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FTT?ST JOINT ASSAULT Sff^? , FIRST .THTTCT ASSAULT SJOffAL (X3&IPiTY: QIjRATIOK REPORT 'FOR' THE IHD JIH&.CREATION

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Following -the Saipan-Tinian Operation, the First Joint Assault Signal Company returned to the Hawaiian Area, arriving on August 2U 9 1944, and remained, attached to the Fourth Marine Division. Inasmuch as there ?;as a large amount of signal equipment expended on the Saipan-Tinian Oper ation and most of the remaining equipment turned over to the Fourth Divis ion on Saipar,, the training for the first two months was limited to a program of such subjects as physical conditioning, training films, chemical warfare j*-field sissitation, and' familiarisation with infantry weapons. A]Ll hands received instruction on the" live grenade course and rifle range. Upon the arrival of the bullc of' the signal equipment -in the latter part of October, the teams and parties ??ere formed and a concentrated course of unit training was initiated and maintained until the first of the year when the teams and parties rere tactically attached to their respective infantry units and embarked aboard ship for the Iwo Jima Operation.
;

During this, second and last two- month training period all Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire Parties 'and all Shore Party Communication, Teems were made available to their respective Regiments- and Battalions at any time these units desired their presence. In addition to their regular/ training under First Joint Assault Signal Company supervision, they par ticipate<?" with their respective urits in Regimental and Battalion fisld exercises, in the four day ship-shore maneuvers that T~ers conducted by each .of; the three infantry regiments, and in the Division CFX on ITovember ' t f SC, 29, and 30. .

The training for the Shore Party Conartuni cation Teams was con sidered satisfactory and upon embarkation they werce considered fully trained. . It is requested that the First Joint Assault Signal Company receive no more grounded aviators as Air Liaison Officers, and it is recommended that when officer replacements are furnished that they be made available at least three months prior to embarkation for combat. TBte state of training of the enlisted men of the Air Liaison Parties and their functioning together -rs teams was very satisfactory, but the qualifications of seven ?7) of tlie fourteen (w officers left much to be desired. Immediate ly fcllo-jiiig the Saipan-Tiniari Operation, seven (7) of the- original Air Liaison Officers, all Captains (AYS) vere detached and four (A) .replacements, all Second Lieutenants (AY) rere furnished. These new officers .were graduates of OCS and ROC, but their Air Liaison training was* limited to t*rp !-eeks of .schooling at Forth Island. Tith

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FIRST JASCO OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE

IK)

JIMA OHSRATIC! (Cont'd.)

this background and tinder the instruction of the seven (7) remaining Air Liaison Officers those officers learned quickly and ?jere fully trained and qualified for combat. On November 27, 1944, four weeks before embarkation, five (5) of the seven (7) remaining experienced Air Liaison Officers Fere detached. Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific was requested to reconsider these detachments and to leave three (3) of the five (5) to serve as Rerimental Air Liaison Officers, but this request r?as disapproved. Seven (7) grounded aviators Fere then assigned', to the First Joint Assault Sirnal Company as Air Liaison Officers. These officers also had the two Ti-eeSrs training "at Forth Island, but they had not attendee 1 OCS or ROC, their ri u.alifications being limited to duty as IT aval Aviators. These given as much instruction as Fas possib3.e rith the facil officers ities and personnel available, but four creeks of training as Air Liaison Officers for grounded aviators rdth no infantry experience is not con sidered sufficient. The field commis. sieving of seven (7) of the Air Liaison non-comrois sioned officers rho had been through tT?o (2) opera tions Tfould have been a better solution.
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Another factor that hindered the training of these officers that the senior Air Liaison Officer was rarely available to aid in their instruction. Since the First Joint Assault Signal Company has been attached to the Fourth lilarine Division, the senior Air Liaison Officer has been a member of the B-3 Section, serving as an Assistant Air Officer and Air Observer and his only connection rith the First Joint Assault Signal Company has been to bo carried on its rolls. The principal duty of this Officer should bo responsibility for the training of the Air Liaison Parties. It is rcconironded thcit this Officer be relieved of his various duties in the D-3 Section and rejoin tho Joint Assault Signal Company inhere he can be used to aid in the training of the Air Liaison Parties,
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It is ro commended that in the future every attempt be made to furnish the replacements for the IT aval .Gunfire Parties, both officers and men, as soon as possible after returning to the rest base, a^d that if specialized training, is to be given the Naval Gunfire personnel in Pearl Harbor or elsewhere, that the entire section of both officers and enlisted men be given the training together as a unit. Fleet' Marine Force Special Order #86-44 Fas a great heir) in obtaining the additional personnel over the T/0 allowance that the parties needed, but these additional men rrrxveo so Ifto that there Fas kittle opportunity to train them sufficiently. The five (5) Shotting Officers that rere needed as replacements also Fere late in arriving, reporting in the latter part of November.. In addition, during the period from September 6, 1944., to November 12,. 1944, all IT aval- Gunfire Liaison Officers Foreon temporary detached duty.es observers on the Le3*te Operation and -from October 20, 1944, to November 13, 1944, all Spotting Officers and Scout Sergeants Fere in Pearl Harbor attending a Favy Gunnery School. This Fas the period that the Divis|,|n| laag.ning Order specified- that team and unit training
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OITFinEFTIAL

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shoTlld be emphasised, "but with all officers and Scout Sergeants absent there was certainly no .opportunity to conduct team training as it should have been done to effective ly prepare the ftaval Gunfire Parties for combat. If radar personnel are to be re classified as radio operators it is recommended that the rr be sent to radio school before assigning them to a combat organization, even if they have to be sent back to the States to receive the training. Fleet Marine Force Special Order #86-44- called for an additional thirty (30) radio operators for the IT aval Gunfire Section of each "Joint Assault Signal Company. In lieu thereof, the First Joint Assault Signal Company received twenty-five (?5) radar operators, including twelve (12) corporals, three recks before embarkation. "Those men kneF absolutely nothing about radio communications, not even voice procedure, and were useless except as equipment carriers. Inasmuch as all basic duty men in the First Joint Assault Signal Company are assigned to Air Liaison or Naval Gunfire Parties as equipment carriers during an operation, -a three -Tveeks course in coirmuni cations cover ing 'both radio and ?dre was given to these men. At the conclusion of the course seven (7) of these were designated communication personnel, voice radio operators ( 767) ,
It is recommended that communication officers not be used for un related duties such as Air Liaison Officers. Prior to embarkation for the Ivo Jima Operation, one of the Shore -Party Coirmuni cations Officers was assigned as an Assistant Air Liaison Officer in the Division Air Liaison Party, was later made a Regimental Air Li?ison 'Officer, and finally round up as a ' Battalion Air Liaison Officer during the latter stages of the oper^

ation.

On past operations, considerable* "attached unit11 difficulty was encountered' by the various teams and parties of the First Joint Assault Sig ' nal Company, irostly in dealing Fith the Battalion and Regimental Quartermasters. On this Operation, however, there rere only one or t^o instances T?here the units refused to is>sue clothing or equipment to the attached First , Joint Assault Signal Company teams and parties. Fhen an organization such as -the First Joint Assault Signal Company has detachments with every Infantry RCT and BLT Headquarters, 5.t is practically an impossibility for the First

Joint Assault Signal Company Quartermaster to make the rounds of each Command Post to keep them supplied $ . the unit Quartermasters should take care of their ' ' attached units.

Following the Saipen-Tinian Operation, a signal requisition for the deficiencies of the First Joint Assau.lt Signal Company ms forwarded to Supply Service, F?/F, ?ac. This requisition" i?as' forwarded on' September 16 5 1944, an.d a considerable amount of emiiptnent arrived in' the latter part of October, but it Fas not until the middle of December that the entire requisition ras filled.
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FIRST JASCO

OFERATiJFs

REPORT FOR THE IWO JIM OPERATION (Cont f d.-)

s Several days before embarkation, thirty, trip (32) TBX-8! Yjerc Company by Supply Servs.ce, FMF, furnished the First Joint Assault Signal Pac, to replace the TBX-4's and SCR 2&Ux s in the' Air Liaison and K aval Gunfire Sections. The Division Signal Officer ordered five (5) of these turned over to the Division Signal Quartermaster "and the other tiventy seven (27) distributed to tho Battalion Air Liaison and- Haval Gunfire Parties. Considerable- difficulty i?as encountered rdth these particular radios, burnt but generators resulting from the -ore sen co of moisture and fungus, growth being the main trouble. This failure did not -appear until after several hours of use, and as there w-.s little op-^ortaiity to use them , prior to embarkation, it tos not until the rehears?! War ex so that the trouble developed. The generators were repaired at vhe 6th Base Depot Signal Repair Shop at Pearl Harbor, ps rras a1a considerable amount of other equipment.
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It is- recommended that all section^* of the First Joint Assault Company be furbished rdth one common portable radio set, the SCR 694 Signal being considered the most likely. The Company nor has TBX-2I,1 , TBX-4's, TBX-s's, TBX-!s, and SCR 2C4's, and one set for all three sections T-ould certainly lesson the supply and repair problems, .

Upon embarkation for the Ifo Jima Operation, the Signal Supply
and Repair Section of the. First Joint Assault Signal Company v&s combined
?dth th?t of the Fourth Division.

The First Joint Assault Signal Company suffered a total of ten (10) officer and one Hundred tv*o (102) enlistee! casualties on the Ifo Jima T Operation, of ' hich t?jo (2) officers 'and \u25a0\u25a0twenty-eight- (2.G) enlisted veve killed in action or died of rounds i
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11.

AIR LIAISON

The folloFing comments on the Air Liaison Section deal vdth adn-inistrative matters' only; the tactical employraent of the Air Liaison Parties and their functioning on the operation are covered in the Divis^
ion Operation Report..

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The T/O: for JASCo calls for each Air Liaison Party to be composeid of one (l) officer and' three (3) enlisted " radio operators (AW). As tas done on the Roi-Namur and Saipan-Tinian Operations, each Battalion and Regimental .Party was increased, this time by three (3) enlisted men, by util izing the basic duty men, cooks, and quartermaster personnel in Company Headquarters. The Division Air Liaison Party was increased so that it totaled one (l) officer and ten (10) enlisted. The vsxir Liaison Section deficient four (A) radio operators, (AW)'., so four (4) radio operators (CF),-.' trere assigned from the Shore Party Section so that each party wuld have three (3) radio operators.

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S REPORT POR THE IWO \

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The Air Liaison Section 'of the First Joint Assault Signal Company suffered a total of six (6) officer and seventeen (17) enlisted killed casualties, of lifnich two (2) officers and five (5) enlisted ir> action or died of "wounds.

There is no need of the AtT /VRC-l radio jeeps in the Air Liaison Section of tho First Joint Assault Signal Company? HZ (TCS) radio jeeps T;illdo just as T-iell. Before, each operation there is a considerable amount of time and equipment expended on, -nutting tho. SCR 54-2 !s in the ift'/ZRC-l's on frequency, and inasmuch as this radio has never once been used by an ' 1 Air Liaison Party on any of the three Operations, its continued use is considered a i?aste of equipment. of a half -track mounted SCR 299 by Party considered a necessity or even desirable. the Division Air Liaison An. SGR 299 mounted in a panel truck such as the .Division Signal Company uses rould be more practicable. Tho continued mechanical failures of the half-track make it more of a liability than an asset.
F either is the emplojnnent
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Tho continued ernplo^/ment of the RBZ radio by the Air Liaison Parties is not' recommended. It is all the Party can do as it is to take care of a portable radio and a radio jeep and operate on the SAR Net rrith otit burdening it do^Yt Tdth another radio and another net. It should be the function of the communications platoon or "2H Section to monitor the SAO l-'et not the Air Liaison Party.

The loss of major items of signal equipment by the Air Liaison Parties on the Iwo Jima Operation is estimated to be approximately 30$. These losses rare replenished by the Fourth Division Signal Quartermaster. Five (5) AN/VRC-I's vjqtq destroyed. on the beach before they could be larded too soon. It is recommended that in the used because they future the radio jeeps be boated so that they can be called on upon re quest and T*hen the units have use for them, rather than havin-g them land at g specified time. The entire Air Liaison Party of the Third Battalion, Twenty I-arines ;ms a casualty on P-Day Another Party ras formed by using Fifth three radio operators from one of the Shore Party Communication Teams, an KOO from the RCT 2J+ Air Liaison Party, and the previously mentioned Communications Officer T*ho ras acting as the RCT 25 Air Liedson Officer . at the time.

111. NAVAL G7ffFIBE

administrative matters only; the tactical employment of Haval Gunfire

The following comments on the Naval' Gunfire Section deal Hth

FIRST JASCO OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE IWO JIM OPERATION (Cont'd.) Parties and their functioning on this Operation are covered in the Div ision Operation Report. Fleet Marine Force Special Order #86-44- increased each
Spotting Section 'from one (l) officer and three (3) enlisted to one
(l) officer and six (6) enlisted; and each Faval Liaison Section from one (l) officer and two (2) enlisted to one (l) officer and five (5) enlisted. This was considered sufficient, but by utilizing the Company Headquarters personnel, each Naval Liaison Section was increased by one (l) enlisted, making a total of six (6). Due to the heavy casualties suffered by the Kaval Gunfire Section in the Saipan-Tinian Operation, and because of the lack of qualified replacements, such as the prev iously mentioned radar men, it was necessary to transfer eleven (11) non-commissioned officers, all radio operators, from the Shore Party Section to the Naval Gunfire Section.

The Naval Gunfire Section of the First Joint Assault Signal Company stiffered a total of two (?) officer and thirty-five (35) enlisted casualties on the Iwo Jiraa Operation, of which nine (9) enlisted were killed- in action or died of wounds.

In October, the First Joint Assault Signal Company received (12) MZ radio jeer>s for the Naval Gunfire Section to be used on twelve the Iwo Jima Operation as a test, the results of which -were to form a basis for future recommendations for inclusion of these lZ.T s in the T/BA. Due to the type of operation however and the fact that seven (7) of the trrelve (12) jeeps were destroyed on the beach before they were ever used, the Iwo Jima Operation did not bring forth all the advantages of the YZ, On this operation, the principal use of the MZ was as a relay station between the Spotter ashore and the firing ship. SCR 300 f s were issued to both the Spotter and llaval Liaison Officer and the Naval Liaison Officer remained boated with the &.Z to relay the information that he received from the Spotter on the SCR 300. The five (5) I^Z's that did get past the beach safely were used continually and gave ex cellent results. It is recommended that Joint Assault Signal Company T/BA be altered so that thirteen (13) KZ radio jeeps are substituted for the thirteen (13) cargo jeeps that the Naval Gunfire liaison Parties
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now

rate.

Thf SCR 536' s of the Kaval Gunfire. Parties of the Assault BLT's were set on their initial spotting frequencies and excellent results obtained. In several cases this was the only contact Parties
ashore had with their firing ships.

Durmg the rehearsal period, four (4) radar beacon teams of two (2) men each were assigned to the First Joint Assault Signal Company, but due to the nature of the terrain and the tactical situation, the radar beacons were never used on the operation. lifta***

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O Ir*oI *0 iCfIS REPORT FOR THE I

JIJ'A OPERATIC^ (Cont'd.) OPERATIC

The loss of major items of signal equipment by tho Naval Gunfire Parties on the Iwo Jx^a Operation is estimated to be 355. These losses Fore replenished by the Division Signal Quartermaster.

IV. SHORE

T COM^IIGATICIS

Ir.asr.ruch as the Commanding Officer, First Joint Assault the Division Shore -"arty Comnmni cations Officer Sirno.l Company, I?;o Jim Operation, a discussion of the tactical employment as on the T?oll as the, administrative details of the Shore Party Communi cation Section, is contained herein. The assigii.mcs.it of the CoicFanding Officer of the Joint Assault Signal Company as tho Division Shore Party Commun ication Officor in addition, to his regular duties is considered an ex cellent idea ar.d worked out r.cll on/ this operation.
On the Roi-#amur and Saipan-Tinirn Operations, the nine (9) Joint Assault Si/mal Company -Shore Party Communication Tear^s rcere attached one per each battalion, regardless of Fhether tho battalion ve.s in assault or reserve. On the Iv?o Jimc Operation however ? Shore Party Communications paralleled the Division Communications inasmuch as there was one team attached to the Division Shore Party Headquarters, one to each of the tv?o Assa-v.lt RCT Shore Party Headquarters, end one to oach BLT Shore no Shore Party of the Assault Regiments, There Communication Tears attached to the reserve regiment. This arrangement proved to be far more efficient then that employed on the tyro previous operations and. resulted in excellent connrrunicr-tior.s on th- beach.

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On Yellor Beaches, the Shore Party Coirtiunicrticn Terms of Battalion Landirg Teams l/ end 2/23 landed at appro^im.-toly H/5J- on 23 lollcr 1and Yellow 2 respectively, and established radio cormuni cations. This included a TBJ on the Shore Party Lateral Net end'er SCR 300 on tho Battalion Command Net of the Battalion Landing Term to -hich they vqto attached. Intra-beach r/ire comrrunicntions r: orc established between lollop' 2 and Blue 1 by H/6, botTTjeq Ycllo^ 2 and Yellor 1, and bct^'cen YclloF.l and the Fifth Division on Red 2 by H/7. The Shore Party Com munication^ Term orBLT 3/23 {in reserve) landed on Ycl-lor 1 at. approxi mately H/S and consolidated .Tlth the BLT 1/23 Shoro Party Gomininicrtion Team. The RCT 23 Shore Pfirt:?- CoiKnmication T& leaded on Yellow 2 at approximate^ H/B|-, but set up r.t a different location than the BLT 2/23 Tean. On D/4, the Shore Party of the Twenty First Marines "res assigned to Ycllpr 2 w.& eper-ted under the control of the RCT 23 Shore -Prrty Commander. The three (3) BLT Shore P^rty Coraruni cation Toxins of theTrenty First Marines T^erc combined to form one Rcgizrontr.l Term and assigned to Ycllof 2. At the snmo.tirc the BLT 2/23 Shore" Party Coo -unication Team vrs removed end combined "Ith the RCT 23 Team, On D/6, ?'hen the Twenty First Marines Shore Party transferred tc Black Beach, the BL*T 1/23 Shore Party Communication Te^m vexs removed from Yellor 1 and


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FIRST JASCO OFHIATICFS REPORT FOR TES I"0

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OPERATIC!? (Cont'd.)
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consolidated ?dth the RCT 23 Team; thus a regimental beach lished insofar as communi cations t;ere concerned.

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On Blue Beaches, ttr:<o Shore Party Commun ication Teams of Battalion Lending Teams 1/25 and 3/25 landed at approximately H/5 on Blue 1. The Shore Party Communication Team of BLT 1/25 moved to the right flank of Blue 1 end set up coirruni cations. Due to the tactical situation that developed, the BLT 3/25 Shore Party Coromuni cation Team vr?.s never roved, to Blue 2as previously planned, but remained on the loft flank of Blue 1. The Shore Party Communication Tear, of BLT 2/25 (in reserve) landed on the loft flank of Blue 1 at ap-rorimatcly H/B and consolidated T.dth the BLT 3/25 Toam. The RCT 25 Shore Party Com nr?icrtion Tear; larded ait. H/Cj- ao?^ set up in the middle of Blue 1, Intra-beach rare ccmmtmi'"aticns between the Blue Beaches and between Blue 1 and Yellor 2 '-ere ostab' i at f3.pprcxinr.tcly H/6 shod Due to the amount of fire on the bcrch, Blue Beaches' '"ere slo in dGvclomnr; and the RCT 25 -nd BLT l/ Shore :~arty Con-runica-ion Teams satisfactorily 25 handled all comr-uni cations on these beaches until D/6vhon the tTr?o teams consolidated, thus forming a regir.cntal beach.
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The Division Shore Party Communication Team ,lardod en Blue 1 and consolidated rith the tro teams of Battalion LandiKg Team D/l 2/25 end. Battalion Landir,? Toai- 3/25. on

Fourth I&rinc Division Shore Party Commun ications srltching centrals furrishing comiruni cations for the Regimental .Shore Parties on Idle" and Blue Beaches respectively and for the Division Shore Party Headquarters. This organisation contir* uod. until D/lo rhon the Garrison Forces took over the botches and the ;^ relieved. Fourth Division Shore Party
consisted, of three

Thus, on

0/6, the

The consolidation of the Shore ."'arty Communications ras never beyond the Re mental phase because the only switchboards * available ~orc BD-71! ith a BP-96 sritchboard the tro" rcginiental s. rT 1 have been boards coulc eliminated. It is recommended that one (l) BD-96 be addod to the T/BA of each Joint Assault Signal Company for the use of the Shore Party Section.
carried,

All rire linos laid on the Fourth Division Beaches roro overherded by utilizing lance polos and "t^o-by-fours v Inasruch as over 50% of the 90 lance polos .carried ashore by the Shore Farty Section of the First Joint -issault Signal Company veve destroyed or lost, the n tt7o<-by-fours n sent ashore by the Corps Signal Section Fore invaluable in the rire cverhcrd. The^e "-ere very fe- rirc linos d&maged by our -vehicles, partly because all lines rcre placed ovcrhoM as scon as laid, and partly because the airfcrac and bulldozer -drivers rerc con scious of tb: _ :"mr)ortancG,''of the riro and vent to great efforts _ to protect , \u25a0k-1... . . . . . coriidpr&Wc vdar'agc done . . rire . shrapnel' but #4#i##,^ crR by to the

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FIRST JAS CO OPERATIONS REPORT FOE THE IWO JIM OPERATIC!? (Cont'tf.) inasmuch as the lines were properly tagged, there was very little diffi culty in repairing the breaks. Because of the loose sand and the nature of the beach no attempt was made to place any of the Fire underground. A "Weasel" for wire laying purposes on the beach would be invaluable and its inclusion in the Joint Assault Signal Company T/BA is recommended.

During the ship -shore phase of the operation, the Division Party Commander on the Division Control 'Vessel had no direct Shore communication with the Shore Party elements ashore. The Navy Beachmaster radio circuits rere too crowded and unreliable. It is recom mended that in the future, space be alloted on the Division Control Vessel for a portable radio to be set up on the Shore Party Lateral Net.- It is further recommended that space also be alloted on the Regi mental Control Vessels for portable Radios to be set up on the Shore Party Lateral Net for tho use of the RCT Shore Party Commanders while
they are
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afloat.

T et The Shore Party -Lateral l functioned well but once the wire in, there was practically no traffic sent on this circuit. lines ''vere It was kept operating mainly as an emergency measure in the event ofthe wire lines being knocked out. It is recommended that the Division Shore Party be the net, Control station^ on this fret rather than Division Headquarters,

As was done in the Saipan^Tinian Operation, the Shore Parties furnished with SCR 300 !s which were placed on the respective BLT and RCT SCR 300 Command -Nets j thus serving as a means of Shore PartyInland Communications. Once again this circuit ,was of great value and is considered the most important of the Shore Party 11ets. The T/BA for the First Joint Assault Signal Company however still calls for a TBX to be used on this circuit and it is recommended that the T/BA for the First Joint Assault Signal Company be. decreased "by ten (IO)TBX's and increased by ten (10) SCR 300' s.
there were no provisions made for the Division Prior to D/2 Shore Party ashore to coree up: on the Division Logistical Control Met. At this time permission was obtained to enter the net and there was a considerable amount of traffic- passed between the Division Shore Party Commander and the Division representative aboard the. Division Control Vessel. It is recommended that provisions be made in the basic communication plan for the Division Shore Party ashore to operate on the Division Logistical Control Net.

The Local Shore Party SCR 536 Net. on 5500 kilocycles was useless inasmuch every Shore Party Comrounication Team in all three Divisions had three (3) sets on this' frequency and each beachmaster bad five (5) sets on the same frequency. ,

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FIRST. JASCO OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE IFO JIM OPERATION (Cont'd.)
The Ship-Shore Administrative Net was not satisfactory inas much as there never seemed to be any action taken on any of the message? sent from the beach to the ship. There was close cooperation between the Beachroaster
no difficulty in sending the message or getting an operators receipt from the ship, but the message never seemed to reach the TQM or whomever it was intended for aboard the ship. It is considered that more thorough s instruction for Navy radio operators and CWO ! in the .call signs of landing force would help to correct tris situation.. un?-ts of the for ten (10) Public Address S3>-steins, one (l) for "each Shore Party
Coimruni cation Team. It is an impossibility for each team to carry
ashore one of these heavy, clumsy systems in addition to the large amount of equipment they aireedy have, so as Was done, in the SaipanTinian Operation, four (4-) sets, one per each beach, were turned over to the Shore Party. It is recommended that, all ten (10) Public Address systems be removed from the T/BA of the First Joint Assault Signal Company and. placed in that of the Pioneer Battalion.

and the Shore Party Communication

Officer

and there was

The

T/BA

for the First Joint Assault Signal Company calls

The Shore ?e.vtj Section of the First Joint Assault Signal Company had two (2) officer and thirty-throe (33) enlisted casualties,' of which eleven (11) enlisted were killed in action. The loss of major items of signal equipment is estimated to be 25%. These losses in men and equipment were replaced j.nitially by utilizing personnel and equipment from the two Shore Party Communication Teams in reserve. Later, as the regimental beaches were formed, all. Battalion Landing Team Shore- Party personnel and equipment became available to the Div ision and RCT Teams. During the course of the operation, a total of one (l) officer and seventy-five (75) enlisted men were transferred to the Fourth Division as comimtni cation replacements. With the exception of eight (8) enlisted casualties that occured while the men were attached to the Division,, all of these replacements were returned to the First Joint Assault Signal Company prior to reembarkation on D/2.
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V. HEOOMmTDATI(KS

1, In accordance with the preceeding paragraphs and the informa tion as contained there^n 5 the following recommendations are made with the belief that if approved they willmore effectively 'prepare the var ious elements of the First Joint Assault Signal Company for combat, and during combat will enable these elements to more effective ly'perform their duties,

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OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE IWO JIM OPERATIGI (Cont'd.)

(l) That equipment and personnel deficiencies be replenished as soon as possible after return to the rest base. (2) That the First Joint Assault Signal Company receive no more radar operators in lieu of radio operators. (3) That communication officers not be used for unrelated duties such as Air Liaison Officers. (4-) Toat specialized training at distant points such as Pearl Harbor for units such as Baval Gunfire Parties be conducted for the entire units or parties rather than for just the officers or designated enlisted men alone. (5) That any changes or substitutions in major items of equipment be made at least one (l) month before embarkation. signal

(6) That all three sections of the First Joint Assault Signal Company be furnished with one (l) comix on portable radio set and that this set be an SCR 694. (k) Air Liaison and I"aval Gunfire (l) That the First Joint Assault Signal .Company receive no more grounded aviators as Air Liaison Officers, (2) That the senior Air Liaison Officer be relieved of his
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various duties in the D-3 Section and rejoin the First Joint Assault Signal Company inhere he can be used in the training of the Air Liaison

Parties.
(3) That the Air Liaison Parties not be required to monitor SAO Net and that they not be issued RBZ's for this use. the (U) That the radio jeeps of the Air Liaison and Haval Gunfire Parties be boated so that they can be called ashore when they are heeded and vheti it is safe for them "to land;
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(5) That MZ radio jeeps replace the the Air Liaison Parties.

