13

THE VALUE OF LIFE

(Optimism and Pessimism)

Study Topics
principles of life's value
13.0 Good World Or Miserable Life
One view says that this world is the best that could conceivably exist, and that to live and to act in it is
a blessing of untold value. The other view maintains that life is full of misery and want; everywhere
pain outweighs pleasure, sorrow outweighs joy.
13.1 Best Possible World (cooperative participation)
The world is the best of all possible worlds. A better world is impossible for God is good and wise.
From this optimistic standpoint, then, life is worth living. It must stimulate us to co-operative
participation.
13.2 Pain Of Striving (universal idleness)
Eternal striving, ceaseless craving for satisfaction which is ever beyond reach, this is the fundamental
characteristic of all active will. For no sooner is one goal attained, than a fresh need springs up, and so
on. Schopenhauer's pessimism leads to complete inactivity; his moral aim is universal idleness.
13.3 Pain Outweighs Pleasure (unselfish service)
The human being has to permeate his whole being with the recognition that the pursuit of individual
satisfaction (egoism) is a folly, and that he ought to be guided solely by the task of dedicating himself
to the progress of the world. Hartmann's pessimism leads us to activity devoted to a sublime task.
13.4 Pleasure Of Striving (future goal)
Striving (desiring) in itself gives pleasure. Who does not know the enjoyment given by the hope of a
remote but intensely desired goal?
13.5 Quantity Of Pleasure (rational estimation of feeling)
What is the right method for comparing the sum of pleasure to pain? Eduard von Hartmann believes
that it is reason that holds the scales.
13.6 Quality Of Pleasure (critical examination of feeling)
If we strike out feelings from the pleasure side of the balance on the ground that they are attached to
objects which turn out to have been illusory, we make the value of life dependent not on the quantity
but on the quality of pleasure, and this, in turn, on the value of the objects which cause the pleasure.
13.7 Pursuit Of Pleasure (hopelessness of egotism)
If the quantity of pain in a person's life became at any time so great that no hope of future pleasure
(credit) could help him to get over the pain, then the bankruptcy of life's business would inevitably
follow.
13.8 Value Of Pleasure (satisfaction of needs)
The magnitude of pleasure is related to the degree of my need. If I am hungry enough for two pieces
of bread and can only get one, the pleasure I derive from it had only half the value it would have had
if the eating of it has satisfied my hunger.
13.9 Will For Pleasure (intensity of desire)
The question is not at all whether there is a surplus of pleasure or of pain, but whether the will is
strong enough to overcome the pain.
13.10 Magnitude Of Pleasure (amusement)
If it is only a question whether, after the day's work, I am to amuse myself by a game or by light
conversation, and if I am totally indifferent to what I do as long as it serves the purpose, then I simply
ask myself: What gives me the greatest surplus of pleasure?
13.11 Highest Pleasure (realization of moral ideals)
Moral ideals spring from the moral imagination of man. They are his intuitions, the driving forces which
his spirit harnesses; he wants them, because their realization is his highest pleasure.
13.12 Joy Of Achievement (measure achievement against aims)
He acts as he wants to act, that is, in accordance with the standard of his ethical intuitions; and he
 finds in the achievement of what he wants the true enjoyment of life. He determines the value of life
by measuring achievements against aims.

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13.0 Good World Or Miserable Life
[1] A COUNTERPART of the question concerning the
purpose and function of life (cp. p. 111) is the question
concerning its value. We meet here with two mutually
opposed views, and between them with all conceivable
attempts at compromise. One view says that this world is
the best conceivable which could exist at all, and that to
live and act in it is a good of inestimable value. Everything
that exists displays harmonious and purposive co-operation
and is worthy of admiration. Even what is apparently bad
and evil may, from a higher point of view, be seen to be a
good, for it represents an agreeable contrast with the
good. We are the more able to appreciate the good when it
is clearly contrasted with evil. Moreover, evil is not
genuinely real; it is only that we perceive as evil a lesser
degree of good. Evil is the absence of good, it has no Pessimism and Optimism
positive import of its own.

[2] The other view maintains that life is full of misery and agony. Everywhere pain outweighs pleasure,
sorrow outweighs joy. Existence is a burden, and non-existence would, from every point of view, be
preferable to existence.

[3] The chief representatives of the former view, i.e., Optimism, are Shaftesbury and Leibniz; the chief
representatives of the second, i.e., Pessimism, are Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann.

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13.1 Best Possible World (cooperative participation)
[4] Leibniz says the world is the
best of all possible worlds. A better
one is impossible. For God is good
and wise. A good God wills to
create the best possible world, a
wise God knows which is the best
possible. He is able to distinguish
the best from all other and worse
possibilities. Only an evil or an
unwise God would be able to Gottfried Leibniz
create a world worse than the best possible.

[5] Whoever starts from this point of view will find it easy
to lay down the direction which human action must follow,
in order to make its contribution to the greatest good of
the universe. All that man need do will be to find out the
counsels of God and to act in
all that we need do is
accordance with them. If he
knows what God's purposes are
to find out the
concerning the world and the counsels of God and
human race he will be able, for act according to them
his part, to do what is right. And he will be happy in the
According to Leibnitz, God's people are feeling that he is adding his share to all the other good in
happy and wanting to cooperate with each the world. From this optimistic standpoint, then, life is
other. worth living. It is such as to stimulate us to cooperate
with, and enter into, it.
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13.2 Pain Of Striving (universal idleness)
[6] Quite different is the picture
Schopenhauer paints. He thinks of
ultimate reality not as an all-wise and
all-beneficent being, but as blind
striving or will. Eternal striving,
ceaseless craving for satisfaction
which yet is ever beyond reach, these
are the fundamental characteristics of
Schopenhauer all will. For as soon as we have
attained what we want a fresh need
springs up, and so on. Satisfaction, when it occurs,
endures always only for an infinitesimal time. The whole
rest of our lives is unsatisfied craving, i.e., discontent and
The best we can do is to throttle all
suffering. When at last blind craving is dulled, every
desires and needs within us and
definite content is gone from our lives. Existence is filled
exterminate the will, says Schopenhauer.
with nothing but an endless ennui. Hence the best we can
do is to throttle all desires and needs within us and exterminate the will. Schopenhauer's Pessimism
leads to complete inactivity; its moral aim is universal idleness.

