This error, however, does not signify that Franciscos death is not compensable because peptic ulcer itself, under specific conditions, is a compensable illness.

Contrary to the CAs conclusion, peptic ulcer is a compensable cause of death, pursuant to ECC Resolution No. 1676 dated January 29, 1981, which unmistakably provides that peptic ulcer is a compensable disease listed under Annex "A," provided the claimant is in an occupation that involves prolonged emotional or physical stress, as among professional people, transport workers and the like.13 Peptic Ulcer is defined as: [A]n ulceration of the mucous membrane of the esophagus, stomach or duodenum, caused by the action of the acid gastric juice. Peptic ulcer is most common among persons who are chronically anxious or irritated, or who otherwise suffer from mental tension. It occurs about three times as often in men as in women. Symptoms include a pain or gnawing sensation in the epigastric region. The pain occurs from 1 to 3 hours after eating, and is usually relieved by eating or taking an antacid drug. Vomiting, sometimes preceded by nausea, usually follows a severe bout of pain. COMPLICATIONS. If ulcers are untreated, bleeding can occur, leading to anemia and therefore weakness and impaired health. Blood may be vomited, and appears brownish and like coffee grounds because of the digestive effect of gastric secretions on the hemoglobin. There may be blood in the stools, giving them a tarry black color. In acute cases sudden hemorrhage can occur and may be fatal if not treated properly. xxxx Worry and anxiety can contribute to the development of an ulcer and prevent it from healing. If emotional tensions persist, an ulcer that has been healed by medical treatment can return. Therefore, every effort is made to help the patient relax. Sometimes counseling or psychotherapy is helpful in relieving emotional strain.14 [Emphasis supplied.] Based on the Annex "A" list and the accompanying requisite condition for compensability, the question that really confronts us is: did Franciscos occupation involve prolonged emotional or physical stress to make his death due to peptic ulcer compensable? A significant point to appreciate in considering this question is that based on the GSIS own records,15 Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease, and confined at the Region I Medical Center in July 2000. The GSIS found this ailment work-connected and awarded Francisco 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits. This finding assumes importance in the present case because the established underlying causes of the combination of these diseases are, among others, the stressful nature and pressures inherent in an occupation.[16] This was what the GSIS acknowledged in recognizing Franciscos total temporary disability. As already mentioned, Francisco worked as Engineer A with the NIA, a job with enormous responsibilities. He had to supervise the construction activities of Lateral E and E-1, and review the structural plan and facilities.17 The stresses these responsibilities carried did not abate for

Francisco when he returned from his Temporary Total Disability; he occupied the same position without change of responsibilities until his death on May 5, 2001. Thus, Francisco had continuous exposure to prolonged emotional stress that would qualify his peptic ulcer a stressdriven ailment as a compensable cause of death. In arriving at this conclusion, we stress that in determining the compensability of an illness, we do not require that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if only in a small degree, to the development of the disease.18 In the recent case of GSIS v. Vicencio, we said:19 It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmans claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to the development of the disease. [Emphasis supplied.] In this case, the chain of causation that led to the peptic ulcer is too obvious to be disregarded. The pressures of Franciscos work constant, continuing and consistent at his level of responsibility inevitably manifested their physical effects on Franciscos health and body; the initial and most obvious were the hypertension and coronary artery disease that the GSIS itself recognized. Less obvious, but nevertheless arising from the same pressures and stresses, were the silent killers, like peptic ulcer, that might not have attracted Franciscos attention to the point of driving him to seek immediate and active medical intervention. Ultimately, when the ulcerproducing stresses did not end, his ulcer bled profusely, affecting his heart and causing its arrest. In this manner, Francisco died. That his widow should now be granted benefits for Franciscos death is a conclusion we cannot avoid and is, in fact, one that we should gladly make as a matter of law and social justice. Purpose of P.D. 626 Understandably, the GSIS may accuse us of leniency in the grant of compensation benefits in light of the jurisprudential trends in this area of law. Our leniency, however, is not due to our individual predilections or liberal leanings; it proceeds mainly from the character of P.D. 626 as a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income. In employee compensation, persons charged by law to carry out the Constitutions social justice objectives should adopt a liberal attitude in deciding compensability claims and should not hesitate to grant compensability where a reasonable measure of work-connection can be inferred. Only this kind of interpretation can give meaning and substance to the laws compassionate spirit as expressed in Article 4 of the Labor Code that all doubts in the

implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including their implementing rules and regulations, should be resolved in favor of labor.20 When the implementors fail to reach up to these standards, this Court, as guardian of the Constitution, necessarily has to take up the slack and order what we must, to ensure that the constitutional objectives are achieved. This is simply what we are doing in this case.1avvphi1 Acting on this same role, we remind the GSIS that when it is called upon to determine the compensability of an employees disease or death, the present state of the State Insurance Fund cannot be an excuse to avoid the payment of compensation. If the State Insurance Fund lacks the financial capacity, it is not the responsibility of the insured civil servant, but rather of the State to fill in the deficiency and ensure the solvency of the State Insurance Fund. This is the clear mandate of Article 184 of the Labor Code, which reads: Article 184. Government guarantee. The Republic of the Philippines guarantees the benefits prescribed under this Title, and accepts general responsibility for the solvency of the State Insurance Fund. In case of deficiency, the same shall be covered by supplemental appropriations from the national government. In Biscarra v. Republic, we explicitly said:21 The fear that this humane, liberal and progressive view will swamp the Government with claims for continuing medical, hospital and surgical services and as a consequence unduly drain the National Treasury, is no argument against it; because the Republic of the Philippines as a welfare State, in providing for the social justice guarantee in our Constitution, assumes such risk. This assumption of such a noble responsibility is, as heretofore stated, only just and equitable since the employees to be benefited thereby precisely became permanently injured or sick while invariably devoting the greater portion of their lives to the service of our country and people. Human beings constitute the most valuable natural resources of the nation and therefore should merit the highest solicitude and the greatest protection from the State to relieve them from unbearable agony. They have a right to entertain the hope that during the few remaining years of their life some dedicated institution or gifted individual may produce a remedy or cure to relieve them from the painful or crippling or debilitating or humiliating effects of their injury or ailment, to fully and completely rehabilitate them and develop their "mental, vocational and social potential," so that they will remain useful and productive citizens. [Emphasis supplied] The GSIS, therefore, cannot use the excuse of the State Insurance Funds present lack of capital to refuse paying income benefits to the respondent, whose husband devoted 27 years of his life to government service and whose death was caused by an ailment aggravated by the emotional stresses and pressures of his work. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: G.R. No. 126352 September 7, 2001

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA A. BARRAMEDA, respondents. PARDO, J.: The Case The case is an appeal via certiorari1 from a decision of the Court of Appeals2 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission3 (hereafter, "ECC") and the letters-decisions of the Government Service Insurance System4 (hereafter, "GSIS") which denied respondent Gloria A. Barramedas claim for compensation benefits under P. D. No. 626.5 The Facts Gloria A. Barrameda (hereafter, "Gloria") started in the government service on July 1, 1971, as a typist in the Court of First Instance of Manila.6 On January 3, 1985, she transferred to the Sandiganbayan and held the position of "clerk". On July 1, 1989, she was promoted to the position of Clerk III at the same office.7 As Clerk III, Gloria would file and keep the records of Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores. All files were kept in old steel cabinets which would jam from time to time because of rust and misalignment of the cabinets rollers. Part of Glorias job was to pull out the drawers of the cabinets where the folders of cases with varying thickness and weight were filed. Because sometimes the cabinets would jam, Gloria would have to exert extra effort in pulling and pushing the cabinets handles. On August 26, 1992, as Gloria was pushing the drawer of one of the steel cabinets, she felt an excruciating pain in her wrists as the drawer unexpectedly jammed midway. She cried out in pain, calling the attention of her officemates, Court Attorney Paulino P. Santiago and Court Stenographer Elenita C. Jasul.8 From then on, Gloria experienced pain in both of her hands and gradually lost grip in both hands and could no longer keep house or carry heavy objects.9 On September 14, 1992, Gloria consulted Dr. Efren de los Santos of De Los Santos Medical Center, who diagnosed her condition as "TENDONITIS EXTENSOR POLLICES (sic) LONGUS THUMB, BILATERAL." Gloria was placed on medication and therapy.10

On March 23, 1993, Gloria filed a claim for compensation benefits with the GSIS11 in the amount of twenty thousand nine hundred twenty two pesos and ninety one centavos (P20,922.91) broken down as follows: seven thousand five hundred pesos and ninety one centavos (P7,500.91) for medicine;12 four thousand eight hundred and seventy pesos (P4,870.00) for physiotherapy13 and eight thousand five hundred and fifty two pesos (P8,552.00) for professional fees.14 On April 2, 1993, in a pro-forma letter, the GSIS denied Glorias claim on the grounds that: First, the ailment is a non-occupational disease, and Second, Gloria did not present any proof that her position as Clerk III at the Sandiganbayan increased the risk of her contracting the disease.15 On April 19, 1993, Gloria filed with the GSIS a letter request for reconsideration of the aforementioned letter-decision.16 On May 20, 1993, the GSIS denied Glorias letter-request.17 On June 1, 1993, Gloria filed with the GSIS a notice of appeal signifying her intention to appeal the denial of her claim to the ECC.18 On September 9, 1993, the ECC board resolved19 to affirm the decisions of the GSIS.20 According to the ECC, First, there was no proof that the closing of the steel cabinets drawers on August 26, 1992 triggered Glorias ailment as Gloria sought medical assistance a month after the incident. Second, medical research reveals that Glorias ailment21 is seen as the result of trauma, rheumatoid arthritis or infection. It is usually the result of strenuous or unaccustomed use of the adjacent joint. From this the ECC concluded that the ailment could not have been contracted in the course of Glorias employment, and denied her appeal. We quote the dispositive portion of the decision:22 "PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit. "SO ORDERED." On November 29, 1993, Gloria appealed from the ECCs dismissal of her claim to the Court of Appeals.23 On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision finding that there existed substantial evidence to grant Glorias claim. The Court of Appeals recalled Glorias tasks as Clerk III of the Sandiganbayan and concluded that such activities were strenuous enough to cause the ailment complained of. However, while the Court of Appeals ruled that the ailment suffered by Gloria was work related, the Court of Appeals found that the amount claimed by Gloria was more than the amount allowed to be reimbursed under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled:24