M/VRC-1 radio

jeeps in

(6) That an SCR 299 mounted in a panel truck replace the "Half track mounted SCR 299 in the Division Air Liaison Party. (7) That thirteen (13) 1% radio jeeps be added to the First Joint Assault Signal Company T/BA for the use of the Haval Gunfire Liaison Sections and in accordance with this, the T/BA be decreased

t
yisWSsE^ffifefccWlS
(c) Shore Part

SBOI- 5G9005691-

e
12

).'

REPORT FOR THE IWO JIM OBERAttO^ (Gont'd^

(l) That the assignment of either the Contending Officer or Executive Officer -of the First Joint Assault Signal Company as Division Shore Party Communications Officer be continued on future
operations.

(2) That in the future the assignment of Shore Party Com* munieation Teams be made to parallel the Division Communi cations # system as was done in this operation. (3) That it be SOP for wire on the beach to lpe placed over head rather than underground. iU) That space be alloted on the Division and Regimental Control vessels for a portable radio to be placed on the Shore Party Lateral Net.
(5) That the Division Shore Party be the Net Control Station on the Shore Party Lateral l:et.

(6) That provisions be made in the basic communication plan for the Division Shore Party to operate on the Division Logistical Control iiret.
"M

(7) That one (l) BD-96 switchboard be added to the T/BA of the First Joint Assault Signal Company for the use of the Shore Party Section. ,

(8) That a "Weasel 11 be added to the T/BA of the First Joint Assault Signal Company for wire laying purposes on the beach.
be decreased

(9) That the T/BA of the First Joint Assault Signal Company by ten (10) TBX*s and increased by ten (10 ) SCR~3OO's for the Shore Party Inland Net.

(10) That the ten (10) Public Address systems of the First Joint Assault Signal Company be removed from the First Joint Assault Signal Company T/BA and included in that of the Pioneer ; Battalion ,
2#2 # It is further recommended that in the event the First Joint Assault Signal Company becomes an organic part of the Fourth Division, the Company retain its present organization and remain a sep arate unit operating directly under Division Headquarters. .
Vj
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VWC^A-vvjk^Q-vV^
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Commanding, First Joint Assault 12 /

>

- -

M. L, THOMPSON /' Captain, U, S. Mar'lne Cofpffc

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)
/ %

..^ Si|jj|^j?S|ipany,

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is

ANNEX MIKE
TO
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION
OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

2nd ARMORED AMPHIBIAN

BATTALION REPORT

.
-r^- ****;

I
i'<

-i^ooJINCLASSIEIED
AUTHORITY Q? ji^/liL

By

>/?
/

/4v>/9^jl^___

O?4

31^4 .&?_

Jo W^

* W*>

UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS " SECOND AmOHUD AHJ>MIBIAN BATTALION fmf, Pacific, in ths field
CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL $$tION REPORT, IWQJIMA CAMPAIGN

P*JsB AND REHEARSAL

The Second Armored Amphibian Battalion was divided into two equal parts for the support of the Fourth and Fifth Marine ! Divisions on the Iwo Jima Operation.* A arid B Companies (j? LVTAf $ each) and det. H&S Company (ILVTAf were attached %$ the. Fourth Marine -Division which further attached A Ccsipa&y to the -SSth Marines, B Company to the 23H Marines and the det. H&S Company tp the Fourth Marine Division Support group.
>

C and D Co&panief (17 LVTA's each) and det, H&S Cosms (1 LVTA) were attached to the Fifth Marine Division as as

signed.

$oth divisions supplied adequate orders, maps, and plans in wflciint time to brief the bat tal ion which was done. prioj.to departure from Saipan because op the numerous ships this battalion was embarked upon* Ham parts of paragraph 3 of the battalion orders to the two groups follows*

3 a. Company Aat HOW-hour lands on beach BLUE I, Oom^ pany A (less Ist platoon) will proceed inland past the first terrace, but not fo so far as to become endangered by our own K.G-.F. and from defilade position will cover the debarKation of assault troops f^om LTO*s and will support the attack until fire is masked by advancing assault troops.
SH:

Ist Platoon after landing willcover the ri^ht In) during debarkation of assault troops. After completion i^St of initial mission, Company A^willattach one platoon to Bl^rfZ on the right to support the attack in the seizure of beach BLUE II." Remainder of 3^VTA(4) l remain in position prepared s to support and/or deliver supporting fire as ordered by RCf
1

Commander,

'

pro ceeds rapidly inland past the first*terrace, but not go. $0 far as to be endangered by our N.Cr.F., and- frgm defilade positions

b^ Company B at HOW-hour lands on YELLOW beaches,

.ES'LJMO BNCAS"-www vnvunvj^iririj eED. E5MOSO SY AUTHORITY <M^O./e So )

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JBNCLASSeED ... -. . , cc
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unclassified
approach to the beach* When unmasked by LGI(G") r s and LCS's and when arriving within effective range, LVTA(4) *s will open fire with all available weapons. The left (s) flan^platpon on I approximately fifty yds to the left rear beach GREBN will eon after passing through the line of LCS(L)!s in order to engage s flank targets opposing the landing.
*

Three manuevers , were held by the battalion on the beaches of Salpan, the final one being in conjunction with the sth Amph ' Tracn. . .
/

The battalion and

was

ready to depart*

Each company carried two cargo LVT's, one: for .maintenance supply, tra^n, A raalo' Jeep was preloaded In aIJL except one maintenance I*VT to establish ra|) id communications.

one for a

It was also planned by this battalion to carry one 6%6, one cargo Jeep, and fcne arc welder per company and, in addition, 2 spare parts trailers, Z water trailers and one 6X6 (wrecker) v were to be carried for the battalion^ but, when the ships arrived at Salman no* apacee were avail bie on sth Dlvlsi6n ships and , only 6ace for one 6X6 and two cargo Jeeps was available on the 4th Division ahlps. \ .

The first wave troops of A and B Companies were placed on two Hospital LST 1 s and the maintenance personnel 6 A \oxA B Companies were placed 6n two Radar LST Is. ' Thirteen men (B Company) were placed on- an APA.
C and D Companies platoons k-ept intact, MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE On the 10th. 11th and 12th of February, y ; embarked on 17 X*S^ e and 5 APA f s for a tation to the taarget area.

were placed' 'on 9 LST's with only the

""'

3^945 this battalion and transport

\

.. . Considerable confusi op. resulted during the rehearsal as *e wave guide boatfe. in the Fifth," t)ivi:sion zone did npt, (appear;

while enroute. to the target*

Routine maintenance

and further briefing were carried on . . .

ONCLASSIFIED

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

UNCLASSIFIED m

Jtebarfcifii; fra& LST f s at 0730, IS Febt&*s> 1945, some of LV$Aff >ere met by. Navy guide lx)at aM #t Ift e&iwmn to tfre' the U> where the LVTAe executed a colwn right ipr 4e<*, feX lowed by $he correct flank movement required t& Sta|% $&c fcfct? talion on line facing the beach* The LVEA's iritiuittfc guide
boats made their Way to the LD without difficulty.

Off of the 4,ftilfei*Biv beachee one guide boat per beach too* position forwarjl of the LVTA wave and fit 0827, upon signal from the control ship, led the formation to the line of LCI181 8 and

lrCSs.

\ i

From the line of LCl's and LCS's in the 41;hMarI>iv fconf, the LVTJPs preceded the guide boats whicfc continued to confrol the wave until it was 300 yds from the beach.
spread to fillthe gaps caused by clreuiuventing the support vessels and 68 LVTA's commenced firings $h0 right and left

tohen the line of LCl's and LCSs was pasefed, the LVIA's

platoons of the battalion formation echeloned to bring greater fire power oh the flanks of the Corps beaches.

Inaccurate enemy mortar and high veloe^fc? shells were re ceived as the first wave nesred i&e beach. A3tthQtigh several LVTA*8 /suffered hits, only one was destroyed. . '. , >

Firing neutralization fire on the beaoh approach, each LVTA had ah average ammunition expenditure of 2? rounds of 75mm howitzer with M^e^uee, :188 rounds 0. caliber and 473 v rounda of 30 caliber.
NARRATIVE OF OPERATION
'

ii and

Co4sr&iiies attached

to 4th^ri>lv Du-4ay

- 19Feb45.

A Ccrmpany on BLUE I, B Company on YELLOW I and II landed abreast at 0905 and> where poslble, continued to fire neutral

wmmmm
-4* #

UNCUSSIFIED

/"-

UNCLASSIFIED

"

izat lon fire on the high ground Jo the front and right (n) flank of the division "beaches. The' LVTA1 s erased firing when they were masked by steep terraces and advancing infantry.
Only one LVTA of B Company and three LVTA's of A Company suceeded in surmounting the second terrace because of the slope and pdor traction on the loose, volcanic ash beaches*
At 1030 the density of enemy mortar and high velocity shells (47 and 75mm) on the beach increased until 7 LVTA*s were des troyed and one platoon of B Company was ordered into the water where it stood by about 300 yards from the beach.

of airport

One LVTA (B Company) delivered fire on the right (n) flank no. I ordered by 1/23 but the remaining LVTA's as (B .Company) were ineffective the rest of D-day.

One of the three LVTA's (A Company) which surmounted the second terrace advanced on the right flank about 400 yards in front of the front lines and, from the cover of a beached Jap LSM, supported the infantry by fire.

From H plus 60 until 1730, four, sometimes five, LVTAf s (A Company) fired at enemy emplaced 6 inch, 37 and 47 mm guns on the high ground north of beach BLUE 11. Both A and B Companies established beach defense along Beaches YELLOW I, 11, BLUE I IID-day night. During the and night heavy mortar and artillery fire fell on the beaches s. destroying 2 LVTA!
Casualties! Personnel

Material

Ammo expended 75mm HE all SQ, and Delay .50 caliber .30 caliber

KIA 35 WIA 1 KIA 17 LVTA's operating 18 LVTA1 s not operating

5

- 1603

15,720

45,650

D Plus 1

-^ -.

All LVTA's of A and B Companies which would operate in water left the beach early D plus 1 and four LVTA^ (A Company) fired area fire in front of 1/24 from 0700 to 1030 with no ap*
&

..

UNCLASSIFIED

.*

parent effectiveness. -The remaining* LVTA's tried to refuel from Bowser "boats and LST's but .it was found that the Bowser boats were not satisfactory as they were not sufficient in num The LST's un ber nor were they in their assigned positions. repairs and, in loading cargo could not take LVTA's aboard for the attempt to obtain gasoline and needed repairs aboard main tenance LST's, 5 LVTA's sank. The remaining LV$A ! returned to a the beach and prepared beach defense*.

Again on the night of D plus 1, heavy mortar, artillery and rocket fire was received on the division beaches but this bat talion suffer ed j^o casualties in either personnel or material. Casualties: Personnel
Material; D Plus 2 1 KIA 4 WIA 1 Sk&E

11 LVTA's operating

24 LVTA's not operating

From the water 3 LVTA's (A Company) supported 1/24 by ef-^ fective fire on scattered enemy personnel and caves in the boat basin until relieved at 1430. A Company was relieved from 3/25 and attached to 1/24. The night of D plus 2, A and 3 Companies established beach defense on YELLOW I, 11, BLUE I, and II with 7 LVTA's.

Casualties:
Personnel Material;

1 Sk&E 7 LVT*s- Operating 28 LVTA*c hoi v&ting x&sx&$e

2 KIA

plus 3

4 LVTA's (A Company) pillboxes on high ground on right (n) flank fired at caves and of RCT 24 from positions on BLUE 11. B Company was released
from RCT 23 and attached

In support of 1/24, from 1200-1300,

to RCT 21.

Casualties:

Personnel Material;

None 6 LVTA's operating 29 LVTA's not operating

-6

UNCLASSIFIED
C

unclassified
D
plus

One LYTA (A Company) took the Commanding Officer of 1/24 on reconnaissance fI*o% 1100-1200 along shoreline to 300 yards north bf^Tachlina point*
At 1230 two LVTA's, positioned Jap O.P. in TA 183-X&Y,
A Company

on the beach, fired at a

%

tenance

that was possible and returned

maintenance

crews landed, performed what main

to their ship.

.The usual beach defense mission was established, by A and B Companies on night of D plus 4.
Casualties;

Kater^al :
P,

Personnel

2 Skm
6 liVTA's operating 29 LVTAVs not operating
1

Plus fr
-

Five LVTA's (A Company) were dispatched for fire support to 1/24. -Three LVTA's weht up coast road, to TA 167-^ and firexi on targets designated by the infantry; unit commanders while the remainging two LVTA^ fired from the water on inland targets. One of the two water bortie LVTA's went ashore at the small boat basin and destroyed 2 esfmf machine gun- nests while receiving heavy small arms and rifle grenade |z*e> This strong point was reported' to the sujpg6t*ted unit ahd was later neutralized by roclcet and air ial straffing.
Casualties:
Personnel
None
9 LVTA161 6 operating
26 LVTAf s not oper at ing

MateriaJL:
D Plt^s 6

On D plus 6, 25 February, 5 VTHA1 q (A Company) were dis patched at 0930 to support 3/25 with' fire from sea but were , released frop their miss i when It was found that the rough oh water made the fire Ineffective. Casualties: Personnel
l'-WI'A

Material;

11 LVTA's operating 24 LVTA's n6t operating

'A

UNCLASSIFIED

* Bllilfc

UNCLAbSirt
D pjLus 7
t
._,.-..,'

ft.

i 1i 1

**

' '

Ho p^r&tlon

oj*

' a^twity.
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t

pr*?iufr'B-:

Personnel

,1 Bk&

Bv Company relieved A Company at ?O<V ZW B*el>uary &Ad 2 f6f L^f 6 {B'-Obpgsnjr) ptatfwWL up north ->ms opa^ at 06X0 put rough water presented aoib^ate fir& aiid tfiey velre released at 16P0. $,Cotoany took up. the, beach defense vacated I3y A Company aria placed; 1 tVTA north of : East Boat Baatn, I East Boat in the Basin and 3'LVTAf 8 south of; beached LBM pn BLUE !!
t

>*

Casualties Personnel
I?J)|Uf^

Material:
|:

None. f 11 s operating l$TA*& nbt operating 24

/

>
/

Three LTC& s (B Company) lef t)ie at 0840 to support right flank of <5/?4. After working witiiIt Ooatpahy cleaning out cliff area, the LVTA^s were recalled to the beach at 1030, Beach defense, placed 2 LVTA.Is "north of %0t Fpat Basin, one in the East Boat Basin and ffcur oh BLUE! beaches which tied in with the defence of sthAmphT^acn. . \ Casualties: tyohe Personnel Katerial ; 13 JLVTAs operating 22 tVTA's not operating
J V

\
s

From I> plus 10 until X) plus 14 no operaiipiuf except beach defense were undertaken. On D pluri 12, B Company was detached ' , from RCT 25 and attached to HCT 2S. '.''."
>

-S;

14

..''
i

B Company was released from HCT 23 and assigned- to RCT g.. Three LVTA's Jb Company) were used to fire from water in front of lines. The, fired at targets of opportunity! furnished
harassing fire, spotted and returned at 150d*
'

effective fire on targets for artillery '

.

*
''Is

-8-

,Mkgm*mggmm**m^

UNCLASSIFIED
/

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v;
t

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i

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UNCLASSIFIED
Casualties: Personnel Material :
D Plus 15
fire harassing None

13 LYTA'a operating 22 LVTA's not operating

From 1145
Casualties?

- 1500,

B Company used 3 LVTA! in the water to s fire on flanks of the enemy opposing RCT 25.

Personnel
16

Material;
D
plus

None 13 LVTA's operating

22 LVTA's not operating

Beginning at 0930, ending at 1040, three LVTA'e (B Company) made a run along the north right flank firing harassing fire but observed no enemy action. At 1445, 6 LVTA*s were sent to observe reported enemy activity in TA 185-D, E,&A and render harassing fire. The 6 LVTA*s returned at 1545 having delivered fire but observed no enemy action. Casualties: None Personnel Material : 13 LVTA^ operating 22 LVTA's not operating
D Plus 17
No operation or activity, except for beach defense.

plus

18

Three LVTA's (3 Company) left the beach as ordered at 1045 to deliver fire at road and draws (TA 185- V&W and TA 168-A&B) and returned at 1215.
ed to- a

Thi date 30 men and 1 officer from 2dArmAmphn were attach Provisional Infantry Battalion under. Lt*Col, Krulewich.
None. 13 LVTAf s operating 22 LVTA's not operating 9

Casualties: Personnel Material <

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<?*

plus

19

Harassing
from 0745 to

1040.

fire was delivered by 3 LVTA's at TA 185-V&U

Three LVTA's (A Company) were supplied 3 Company to place in beach defense north of East Boat Basin making a total of 9 LVTA's on beach defense.
.Casualties;

* Material ; ~

Personnel

none
13 LVTA's operating
22-LVTA's not operating

plus

20

Three LVTA's (3 Company) made a nonfiring reconnaissance up north east shore at 1115 for 2/24 and returned to beach at
1430.

Casualties:

Personnel Material
D
plus

None 13 LVTA's operating 22 LVTA's not oper^tin^

21

No operation or activity, except for beach defense.

D. Plus 22

,f

RCT 25 used 3 LVTA's opposite pocket (TA 185-V&W) from 0640 until 1030. Some machine pun and mortar fire was received but believed to be overs from friendly troops.

A and 3 Companies had no more activity except for beach, defense until embarked aboard ship for return to base camp.

C and D Companies

attached

to sthMarDiv D-day, 19Feb45:

At 0905 D Company (17 LVTA's) landed simultaneously with and on the left of C Company (17 LVTA's). Little fire was re ceived by both companies on the approach to the beach but nei ther could surmount the terraces to the front as previously planned. Masked by the infantry and terraces shortly after landing, both companies left the beach and reorganized in the water. After reorganizing, C and D Companies moved to south of
#"

-10

UNCLASSIFIED
Q

UNCLASSIFIED
the division beaches and kept Hot Rocks and targets of oppor tunity under fire until 1730. Both companies came in at 1730 "but, as the congestion ort the beach forbid more than 2 pla toons, the remaining 4 platoons were ordered to ships. Un able to locate the LST's, the four platoons remained in the water all of D day night. Refuelling was done during the day from Bowser boats.

Casualties:
Personnel
Material;

6 WIA
31 LVTA*6 operating
4 LVTA's not operating

D Plus 1
*,

At 0700, D Company was ordered from the beach by the beach commander and remained afloat all day. Two platoons landed at 1700 for beach defense. At 0700, C Company was only partially resupplied with ammunition as there was a shortage of 75mm howitzer on the beach but completely resupplied with fuel. Hot Rocks was then kept under observation and fife from 0930 until 1400, One platoon remained on the beach for defense at night while the other two platoons (C Company) boarded LST's.

Casualties:

Personnel

Material;
D Plus 2

28 LVTA1 s operating .
7 LVTAf s not operating

1 WIA

Two platoons C Company remained on the beach for beach defense while all remaining LVTA's went aboard LST's that would accept them. One LVTA (D Company) a-t eea after being ordered to le;ayie the-LST by the LST commander,

Casualties:
Personnel Material;

None

14 LVTA's not operating

21VLVTA's

operating

D. Plus,

5
CPB?e

At 1400, D Company

ashore*

-11

HNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

One platoon .C Company maintained

the defense

of REP beach

11.

Gasualtle c : Personnel Material :

P Plus 4

None 23 LVTA's operating 12 LVTA's not operating

Company in Two LVTAf s sssisted the Corps Reconnaissance Ta 147. All LVTA's. ( C and D Companies) except one mopping up went to PURPLE beajch'for beach defense. The one LVTA remained on beach RED IIWr defense of that beach.
Casualties :

Personnel *%terlal:
D-plu-p 5

None 23 LVTAIfi1 fi operating 12 LVT&'s not operating

their defense

At 0730 D Company killed 10 Japs trying to come through position on PURPLE beach.

Casualties:
Personnel
Material; D plus 6

1KIA

2 WIA
24 LVTA's Operating
11 LVTAIs not operating

No operation or activity, except for beach defense.

D plus 7
C and t) Companies were given the mission of supporting 2/27 TA 198 from water borne positions. in C Company furnished 9, and D Company 11 LVTA's. D Company destroyed 3 enemy occupied caves with the 75mm howitzer, but as our own infantry yes endangered by LVTA fire, orders were given to cease fire.

Casualties:
Personnel

Material

None 24 LVTA's operating 11 LVTA's not operating

No activity until D plus 21/ 12 March, by either company ex cept for the movement of all LVTA'e on D plus 10 to TA 147-G&L i*r
i

UNCLASSIFIED
O

-12-

fjnM^^^M^^l
i

c
UNCLASSIFIED

for defense positions' on the

Casualties;

beach.

Personnel
Material

Rocks..

None
23 LVTA's operating
12 LVTA'e not operating

12 &e.rc

Transportation was furnished by 10 LVTA's to the Corps Recon naissance Officers for the reconnaissance of KAMA and KANGOKU Casualties Personnel Material :

None

23"LVTAf fl operating 12 LVTA's not operating

f

D plus 22

Ten LVTA.'s ( C Company ) supported a landing of the Corps Company on KAMA and -KANGOKU Rocks with neutral Reconnaissance ization fire.
*ftsr D plus 22 neither company had any activity except for beach defense until released to battalion control for reembarkation.

COMMENTS. AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- SUPPLY

i*s all amphibious tracked vehicles ere disembarked at approx imately the same time, it is to be anticipated that all LVT's willneed to refuel et the same time. The Bowser boats were not sufficient to handle the refueling problems when gasoline was needed by the LVTA's, Often the Bowser boats, after being ap proached, carried gasoline of incorrect octane rating, boats, were not evenly distributed along the Corps beaches.

It is recommended by this battalion that Bowser boats carry a sign on which MlOM100 H or "80" is written to indicate the octane rating of gasolene carried.

Furthermore, it is recommended that cargo kVT's refuel from the LST'e on which the cargo LVT's are loaded and that the "100" octane Bowser boats be used for the LVTA's, removing the neces sity of the LVTA's returning to the LST area.
a more' even distribution of Bowser boats off Corps beaches
would have facilitated refueling,
'-13

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLrtabiriED
-*

s It is also recommended that the LST ! beequiped with boat booms to expedite refueling as several LVTAf s could be tied to the booms simultaneously. AMMUNITION
A and B^&npenies were unable to obtain 75mm howitzer ammu nition although ~if was requested through RC!Fs, "^control boats, and the division. As the result, A and B Companies drew 75mm howitzer aminu.nitloh from the artillery units which had little to spare. '....-..
COMMUNICATION
n

The SCR 508 radios (two receivers) were used in the bat talion and company command LVTA1 s while SCR 528 's (one recei ver) were used in the remaining LVTA's. Because the high fre quency sets are not used as widely as the low .frequency sets, this battalion was able to use the number of different fre
quencies necessary

for adequate

communications.

done by this battalion was the application of submarine cable waterproofing compound to the antenna mast bases. The SCR 300 's which were used for liaison with Infantry units did not perform well in a running LVTA as the noise of the engine made the reception inaudible.
l

The frequency crystals did not Jar off frequency and very little drift was encountered. The waterproofed radio boxes approximately 80$ effective and the only waterproofing were

for liaison.
MATERIAL MODIFICATIONS MADE

ARMOR

It is recommended that the radios be mounted in the cargo compartments of each LVTA to afford better protection from salt water, and that this battalion be supplied with SCR 510 f s

As learned by experience the LVTA with one inch ar mor base, offers insufficient protection from small arms fire. This battalion equipped all LVTA's with the auxiliary armor plate kit "for VT f s which consisted of a 1/2 inch bow plate and four 1/4 inch pontoon plates. In the majority of cases
the added armor stopped shell fragments and in no instance did
small arms fire penetrate the added protection.

Small arms fire and shell fragments did penetrate inch armor not protected by the additional armor. *
-14

the

1/4

UNCLASSIFIED
O
A

UNCLASSIFIED
*

adversely.

The Increase in weight caused by the addition of the ex tra armor did not effect the seaworthiness or land operation

tion when the operation ceased.

Most LVTA1 s with 100 operating hours were in fair condi

MATERIAL

The .50 caliber skymount was modified in that the complete cradle was discarded and the tripod head H2 on 12 inch exten A 18 "X24 "X;|/ktt armor ' shield was placed sions was 'substituted. . : in front of the LVTA commander. . The .50 caliber as modified was easier to handle and there fore more effecient but the .50 caliber operation was still cumbersome.
panel

The Red and Green guide lights placed on the instrument., and operated . by the LVTA commander with a toggle switch should be placed in all LVTA's to insure a method of directing the drivers when other means of communication fail.

The bulkhead behind the driver and his assistant was re moved for ventilation and in some vehicles electric blowers brought in cool air for the drivers.

In order to facilitate the towing of vehicles, cables were equipped with hooks in place of clevises were slower and pr-one to.Jamming.
RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS GYRO-STABLIZER AND POWER TRAVERSE

towing which

As has been recommended, the installation of' a gyro-staba ~ " Il2er vould improve: the , . water "borne gunnery*

BILGE PUMP

If an auxiliary means (separated from the engine) of pumping water could be provided, .LVTA1 s with inoperative en gines could be pumped and would not sink because of slow leaks.

UNO- SHED

wm^

H|RUHtaHMHjj^^^^^^^^^_^~^^^M^|Mf|

UNCLASSIFIED

the company LST should carry only gear for the

LOADING

It is recommended that each company be loaded on one LST. with all its maintenance and supply gear.
company.

Furthermore

iO/DITIONAL L<iUIPMENT
assistant

Foul weather gear ie necessary for at least the driver and driver as water pours through the vision slits and hatches in an ordinary sea.
If LVTA's are to be used as a support weapon in the role of artillery as is directed by higher echelon, it is recommended that at least 2 bull dozers (T-18) for the purpose of digging in ammunition and weapons be added to the TBA.

'^r {UoaL* v *
R. M. FAWELL, JRw Lieutenant Colonel, U. S, Marine Corps Reserve,
Commanding.

4:

-16

UNCLASSIFIED
Q
O

v.'C
'.

