Reconciling the State and Society in Somalia:

Reordering Islamic Work and the Clan System

Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow)

and Ibrahim Farah1

Introduction
Somalia remains one of the world’s hot spots that attract news coverage on
failed and collapsed states, African civil wars, cyclic droughts and floods, abuses
of human rights, religious extremism, global war on terrorism, and military
interventions. Successive regional and internal attempts to reconstitute the
Somali state and numerous peace and reconciliation conferences had failed to
bring neither peace nor functioning institutions. Approaches used in these
conferences were swinging: from warlord conferences (1991-99) to civil society-
driven (2000) and to warlord-dominated processes (2003-04).2 The emergence
of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006 and their encounter with the allied
forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and those of Ethiopia added
more agony to the Somali tragedy.

Evidently, during wars and calamities, most people took refuge and solace in
their faith and protection from their ethnic enclaves and clans. Subsequently,
Islam and clan attachments, the basics of ‘Somaliness,’ developed gradually

1
The authors are PhD candidates in Islamic and international studies respectively and are
engaged in consultancies in regional political analysis on Somalia and the Horn. This paper was
presented in the 10th Somali Studies International Association (SSIA) conference held in Ohio
State University on 15-18 August, 2007.
2
“The first ‘Somali’ reconciliation conference in which all faction leaders participated was held in
Addis Abba in March 1993 under the sponsorship of the UN and funded by the Swedish NGO Life
and Peace Institute (LPI). The other three major conferences were held in Kenya (1994), Ethiopia
(1996), and Egypt (1997). Participation in all these conferences was limited to the warring
political factions. See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Penetrating Cultural Frontiers in Somalia:
History of women’s Political Participation during four Decades (1959-2000).”African
Renaissance. 4:1 (2007), 44.
into high position in the society that should be reckoned in any new power
configurations.3 The balance of power that determines state-society relations
has also shifted towards society in the aftermath of state collapse and the
establishment of the ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland’ administrations. The same
phenomenon was observed during Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti
in 2000.4 In these local administrations and Djibouti conference, preliminary
reconciliation of the state and society was launched on the basis of mutual
recognition. Conversely, the IGAD-sponsored conference in Kenya (2003-2004)
had reversed the reconciliation trend and instead, the conference was hijacked
and manipulated by the warlords relegating all other stakeholders into the
periphery.5 As a consequence of this faulty process, the Somali conflict shifted
to a more knotty stage. Almost three years have passed since current TFG was
formed in 2004 and the people of Somalia are more divided and attached to the
interests of foreign powers. Moreover, protracted conflicts based on social,
political and resources have added up new violent conflict on the interpretation
of Islam with the emergence of the UIC.

As the title implies, the paper points out the need to reconcile the state and
society in Somalia although this process faces two main challenges: Islamic
extremism on one side and radicalization of clans on the other, both of which
are contentious and widely misused as instruments of the conflict. This will be
done from a scholarly perspective and by provoking policy makers on Somali
affairs. This paper, therefore, aims to study the impact of the breakdown of the
indigenous systems and authorities and alerts the increasing level of threat to
the very existence of Somalia. The fundamental assumption is that organized
clan system and legitimate and authoritative interpretation of Islam will
3
See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Tribalism and Islam: The basics of Somaliness.” Muddle Suzanne
Liluis, ed. Variations on the theme of Somaliness. Finland: Centre of Continuing Education, Abo
University, 2001.
4
This new relationships became visible in the civil society-driven Arta peace process held in
Djibouti in 2000, where both the Somali Islamic institutions and the clans were recognized.
5
‘Somaliland’ had established “Golaha Guurtida” similar to the Senate form in other countries
while in Puntland the Issimo similar to the Guurtida is also very active in the management of
conflict just like Islamic organizations and civil society groups.
contribute to the stability of the Somali state, and bolsters regional and global
security.

1. Theoretical Framework
Just to refresh the memory of the reader, there are three important theoretical
definitions to bring forth on the state and the society and their relationships:
1.1. The state: The state as defined by political scientists and jurists is a
community occupying a specific territory which has a functioning government
and recognized as such by other governments. 6 In public perceptions, however,
the meaning of the state, regime and government are not quite discernable.
Particularly, Somalis express these three terms as “dawladda.”7 The state in
this paper means the institutions which enforce a public good and its capability
is measured by its ability to “penetrate society, regulate social relationships,
extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”8 Post-
colonial states in the Muslim societies, and Somalia is not different, are
fashioned to be secular in essence with some religious coloring; putting these
states in conflict with the basic value system of its population.