"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition is hereby GRANTED ordering the GSIS to reimburse petitioner of the proper amount compensable under the rules implementing PD 626. "SO ORDERED." Hence, this petition.25 The Issue Whether or not Gloria was entitled to compensation for work related ailment under P.D. No. 626. The Courts Ruling We rule in the affirmative, and consequently, find the petition without merit. Under P. D. No. 626, if an ailment or sickness is not listed as an "occupational disease," the claimant must prove that the risk of contracting the illness suffered was increased by his or her working conditions.26 The degree of proof required is "substantial evidence." Jurisprudence defines "substantial evidence" as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.27 In the case at bar we find that the evidence met the degree of proof required. The affidavits submitted by Gloria as well as certifications with respect to the injuries she suffered and the nature of her work justified her claim. The following are Glorias functions as Clerk III in the Sandiganbayan:28 First, types drafts and final copies of decisions, resolutions, as well as correspondences emanating from the Office of her Justice, and second, files and keeps records of the same. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is reasonable to conclude that the aforementioned activities which entail the opening and closing, pushing and pulling of rusty steel drawers, which sometimes jam and misalign; the lifting and filing of voluminous files and expedientes and the typing of various drafts and resolutions caused strain and the overstretching of her wrists joints and tendons. Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof and not direct proof of a causal connection between the work and the ailment is required. To require proof of actual causes or factors which lead to the ailment would not be consistent with the liberal interpretation of the social justice guarantee in favor of workers.29 We thus do not find any error in the Court of Appeals ruling reversing the decision of the ECC. The ECC, as an agency charged by law to implement social justice must adopt a more liberal attitude in favor of claimants like Gloria when it decided her claim for compensability, especially as in this case, when there was basis for inferring a work-connection to the ailment she suffered. The policy of the State is to give maximum aid and protection to labor.30

The Fallo WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32703 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 148089 March 24, 2006 JAIME M. BARRIOS, substituted by his heirs, ERLINDA BARRIOS and CHRISTIANNE JOY BARRIOS, Petitioners, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION), Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated February 9, 2001 and Resolution2 dated April 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (Fourteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48150. The pertinent facts as gleaned from the records are: Jaime M. Barrios, now deceased, substituted by his heirs, wife Erlinda and daughter Christianne Joy, now petitioners herein, was employed on February 1, 1975 as a driver in the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), respondent. On January 16, 1997, he retired as DriverMechanic 3 after rendering twenty-two (22) years of public service. He was then fifty (50) years old. From August 5 to 17, 1996, or five months and 11 days before his retirement, Barrios was confined at the Lung Center of the Philippines due to chronic renal failure and diabetes mellitus. Prior thereto, he had been suffering from diabetes for fifteen (15) years. After his discharge from the Lung Center, his condition did not improve. On October 8-31, 1996, he was treated at the Manila Doctors Hospital for end stage kidney disease secondary to diabetic nephropathy. On his second day, he began undergoing dialysis. On September 2, 1997, Barrios filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for income benefits, pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626,3 as amended. The GSIS denied his claim on the ground that end stage renal disease and diabetic nephropathy are not among the compensable occupational diseases listed under Annex "A" of the Decree; and

that there is no showing that his job as a driver-mechanic increased the risk of contracting the ailments. Barrios filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the GSIS denied the same. He then appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). On January 15, 1998, while the case was pending in the ECC, Barrios passed away. The cause of death as shown by the Death Certificate was renal failure secondary to diabetes mellitus.4 On April 17, 1998, the ECC rendered its Decision affirming the GSIS ruling. The heirs of Barrios then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On February 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the Decision dated April 17, 1998 of respondent Employees Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. MG-9371-1197 affirming the letter dated October 7, 1997 of respondent Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for income benefit is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. In denying the petition, the Court of Appeals held: Petitioners arguments rest mainly on their claim that Jaimes circumstance was the same as those of Geronimos. However, a perusal of the records of this case discloses that while Mr. Barrios had been, in his lifetime, contending that his case falls squarely under the Narazo Case, they however failed to present any evidence to establish the claimed similarities. There was no evidence to prove Jaimes nature of work and working condition. More importantly, no evidence whatsoever was presented on any reasonable relationship between Jaimes working condition and the disease which eventually claimed his life. All he and his heirs had were bare assertions that his job as a driver-mechanic increased the risk of him contracting the said disease. But bare allegation does not ipso facto make Jaimes disease compensable. Award of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive proposition. And, while it is not required that the work-connection be proved by direct evidence, it is however required that the claimant should at the very least submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. Sadly, neither the deceased nor his heirs have discharged this duty and for this reason we have no recourse but to agree with the findings of the respondent ECC. Further, assuming arguendo that indeed part of Jaimes work was to drive around Metro Manila for 3 to 5 hours daily, carrying officials of the NIA to their respective appointments, still, the Narazo Case cannot be applied to his case because his nature of work and work condition is not

