The University of Westminster

Established 1908

The University of Westminster

VOL. CCTV. . . . No. 786 LONDON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 20th, 2012

Established

1908

IS THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS LIKELY TO BE SOLVED?

The Hard Problem Problems? What Problems?
Once we solve the easy problems, why should there be another hard problem that we have to solve? argues Ashley CampsLinney, following a similar line of argument to Daniel Dennett in a response to Chalmers, amusingly called, Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness Imagine some vitalist says to the molecular biologists:

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As Susan Blackmore says, no one has been able to bridge the fathomless abyss between mind and brain. There is no conclusive explanation as to why we experience that which we experience. The field is still highly theoretical to the extent where there is little general agreement, said Robert Rorschach opening the first debate. David Chalmers outlined the issue; distinct from the hard problem, examples of the easy problems are:

Trapped in language?
Austin Caffrey raises the point that all explanations of consciousness are language-based and so follow linguistic flaws such as problems of definition. Hubert Greliak drew attention to a field outside of psychology, to the field of mathematics, where Austrian statistician, Kurt Gdel proved that the system of mathematics cannot be used to prove itself. Similarly, language cannot prove itself, no matter how many definitions you look up, you will only get more words. Is consciousness in the same logical boat? Is it doomed to fail to understand itself in this way? A system referring to itself creates paradoxes that cannot be logically resolved Kurt Gdel

The easy problems of life include those of explaining the following phenomena: reproduction, development, growth, metabolism, self-repair, -the ability of a system to access its own internal states; immunological self-defence . . . These are not all that easy, of course, and it may take another century - the integration of information by a cognitive system; - the reportability of mental states; It would be ridiculous to claim to or so to work out the fine points, but they are easy -the focus of attention; know how we make consciousness compared to the really hard - the deliberate control of behaviour; problem: life itself. We can - Antonio Damasio - the difference between wakefulness and sleep. imagine something that was capable of reproduction, - the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to stimuli; development, growth, metabolism, self-repair and David Chalmers, in his paper immunological self-defence, but that wasn't, you know, alive. The residual mystery of life would be Facing up to the problem of untouched by solutions to all the easy problems. In consciousness, claimed that fact, when I read your accounts of life, I am left these easy problems are feeling like the victim of a bait-and-switch.

Hard Criticisms
Colin McGinn takes the standpoint that further investigation is futile as we are cognitively closed when it comes understanding consciousness. Patricia Churchland takes a step outside the problem and asks, How are we supposed to know beforehand which problems are hard and which are easy? She notes that in the past biologists assumed that how information is carried from parent to child would be insurmountable, while how a protein folds would be a simple discovery. It turns out that we still dont understand protein folding, however DNA was discovered 50 years ago. In conlcusion, Mr. Rorshachs opening comment seems most appropriate, No one can tell the future.

within reach of being solved, but in contrast no current explanation even comes close to solving the hard problem.

Humans are cognitively closedwe are constitutionally ignorant at precisely the spot where the answer exists - Colin McGinn

Assuming a defeatist viewpoint will ultimately hinder rather than help the process of discovery Hubert Greliak

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VOL. CCTV. . . . No. 787

Established

1908

Free Will vs Determinism

IS THE NOTION OF FREE WILL AN ILLUSION?

Man can indeed do what he wants, but

LONDON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27th, 2012

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Arguably the most discussed and argued problem in the he cannot want what he wants history of philosophy and thought. Of interest to Schopenhauer psychologists as related to the problem of consciousness, can the mind or will or consciousness affect reality? Considering the findings from Geroge Libets

Free-Will vs Free-Wont

The question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of metaphysics David Hume

Scientific Research
George Libet conducted an experiment to measure the timing of conscious will. To find out, he asked subjects flex their wrist, at times of their own choosing, and measured the following three things: the time at which the action occurred, the beginning of brain activity in motor cortex, and the time at which they consciously decided to act. The main finding is that the experience of choosing happens 350 milliseconds after the brain activity which shows the decision to move has already been made.

