Hacking Google Chromeos: Matt Johansen Kyle Osborn
Hacking Google Chromeos: Matt Johansen Kyle Osborn
Hacking Google Chromeos: Matt Johansen Kyle Osborn
Matt Johansen
Team Lead
[email protected] @mattjay
Kyle Osborn
Application Security Specialist
[email protected] @theKos
August 2011
Page 1 2011 WhiteHat Security, Inc.
special thanks to: Googles Security Team Jeremiah Grossman Chris Evans
Kyle:
- Application Security Specialist - Primary focus on Offensive Security Research - Likes to push the Big Red Button
Chrome OS
The time for a Web OS is now Eric Schmidt
What we know: Revolves around the browser Virtually nothing stored locally Cloud heavy (re: reliant) Fast!
Chrome OS (contd)
Nothing stored locally = no usual software suspects.
Mobile = App Crazy Chrome OS = Extension Crazy
In order to get usability / functionality out of a locked up device users must use what is available.
ScratchPad
Preinstalled note-taking extension Auto Sync feature to Google Docs ScratchPad Folder Google Docs Feature Folder/Doc sharing. No permission needed!
Permission Structure
Why are Extensions any different?
Individual extensions have unique permissions Use chrome.* API Permissions set by 3rd party developer Some extensions require permission to talk to every website Similar to Mobile Apps
Security Implications
Chromebooks run the first
consumer operating system designed from the ground up to defend against the ongoing threat of malware and viruses. They employ the principle of "defense in depth" to provide multiple layers of protection, including sandboxing, data encryption, and verified boot. Google.com/Chromebook
Things Done Very Well Sandboxing tabs so they dont talk to each other Local storage is virtually non existent Attack surface limited to client side browser exploits Handles own plugins (flash, pdfs, etc.) Eliminates most modern virus / malware threats
Kyle Osborn
Application Security Specialist
[email protected] @theKos