the same as in the case of Geronimo. While Geronimo was a Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor primarily dealing with the detailed preparation of the budget, financial reports and review and/or examination of other provincial and municipal offices a job requiring full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the budget and/or financial reports, Jaimes job, on the other hand, does not require the same degree of concentration as would make him forego urinating or control the same. His job requires skill not analytical thinking. And, unlike Geronimo, Jaime could relieve himself without having to worry about forgetting what the last transaction was, what the last entry in the ledger was, how much it costs or if the local government has fund for it. Moreover, while waiting for the officials of the NIA, Jaime has a waiting period which he can make use of the rest and relieve himself if need be. Besides, it is most probable that Jaime is not the only driver at the NIA and such being the case, he could not have been driving for the officials of the said office day in and day out. There would be others on duty and there must have been a working schedule being followed by the drivers of NIA so that not one of them would be unjustly burdened with driving everyday. In addition, we also find it impossible that the officials of NIA were attending meetings outside their office everyday that would warrant the daily driving activities of Jaime. Petitioners seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. The sole issue before us is whether petitioners are entitled to income benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended. Section 1(b), Rule III implementing P.D. No. 626, as amended, provides: For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Under the above Rule, for the death of Barrios to be compensable, petitioners, as claimants, must prove that (a) his sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules of Employees Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions. In Salalima v. Employees Compensation Commission,5 we held that where the disease or illness that caused the death or disability of the employee is not included in Annex "A," his or her heirs are entitled to compensation if they can prove that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his or her working conditions. The law does not require that the connection be established with absolute certainty or that a direct causal relation be shown. It is enough that the theory upon which the claim is based is probable. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.6 In the instant case, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners main argument that a drivermechanic in Metro Manila, tasked with transporting NIA officials to their destinations for several

hours a day, would have severe problems associated with urinary functions. Petitioners invoked our ruling in Narazo v. Empoloyees Compensation Commission.7 In this case, Geronimo Narazo (deceased, and substituted by his wife Amalia) was a former budget examiner in the Office of the Governor of Negros Occidental. Geronimos duties were preparing the provincial budget, drafting financial reports, and reviewing the budgets of provincial and municipal offices. He had to sit for hours and, more often than not, had to forego or even delay urinating so as not to interrupt his concentration. Moreover, he was under tremendous tension and pressure. Because of the nature of his work, which required full attention and thorough studies of the entries of accounts in the budget and/or financial reports, he suffered uremia due to destructive nephropathy and benign prostatic hypertrophy which caused his death. Although uremia is not among the compensable ailments under P.D. No. 626, we granted him compensation benefits. We held that under the circumstances, the risk of contracting his disease was aggravated by his working condition. It is true that the work of the late Barrios did not require analytical mental process. As the Court of Appeals held, he did not have "to worry about forgetting what the last transaction was, what the last entry in the ledger was, how much it costs or if the local government has funds for it." However, the Appellate Court failed to consider the nature of his ailment and the working conditions associated with his employment. The court then failed to see the connection between these two. Barrios was diagnosed to be suffering from diabetes mellitus complicated by end stage renal disease. This is where the line must be drawn between him and Geronimo Narazo. Diabetes mellitus is "a metabolic disorder in which the ability to oxidize carbohydrates is more or less completely lost, usually due to faulty pancreatic activity, especially of the islets of Langerhaus and subsequent disturbance of normal insulin mechanism. This produces hypoglycemia with resulting glycosuria and polyuria giving symptoms of thirst, hunger, emaciation and weakness and also imperfect combustion of fats with resulting acidosis."8 Glycosuria is "the presence of an abnormal amount of glucose in the urine."9 Polyuria, in turn, is "the passage of a large volume of urine in a given period."10 A fundamental characteristic of diabetes, regardless of whether it is Type 1 (insulin dependent) or Type 2 (non-insulin dependent), is frequent urination or polyuria.11 End stage renal disease, on the other hand, is attributable to complications of diabetes. The kidneys or renal system filter waste products out of the blood and recycle other important substances. This ailment is the stage where the kidneys or renal system fail to perform their function of filtering waste products out of the blood. Damaging chemicals, such as creatinine and urea, remain in the blood, thus, necessitating dialysis or mechanical cleansing of the blood.12 Diabetes is "a deficiency condition marked by habitual discharge of an excessive amount of urine."13 Simply put, a diabetic sufferer has to urinate frequently. Otherwise, he will suffer nephropathy or kidney disease. Records show that as a driver-mechanic, Barrios was tasked with transporting NIA officials, various consultants, and even World Bank officers, to different destinations in Metro Manila and