Does Libets experiment suggest that we simply experience choice when in fact unconscious brain processes are calling the shots? Unlike experiment, can man even do what he wants? some other interpretations, Libet himself does not think this is the case. He carried out another experiment to test what happens when people begin to act and then stop themselves. The brain activity began as normal, but then flattened out and disappeared about 200ms before the action was due to happen. From this he argued for the text existence of a conscious veto. Consciousness couldn't initiate the action but it could act to prevent it. This matches a point raised during the debate, that it doesnt seem we can choose which thoughts come into our heads. Often silly or absurd thoughts and ideas pop up but we choose to ignore them. It would seem that although we do not have free will, we do have free wont.

Ethical Implications

If our will is not our own, then how can we be held responsible for our actions? Whether or not one personally believes in free will, society and its institutions function on the implicit assumption that we can choose our will and therefore have responsibility. It is an idea so entangled in our way of functioning that it would seem a necessity to modern society. For example, the judicial system would break down if people were allowed to plead not-guilty for their crimes, on account that free will is a socially-constructed concept and doesnt exist.

Existential philosophy and the last choice

An audience member shared their personal view about choice and freedom; that fundamentally we have choice and ultimately even if our actions are restricted, we still have the free will to choose how to think. This idea is borrowed from Viktor Frankl, an existential psychologist who survived the holocaust. He writes about his experience Everything can be taken from man but one thing: the last of human freedoms to choose ones attitude in any given set of circumstances.

The University of Westminster

VOL. CCTV. . . . No. 788

Established

1908

CAN A MACHINE BE CONSCIOUS?

Is it just Sphexish Behaviour?

LONDON, MONDAY, MARCH 5th 2012

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achieve the required complexity of cognitive systems. However, how many of our cognitive functions are sphexish seemingly autonomous and purposive but actually deterministic? If this is the case Artificial Intelligence then it would seem that all we need is In humans, a single neuron has nothing resembling advances in technology and programming intelligence. Yet in combination, billions of neurons skill to replicate artificial consciousness
combine to form a mind that does possess intelligence it emerges with sufficient configural complexity of neurons. So it is not inconceivable that other attributes such as consciousness, creativity and emotionality may emerge also with sufficient complexity. However, if we were to assume that consciousness is not such a by-product, then an additional question is whether or not it is possible to computationally define, code and replicate it.

Can a machine look at The answer we dont. As with many other Machines follow programming, which is the world and be debates, the crux of the issue rests on answering inherently limited in flexibility and inspired to write a the question of questions, what exactly is this adaptiveness, so it seems would fail to sonnet or a poem?
thing we call consciousness? If we dont first determine what it is, how can we hope to build it into machines? Then again, even if by chance a machine is built, how do you know its really conscious? Theres no easy answers here...

How do we measure consciousness?

Is a machine capable of love?

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Is a human capable Although being alive seems fundamental to our idea of consciousness, perhaps of falling love with a this is because we only know ourselves. machine? However, there seems to be no logical *** necessity between life and experience or If the machine didnt look like us, that consciousness need necessarily would we ascribe it arise from organic material, where machines are, by definition, inorganic. consciousness?

Does a machine have to be alive and breathing to be conscious?

A par ticularly astute member of the audience raised the criticism against the advancement of technology to the abilities of human consciousness - is it possible for a machine to write poetry? Austin Caffrey of the panel mentions that computers today have the ability to write poetry, at least, it looks that waymachines certainly have the ability to arrange words in a certain order, according to the rules of grammar and syntax, even to portray meaning. However, upon further inspection of this idea, it seems that poetry is not simply language, it is a specific type of language, infused with meaning, subjectivity, personality and emotion. Are computers today capable of this? Certainly not. What is interesting to consider is whether a machine will ever be able to produce language in this way. It seems a shift in the current paradigm as to how we perceive technology will be necessary, as current perspectives find it hard to fuse the the concepts of computers and technology with that of personality, emotion, innovation and creativity.