1.2. The society: The society is “the aggregate of people living together in a
more or less ordered community” or “a particular community of people living in
a country or region, and having shared customs, laws, and organizations.”9 In
this paper, society means the people living within jurisdiction of the Somali
Republic organized traditionally as clans and religious brotherhoods.10 In the
modern era, besides traditional organizations of the society, “Ururada Bulshada

6
See Garner, Wilford, Political Science and Government (American Book Company, 1928), p.52.
7
Lately, technical terms were coined such as qaranka (the state), xukuumadda (the
government) and rejiimka (the regime) while the term dawladda remains a general term for all.
8
See Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak states: State-Society Relations and State
Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1988), p.4.
9
See more at http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/society.
10
There are four major clans and a group of minority sub-clans making a clan on their own:
Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and the Digil-Mirifle, the minorities (or others as was adopted during the
Arta peace process. These clan groupings were formed during Arta peace process in 2000 into a
4.5 clan distribution formula. Moreover, the Sufi brotherhoods of Qaderia, Ahmadiya, Salihiya
and other smaller brotherhoods are rampant throughout the country.
Rayidka ah” (civil society organizations) have emerged that include registered
charities, developmental organizations, Islamic organizations and professional
associations.11

1.3. State-society relations: According to Tracy Kuperus, relationship

between the state and society represented by the civil society institutions
(traditional and modern) are assumed to be conflcitual. However, these
relations can be described in six possible scenarios ranging from extreme
cooperation to extreme conflict: 1) mutual collaboration; 2) mutual
engagement; 3) conflictual engagement; 4) mutual disengagement; 5) enforced
disengagement; and finally 6) resistance-revolutionary disengagement.12
Historically, this relation in the Somali context shifted with the change of the
nature of the state from quasi democratic (1960-1969) to authoritarian (1969-
1990).

2. Historical Background:
Historically, state-society relations in Somalia are characterized as conflictual
since state institutions were formed by the colonial powers without the
participation of the community leaders (clan elders and Islamic scholars).
Gradually, the state encountered two major internal conflicts and rebellions.
These are the rebellion based on clan sentiments and insurgence in the name of
Islam. Consequently, Islam and the clan, which are the two common
denominators of the Somalis, were used as ideologies of conflict and
instruments of struggle for political power.
2.1 Clans vs. the State: Clash and Compromise
Some clans began their overt armed rebellion when some of them have
dissented widening imbalances of military regime’s power-sharing modality or
losing previous political privileges. Clanism as political factor was taking roots in
11
Traditional and modern civil society organizations in Somalia are classified in these two
categories. See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Non-State Actors in the Failed State of Somalia: Survey
of the Civil Society Organizations in Somalia during g the Civil War.” Darasaat Ifriqiyayyah, 31
(2004), p.59.
12
See Tracy Kuperus, Frameworks of State-Society Relations, accessed at:
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/S&Ps/1994-Su/S&P_VIII-4/state_society_relations.html.
the early formation of the political parties in 1950s, even though official state
policies were consistently vilifying and suppressing clan sentiments through
variety of legislations and harsh policies.13 Yet, policies and approaches used
during the military regime to suppress clan sentiments have not only nurtured
the clan system but it also polarized and to some extent radicalized. As a result,
armed opposition along these clan and sub-clan lines had emerged one after
the other mainly in the 1980s: for example, the Majerten-dominated Somali
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which was formed in 1978, the Isaq-led
Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981, the Hawiye-based United Somali
Congress (USC) in 1986, and the Ogaden-dominated United Somali Patriotic
(USP) formed in 1989. These armed factions have gradually weakened the
state and finally succeeded to topple the regime and the state in the early
1991. Unfortunately, in the absence of the national vision, low capacity of
leaderships and Ethiopian strategic agenda that nurtured these factions,
internal conflicts exacerbated and brutal civil war broke out reverting Somalia
into pre-state primitive conditions.

In the southern regions, Somalia remained in turmoil as fiefdoms in the hands of

many ever fighting warlords answerable to no authority. On other hand,
‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland,’ succeeded to overcome challenges of the armed
factions and established peaceful and thriving but fragile administrations on
clan-based power-sharing models. It can be argued that the official recognition
of the roles of clan elders and Islamic scholars in the rebuilding institutions
while at the same time eliminating extremist tendencies have saved these
communities.14
13
Three important laws were passed prior to 1969. The first was intended to reduce the
authority of the tribal chiefs, the second to lessen tribal solidarity and the third resulted in
banning political parties that utilized tribal names. The military regime enacted laws to
liquidate dabar-goynta charged to eliminating clanism in Somalia; abolishing the Diya (blood
money) system, renaming clan chiefs in the rural areas; and introducing compulsory auto
insurance and local government responsibility for funeral expenses. Above all, massive
propaganda against clanism was conducted in the name of the ‘socialist transformation’ of
Somali society.
14
Islamists participated in the formation of Somaliland and their influence is evident in the
adopted flag and constitution. With respect to Puntland, they disbanded SSDF armed faction and
On the other hand, after more than twelve failed conferences, a new approach
for reconciliation was set into motion in the Djibouti-sponsored peace initiative
in 1999. This conference had adopted officially a clan power sharing formula
based on the famous 4.5 system. This means that the clan factor was
recognized and affirmed in the Transitional National Charter (TNC). The change
of the elite’s views on state-society relations has not only practical relevance in
the absence of modern political institutions, but also was a sealing victory of
traditionalist approach over sophomoric modernist’s mythology.15

2.2. Islam vs. the State: Marginalization and Conflict

Although Islam is the common religion of the people of Somalia, nonetheless, its
practical application was limited and played a peripheral role in the modern
Somali state. This means that despite the societal Islamic practice in ages
throughout Somalia, the post-colonial state has been cilmaani Uyaal, meaning
quasi-secular in the post-independence era and cilmaani, meaning secular
during the military regime.16 As a result, Islamic organizations started to emerge
in the late 1960s to express protestation against growing tendency of
secularization and westernization in the society.17 Although a number of Islamic

weakened Al-Itixaad Islamic organization the bloody war of 1992.