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13.3 Pain Outweighs Pleasure (unselfish service)
[7] By a very different argument Von Hartmann attempts to establish Pessimism
and to make use of it for Ethics. He attempts, in keeping with the fashion of our
age, to base his world-view on experience. By observation of life he hopes to
discover whether there is more pain or more pleasure in the world. He passes in
review before the tribunal of reason whatever men consider to be happiness and a
good, in order to show that all apparent satisfaction turns out, on closer inspection,
to be nothing but illusion. It is illusion when we
soberly considered, every
believe that in health, youth, freedom, sufficient
enjoyment brings much
Von Hartmann income, love (sexual satisfaction), pity, friendship
and family life, honour, reputation, glory, power, more evil and misery than
religious edification, pursuit of science and of art, hope of a life after pleasure into the world
death, participation in the advancement of civilization, that in all these we have sources of happiness
and satisfaction. Soberly considered, every enjoyment brings much more evil and misery than pleasure
into the world. The disagreeableness of "the morning after" is always greater than the agreeableness of
intoxication. Pain far outweighs pleasure in the world. No man, even though relatively the happiest,
would, if asked, wish to live through this miserable life a second time.

Now since Hartmann does not deny the presence of an ideal

factor (wisdom) in the world, but, on the contrary, grants to it
equal rights with blind striving (will), he can attribute the
creation of the world to his Absolute Being only on condition that
He makes the pain in the world subserve a world-purpose that is
wise. But the pain of created beings is nothing but God's pain
itself, for the life of Nature as a whole is identical with the life of
God. An All-wise Being can aim only at release from pain, and
since allexistence is pain, at release from existence. Hence the
purpose of the creation of the world is to transform existence
into the non-existence which is so much better. The world-
process is nothing but a continuous battle against God's pain, a According to Von Hartmann, the
battle which ends with the annihilation of all existence. The pursuit of pleasure (Egoism) is folly.
moral life for men, therefore, will consist in taking part in the We ought to be guided by unselfish
annihilation of existence. service to a noble cause.

The reason why God has created the world is that through the world he may free himself from his
 infinite pain. The world must be regarded, "as it were, as an itching eruption on the Absolute," by
means of which the unconscious healing power of the Absolute rids itself of an inward disease; or it
may be regarded "as a painful drawing-plaster which the All-one applies to itself in order first to divert
the inner pain outwards, and then to get rid of it altogether." Human beings are members of the world.
In their sufferings God suffers. He has created them in order to split up in them his infinite pain. The
pain which each one of us suffers is but a drop in the infinite ocean of God's pain (Hartmann,
Phanomenologie des Sittlichen Bewusstseins, pp. 866 ff.).

[8] It is man's duty to permeate his whole being with the recognition that the pursuit of individual
satisfaction (Egoism) is a folly, and that he ought to be guided solely by the task of assisting in the
redemption of God by unselfish service of the world-process. Thus, in contrast with the Pessimism of
Schopenhauer, that of Von Hartmann leads us to devoted activity in a sublime cause.

[9] But what of the claim that this view is based on experience?

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13.4 Pleasure Of Striving (future goal)
[10] To strive after satisfaction means that our activity reaches out beyond the actual content of our lives.
A creature is hungry, i.e., it desires satiety, when its organic functions demand for their continuation the
supply of fresh life-materials in the form of nourishment. The pursuit of honour consists in that a man
does not regard what he personally does or leaves undone as valuable unless it is endorsed by the
approval of others from without. The striving for knowledge arises when a man is not content with the
world which he sees, hears, etc., so long as he has not understood it. The fulfilment of the striving causes
pleasure in the individual who strives, failure causes pain. It is important here to observe that pleasure
and pain are attached only to the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of my striving. The striving itself is by no
means to be regarded as a pain. Hence, if we find that, in the very moment in which a striving is fulfilled,
at once a new striving arises, this is no ground for saying that pleasure has given birth to pain, because
enjoyment in every case gives rise to a desire for its repetition, or for a fresh pleasure. I can speak of
pain only when desire runs up against the impossibility of fulfilment.

Even when an enjoyment that I have had causes in me the desire for the experience of a greater, more
subtle, and more exotic pleasure, I have no right to speak of this desire as a pain caused by the previous
pleasure until the means fail me to gain the greater and more subtle pleasure. I have no right to regard
pleasure as the cause of pain unless pain follows on pleasure as its consequence by natural law, e.g.,
when a woman's sexual pleasure is followed by the suffering of child-birth and the cares of nursing. If
striving caused pain, then the removal of striving ought to be accompanied by pleasure. But the very
reverse is true. To have no striving in one's
life causes boredom, and boredom is always
accompanied by displeasure. Now, since it
may be a long time before a striving meets
with fulfilment, and since, in the interval, it is
content with the hope of fulfilment, we must
acknowledge that there is no connection in
principle between pain and striving, but that
pain depends solely on the non-fulfilment of
the striving. Schopenhauer, then, is wrong in
any case in regarding desire or striving (will)
as being in principle the source of pain.