The University of Westminster

VOL. CCTV. . . . No. 788

Established

1908

DO ANIMALS HAVE CONSCIOUSNESS?

The embarrassed cat
One member of the audience shared their experiences of their own pet and how it will act differently depending on whether or not it thinks its being observed seemingly showing signs of embarrassment upon realising its owner had witnessed it slip. Austin Caffrey raised the point that if indeed this is the case, then it could hold evidence for our argument. Embarrassment is a secondary emotion and a complex process which acquires not only Theory of Mind but also the ability to consider the experience of others to reflexively determine your choice of behaviour. Lauren Coetzer replies that ascribing emotions to animals entails its own set of problems. Humans are programmed to anthropomorphise, which can be seen in our use of language when personifying inanimate objects. We see ourselves projected out on to the world, and then forget it was us who did the projecting. Of course, the evidence provided was purely anecdotal and so of little ecological value therefore the group concluded that experimental trials should be done to determine whether or not the cat actually does show signs of embarrassment and also what the implications are.

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By what criteria do we measure?

As usual when it comes to exact and precise definitions, there seems to be no general consensus as to which set of criteria or characteristics are to be used to accurately judge consciousness, both in ourselves and others. With our incomplete understanding it becomes very difficult to ascertain which features of intelligence are necessary and sufficient for consciousness.

Theory of mind - a valid criterion?

It has been suggested that theory of mind is a necessity for consciousness, which would show promise, as certain primates have been demonstrated to have developed this level of intelligence. However, research also suggests that young children and certain people with autism lack theory of mind. Are these human beings not conscious? The group threw out this ridiculous idea with a tremendous laugh - it seems ToM is neither sufficient nor necessary.

Do I have consciousness?
Andrej OMurchu points out that we dont even know if other humans are really conscious , I mean, I believe I am and conscious and I believe you are conscious, but I dont really know for sure This highlights the complexity of the dilemma before we even begin discussing other species our reasoning falls short at determining whether our neighbour is even conscious. This is interesting because although it seems that no one believes that anyone else in the group does not have consciousness, no one is able to prove it empirically, largely due to the fact that there is no objective measure for subjectivity yet.

Pain and Subjectivity

Hubert Greliak posed the question that, if pain is subjective, and animals experience pain subjectively, is this evidence for consciousness? It would seem subjectivity is a necessity for consciousness and evidence that shows animals experiencing pain in different and unique ways show evidence for subjective experience. However, is subjectivity sufficient for consciousness? No, there is a whole lot more to the story

The University of Westminster

VOL. CCTV. . . . No. 788

Established

1908

DO NEAR-DEATH EXPERIENCES EXIST?

Reframing the question
Of course they existIts like asking do experiences exist? Robert Rorschach

LONDON, MONDAY, MARCH 19th, 2012

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Commonality of Experience
While there are always variations to each unique NDE, there is a significant consensus on certain main themes. Common features include: Going down a dark tunnel or through a dark space towards a bright white or golden light; watching ones own body being resuscitated or operated on; emotions of joy, acceptance, or deep contentment; flashbacks or a panoramic review of events in ones life; seeing another world with people who are already dead or a being of light; and finally deciding to return to life rather than enter that other world.

Language problems
One of the panel members highlighted problems of definition certain subjects of NDE are not simply near-death but pronounced clinically dead, according to our current medical model, therefore the term near-death is a misleading one.