15
4.5 formula of power sharing adopting during Djibouti Reconciliation Conference in 2000 were
strongly criticized by many scholars like Omar Enow, Mohamed Enow, Abdi Samatar and Ahmed
Samatar. However, these scholars failed to come up with acceptable practical approach of
power sharing in the absence of political institutions. Also, it is important to note that 4.5
formula offered women and minority clans more seats in the parliament while so called
dominant clans received less seats comparatively. In the final analysis, 4.5 was a temporary
measure of democratization of traditional society and never intended to be used as permanent
approach for future political model. See Mohamed A. Enow. “Inclusive but unequal: the enigma
of the 14th SNRC and the Four point five (4.5) factor” in Abdullahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Souare
(edited), Somalia at the crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed
State (London: Adonis and Abby publishers Ltd, 2007).
16
Constitutions of 1960 indicate that the state was not secular; nevertheless, the way of life
continued secular treats prevalent during colonial era. On the other hand, ideology of socialism
adopted during military regime that negates Islamic values qualify military regime to be
characterized as secular.
17
17. The most active Islamic organization in the early years of the Islamic movement was “Al-
Nahda Movement” founded in 1967 by Sheikh Abdul-Gani and Sheikh Mohamed “Geryare”. For
more details, see Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Political Islam in Somalia.” Middle Eastern Affairs
Journal. 1:3 (1993): 44-55.
organizations were covertly organized during the military rule (1969-1990),
nonetheless, three major Islamic movements, namely Al-Islah, Al-Ittihad and Al-
Tablig appeared to the public scene after the collapse of the state. 18 Evidently,
these three organizations took different approaches and means in achieving
their programs and strategic goals.19 Also, other splinter groups or smaller
organizations showed activism during the civil war including some extremist
groups.

During the civil war, Islamic organizations succeeded to outreach Somali

communities in the Diaspora and inside the country. Moderate elements of the
Islamists have actively participated in Buroa and Borama Conferences of
‘Somaliland’ and in the Growe Conference of ‘Puntland’. The Islamist inputs in
these conferences are evident in the adopted constitutions of the two
administrations.20 Moreover, in the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti
in 2000, the role of Islam was placed high as the supreme reference for all state
laws.21 Moreover, Islamic organizations and Ulama not only fully participated in
the conference as part of their clans, but in the name of Ulama, five special
seats were allocated in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA).22 Conversely,
the IGAD-sponsored Eldoret/Mbagathi peace process discriminated against and
excluded almost Islamic organizations and renowned Islamic scholars.23
18
The famous Al-wahda movement in the Northern regions “Somaliland” was incessantly
breaking into sub-groups unifying with other movements. Names such as Al-Ittihad (1981), Al-
Tajamuc(1992) and al-Ictisam (1996) were adopted by the Salafia movement originally
established under the name of Jama Islamiyah (1979) .
19
See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Recovering the Somali State: the Islamic Factor.” In Somalia:
Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa, edited by A. Osman Farah, Mamo
Mushie, and Joakim Gundel. London: Adonis & Abby Publishers Ltd, 2007. See also Andre Le
Sage, "Al-Islah in Somalia: An analysis of modern political Islam," unpublished manuscript; and
Roland Marchal, "Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war," in Alex de Waal (ed.),
Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indiana University Press, 2004).
20
See for example the flag of ‘Somaliland’ and its constitution. The same is true in ‘Puntland.’
21
See the Article 2.2 and Article 4.4 of transitional National Charter adopted in the conference.
22
These five seats were offered mainly to the Ulama of the clan-based Islamic Courts from
Mogadishu constituency. Delegates of the Somali Reconciliation Conference mandated the
president of Djibouti to allocate 20 parliamentary seats outside of 4.5 power sharing formula.
23
For example, among excluded Islamic scholars from the conference after their invitation was
Dr. Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Al-Qutubi because of his affiliation to Al-Islah movement. Many
prominent Islamic scholars were absent from the conference because they were not invited at
all. Interview with Dr. Al-Qutubi on 21 July, 2005, Mogadishu, Somalia.
As a result, the exclusive warlord-dominated conference was concluded with the
formation of the TFIs. Moreover, with US financial and political support, the
warlords formed an anti-terror alliance against Mogadishu-based Islamists,
notably the UIC and its allegedly Mogadishu-based backers in February 2006.
However, this undertaking did provoke unprecedented upsurge of Islamic rage
in Mogadishu under the UIC leadership and the US-backed warlord program was
aborted. Thus, the political environment of Somalia had changed dramatically
with the outright victory of UIC over the warlords and their uncontested power
in Mogadishu and the surrounding regions. Nevertheless, the jubilation of UIC
lasted short with the impasse of the peaceful dialogue and escalation into a
total war participated by the Ethiopian military with US tacit support.

This is evident in the fact that Islamic and clan sentiments -- if aroused as
political agenda -- are capable of crashing the Somali state. It was so in 1991
regarding clan extremism and the same scenario repeated itself in 2006 vis-à-
vis religious extremism inclinations. The major difference between 1991 and
2006 with respect for the Somali state is post-9/11 developments which
changed the landscape and language of international relations. Because of that
change, any armed Islamic movement is at risk to be labelled to have links with
global terrorist networks. In the Somali case, the United States and its regional
ally in the Horn, Ethiopia, claimed that the UIC has terrorist elements in its ranks
and in that pretext, Ethiopia with US military backing intervened militarily in
Somalia and defeated the UIC forces.