[11] In truth the very reverse of this is

correct. Striving (desire) is in itself
pleasurable. Who does not know the pleasure
which is caused by the hope of a remote but
intensely desired enjoyment? This pleasure is
To have no striving in one's life causes boredom, and the companion of all labour, the results of
boredom is always accompanied by displeasure. Striving which will be enjoyed by us only in the
(desire) is in itself pleasurable. future. It is a pleasure which is wholly
independent of the attainment of the end. For when the aim has been attained, the pleasure of
satisfaction is added as a fresh thrill to the pleasure of striving. If anyone were to argue that the pain
caused by the non-attainment of an aim is increased by the pain of disappointed hope, and that thus, in
the end, the pain of non-fulfilment will still always outweigh the utmost possible pleasure of fulfilment, we
shall have to reply that the reverse may be the case, and that the recollection of past pleasure at a time
of unsatisfied desire will as often mitigate the displeasure of non-satisfaction. Whoever at the moment
when his hopes suffer shipwreck exclaims, "I have done my part," proves thereby my assertion. The
blessed feeling of having willed the best within one's powers is ignored by all who make every unsatisfied
desire an occasion for asserting that, not only has the pleasure of fulfilment been lost, but that the
enjoyment of the striving itself has been destroyed.

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13.5 Quantity Of Pleasure (rational estimation of feeling)
[12] The satisfaction of a desire causes pleasure and its non-satisfaction causes pain. But we have no
right to infer from this fact that pleasure is nothing but the satisfaction of a desire, and pain nothing
but its non-satisfaction. Both pleasure and pain may be experienced without being the consequence of
desire. All illness is pain not preceded by any desire. If anyone were to maintain that illness is
unsatisfied desire for health he would commit the error of regarding the inevitable and unconscious
wish not to fall ill as a positive desire. When some one receives a legacy from a rich relative of whose
existence he had not the faintest idea, he experiences a pleasure without having felt any preceding
desire.

[13] Hence, if we set out to inquire whether the balance is

on the side of pleasure or of pain, we must allow in our
calculation for the pleasure of striving, the pleasure of the
satisfaction of striving, and the pleasure which comes to us
without any striving whatever. On the debit side we shall
have to enter the displeasure of boredom, the displeasure
of unfulfilled striving, and, lastly, the displeasure which
comes to us without any striving on our part. Under this
last heading we shall have to put also the displeasure
caused by work that has been forced upon us, not chosen
by ourselves.

[14] This leads us to the question, What is the right method for striking the balance between the credit
and the debit columns? Eduard von Hartmann asserts that reason holds the scales. It is true that he
says (Philosophie des Unbewussten, 7th edition, vol. ii.
p. 290): "Pain and pleasure exist only in so far as they
are actually being felt." It follows that there can be no
standard for pleasure other than the subjective
standard of feeling. I must feel whether the sum of my
disagreeable feelings, contrasted with my agreeable
feelings, results in me in a balance of pleasure or of
pain. But, notwithstanding this, van Hartmann
maintains that

"though the value of the life of every being can be set

down only according to its own subjective measure,
yet it follows by no means that every being is able to
compute the correct algebraic sum of all the feelings
of its life —or, in other words, that its total estimate of
its own life, with regard to its subjective feelings,
should be correct." But this means that rational For Hartmann we calculate the “quantity of
estimation of feelings is reinstated as the standard of pleasure” by means of a rational estimation of
value. feelings to establish the value of life.
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13.6 Quality Of Pleasure (critical examination of feeling)
[15] It is because Von Hartmann holds this view that he thinks it necessary, in order to arrive at a correct
valuation of life, to clear out of the way those factors which falsify our judgment about the balance of
pleasure and of pain. He tries to do this in two ways: first, by
showing that our desire (instinct, will) operates as a disturbing
factor in the sober estimation of feeling-values; e.g., whereas
we ought to judge that sexual enjoyment is a source of evil, we
are beguiled by the fact that the sexual instinct is very strong
in us, into pretending to experience a pleasure which does not
occur in the alleged intensity at all. We are bent on indulging
ourselves, hence we do not acknowledge to ourselves that the
indulgence makes us suffer. Secondly, Von Hartmann subjects
feelings to a criticism designed to show, that the objects to
We are misled by instinctual desires that
which our feelings attach themselves reveal themselves as
conjure up the prospect of a pleasure
illusions when examined by reason, and that our feelings are
that does not occur in the expected
destroyed from the moment that our constantly growing
intensity at all.
insight sees through the illusions.

[16] Von Hartmann, then, conceives the matter as follows. Suppose an ambitious man wants to determine
clearly whether, up to the moment of his inquiry, there has been a surplus of pleasure or of pain in his life.
He has to eliminate two sources of error that may affect his judgment. Being ambitious, this fundamental
feature of his character will make him see all the pleasures of the public recognition of his achievements
larger than they are, and all the insults suffered through rebuffs
smaller than they are. At the time when he suffered the rebuffs
he felt the insults just because he is ambitious, but in
recollection they appear to him in a milder light, whereas the
pleasures of recognition to which he is so much more
susceptible leave a far deeper impression. Undeniably, it is a
real benefit to an ambitious man that it should be so, for the
deception diminishes his pain in the moment of self-analysis.
But, none the less, it falsifies his judgments. The sufferings
which he now reviews as through a veil were actually
experienced by him in all their intensity. Hence he enters them An ambitious person sees all the
at a wrong valuation on the debit side of his account. In order pleasures of public recognition as larger
to arrive at a correct estimate an ambitious man would have to than they actually are.
lay aside his ambition for the time of his inquiry. He would have to review his past life without any
distorting glasses before his mind's eye, else he will resemble a merchant who, in making up his books,
enters among the items on the credit side his own zeal in business.