UNCLASSIFIED
ANiMEX ABLL, TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN
ADMINISTRATION RECAPITULATION OF CASUALTIES

PERSONNEL

KILLED' WOUNDED (EV) 1 SICK (EV) WOUNDED (NQN EY) 1 MISSJig ' o .' E > 0 ! E. f 0 * E 0 * . E . 0 '* E i' i ..;' t i i i 1 0_ 1 'U' 4 0 r 1 4X '0 f 9 l 0 9 0r v

'
I

'

'

'

'

'

' '

' '

RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that regardless of the divisions to
which attached that all Reports and Administration be handled
through one centralized unit*. It i$ further rec^fflmendsd t&at 3.
a copy of the Standing Operation Procedure for embarkation
roetsrs, reports, and other administrative details required
by higher echelons be furnished this organization by the. unit
to which it is attached, in the ast' operation this battalten.'
4id.reeiTe administrative matter pertaining to the *bove t
euftjfeiir, but only to the. extent of reference to orders pul>.
liefeed^nd distributed before this battalion was attached to
the .divisions, therefore the battalion did not have copies of
these references. .

k*\ R. M. FAWELL, JR,, Colbnel, U, S. Marine Corps Reserve, Lieutenant

Commanding*
;

UNCLASSIFIED

? /

c
UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX BAKER TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGNMfipi.QAL

The Medical Section of the Second Armored Amphibian Bat talion consisted of the Battalion Surgeon. Battalion Dental The person Officer, and thirteen enlisted hospital corpsman. nel was further subdivided in order that the two flank companies were assigned three corpsmen each and the two other line comp anies two each for the" initial assault wave. The Headquarters section comprising the Battalion Surgeon, Battalion Dental Officer, end three corpsman formed the Battalion Aid Station group. This group embarked at Saipen with their respective The Journey from Saipan to the target area was of companies. short duration and no sickness of personnel was encountered. Sanitation was satisfactory.

In the assault phase the company corpsmen went ashore as craw members in LVTA's* The Battalion Aid,Station group re mained aboard Hospital APA .120 on call. Each LVTA was equipped with a complete First Aid Kit,, while auxiliary supplies for each company viz.: sick call supplies, sanitation equipment with prefabricated "he.a.ds, DDT eprayets were preloaded aboard The corj:.smen landed in the initial wavemaintenance tractors. and remained with their companies handling any of their pasual ties or those of other units on hand. The supplies preloaded . tracters. were .for. the. .most part lost, whjen these in maintenance vehicles were sunk. In the meantime the Headquarters section functioned aboard APA 120 in collaberptlon with a medical company. On t> plu^ 1 when the Medical Company was ordered ashore con trary to plans, the Headquarters section took oyer^the function mobilizing all available non-medical personnel to. , s^jt in as handling and treating all casualties.

the

personnel.

The Battalion Aid Station -was ordered ashore when the Battalion CP wa& established. Equipment in a preloaded ambu lance jeep was brought ashore and a Battalion Aid Station set up in a large cistern in the vicinity of MOTOYAMA Airfield #1* In as much as two companies were located on the BLUE beaches and two on PURPLE beaches, this represented an approximate mid-point. It was in close proximity to evacuation points as well as to Division Hospitals. There were no losses on medical

prefabricated

Bally vielte were made to the company bivouac areas. The heads were set up and area as well as foxholes

UNCUodiriED
/

I;

-u^d-excluslvely and the use 6f mess igear not #e-rjfiltted. San-* Itatton waf satisfactory* There ms np incidencje of infectious 41fieasee ana only, one caee of possible 'dysentery and three cases of'jhild disorders reported. In every instance the individual admittedly used mess gear contrary to orders # ' ' ''" " / *. V . Itedlcal supplies were ad,e<iuate although $h loss of medical supi>lies aboard the' cargo trccters resulted in a tempbrary shbr^ ' age in the companies. v

of 4u^t?d with/DM powdex*. Because mesaa lafc of proper equipment gear, canned rat ions were for oookingvani^eterillaatlon of

'

'

'

RECO^dMENDATION^

It has been observed that wearing of clotliing impregnated vlth dimethylphthalate results in a chemical deriatltis of . . . sensitive parts le f the scrotul area* Apparently, prolonged rearing iespeclally when clothes have been wet causes this d^rwatitis^ .It is repommended that impregnated clothing/ in *the case of IVTA'peHonnel, wt^bewora whiM !# teittfce arfd ' .^sute 3&6so& %o icimirrsidn invwutr> but 'be" Worn on#e a bivouac area. is established on the beach*
/

v
/

R. M. FiiWELL, JKi Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve,

I:

UNCLASSIFIED
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ONCLASSIFIED
JIM. CAMPAIGN
'

APPENDIX 1 TO
|l"f

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO

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UNCU^iriED

Lieutenant Colonel^ Uv S # MaTine Corpe keeanre,

Cpmrnending,

O UNCMS/F|ED

o
UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX -2 TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

RECAPITULATION OF CASUALTIES

MATERIAL

LVTA'6
Destroyed by enemy fire
(mortars and high velocity)

Sunk because of mechanical

failures

Sunk beoause of leaks caused by enemy fire

i

Sunk due to insufficient fuel

Operating at conclusion of operation

Total

LVT's
Sunk because

Operating at conclusion of
n operation ,;.?
TOTAL

failure

of mechanical

....

-One LVTA ceased to operate because of the failure of low gear needle bearings and could not be repaired because of lack of parts. One LVTA had the controlled differential to fall but this assembly was replaced in one day, \
i

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Lieutenant

Colonel, U* 8. Marine Corps Reserve, Commanding,

-'

R. M # FAWELL, JRC ,

,~l*. *

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX 5 TO SPECIAL 'ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

aRMORMENT

Each LVTA carried a howitzer, one 50 caliber machine gun, mounted in the turret ring, one 30 cp liber machine gun in front of the assistant driver and one 30 caliber machine gun mounted in front of the howitzer loader.

i\ V\\ v A a Xj^xJJ Oca, R, M. FAWELL, 5W Lieutenant Colonel, -U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
i

Commanding.

* JU"

***

UNCLASSIFIED

ts

'5

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX NAN

TO
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION
OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

sth AMPHIBIAN TRACTOR

BATTALIONREPORT

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED
Serial jfqu (M%M

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IK-TH^n' 77p jt'IC!lst*ls

Q-LS/ma

fifth amphibiaf mkQMi bat^alio^

1 IXM K&BtEE 'fOkCftj' PACIFIC

1? April, 19**$*

Proa:

To? Vi*:

The Commanding Officer.

Officer. Pacific, The Commanding General* Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,
The The Commanding General, Fourth Marine Division.
Special Action tteport, IVo t*iaa Campaign*
/

Subject:

Reference:

(a) (a) Pac Fleet Conf ltr lCtJ+5, dated iJanU5. (b) (b) FMP Oen Ord' 66-UU, dated 27Dec^., (c) (c) VAC Staff Memo Ko. 5-^s*; dated 10MarJ*5. (d) Mariv SOP V?-. l~*6, dated gFebH5.
(.

Enclosure

8:

(A) Maintenance Report. (t) Medical and Casualty "Report,

v

(,

For Combat a) In \pre-Daratt6n for the Iwo Tljna operation the t fitting schedule covered the followjlng igroort ant subjects* communlcatlone, forniitioa driving, physical development, concentrated we- Invasion briefing and related subjects. All tractor personnel received intensified instruction, a#t>roxi mately 25 hours, in the correct coerat ing procedure of the mCS radip; Sefciw phore signaling was also practiced. Valuable training was acotdred by the practice of formation driving and seventy^five replacement personnel were given a month of driving instruction, To assure the good Physical conditions the troops supervised calisthenics were, alternated three times a* week with swlbw Two months previous to the present o-oeration the training sched ming classes. ule was Intensified and all subjects vere given a review. One month before the operation all personnel involved fcegan a -ore- invasion briefings which fa miliarized them with the overall -clan and their ass ignrnptet.
(b> During the Iwo operation this battalion used .two (?) V** models; the tV 2 and the tV* !+? These tractors were received' with a one half Inch sheet of armor plate on the bovr and one quarter inch Plate on the t>oa-* toons. Having suffered casualties in former oT>erations for lack of adequate ing armor this battalion made modifications utHi* armor <olate off old XVf On the IVT U the conventional one half inch splinter shield was welded above the engine compartment and a strip of Quarter inch plate was welded inside the cargo compartment to cover the unprotected area behind the track. Be sides this- addition a quarter Inch strip was welded along the outside of the top sponson. 6n the tiVT 2 one. half inch splinter shields were welded on each aide of the cab and a sheet of one quarter Inch relate, approximately ftma? by . five feet, was welded to the inside of the forward part of the cargo compart ment* These modifications were designed for the maximum xirotfiction of passen .*.*".>* ./v/Mrirr\ gers and crew.

Preparation

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(c) Each LVT was equiwoed with twt> gunhi?lds attd two thirty
mecklne jgtuwi* Former combat exifters^nc(" i&roy^ that tHe^ fiftyfifty calfber
c^i^er nw^hlae' gto 'le viMuXjr^cajmbftrsome It la more dffti<^4l ij*ep clit ilil| !
%oi t&fe t&irty* an4 firlag^is very infrefrxeniv Hwftftty die^ iith^'fibet ttt Vfrtre carried fifteen hundred rorunds n*t gujs. ; JoEX'*cf%hefe* carri^A tfadi**
and foTifc&e. Thl allotment of amsmnttibn Taroved' to, W ,a&&aua;te ,
:'

, . (4) All tractore were equitn>ed wtth 'one i"NJS radi iai4 a^l:^t> (g> J,?Ts had two radios installed. !Phe *$isle& the iV? wave dbnttt^tt)ri aiaiid ; in c^mnrunicatson t^'betractors SJh^y With the^battalion e^iirtiiSdey ft all tinifts and with' t&elr own also served a useful Wboe as a wmauaicaiion Wtwta^"^ the battalion fa shoreparty laison officer and they,'"' used in case^bf '' X ' could /be v emergency by the infantry. \

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(c), The I/VTs were loaded aboard the tank decks ot s4x LjS*. fe tsPaeportaiioii to the target area* Three of the ISTs were loaded from, a Sacfc aad three in the water. During the rehearsal previous to tite operation ltVsf* wWe reemoarkod atOard tSTs in the conventional manner "hV,badking * theii 6n With , the aid of gusde rope's^
?

' Overall Tlan and Scheme of Manuever for"Ly?s ./ (a) For the Iwo operation this "battalion was attached t0> Srt/ 25 of the fourth Marine Division. On B-Day this battalioi was to land BL? \f2% and JLT 3/25 of this regiment. For this manuover thif bat^a^ibn was fori^d into two task groups which vere designated as ?a'sk Oroup A and B restjec^ively:. Both groups consisted of forty-seven LVfTs apiece, faskr G-rWp A with 32^4/^5 wa* to Wake the landing in four waves on- the left of Blue One 'with the. flpJltiW iag allocation of tractors* Second wave,, fourtoea L# 2s; tMrdt wave, hinV'* and three JM ?&; fifth wave, ton LVT Us and^ne; LVT 2; sixth wave^ IVT eight LVT and two LVT ks were used as tractors. Task &roup B landed 3rd BLT in column of companiefi on tote ri^t pi Sl^te One vas formed 'as follows: second wave, seven LVT ?s; third wave, seven XV*P Us; fourth wave, 11 Us; sixth wave, six LVT Us; six A wave, seven LVT Hs; fifth wave, seven LV! ten lVt Us and three LVT Us acted as free tractors. Th-R majority of tW Us had four, men crews, and m2s had three men crews; All gutts were to be handled by assault troops.
2.
i

(b) Each LVT carried an average load of twenty to twentynfive

troops. Besides troops LVTs carried three ,jeet>s, mortars, machine gUn; com
munication and demolition gear, and extra ammunition and water. 'Sight thous
and pounds was considered a maximum load. Original operation Tslana called
for this battalion to unload seven preloaded amphibian trailers from IST 787*
An additional 32 trailers were loaded on the tJSS Ozarfc to be unloaded ky LVTs

on call*

UNCLASSIFIEa

m fiKtAi a r\r\tr ttT\

\

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UNCLASSIFIED

IWO JIMA OPERATION REPORT

(Continued)

The Control Plan (a) The Favy control set-up for this operation followed the usual procedure with a few modif ications. LVT waves v'ere controlled initial ly "by the Trans Division Control Boat on station off the designated "beach and then by LCVP guide "boats, two to each wave. Rather than taking station on the flanks of each LVT wave one guide "boat xireceeded the center LVT and one followed. This system worked very well Prom the LD to the "beach two LCPLs guided in an assault wave of LVT As and were then to standby and mark the center of their respective "beaches. These "boats failed to remain on station and were of very little use to us until replaced during the unloading phase.

3.

(b) The "battalion control organization "began with the LSTs which we had "been allocated. Aboard five of these we had TCS jeeps mounted topside. On the sixth ship there was not sufficient room for a jeep so it was necessary to take a -oortable TCS aboard. These radios assured communication between ships, all LVTs and the battalion commander. Aboard the Trans Divi sion PC on the LD the battalion commander had a TCS for his use allocated by' the Navy. In addition to the TCS for his own battalion communication, he had a 508 connecting him with the Division LVT officer on the Trans Ron PC and the other LVT battalion attached to the Uth Marine Division stationed on Yellow Beach Trans Division PC. The two ICPLs vhich guided in the first wave were equipped with TCS radios and each carried an LVT control officer. Com mand LVTs carried dual radios for the puroos.es previously mentioned. LVT wave officers were allocated as follows: second wave, four; third wave, three; fourth wave, one; fifth wave, three; sixth wave, two; and six A wave, one.
Account of Initial D-Day Land in, (a) On the morning "of 19 February, 19^1 the LVTs of this bat "talton disembarked frotor their LSTs and: -o^oceedfid irr Column formation' behind their lead guide boat to the LD where, by executing a left or right flank movement, as the case might be, they came into line. The process of disem barking averaged from ten to fifteen minutes depending on how the individual LSTs had their tank decks loaded. It took atroroximately the same time in terval to form our waves once the LD had been reached. A fast moving current complicated the process pf wave formation. The first wave of LVTs crossed the LD at 0830 and reached the beach at 090^. Succeeding waves were dis patched from the LD by the PC at aryoroximately five minute intervals, and landed in good order. Fine ty-four LVTs, thirty-two LVm 2s and sixty-two LVT k$ t were disembarked D-Day morning.,. Fone failed tor leave their ships. Pour LVT 2 maintenance tractors remained aboard to be used on call. Finety-fbur* LVTs reached shore landing 100^ of the troops carried.

N-.

(b) This battalion 1 s landing beach was designated as Beach Blue One, an area approximately six hundred yards in length. However, due to the fact that the Trans Division Control boats were over 500 yards off station

UNCLASSIFIED

mmmm

ONCUSbiriED

WO JIM* OPBEATIOtf KBPORT

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(continued)
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to the south to "begin with the waves got off to a bad start. Some guide "boats attempted to rectify the error and ail tractors were <>r,dere& i# "beatf rlgfctt la their approach to the "beach. As it turned out the troops carried by this "battalion actually landed on Yellow Two -and left flank, of 51-ue OiteV .'^o reef or offshore obstacles were encountered on the trio in., : The ettrf' cpujd be classified as negligible D-4)ay. However, the steep gradient of the' Bach ac centuated the effect of the surf and later caused several tractor The befech itself consisted of coarse, loose, volcanic sand with approximately a twenty degree slope leading to a steep wave built terrace approximately ten yards inland and ton to twelve feet in height. Evidence of mines was encoun tered although no casualties resulted and on the left flank of the beach em bedded steel poles about three feet high prevented LVTs from negotiating, the first terrace as did the extreme heighth of the terrace itself.. Ur>on hit.tjtng the beach the LVT ks executed a half right movement as ordered. and then un- "..'.. loaded troops via their ramps. The LVT 2s disembarked troops over their sides. The high first terrace made it necessary to let the troot>s out only a few yards inland but no troops were landed in the water. Actually the terrace, v although it prevented progress inland, -nrovidnd good martial defilade; In this initial assault four LVTs became casualties from enemy fire but not un' til after they had .hit the beach and discharged their troop, load. Hetraction ' was readily accQmplished inspite of intense shell and mortar" fire and LWs returned to their parent L'STs by passing through succeeding waves and then pulling out to the flanks to avoid confusion.
%
1

>

casual-ties.

(c) Approximately three hundred yards from the beach on the initial trip in some of our LVTs opened fire. Pill boxes, onemy personnel ob served running off the. beached APD, and the beach itself provided the targets. Approximately one thousand rounds of thirty caliber ammunition were expended with results vrhich, due to the general confusion, could not be observed.
(d) Time and again I/VT armor proved its effectiveness*. The tack-on armor plate sto-rroed a good deal of shrapnel snd small arms fire. The quarter inch plate, especially on the pontoons, was frequently -oierced by shrapnel but its velocity was slowed to the -noint where it failed to oene trate the cargo compartment. The modifications installed by this battalion turned most all shrapnel and' small ar"ftts. They had good psychological value as well as affording better protection than has heretofore been offered in; amphibian tractors* The strips of -nlatfe along the top sponson and behind the track enabled the crew chief , keep his Head high, enough to look through the to machine gun slot in the gurf. .shields^ This, made for better control.
Action After Assault Landing (a) After the assault landing IVTs reerabarked aboard their par ent LSTs and awaited orders "to* begin unloading. The first tractors to reach shore with supplies were able to "Dick their way over the first terrace on the beach by locating low spbts. By a careful reconnoitering of routes inland,

5-

UNCLMOOirIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IWO JIMA OPERATION KBPOHT

(continued)

and "by utilizing the same routes continually, damage due to mines was kept at a minimum. D-Day night this "battalion received en urgent request for LVTs to carry ammunition to the hard pressed front lines. Approximately thirteen tractors were dispatched which were all that were available since all tut one LST of our group had retired several miles to sea. IST 7^7 on request -culled in near the PC off Blue One to discharge the loaded LVm s which continued to haul ammunition throughout the night to the "beach and to the front lines. By morning this LST had been 90^ unloaded. Although balanced loads were taken in sometimes, tho call was for ammunition and nothing else. One LST preload of ammunition was not much but apoarently was sufficient for the troops to stay on the lines the rest of the night. Th following morning, (D uLus l) LVTs continued to unload the LSTs, leaving many on shore to work cargo to in land dumps. In the ensuing days besides carrying c?rgo from ships to organ izational dunros LVTs carried -oriority sutmlies to the front lines, unloaded beached LSTs, LSMs and LCTs, transported bodies to the cemetary, pushed LCMs off the beach, anchored LCTs to shore, evacuated wounded from the beach through high seas Which small-boats could not negotiate, unloaded swamped small-boats saving valuable cargo, took Faval gun fire control officers to their ships, and the division bomb disposal officer made use of LV^s to dump duds at sea.

(b) During the unloading phaso the battalion suffered consid erable loss of LVTs from a combination of mechanical failures, enemy shell fire and unfavorable surf conditions. Several LVTs were also unnecessarily lost through the refusal of LSTs to take them aboard at night. A thorough dis
cussion of this condition is considered under Comments and "Recommendations. After the initial assault LVT 2s were seldom used as the demand was for LVTs with ramps, Wo were called upon to work on a twenty-four hour basis initial ly although later we were able to cut dovn and have merely a dozen or so LVTs standing by for emergency unloading.

(c) The refueling of LVTs presented a real -oroblem and was han dled with a lack of foresight and spend. During the assault txhase refueling was accomplished by LSTs and bowser boats on Blue Beach. Even on D x>lus one some LSTs had no fuel available. Thn shortage of high octane gas was reported prior to leaving the staging area. Pontoon barges T>ut in a late arroearance but they had no gas to dispense until after dumps had been set up ashore. Bow ser boats, one solution to the problem, did not "out in an ap-oearance until late D-Day afternoon and were totally inadequate in number. Their crews did not ap-oear to be cognizant of the job to be done and reported to the Trans Division PC without fuel. These boats were sent into shore without any gas and were told to stand by for anICM loaded with gasoline. The LCMs were not equipped with winches to r>ut gas drums over the side and had no iDumps. Con ceivably drums could be transferred from an LCM to an LCVP across their ramps but it would have been a ticklish job in even a calm sea. Off shore the sea was rough and the transfer of gas and cJ was rendered -oractically impossible.

- 5
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After the assault phase refueling was done from shore dumps which we "built ofcr*eye* by securing fuel Wherever it was available* In" the course of $jte' a3>tfaU&n this battalion used aptm>x>a*tely I*o,ooo gallons of gasoiiire/KJOL,, ' gabions of 50 weigit oil and i,2o6^o*&as of CO greases Uhis of course it, \ s^very rough estimate.
1

Communication (a) 7CS radios. Models 7-^-9 and 12 used fo^r this oDeara performance was cine hundred percent. tlp9v< All radio* finqtsone4 la^s,il ei*nr they or the tractors were destroyed. All radios we're enclosed $n va^: terproof cabinets with all connections waterproofed with waterproofing cofe ' poun4 9?he only other form of communication utilized was the tele^oaie. $o trosuMLe was encountered other than occasional "broken lines which we,e repaired i * as soon ex they were destroyed. ; .
Motor fransDort (a) Before loading at>oard ship at the staging area ttois "bat-* talien was allocated loading s-oace for tvw 1-ton Ux^ reconnaiisance trucks tut. there wes only amace aboard ship for on*. Due to the iefio^ of ,^he t aw|iaix, and the necessity of suwlyin^ the battalion witfe water a4 rations, s^me difficulty wa* encountered in doing the job wi^n one jtruci* were used as much as possible for this job but their presence on was not desired. Other mobile equipment, such as two (P) 300 galltfii waietr trailers, 1 luber, 2 selvage pumps, etc, were also allocated shitroing sttft&e but at the staging area no room was available and we were forced to leave , , them behind, / c

6. .;

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Comments and Recommendation: a) LST loading. !Phe manner ift which the cargo over and above the preload was stowed was highly unsatisfactory and shoved complete disre gard for some of the important problems of unloading. In the. first t>lac > having the cargo along one side of the ship the entire length of the tank decfc restricted the loading immeasurably and in many Instances we had tp take out shoring and shift the cargo to load 1? 17*s in the tank deck at the stag* ing area. Even then the maximum space "between the LYT and tha bulkhead va* Ihis lack of space would not perait us to service the vehicles onboi^d end Mndered disembarking considerably In addition the rear of the teik deck was also loaded down with the preload to the extent of covering up the maim winch, rendering the LSTs incapable of taking aboard damaged LWs in/fehe earlier stages. Unloading parties were not furnished with a loading t)latt'and were forced to. break the whole load down to find specific items. (b) Communication and control plan. ?he Ravy comraunication set-up for this operation provided for the installation of a TGS and a 508 radio on the Trans Division PC boat for the battalion commander and a TCS

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' " "

*"*
T

portable in each of the LCPfc beach control boats. At the staging area\A 157 carrying one LCPL had received no. instructions for that installation. In addition these "boats were to guide the first wave of LVT As to the beach. slid then remain on station for farther control of J*V5 traffic, One of th^se from APA 193 returned to the PC and then after closing the beach T)roOee'ded to func tion as a salvage' boat and running hither and yon and up and down thW beach rendering the amphibian tractor officer and communication set-up aboard r.ather useless to the battalion commander for control purposes. "It'is feouestetf'.that ptovicions be made in all future operations for a conference betvefti m jsbibian tractor battalion commander and Favy^ wave guide b/fficefrs#!. jt\rai,'dii>e for the first time in this operation and helped immensely to iron out derstandings and many questions -out up by wave guide officers making" th^ir * , firas combat lending; \ \

mJsW

(c) Refuel in^; It was pointed out during the plannlig^ohase for the Iwo .landing by th~is>att alien coniafinder that 20 drums of 100 octane gas per LST going into the target was not sufficient in case of emergency. As.it sturned out several -' LSTs on'
t) plus 1 were completely devoid ,of gas for : '/.',,, ,- -ijt,
'/;.., refueling of-LVTs. , i,>\
/

(1) fheXST is th logical refueling TJoint for. t>e|^s. i.:, * and the ,reservoir of fuol should be placed on it and not rely o^n of bargee which Clever/ arrive in time to be useful.- because' of th^ treie|i^d^ ne'^i for aflrahibisn, tractors on $Ivlq Beach so early in the asiaolV^ "jfiw^riC,, our amjihibian tractors were actually shore based previous to theorde^ jljfeis ~, / J necessitated setting up shore dump&t prior to previous x>lans. * ' * s. \~
the unloading phase from LSTs are not practical and waste unloading time1 on the bfcaoh. as aach UTP may have to stop at 3op designated dumps to be uti , T lbaded. If each LVT carried one item unloading would be greatly eicpe^ited,.

(d> Balanced loads for IT/^s. Balanced loads for ITTs during

(*) 1.55? condturfe. LST' control and manuever on tfce. Approach to the- debarkation point on 15-&y was excellent. The'lS^s we're WeX3, spaced jfittfL^ in good position to facilitate the unloading oflWs To time was lo^t ,and' , all LWs were disembarked -in good order.
, ,
\.,
s

(l) It has been tiointed out that several IVTs were unnbees-** r gerily lost because- of refusal' by LSTs to take them aboard at nigfrt. It that by ifcis time an SO? for I,$T operatiW would be fairly w3ll undets^pol but theiap, actiCKn* during, this operation did not bear out that fact ; '6h t^e> '^|^Sf of B^lus 1 during the air alert and the ehiiming area, was smo|ced r: were caught water borne and forked to &> aboard ant IST that would have fctoti. Most of them were ordered ashore immediately to avoid confusion and to remain until morning.

\:

*7

HNCUSSIFIEO

UNCLAIMED

IWO JIMA OPTUTIOtf SEPORT

(continued)

(2) During the night ulfcas were sent to the "battalion com mander from his own officers on LSm s that their LSm was moving with tractors still in the water and requested he lt) in getting them to take them aboard. In one instance LST 928 refused to take two L^s aboard which were short on fuel and when they had finally exhausted their fuel trailing the LST and. sank, the men were forced to go overboard and "be kicked ux> "by small-boats. Such lack of cooperation is inexcusable.

(3) LST 763, an artillery LS* which had two LVT Us from this battalion aboard, unloaded Dukws on the afternoon of D "Dlus 1. The two IV's had to disembark to allow the Dukws to unload, '"hey disembarked at- 1130 with orders to standby until the Dukws cmne off. At 1730 after standing by for 6 hours they were informed by the skitroer of the LST thpt he could not re^mbark them and gave no reason. He gave them th* general suimosed location of LSm . . 76U and told them they might go aboard her. At dusk th^ tractors were caught in the smoke screen in the transport area and drifted all night.- Fortunately
we had radio communication and the crews vere kicked ut> the following morning by a destroyer miles at sea. Lost, two LV^s, two radio leeisS, and a load of equipment belonging to the lUth Marines.
f

(U) The same night LST 713 the flagshtn for the LST group on Blue Beach, anchored in close and notified this battalion commander that . he was capable of taking LV"s aboard. A short while, later a tractor was turned away from this 6hit> and given as a reason the fact they were to take only damaged LVTs aboard. The following morning a message was sent by this battalion commander to the flagshtn of the Sluo. "Reach LST grout) requesting he order his LSTs in close to facilitate retrieving LVms left ashore the -ore vious night in order to commence unloading with less delay, return mes sage read to the effect that they had bo en waiting all night to take on LV's, but contained no reply to the request. Further requests were necessprv to obtain a satisfactory reply. Such inconsistency is becoming tynicpl of LST control and also causes unnecessary loss of eauinm^nt. (5) The LST 7^7 should be commended for its splendid coop eration during the night of D-Day in unloading its cargo throughout the night. Every Naval Officer and man on the shi^ worked to facilitate our unloading ' . much needed ammunition.
(f) LVT models. Fo new models were used 'on this operation, how ever it vras very apparent that rairro tyne tractors Were in demand in excess of their number present. The LVT 2 after the assault -ohase is inadeouate for general unloading and causes unnecessary labor and wasted time in trails-sort ing cargo. (1) The LVT U used by this battalion in the Ivo landing had
an improved ramp hinge and winch mechanism which speeded ud loading and un

loading immeasurably.