3. Chaos of the Islamic Work

Islam is a complete way of life that provides guidelines for the political, social
and economic life of Muslim communities and states. Historically, Somali people
confronted external threats using the concept of “Jihad” against infidels as
resistance ideology against all colonial powers. Conscious of the strong
presence of unreceptive culture of nomadism combined with the ideology of
Islamic Jihad, colonial power offered due consideration to Islam and did
acquiescence lately with the leading Ulama.24 As a result, the role of Islam was
well placed in the first constitution of the Somali Republic in 1960. 25 The
constitution affirms that “Islam is the religion of the state” and that “the
doctrine of Islam shall be the main source of laws of the State.”26 Moreover,
“laws and provisions having the force of law shall conform the constitution and
to the general principles of Islam.”27 The post-colonial Somali government also
adopted a law restricting the spread of other religions within Somali territory in
1963.28 In order to do justice to the founding fathers of Somalia, general policy
of the government (1960-1969), as recorded in the constitution, was to preserve
the general ethical values of Islam, promote the unity of Islamic Ummah and
encourage Islamic education in the public schools.29 Nevertheless, the inertia of
colonially inherited political, social and economic systems continued and
remained intact. Moreover, colonial laws and westernized culture of the elites
were also sustained as part of the status quo. Furthermore, westernized urban
culture such as night clubs and alcohol drinking and selling in the public spaces
were not restrained. In the nutshell, the capacity of the state to initiate any
reform program was very slim and therefore the status quo was sustained.

24
This policy was adopted after long confrontation with Ulama leading Jihad since 1990. In
particular after the emergence of Darwish Movement led by Sheikh Abdullah Hassan (1990-
1921). Moreover, Italian Fascist policy was to forge alliance with the Islamic communities in his
war against Ethiopian Empire in 1935. As a result, Italy had built Islamic institutions such as
Mosques in the town of Baidoa Furthermore, though Italian colonial administration supported
Christian Missionaries, nevertheless, they were restrained in order to avert conflict with the
Muslim communities.
25
Please note the political connotation involved in the terms “Somali Republic,’ and the
“Republic of Somalia.” The first signifies the unity of Somalia, i.e. both northern and southern
Somalia while the latter shows the former southern Somalia before independence and
unification.
26
See for example Article 50 of the 1960 Somali Constitution.
27
See Article 98, para 1 of the 1960 Somali Constitution; See also Paolo Contini, The Somali
Republic: an Experiment in Legal Integration (London: Frank Cass & Company LTD., 1969), p.58.
28
See Article 29 of the 1960 Somali Constitution which states that “Every person shall have the
right to freedom of conscience and freely to profess his own religion .... However, it shall not be
permissible to spread or propagandize any religion other than the religion of Islam.” Restricting
the spread of other religions was adopted on 29 June 1963.
29
At the national level, the national institution designated for the Islamic affairs
was the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The office of Mufti, an expert of Islamic
jurisprudence, designated to offer official religious fatwa for the public and
appointed as such by the state had never existed in Somalia. Moreover, an
Islamic Council issuing collective fatwa on the Islamic matters through research
and deliberations was also never established. Traditional Islamic institutions
such as mosques, mawli’is and Qur’anic schools were initiated and maintained
by charitable individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Practically, the Somali state considered Islamic institutions as belonging to the
private realm and never allocated any budget for its promotion and
development.

On the other hand, Islamic education was limited to the traditional Halaqa
education in the historical Islamic centers, mosques, and mawli’ics and Qur’anic
schools. Traditional Islamic education primarily focuses, after the memorization
of the Qur’anic text, on specific curriculum of Shafi’i Jurisprudence, Sufism and
Arabic Grammar. However, that tradition began to change with the appearance
of the schools administered by Egypt’s Al-Azhar University by 1953 and
government school of Islamic Studies aimed to train Islamic judges for the
elementary courts. Few graduates of these schools were offered scholarships to
Al-Azhar University before the independence in 1960. Also, Islamic universities
in Saudi Arabia graduated few Somali students after the independence. In the
subsequent years of 1960s and 70s, many Somali students graduated from the
Islamic universities in the Arab world.30 Locally, the Faculty of Shari’a and Arabic
Language was one of the last faculties of the former Somali National University
(SNU) inaugurated in 1985.31 Beyond that, Islamic education was limited and
only confined to the graduates from the Islamic universities in the Muslim world,
30
New Islamic scholars began to graduate from the Islamic universities such as Al-Azhar in
Egypt, Al-Iman University in Saudi Arabia. Among these are Sh. Abdulqani Sh, Ahemb, Sh.
Mohamed Ahmed Nur “ geryare”, Sh. Mohamed moalim and others. These scholars had founded
Al-Nahda society in Mogadishu. For more detailed account see Abdurahman Abdullaahi, “
political Islam in Somalia”. Middle eastern affairs jounal. 1:3 (1993):46-47
31
The 1969/1990 military regime looked at Islamic organizations as an impediment to its
socialist programs and the regime did not promote Islamic education and institutions.
mostly from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.32 Many of the graduates of these
universities were offered jobs by Islamic Institutions like Dar-Al-Ifta in the
kingdom of Saudi Arabia and were sent back to Somalia as preachers to spread
what nowadays termed as Salafism. Only few Somalis received post-graduate
degrees in Islamic studies as post-graduate opportunities in Islamic studies and
in research were and remain scanty.