[17] But Von Hartmann goes even further. He says the ambitious man must make clear to himself that the
public recognition which he craves is not worth having. By himself, or with the guidance of others, he
must attain the insight that rational beings cannot attach any value to recognition by others, seeing that
"in all matters which are not vital questions of development, or which have not been definitely settled by
science," it is always as certain as anything can be "that the majority is wrong and the minority right."
"Whoever makes ambition the lode-star of his life puts the happiness of his life at the mercy of so fallible
a judgment" (Philosophie des Unbewussten, vol. ii, p. 332). If the ambitious man acknowledges all this to
himself, he is bound to regard all the achievements of his ambition as illusions, including even the feelings
which attach themselves to the satisfaction of his
ambitious desires. This is the reason why Von
Hartmann says that we must also strike out of the
balance-sheet of our life-values whatever is seen
to be illusory in our feelings of pleasure. What
remains after that represents the sum-total of
pleasure in life, and this sum is so small
compared with the sum-total of pain that life is no
enjoyment and non-existence preferable to
existence.
[18] But whilst it is immediately evident that the interference of the instinct of ambition produces self-
deception in striking the balance of pleasures and thus leads to a false result, we must none the less
challenge what Von Hartmann says concerning the illusory character of the objects to which pleasure is
attached. For the elimination, from the credit-side of life, of all pleasurable feelings which accompany
actual or supposed illusions would positively falsify the balance of pleasure and of pain. An ambitious man
has genuinely enjoyed the acclamations of the multitude, irrespective of whether subsequently he himself,
or some other person, recognizes that this acclamation is an illusion.
the elimination of all The pleasure, once enjoyed, is not one whit diminished by such
"illusory" feelings from life's recognition. Consequently the elimination of all these "illusory" feelings
balance actually cancels out from life's balance, so far from making our
life feelings that were judgment about our feelings more correct,
genuinely there actually cancels out of life feelings which
were genuinely there.

[19] And why are these feelings to be eliminated? Because they are connected
with objects which turn out to have been illusions. But this means that the
value of life is made dependent, not on the quantity of pleasure, but on the
quality of pleasure, and this quality is made dependent on the value of the
objects which cause the pleasure. But if I am to determine the value of life
only by the quantity of pleasure or pain which it brings, I have no right to
presuppose something else by which first to determine the positive or negative
value of pleasure. If I say I want to compare quantity of pleasure and quantity
of pain, in order to see which is greater, I am bound to bring into my account
all pleasures and pains in their actual intensities, regardless of whether they
are based on illusions or not. If I credit a pleasure which rests on an illusion The “quality” of pleasure
with a lesser value for life than one which can justify itself before the tribunal depends on the value of
of reason, I make the value of life dependent on factors other than mere the objects that cause
quantity of pleasure. the pleasure.

[20] Whoever, like Eduard von Hartmann, puts down pleasure as less valuable when it is attached to a
worthless object, is like a merchant who enters the considerable profits of a toy-factory at only one-
quarter of their real value on the ground that the factory produces nothing but playthings for children.

[21] If the point is simply to weigh quantity of pleasure against quantity of pain, we ought to leave the
illusory character of the objects of some pleasures entirely out of account.

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13.7 Pursuit Of Pleasure (hopelessness of egotism)
[22] The method, then, which Van Hartmann recommends, viz., rational criticism of the quantities of
pleasure and pain produced by life, has taught us so far how we are to get the data for our calculation,
i.e., what we are to put down on the one side of our account and what on the other. But how are we to
make the actual calculation? Is reason able also to strike the balance?

[23] A merchant makes a miscalculation when the gain calculated by him does not balance with the
profits which he has demonstrably enjoyed from his business or is still expecting to enjoy. Similarly, the
philosopher will undoubtedly have made a mistake in his estimate, if he cannot demonstrate in actual
feeling the surplus of pleasure or, as the case may be, of pain which his manipulation of the account may
have yielded.

[24] For the present I shall not criticize the calculations of those Pessimists who support their estimate of
the value of the world by an appeal to reason. But if we are to decide whether to carry on the business of
life or not, we shall demand first to be shown where the alleged balance of pain is to be found.

[25] Here we touch the point where reason is not in a position by itself to determine the surplus of
pleasure or of pain, but where it must exhibit this surplus in life as something actually felt. For man
reaches reality not through concepts by themselves, but through the interpenetration of concepts and
percepts (and feelings are percepts) which thinking brings about (cp. p. 56). A merchant will give up his
business only when the loss of goods, as calculated by his accountant, is actually confirmed by the facts.
 If the facts do not bear out the calculation, he asks his accountant to check
the account once more. That is exactly what a man will do in the business of
life. If a philosopher wants to prove to him that the pain is far greater than
the pleasure, but that he does not feel it so, then he will reply: "You have
made a mistake in your theorizings; repeat your analysis once more." But if
there comes a time in a business when the losses are really so great that the
firm's credit no longer suffices to satisfy the creditors, bankruptcy results,
even though the merchant may avoid keeping himself informed by careful
accounts about the state of his affairs. Similarly, supposing the quantity of
pain in a man's life became at any time so great that no hope (credit) of
future pleasure could help him to get over the pain, the bankruptcy of life's
business would inevitably follow.

[26] Now the number of those who commit suicide is relatively small
If there is no hope of compared with the number of those who live bravely on. Only very few men
future pleasure to help get give up the business of life because of the pain involved. What follows? Either
over the pain, the that it is untrue to say that the quantity of pain is greater than the quantity
bankruptcy of life will of pleasure, or that we do not make the continuation of life dependent on the
follow. quantity of felt pleasure or pain.

[27] In a very curious way, Eduard von Hartmann's Pessimism, having concluded that
life is valueless because it contains a surplus of pain, yet affirms the necessity of going
on with life. This necessity lies in the fact that the world-purpose mentioned above (p.
127) can be achieved only by the ceaseless, devoted labour of human beings. But so
long as men still pursue their egoistical appetites they are unfit for this devoted labour.
It is not until experience and reason have convinced them that the pleasures which
Egoism pursues are incapable of attainment that they give themselves up to their proper
task. In this way the pessimistic conviction is offered as the fountain of unselfishness.
An education based on Pessimism is to exterminate Egoism by convincing it of the
hopelessness of achieving its aims.