UNUUodiHED
- B
-

s}/>-{s />-{

Or. L. SHSAD

>

I,

ONCMSSiF|

ED

EFCLOSUBE "A" TO IV/O JIMA OFSHATION SEPORT.

1 Recapitulation of LH losses.

1 Sunk

(a) Shell fire ("b) Mechanical failure (c) Accidents

Fotal
1

16

10

30
2 1 1

2. Burned out in ammo dump fire Swamped in surf Cannabilized to repair other Knocked out on "beach "by shell fire 5. Total

3 3

_J?

k3

(a) Of those sunk "because of mechanical failure 11 were lost while under tow due to sea conditions. 8 tractors of those sunk were final drive failures and approximately g -were engine failures of unknown des cription. (b) Several other final drives went out and were replaced shore. We also experienced studs shearing off on the rear idler ..sprockets. on Fo differential trouble was encountered, "but a total of 3 tractors had the first and reverse gears go out.
B. Status of LVTs "before and After Deration* and Ql new ITU ks prior to the operation. IVT6 was approximately 175 hours.

X. This "battalion

possessed

lh rebuilt LVT

2s, 22 new

LVT 2^,

The average operating 'time for the

2. Fifty seven LVTs will require extensive overhaul to "be used for further combat* Of these 57 this battalion could overhaul 20 for future
operations.

C.

1. battalion was assigned IST 7^7 as a maintenance LST and the major part of our spare t>arts and equipment and mechanics were embarked aboard However two maintenance sections were aboard LST 713 with *i minimum of parts and equipment. Bach LS1 carried track "oarts and two mechanics for ? minor repair work.

Status of Maintenance During Assault

2.

Total equipment carried:

- acetylene sets 1 1-ton truck h - Maintenance LVTs

k

2-2 wheel arc welders

(retrievers) Boxes of assorted -carts.

EHCLOSUBB

tt

UNCLASSIFIED

JNCLASSiFIED

ENCLOSURE "A" TO IWO JIMA OPERATION RBPOKT

-;**"

(continued)
*>%

'-*

3. The major part of the equipment this "battalion planned to take, such as lubers, additional transportation, s-nare engines, etc. wereleft : at Saipan due to lack of loading space.
as retrievers by this bat talion were carried as maintenance" LVTs. Three of these were lost in the op eration.
2s, rigged and equipped

k. Pour LVT

5. Ho

Favy

S-9A or 3-20 units were available.

6. The maintenance set-uu ashore was on a "battalion "basis and all mechanics and equipment were pooled in one area. Lack of heavy retriever equipment on the spot caused us to lose several LVTs knocked out in surf which later "became unsalvagea"ble "because of "being "buried in shifting sand.
were inadequate. There is no question "but what our maintsnancje facilities It seems that unless LVT personnel go ."board the L^s first, ' adequate^ space for allocated and necessary e equipment is not available /'in^iie event units are kicked up enroute to the target. Our maintenancf LST. tsl was of little use to us at sea "because of a faulty winch in tfye tank deck render ing it incapable of winching disabled LVTs aboard. In attempting to tow them through the surf , several were lost.

7-

8. In, our case we had to load maintenance equipment of the Second Armored Battalion on our maintenance LST also. In future operations which may last for an extended period the increased allocation of maintenance equipment necessary for each "battalion willprohibit the use of one LST fear the transport of equipment from two units, effort .should be made tJo unload cargo from maintenance LSTs rapidly to free the tank deck for mainten
ance work.
*

9. Additional failures of LVTs other than those mentioned be fore include several bilge punro failures and continued breakage of ramp clamps These ramp clamps were not of the modified type however.

fc ENCLOSURE "A"

UNCLASSIFIED

<s

- 10 -

> /

UNCLASSIFIED

MCLOSUKE "Bf TO IO JIMA. OPE^-ATIOK REPORT

Casualty Re-port

Officers

Enlisted

Killed in apt ion Wounded and. Evacuated

Sick and evacuated Wounded, not evacuated Missing in action

1
0
1
0 0 2 Medical Personnel

1. The total medical personnel involved in the operation in(1) medical officer and five (5) hospital corpsmen. One (l) den eluded one tal officer and four (k) hospital corosmen were left in the rear echelon.
Equipment

to limitation of cargo space, an attenrot was made to keep the amount of equipment carried to an absolute minimum. Each hospital corpsman was equipped with the regulation unit #3 reenforcad by the addition of clinical thermometer, cotton aoplicators, adhesive tape, hemo stats, and vials of merthiolate, phenobarbital, and acetylsalicylic acid. Additional small "battle dressings and -morphine syrettes were also carried. In addition to units #5a and #5b battle dressings and tilasma were carried in bulk. Two units of stretchers and one of splints were included.
2, Due

mind, the supplies

3*

Although preparation was made with a shorter operation in carried were adequate to the needs of the battalion.

Aid Station

\ \

k. An aid station was established on Blue Beach One atrorox imaiely centrally in the Battalion Fivouac area. Due to limited hospital corps personnel, no attempt was made to allocate corpsmen to the com-oanies, \and sick call and casualties were handled from this one station.
if
COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY

3 1695 00241 6055 EHCLOSUKB B

11

UNCLASSIFIED

k
i
V

UNCLASSIFIED

&K.

s._mi

n,

jsl

>

UNCLASSIFIED

s3O

Jfta^

H<S*~

f.

J tflin^d^

UNCUSSto
%
SECTION

1
1
1 3

INDEX
TITLE
PAGE

I II 111 IV; APPENDIX:

PLANNING AND PREPARATION MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

1-2
3-4

5
6-21

NARRATIVE OF OPERATION 1. OVERLAYS OF PROGRESS 2. MINE REMOVAL

3. WATER SUPPLY
, (1-4) ,

..

22 -6
27-31 32-36

4. ROAD CONSTRUCTION
V ANNEX ABLE BAKER
CHARLIE DOG COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

....

37-39

ADMINISTRATION INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SUPPLY

-

1 1-2 1-4

1-3

Vt42SfHED

*
SECTION I

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

sj

4fe'-n\^

*.v

ffl!*lifl||fheer%^talion
A

....

Operation Report

....

OTO JIMA

-
ORGANIZATION,
As in past operations
to Regimental

Battalion were attached as follows:

the letter companies of tjie 4th Engineer

Combat Teams 23, 24 and 25,

Company n A w Company wnwBn * Company *Cfl

. ., . . ., ... ..
?

RCT 25
RCT 24 ROT 23

Headquarters and Service Company and Battalion Headquarters were included in the Support Group for administrative and rear area secur ity purposes. None of the letter companies throughout the operation was ever released to parent control.

DRAINING PRIOR Tfr THS OPERATION.

Due to the severe losses in key and experienced engineer person

nel during the Saipan-Tinian operation, a complete and detailed
training program was necessary to supply the companies with their
minimum requirements in equipment operators, carpenters, riggers
Throughout the training program,
and all other basic specialists* stressed, engineering was except for the last twoweeks during which
time the companies concentrated upon infantry and assault 'training.
The location of the rehabilitation camp provided excellent facil ities to train equipment operators since there was much road main tenance to be accomplished plus the construction of a 100 point rifle range and an access road thereto. Mechanics, daily maintenance crews, machinists, welders, surveyors and all personnel required to carry on a large earth moving project benefited by this type of construction. Numerous carpentry and painting jobs were completed to provide
sufficient training of this type. Personnel of the Equipment and
Utility Section carried out normal miscellaneous electrical and
refrigeration repair work, however, due to limitations of time* con
siderable pressure was placed upon the four water squads of this
section to bring both the equipment and personnel to the highest
degree of efficiency possible.

to 1 December, a total of 58
construction projects ranging from one day to two months 1
duration were assigned the battalion and completed. The above fig
ure does not include numerous small services furnished units of the

separate

During the period from 1 September

Division.

fiHCUfifiiarf
Fourth Engineer Battalion

#*

(cont'd)

Operation Report

- TWO

JIMA

Two noteworthy battalion schools for the letter companies were considered especially valuable, these being the rigging school and the mine- laying and removal school. Special emphasis was placed upon the latter which yielded excellent returns on the operation. A Pivision S.O.P. on mine and minefield marking was conceived, written and published, and each platoon of this battalion was trained in accordance with this directive. All types of Japanese mines every conceivable type of booby-trapped fields were combined with laid and removed with most satisfactory results. The above described training of this battalion was conducted after a complete reorganization of the Headquarters and Service Company to comply with the new Table o Organization of the Engineer Battalion resulting from the disbandment of the Division's Engineer Regiment, the Twentieth Marines.
C

- EQUIPMENT

PLANNING-.

Upon receipt of notification of the target, a complete study was made of the intelligence material available with a view to taking only such equipment deemed necessary to support the operation. The equipment as shown in ANNEX "DOG 0 of this report was decided upon at a joint conference of the Battalion Staff and the Company Commanders. In general, after considering the area occupied by this Division ajid the time required to complete engineer missions assigned during the operation, it can be safely said that the equipment carried for this operation by this Battalion was adequate.
D

- MANEUVERS AND REHEARSALS.

Due to the nature of the work performed by engineers and the attachment of the letter companies to the Regimental Combat Teams precluding the operation of the battalion as a unit, very little was gained from the various CPX ! which were held prior to embarking. s Command post procedures and installations were used as on previous operations and were found to be adequate.
Ship-to-shore rehearsals at the base camp provided some training for the letter companies, however, due to the crowded beach condi tions, Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company were not landed. Radio communication was established with the engineer letter companies and with the Division and proved satis
factory.

03.

i.*,.

. Sp ||fvr

._

?.,_

n
j'

<

SECTION II

MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

Hf

"^^l!!OM%S|in^lfMattalion A

Operation Report

- IWO

JIMA

- "(cont'd)

REHABILITATION PERIOD.

Tue to the restriction placed on the TOP SECRET r>lans and orders no briefing was provided for the enlisted personnel during this per iod. Rifle ir.iipectloria and supervised athletics for the men were conducted daily after which 25 percent of all personnel were auth bervy or!zed li

A conference was hsld with the Company Commanders to issue finar instructions ai<d to make certain that all equipment was accounted for on the various? ehit>s to which it was assigned. A conference galled by the FMF,Pac, Engineer Officer was attend by the '^AO ami the 4th and sth Division Engineer Officers to ed riiscuss final plans fur the coordination of all engineering work

which was to be accomplished

on the island.

at which time recent

conferences were attended on the Division command ship changes in the plans or important phases of the unloading and landing plans were discussed and emphasized.

Numerous

It is believed that the rehabilitation period at Oahu for this operation was of sufficient length to provide all units an oppor tunity to prepare themselves for the pending operation.

SHIPBOARD TRAINING.

Upon leaving the Hawaiian Area an intensive briefing program was conducted for all of the Headquarters and Service Company officers aboard the A]? A 157 by the staff of Battalion Landing Team 1/25 and all attached units, All officers attended these school periods, the subject matter of which covered all orders from the Fifth Fleet Order to the Battalion Landing Team Order. School was held for the enlisted men after the officers 1 classes during which time pertinent information i^as passed on to the troops. Officers and men of the letter companies, attached to the Combat Teams, received the same type of instruction while aboard their ships. It Is gener-csl.ly believed what all hands received more detailed information c-onutr^ing this operation than any other thus far.
On all Shi-OS the relief models were available at all times to small groups of eniiated men at a time under the supervision of an officer who covered the nhases of the landing, answered questions
'

*>*

- 3

UitilbS i^^^R^n^^KF1

iiy lUf lldr111I'fe 1 Mfe' IM

*-.*

^Trcftfrth Engineer Battalion -. Operation Report

IWO JIMA

(cont'd)

and in general, portrayed the initial phases of the landing. Ter rain features and orientation land marks were pointed out to further acquaint the personnel with the target. C

FOK^RD AREA REHEARSAL.

Headquarters
not boated,

As in the Hawaiian Area rehearsals, Company and Battalion Headquarters were orders were prepared in accordance with latter companies were all boated and no th-3 original plan.

all the rehearsal plans* The changes were required in

however,

and Service

l|j||f'^
ft*

fl <n:^!?f*li*M

SECTION XIX
SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

V^^f^yKl^MeA&Kttallon Operation I
<

Report

IWO JIHA

(cont'd)

Headquarters and Service Company and Battalion Headquarters were both to land "upon order 11 The order to land was to be received from the Support Group. Due to the fact that this company had no assurance as to the type of landing craft which would be used from ship-to- shore, it was necessary to have it divided into platoons, sections, and boat teams. This system provided sufficient flexibil ity to land organised tactical units with officers in charge of each, regardless of the method of landing.

No landing instructions were issued for this company until D/5 when personnel boarded an LSh at 0930, received orders to land on Blue Beach #1 at 1030, and hit the beach at 1100.
Company "A", attached to Regimental Combat Team 25, was landed The first platoon landed in the third and fifth assault waves. The third platoon landed in the fourth and sixth waves. Each of the above platoons landed in four I*VT2fB.f 8. The second platoon landed at 1600 in Z LCVP*s. Sixteen men of Headquarters Platoon landed at H/35 in an LCM with an armored bull-doser. The Company Commander and the Executive Officer landed in the same LCK. The remaining personnel, mostly tractor operators, landed on call and were all ashore by the evening of D/7.
by platoons,

Blue Beach #1.

Company "BM attached to Regimental Combat Team 24 which was the Division Reserve, was landed as a company in the Combat Team Support Group* This wave consisted of seven LCVP !s and was the rt on call" wave "Easy^r The company was boated at 1430, D-Day, upon receiving orders from the Regiment, and w.ere landed upon order at 1900 on

Company I!C 11 attached to Regimental Combat Team 23, was landed by platoons with the Battalion Landing Teams to which they were attached. The first and second platoons each landed six men in the second wave. The bulk of the above two platoons were landed in 2 LVT2's each in the fourth wave. The third platoon in one LCVP landed with the Reserve Landing Team at 1330, on D-Day. Headquarters Platoon landed at 1630 on D-Day in 2 LCVP's.

SECTION IV

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

JfJ^m^F

WRftfl

M^fc^F

IP

IBSwWtW**/

Operation Report

- IWO

JIMA

(cont'd)

The following narrative summarizes the daily activities of the Fourth Engineer Battalion from 1600 on D-l until 1600 on D/26 days at which time the organization had completed re- embarkation. Each paragraph covers a twenty-four -hour period running from 1600 on the first date indicated until 1600 on the second date. All times are
local time.

18

- 19

Februar
ship awaiting orders to land.

Hq&Serv Company remained aboard

Company "A" landed in the assault with its platoons attached to their respective BLT's of RCT-25 on Beach Blue One, and proceeded to remove mines in the beach area, Company - preparatory "B" attached to landing.

to RCT-24, in reserve,

boated in 7 LCVF's

Company "CH landed in the assault with its platoons attached to their respective BLT's of RCT-23 on Beaches Yellow One and Two. The company cleared lanes for the tanks from the beach area to Airfield No. 1. The armored bulldozer worked on beach egress roads.
19

- go

Februar:

Company "A" removed mines on Beach Blue Two and executed some demolition missions. A pioneer road was constructed on Beach Blue
One.

Company "B11 landed at 1900 and went into a reserve position with RCT-24 during the night hours. During the day the platoons removed mines on Beaches Blue One, Yellow One and Two. Company "C" continued their mine removal operations on the Yellow Beaches. Company "C fffs armored bulldozer assisted the shore

party.

20
Company
lfAir

21 Februar:

continued to remove mines and execute

demolitions in

*>

-6

Fourth

Snglnelr^lb&fcalion

Operation Report

IWO JIMA

(cont'd)

the RCT-25 zone of action. from Beach Blue One.

Work was continued on the road leading

Company

nnn Bn

removed mines in TA 166H.

Company "Ctf removed mines in TA 165K,L. The armored bulldozer assisted the, shore party in moving equipment.

21

22, February

Permission to land Battalion Headquarters and Bq&Serv Company was requested but the request was not granted.
Company H A!I operated their armored bulldozer on the pioneer road leading from Beach Blue One. The platoons continued to remove mines, whers discovered,- inland from Beaches Blue One and Two. Company *Bn provided security for the RCT-24 command post. Company flC" ls platoons returned to engineer company control and executed mine removal, demolition, and road maintenance mission in the vicinity of RCT-^'s command post. The armored bulldozer continued to work in the Yellow Beach area. 22
Requested

25 Februar: and Hq&Serv

permission

Company.' Company
W A"

to land Battalion Headquarters

land from Beaches

in TA 183 W. the period.

removed mines and executed demolition missions in Blue One and Two*
mine reconnaissance and removed some mines provided command post security during

Company ,"B" executed

The engineers

Company "C* provided -command post security, and removed mines from a road in TA 1838, The armored bulldozer filled shell holes and improved roads in TA 181X,Y and TA 164 E.
*

*iW ?.*..:ft'*

-7-

UNGU&SIEe

1 BUM

ft

Ifc B

Operation Report

IWO JIMA
t

(cont'd)

23
Hq&Serv Company,

24 Februar;

less portions of the Equipment and Utilities Section and Quartermaster personnel, landed at 1100 on Beach Blue One. A temporary CP was established at TA 166K from which the com pany moved to the Battalion CP. Battalion CP was established by 1500 at TA 165 R. No equipment came ashore this date.

Company

ground above the East Boat Basin.

"A" started to construct a road in TA 183W,R to the high quarry. Mines were removed in the vicinity of the "B" carried out demolition missions against caves at
Mines were removed in TA 166H and TA 183F,G,W,

TA 183W~X,Y.

Company

The Company "C" provided security for RCT-23's command post. armored bulldozer dug revetments for 23rd Marines quartermaster.

24

25 Februar

Individual shelters within the Hq&Serv Company bivouac area improved and revetments for equipment were constructed. Battal ion equipment park was established in TA 165 R. Landing of engineer equipment began this date, and work was started on a supply road between Beach Blue One and the Division dump, running through TA 165 X,W,R,<i,V. One TD-18 angledozer was detailed to work on the Division supply road and two TD-18 angledozers dug revetments for equipment in TA 165R and for the water distillation units at TA 149 Con Beach Yellow Two. By the end of the period, nine distillation units were ashore, six of which were installed and four were operating. The mine detail from Hq&Serv Company searched the equipment park and the Division supply road for mines and duds.

were

Company "A(f worked on the roads around the quarry. Mine removal and demolition missions were continued in .the area around the quar ry and the East Boat Basin.

"BHl s armored dozer operated on the road in TA 165-C and

The platoons
constructed revetments for the RCT-24 quartermaster. conducted mine reconnaissance and deactivated and removed mines in
TA 183 V and TA 166E.
Company
\

in TA 183F and TA 183 U. Company H C II conducted mine reconnaissance ines were removed in TA 183F. The bu11dp z e r contl SUfiflfoL jfeyeral #,i,

l/iyCLiirirrf
Fourth Engineer Battalion
dig revetments

fsfcss^saawwf

- Operation
* "
"
M

~1

Report

-I WO

JIMA
'm

(cont'd)

for 23rd Marines quartermaster.

25

26 Februar;

Grading of the one lane road from Beach Blue One to the Division dump was completed and 100 feet of beach mat laid at the beach end. Excavation work was started at the proposed Division Hospital site in TA 165K,L. k reconnaissance party investigated the quarry at Tii 183 and found the material suitable for road surfacing. One TD-18 angledozer worked on the Division supply road, one TD-18 angledozer was assigned to Company lfAft for forward area work and two TDIB angledozers continued the work at the Division Hospital project. Hq&Serv Company mine detail removed mines reported in the vicinity of the 14th Marines, command post* Company !IA" worked on roads in the vicinity of the quarry in TA 183W,R,5,T and executed demolition missions, against caves in the RCT-25 zone of action.

TA 165-0.

Company nn Bxl attached to RCT-24 in reserve,

Company

was in bivouac in

"C" removed mines in TA 183F, TA 200W,X and executed demolition missions in TA 183 D. Work was commenced on a road in TA 1838 and construction of a road from RCT-23 command post to quartermaster dumt> was started.
26

- 27

Februar

'fork continued on the Division Hospital project and work on the revetments for VMO-4 was started in TA 165 K. One TD-18 angledozer worked on the VMO-4 revetments and one TD-18 angledozer was assigned to Company ttA" for forward area work* Additional waterpoints were established at Beaches Yellow Two and Blue One, TA 1498 and 165T, respectively, these new water points were designated Water Points 2 and 3, respectively. All units were dispersed and camouflaged. Operation for the period; Units operating 12; units under repair 3; water delivered 6500 gals; water stored 3500 gals; water 10,000 gals. The mine detail searched the* area of the distilled Division Hospital and VMO-4 revetments for mines. Enemy shelled the Battalion Command Post area between 2000 and 2100, 26 February, resulting in .casualties numbering one dead and two wounded, Two^ TD-18 angledozers were slightly damaged by fire resuiAlJll^mAfillhiflli^l*

--

~ 9

illjliffaM^lw^i^^ at:talion fat: lionfB

?

"

Operation Report

- TWO

JI.MA

-.'

d): (cont !

Company "A" improved the existing road in TA 183VT, removed a hasty mine field in southeast corner of TA 1665, and continued demo lition operations in TA 184. Company "BTI remained with RCT-24 in Division reserve.
4

Company "C" remained in bivouac area at RCT-23 command post. One platoon cleared mines from proposed roadway skirting Airfield No. 2 in TA 200X. T/Jork on the roads started the previous day was
completed.

27

- 28

Februar;

The quarry was opened at TA 183W after the area in and around quarry had been searched for mines. the Trucks from the Engineer. Battalion and the Fourth Pioneer Battalion started hauling from the quarry at 1300, Work continued on the Division supply road using clay from the quarry for surfacing. Projects at the Division Hos pital and the VMC-4 revetments were completed this date. One truck loader tractor operated at the quarry; ono TD-18 angledozer complet ed the work on the VMO-4 revetments; one TD-18 angledozer spread surfacing material on the Division supply road* Water supply opera 13; units tions for the period were as follows:* Units operating repair 4; water delivered gal's; water stored under 4100 12,685 13,285 gals. gals; water distilled

Company "A" continued to improve the existing road in TA 183 X and constructed a supply road in. TA 184 L. The platoons were engaged in mopping- up operations in RCT-25 zone of action. Company "BMle armored bulldozer operated in TA 183 V,W and' TA 1668 building and repairing roads. The first platoon remained in its area; the second platoon was attached to BLT 3-24, and the bivouac third -olatoon was attached to BLT 2-24.
r searched the roadway from TA 1821 through RJ 184 to missions, in TA 200 Y. The CR 249 for mines and executed demolition armored bulldozer started improving the road from CR 249 to Air field !*o. 2.

Company

" C"

s.

, %

- 10 -

f.

tllion *

"^

Operation Report

IWO

JIMA

%^

(cont'd)

28

February

-
1 March

Surfacing of the Division supply road proceeded rapidly. The road from TA 165P passing the Division Hospital and running through TA 165G,H,8 and connecting with the Division supply road in TA 165R was re graded preparatory to surfacing. Additional work on VMO-4 rcr '^tnionts was started and revetments were constructed for the Divi sion Signal Supply and Division Signal Company. Quarry operations Equipment operating for the period: one TD-18 anglecc itinued. do zor worked on the Division Signal Supply revetments; one TD-18 anaoclozer spread clay on the Division supply road; one TD-18 angle do ,or was assigned to Company MA" for forward area work, however it hi:;; a mine and was damaged extensively. One motor patrol grader worked on the road passing Division Hospital. One truck loader tractor and 3/8 cv.yd, motorized shovel worked at the quarry; eight trucks from the Engineer Battalion and five Pioneer Battalion trucks hauled clay from the quarry. Water supply operations for the period 14; units being emplaced 3; operating were as follows: Units 15,890 gals; water stored .900 gals; water dis water delivered tilled 12,090 gals. Water Point No 4 was established on Beach Blue Two.

Company

"A" was with RCT-25 in reserve

Company "B" attached to RCT-24 carried out normal demolition missions and removed minefield in TA 166 A.
Company "C" rested in bivouac area. The armored bulldozer pleted the road project started on the previous day.

com

1-2 March Surfacing Surfacing of the Division supply road was continued. The through 165W,R,Q-,V,U. was completed on the road from TA 165 X road in TA 148A,E was graded and widened preparatory to surfacing. The road running through TA 165E,G,H,1 was regraded and widened. Additional work on the VMO-4 revetment project was completed. Quarry operations continued. Equipment operating during the period was em ployed as follows : One TD-18 angledozer and TD-18 utility tractor with pull grader on the road in TA 165E,0,H,1; ofie TD-18 angledozer and motor patrol grader on the Division supply road; two TD-18 angledozers at the VMO-4 project; one TD-18 angledozer at the quarry; 3/8 yard shovel and one truck loader "tractorfeJ^^h^^uaTry; eight ,tracks, hauling clay. Water supply op erati g^felj^^^i:ti^^Bj^ l ll ons *^l

'^f^

.^^l%

-11

JlF *^'S
'

fJ ?

i^^i,

Fourth Engineer Battalion

- Operation

Report

- JWO -

JIMA

16; units under repair ~ 3; water delivered operating 14,220 3,400 gals; water distilled 16,720 gals. gals; water stored The Hq^Serv Company mine removal personnel continued to work on all road and excavation projects.

- Cc'ohV'd)"

Company

tr M

A attached to RCT-25 remained in reserve.

Company "BMl s armored bulldozer worked on roads in A 183Gr,8; 165 Cand 1668. The first and second platoons acted as command post security for their respective BLT's. The third platoon execute 4 assault missions on Hill382.

vu C 0l s first platoon executed demolition missions against caves in TA 183E. Other platoons of the company were inactive.
Company

--3 March

Surfacing continued on the Division supply road. The road beween CR 69 in TA 1668 and RJ 184 in TA 183P was graded and improved between RJ 184 and CR 249 in TA 183G-. The grading and widening o:f the road between the Division Hospital and the quarry was completed. The road from the quarry leading to Beach Blue Two was improved and graded. Two additional revetments were completed at the Division Hospital and a 32' x 16' operating room constructed. The disposition equipment for the period was as follows: two TD-18 angledozers of Hospital; one TD-18 angledozer and motor patrol at the Division grader on the Division supply read; one TD-18 utility tractor and pull grader and TD-18 angledozer on the road running from CR 249 in TA 183G- to the ouarry and from the quarry to Blue Beach Two; motor patrol grader also worked on the road from the Division Hospital to the quarry, completing the grading of this road for two way traffic; one TD-18 angledozer, one 3/8 yard shovel and a truck loader tractor at tlie quarry; eight trucks continued to haul clay. Water supply operations for the period were as follows: Units operating 17; 8,500 gals; water dis 10,060 gals; water stored water delivered 15,160 gals. Mine detail found several mines along the road tilled shoulders between the quarry and CR 249 in TA 183G-.