As part of the cultural interaction with the wider Islamic world, religious
practices have nevertheless witnessed tremendous change since the 1970s.
Besides traditional Shafi’i Jurisprudence prevailing in Somalia for centuries,
other schools of jurisprudence have registered some presence. With the
emergence of Islamic revival by the 1970s, a new phenomenon of non-
complete-affiliation to the historical school of jurisprudence -- the prevailing
Shafi’i school -- became visible in Somalia.

The interpretations of other schools have been introduced and some of these
practices and advocacy of some of these schools of thoughts have created
disorder and conflict in the spaces of worship and Islamic studies. In particular,
the Salafiya movement and other graduates from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
emphasised on the selected aspects of Hambali Jurisprudence, a school which is
widely practiced in Saudi Arabia but is more alien to the Somalis. The impact of
the Salafiya movement was so great that religious conflicts were mounting all
over Somalia and the Sufiya vs. Salafiya confrontations were evident in all
religious spaces. As time went, both groups radicalized and religious tolerance
has been waning. Ideologically affiliated groups to the evolutionary approaches
of Muslim Brotherhood like Al-Islah, Al-Wahda and Al-Ikhwan played a
moderating and soothing role of the mounting conflictual religious debates.33
32
As a reaction to the Somali socialist programs, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia offered hundreds
of scholarship to Somali students in their universities and particularly admitted most of them in
Islamic universities.
33
Al-Islah is an Islamic organization ideologically affiliated to the approaches of the International
Muslim Brotherhood networks. Al-Wahda is a local organization historically well-known in
“Somaliland” that follows the same ideology of non-conflict with the traditional Sufi Orders. Al-
Ikhwan is similar to Al-Wahda and concentrated in the South and affiliated to the renowned
On the other hand, parts of the Hanafi jurisprudence spread in the Indian
subcontinent and made inroads with the appearance of the Tabliq group in
Somalia especially in the last two decades. Nonetheless, one should keep in
mind that the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and
Hanbali, are identical in most of their legal conclusions. Differences in the
remaining questions are traceable to methodological differences which most of
the Islamic workers in Somalia do not master. Moreover, most of the scholars
agree that non-experts on Islam, which means Muslim masses, should follow
one of the schools of jurisprudence and do not allow flip-flopping for one school
to another.

The reaction of the military regime to the activities of the Islamic movements
was brutal and violent. It was a denial of the basic rights to freedoms in all its
forms. As a result, like all the other dissident political organizations in the early
1970s, Islamic activists in Somalia were pushed to underground activities.34
These harsh policies included banning the Islamic Hijab, imprisoning and
executing Islamic scholars, adopting laws that go against Islamic Sharia such as
the law of inheritance and the family laws in general.35 Naturally, religious
extremism mostly developed as a reaction to the ruthless state repression of
these Islamic movements. Conversely, after the collapse of the Somali state in
the early 1991, Islamic political institutions emerged and -- as a result of this
vacuum -- became completely free from state control. However, within the
chaotic situation, some individuals and groups interpreted Islam in extreme
forms. In fact, in first time in the history of Somalia, Islamic armed groups were
engaged in bloody confrontations with the clannish factions and new
phenomena known as Salafia Jihadist had shown presence in Somalia.36

Islamic scholar sheikh Mohamed Moallim.

34
Because the military government banned other political parties and social organizations, all
dissidents therefore resorted to the underground option or exile.
35
Somali religious scholars had voiced their concerns with respect to the regime’s interference
in the family law by introducing articles equalling genders in the inheritance. This legislation
directly contravenes Islamic law and indicated lack of respect that the regime retains to the
Islamic laws and values.
At the national level, Islamic consciousness had reached its height during the
civil war. The constitutional debate during Somali Reconciliation Conference in
Djibouti produced an interim Charter regarded as the most Islamized
constitution in the history of Somalia. It included two important provisions. For
example, in Article 2.2, the Charter reinforced that “Islam shall be the religion of
the state and no other religion or ideas contrary to Islam may be propagated in
its territory.”37 Similarly, Article 4.4 stated that “the Islamic Sharia law shall be
the basic source for national legislation. Any law contradicting Islamic Shari’a
shall be void and null.”38 These two articles were rewritten in the Transitional
National Charter of 2004 with slight modifications.

All above said is a manifestation of the chaos in the Islamic works that
constantly generate conflicts within communities and society at large.
Moreover, this chaotic situation provoked religious conflict among Islamic
workers too. Furthermore, armed and extreme ideologies had led to the bloody
confrontations with local administrations and state institutions provoking
regional and international intervention in Somalia.