[28] According to this view, then, the striving for pleasure is fundamentally inherent in
human nature. It is only through the insight into the impossibility of satisfaction that
this striving abdicates in favour of the higher tasks of humanity.

[29] It is, however, impossible to say of this ethical theory, which expects from the
establishment of Pessimism a devotion to unselfish ends in life, that it really overcomes
Egoism in the proper sense of the word. The moral ideas are said not to be strong An education
enough to dominate the will until man has learnt that the selfish striving after pleasure based on
cannot lead to any satisfaction. Man, whose selfishness desires the grapes of pleasure, Pessimism is
finds them sour because he cannot attain them, and so he turns his back on them and to exterminate
devotes himself to an unselfish life. Moral ideals, then, according to the opinion of Egoism by
moral ideals, according to the Pessimists, are too weak to overcome Egoism, but convincing it
they establish their kingdom on the territory which of the
opinion of Pessimists, are too
previous recognition of the hopelessness of hopelessness
weak to overcome Egoism Egoism has cleared for them. of achieving
its aims, only
[30] If men by nature strive after pleasure but are unable to attain it, it follows that then do they
annihilation of existence and salvation through non-existence are the only rational ends. devote
And if we accept the view that the real bearer of the pain of the world is God, it follows themselves to
that the task of men consists in helping to bring about the salvation of God. To commit the higher
suicide does not advance, but hinders, the realization of this aim. God must rationally be tasks of
conceived as having created men for the sole purpose of bringing about his salvation humanity.
through their action, else would creation be purposeless. Every one of us has to perform
his own definite task in the general work of salvation. If he withdraws from the task by suicide, another
has to do the work which was intended for him. Somebody else must bear in his stead the agony of
existence. And since in every being it is, at bottom, God who is the ultimate bearer of all pain, it follows
that to commit suicide does not in the least diminish the quantity of God's pain, but rather imposes upon
God the additional difficulty of providing a substitute.
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13.8 Value Of Pleasure (satisfaction of needs)
[31] This whole theory presupposes that pleasure is the standard of value for life. Now life manifests itself
through a number of instincts (needs). If the value of life depended on its producing more pleasure than
pain, an instinct would have to be called valueless which brought to its owner a balance of pain. Let us, if
you please, inspect instinct and pleasure, in order to see whether the former can be measured by the
latter. And lest we give rise to the suspicion that life does not begin for us below the sphere of the
"aristocrats of the intellects" we shall begin our examination with a "purely animal" need, viz., hunger.

[32] Hunger arises when our organs are unable to continue functioning without a fresh supply of food.
What a hungry man desires, in the first instance, is to have his hunger stilled. As soon as the supply of
nourishment has reached the point where hunger ceases, everything has been attained that the food-
instinct craves. The pleasure which is connected with satiety consists,
to begin with, in the removal of the pain which is caused by hunger.
But to the mere food-instinct there is added a further need. For man
does not merely desire to restore, by the consumption of food, the
disturbance in the functioning of his organs, or to get rid of the pain
of hunger, but he seeks to effect this to the accompaniment of
pleasurable sensations of taste. When he feels hungry, and is within
half an hour of a meal to which he looks forward with pleasure, he
avoids spoiling his enjoyment of the better food by taking inferior
food which might satisfy his hunger sooner. He needs hunger in order
to get the full enjoyment out of his meal. Thus hunger becomes for
him at the same time a cause of pleasure. Supposing all the hunger
in the world could be satisfied, we should get the total quantity of Gourmets cultivate the
pleasure which we owe to the existence of the desire for pleasurable sensations of taste
nourishment. But we should still have to add the additional pleasure to increase the quantity of
which gourmets gain by cultivating the sensibility of their taste- pleasure.
nerves beyond the common measure.

[33] The greatest conceivable value of this quantity of pleasure would be reached, if no need remained
unsatisfied which was in any way connected with this kind of pleasure, and if with the smooth of
pleasure we had not at the same time to take a certain amount of the rough of pain.

[34] Modern Science holds the view that Nature produces more life than it can maintain, i.e., that
Nature also produces more hunger than it is able to satisfy. The surplus of life thus produced is
condemned to a painful death in the struggle for existence. Granted that the needs of life are, at every
moment of the world-process, greater than the available means of satisfaction, and that the
enjoyment of life is correspondingly diminished, yet such enjoyment as actually occurs is not one whit
reduced thereby. Wherever a desire is satisfied, there the corresponding quantity of pleasure exists,
even though in the creature itself which desires, or in its fellow-creatures, there are a large number of
unsatisfied instincts. What is diminished is not the quantity but the "value" of the enjoyment of life. If
only a part of the needs of a living creature find satisfaction, it experiences still a corresponding
pleasure. This pleasure is inferior in value in
proportion as it is inadequate to the total demand of
life within a given group of desires.

We might represent this value as a fraction, the

numerator of which is the actually experienced
pleasure, whilst the denominator is the sum-total of
needs. This fraction has the value 1 when the
numerator and the denominator are equal, i.e.,
when all needs are also satisfied. The fraction
becomes greater than 1 when a creature
experiences more pleasure than its desires demand.
It becomes smaller than 1 when the quantity of
pleasure falls short of the sum total of desires. But
 the fraction can never have the value 0 so long as the numerator has any value at all, however small.

If a man were to make up the account before his death and to distribute in imagination over the whole
of life the quantity belonging to a particular instinct (e.g., hunger), as well as the demands of this
instinct, then the total pleasure which he has experienced might have only a very small value, but this
value would never become altogether nil. If the quantity of pleasure remains constant, then with every
increase in the needs of the creature the value of the pleasure diminishes. The same is true for the
totality of life in nature. The greater the number of creatures in proportion to those which are able
fully to satisfy their instincts, the smaller is the average pleasure-value of life.