Company UAH carried out normal demolition missions and removed a road block in TA 184W,X. Company HBn continued work with its armored bulldozer on roadways and craters .in the vicinity of Airfield No* 2. 12

i
f

,_

Fourth Engineer Battalion

Operation Report

% -***-?,.*-

IWO JIMA

(cont r d)

../Company "Ctt was inactive during the period except for the armored bulldozer which improved the roadnet in the vicinity of the RCT~23 cOifimand post. ".

_-

4 March

Surfacing of the Divisidn supply road was completed. Grading of the road between the quarry and CR 249 in TA 183G- was completed* Improvement of the road from CR 249 in TA 1830, running through 183F and TA 182J,0,N to CR 263 and then through 182R,X,W to Airfield No. 1 was started. A new, .road was surveyed and graded in TA 165E,J and TA 183 V. Loading operations in the quarry were taken over. by 62d Naval Construction Battalion. Equipment of the battalion was employed as follows: One TD~IB angledozer on the Division supply road; one TD-18 angledozer at the quarry; two TD-18 angledozer s on the road from Airfield No. 1 to CR 249 in TA, lB3O} one TD-18 angledozer on the new road project; motor patrol grader on the road between the quarry and CR 249; one TD-18 utility tsractor and pull grader on the road from Airfield No. 1 to CR 249; ten trucks hauled clay* The Hq&3erv Company mine detail discovered and removed a large mine field at CR 249. The first platoon of Company ttB tt and the second platoon of Company W C" were made available by RCT-24 and RCT-23, respectively, to assist the battalion mine detail. WatSr supply operations for the* period were as follows: Units operating 17; water delivered 17,300 gals. 18,155 gals; water stored 7,645 gals; water distilled A flagpole was constructed and delivered to the Division Cemetery*

r Company "A! engaged in mopping~up of min.es in TA 184 X. '"..

demolition work and the removal

Company vuBtt assisted H^&Serv Company detail in removing mines at CR 249. Second and third platoons executed demolition missions in TA 201 Vand TA 201P,Q, respectively.

The second platoon

Company !IC" was with RCT-23 in reserve. helped Engineer Battalion Headquarters in probing a roadway for
mines. The bulldozer was 'operated on a road in TA 183C,D.

4-5 Hare

The road from CR 249 in TA 1830 to Airfield

W&KPW I^P^lPilfft
S

'V

y.'-fIP k -

- *'?

- 13

'Mfclilfi|J^i|^^|allon -

Operation Report

TWO TCMA

(cont'd)

The road from TA 183 V through TA 165E,X was graded and surfaced with clay. The road from the lateral beach road to Water Point No. 4 was graded and surfaced with clay. The road between TA 165R and N was surfaced with clay. Disposition of the equipment for the period was as follows: One TD-18 angledozer and TD-18" utility tractor with pull grader on the road from CR 249 to Airfield No. 2; one TD-18 angledozer at Water Point No. 4; one TD-18 angledozer and motor pa trol grader on the road in TA 183U, TA 1652, J; one T&-18 angledozer on the Division supply road extension; ten trucks hauled clay. Water supply operations for the period were as follows: Units in operation 15; units unde> repair 2; water delivered 18,130 gals; water stored 5200 gals; water distilled 15,685 gals.

.Company "An continued its mopping-up zone of action.

operations

in the RCT-25

Company ww Brt worked on the roads in TA 200 V and ,TAr.IB3D,G, The roadway from CR 249 to Airfield No. 2 was searched for mines. Dem olition .missions in TA 201V, P,Q were continued.,

Company n C" was inactive during "the period."

<-\

-
6

March

Road construction for this date consisted of maintenance of the \ existing road net. Surfacing of the Division Cemetery was begun using clay from a new quarry opened this date at TA I*B3W,X. The old quarry was turned over to the 62d Naval Construction Battalion. The flagpole was erected at the cemetery. The Hq&Serv Company's engin eer equipment was employed as follows: One TD-18 angledo.zer and one truck loader tractor at the quarry; TD-18 utility tractor with pull grader and one TD-18 angledozer on road maintenance; one motor patrol grader and two TDr-18 angledozers at the Division cemetery.. project; ten trucks hauled surfacing material. Water supply operations for the period were as' follows: Units' operating 16; units under re pair 1; water delivered - 20,670 gals, 4 water stored 3500" gals; water distilled 1|3.,9.W gals. An angledozer operating in. the cemetery struck a deeply buried mine, wrecking the traotor ; and slightly injuring the operator. Mine detail cleared, the' new. quarry ' '"<; i -". area of mines and duds.

11 Company "A graded- the old roadway running through TA IB3W,R,M and continued demolition and mine removal operations in TAr iB4.
V

4* v*>

14

UHlilriSi!^^

:*

Operation Heport
at

% %
-*'

*>
'

.
*
*

*
-*

IWO JltoA

(eont'd)
*

Company *Bn 'a second platoon continued assault 'work in TA 201P,Q The other elements of the company were, inactive.

Company wG n returned to the front lines to execute mine and de molition missions in TA 201J,L,.N,V. The armored bulldozer improved and graded the road in TA 18"3G,B.
6-7 March

Maintenance of the road net and surfacing of -Division Cemetery was continued on this da'ue. Two TD-18 angledozers and one TD-14 utility tractor with pull grader operated on road maintenance. One TD-18 angledozer improved the road from RJ 69 through TA 166C,D,E to the East Boat Basin in TA 167 A. The motor patrol -grader worked on the Division supply road during the morning. One TD-18 angledozer continued to spread clay at the Division Cemetery project. One truck loader tractor and one TD-18 sngledozer continued opera tions in the quarry. All available trucks hauled surfacing mater ial. The mine detail probed an area around the Division Cemetery for mines and worked on the road to the East Boat Basin; some mines were found at the latter location. Water supply operations for the period were as follows: Units operating 14; units under repair 3; water delivered 17,960 gals; water stored 4400 gals; water

distilled -

18,860 gals.

Company "A" worked on the roadway in TA 184 and continued mine removal and demolition work. Company "B" did not change its disposition from that of the previous day. Company "CH performed heavy demolition missions in TA 201E,1,H, N,.V. The armored bulldozer graded roadway in TA 182V, T and T 183 P. 7 A forward area

- 8- March

supply road from TA 183 Cthrough TA 200W,X,S was graded by the TD-18 utility tractor with pull grader. The battalion mine detail probed this road site for mines. One TD-18 angledozer and the motor patrol grader spread clay and graded the road section between the Division Hospital road and the Division supply road. This road passes through TA 165-I, N

%S^ ft:' .W#

<
at,

'* :

- 15 -

"

' **-"* " *'

"'

K^^Ww^y ^_^* ^^^ ~r - " " .^^

.-- -^

Fourth Engineer Battalion

a^*

~*^^

>^* -

Operation Report

- IWO'JIMA ~
**

.
,^m

*
_^

" M. I^L J^L> .j.. jp

jk +

ll mmt&

(cotitr'-dr'

f 7^-

.^< ^.

'

in TA 1668 to East Boat Basin continued with one TD-18 angledozer operating, on this job* The truck loader and a TD-18 angledozer continued operation in the quarry. One TD-18 angledozer continued The mine detail removed the surfacing job in the Division Cemetery. four box mines from enemy emplacements in TA 183 U. Water supply operations for the period were as follows; Two additional uhltrs installed at Water Point No. 4 and one additional unit at Water Point 15; units under repair -2; water delivered No. 3. Units operating 5,700 gals; water produced 16,975 g&le. 15,675 gale; water stored

--

Company

ttAlf

continued work of

the previous day* The platoons remained

,

"BtK worked on the road in TA 200 S. with their respective BLT r 6.

Company

Company W viuh all its platoons attached to SLT -23 removed mines arid performevi'- demolition missions in TA 201E,J,N. The armored bulldozer graded a" road. passing through TA 183 C.D* and TA 200X,T,0,
8-9 March
, The TD-18 utility tractor with pull grader worked on roads running to the East; Boat Basin &t TA 167 A RJ 69 in TA 1668 through OR 249 in TA 183G to Airfield No. 2, and from CR 249 to CR 263 in TA 182M. Clay surfacing was spread, on roads in vicinity of CR 249 with twer TD-18 angledozers voting in' this area. One TD-18 angledozer and the truck loader tractor operated In the tjuarry. One TD^lB angledozer and motor patrol grader maintained the road from the. quarry to the Division Hospital. One TD-18 angledozer continued.^ork irt Division Cemetery. One TD-18 angledozer .dug two additional revetments for the Division Hospital and three revetments for the. Provisional Battalion at TA 182 V, Eight trucks .hauled clay. Water supply operations for the period were as follows; Units operating^- 3,6; units under 4; water delivered 18,970 gallons; water' stored 4,800 repair 18,070 gals. Two officers and fifty men gals; water distilled were detached from Kq&Serv Company for temporary duty with provi sional Battalion, acting as a Division Reserve Battalion and for mopping up in rear areas.
from,

Company ojini%s|iof

tt AHt s

situation was unchanged

from the previous day.

Company i'B^ started assault work along the beach road in the vi fi>. 1668 V. The armored bulldozer operated on roads in
*
r

- 16

;'

UllUU'UUlllUW

*
FourrK^Wll iJkfgLion - Operation
TA 201P/V,W,S and 200T,0,X,
continued mopping up work of the previous day. armored bulldozer graded the road in TA 201G,H,M,N,0.
Company
9
MC H

%
(cont'd)

Report

- IWO

JIMA

The

10 ftaarch

The TD-*lB utility tractor with pull grader maintained the inland road net.. Ho tor patrol grader engaged in maintenance of the roads Quarry operations continued, using the in the Division beach area. truck loader and one TD-18 angledozer. One TD-18 angledozer dug an additional revetment for the Provisional Battalion at TA 182 V. Additional access roads were constructed to Beach Blue Two, clay being spread on these roads and on the beach. Surfacing of the Division Cemetery continued with one TD-18 angledozer working there. Water sprinkler operated throughout the day on the Division rear area roads. Water supply operations for the period were as follows; 2; water delivered 18; units under repair Units operating 19,490 gals; water stored 6,575 gals; water distilled 21,265 gals. Two additional units were installed at each of Water Points No. 1 and

2.

Company

!lAtt

continued work of the previous day.

Company ttB w removed U.S. anti-personnel minefield in TA 184T,Y, and continued mopping-up operations in TA 201W,5,T; TA 202P,U; and TA 184C,D. The armored bulldozer improved the road running through 201V,W,X,5,T and TA 202U. Company ttC M continued to perform demolition missions in TA 202L, Q,,V,N, The armored bulldozer continued its work of the previous day and extended the road through TA 201 and TA 202P,Q,V,W.
10

11 Marc;

The motor patrol grader maintained the roads in the Division The water sprinkler worked on the road from the Division Hospital to the Division dump. Twelve trucks hauled clay from the quarry where one truck loader and one TD-18 angledozer were oper ating. Surfacing of the beach access roads and of Beach Blue Two was continued; one TD-18 angledozer and one TD-18 utility tractor with pull grader spread surfacing material and grateil_this area. Ihe road on

rear area.

jr

- 17

bIlia \^t^jkmb w

HL yilVlipiiiliFyi^lniftetrfettalion
i|."j|

ftjjrtjjL j, yf"ibr*j

.;

**<***%&m r

Operation Report

itwrMA - (eont ra)c*

>*

the east-west runway of Airfield No. 2 through TA 183A,8,C; TA 200 was' graded. An access road running through TA 165 V, TA 1498, Cto Water Point No. 1 was constructed and surfaced. Three TD-18 angledozers continued grading and excavating in the Division Cemetery, Water supply operations for the period w.e re as follows: Units oper 20; units under repair 23,170 gals; 4; water delivered ating water stored 3600 gale; water distilled 20,195 gals.

201V.

Company "A* improved the roads in TA 185P, TA 184C,D,1 and TA Demolition missions 'were continued in TA 185.

Company "B" improved the road from Higashi Village- to RJ 1J.6 and thence right and left to 185L,H. The first platoon was attached to Company rlI", 25th Marines for demolition work. The remainder of the company did rear area demolition work around Higashi Village. Company lfC H with all its platoons attached to BLT 1-23 contin ued mopping-up operations in TA 202W,X,5,N. Mines Were removed from the beach in TA 203 U. The erraored bulldozer graded the road running through TA 202Q,,V,W,X and TAIBSF.

11
al, to the

- 12 March

The water sprinkler worked on the road from the Division Hospit Division dump running from TA 16 5L RJ 184 through TA to 165-1, N,R,Q,V,U; TA 149A and 1482, The. motor patrol grader was en gaged in maintenance of the Division inland road net as far as Air field No, 2. One TD-18 utility tractor with pull grader graded the Division reembarkation area and access roads at Beach Blue Two and also the road from CR 249 to 'CR 263 to Airfield No. 1. Quarry operation continued with one truck loader and two TD-18 angledozers* One TD-14 angledozer worked alternately at the quarry and at the . Division Cemetery. Eleven trucks hauled clay to the surfacing pro supply operations, for the period were as follows; jects. Water 21; units under repair Units operating 3; water delivered 23,260 gals; water stored 25,910 gals; water distilled 6250 gals. fifty men rejoined the Battalion from the Tw-6 officers and Provisional. Battalion "upon "its disbandment.

11 Company "A continued its operations

of the previous

day.

.<,

-
18

1Jftti! *t %M*f

UIIGUSHC
Company
HB"H B"

Fourth Engineer Battalion

Operation Report,- IWO JIMA

%
(cont ! d)

executed demolition missions in TA 202 and TA 185.

Company "C" with all of its platoons attached to BLT 1-23 con
tinued to close the entrances of caves in TA 202K,L,P,Q,5,T,W,X,Y
and TA 185D,E. 12

- 15

March

The motor patrol grader continued maintenance of the Division rear area road net. The water sprinkler continued working on the road from the Division Hospital to the quarry and to the Division supply road. One TD-18 angledozer and the TD-18 utility tractor with pull grader worked on the road from TA 165 V Waiter Point No.l, to One TD-18 angledozer spread surfacing on the road from TA 165-I, M, L,Q. One truck loader, two TD-18 angledozers, and one Tl^-18 utility tractor and ripper operated in the quarry. Two TD-18 angledozers continued operation in the Division Cemetery. The Hq&Serv Company w in RCT-23 zone of action removing mine detail assisted Company "C mines in TA 202P,U. Hq&Serv Company also supplied a 12 man working party to the Division for a Jap burial detail. Water supply opera 24; units tions for the period were as follows: Units operating under repair 3; water delivered 25,805ga15; water stored 10,200 gals; water distilled 29,755 gals. *** Company was engaged in mopping-up operations in TA 185.

Company MB" removed mines from small fields in TA 185R, S and

marked the remainder of a U.S. anti-personnel minefield in TA 184,
Company "C" had all its platoons removing a minefield In TA
202P,Q,U. At 1500 all platoons reverted to company control and
moved to "bivouac area in TA 182 Y.

13

14 March

Reembarkation operations started this date. All engineer work

with the exception of water supply ceased. . A loading detail of 5
NCO's and 50 men were supplied to load the USS KINGSSURY. One
officer (loading officer! and 17 men (equipment operators) reembark
ed aboard the USS KINGSBURY for transportation to base camp. Bat
talion equipment was prepared for loading.- Jfeter supply operations
for the period were as follows*. Units ope|lli|l|| ut^^^%PW|~ &'

- 19

3r^--*m+m

l UlvlflstfVtJWtiifeil-.ittalion - IP? FOB ffl *^^!l^^2L

i*
'

Vi^^^

'* '

fi#

**M

_,L

m^ s

_^

-|

,^

Operation Report v'ITO JIMA

mtt

fpHf

#HI

(cont'd)
~+
*

23,360 gals; water stored water delivered 23,085 gals. distilled Company

9,925 gals; water

M "A continued to execute demolition missions in TA 185 #

Company "B" was engaged in moppingr-up

Company
nC n

operations

in TA 185.

remained in bivouac

area.

14-15 March
Preparations for facilities were r -cr -s tooted at Division troops- Vete? supply as follows * Unite operating - delivered -23,690 gals; water 22,765 gals.

continued this date. Shower No, 4 for Fourth Water Point operations for the period were 5; water 122; units under repair 9,000 gals; water distilled stored

Company "AM continued operations

Company Company

of the previous day # of the previous day,

*

"B" continued operations

B ft C

remained in rest

area.

15-16 March The Five trucks resumed hauling clay to the Division Cemetery. quarry was now operated by the Third Engineer Battalion* Water supply operations for the period were as follows: Units operating 22; units under repair 24,720 gals; water 5; water delivered 22,485 gals. stored 8,765 gals; water distilled

~.

Companies

last elements

were overcome

of organized enemy resistance by nightfall*

"A" and HB". continued their

operations in TA 185 # in the Division area

#

The

CoHroariy "C"- was- embarked

aboard APA 17?

16-17 March

Preparations

for reembarkation

continued.

Operation of the water

UNCiiSfiinrr Fourth Engineer Battalion

'

-^. .-..

Operation Report

..

IWO JIMA

(cont'd)

units terminated on this date. Water stored was delivered to the Division dump. Total delivered for this date was 5,750 gals. Company ll w was embarked aboard APA 172. A n Platoons of Company *B occupied a defensive position in TA 184 during the entire period.

17

18 torch

Preparations for re embarkation completed. The Battalion Command Post closed at 1600, 18 March and unit moved to Beach Blue Two for re embarkation.

Platoons of Company

MB M

reverted to company control at 0700. March

:>flB^:

>fl8^ 19

Officers and enlisted men of Hq&Serv Company and Battalion Head quarters reembarked from Beach Blue Two at 2200 and boarded the U.S.S. PICKAWAY, APA 222, at 2400.
Company "Btt was embarked aboard APA 222 at 1800

'* *.

*
APPENDIX 1
OVERLAYS OF PROGRESS

/ _, /-/^.^. P>OAO 517"E5 &OTH PXCfi>O2>> fOMOefZ COA/STXCCT/OA/ HAV ?>&e/V

yakost/ckA COA/T//VC/OVS e>irr or yakost/ck >OM& Af/A/5 &/** OACT4V4TO. 3. M/M CLAS*.*\MC OAJ Y-LO\A/ 4* &VG& /3/V a^/ XD+/.

/SO YDS. /NLAMO

THE &A<?H

TAS 200 V/r*.SOO /*>. AEG'At. U//T-H T-APE MEASVfiE. <r YAAO*r/CM>\ A//A/ES >TOA/A7'o&*> O^CT'/\/A'7\^ 0 >V '"' C<9., -4Z&EA/&&. &A/ &+ 7. \ i CAMES FO& TA/VM T&Amc OA/ /Vt?/?77V~ PKOe>& FO/Z A*//VS OA/ O+T &V "C"CO.
%

>S>O^f^\

J
2S /-S&A2AS

f'4 "

jDOC/3.

\. /

SAY. &+S

A CO.,

<& EAJG/2

*YOS?A/

/ /

\\
AP AS/A/tt #EA*O\/C> &Y~C"CO. 4.TXGAJGK &/V

>S\S
L

s//

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m

KOAO &JLOC+Z REMOVEO AT /&3<3. C & -TWO +SOXA/ As7/ASS J

O+3

\.

XI lv

I
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#

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-^^

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(SAPS

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ASAOF OA/ &EAC/VFS PO/Z TAA/K -T&AFFJC, /U.SO /A/ T-45 /43. YAROS-r/CA<- &OAS& A*/A/5

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0

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I

T7\ sSy?^ JOT f \r s&n?K

/ ?OW OP 3/A/<5.E /-to**/ /w/A/es

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REPERENCE MAP: 1 : 20,000 SPECIAL A)R ? GUISJIOEPvV TARGET MAP OF IWO JIVIA

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COMPOSITE SITUATION MAP

FROM D-DAY TO 100,D+25
M

APPENDIX 2

MINE REiviOVAL

flH M

M .^^b.

mm +f

&&*&&

Fourth Engineer Battalion

Operation Report

IWO JIHA

(cont f d)

An increasing tendency of the Japanese to engage in mine warfare has been observed in reports of recent operations throughout the ' Pacific Ocean Areas. This trend was apparent in the Iwo Jima opera tion, where the Japanese, displayed logical, tactical employment of mines. Although their efforts were, fairly effective, the state of training of the enemy forces had not reached the stage where maximum efficiency was attained. In many instances mines were discovered emplaced but not activated; the frequency with which this occurred is attributed to Incomplete training and casualties to key personnel*

Although no radically new types of mines were encountered, new methods of activation were observed. Two new type grenades made their appearance, and a shaped-charge anti-tank grenade was found in quantity. The following mines and grenad-es were found: (1) Two-horn Hemispherical Mine. JLXIII, Comment:

Unfavorable beach and surf conditions apparently

precluded the use of this mine as an anti-boat mine> but small fields were discovered about 100 yards inland for anti-tank use. On several occa sions these mines were used for road blocks. See photograph No* !

(2) One-horn Conical Mine. JLXVI* Comment:

This mine designed for anti-tank and anti-mechani sed defense was encountered throughout the Divi sion Zone of Action. The majority however, were found on the beaches and their immediate vicinity* On the Yellow Beaches this mine was found burled in an inverted position without the chemical horn; it was activated by placing a yardstick mine aero 6S the base* On small beaches in the north east sector of the island this type of mine was found partially burled inland from a low barbed wire entanglement. As many as five trip wires were connected between the mine's single horn and the barbed wire* Se photograph No. Z*

(3) A

,1

Bombs 50. 63 and

Buried as Kines*

Comment:
*
ft-* v^

All bombs discovered were of the Navy type. Con trary to previous enemy doctrine which called for

- 22

4fct.

***>m

Tourth Engineer Battalion

- Operation
*

Report

- IWO

JIMA

(cont'd)

bombs to be buried in a vertical position and armed with an A-3 type fuze, these bombs were buried horizontally without fuzes. Bombs were activated by placing a yardstick mine on top and in direct contact with the bomb. This procedure generally proved to be very effective. See drawing No. 1.

(4) Yardstick Mine. Comment:

This mine was widely used as a means of detonating heavier charges as previously mentioned, but it also appeared by itself in anti-tank and antimechanized mine belts and defenses. See photo
graph No. 3*

(5) Terracotta Mine. Comment:

According to Japanese instruction sheets this mine On is to be used against vehicles and personnel. I Jima it was primarily employed as an anti too personnel weapon. It was found near emplacements either with and close to barbed wire entanglements or without a trip wire (cat-gut is used for trip wire, 30 yards being supplied with every 5 mines). See photograph No. 4.

(5a) .80x Mine (Small Comment:

This mine is an adaptation of the terracotta mine using the same fuze and explosive charge. See

photograph No. 5. (6) Tape Measure Mine. Comment:

Extensive use of thle mine in the vicinity of emplacements and roads was noted. Both anti The personnel and anti-vehicular fuzes were used. indiscriminately without mines were scattered See photograph No. 6. regard to pattern.
(Mine).

(7) Magnetic Anti-tank Grenade Comment:

i

|\\yi*lOf lIMII

JM>%i 22tt*fc*tt*Ma
<

One or more of these was found on The person or enemy dead in the initial phases of the operation. It seems probable that this item is standard

- 23 .

r*

#-4>'p*>*

T? ~"ow?HEnglneer

Battalion

Operation Report.- IWO JIMA

(cont'd)

equipment for each soldi er <initd<ition to its primary use it is exceptionally effective as a See photograph No, 7* hand grenade*

(8) Anti-Tank Grenade Comment:

(Shaped-charge)

These grenades appeared for the first time in quantity. Two sizes were found which indicate that it is still in' the experimental stage. Al though each emplacement for infantry appeared to have a large quantity on hand, no instances of their use upon our tanks were reported in this Division's sector. Experiments conducted showed this grenade to be capable of penetrating our medium tank's armor. The test was made with a hand placed charge. See photograph No. 8.

(9) Terracotta Hand Grenade.

Comment;

Reports indica.te that this grenade is used for? concussion effect, but ,it does not appear to be too effective. See photograph No. 9.

(10) Frangible Smokq Grenade. Comment:

White.

This grenade contains a yellowish liquid, which, according to translations from the instructions on the shipping container, is of varying composi tion. The liquid composition is primarily titanium tetrachloride with varying amounts of silicon tetrachloride. See photograph No. 10*

(11) Improvised Box, Mine Comment:

Numerous mines were found in and around emplace ments, but very few had been activated or emplaoed. Bee photograph No* 11.

(12) Molotov Cocktails. Comment:

These were widely distributed but unused. In many instances whole* cases were found unopened* One type is shown in" the accompanying photographs.

ttto&i u/:^

24

F
J |^TlKW^^ I^"'

Fourth Engineer Battalion

Operation Report

- _
y

,# .*..

f* (cont'd) IWO JIHA

,:

No,

The liquid fillinghas a petroleum base with some; thickener added, possible latex. See photograph
12.

(13) Miscellaneous

G-renadee

and Prepared Explosive Charges*

Comment:

See phoi-.cg.raph No. 13.

Japanese policy, based on information gathered to date, does not appear to dictate a standard mine pattern. Definite trends and ten dencies observed indicate that some doctrine is being formulated.

Beach mine defenses have taken on the most definite pattern and can be broken down into three zones or mine belts:
composed of 6 a. Anti-boat defense zone: This mine belt i usually placed off shore two horn hemispherical mines from the high water mark* Due to unfavorable surf con ditions this was n6t borne out in this operation, but the doctrine has been well established in previous landings.

b. Beach defense zone: Again as in previous operations the single horn conical mine was found on and in the immediat, Two rows of these mines were vicinity of the beaches. found, rows about six paces apart with individual mines in the rows six paces apart and staggered to give a mine density of one mine for every .three paces of front-. s Barbed wire may or may not be found to seaward of th3 belt. A typical section of this type is shown in drax-iiig No* 2, attached.
#

c. Inland defense

zone: This zone inland from the beaches compo.sed of 850 Kg aerial bombs activated with yard was stick mines. Drawing No. 3 shows the pattern found about 150 yarde inland from Blue Beaches, rows 1 and 2 con The Japanese tinued on down through the Yellow Beaches. conveniently marked the location of each bomb with a, had small wooden stake that had never been removed.

After beach areas are passed mined areas can only be anticipated
but not definitely predicted, and thereaftjnJiJa&^minfi Jtei|BJiSw^
indefinite. Areas in the vicinity of barblAMnj(pfeO^np3!Sd in Drawing No. 4) are likely to be mined I

vlfrtftflfsi&tf

25

Fourth Engineer
_._,
-_
_..