4. Anarchy and the Breakdown of the Clan Authority

4.1. Anarchy in the Clan System: Since 1980s, individuals claiming to

represent their clans called “warlords”, constantly appropriated authority from
the legitimate clan elders. They claimed to defend the interest of the clan,
waged wars, established sparo, looted, collected legio, confiscated properties
and lands, killed at will and signed alliance pacts with other warlords.39 In doing

36
The ideology of Salafia Jihads calls for wagging continuous Jihad against regimes that claim to
be Islamic because they do not follow Shari’a Law. Some of these organizations are part of the
global networks of Jihadists known as Al-Qaida. Al-Itihad Islamic organization adopted this
ideology in 1992 and accordingly confronted armed factions in many regions of Somalia ( Juba,
Puntland and Gedo)
37
See the Transitional National Charter (TNC) adopted in 2000 in Arta, Djibouti.
38
Ibid.
39
Sparo is known as the road block used by the militias to control streets. Legio is the money
collected from the people as taxation of the militias.
so, they never consulted legitimate leaders of their clans. Sometime, they even
punish legitimate leaders who refuse to conform some of their policies and
actions. Often, these warlords created new loyalist elders of the clan and
demoted legitimate elders by splitting sub-clans or diya-paying groups and
marginalizing the legitimate clan leaders. They have mastered how to
manipulate clan sentiments and as a result, received the support of the
uneducated youth recruited to their armed militia. They also received financial
support from the business men and women of the clan who considered them as
protectors of clan political interest and grantors of security, dignity and
prestige. Moreover, in more than 10 years (1991-2000), these warlords
succeeded to hijack national agenda representing their clans in the failed
reconciliation conferences and were accepted as such by the international
community. In the last Reconciliation Conference in Kenya (2003-2004), these
warlords were erroneously privileged to select members of the Transitional
Federal Parliament. Consequently, the whole Impagathi reconciliation process
was deceptive and forgery of the national political agenda. This process remains
in the historical records as a hallmark of shame for those who coached and
offered legitimacy.

Moreover, in the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000, new

traditional elders appeared to the scene claiming that they represent their
clans. These new traditional elders were created during the conference to
represent their clans in the selection process of the members of the parliament.
Some clans claimed new identity and affiliation to new clan groups by joining
alliance or the cluster of so called minority clans. This new rearrangement gave
them more members in the parliament unattainable if they had stayed in their
traditional clan groups. From this conference, the new political vocabulary of
“Duub Carte” meaning traditional elder of Arta had appeared.

Furthermore, in March 2007, Hawiye Elders Committee appeared to political

arena in Mogadishu articulating what is termed as “Hawiye Political Agenda and
grievances”. They expressed opposition to the Transitional Federal Government
and Ethiopian military intervention. Often, these elders seemingly represented
political agenda of the opposition groups. The leader of this group was Haji Abdi
Imam, a brother of Imam of Abgal sub-clan, Imam Mohamud Imam Omar. The
group claimed that they represent Hawiye clan interest and the international
community had dealt with them as such.40 In reality, however, they were not the
legitimate traditional leaders of Hawiye nor were elected as such by any Hawiye
clan conference. They were self-appointed group claiming to speak in the name
Hawiye clan-lineage. Later, the group had splintered into two factions and each
faction claimed that their group represent legitimacy of the group. One of the
splinter group joined the National Reconciliation Congress while the other group
remained in the opposition. The formation of this politically motivated group in
the name Hawiye is part of the continuous and illegitimate use of the clan
names as the warlords did earlier.

Three above examples shows how clan system and authority broke down and
how its fragility is exploited by the political elites. The same phenomena occur
in the all regions of Somalia including “Puntland” and “Somaliland”.
Notwithstanding the natural erosion and breakdown of the clan system by
splinting into smaller groups mostly without any new social contract between
the clans, the illegitimate use of the clan name is indicative to the breakdown of
the traditional authority. And, manipulation and contra manipulation of clan
system by the political elites and their continuous forgery of the social reality
remains one of the biggest challenges in Somalia.

4.2 Literature Review: Many scholars have written about the origins,
processes, types and different management approaches of the Somali conflict.
For the purposes of this paper, three scholars stand out of the crowd: Bradbury,
40
On March 22, a day after the newel of fighting in Mogadishu, Hawiye Elders Committee was
publicly announced. Ethiopian officers and international community were negotiating with the
group for cease firing and other issue concerning reconciliations processes. See
www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_leaders_Ethiopian_commanders_
meet_with_Hawiye_elders_printer.shtml.
Samatar and Clark and in all perspectives, the role of the clan, and/or the
kinship system is mentioned. For example, Bradbury argues that there is no
single factor, which can explain the causes of the Somali civil war. 41 He,
however, points out that the legacies of European colonialism, the Somali
kinship system, contradictions between a centralised state and a pastoral
culture, Cold War politics, militarization and uneven development, ecological
decline, lack of power-sharing, corruption, oppression and the cumulative
impact of decades of armed conflicts have all contributed. Bradbury further
argues that the common use of ‘anarchy’ and ‘madness’ to describe the war
and state of disintegration in Somalia, demonstrates an ignorance of Somali
society and the nature of the civil war, by the outsiders. To him, this ignorance
was evident in the massively expensive and controversial UN military
intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s.

Samatar, on the other hand, argues that the Somali society was torn apart
because their blood ties without the Xeer,42 was manipulated by the elite so as
to gain or retain access to resources.43 He traces the conflict to two major
historical benchmarks in the evolution of Somalia: the commercialisation of the
subsistence economy; the imposition of a colonial structure and the creation of
post-pastoral democratic nodes of power. While Samatar agrees with other
analysts that it was the unseating of President Siyad Barre that finally pulled the
trigger that sparked off the Somali conflict, he comes up with two components
which should be part of the task to restructure Somalia if it is to come back to
normal: the creation of an economy in which productive investments; and
crafting political order which is accountable, representative and entrepreneurial,
and which does not allow for the personal appropriation of public resources.
Clark, on the other hand, takes a different stand and links the problem of the

41
See Bradbury, Mark Somaliland Country Report (Totton: Hobbs Printer Ltd., 1997), p.1.
42
Xeer is the Somali traditional or customary law, which is more of social conventions/contracts.
It serves very important roles in managing not only social life but also present day Somali
politics in this new era of statelessness an anarchy.
43
See for example Samatar, A., Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil, Minority rights Group, London,
1991.
Somali people partly to the nature of their social and political organization,
which is based on a decentralized culture.44

The above summary of the literature reviewed shows the centrality of the clan
system and its significance in the conflict and attempts to manage.

4.3. The Somali Clan System: History vs. Reality

As much of the contemporary conflict in Somalia can only be understood in the
context of its history, historical claims and grievances by most Somali clans and
sub-clans play an important and powerful role in the current political debates in
Somalia. Also, although the interpretation and misinterpretation of Somali
history is itself a contentious political issue due to its clan-based nature, it is
important to carefully examine the significance and/or implication of the clan
system in the Somali conflict and its management.

There are a number of issues that need to be looked at: 1) the historical fact
that the movement by Somali clans is a major source of production and
dominance of the Somali culture, lineage identity and adherence to Islam
throughout the Eastern Horn of Africa; 2) that the history of pre-colonial Somali
migration shows the scattered nature of clan settlement throughout Somalia;45
3) that Somalia was a stateless society except for very few exceptions. As
Roland argues like most broad generalizations, this one merits qualification.
Some parts of Somalia did at different points in history sustain Sultanates and
quasi-state polities.46 Customary law and/or Xeer47 evolved to manage relations
within and among Somali clans, sub-clans and sub sub-clans. It is also still one
of the few conflict management elements that survived to the present day.
44
See Clark, J. “Debacle in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs Vol.72, No.1, pp.109-123.
45
A good example for this is the Ogaden/Darod sub-clan members who are also found in
Ogaden, Ethiopia; southern Somalia and Kenya’s northeastern region.
46
See for example Roland Marchal, “A Few Provocative Remarks on Governance in Somalia,”
Nairobi, UNDOS Discussion Paper, November 1997; See also Lee Cassanelli, The Shaping of
Somali Society (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1982).
47
Throughout Somalia, a combination of Islamic Sharia law, customary law and the pre-1991
penal code is widely used.
Historically, there was a decentralized political authority vested in the
community elders and clan leaders who had to negotiate disputes and conflicts
with other community elders and clan leaders by relying on customary law.
There was also the diya system or blood compensation, which was part of the
Xeer but mainly derived from the Islamic Sharia law.48 Generally, the Somali
customary law, Xeer, and the diya system helped prevent not only communal
conflicts and criminality but also served and contained lawlessness in pre-
colonial Somalia. To-date, however, the 4.5 clan distribution formula took over
the place and the role of the clan. In other words, everything is to be done
according to the famous 4.5 clan system: from recruitment; to political power-
sharing to cooperatives in wealth creation. Although it is meant to safeguard
the interests of the group at any one time, it is making a very negative
contribution to the historical cycles of Somalia at such a critical time. Despite
the fact that this has been the fruits of the Somali Reconciliation Conference in
Djibouti, it has nonetheless been very useful during the process.49 It, however,
left a bad legacy: one of exclusion; misrepresentation; and nepotism. It was also
explained within the confines of Somali politics.

In real terms, today’s Somalia is ‘no man’s’ land. One can see an internationally-
respected but impotent Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) that lacks total
control of the country. Islamic insurgencies with some support from Hawiye clan
continue to fight against TFG and its Ethiopian supporters. In addition to that,
‘Somaliland,’ claims to have seceded from the rest of the country while
‘Puntland,’ which used to claim that it was an autonomous regional state
waiting for a future federal government to share power with, is yet to be
brought onboard. Instead, the ‘Puntland’ administration is dealing with the

48
Diya system or blood compensation was negotiated and members of the group that
committed the crime had to pay what was agreed with the other group. In Islamic Sharia law,
the diya is 100 camels for men and 50 for women. This is paid to the aggrieved clan as
compensation. Presently, due to the Somali customary law Xeer, clans pay whatever they agree.
This also becomes another binding Xeer when the same is done to any of their members.
49
For example, it created the concept of the Somali 6th clan: the Somali women.
outside world, printing new Somali currency notes and working on oil
exploration. There is a clan dispute over Kismayu where each and every Somali
clan claims at least partial ownership. While the Digil-Mirifle clan is yet to fully
reconcile, there is a rift emerging in Beletweyne over the administration of Hiran
region. In all the above fragile social relations the Somali people are divided
over their religious groups’ affiliations: from traditional Sufist Ahl Sunna Wal
Jama’ah; to Al Ittihad Al Islami; to Al Islah and so on. The same differences and
wrong perceptions exist among the Somali clans. For example, Somali politics is
widely believed to be between the Hawiye and Darod while, interestingly
enough, the rest are marginalized and are helplessly watching from afar.