The cheques on life's pleasure which are drawn in our favour in the form of our instincts, become
increasingly less valuable in proportion as we cannot expect to cash them at their full face value.
Suppose I get enough to eat on three days and am then compelled to go hungry for another three
days, the actual pleasure on the three days of eating is not thereby diminished. But I have now to
think of it as distributed over six days, and this reduces its "value" for my food-instinct by half. The
same applies to the quantity of pleasure as measured by the degree of my need. Suppose I have
hunger enough for two sandwiches and can only get one, the pleasure which this one gives me has
only half the value it would have had if the eating of it had stilled my hunger. This is the way in which
we determine the value of a pleasure in life. We determine it by the needs of life. Our desires supply
the measure; pleasure is what is measured. The pleasure of stilling hunger has value only because
hunger exists, and it has determinate value through the proportion which it bears to the intensity of
the hunger.

[35] Unfulfilled demands of our life throw their shadow even upon fulfilled desires, and thus detract
from the value of pleasurable hours. But we may speak also of the present value of a feeling of
pleasure. This value is the smaller, the more insignificant the pleasure is in proportion to the duration
and intensity of our desire.

[36] A quantity of pleasure has its full value for

us when its duration and degree exactly coincide
with our desire. A quantity of pleasure which is
smaller than our desire diminishes the value of
the pleasure. A quantity which is greater
produces a surplus which has not been
demanded and which is felt as pleasure only so
long as, whilst enjoying the pleasure, we can correspondingly increase the intensity of our desire. If
we are not able to keep pace in the increase of our desire with the increase in pleasure, then pleasure
turns into displeasure. The object which would otherwise satisfy us, when it assails us unbidden makes
us suffer. This proves that pleasure has value for us only so long as we have desires by which to
measure it. An excess of pleasurable feeling turns into pain. This may be observed especially in those
men whose desire for a given kind of pleasure is very small. In people whose desire for food is dulled,
eating easily produces nausea. This again shows that desire is the measure of value for pleasure.

[37] Now Pessimism might reply that an unsatisfied desire for food produces not only the pain of a lost
enjoyment, but also positive ills, agony, and misery in the world. It appeals for confirmation to the untold
misery of all who are harassed by anxieties about food, and to the vast amount of pain which for these
unfortunates results indirectly from their lack of food. And if it wants to extend its assertion also to non-
human nature, it can point to the agonies of animals which, in certain seasons, die from lack of food.
Concerning all these evils the Pessimist maintains that they far outweigh the quantity of pleasure which
the food-instinct brings into the world.

[38] There is no doubt that it is possible to compare pleasure and pain one with another, and determine
the surplus of the one or the other as we determine commercial gain or loss. But if Pessimists think that a
surplus on the side of pain is a ground for inferring that life is valueless, they fall into the mistake of
making a calculation which in actual life is never made.
top
13.9 Will For Pleasure (intensity of desire)
[39] Our desire, in any given case, is directed to a particular object. The value of the pleasure of
satisfaction, as we have seen, will be the greater in proportion as the quantity of the pleasure is greater
relatively to the intensity of our desire. It depends, further, on this intensity how large a quantity of pain
we are willing to bear in order to gain the pleasure. We compare the quantity of pain, not with the
quantity of pleasure, but with the intensity of our desire. He who finds great pleasure in eating will, by
reason of his pleasure in better times, be more easily able to bear a period of hunger than one who does
not derive pleasure from the satisfaction of the instinct for food. A woman who wants a child compares
the pleasures resulting from the possession of a child, not with the quantities of pain due to pregnancy,
birth, nursing, etc., but with her desire for the possession of the child.

[40] We never aim at a certain quantity of pleasure in the abstract, but at concrete satisfaction of a
perfectly determinate kind. When we are aiming at a definite object or a definite sensation, it will not
satisfy us to be offered some other object or some other sensation, even though they give the same
amount of pleasure. If we desire satisfaction of hunger, we cannot substitute for the pleasure which this
satisfaction would bring a pleasure equally great but produced by a walk. Only if our desire were, quite
generally, for a certain quantity of pleasure, would it have to die away at once if this pleasure were
unattainable except at the price of an even greater quantity of pain. But because we desire a determinate
kind of satisfaction, we experience the pleasure of realization even when, along with it, we have to bear
an even greater pain.

The instincts of living beings tend in a determinate direction and aim at concrete objects, and it is just for
this reason that it is impossible, in our calculations, to set down as an equivalent factor the quantities of
pain which we have to bear in the pursuit of our object. Provided the desire is sufficiently intense to be
still to some degree in existence even after having overcome the pain —however great that pain, taken in
the abstract, may be— the pleasure of satisfaction may still be enjoyed to its full extent. The desire,
therefore, does not measure the pain directly against the pleasure which we attain, but indirectly by
measuring the pain (proportionately) against its own intensity. The question is not whether the pleasure
to be gained is greater than the pain, but whether the desire for the object at which we aim is greater
than the inhibitory effect of the pain which we have to face. If the inhibition is greater than the desire, the
latter yields to the inevitable, slackens, and ceases to strive. But inasmuch as we strive after a
determinate land of satisfaction, the pleasure we gain thereby acquires an importance which makes it
possible, once satisfaction has been attained, to allow in our calculation for the inevitable pain only in so
far as it has diminished the intensity of our desire.

If I am passionately fond of beautiful views, I never

calculate the amount of pleasure which the view
from the mountain-top gives me as compared
directly with the pain of the toilsome ascent and
descent; but I reflect whether, after having
overcome all difficulties, my desire for the view will
still be sufficiently intense.