3ai?talion

-_

Operation Report
_. _.__._

0 JlM^lcont'd) -^ 3Ji' _!%

:\

__

anti-personnel mines. Drawing No. sis a typical example of this type of field. Anti-personnel mines are to be expected in front of emplacements > but no pattern can be anticipated. Road shoulders were found to be mined in many instances but there seemed to be little or no regularity or pattern. A considerable number of nuisance mines were scattered over the entire island.

Although numerous booby traps were reported, no report booby trap actually being deactivated was received.

of a

The mine removal procedure developed and practiced during the training period prior to the operation was employed by the Engineers during the operation. The SO.P# on minefield and mine marking; afi it applied to assault phases, was followed throughout the operation and proved to be of great value to all units engaged in this work.

Although each Engineer platoon had a magnetic mine detector (SCR-625) at its disposal, the high iron content of the soil on Iwo Jima made its use impractical. All buried mines discovered were the result of systematic probing with utility knives, bayonets or similar articles. Several non-metallic mine detectors (AN/PRS-i) were received 4ust prior to embarkation, but insufficient time was available to properly train operators* Preliminary results obtained with the two units carried by Headquarters and Service Company wer-6 disappointing. Further tests will be conducted in rehabilitation area to determine usefulness of this detector.

The assistance and cooperation of the Second Bomb Disposal Com pany in the removal and disposal of mines and bombs contributed greatly to the success of the entire mine removal project*

'->i^rv> '

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26

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3TPAA/O t>A>> W/# 37XPLFD TO SA/4LL WOQOfN OOSTS 6"7T>/Z" A6O\/ 77/^ G&OCSA/0. y~H: POSTS AGE PLACED /A/ A T/t/AA/GCM.*4J* PATTED AC EACT// POST A>O?/T G* APART

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T-eRKACOTTA MINES SS/?RC PLACSO WtTHOOT RE&ARO TO* /bt/T <ertGRALLY MGAR. TO 7"//B COGES Ojs 7~H &AR&GD WIfKE. Z. YARDSTtCK M/M KOW3 IVA A &OUT 4 PACCS
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OT'PC^HPJI^I

APPENDIX 5

WATER SUPPLY

Of

mil
1.

Operation Report

- IWO

JIMA

(cont'd)

The following report of water production and operational difficulties experienced with various Badger Distillation Units together with general notes and observations of the water supply problem is herewith submitted. Only breakdowns or other malfunc tions that caused one or more hours inoperation are recorded herein. Other shutdowns, caused by minor mechanical difficulties and quickly corrected in the field are deemed unimportant and therefore, not
mentioned.

2. Mine distillation units were unloaded from an LSM on the. beach at approximately 1600, D/5. Six of these units were set up in revetments during the course of D/6 and late in the same afternoon, water was being produced from four units. By noon of D/7, 3500 gal lons had been produced of which approximately 500 gallons had bean dispensed. As additional units were unloaded, they were set up and put into operation. During the period, D/ 7through D/9, no accurate record of operation was attempted; however, it is estimated that a total of 30,000 to 35,000 gallons of water was produced and dispens ed to all comers at the water points. On D/ 0 a delivery system was 1 established whereby all water was hauled to the Division water dump for further distribution. An accounting system of water thus deli vered was also set up at this time. Records were kept on- a24 hour basis, a consolidation of which is tabulated as follows: (See also graphical analysis of water production attached).

WTo
14

DATE
11 12 13
15 16 17 18 19 20 21

WATER ON HAND 900 gal. 3400 8500 7645 5200 3500 4400 5700 4800 6575 3600 10,200 9925 9000 8765

WATER ISSUED 15,290 gal. 14,220 10,060 18,155 18,130 20,670 17,960 15,675

18,970

22
23 24 25 26

6250

19,490 23,170 23,260 25,805 23,360 23,690 24,720

25,750

TOTAL

338,375

gals.

27

UNGfcASMD

*
111 B^^k
'

if"

'"

"

roTnWMmllnli^Jfettalion -

Operation Report

- IWO

JIMA

(cont f d)

SUMMARY

Theoretical total capacity (1500. g, p. d. /unit on beach) period D/ 0 to D/26 Recorded amount of water issued 1 69,000 gal due to units being out of service Losses Other losses (errors in accounting, leakage,

--

- 502,500 - 538,375

gal.
'rt

seepage,

spillage, pilferage,

distillate, etc.

contaminated -------------

95,125

is Total Operation Losses

.Average number of units in daily operation : Average quantity of water issued daily Average production per unit in daily operation -'---Average efficiency per unit, daily
--tj-

:>~

- - --- - ------------------m x

164,125 gal.
18.5 19,904 gal. 1,075

"

72;*

"j

3. (a) UNIT MC #60380; This unit -was started 25 February and operated approximately J hour when the Morflex Coupling (installed at rest camp) failed. The Potts town Compress or on this unit was quite noisy arid the engine seemed. ~u be laboring. A Crocker-A'heeler rubber ball coupling ;,ru.. substituted but the balls failed after approximately -; hour. New balls were installed after which the unit -a?? again started. Quieter operation was noted and no fur ther trouble was experienced until 11 March when the floe I valve in engine water cooler failed to function. At thia Valve time it was noted that engine rpnrs were lessening. and carbon job on engine necessary. Float was found to have come loose due to vibration. Unit put into opera tion after about 9 hours. Shu-t 'down again on 16 March due to need of cleaning tubes which job was not accomp lished as the water point was s-ecured.

(b) UNIT MC #50254: This unit was started 25 February and operated approximately 12 hours when the Morflex Coupling (factory installed) failed. This unit was equipped with a Sutorbuilt compressor and rah very' quietly and smoothly. Rubber ball coupling installed after which no further Time out of service approxi trouble was experienced. mately 3 hours.
j

(c) UNIT MC #50253: This unit started 25 February and opera approximately 15 hours when the Morflex Coupling fail ted ed. Another Morflex Coupling from a unit not in operation
**;

* v"
i:

r ;

'-'' " 'Vjjji'

28

Twft.n.Tf^lrfteTsrttalion -
Operation
perienced.

Report

*b ittfO

JX

was substituted after which no further trouble was ex Time out of service approximately 5 hours On 16 March this unit was shut down to clean tubes which job was accomplished in about 10 hours. Unit ready for further operation but water point was secured at this time

(3.) UNIT KG #80727: This unit ran perfectly for 5 days. Dur ing a routine shutdown for lubrication the engine seized for no apparent reason. Engine completely overhauled and unit put back into service after about 8 hours. On 15 March this unit was shut down to clean tubes and en gine which job was accomplished in about 10 hours. Unit ready for further operation but water point secured at this time. (c) V^'LMOjtOCZcS}. This unit was noticeably noisy a short tino aXc oi' ><->. ng started up on 7 March. On 11 March, K'T'Sgt bollock investigated source of noise and fou::ul broken half- rjootn on drive gear of Sutorbuilt com;-: re n so rwith mating half-tooth on driven gear cracked. Secur the unl g as unserviceable. This is a new machine am had never been tampered 'with or adjusted by this bat^ali m (f) UNIT MG #59945' This unit is one of the six given up i-ii -i place of six units surveyed at rest camp. All indic&T;:on j . 1 job. are that it is a ''rebuilt' Is equipped with Fout,^. town compressor. Was put into operation on evening o~'.' 11 March. Ghest pressure failed to reach normal level and erratic operation was experienced. Distillate was produced but constant attention of operator was necesnary. "Trouble shooting" ws started next morning and contin ued until 15 March when a defective gasket on the inlet end of the heat exchanger was found. According to the operation manual, this end of the heat exchanger need not be tampered with unless a complete overhaul is de sired. Defective gasket replaced and unit put into operation with excellent results.

(g) UNIT MC #80728:

This unit out of service about 24 hours to install new shaft and bearing on brine pump and to clean engine. Pulley on shaft worked' loose and wore down shaft so that further tightening of set screw was ineffective. Sngine water pump had developed a leak and was replaced at this time.

I*?.

'?

- 29 -

S^m B

M&

Fourth Snglneer Battalion

Operation Report

IWO JIMA

*.

(cont'd)

(h) UNIT MC #59982: This unit out of service about 24 hours to clean engine and to replace leaking engine water pump. (i) UNIT MC #80518: to clean engine.

This unit out of service about 24 hours

(j) UNIT MC #80504: This unit out of service about 12 hours to- clean tubes. High chest pressure and erratic opera tion were synrotoms tt;at such work was necessary. Unit had run very satisfactory sn<3t. continuously for 14 days. (k) TWIT MC #80541: to clean tubes.

This unit shut down for about 10 hours

(1) tTOT MC #59979: This unit secured on 14 March a.ue to compressor coupling trouble. Key had moved along ehaft and finally wore the keyway so large that.it became useless to do more work on the coupling, This trouble was detected on 12 March but attempts to correct same

were

not permanent.

(m) UNIT MC #58052: clean engine.

Unit shut down for about 8 hours to

(n) UNIT MC #80554: Unit out of service approximately I, hours to clean engine and re-sweat leaking connection on exhaust heat exchanger. (o) UNIT MC

hours to clean engine.

#59955:

Unit out of service approximately

'

(p) UNIT MC #50252: The unit operated very satisfactorily but distillate production was only 50$ normal (est)* This trouble is diagnosed as poor compressor efficiency as is evidenced by sub-normal chest pressure. A re
placement
unit or new compressor is indicated.

4. General observations of past performance for future operations follow:

and recommendation?

(a) All engines

operation.
.*

becrme inefficient after about 500 hours This seems to be caused by fouling in the combustion chamber due to high lead content of the gas oline used. Lower octane gasoline would alleviate this

30

Fourth Engineer

wftlalion

Operation Report'- IWO JIMA

fcont'd)

that these engines operate 'at about 220 degrees F. as compared to 160-180 degrees in the ordinary truck engine using the same 80 octane gasoline. Furthermore, manufacturer's specifi as to capacity and general overall efficiency cations are based on 55-70 octane gasoline. An approximate efficiency ratio of gasoline to water is 1:65 for plan ning requirement in fuel:

trouble.

It should be remembered

(b) The present method of determining quantity of water dis pensed is somewhat erroneous, i.e., for every four (4) five gallon cans delivered, credit is given for 20 gal lons of water, whereas 21 gallons is actually received. In other words, the cans hold one quart more than nom inal capacity when filled to overflowing which is usual
practice.

(c) Although no analysis was made, it was evident that the sea water in the immediate vicinity of two Jima is un usually high in mineral content. This is borne out by the fact that all distillation units H sceled-up M aftei about 400 hours operation and in much shorter time it' the sea water (at source) was warm. Apparent absence of usual marine life around the shore line, such as crabs, small fish, barnacles and even sea- weed might be considered further evidence of this high mineral content.
1

(d) Inasmuch as quick scaling and inefficient operation of distillation units was experienced at Water Point N0. 4 when warm sea water was inadvertently used as a source, and at other water points on the island when hot brine w^s used, it is suggested that the E.M. Badger Co. be asked to recommend maximum sea water temperature con sistent with efficient operation of their machines; such data to be published in a technical bulletin to gether with the caution that water known to be highly mineralized (whether hot or cold) should be avoided if
possible.

nv

31

A/tSAJG&e Of C/ASST&

O/>~*AT/ASG

PRODUCTION ANAIYSIS of

BADQ^KBUW- W^ti%iiL^m'
J

APPENDIX 4

ROAD CONSTRUCTION

a- -uf*.**,**
ft l^^^^u^^^^M^^^^^Jto fiKg I

4t

*
Tcont'd)
**

**

Fourth Engineer Battalion

RECONNAISSANCE PHASE.

Operation Report

IWO JIMA

Continuous reconnaissance throughout the Division area necessary to keep road construction and maintenance abreast traffic requirements. /

require rebuilding wherever

was

of

All existing Jap roads were characteristically

poor and would

used.

laid with a deep deposit of volcanic ash which is incapable of sustaining heavy traffic. However, the material has very good drain age properties and is well graded* The quarry located in target squares 183 V/, X, was found to con tain an unlimited deposit- of sand clay. Visual inspection of the material indicated that it had good binding quality and particle size distribution. -Further investigation indicated that it was the same material used by the Japs to sub-surface the local airfields, although they had used very little of it for road surfacing. It was evident on D/6that the existing system was inadequate,,
Beach and dump traffic moved slowly and with great effort through
the loose ash* Congestion was universal. Roads were too few and too narrow, Additional beach, matting required to provide traction was., not .available and tracked vehicles were damaging- the matting already in place, "/' '.

Inland from the "beach the terrain sloped up at approximately a 20$ grade to Motoyama Airfields #1 and #2. The entire area'.!;'over

11.

ESTIMATE OF THE- SITUATION.

Efficient movement of* traffic "throughout the Division zone made a planned two lane road net system imperative; road construction to start Immediately in the Division beach area and progress . forward to the vicinity, of battalion tSP^s'ae permitted by the tactical situation. All roads to be two lane (20 ft^minimum width) surfaced* construction = and maintained. To accomplish the above in the most expeditious, manner, tjie following schedule of operations was inaugurated;. ; Priority of work as indicated:* . , 1. Opening and .operating quarry. 2, Construct lateral beach road connecting "Division dump and beaches; TA i6SX;W.B*Q.VS 1484,E. * m.

52

*.

!MAD
roads.

G&m

Fourth Engineer Battalion

- Operation

Report

- I JIMA WO

>

(cont ! d)
*>

3, Improving and surfacing existing beach and dump

TA

4. Construct new short cut roada in dump areas. TA 1651,N,5.W 5i Improve and surface road from Division Hospital to quarry. TA 166K to CR 68. Improve and surface road from CR 58 to CR 249. 6* 7* Construct new road from RJ 184 to intersect with
Motoyama Airfield #2 (TA 183B), 9t9 t Improve and surface road from CR 249 to CR 263 to Motoyama Airfield #1 (TA 165 C). 10 f Improve and surface road from CR 58 to Bemb Disposal Dump (TA 167 A), 11# Improve and surface road from RJ 69 to Water Point #4" (TA 166H). 12, Improve and surface road along south and west side of Motoyama Airfield #2 (TA 1838,C,D; 200Y,T.). 13, Improve and surface roads in Division dump area (TA 148H,1,J). 14 f Improve and surface road from water point #1, Ta to rad junction in TA 165, 15, Construct dump access road for Provisional Battalion (TA 182R). 16, Construct access roads to embarkation area (TA 165 A to 165K).

165J,0,5,T.W,X.

8. Improve and surface road from CR 249 to RJ 273 to

road passing through TA 165 J,

111. CONSTRUCTION DETAILS.

During the period D/7through D/24 approximately six miles of surfaced/roads were constructed in the Fourth Division zone. The proximity of high grade natural materials made simplified, speedy construction methods appropriate. Although the volcanic ash had no lateral stability unless con fined, it was ideal subgrade material where grade could be obtained By careful planning only minor local cuts and without embankments. fills were found necessary to secure satisfactory stability and alignment, TD-18 angle-dozers were used exclusively for this work with excellent results.

*%%

,
33

JUE|Bl^^BinielE|?talion ion
w*m

**>

ww

*tm

+mt

Operation
1

Repost r-^O.%IMA Icon t'd) Report -I^G^IMA ( cbnt J d)

*> n|
**,*

j*''>*

'

**#J5,

V-'Wv^~m*"^m*

m#

Mt

"

The sand-clay surfacing: in its natural state was deposited on the sub-grade from dump trucks, ,TD~IB angle-dozers spread the material in a single layer 3" to 6" thick, .after a. few hours- of traffic compaction, graders, shaped the surface. Particle distribu tion, moisture content and'cohesion of the natural material were such that a^gpod stable tractidn surface was obtained without mechanical stabilization or additional water. Heavy traffic and moderate rain falls of two to three hours r duration had no deteriorating, effect during the time the roads were under observation.
Maintenance requirements were moderate, one motor grader patrolled the roads daily shaping the 'surface and fillingholes where nec-^ essary. Medium tanks and am'phtracs caused most of the s urface'f ace' d- . fects. Continuous sprinkling with salt water prevented dusting; and raveling. This work was accomplished by. two improvised 2000--gallon " trailers.

Enemy mines were a constant threat on sub-grade construction* All possible "precautions were taken and many mines were removed by probers working ahead of the equipment. No casualties, disabled equipment or appreciable lost time resulted from mines encountered on the roadwork described in this report.
Quarrying operations were started on D^9 with the following equipment; One 3/8 yard shovel, one TD-9 shovel loader, one TD~IB dozer and ten 2jT dump trucks, average daily production with this combination was approximately 400 loads or 1200 cubic yards.

There were several quarry sites in the same vicinity which had been opened by the Japs* The one chosen initially had the advantage of shorter haul and was favored by. the tactical situation at this time. It had been worked extensively, and very little preparation There was one, drawback In that the face was much too was necessary. Benching by blasting and dozers high for safe close-up operation. proved impractical and when operation became dangerous the site was abandoned* However, several thousand loads of material were obtained from the floor and lower face before, this became necessary. The original reason for opening the quarry was to obtain sur facing for roads in the Fourth Division area but it was soon supply ing material for the airfield work and various other projects .throughout the Fifth Amphibious Corps area.- The original light equipment *was replaced by a Xi yard shovel and a 3/4 yard shovel to take care of the increased demand.

*i*:-&^.S-?s-r%*?

??

icraFe

#*?&*"*.

V*
t

Fourth Engineer Battalion

- Operation

Report

- IWO

JIMA

(cont'd)
-

One of the nearby sites was selected to provide material for the remaining work in the Fourth Division area* As in the previous case, operations by the Japs had resulted in a very high face. extensive The amount of material for estimated requirements did not warrant the use of benching methods. It was decided to work the floor and lower face again. The amount of preparation required to place the site in operation wats negligible and quarrying operations were started on D./17 with the following equipment*. Three TD-9 shovel loaders, one TD-18 angle-dozer, one ripper w/TD-18 utility tractor to rime mover and ten 2iT dump trucks.

The material was so highly consolidated that the light shovel loaders did not have enough power to cut through it. The ripper and angle-dozer were able to keep a good stockpile of loose material ahead of the shovel loaders. When the project was in full swingdaily production average was 300 to 350 loads.

$#llf

? -'.j

UNCLASSIFIED
1. Total length 2. Total square 5. Total angledozer
8. Square 9. 10.
ti II

oT*oad

constructed

;w^/f>'^;/ (m^ri 2CK4idthf<H' .16,560

yards road constructed,

?

...
? ?

yds.

,73,920
9,000 1,250
170

3. Total cubic yards road surfacing material.

4. Total man hours on road construction

. ..
?

hours road construction

? ?....

6. Total grader hours on road construction*

45 850 59 350

7. Total truck hours on road construction

yards of road constructed
ii It it

??...,

per man hour.

11 11 11

v
H it

n
tl

w
ft

dozer

...??

grader.

350
*

11.

tt

tt

truck
.

12. Total grader hours on road maintenance it v 13. "man

87

134
408

14*

*
it

gals, water

"

..... . .

15. Square 16.

yards of road maintained per

it it

man hour

.
* *

.64,000
184 551
?

tt

tt

grader hour.

17. Gallons of water per square

18 i Total yardage quarried

yard road maintenance*

19. Total man hours on quarry operation. 20.

lf

...... .
4

11,000
380

equipment

hours on quarry operation

21.

truck

"

240
1,300
30 46 8.4

!l

? ?

22. Yardage quarried per man hour.

23.
it it it

24 ?

"
"

tt

equipment

hour.

truck hour.

0(0 W^"

36

SECTION V

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Operation
1.

Report

IWO

jifeJ^con^d)"

COMMENT : The heavy angledozer tractor with armored cab again Droved its worth in this operation for pioneer road building in areas subject to sniper and sporadic mortar fire. For this operation, the number of armored cabs (5) carried by this bat Visibility from the present cab is poor. talion was adequate. Excessive heat is developed inside the cab due to the lack of insulation between cab interior and !the engine. The interior of the cab for the TD-14 tractor with angledczer is too con fined to permit the operator easy manipulation of the controls. RECOMMENDATION : Suggestions for improving the present cab willbe submitted as a separate letter.

armored

COMMENT : This operation demonstrated an urgent need for a heavily armored tracked vehicle to aid in the assault of forti fications requiring large explosive charges for demolition. Tfte Army Engineer Armored Vehicle modified from the medium tank is capable of carrying large quantities of explosives to a selected target for demolition in spite of heavy enemy concentration of small arms and light mortar fire. RECOMMENDATION : It is recommended that four U) Engineer Armor ed Vehicles per division be procured for assignment to the Division Tank Battalion for operation by a tank-engineer team.

3.

COMMENT : In the training period prior to the operation and in the preparation of operation plans much lithographic reproduc tion was done by this battalion in multiple copies requiring cutting. No means are provided in the Divisions for cutting paper stock except laborious trimming by hand. RECOMMENDATION:. It is urgently recommended that a paper cutter, hand operated, capable of handling the largest paper stock fur nished the Engineer Battalion Reproduction Section be procured and issued on the basis of one (1) per Hq&Serv Company, Engineer Battalion, Marine. Division.

4.

COMMENT : It was once more forcibly impressed upon this battal ion that the Browning Automatic Rifle and the bazooka, or rocket launcher, are indispensable in mopping-up operations against the *

- 3? sr.*#

ifnuEfIOQiPHLL

WliMffi"fngineer Battalion

Operation Report

- IWO

JIMA *- (cont'd)

>/
%

-.,---.--^.,.-*-.-.

v if^p^.tt -^-j -e^.,^-. Japanese* Motroing-up against the Japanese may include anything from a. single wounded enemy soldier .with a hand grenade to a well aimed and equipped force which has successfully laid low until the main infantry force has massed by. Most mopping-up missions initially are squad tasks to permit conrolete coverage of extensive areas. The squad, therefore, should have the necessary roopt>ing-*up weapons.
-..___..--.-

RECOMMENDATION: (1) Browning Automatic Rifles should be allowed the Engineer Battalion, Marine Division, on the basis of one (l) t>er engineer squad* total of twenty-seven (27) for Engineer Battalion. (2) It is further recommended that the allowance of rocket launchers, AT, 2.56 inch, MIAI, for the Engineer Battalion be increased to one ll) per engineer squad or a total of twentyseven (2?) per Engineer Battalion.

5. COMMENT i The clearance of passages

for tanks manually through enemy minefields while under fire is extremely costly in person nel. Mine removal engineers must operate in an exposed position. They cannot use the mine detector while under fire since it is designed to be operated by a man in an upright position.

RECOMMENDATION ; It is recommended that the "demolition snake" be procured and issued to the Marine Division for future opera tions in an effort to decrease the cost in personnel of breach ing passages through enemy fire-covered minefields.

6. COMMENT: On this

operation the five allowed TBX radios were Two TBX f s were held at Battalion Head used to good advantage. quarters, one of which operated on the Division Logistic Net and the other was used on the battalion net. Sach Company Headquarters had one set and was in communication at all times Ship to shoi*e communication worked satis with the battalion. factorily and in the early days of the operation this kept Battalion Headquarters informed as to the situation ashore. Through this means, the battalion was informed of the fact that one company had lost all but one officer by D/2 and the battal ion adjutant was sent ashore as replacement Company Commm der immediately. With the present allowance of radios, however," platoon leaders have no communication with the Engineer the Company Commander or with the Landing Team Commafider, With this

- j?^ri toi rm Ih

JPfc^K^23^Bss^B^B^Bs2^B^B^* w* F

WflDUfcM|#wlrl^fcLii^n - Operation Report

'

ir^^ Jl^d^^mnt^)

condition in mind, it is deemed advisable to equip the platoons The Engineer .and the Company Commander With SCR-300 radios. equipped with SCR-508 radios to pro Armored Vehicle should be vide communication with the tanks of the Tank Battalion* In order to provide communication between the Armored Vehicles and the Engineer Company Commander in the sector in which the vehicles are operating, it is desired to equip the Engineer Battalion ton with an SGRe.SIO radio, with i 4x4 truck. The present num ber of wire men is satisfactory, however, with the additional requested radio equipment, additional communication personnel will be required.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the following personnel and main items of radio equipment be allowed an Engineer Battal
ion:

EQUIPMENT 5 TBX radios

PERSONNEL
10

REMARKS Used on lira Jima with excellent results.

Liaison set For use of platoons and companies (l per Pit, 2 per CoHq) NCO !s Linemen and operators
Communication
officer

UNCLWE

ANNEX "ABLE"
ADMINISTRATION
*

FdWll|#|i/lfJOffaffo -

-tnKl^lCCicuri^

Operation Report

- IWO

JIMA

(oont'd)

1. The initial distribution of the personnel of the Fourth Engineer Battalion for the operation is shown in the attached Disposition of Personnel chart which indicates that the lettered engineer companies
command.

operated under normal CT attachments. Headquarters and Service Com pany was retained under Division control through Support Group

2. By noon of D-Day the engineer platoons of rtArl and "C 11 companies, attached to their respective landing teams, x>rere ashore; the major ity of the personnel in the Headquarters Platoons of "both companies were also ashore, having left small detachments on "board ship to handle equipment that had not yet been unloaded. On the evening of D~Day, Company "B M was ashore. Headquarters and Service Company landed on the morning of D/5and by D/ 8all detachments that were left aboard ship initially to unload equipment had landed.
suffered by this battalion during the opera were 12 officers and 207 enlisted. The losa of trained special ist personnel is shown in the thart containing the breakdown of Inspection of the casual casualties by specification serial number. ty graphs reveals that "A" and "C l! companies sustained their heavi est losses on D-Day, and Company UB", landing with the reserve CT on D/l, also began to suffer heavy initial losses Boon after it had These severe losses in the early stages established itself ashore. operation are in accord with the experience of all units of the landing on the first two days on Fourth Division beaches.

5.

tion

Total casualties

4.

With the lettered engineer companies attached to combat t4ams, this battalion headquarters was responsible for the operation and
administration of Headquarters and Service Company only. The let
tered engineer companies, which were required to submit daily
strength and casualty reports to their combat teams, also submitted
these reports to the Fourth Engineer Battalion Headquarters.

5.

enced company officers, employment in most instances on those

specialized missions for which they had been trained, and prompt
and abundant mail deliveries.

tion, which fact is

The morale in this battalion remained high throughout the opera attributable to efficient handling by experi

HtfSfHG!

DISPOSITSON

(F I

PEZtSONHXL O E N G I N m BATTALION
F

ON DfVISIOl! SHIPPING

CT 23 SHTPPINQ
6
(Be'

CT
UA-33

25 SHIPPING
& -

CT 25 SHIPPING
APA-120 (A ".

C o . 1
31 d . .
Go.

3 off.
APA-158
( W t

3 off.

17 enl.

3 off'.

Co.lIa&2dP1 7 enl. 3

'1
1
I

1 off.
('CW

a ea.

C . o )

4l e a .

A P A - a l"Bn
2 off.

1 off.

A P A - u ("Cm c . = o )

CO. 3rm)
45 enl.

3
1 off.
APA-15'7

( n ~ u~0

1 off.
APA-196

rlz

snl,

26 enl.