the surrounding provinces of Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog. These travels required him to sit behind the wheel for many hours. Job efficiency required him to transport his passengers to their respective destinations on time. He thus faced a situation where he had to forego urinating for hours. To this must be added the stress and strain every driver encounters while on the road.14 We have no argument with the finding of the Court of Appeals that as a driver, Barrios had waiting times during which he could freely relieve his bladder. But what the court overlooked was his need to urinate frequently due to his diabetes. This ailment afflicted him not only when he was resting, but also when he was on the road. With high ranking passengers in his charge, he had no choice but to drive continuously most of the time. As a consequence, his disease was aggravated. Nephropathy then set in with fatal results. Under these circumstances, we must apply the avowed policy of the State to construe social legislation liberally in favor of the beneficiaries.15 This is in line with Article 166 of P.D. No. 626, as amended, which reads: ART. 166. Policy. The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees compensation program whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of work-connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit and medical or related benefits. P.D. No. 626 is a specie of social legislation. Its primary purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the ordinary worker against the perils of disability, the hazards of illness, and hardships of other contingencies which may result in the loss of income. It seeks to give full force and effect to the policy of the State of giving maximum aid and protection to labor.16 This is so mandated by Section 18, Article II of the Constitution which provides: SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of the workers and promote their welfare. Where, as here, there is a basis for inferring that the risk of contracting the disease was aggravated by the employees working conditions, it is but proper that the ECC, tasked with implementing social legislation, adopt a liberal attitude in favor of petitioners, like the widow and orphan of the late Barrios. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Fourteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48150 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The GSIS is directed to promptly pay the petitioners compensation benefits arising from the death of Jaime Barrios pursuant to P.D. No. 626, as amended. SO ORDERED. ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 191218

May 31, 2011

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the GSIS, Petitioners, vs. ARWIN T. MAYORDOMO, Respondent. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and its then President and General Manager, Winston F. Garcia (Garcia), assail and seek to modify the July 31, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105414,2 as reiterated in its February 5, 2010 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof for lack of merit. The Facts: Respondent Arwin T. Mayordomo (Mayordomo) was employed as Accounts Management Specialist of the GSIS Fund Management Accounting Department (FMAD), responsible for the preparation of financial statements, from October 2, 2000 until his dismissal on August 31, 2007.4 Sometime in September 2004, Ignacio L. Liscano (Liscano), then GSIS Information Technology Officer (ITO) III called the attention of Joseph Sta. Romana (Sta. Romana), another ITO, about a network conflict in his personal computer. Sta. Romana conducted a network scan to identify the source of the problem. During the scan, he discovered that another personal computer within the GSIS computer network was also using the internet protocol (IP) address5 of Liscanos computer. This other computer was eventually identified as the one assigned to Mayordomo with username "ATMAYORDOMO." Sta. Romana immediately restored the correct IP address assigned to Mayordomos personal computer. Until this restoration, Liscano was deprived of access to the GSIS computer network and prevented from performing his work as ITO. Mayordomo was verbally reminded that he had no authority to change his IP address and warned that doing so would result in network problems.6 On February 9, 2005, in the course of another network scan, Sta. Romana again encountered the username "ATMAYORDOMO." This time, an IP address, belonging to the range of the GSIS Remote Access Server (RAS),7 was simulated and used. Knowing that the RAS would provide an exclusive external trafficking route to the GSIS computer system and realizing that Mayordomo could have gained access to the entire GSIS network including its restricted resources, Sta. Romana lost no time in reporting the matter to Rolando O. Tiu (Tiu), Vice-President of the Resources Administration Office. Before the IT network personnel could take any action, however, Mayordomo restored his assigned IP address.

The next day, the username "ATMAYORDOMO" appeared again in the scan, this time using two (2) IP addresses of the RAS (143.44.6.1 and 143.44.6.2). With notice to Tiu, Mayordomos personal computer was pulled out to have the glitches caused by the unauthorized use of the said IP addresses fixed. According to GSIS, "[t]he unauthorized changing of IP address gave freedom to respondent to exploit the GSIS network system and gain access to other restricted network resources, including the internet. It also resulted to IP address network conflict which caused unnecessary work to and pressure on ITSG personnel who had to fix the same. Further, as a consequence, Mayordomos simulation of the RAS IP addresses caused disruption within the GSIS mainframe on-line system affecting both the main and branch offices of the GSIS. His actions likewise prevented authorized outside users from accessing the GSIS network through the RAS IP addresses he simulated."8 In his Memorandum9 dated February 11, 2005, Tiu reported Mayordomos acts to Esperanza R. Fallorina and Maria Corazon G. Magdurulan,10 with emphasis on the danger of changing IP addresses as a "channel for virus proliferation that could result to loss of critical files for all those infected and render said users unproductive." Tiu also reported that Mayordomo changed his IP address to gain access to the internet as shown by downloaded programs in his computer that were not allowed or unnecessary for his work. In his written explanation11 of the same date, Mayordomo admitted the acts imputed to him and offered no excuse therefor. He nonetheless explained his side and claimed that the IP address assigned to him could not access the network due to a conflict with another IP address. Despite several verbal notices to the Information Technology Services Group (ITSG), he was simply told that the conflict would eventually disappear. The network conflict, however, persisted and resulted in the disruption of his work constraining him to use another IP address to use an officemates laser printer which was only accessible thru the Local Area Network (LAN). In his desperate need to print a set of financial reports which were considered a "rush job," Mayordomo decided not to request formal assistance in accordance with the proper procedure. He apologized and promised not to change his IP address again, acknowledging the hazards of such careless use of the system. On February 21, 2005, Human Resource Office Vice-President J. Fernando U. Campana issued a memorandum12 strictly enjoining Mayordomo "not to repeat such actuations, and to follow standard office procedures or exercise prudent judgment and obtain the necessary clearance before engaging in any extraordinary measure." In the same memorandum, it was noted that Mayordomo did not heed the earlier warning by the ITSG on the effects brought about by the changing of his IP address to the entire network system. Further, despite absence of intent to harm the system, his act of changing his IP address to facilitate the printing of rush accounting reports was "unsanctioned/illegal" because he lacked the authority to access the network. Thereafter, Mayordomos personal computer was returned to him. On May 3, 2006, or more than a year later, Mayordomo received a Show-Cause Memorandum from the Investigation Department in connection with his previous acts of changing his IP address.13 In reply, Mayordomo admitted that he changed his IP address because the one given to