Thus pleasure and pain can be made commensurate

only mediately through the intensity of the desire.
Hence the question is not at all whether there is a
surplus of pleasure or of pain, but whether the
desire for pleasure is sufficiently intense to
overcome the pain.
The question is not whether there is a surplus
of pleasure or of pain, but whether the desire
for pleasure is sufficiently intense
to overcome the pain.
[41] A proof for the accuracy of this view is to be found in
the fact, that we put a higher value on pleasure when it has
to be purchased at the price of great pain than when it
simply falls into our lap like a gift from heaven. When
sufferings and agonies have toned down our desire and yet
after all our aim is attained, then the pleasure is all the
greater in proportion to the intensity of the desire that has
survived. Now it is just this proportion which, as I have
shown (p. 137), represents the value of the pleasure. A
further proof is to be found in the fact that all living
creatures (including men) develop their instincts as long as
they are able to bear the inhibiting pains and agonies. The
struggle for existence is but a consequence of this fact. All
living creatures strive to expand, and only those abandon
the struggle whose desires are throttled by the
overwhelming magnitude of the difficulties with which they
meet. Every living creature seeks food until sheer lack of
food destroys its life. Man, too, does not turn his hand
against himself until rightly or wrongly, he believes that he
cannot attain those aims in life which alone seem to him
worth striving for. So long as he still believes in the
possibility of attaining what he thinks worth striving for he
will battle against all pains and miseries. Philosophy would
have to convince man that striving is rational only when
pleasure outweighs pain, for it is his nature to strive for the
attainment of the objects which he desires, so long as he It is his nature to strive for the attainment
can bear the inevitable incidental pain, however great that of the objects that he desires, so long as
may be. Such a philosophy, however, would be mistaken, he can bear the inevitable pain.
because it would make the human will dependent on a
factor (the surplus of pleasure over pain) which, at first, is wholly foreign to man's point of view. The
original measure of his will is his desire, and desire asserts itself as long as it can.

If I am compelled, in purchasing a certain quantity of apples, to take

twice as many rotten ones as sound ones —because the seller wishes to
clear out his stock— I shall not hesitate a moment to take the bad apples
as well, if I put so high a value on the smaller quantity of good apples
that I am prepared, in addition to the purchase price, to bear also the
expense for the transportation of the rotten goods. This example
illustrates the relation between the quantities of pleasure and of pain
which are caused by a given instinct. I determine the value of the good
apples, not by subtracting the sum of the good from that of the bad ones,
but by the fact that, in spite of the presence of the bad ones, I still attach
a value to the good ones.

[42] Just as I leave out of account the bad apples in the enjoyment of the good ones, so I surrender
myself to the satisfaction of a desire after having shaken off the inevitable pains.

[43] Supposing even Pessimism were in the right with its

assertion that the world contains more pain than pleasure, it
the will is not set upon a surplus of
would nevertheless have no influence upon the will, for living pleasure, but on whatever quantity
beings would still strive after such pleasure as remains. The of pleasure remains after
empirical proof that pain overbalances pleasure is indeed subtracting the pain
effective for showing up the futility of that school of philosophy which looks for the value of life in a
surplus of pleasure (Eudaemonism), but not for exhibiting the will, as such, as irrational. For the will is not
set upon a surplus of pleasure, but on whatever quantity of pleasure remains after subtracting the pain.
This remaining pleasure still appears always as an object worth pursuing.
top
13.10 Magnitude Of Pleasure (amusement)
[44] An attempt has been made to refute Pessimism by
asserting that it is impossible to determine by calculation
the surplus of pleasure or of pain in the world. The
possibility of every calculation depends on our being able
to compare the things to be calculated in respect of their
magnitudes. Every pain and every pleasure has a definite
magnitude (intensity and duration). Further, we can
compare pleasurable feelings of different kinds one with
another, at least approximately, with regard to their
magnitudes. We know whether we derive more pleasure
from a good cigar or from a good joke. No objection can
be raised against the comparability of different pleasures
and pains in respect of their magnitudes. The thinker who
sets himself the task of determining the surplus of
pleasure or pain in the world, starts from presuppositions
which are undeniably legitimate. It is possible to maintain Every pain and every pleasure has a definite
that the Pessimistic results are false, but it is not possible magnitude (intensity and duration).
to doubt that quantities of pleasure and pain can be
scientifically estimated, and that the surplus of the one or the other can thereby be determined. It is
incorrect, however, to assert that from this calculation any conclusions can be drawn for the human
will. The cases in which we really make the value of our activity dependent on whether pleasure or pain
shows a surplus, are those in which the objects towards which our activity is directed are indifferent to
If I am to amuse myself after the us. If it is a question whether, after the day's work, I am to
day's work, then I simply ask myself, amuse myself by a game or by light conversation, and if I
am totally indifferent what I do so long as it amuses me,
What gives me the greatest surplus
then I simply ask myself, What gives me the greatest
of pleasure?
surplus of pleasure? And I abandon the activity altogether if
the scales incline towards the side of displeasure. If we are buying a toy for a child we consider, in
selecting, what will give him the greatest pleasure, but in all other cases we are not determined
exclusively by considerations of the balance of pleasure.

top
13.11 Highest Pleasure (realization of moral ideals)
[45] Hence, if Pessimistic thinkers believe that they are preparing the ground for an unselfish devotion to
the work of civilization, by demonstrating that there is a greater quantity of pain than of pleasure in life,
they forget altogether that the human will is so constituted that it cannot be influenced by this knowledge.
The whole striving of men is directed towards the greatest possible satisfaction that is attainable after
overcoming all difficulties. The hope of this satisfaction is the basis of all human activity. The work of
every single individual and the whole achievement of civilization have their roots in this hope. The
Pessimistic theory of Ethics thinks it necessary to represent the pursuit of pleasure as impossible, in order
that man may devote himself to his proper moral tasks. But these moral tasks are nothing but the
concrete natural and spiritual instincts; and he strives to satisfy these notwithstanding all incidental pain.
The pursuit of pleasure, then, which the Pessimist sets himself to eradicate is nowhere to be found. But
the tasks which man has to fulfil are fulfilled by him because from his very nature he wills to fulfil them.