(m GO)-10 d.
4a .
APA-33 (rrsls Go)-11 enl. (later Supply squad)

(m Cp,
172 enl,
51 enl.
5 enl,

(water Supply squad)

U off,
4 off,

A K A 4 5 (HBoS Co.1

nu-p 1 -

APA-120 (EiS CO)-lo edl. (watex Supply Sqmd)

#?""'

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o o
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0*25

TIME CDAYS]

CASUALTY GRAPH

bATTALIO^JCbttStflffl

TIME CDAYS]

CASUALTY GRAPM company qimmm

ILJ

SJ^^^M^iy^Spl*

b
< <
N IN TH Kb

p
LI

100

8
E

75

a a
5O

.T

ILJ
O ID
1L

IL y
o
D-DAY

1 1

D+s

D+IO

D+ls D+ls

D+2s

TIME CDAYSJ

CASUALTY GRAPH COMPANY bllWi

D+2s

TIME

CDAYS]

CASUALTY GRAPH company cnnn

ANNEX "BAKER*

'INTELLIGENCE

1/fIfIiOTEP

Fourth Engineer Battalion,- Operation Report

***^!i*
Kb

IWO

JIMA

(cont'd)

I. ENGINEER INTELLIGENCE.
The information of engineering value, obtained from aerial photo graphs and maps before D-Day, was as accurate as possible considering the small scale of the photographs and the difficult conditions under which they were taken* The camouflage recommendations determined from colored aerial film were accurate, but camouflage painting of vehicles and some camouflage net garnishing did not conform to the "mouse-gray 11 coloring of the terrain in the beach area. Camouflage discipline was generally satisfactory in the Divisional Zone con sidering the number of troops and activities in the area.
peoted,

The few Japanese roads within the Division Zone proved, to be inadequate tohaiidle the Divisional traffic.

as ex

The quarry located in TAS 183 X was opened and exploited by this battalion and provided sufficient borrow material for surfacing of Division roads, the 3rd and 4th Division cemeteries, extension of airfield runways and the reembarkation staging area.

Aerial photographs showed numerous wells within the Division Zone; those tested were too brackish for drinking but safe for It was reported that in TAS 182R the Japs had a large washing. distillation plant but investigation by an" Engineer officer showed the plant to be a water pumping station. The Japs 1 principal source of fresh water appeared to be rainwater drained from airfields into
concrete

catchment

basins.

The lumber supply on the island was practically nil. Except for a few large pieces of heavy timber found in eastern boat basin, the Division supply of lumber for construction purposes was trans ported to the island.
reconnaissance in the forward areas was done by the In the companies attached to the Regimental Combat Teams. rear areas, the reconnaissance of roads, possible water poirits, mined areas and mine fields, was made by Headquarters and Service Company.

Engineer

engineer

11. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

Due to the fact The supply of maps and photographs was adequate. TA map (64th Topographic Battalion) was merely an that the 1/5000

ft*.

mm

URRUfISTO

Fourth Engineer Battalion

~

Operation Report

I JIM WO

(cont'd)
-"

1/10000

enlargement of the l/1000d.map, it showed no more detail than the map. The other maps supplied this Division were as accurate as possible considering the high altitude at which the photographs were taken, the' tip and tilt of the photographs and the small over lap between flights. The combat teams had no vertical aerial photo graphic coverage af ter D-Day. Aerial color film emphasizes detail more than ordinary film but no color film sorties were made avail able to the pivision.

111. MINES AND MINE FIEIiDS.

See Appendix 2 to Section IV.
)

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS.
It is recommended that the enlarged 1/5000 TA map (64th Topo graphic Bn). be eliminated in the future. During an operation frequent vertical aerial photographic missions 'should be flown. These photos should be developed and printed and distributed to the combat teams for detailed study of the terrain to their front.
relief, mappers and mappers to further enhance the value obtained from maps and models having the correct terrain color*
: i

Colored -aerial film strips (verticals) should be supplied to

-2-

ONCLASSW

ANNEX CH&BU W

OPERATIONS

iwcushfb

Fourth Engineer Battalion

- Operation
GENERAL

Report

m
IWO JIMA

*
(cont'd)

This operation proved to be the first of its type for this Divi sion wherein the Engineer Battalion Headquarters was able to func tion strictly as engineers, without the numerous additional duties resulting from being engrossed in the functions of the Shore Party. It is believed that this most recent method of employment is an absolutely sound one in that it permits the utilization of Hq&Serv Company and p. Battalion Headquarters for engineering in the Division al rear area. Excellent supply roads, numerous beach egress roads, satisfactory rear area construction projects, proper supervision ov^r utility requirements, and vital assistance, where needed, to ;/<: rt the combat sa team attached companies were all possible and y- oliin the capabilities .. of this company due to the narrow Division zone of action. Close contact with the engineer letter companies varf maintained throughout the operation to attempt to foresee their reo.iirements and to assist them in any way possible.

CONSTRUCTION SECTION
All job assignments, such as the building of the Division Hos pital operating rooms or the construction of showers, were received by Battalion Headquarters and turned over to the Construction Offi cer for action. Due to the fact that sufficient lumber was avail able to this section for construction purposes, there was in no case any delay from the time of receipt of the mission to the time the work was started.

WATER SUPPLY SQUADS

These squads, being a part of the Equipment and Utilities Section, operated under the Qfficer-in- Charge of that section. The functioning of this unit was considered satisfactory, thus maintain ing their high standard of efficiency as shown, on Salpan and Tinian. They installed, repaired, maintained and operated all the units re quired to supply the Division with a sufficient quantity of distill ed water. No purified water vras used on this operation since no fresh water sources were located* although eight portable units were on hand to exploit any likely sources.

r-

IJIIm^P**

Fourth Engineer BattaliOh, **

V

Operation

Report^f^Do' tr>

*? (cont d)

It is believed that the Hq&Serv Company four squad sec tion composed of all the water men in the battalion is a very satisfactory arrangement since, all operations are combined tinder one head. The dispersion resulting from temporarily attaching one squad to each letter company for transportation purposes to the target has worked satisfactorily an the past two operations, The water section allowance of 7 men per letter company and 6 men from Hq&ServCompany has been supplemented by approximately 50 additional men taken from other sections in the company, however, this does not appear satisfactory since it is expected that on large opera' tions these extra men would not be available. . v
...* W.^.

.UIPMEMT AND UTILITY SECTION

In addition to supervising the water section as described above, all Bq&Serv Company engineer equipment is placed under the control of this section. Data covering hours of operation and on The preventative maintenance was recorded for all equipment. assignment of operators and. reliefs for same during long operating hours was capably controlled- by this section.

DEMOLITION. SECTION Although not- legally recognized in the T/0 as a bonaf ide section under the control of the Demolition Officer, a group of 10 men were trained during the training period in mine removal and advanced engineer demolitions. Duty with this section in most cases was additional to their 'regular- duties a,nd on a volunteer basis. This section was used to remove minefields located in rear areas, to assist and supplement letter companies when required, and to accompany each piece of Hq&Serv Company equipment when operating by to eliminate the possibility of visible mines being detonated the equipment. This section-,,, although small in number was invalu able to this bettallon throughout the operation,
;

OftLASSPEO

Fourth Engineer Battalion

'
jgr j. m.

- Operation *Rfe#or-|. ~ IWO JIMA, :f H w *

n

(cont'd)

mm *m*

*wWt imm

'" " ' MOT6R TRANSPORT

ri
'

'

The excellent cooperation of thle section with all other sections in providing prompt and efficient transportation greatly speeded up all work in which this battalion was involved* Truck requests, in general, were made directly to the Motor Transport Officer who complied with them and shifted the personnel into re lays in such manner that it can be said rarely during the daylight hours were any trucks idle except for the short time they were in for greasing, refueling or being checked-over for defects. This efficiency was particularly noticed in the dally number of loads which were hauled from the clay quarry* Despite the long hours of operation, the first echelon maintenance performed by this section resulted in no losses to the equipment of this section throughout this operation.

REPAIR SECTION
Too much cannot be said of the excellent work performed by this section in this operation. Excellent specialized training, able leadership, and the ability to improvise, enabled this section to reembark from this well mined island with very little loss of equipment. An example of the excellent work performed by this section is demonstrated by the fact that despite the damage done to four TD-18 dozers by mines and Jap shelling which oaused the firing of two of these tractors, the battalion returned to the rest camp with five of the six TD-18 dozers Initially embarked.

COMMUNICATION SECTION

This section, recently reorganized, culty in maintaining both wire and radio equipment and personnel made available* which willbe placed upon this battalion

little diffi communication with the However, expected demands as extended engineering
experienced

ii-

yf

*!*>?

ny&K
#*

.%

yf|yiJV3wW*"h*

Pk

I m. JA

(L

$J I'

'

Fourth Engineer Battalion

- Operation

Report

I JIMA WO

(eont f d)

*,'

missions no doubt will continue to gain in importance, the increase in personnel and equipment as recommended

substantiates in Section V,

LETTER COMPANIES
V.

fl

The letter engineer companies were never under the operational 'Throughout various control of the Engineer Battalion Headquarters. periods during the operation the companies changed from operating as a company under the company commander to operating as three platoons, each receiving its orders directly from the Landing Team Commander to the engineer platoon leader. At times the platoons would take direct orders from the. rifle company commander in whose area they were working* In a few instances the engineer company commander employed the entire company at the direction end upon the order of one of the battalion commanders. At all times a small sec tion of 5 or 6 men were attached to ee.cji infantry company for the purpose of immediately investigating mines or booby traps when and if found.

-4-

uNCLreSinLU

ANNEX *DOG
SUPPLY

B|W!mlon

Operation Report

- IWO

JIMA

(cont'd)

1,

Prior to embarkation for the operation, the status of supply All supplies and equipment within this battalion was very good. requirements for the operation. were on hand to fillanticipated The motor transport vehicles and engineer equipment carried by this battalion are shown in the Vehicle Landing Chart. The fact that CT attachments were in effect necessitated the loading of equipment and supplies on 4 AKA's and 11 aPA' s throughout the Division'ship ping. (See Distribution of Engineer Equipment and Vehicle Chart. )

2. The supply problem confronting this battalion after landing was not a difficult one due to the fact that the lettered engineer com viT.Xes remained attached to the CT's throughout the operation. Other trian the fact that there were too few sandbags available for protec tion of the water distillation rxLants, su-oply presented no problem.
3. Salvage commenced within the battalion area on D/6days and was conducted by a salvage section organized within Headquarters and Service Company consisting of one (l) NCO (QM Personnel) and a work Many items of individual equipment and ing t>arty of five (5) men. weapons were salvaged and turned into the Division salvage dump. come Salvage continued for four (4) days until the entire battalion area had been checked and all salvageable items removed.

4. The total loss of engineer equipment and vehicles for this battalion during the operation was as follows:
ITEM
REMARKS

IJTRUCK , 2|Ton ,6x6 , cargo

Was never landed on beach.

Destroyed by land mine. Destroyed by land mine. Destroyed on beach by shell.
Destroyed on beach by shell.

-TRACTOR, hvy,w/ang doz (TD-18) 1

l-TRACTOR.hvy.w/aag doz (TD-14)

*l-TRACTOR,It,w/crane (TD-9) *1-SHOYEL,

3/8 cubic

yard

?NOTE: This equipment was attached to the 4th Pioneer Battalion for "use on Shore Party work.

Parts from the above vehicles were salvaged vehicles during the operation.

and used to repair other

-1-

wssm

Fourth Engineer Battalion

- Operation

*'*^-^%^\Sri***v
Report

-*:vfo*teu

(o#t f d)

The road net in the Division zone of action was such, that all points were accessible. All roads were of sufficient width and sur permit- two-way traffic' in all types of .weather. faced so as to

5.

of traffic control points at all major intersec

tion a ir. .the Division zone, manned by experienced -military . pciioe, .
nervel'to maintain a -smooth flow of traffic at all times, Pscpite oh:- volume., of traffic, the road net was adequate to .support tbo operation 'and the problem of traffic circulation never became serious
F, s"t ablishift en t
'

** ..
i

-2
.

*Jk!

;r . .....^

Wfeftl^ilAlfteplltalion

Operation Report

1_

IWO JIMa
.v.

J : (cont'd)
*

EXPENDITURE OF EXPLOSIVES DURING OPERATION

itthm AMOUNT EXPENDED
special, special,

CAPS, blasting, CAPS, blasting, CORD, detonating,

electric

9,775

non-electric
spools

.
(spools).
(pounds).

40,000

100ft

1,630 5,682

DETONATOR, 15-second EXPLOSIVE, C2

delay, M-l

EXPLOSIVE, demol, chain of eight blocks,

. 75,000 M-l. . . . 440

178

EXPLOSIVE, shaped- charge,

EXPLOSIVE, TNT,

401b, T-3

iVo block,

(pounds).
(feet)

FUZE, blasting, time

LIGHTERS, fuze TORPEDOES, bangalore,

.
MIAI,

. 28,080
. . 92,200

15,000
2,020

......

(sections)

- 3
-

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$i

r*

VEHiCieS 0/SPOSmONOF N*MA Q4NPMENTj VEHiCieS

CT 23 SHIPPING CT 24 SHIPPING CT 25 SHIPPING scrap. 1TRACTOR, hvy, w/doz back dump scrap.
1TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-W, oar go.
go. 1 TRUCK, 4-ton, 4x4.
4x4. 2 TRAILERS, 1-ton, 2-W, water.
water. 3 TRUCKS, 2^-ton, 6x6, dump.

AKA-60

(C W Co. HqPlt Equip)

1 TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-W, cargo.

2 TRUCKS, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo. 1COMPRESSOR, air, 105 cfm. 7 WATER DISTILLATION PLANTS. 1 TRUCK, 2-fc-ton, 6x6, cargo.

APA-158 ("C" Co. lstPlt 1 TRUCK, 4*ton, 4x4.

4x4. 1 TRAILER, -ton, 2-W, dump.
dump.
APA-207 ("C Co. 2ndPlt

1TRUCK, 4-ton, 4x4. 1TRAILER, -J-ton, 2-W, dump.

1AMBULANCE, 4-ton, 4x4.

4x4. 6 TRACTORS, hvy, w/ang. dozer (TD-18).
(TD-18). 2 TRACTORS, hvy, w/PCU.
w/PCU. 1TRACTOR, light, w/doz shovel.
shovel. 1TRACTOR, airborne.
airborne. dump. 3 TRAILERS, -J-ton, 2-W, dump.
3 TRAILERS, 1-ton, 2-W, oar go. 1TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-W, greasing.
greasing. 1 TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-W, stockroom.
stockroom. 3 TRAILERS, 1-ton, 2-W, water.
water. go. 1TRAILER, 2-ton, 4-W, oar go.
2 TRAILER, 2-ton, 4-W, stockroom.
stockroom. shop. 1TRAILER, 5-ton, 4-W, mach. shop.
3 TRUCKS, 4-ton, 44.
44. 6 TRUCKS, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo.
cargo. cargo. 1TRUCK, 2^-ton, 6x6, cargo.
12 TRUCKS, 2-ton, 6x6, dump. 1TRUCK, 2^-ton, 6x6, wrecking. 1 COMPRESSOR, air, 105 cfm. 9 WATER DISTILLATION PLANTS. 1RIPPER, 2-wheel. 2 SCRAPERS, 4-whl, FD 8 cv. yd.
APA-33 (WB( WB Co.
HqPlt Equip)

1TRUCK, 4-ton, 4x4.

APA-120 (A Co. HqPlt Equip)

1TRACTOR, hvy, w/doz back dump scrap.

scrap. 2 TRAILERS, 1-ton, 2-W, cargo.
cargo. 1TRUCK, 4-ton, 4x4*
4x4* 2 TRUCKS, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo.
cargo. dunp 3 TRUCKS, 2f-ton, 6x6, dunp
1COMPRESSOR, air, 105 of*.
of*. 1TRUCK, 2^-ton, 6x6, cargo.
cargo. 5 WATER DISTILLATION PLANTS.
PLANTS. 1TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-W, water.

AKA-66 ("A* Co.

APA-157

HqPlt Equip)

2 WATER DISTILLATION PLANTS.

("A" Co.

lstPlt

1TRUCK, 4-ton, 4x4. 1TRAILER, -ton, 2-W, dump.

APA-120 (A Co. 2ndPlt

APA-154 ("C" Co.

3rdplt I |qip)

1TRUCK, 4x4. 1TRAILER, 4-ton, 2-W, dunp.

1TRUCK, 4-ton, 4x4.

4x4. 1TRUCK, 2^-ton, 6x6, cargo.
cargo. 7 WATER DISTILLATION PLANTS.
PLANTS.

1TRUCK, 4~ton, 4x4* 1TRAILER, i-ton, 2-W, dump.

AK-65

(B Co. HqPlt Eg

APA-163

("A* Co.

3rdPlt Equip)

1TRACTOR, hvy, w/doz back dump scrap 2 TRUCKS, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo. 2 TRAILERS, 1-ton, 2-fi, cargo.
APA-118 ("B" Co. latPlt Equip)
dump. 1TRUCK, 2^-toB, 6x6, dump.
1 COMPRESSOR, air, 105 cfm.
cfm. 1TRUCK, 4-ton, 4x4.
4x4. dump. 1TRAILER, -fc-ton, 2-W, dump.

1TRUCK, 4~ton, 4x4* 1TRAILER, -ton, 2-W, dump.

APA-156 ("E* Co. 2ndPlt dump. 1TRUCK, 2-ton, 6x6, dump.

1TRUCK, 4-ton, 4xl*.
4xl*. 1TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-W, water.
water. 1TRAILER, -ton, 2-W, dump.
dump.
APA-206 (WB( WB Co. 3rdFlt ESqui]
dump. 1TRUCK, 2^-ton, 6x6, dump.
1TRUCK, -J-ton, 4x4.
4x4. 1TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-W, water. 1TRAILER, -ton, 2-W, dump.

NOTEs

EquipThe- following H&S Co. Equip ment was embarked aboard

AK-67*
1TRAILER, 15-ton, Machinery. 1CRAMR, road, 4-whl, self -propel. 1 CRADER, road, leaning whl, pull.

_,t

rt

"sfflss:
3 169500535 1093

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80 WAY 1945

Pofrn^&gdZj

Vi'6/Rirs-efb

HEADQUARTERS, BATTALION, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FOURTH TANK FMF., c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, ShM FRAIICISCC, CALIFORNIA.
18 April, 1945,

=r-ial No. 54-45.

INifcftOTP
~rom:
Td:
Sabject:

The Commanding

The Commanding General, Fourth Marine Division

Cx>er-tion Report, Iwo Jima.

Officer.

Reference:

(a) Div 30P#l--45. (b) Special Air and 0-unnery Target Mat), Iwo Jima, 1:10. 000. (c) Table of Organisation, F-79.

{ -0

In accordance with paragraph 1. the following renort is submitted.

i ?lan:.;i:vC-

two (2), reference

or

preparation

enance. Conconitant. with the driving she maintenance training, Instruction in the 500 series FK radio equipment nc! the mechan ised flame thrower E 4- -5 w?s cerried out.
2.

Training -oeriod between 1. the Tinian Operation and che Iwo Jima Coercion was largely devoted to acquainting Due to the fact i.el of this organization with 'new equipment. that Tanks'^ lV S. Army, medium, K4A2, were replaced by Tanks, U.3, Army, medium, K4AS, approximately forty (40) tier cent of the train ing time was spent on basic subject? such as driving and maint

The K4A3 tanks were equipped with all the necessary instruments for indirect fire -and. a school in indirect fire tech Due to the time nique vras conducted by the Fourteenth Marines., abandoned, but all tank companies fired, at factor this school was least two indirect fire problems.
Approximately twenty (20) Der cent of the training 3. All personnel' neriod was devoted to weapons firing md gunnery. of this organization fired their individual weapons on at least All tank crews fired all tank wea three (3) different occasions, pons, and all crews had a minimum of two (2) days on the range. Awroyirmtely thirty (30) -ocr cent of the training neriod v^s devoted to 7 nf ah try-Tank team training. Conferences r.^ re held by each t^nk ccir^any's officers with the infantry off respective :.. cers of their combat teams. In^these conferences bas :.c instruction in tank capabilities, l ap^ation

4.

imi^|Mlj|il^|p

"A.

L-JIJS

fc||(^jerl.fion

Iwo Jima.

3er v 0. 04-45,dtd

18A0r45

-:-re piven, infantry-tank coordination, liaison and communication jscus^ed, and nlsns Tor the It-jo Jima operation drav/n ur). All in ntry ccr/roanies received" schooling at the tank Dark in the use o' :e tank, telephone, arm and hand signals, terget designation etc. allowing this indoctrination school small unit oroblems were con i.cted, ?nd later oroblems which included firing vrere held with eh BIT.
*Vr>">roxifl}ptely ten (1C) ocr cent of the training t>er ~rop'r?ms to athletics a.d ohysical conditioning. 1:1 tfiseb?!" , softb^ll, basketball, touch football, swiruEiing, tenni id t"r-ck vere coicuctec. This orFanization did ..ot participate in the rehearsal conducted in th-r training e-rea.
5.
1

:d vr^ -_evoted

II

Tf

CV7"

'

:-. T
:

TC O p Ji:C T'IVK
f

1. "ank cou.^pr.ie 0 were ein^^rivpd in ten (10) Jo 's. v of?.~iuart?r c? pnd - c rvice C!orr"oa ""Iptoon, 17 dlus Tnnk lor;"> any, attached einbprkeri en the -TA 190 and the Ordnance were -"?ttallon OomrTi^nder m d thr ; (3) enli-sted ir-en were emV-arkec on -e the Li vision ShiD 33. Thi^ organization did not r>art in thf I'orv/ard are^ rehearsal exceot for a communication iciDate check. The LdM's executed required. ccrx irol exercises, but did not beach.
T J

11l

r i To si-lrs :'cv'i:'T Tf!?

t

1. were loaded
"

The assault tail;. oom-n^nie as D?r table below. Cormanv Cormany ?!5 nd :onna.iy :" to i.Z? ?Z
;|

' : vns attached "' (Tom^anies "A" -." ." attached

"

B.ng

r tf^' )

to

L-SH : T'nit : LSM 3 e. ri N3 ; yo ._^ -mb ark s c1 ; a1

11

cc:-P4Ny

"

M
"

:
V ehlcle a Cmbark ed

Position . on LD Center Blue Beach

Cne

320 :4th?lat. : 3 ledium Tanks 3rd?lat. : 1 Flame Tiirovjer Tank : 1 Flail Tank ; Co,Hq. ::xecC s Tank
I T*

'

12
13

70 :lstFlat. : 3 I- edium Tanks ordflat. : 3 ec'iiuni Tanks

? 1

left Flank: rlue Eeach:

Cne

74 :2nd"^lat. : 3 !-'ediuiE Tanks,

1 Flame

:o,Hq

Thrower Tank Doz^r Tank, C

.ight Flarfc

"

-%^ilW;
ISM 14

*^Weretioa Report,
.:" LbM
2

Iwo Jima. SerNo. 34-45, dtd 18Ax>r4.r:0

COMPANY "C"

1er^2;~.2l-29

;Embark e a : Vehi c c s Smb ark e d 1

Thrower . Tank

Unit

Position

: on LD

.":"
.

?16 :lstFlat. : 3 Medium Tsnks,

Co.,JJq.

1 Lo zer Tank ,C C

.'

1 Flame
b

Right Flank:

,T ank

Yellow Bear
eh -Two.

15

126

:2,)d.Plat, : 3

I'iecliuru Tanks

SroFlat. ; 3 Medium Ta.nks 13

Left Flank: Yellow Sear

ch Two.

211 :4thPlat. : 3 Kedium Tanks, 1 Flame : Yellow Thrown r ""ank. : Peach One. f : :Oo : g. : 1 nail. i^nk.^cC's Tank :
T

This loading Dlan maintained the tactical unity of 2. the trnk units, anc x-ms so designed to .r>ermit tank units to move to 'the sutmort of assigned ELT's without confusion on the beach.
1

3. The six- (5) tS? TI s carrying the assault tank com^an- ies were to be in ooniticn on the LD by H 10 nd were to con They were on call by the stitute the sev-anth vrav<?. Gonr-n'and.ers were to-be dis,patch-d by Transport Tivision Control. and.
4 The reserve t?nk ccmnany ( domoan.J" . "3" ) with the re triev-rs of the assault tank coiuDsriies, the Battalion Command Tanl and one st>are tan!< was embarked on LS^'s number 48, 59, 239, end 145, and was to stand by in LS'S ,&rea *tfan.
' OojiDany "A" was dispatched 5. at 1003 Log day, and lanr d on Beach Slue One at 1020. Joimany "C'was dipr>?tched at 0948, nd landed on.Yellovr Beaches at 1005.

IV

ARPATIVS LF CPimTIU"

arrangements Los- day: Previously failed, where 1. Company t! 3 !< of (oeoond 4rm^red Armhibian Tractor Battalion), in irould t)9.ps beach informs tioo to Ccm">any "G" of thi^ orpani?aticn nd Comosny "A.11 , Second Armored A,mr>hibian Tractor Battalion would " give information, to Com^eiiy "A." received ii/ord th?t A" the =>re? 200 yards inland vid '3outh of Beach Blue One was mined. GoiEDany "G !l , beach reconnaissance unit? 3 reverted Yellow Beaches
'

'

mhb M s"s

**Sy'v

<x

*,1a.V.;V'.; Gyration

Report, Iwo Jima.