Is it just a fancy name for another altered So the question is not to determine state of consciousness? Austin Caffrey
whether or not people experience this phenomenon, but rather to describe and explain exactly what is being experienced. Certain people describe NDEs as proof of the existence of after-life, while others would argue they are mere hallucinations. Similar states of consciousness can be replicated through certain drugs e.g. ketamine or DMT. It is possible to interpret this as proof of their hallucinatory nature and biological origins, but this does not answer other important questions
The paradoxical occurrence of heightened, lucid awareness and logical thought processes during a period of impaired cerebral perfusion raises particular perplexing questions for our current understanding of consciousness Bruce Greyson

Cross Cultural Differences

It becomes easy to assume that the universality of these experiences lend itself to biological or genetic explanations. However, there is also correlation between personal factors and the content of the experiences and visions e.g. Christians seeing Jesus. The relationship between content and culture/beliefs suggest that certain sociocultural factors may have a role to play in the construction of these experiences. Not to rule out the biological explanations, the common features of NDEs are best-explained by the similarity of all nervous systems; that the brain will behave in predictable ways e.g. when starved of oxygen regardless of society or culture.

The features of NDEs are not unique to dying, many quite ordinary people have quite extraordinary experiences within their daily lives, not necessarily in extreme circumstance, such as religious or mystical experiences. This line of thinking would suggest that the critical factor is not an afterlife but rather some facet of the human nervous system. Austin Caffrey goes on to argue that observable and predictable subjective experiences can be replicated by manipulating the environment; this is a really good example of the idea that the brain is in fact the mind. However, there will always be a gap between objective measures of environment and individual reports due to the subjective nature of introspection and differences in interpretation.

Research issues
Methodological limitations make examination of the issue even more difficult (a) it is hard to find participants who are experiencing life-threatening situations (b) it is even harder to find an ethics committee who will grant permission for a study that seeks to kill or nearly-kill its participants.

The University of Westminster

VOL. CCTV. . . . No. 788 LONDON, MONDAY, MARCH 26th, 2012

Established

1908

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CAN MYSTICAL EXPERIENCES BE A LEGITIMATE PART OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

Characteristics of Mystical Experiences Mystical Drugs?
The panel presented agreement that mystical Priya Patel proposed that although similar experiences can be induced using experiences must meet a set of four criteria: Transient - the experience is temporary, the drugs, these are not real mystical individual soon returns to a "normal" frame of experiences as they are not passive. mind. It is outside our normal perception of space Robert Rorschach raised examples of tribes who use hallucinogenic drugs as and time. Ineffable - the experience cannot be adequately part of their religious ritual. Can these be simply discounted as invalid? Ms. Patel put into words. Noetic - the individual feels that he or she has went on to discuss research where learned something valuable from the experience. church-goers were given LSD. 80% of the Passive - the experience happens to the sample reported a mystical experience, with follow-up 30 years later showing individual, largely without conscious control. that most of them still regard it as the Following this, Cyndalia Goes raised a criticism m o s t n o e t i c , r e v e l a t i o n a r y a n d against strict categorisation, arguing that this may enlightening religious experience of their lead to the exclusion of valuable data, just lives. Are their expectations a crucial because it doesnt meet certain requirements. variable in explaining these findings?

Regardless of religious or non-religious, induced or not-induced, each mystical experience has its own value to the individual Cyndalia Goes Subjectivity Issues
Similar to NDEs, research on mystical experience brings with it all sorts methodological limitations. First of all, it is difficult to catch someone in the middle of a spontaneous mystical experience. Also, individual differences in recollection and in interpretation will account for a certain amount of the variance in subjective reports. Ashley CampsLinney raised an interesting criticism on research in this field; data is gathered from sample who put themselves forward, often answering adverts. This raises sampling issues of self-selection and the creation of a biased population. population. In addition to this, as the field is related to religion, its likely that religious parties will fund research which then may contain hidden agendas and distort the process of science.

If you talk to God, you are praying; If God talks to you, you have schizophrenia Thomas Szasz
Hubert Greliak suggested that it is interesting to consider how the content of the experience can change our perception of it. If someone has a bad hallucination, we class them as mentally ill, however if someone has a positive hallucination, we grant it the elevated status of mystical experience.