The Pessimistic system of Ethics maintains that a man cannot devote himself to what he recognizes as his
task in life until he has first given up the desire for pleasure. But no system of Ethics can ever invent
other tasks than the realization of those satisfactions which human desires demand, and the fulfilment of
man's moral ideas. No Ethical theory can deprive him of the pleasure which he experiences in the
realization of what he desires. When the Pessimist says, "Do not strive after pleasure, for pleasure is
unattainable; strive instead after what you recognize to be your task," we must reply that it is human
nature to strive to do one's tasks, and that philosophy has gone astray in inventing the principle that man
strives for nothing but pleasure. He aims at the satisfaction of what his nature demands, and the
attainment of this satisfaction is to him a pleasure.
Pessimistic Ethics, in demanding that we should strive, not after pleasure, but after the realization of what
we recognize as our task, lays its finger on the very thing which man wills in virtue of his own nature.
There is no need for man to be turned inside out by philosophy, there is no need for him to discard his
nature, in order to be moral. Morality means striving for an
end so long as the pain connected with this striving does
not inhibit the desire for the end altogether; and this is the
essence of all genuine will. Ethics is not founded on the
eradication of all desire for pleasure, in order that, in its
place, bloodless moral ideas may set up their rule where no
strong desire for pleasure stands in their way, but it is
based on the strong will which attains its end even when
the path to it is full of thorns.

[46] Moral ideals have their root in the moral imagination

of man. Their realization depends on the desire for them
being sufficiently intense to overcome pains and agonies.
They are man's own intuitions. In them his spirit braces
itself to action. They are what he wills, because their Moral ideals are his own intuitions and their
realization is his highest pleasure. He needs no Ethical realization is his highest pleasure.
theory first to forbid him to strive for pleasure and then to
prescribe to him what he shall strive for. He will, of himself, strive for moral ideals provided his moral
imagination is sufficiently active to inspire him with the intuitions, which give strength to his will to
overcome all resistance.

[47] If a man strives towards sublimely great ideals, it is

because they are the content of his will, and because their
realization will bring him an enjoyment compared with which
the pleasure which inferior spirits draw from the satisfaction of
their commonplace needs is a mere nothing. Idealists delight in
translating their ideals into reality.

[48] Anyone who wants to eradicate the pleasure which the

fulfillment of human desires brings, will have first to degrade
man to the position of a slave who does not act because he
wills, but because he must. For the attainment of the object of
will gives pleasure. What we call the good is not what a man
must do, but what he wills to do when he unfolds the fullness
of his nature. Anyone who does not acknowledge this must
deprive man of all the objects of his will, and then prescribe to
him from without what he is to make the content of his will.
He will strive for moral ideals provided
his moral imagination is active enough [49] Man values the satisfaction of a desire because the desire
to inspire him with intuitions that springs from his own nature. What he attains is valuable
give his will the strength to because it is the object of his will. If we deny any value to the
overcome all resistance. ends which men do will, then we shall have to look for the ends
that are valuable among objects which men do not will.

[50] A system of Ethics, then, which is built up on Pessimism has its root in the contempt of man's moral
imagination. Only he who does not consider the individual human mind capable of determining for itself
the content of its striving can look for the sum and substance of will in the craving for pleasure. A man
without imagination does not create moral ideas; they must be imparted to him. Physical nature sees to it
that he seeks the satisfaction of his lower desires; but for the development of the whole man the desires
which have their origin in the spirit are fully as necessary. Only
those who believe that man has no such spiritual desires at all can moral action consists, not in the
maintain that they must be imparted to him from without. On that eradication of one's individual
view it will also be correct to say that it is man's duty to do what he will, but in the fullest
does not will to do. Every Ethical system which demands of man development of human nature
that he should suppress his will in order to fulfil tasks which he does
not will, works, not with the whole man, but with a stunted being who lacks the faculty of spiritual
desires. For a man who has been harmoniously developed, the so-called ideas of the Good lie, not
without, but within the range of his will. Moral action consists, not in the eradication of one's individual
will, but in the fullest development of human nature. To regard moral ideals as attainable only on
condition that man destroys his individual will, is to ignore the fact that these ideals are as much rooted in
man's will as the satisfaction of the so-called animal instincts.

top
13.12 Joy Of Achievement (measure achievement against aims)
[51] It cannot be denied that the views here outlined may easily be misunderstood. Immature youths
without any moral imagination like to look upon the instincts of their half developed natures as the full
substance of humanity, and reject all moral ideas which they have not themselves originated, in order
that they may "live themselves out" without restriction. But it goes without saying that a theory which
holds for a fully developed man does not hold for half-developed boys. Anyone who still requires to be
brought by education to the point where his moral nature breaks through the shell of his lower
passions, cannot expect to be measured by the same standard as a mature man. But it was not my
intention to set down what a half-fledged youth requires to be taught, but the essential nature of a
mature man.

[52] Every mature man is the maker of his own

value. He does not aim at pleasure, which comes to
him as a gift of grace on the part of nature or of
the Creator; nor does he live for the sake of what
he does not aim at pleasure, he recognizes as
which comes to him as a gift duty, after he
has put away
of grace, nor does he live
from him the
for the sake of duty desire for
pleasure. He acts as he wills, that is, in accordance
with his moral intuitions; and he finds in the
attainment of what he wills the true enjoyment of
life. He determines the value of his life by
measuring his achievements against his aims. An
Ethical system which puts "ought" in the place of
"will," duty in the place of inclination, is consistent
in determining the value of man by the ratio
between the demands of duty and his actual
achievements. It applies to man a measure that is
He determines the value of life by measuring his
external to his own nature. The view which I have
achievements against his aims.
here developed points man back to himself. It
recognizes as the true value of life nothing except what each individual regards as such by the measure
of his own will. A value of life which the individual does not recognize is as little acknowledged by my
views as a purpose of life which does not spring from the value thus recognized. My view looks upon
the individual as his own master and the assessor of his own value.