him by the ITSG was in conflict with some other IP addresses. The ITSG was not able to address this problem, prompting him to change his IP address to be able to perform his work. In June 2006, President and General Manager Garcia issued a formal administrative charge14 against Mayordomo, for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. In his July 3, 2006 Answer,15 Mayordomo admitted that he changed his IP address but he denied having violated any policy or guideline on the subject because no policy, regulation or rule pertaining to changing of IP address existed at the time of its commission. It was only on November 10, 2005 when the GSIS adopted a policy against unauthorized changing of IP addresses. Hence, he could not be held liable in view of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. On August 6, 2006, Mayordomo submitted his Supplemental Answer with Manifestation,16 attaching affidavits of his co-workers stating that he indeed reported the problem with his IP address but this was never fixed by the ITSG. He also averred that he had previously used a username and password of an officemate with the blessing and explicit approval of the latter. He then waived a formal investigation and agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record. On March 7, 2007, the GSIS rendered its Decision17 finding Mayordomo guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of benefits, loss of eligibility and disqualification from government service. In said Decision, the GSIS discussed the significance of an IP address, viz: "An IP address is an identifier for a computer or device on a TCP/IP network. Networks using the TCP/IP protocol route messages based on the IP address of the destination. The format of an IP address is a 32-bit numeric address written as four numbers separated by periods. Each number can be zero to 255. For example, 1.160.10.240 could be an IP address. Within an isolated network, one can assign IP address at random as long as each one is unique." It is clear from the above that no two (2) PCs can have the same IP address. And in the event where two (2) PCs end up having the same IP address, both PCs would not be able to access the network xxx When the respondent changed his PCs IP address to that of Mr. Liscanos PC, both the respondent and Mr. Liscano were not able to access the GSIS network. To the respondents bad luck, the IP address he used was assigned to the PC of an ITSG personnel, thus, the same was immediately investigated and his actions discovered. xxx On the other hand, the "RAS" is a server that is dedicated to handling users who are not on a Local Area Network (LAN) but need remote access to it." And owing to its function, no restrictions are imposed on the IP address of the RAS. Thus, in the instances when the respondent simulated the IP address of the RAS, he not only jeopardized the accessibility of the GSIS network to outside users, he also gained access to the entire GSIS network and its other resources, including the internet, which would have otherwise been prohibited to him. Simply

put, the respondent breached the barriers that were put in place to protect the network and its other resources from unauthorized incursions when he simulated the RAS IP address. x x x. Mayordomo moved for reconsideration of the decision against him arguing against the unfairness and severity of his dismissal.18 He argued that his act of changing his IP address was in no way a flagrant disregard of an established rule, not only because no policy penalizing the act existed at that time he committed it, but because his reason for doing so even redounded to the benefit of the GSIS. Simply put, absent were the elements of corruption and the clear intent to violate a law on his part and only the motivation to accomplish his task reigned upon his judgment. In its Resolution dated July 18, 2007,19 GSIS denied the motion for lack of merit. It explained that the nonexistence of a policy prohibiting the unauthorized changing of IP addresses might relieve Mayordomo from an "administrative offense of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, his actions and its effects on the GSIS network system fall within the ambit of grave misconduct xxx [T]he assignment of, alteration or changing of IP addresses is vested solely on the ITSG. Respondent not being a member of the ITSG clearly had no authority to alter his IP address, whatever may have been his justification for doing so." On September 14, 2007, Mayordomo filed an appeal20 with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which dismissed it in Resolution 080713,21 for failure to comply with the indispensable requirements under Section 46 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.22 On reconsideration, however, the CSC ruled on the merits of the case and affirmed the findings of the GSIS, thus: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Arwin T. Mayordomo, Accounts Management Specialist, Fund Management Accounting Department, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 08-0713 dated April 21, 2008 STANDS.23 The CSC rejected Mayordomos defense of good faith in view of the previous verbal warnings he received. By changing the IP address of his personal computer for the second time, after notice of its hazardous effects to the system, Mayordomo committed an act that was inherently wrong. According to the CSC: A perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration shows that Mayordomo did not present new evidence which would materially affect the subject Resolution. xxx Movant has the repetitive averments that there was no existing company policy that prohibited GSIS employees from changing their IP addresses, and as such, there was no clear-cut penalty for the said offense; that by changing his IP address, he was in good faith and meant no harm to the GSIS; that his acts do not constitute Grave Misconduct. To these, the Commission emphasizes that in the first place, the act which Mayordomo committed was one that is inherently wrong. Moreover, the express warning and prohibition

