Android Malware: Mario Ballano
Android Malware: Mario Ballano
Android Malware: Mario Ballano
Mario Ballano
Symantec
1
Agenda
1 2
3
4 5
Q&A
Introduction to Android
Android OS features
Multiple handset layouts: VGA, 3D, traditional smartphone layouts.. Connectivity: GSM, CDMA, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, UMTS, etc Messaging: MMS/SMS, Android Clout to Device (CD2M), Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) Web Browser (WebKit + V8) - 100% ACID on Android 4.0 Java support (Dalvik) Additional hardware support (GPS, accelerometers, gyroscopes, ) External storage (FAT32/Ext3/Ext4) Multi-tasking, multi-touch, video-calling, tethering, wide range of media supported formats, streaming support, etc
5
How are third-party apps built?, where do they run?: The Dalvik VM
Based on the Java VM
Register-based
Optimized for low memory requirements Applications are developed in Java and compiled into Java bytecode, a tool called dx translates them into Dalvik bytecode It is not a security boundary! Applications are allowed to run native code
Applications are self-contained within Android application package files (APKs) Google Play is the main distribution hub of Android Apps, as of September 2012:
~675.000 applications available 25 billion app downloads
There are plenty of other alternative Android markets Online file-share services
9
10
Android permissions:
android.permission.*
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
android.permission.INTERNET
Apps may also share resources by declaring permissions enforced by their signature level Permissions are granted to the App by the user at install time
11
Application Isolation
Apps run in a sandboxed environment. The application sandbox does not rely on the Virtual Machine technology they run in, it is instead based on: Processes
12
Application Signing
Apps are signed with self-generated certificates No Certificate Authorities are involved
Apps signed with the same certificate may share UID or get specific permissions granted
13
14
15
Pay-Per-Install
Adware mTAN stealing
16
17
Volume statistics
Symbian signing Ikee worm on rooted phones 101 Families 16,000 Samples
120 100 80 60
40
20
0 2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Symbian
IOS
Android
Families
Variants
Samples
1:8
1:27
1:159
Android.Opfake (2012)
Driving mobile polymorphism
Sends Premium SMSs
24
Classes.dex, classes compiled in DEX format (Dalvik VM) May contain native code, usually within the lib\{platform} directories. Resources within res directory
25
26
Threat propagation
27
Demo: Android.Geinimi
28
Android.Genimi profile
Discovered on December 2010 One of the first known malwares with botnet capabilities for Android Uses a XML-based protocol + DES encryption Obfuscated code : ProGuard + encrypted strings (DES) Three wake-up entry points:
Execution of infected App BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast SMS_RECEIVED broadcast
Implements 36 different server-side commands divided in two categories, some of them overlap Believed to be a proof of concept malware prototype
29
Q&A
Thank you!
Mario Ballano Symantec
31