5. Conclusions
The paper offered a brief background of the state versus the clan system and
Islamic work in Somalia. It examined the disintegration of the clan system and
explored the chaotic situation of the Islamic work and the misuse of the legal
fatwa. The paper finally provided some suggestions for the reordering of the
clan system and the reorganization of the work of Somali Islamic institutions.
For example, from the above brief literature survey, the kinship system argued
by Bradbury; the traditional Xeer by Samatar; and the social and political
organization by Clark all point out to the fact that the clan played an important
role in conflict prevention and/or management from pre-Colonial Somalia. This
also witnesses that Somalia’s long history of migration, conquest and
assimilation, coupled with the colonially imported ‘nation-state’ system, has
made a serious impact upon the social, and in this case the clan system, the
political and administrative health of the nation; so much so, that conflict has
become almost a recognized part of daily life. It is also true to say that the
rootless ‘pastoralist’ nature of the majority of the Somali people has even
further exacerbated the already difficult situation.

A pertinent illustration of this premise lies in the work of two Africanist scholars,
Richard Burton and Ian Lewis, both of whom carried out extensive research on
Somalia. The conclusions they drew from their studies, though in apparent
contradiction, clearly illustrate the contradictory and conflicting nature of the
Somali psyche. Richard Burton characterized the Somali people as ‘fierce
republicans’; Ian Lewis, meanwhile, dubbed them ‘pastoral democrats’. Both,
perhaps, are correct. The fact that one cannot be a fierce ‘republican’ and a
pastoral ‘democrat,’ at the same time, calls for a reordering of the clan system.
This is based on the notion that the clan system is the root cause and/or trigger
of the Somali conflict; and that it can be used positively and constructively to
manage the conflict if carefully approached. The paper calls for a return to the
positive use of the clan and/or kinship system; the traditional Xeer and the
social and political organization Somalia and Somalis have had for long.

Similarly, comprehensive reconciliation in Somalia could only be realized when

the current clan conflicts are resolved; Somali Islamic institutions reorganized
and state-society relations improved. This means that a holistic approach needs
to be used in all the processes towards the achievement of this goal: for
example bringing all Somali actors onboard from the TFIs, the opposition, civil
society, the Somali Diaspora, and other regional administrations. However,
reaching this goal demands reorganizing society without which the state is
exposed to cyclical destabilization and collapse.50 In the last two decades, the
role of Islam – particularly the misinterpretation given -- and the clan system, as
the basis of Somali society, had been changing from being shared societal
norms to a means for divisive political agenda. Thus, self appointed warlords
were waging wars in the name of their clans and sub-clans while religious
clerics were also engaged in Jihadist tendency toward the issuance of fatwas
thus letting the country fall into a more serious trap especially in the absence of
a recognized and functional Somali government with weak traditional
authorities and interested groups exploiting Islam and the clan system.

50
There is a possibility of cyclical collapse where weak state institutions (1960-1969) leads to a
military takeover (1969-1990) and civil war (1990-2004), and back to the starting point of weak
state. Current TFIs represent the beginning of instituting the weak state.
Religious extremism in Somalia is part and parcel and an extension of similar
phenomena in other Muslim countries. Moreover, the current chaotic situation in
the country is part of the civil war syndrome and lack of a visionary and
responsible state authority. The plethora of literature produced about this
worldwide phenomenon is too general for the Somali case. It was apparent that
most Somalis do not comprehend the severity of extremism in their countries.
Hence, the research and comprehension of the problem is highly needed.
Although this paper attempted to raise the awareness of the problem, it does
not aim to offer ready-made answers to the complex question: what are the
major causes of religious extremism?

Three major causes could be summarized as follows. There is a growing

influence of the “takfir” doctrine in the society, a dangerous doctrine whose
proponents judge other Muslims to be non-Muslim. There is also a prevalent
illiteracy and strong emotional attachment to Islam in Somalia where
superficiality in understanding Islam, strong emotional attachment, the failure
of other solutions, and perpetuation of violence in the name of Islam projected
in the media, all contributed to the nurturing of excessiveness towards Islam.
And finally, there is absence of a credible Somali Islamic authority. Most of the
Muslim countries have a national authority charged with Islamic affairs. This
kind of authority could be vested on a Mufti and/or a consultative council who
can interpret Islam and issue legal fatwa on any disputed matters. Somalia
never had such a Mufti or a consultative council and this vacuum lets non-
qualified clreics to decide on such sensitive matters and without proper
authority from the Somali people whose behalf they issue fatwas.

Finally, the question remains on why reconcile the state and society? First, the
state is both artificial and it is imposed. Its nature, structure and functions are
also alien to the culture of the Somali society and this led to state collapse;
secondly the argument that the society can not live without a state no longer
holds especially in the Somali case as the 17-year old absence of the Somali
state serves a good example; and finally any Somali state will not return nor will
it be able to sustain without resolving its original conflict with its society. In
other words, unless the Somali state becomes a state by the people and for the
people, the chance of cyclic collapses is very high.

The imperative of reconciliation between the state and society therefore lies on
four key foundations: 1) promoting and abiding Islamic principles and values; 2)
grassroots reconciliation between and among the Somalis; 3) attaining and
sustaining of minimum level good governance; and 4) building on equality of all
citizens with no reference to the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula anymore an no
monopoly of religion by one group.

From the above, the ultimate reconciliation of the state and society will be
realized only when the roles of Islam and that of the clan system are well
demarcated vis-à-vis the borders of the state, and when both the state and
society respect these boundaries.

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