given by the GSIS officials when he was first caught changing his IP address is and constitutes the rule that obviously made the act he committed, prohibited. xxx Further, since the same act/s undoubtedly caused undue prejudice to the government, in the sense that it exposed the GSIS system to immense risk, movant is correctly found likewise guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. But since this second offense has a lighter penalty, such is subsumed under the more grievous offense of Grave Misconduct, which is punishable with the supreme administrative penalty of dismissal.24 Undaunted, Mayordomo elevated the case to the CA by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Mayordomo argued that the above CSC Resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. He reiterated his arguments before the GSIS and the CSC, as follows: that he did not commit so grave an offense to warrant his dismissal from service; that the GSIS miserably failed to present evidence showing illwill or bad faith on his part; that his act of changing his IP address was not punishable because no existing company policy was in effect at that time and, in fact, it was only nine months after his act was complained of, when the GSIS issued a policy/guideline on the matter; that the Memorandum issued earlier by the Vice-President of the Human Resource Office sufficiently served as his penalty for his careless acts; and that granting that he should be penalized anew, his length of service and work performance should be considered for him to merit a lighter penalty than that of dismissal. On July 31, 2009, the CA partly granted the petition.25 According to the appellate court, while Mayordomo failed to exercise prudence in resorting to changing his IP address, it could not be said that this act was characterized by a wrongful use of station or character to procure personal benefit contrary to duty and rights of others. GSIS failed to prove that Mayordomo acted out of a sinister motive in resorting to such acts or in order to gain a personal benefit therefrom. The records would only show that Mayordomo did so when he was faced with the conflict of his own IP address with others and the urgency of his office tasks. In meting out this penalty for Simple and not Grave Misconduct, the CA took into consideration Mayordomos length of service in the government and his fairly clean record prior to the incident. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision thus reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Resolution No. 080713 and Resolution No. 081524 of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Finding petitioner Arwin T. Mayordomo guilty of simple misconduct this Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day. SO ORDERED.26 On reconsideration, the CA rejected Mayordomos prayer for payment of backwages corresponding to the period of his preventive suspension. In its Resolution dated February 5, 2010, the CA emphasized that Mayordomo was not completely exonerated from liability for the act complained of. The offense was merely downgraded from grave misconduct to simple

misconduct. Therefore, Mayordomos dismissal is "deemed a preventive suspension pending his appeal." Thus, he was not entitled to the payment of backwages and other benefits during the said period. Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious errors on the part of the CA in modifying the penalty imposed on Mayordomo: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN DOWNGRADING THE OFFENSE TO SIMPLE MISCONDUCT AS IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT ALTERED HIS ASSIGNED IP ADDRESS NOT ONLY ONCE BUT FOUR (4) TIMES, DESPITE WARNING. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACCORDING RESPECT AND CREDIT TO THE FINDINGS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THE CSC, WHICH WERE SUPPORTED BY MORE THAN THE REQUIRED SUSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. The petitioners contend that Mayordomo, from the outset, had full knowledge of the nature, purpose, and importance of an IP address and the dire consequences of changing the same. In committing "computer identity and capacity theft,"27 Mayordomo is guilty of Grave Misconduct, and even Dishonesty, as shown by substantial evidence. Hence, the CA erred in giving credence to his assertion that his act of changing his IP address was not attended by corruption and sinister motive, considering that he freely chose to traverse a tortuous path of changing his IP address, to simply print a document for his alleged rush work. While the latter task is simply akin to the goal of "reaching Tibet from Nepal,"28 Mayordomo took the most difficult route, that of changing his IP address, and worse, into the most powerful IP address in GSIS. For petitioners, Mayordomos dubious motive is shown by his desire to "get to the top, with all the privileges, advantages and practically limitless vista of taking that topmost perch."29 For his part, Mayordomo reasons out that during the time when the GSIS FMAD was in the peak of activities, he was constrained to alter his IP address because of the failure of the ITSG to fix a conflict which effectively disrupted his work. He claims to have no reason to cause harm to the system and to the GSIS in general, because in the first place, he was not informed of the hazards of changing IP addresses. It was only by November 10, 2005, or nine months after the incident, when the GSIS issued a policy/ guideline30 on the matter. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon the employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer, has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the

misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position.31 In this case, the attending facts and the evidence presented, point to no other conclusion than the administrative liability of Mayordomo. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees32 enunciates the state policy to promote a high standard of ethics in public service, and enjoins public officials and employees to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity and competence. Section 4 of the Code lays down the norms of conduct which every public official and employee shall observe in the discharge and execution of their official duties, specifically providing that they shall at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, and public interest. Thus, any conduct contrary to these standards would qualify as conduct unbecoming of a government employee.33 Here, Mayordomos act of having repeatedly changed his IP address without authority, despite previous warnings, shows that he did not exercise prudence in dealing with officework and his officemates. After the first warning he received from the ITSG, Mayordomo should have realized that his unauthorized act brought inconvenience, not only to a fellow employee, Liscano, but to the entire GSIS, which was actually deprived of service from a paid employee. As if he did not understand the repercussions of his act, he again toyed with his IP address and deliberately ignored the importance of necessary clearance before engaging in any extraordinary measure. Worse, he chose the RAS and gained access to the entire GSIS network, putting the system in a vulnerable state of security. When Mayordomo was alerted by the hazardous effects of using an IP address other than his, he should have realized that, a fortiori, using a RAS IP address would expose the GSIS system into a more perilous situation. Indeed, prudence and good sense could have saved Mayordomo from his current tribulation, but he was unfortunately stubborn to imbibe advice of caution. His claim that he was obliged to change his IP address due to the inaction of the ITSG in resolving the problem with his own IP address, cannot exonerate him from responsibility. Obviously, choosing the RAS IP address to replace his own was way too drastic from sensible conduct expected of a government employee. Surely, there were other available means to improve his situation of alleged hampered performance of duties for failure to access the system due to IP conflict. Certainly, gaining access to the exclusive external trafficking route to the GSIS computer system was not one of them. The Court neither loses sight of the undisputed fact that Vice-President J. Fernando U. Campanas Memorandum stated that the ITSG discovered unauthorized and unnecessary downloaded programs in Mayordomos personal computer when it was pulled out. Hence, despite his insistence that exigency was his sole reason in altering his IP address, sheer common sense and evidence to the contrary belie this. Mayordomo likewise fails to convince the Court to adhere to his position that the lack of official policy and guidelines at the time of commission makes the act of unauthorized alteration of IP addresses exempt from punishment. While official policy and guidelines apprise covered employees of offenses carrying specific penalties, the Court may not close its eyes from the fact

that actual notice of the dangers of changing his IP address was made known to Mayordomo, right after the first incident. The CSC was correct in holding that subsequent to the first warning, Mayordomo was fully aware that changing his IP address without acquiescence from the ITSG, was inherently wrong. In the same vein, proof of the alleged damage caused by Mayordomos act to the GSIS system and its use by the general public, is not necessary. The inaccessibility, unnecessary interruption, and downtime to the GSIS network as may be experienced by outside users, is obvious. Proof that the public was inconvenienced in using the GSIS website is not necessary in order to conclude that the unauthorized changing of IP address can produce pernicious effects to the orderly administration of government services. It is well-settled that in administrative cases, the injury sought to be remedied is not merely the loss of public money or property. Acts that go against the established rules of conduct for government personnel, [in this case, that of resorting to unauthorized and radical solutions, without clearance from appropriate parties] bring harm to the civil service, whether they result in loss or not.34 This rule is in line with the purpose of administrative proceedings, which is mainly to protect the public service, based on the timehonored principle that a public office is a public trust.35 Albeit different in degree, both the CSC and the CA agree that Mayordomo is guilty of misconduct in office. A long line of cases has defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer."36 Jurisprudence has likewise firmly established that the "misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence."37 To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.38 Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or employee who unlawfully or wrongfully uses her station or character to procure some benefit for herself or for another, at the expense of the rights of others. Nonetheless, "a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave. Grave misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct."391avvphi1 Based on the foregoing rule, the CA designated Mayordomos offense as Simple Misconduct, on the ground that the elements particular to Grave Misconduct were not adequately proven by the GSIS on which the burden of proof lay. There being no clear and convincing evidence to show that Mayordomo changed his IP address for personal or selfish needs, the CA found that his act could not be said to have been tainted with "corruption." The Court is inclined to disagree with the CA not only in downgrading the offense from Grave Misconduct to Simple Misconduct, but on the nature of the offense charged itself. The Court indeed finds Mayordomo administratively liable, but modifies the designation of the offense and the penalty imposed by the CA.

The Court has come to a determination that the administrative offense committed by the respondent is not "misconduct." To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties.40 The duties of Mayordomo as a member of the GSIS FMAD surely do not involve the modification of IP addresses. The act was considered unauthorized, precisely because dealing with the GSIS networks IP addresses is strictly reserved for ITSG personnel who are expectedly knowledgeable in this field. In Manuel v. Calimag, Jr.,41 the Court emphatically ruled: In order to be considered as "misconduct," the act must have a "direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x x x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x More specifically, in Buenaventura v. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer." [Emphasis ours, citations excluded] In Cabalitan v. Department of Agrarian Reform,42 the Court sustained the ruling of the CSC that the offense committed by the employee in selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during office hours was not grave misconduct, but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In Mariano v. Roxas,43 the Court held that the offense committed by a CA employee in forging some receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations, was not misconduct but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because her acts had no direct relation to or connection with the performance of her official duties. Accordingly, the complained acts of respondent Mayordomo constitute the administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which need not be related to or connected with the public officers official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.44 Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Jurisprudence, however, is instructive on this point. The Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to safe keep public records and property, making false entries in public documents and falsification of court orders.45 The Court also considered the following acts as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, to wit: a Judges act of brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; a court

interpreters participation in the execution of a document conveying complainants property which resulted in a quarrel in the latters family.46 Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is classified as a grave offense under Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, with a corresponding penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense. As this is Mayordomos first case, he should be meted the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day. As a final word, the Court makes clear that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of that officer or employee, but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and confidence in the government.47 The respondent is reminded that "the Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public service."48 WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105414 affirming with modification Resolution No. 080713 and Resolution No. 081524 of the Civil Service Commission, finding the respondent guilty of simple misconduct is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arwin T. Mayordomo is declared GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and is suspended from service for six (6) months and one (1) day. SO ORDERED. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice