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    De Galicia V.mercado

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    Sean Galvez
    De Galicia co-signed a check for his business partner Arciaga. Without his consent, Arciaga discounted the check to Mercado at an 8% interest rate. When the check bounced, Mercado sued De Galicia and Arciaga for estafa. De Galicia then filed a case to declare the agreement between Mercado and Arciaga null and void. The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and indispensable party. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, finding that while the trial court had jurisdiction, Arciaga was an indispensable party that was not impleaded.

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    De Galicia V.mercado

    Uploaded by

    Sean Galvez
    165 views2 pages
    De Galicia co-signed a check for his business partner Arciaga. Without his consent, Arciaga discounted the check to Mercado at an 8% interest rate. When the check bounced, Mercado sued De Galicia and Arciaga for estafa. De Galicia then filed a case to declare the agreement between Mercado and Arciaga null and void. The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and indispensable party. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, finding that while the trial court had jurisdiction, Arciaga was an indispensable party that was not impleaded.

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    tax case

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    De Galicia v.Mercado

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    De Galicia co-signed a check for his business partner Arciaga. Without his consent, Arciaga discounted the check to Mercado at an 8% interest rate. When the check bounced, Mercado sued De Galicia and Arciaga for estafa. De Galicia then filed a case to declare the agreement between Mercado and Arciaga null and void. The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and indispensable party. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, finding that while the trial court had jurisdiction, Arciaga was an indispensable party that was not impleaded.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    165 views2 pages

    De Galicia V.mercado

    Uploaded by

    Sean Galvez
    De Galicia co-signed a check for his business partner Arciaga. Without his consent, Arciaga discounted the check to Mercado at an 8% interest rate. When the check bounced, Mercado sued De Galicia and Arciaga for estafa. De Galicia then filed a case to declare the agreement between Mercado and Arciaga null and void. The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and indispensable party. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, finding that while the trial court had jurisdiction, Arciaga was an indispensable party that was not impleaded.

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    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    of 2

    CIV PRO DE GALICIA v.

    MERCADO

    G.R. No. 146744 DE GALICIA v. MERCADO EMERGENCY RECIT: De Galica, signed a check, together with Arciaga (partner). Arciaga gave the check to Mercado at a discounted price. The check bounced, thus, Mercado filed a case for estafa and BP 22. De Galica filed a declaration of nullity of the agreement between Mercado & Arciaga. RTC dismissed because not within the jurisdiction also the principal relief sought is for the declaration of the subject check in the amount of P50,000 a nullity. Hence, capable of pecuniary estimation. Hence this petition. SC sustains the dismissal of the subject complaint for its failure to implead an indispensable party. (Mercado) Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. The interests of such indispensable party in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound with those of the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. FACTS: De Galicia was a business partner in RCL Enterprises, he was asked by his partner Arciaga to co-sign with her a Philbank check for P50,000 payable to cash. Allegedly without his knowledge and consent, Arciaga rediscounted the check with respondent Mercado at 8% interest. Mercado gave Arciaga the sum of P46,000, representing the value of the check less 8% as interest. Mercado presented the check for payment but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Mercado then filed a complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22 against De Galica and Arciaga. De Galica countered by filing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila case for the declaration of nullity of the agreement to pay interest between Mercado and Arciaga. The RTC dismissed De Galicas case for lack of jurisdiction & it also denied his motion for reconsideration. Treating the complaint as one for recovery of a sum of money, the trial court ruled: Even granting in arguendo, that the action seeks to have the agreement (?) between defendant Mely Mercado and one Carmen Arciaga with respect to the payment of interest to be declared null and void, this Court is in a quandary because one of the parties (Carmen Arciaga) in the so-called agreement is not a party to the present case. Also, the rate of P50,000 is way below the jurisdictional amount vested in the Regional Trial Court. It was appealed, and a reading of the instant case indicates that the principal relief sought is for the declaration of the subject check in the amount of P50,000 a nullity. Hence, capable of pecuniary estimation, the so-called agreement merely an incident thereto. This Court finds no reversible error to reconsider its assailed order

    Via this petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, on a pure question of law, DE GALICA assigns this error to the abovementioned order: ISSUE: Whether or not THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER ITS SUBJECT MATTER SIMPLY BECAUSE THE AMOUNT INVOLVED [WAS] ONLY P50,000.00. DE GALICA De Galica insisted that the complaint for declaration of nullity of the agreement between Mercado and Arciaga was within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Also the subject matter of the complaint was not for the recovery of a sum of money but for the nullification of the agreement to pay interest, with a prayer to also nullify the check, in which case the action was not capable of pecuniary estimation. He argued that it was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaint on the basis merely that the amount involved was P50,000. MERCADO Contends that the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint was warranted since the action essentially involved the nullification of the check amounting to P50,000. She insisted that the amount was outside the RTCs jurisdiction, thus, it could not possibly take cognizance of the case. Also, Mercado added that the RTC did not err in dismissing the complaint because Arciaga, as an indispensable party, was not impleaded. HELD: PETITION DENIED, this Court sustains the dismissal of the subject complaint for its failure to implead an indispensable party. (Mercado) RATIO: In determining whether or not the subject matter of an action is capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance (now RTC) would depend on the amount involved. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by the courts of first instance (RTC). Thus, the subject of the action before the trial court was indeed incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore cognizable by the RTC. For the complaint reveals that it primarily sought to annul the agreement under which Arciaga obligated herself to pay respondent interest on the amount of the rediscounted check.

    CIV PRO DE GALICIA v. MERCADO

    Thus, what was being assailed was the payment of interest. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the RTCs jurisdiction on the subject case, this Court sustains the dismissal of the subject complaint for its failure to implead an indispensable party. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. The interests of such indispensable party in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound with those of the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. As a rule, an indispensable partys interest in the subject matter is such that a complete and efficient determination of the equities and rights of the parties is not possible if he is not joined. The court holds that Arciaga was an indispensable party to the suit filed by De Galica against Mercado In Aracelona v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the joinder of all indispensable parties must be made under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of the judicial power. There, we ruled that when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed.

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