Srr' T^. 34-45, dtd lSApr^S.

routes could be found. The LSI11 9 carrying Coraosny V" vehicles beached in exactly the opposite order from the plan shown in the table in Dars-grann 111, 1; this caused confusion and made it nec essary for tHfil'. r>lstoons to cross over in order to support the BLT's, The tanks landed under a hail of to which they were assigned. pr:.d anti-tank fire; ?11 thr^e LSl:' s wer hit and artillery, " damaged. The Ccmo&ny A." dozer cut a road through the first ter
race inl'.nci from E:ach Blue One, but hit a large horn mine and re
ceiver! tr:.r;:" i- rpe caliber direct mortar hits. The dozer wrs com
Cr.moany "k" tpnks proc-deel inland in a column , pletely r1:r1: stroked. They encountered "a mine Picking their vsy through shell carters. t?nks 100 yards inland ?nd wc-re immobilized. The Oorr/opny firld A fired into" the cliff vicinity If I^s D a:id L, 166 A ?nd B an a 183 pad v, ,^nd into pill bx-^p in resr of "Blue Beaches. kt
I", V, 4ow r)i^s"fiv3- (^) hours th- First, Third, *=nd Fourth Platoons of
lonroany "? ft Ifrid-d on B-ach Elue Cn etc reinforce Conroany "A"; two
" V retriever vv c g ciqnsj.rtf rs t^nks of vorr^^ny "3" nd th- Corrriany landed with thi grour>. Intense artillery ?<)d rcort^r fire contin day ?'".d by Fct-i -olus seven (7) hours, seven Company "A.11 trnks ued all were bop'^-vd dewn B.nc fiv^ (5) had been knocked out. One Company "B" t-^nk v:a<a stuck in a sh'll hole, and one was hit by 47 mm AT At Fow r>lus seven (7) hours the Commanding Officer, fire p-^6 burned. Officer s.^d .First Platoon Leader of Oomrvany "A" were woun Executive ded a"d cvacuat d ?nd the Conmanciinp Offic-r of Company "B !i assum ed coffifl3nci of all t^nks In th:- zon^ of action of ROT 25. T-nks in tills R3 m zen-j bivcuc-d in an arcrz 25 to 100 yrds i.i re^r cf the front U.ifs. By night fr11 Ccrapany "A" had sustained, thirty (.30) casualties. Cn the 7-" I .lew Efpch s th-; tanks cf Company "C" had difficulty ait to the loos volc?.nic ash which immobilized great and r-. strict ed the mcveirent of others. many v-:nicl LSM 216 bea ched at its ? signed -ocint en th right iflr.nk of Ye1 lew Two, and .f the first t^nk off beggoe down 1 s s than fiiv c f: t f,r c m th 2 ramp s remaining tanks in that vessel. L3IC 216 retract end, blocking the ; ed and b c r. en ;- c. again about 200 yards scuth i;hire foot reconnaissance shev/ed th?t tanks vculd also bog down. The LSK In the meantime- had broach:d en the b:-ach, and it took thirty (30) minutes for it tc re treat th- P.ccnd time. At 1245 LSM 216 beached on Yellow One, but the sand was tec scft, so it withdrew for the third time, and at 1300 beach; d rrain discharging its remaining vehicles. LSM's 126 and 211 --bt ached, at their assip:n;-d spots and were able to discharge their vehicle -with little difficulty. Three tanks from LSK 126 struck minr-pj lc e s than 150 jpros from the beach, and the remaining three moved t: the sumcrt of BLT 1/23 finally reaching the No. 1
r

too soft for landing of talks ang! beach exits mined, and blocked by These units advised that the landing of tanks on shell craters. "be delayed until suitable beaching areas and exit Yellow Beaches
'

'

U-

4
r

UltI~'C t3rttfc- * ft ' dud t?

'
v

"* '
~p cr t

tfr>.:. i4.?i4.? tier.

ma IweC i

scr.'o.c r.'o. 34-45,

dtcl

18Apr4 r^

Airfi 16 Juit south cf tho _'rst-" r --et ruravay turning potoh. h? t?ak frc. m Lil--. 211 workiop; slowly arr/j-.ipr miner 9nd shell hole-p re The 'fla.il which w^.a en this ached thr --irli'.lci ft pbcut neon. Th.-, tanks from Ls^ "bocro-c eev-n in soft srnd Ju^t iif the bcp.ch. LS!-' 216 fls', fiaelly itj.^c'l tht ir w?:' tc th: .-.irficlcl knocking out I flaiE-:.- threw-- r. v c tp.nks v/^re Bv-rr=>l r>illbc-xos \ itn th^ CE able tc r.rj'-.rstc in thr- zo.i- cf 3LT 2/23 dm to soft s^-nd though Llov^n srv-rrl fi'ferts w:rt. msec- tc pet v-;.hiclus into thp-.t zene. (11) t^.iks anc; tvo (2) flame thro v ing tpnks from Ccrao9jny "'J Sl cr> thry ted ur> positions in retcf v.ith BIT 1/2? until dark just off the; .ope of ths airfield in T.4 164 X and Y. hull d-:.fil?<^ 59, carry! rip: th-. i.eond Platoon of Coinofny "", thi- CciuDany "b" L3M dozer -^nd th battrlion Com^rnC^r trnk, w-^s .rdrrccl to b-ach on Yvl : This IS!.' v??s forcod to low On tc r. i:ifcrct- JoiEt>any "G" 9t 1400. Tjort-^r firs after oi^chrrginp- only two vehicles, withdraw dv-:- tc ropr-o down on th- b-rch. Th?: oth.r vehicle joined cr- rf
1

Oorr^pny
9

'y\

The Cororre^inp Officer cf Com 1 o :rr^a:id of n".! t^nks in th- ?ono cf RCT n.qny : vp.out r1 cnrly in tho morning, 25 v~s wovr.^ o nd . th-3 Bn~3 L tf. trcuit] comr^nd of Ccnronny "B" .t tho snje vrR crr'Trfl 9Rhorc tiiiif- th" As^it3":-t Pn3 w->a rd r-T" -^shoro to take command of Company "n" ?nc the E.-tt alien R^cr-nnaiafiinc: and Liaison Offic-r to bf >-. cv.tlve-: Cfficor of GcnTo^.iy "A". Th':P(; officers r-75.ch=vd the CcniD-^ny "V1 pno-nt most of tho day reorganiz beach ?t about noon. ing r:id r-: tric-vinp:. caiE'Tj?:- d m d bogrt.d down vehicles, and h^>d oipht or)'rativ vchicl-s V-y dark. Hip-ht (8) tanks front Com-osny "5" suor>orteo =>CT 25 firing on t^rs-rts of or)ocrtunity ComDPny "C IM s eleven (11) orv.. rational vhicl. s were divided into threo (-3) pla toons -vhlcn lr.cl th; --^sault co.^ani- q of ROT S.7; across Airfield *T c. 1. . Those vehicles could not n^potiat- tho bluff on the :"/ sic1-^1 -^ of the airfield, r.c attiimot? to pevpne- v"0 thr taxiwrys tovrard Airfi:.--lc! :'o. % w-.r- st-;-o^;d b^ mines in TA. IRS1 R 5 3 and 181 X. Three Com-oany "C" v? hides v-'.r- ki^ck---d cut, tw; by min-:s nd one by h;p vy mcrt n r fire-. The r. oaj nine vehicles from LSM 59 l-ndt-d pnd ;oin ed Coir^^ny C" at nif-htfall.
1

"n "

rccr

?lup

Cn? lay;

vbo hpC

;t

D-:? rlus Two Lays: Companies V and "B" supported 3. 25 vrith ESI"L rational vehicles firing into tho cliffs to the ROT front sj/icl c\ stroying Dill boxes end caves. Two (2) Ccm-pany "B" : \. i r; knock, d out by 47 mm AT fire and two threx? tracks. vchicl.s ThesT cc^r:ii,s clvcuac.d in TA ISS for the night. Twelve (12) v?hlcl-s of 3c many "3" suoncrt'ci. the and reached
;

"

?ttacJ^^^^JT-2^

iliiPlATOtot"?'

Subject:

Cr>:ration Report,

Iyo Jiroa. ScrNo. 34-45, dtd 18A0r45.

>

1 via the road running the hlp-h ground across from Airfield CR 30 through TA 181 V after this rosfd was cleared of mines. frcm 1 The C.C7 r t^k -ov.nh-C a ro^c to tht ridp>~ in TA 182 X vhsre it was knocked cut by 47 mm AT fir:. Tht: Battalion Kainte.nancf- Officer landed wit-n ni'i:- (9) mohanics to survey the damage and to aid the The- Assistant Platoon Leader of thr. i.i saint-; nance work. OoinoaniiT Plate or. also landed with nine- (9) enlisted men to aid Tank Ordnance the Eattsll^i rai.ntcnsnc;- Officer.
'

Dog Flu 3 Thr. c Lays: Companies "A" and "B" sutDort-. of RCT 25, but v;er: limited by cliffs end rough ter cci th-? attach rain. Cne s.ctie-n of tanks cleare.6. sceol enemy troo-os from the area adjacent to the East Bcr.t Basin. C-cmoany "C" was attached to srjue area as or c-:--?dlng day. Two (2) tanks 21, and cr>er?t:d in the by 4? mv AT fire. w~re knocked cut
4.
;

Dog Plus Four Days: Companies "A" and "P" perform Company "CJ" wcrkc-d un -d th=>s the day r>rtc- edinp 2 at TA 182 (J, and from posit to the south' rn -rid of Airfield ions on the runw.qy d -ptrcy -d f-n*=my -no^itions in T ft. '182 B. Cne tpinV" was knock-rc 1 evt by 47 mm A" fire. Th-~ Pattalion Commander and his liaison narty land:c! at about noon, o.nd st no 'his CP in the any "1" bivouac s.r-:> at T A 164 Y. Two onliated men from Tank Ord landed with maintenance equipment. nancr
f-rmo

mi-s^lonp

>

; 1/C4 ?t the :-st L'o,?.t Basin.- All ode. rational vehicles U of Coroar.iug A" and "3" (20 tanks in all) were Dlaced under the id f the CorriDan^i ep Officer cf Company "0" to oartlcix>ate in comma: massed tank attack, crci ;. r:d by higher echelon, vjith tho x>ur-oos of 1 "c. 2. All available tanks of the Third and Fif T?n] B r tt.?li:>n vr r. to participate- in this attack which was un : th der thr .ccr.on.nrid of th<- CorjE^ndir.g Officer, Fifth Tank Battalion. The p-frv. rrl vlb.n wps for th^ Fourth Tenk Battalion to attack down a the ri?n t rue; *; y ar.c th-r Third snd Fifth T^nk Bat talion b to move As it turned out the only route-on to thf down the lift runway. Airfield vras the- cvk. mac(- by Gomoany "C" S'-vral days previous frcm OR 230 tc the runway at TA 182 The morning was s^cnt in clear-- ing thi'3 rout* of mines r.rid in untangling traffic Jams caused by thr conalizi-is of som^ s-. v -nty tanks into this narrow corridor. A column of tanks extend d frem l!one airfield to tht- next Eventually A" get onto the runway and progressed eight (8) tanks frcm Ccn:t>a.ny as TA 183 B md 200 V destroying four (4) AT guns and t^n as far Tvu trnkg v.<re destroyed by 47 mm , AT fire and (10) 'bcxe-3. S&fill nuL.b ;rs of vehicles from the Third Bn<3 Fifth damr.g,o. three Tank B?tteli-is also bV-ntually reached tll: |E jP^ii^ o6^

6.

Dcg Plus

Days;

Company

sunport

BIT
'

"B" sent four tanks to

securin^Airfielc

a.

Wtf^fcV

7^!

"

-^^^^^ iVMAnb^l^iK>i

ajf

Kj^at

f^^BP^
18Apr45

&4^fi^m4fc4itf>ib^4 He-Dort, Iwo Jims. SerNo. 34-45, dtd

"*'

awl* fee oftnxrfinf?.

Airfield No, 2
Company was secured. w^s relieved at dark by elements of the
Third T~nk Battalion *nd reverted to HOT 23. Two CP maintenance
men froa Head quarters and Service Company landed.
For
i: o(lo (l

practical purposes

Dog Plus Six Days: Company ".4" w^s in reserve and spent Company "B" sent two t^nks to the East the day in maintenance. Boat B^sin and six (6) tanks stood by to support BLT 3/24, but were not called on. Coiroany "C" supported the attack of BLT 3/23 agrln These' tanks fired close support missions from TA 183 st Hill 382. T G- and 200 J where they were held up by an extensive minefield. Thrc~ officers and twenty two (22) enlisted men from Headquarters and Ser vice Company landed and set up the Battalion dump. One officer and eleven (11) ?nlisted m-:n from, ths Tank Ordnance Platoon also landed.

7.

Dog Plus Seven Days: Six (6) tanks from Company "AH sup ported the attack of RCT 2b by firing at designated pillboxes and Company "BM Kas in reserve and spent the d.y in maintenance. cvf. sucportad Company "C" th3attack on Kill 382. Engineers were unable to clear the minefield in TA 200 W and two tanks v;ere knock ed out. Three officers md ten (10) enlisted men from Headquarters and Service Company landc-cl on Blue Beach One and the Battalion CP was established at TA ISb 0,

8.

9. Dog Plus Eighi; Dys* Company "AH performed the same mis sions as the preceding day. Second Platoon, Company "B" reverted to Company "B" control *nd that Comnany supported the attack of RCT 23 on Hill 382 4 Company "C" was in reserve and spent the day in One officer and twenty one (21) enlisted men from maintenance. Headquarters and Service Company landed i 10. Dog Plus Nine Days: All Company "A" tanks supported the attack of the left ELT of RCT 25 firing at pillboxes and one block house which effectively withstood 75 mm fire. Terrain limited tank operation to the zone of this BLT. Third Platoon, Company "B", fired close-in 20 minute preparation prior to King hour in the zone of BLT 2/23. Company "E" fired supporting missions on Hill382 and the cliffs and ridged ohe right.. Company "C" was again in res erve.

11. Dog Plus Ten Days: The remainder of Headquarters and Service Company, the Tank Ordnance Platoon and remaining Tank Bat Company "A" sent two tanks to the right talion equi-oi-ent landed. BLT of 25 where they fired close support missions. Six (6)
-7

*:*&s

Subject:
operated

If Iffil i*ertfer&f

PX

Iwo Jima,

SerNO. 34-45 ,dtd 18Apr45

with the left 3LT of RCT 25 against t&e.s.txjong block house encountered the previous day. Approximately 800 gallons of flame thrower fuel end 3ix hundred rounds of 75mm ammunition were fired at the block house^ but the infantry was unable to secure it. One tank was- knocked out by a land mine; evldentalj during the night of day. D / 9 - D / 10 the enemy remined the trail used the H wes Company "B attached to RCT 24, but no tanks were called for, or used, due to the extremely rough terrain. Company "C lf remained in reserve.

12. Dog Plus Eleven Days: Commanding Officer, Company "A",

resumed command of that unit and the Assistant Bn-3 returned to
Headquarters and Service Company. Six tanks from Company "A", a
flame thrower and a dozer supported the attack of the left BLT of
25. A shape charge was thrown on the dozer, but with no ap-orec iable damage. 1,000 gallons of flame thrower fuel and considerable 75mm were again fired at the blockhouse: Three Company "A" tanks supported the right BLT in the same manner as the preceding day. First Platoon, Company "B", sutroorted the attack of BLT 2/24 and Second Platoon supported BLT 3/24. 500 gallons of flame thrower fuel were fired at ?. blockhouse, in the zone of BLT 2/24. Company ' 11 C 11 remained in reserve,
13. Dof? Plus Twelve Days: Comoany "A" was in.reserve and de voted the day to maintenance. Comoany "B" moved its bivouac area to TA 183 P. The First Platoon, Comoany "B", supported BLT 2/24, and the Third Platoon sutvoor'jed BLT 3/24. 500 gallons of naoala were day. Company fired at the same blockhouse fired uoon the tt C M support missions in the vicinity attached to RCT 23 fired close of Turkey Knob, using the large flame throwers to advantage. Com pany M C M bivouac area wss moved to TA 182 Y.

14. Log Plus Thirteen Esys: Conroany "A11 moved bivouac area t* TA 165 J and remained in reserve. The First Platoon, Comoany fIBM , supported BLT 2/24 and Second Platoon supported BLT 3/24. Ctmoany "tt* carried out the same tt/Xp -vions as on the preceding day. The
Company "C" dozer

was knocked out by a mine.

15. Dog Plus Fourteen Days: Four (4) tanks, and two (2) flame throwers from Conroany At! worked on a by-oassed pocket in the zone of HCT 25, destroying c^ves and pillboxes and expending over 1,500 gallons of flrtne thrower fuel. The remaining Company "A" tanks stood by to supDort the attack of RCT 25 if called. Company tr" furriis^ed close* fire suprcrt to the attack -of ROT 24%,. .Company rt C ir carried out the same mission as on the preceding day. Fur (4) tanks and one. flame .. thr-wer ff m Cmioany "A again operated against the Docket in RCT 25 f - z:ne 'f action and three (3)*wtanks *veja^rf*^ZhJzhj* lett
. 16,

"

Dog Plus Fifteen Days!

M

""I^^^

" Gp^tion

Two

Jima';^3erNo

. 34-45,

dtdlBApr4s

>

BLT. Th- Fourth Platoon, Company "B", surroartsd PLT 3/24 pnd the
Third Platoon support <-d 2/24. On? flame thrower, the Company "E"
dozer nC one tank were knocked out by mines; this was the last H dozrr operative In the Battalion. Two Platoons of Company "C attempted to drive east toward the sea dov/n a corridor running th rough TA 201 1-5, :*, 0, T, X, R, Q, Victor, and Uilliam. Th:: tanks proc ..d:d v<ast down th- road running from CH 331 to RJ 189, but at TA 2CI. M th-y werv. forc-d off the road by large shell cr?.ters and a mine field. These t*nks took up 'positions in field in south east of TA 201 M and fired at targets cf opportunity. The rough terrain would not permit tanks to advance beyond. TA. 201 M without the aid of a tank dozer, and no dozer was available.
1

Company "A" continued to operate 17. Do,s Plus Sixteen Cays: in RCT 25 zone of action. The First Platoon, Company in the Docket preparation for BLT 1/24. The Third "B", fired al5 minut-e clcoe-in support -~d the attack of BLT 2/24. -Ccie flame thrower tank Platoon Company "C" with the aid of a dozer Ttfas knooktd cut by a Dine, th- Flf tii Tank Battalion pushed -through to TA 201 S borrowed from where they were helt.a by a large mine field. One tank was destroy ed by a mine at th: HJ in Tk.201 L.
Dop Flus Scv-i^.n Days: One platoon of Company "A" supported the attack of chv left ELT of RCT 25 while another platoe; The First continued to mop up the toi eVxcusly mentlon-d pocket su-oporttd the attack cf BLT 2/24. Company Platoon, Company 11 operpted In the same arc? as on the preceding day > but was
C" ,again halted by mines after r.. .short advance.

13.

"E*>

19. Dog Pluc Eighteen Drys* Company "A" performed the samemissions as thy. Pr c,;eding day. The Second Platoon, Company "3", furnish dcloen fire support for ELT 3/24 throughout the day. Com pany "C" with the eid of the Fifth Tnnk Battalion dozrr pushed th rough to th-- ricliT- in TA 201 T. On* tank w?s knocked cut by a mine, the' dozer was d^mre-.d by large caliber mort?r fire, p.nd one tank was set fire, but nctdamag-d appreciably, by a napalm bomb from support aircraft 20. Dos- Plus Nineteen Days: On- platoon of Company "A" sup ported the Vttrok of the left BLT of RCT 25. One platoon stood by Cn<; platoon proceeded up -the in the c ntr ELT's zone of action. beach re*d i.i front of .tfcu- right BLT, and- support-' d that units Company "B"towed a sled mounted 7.2 inch drive to^^rc1 tlio s-.a. lpu^o.hcr into the zone of BLT 1/24 and fired twenty (20) rocket
9

UlluLfiiiHlf ILli l

11 I UVYir HI I

I i

Subject:

Oo .-rr.ti.cn -.-pert, Ivo Jima.

3f rN0. 34-45 J dtd 18Apr45.

rockets. After rsrin;-rs r. r< GV.;d min?s from th~ road running .from CR 331 to PJ 189 Zor^any "Cir-ovod down to the latter point and pp.ve effective fire- suoocrt to 23.
;

Company "V assist Company "B" wr.s zone cf action. ed in th: KCDoinr. uo of RCT 25 in rcs.rve. Cm. pirtoon of Company "C" proceed: d to RJ 189 p.nd fired supporting fir,.s fcr RCT 9 against csves in TA 202 M.

21.

Teg rius Tvrnty

rpys:

Ont

platoon of

'g

stnd-'by

22.
/

Dcg Plus Twr-'ity-Oni- D^ys: but did not op ..race.

All te.nk Cciripanits

wire

on

P.3. Cog Plur? T^nty-Two Daysj 3r.mo conditions or- vailed as th- oroc :: dinp cry. Cc-nrcp.ny "E" turned ov^-r tv/tlvi (li) op-r- on ation-1 trnks to thi- Fif-:h T^-nk Battalion at 1030; six (6) of these t-^nks 'fi?.rr. rrturriv.c 1 at '.V?00. Goiiroany "C" turned ovor tyro flame th rowert^ika to th^ Fifth T^k B^ttnlion.
A. Doo; Plus T -rr"ity- -Thrr -: Days: On^ platoon of Corroany "A" plus th; rn^ir t] Lv ?- i frc.T. Como^ry "C" co-^rat'-d in sup-oort of ROT G. Cc^-nlc^ lfE" sne! "0" reiriPlnrd on stand-by. 25 In TA Is B
T
s

25. Dog "*lus T, i:jy--Four D^.ys : Battalion embarked all oper ational tfnks l:s enj platoon and the two flam-- throwers from Company "A", th twe f ...oc throx^-rrs from Coiroany "C 1! (loaned to Fifth T -.,;}k Bnttalicn) -.'ic .^: x tanks from Company "B" (also loaned to Fifth 7-onk B^tt-licn> pbo^rd the L3D#2 along v/ith four officers and s---v.:ty five (75) :r.lio"c; d rr>en.
1

'

26. Dog Plus Twon i;y. -Fi v-r D=i.ys j Company attack of RGT 25 vith two t-^nks and onz fl.amc a flan, throw- r borrowed frocj with p trnk. BLT 3/24 in rL-cucing th pocket along the East of Coroa-y "C" mb-rk-d aboard the APA 228.
f

"A"

the Company "B"> thrcwer. Company "A" supported Coast. Rtn3alnd.-:r

cup-oort-i-d

27. Dog Plus Tw.;aty-"3ix .Dayc: One flamt; throw-r tank was turn-.d ovr to Third TnV. Battalion aftc-.r Comosny "A" conducted " loaded its r-omaining Ccmoany school for that !3?ttalion. tanks aboard LoD#2 rud its persun:u-l w.re eajbr.rkcd aboard APA 178. Com pany "3" r^ct.iv d fcur (<) tanks back from the Fifth T?jik Bsttalion
Compsny "B" loaded four (4) 28. Tog Plus Tvixnty-j-ivc-n Days: tsnks ?borrd LSD>/2 cr.r;brkcd rer.ainlng personnel aboard APA 230. Hi-^dquartcrs J^rvict. Oozroz-ny embarked aboard the AFA 233. Two 0 tvo fl :;.: throw, rs vcre left vriwthjlte|S4|^th Tank Battal t^.nks =rid " ion. One fli.; throw ..r and two M4A2 tmks

I'fP^f^fl^fiol^T"-'

llSlwl^^W^''''

which had
b:,en

'Ov-rFti'-jn

Report, . Iv/o Jlma. SeffNo. 34-45, dtd 18Apr45

were left with the Third Tank Battal (56) tanks (dozers, retrievers, flails snd flame thcrvj;;rs) eiLbrrked for the operation thirty-eight (58) were reembarked at the end; seven (7) were turned over to other units and eleven (11) wore- destroyed.
ion. Of the
fifty- -six

badly damaged

v
I -i.

co.v;i:e:-:ts

and recommendation

than in engaged.

Personnel losses wer^, higher in this otK-raticn -oreceeding one in which this orgaiiization has been The. tabl:. b.;low shov/s personnel losses for the operation: Officer I:nlist-d
Officer

AIT THORI7^?D T. 0. STR^TGTR Cfficcr

Snlist

mlistr-a
585)

M^.rinn
-Tavy

35

9).

36

594

ACTUAL JT^.G:^:T2L C ." JbSX? EMBARKATION eei^c-P

Combrt Echelon leg-r Cffictr Cffictr

Marine
N avy

"37
1
Gfficer

Enlist in )
b 81

11)"
Enlir.tsd
55)

38

Rear Echelon Fsrine

Navy
'

592) ) ) )
) ) 56) ) )

1
_N

42

679

Attachments TkCrdPlt nr.me Throv :~-r Repalrijan and Qp^-.,rv^ r

Marine
Navy

) )
3

Officer 2 1

E.nliGt:-Ci 30) !
N
/

) 31)

Army

11-

Ural I UXrXlrrlfuf

T4-f %

" p %
"

UNCLAssine

Subject:

Operation Report,

I Jima. SerNo. 34-45, dtd 18Apr45 wo

CH FATS
Marine
"

(TJ^^B^'^-l^^LC;^,.
orficc.-r
3

Siui sr. a

5-) 2)

Officer
3

Enlisted
56

Officer Enl?

avy

S&SUALTI.-S 19 7*345

- 13KAR45
T
T

Marine
Mqvy

:riLL^.r: T(EV) '.SYjZV) !T.nP(*roT-V)! .nP(*r0T-V) :KESSIi'G: TOTAL : : 0: E:C: ": 0: E: 0: E > 0: 2; 0: E : 7; 5; 18 t : 1: ??.: 7: 60: : : : 11: 107: ::1:':::: : 1: : : : 4 3 :

BATTALION T'Zt*.3W ZL LO 35 ro_gBDSo4< ~ 18!:AR45 Offi~r 32HH31 Cffio^r . Enlisted Officer 23) Killed 1 S3 1 Evacuated 3?ttl- Casualties 7 31ok >sualti:s (Incl 2 ;MEv .Snrcut-) Transferred TkC-rd^lt.
Amy Cto^rvpr
Ccllc-,-c Tr^i;:ir.Q'

Enl^

2 1

Rear Tch:lcn Tr. RETURII^r TO DUTY 19FEB^5 Marines "DTTDT * i" -* Ti. Tll^
1

30) )
3) 2)

- 18i:AR45
3

35)
)

12) )

3
1)
7

13

Marine (C?) EFFECTIVE STRENGTH C!- DATE OF Rggffr ARK-ATIO>~ I&:U?.4S Combat Vsrino ~ohc lon Cfflc.-r o?

inlllL^d 501)
:33
511)

ISlmW wsul^^I fe
fi

ion T3st>ort Iwo Jim *- Ser*?o. 34-45, dtd 18*0r45 Enlisted

53)

Officer Rear Echelon

Marine
Navy

Officer

Enlisted

Cfflcrr

Enlist

Attachirn-nte
"?avy

) ) )

Army Observer detached 12 March, 1945. detached 13 March, 1945 T^nk Ordnance Platoon

RECAPITULATION

122 casualties
killed
qomn?fly

Battalion Battalion
Company Coicosny

- 122/687
24/687 6/176

or .17?
or .034

"A" casualties killed

48 CASUALTIES

-
48/176 -

-
-
-
41/179 - 12/179

or .286 or .034

Oomnany

"B"

cBurlties killed
tJonrn^.-iy

29 CASUALTIES Cor,nany 29/178 or .15? Conroany 5/178 or .028

"C H

41 CASUALTIES
Cormcny loro^.ny

cpunlties

killed killed

or .229 or .067

cvs T^x
1) O-unshot 2) Land J'inss o) Burns 4) Re- coil "":eh

ns^irTicvT

11 '10
8

5) Mortal *:
v

6 79
*"

6) Combat Fatigue 7) Grenade 8) Strain 9) Jst) Kortar Fuse

"

3 9 2

*-y\ 1 .;-? r^^ Toe^sures B. o encountered on IT/0I T /0 JIMA

were unusual i.* thr t thry closely resembled orthodox nnti-tcnk doc
trine of oth "rA cs.

(a)

:.ine

fields were extensive 13

mini Af*f*iorr

and very effective. They

'#

;?#

Subject:

Operation Rupert,

Iwo Jima. SerNo. 34-45, dtd!8A0r45.

The fields themselves were covered by anti ed by anti-t^nk' guns. guns, so that removal cf mines did hot allow easy aece?s to in- . tank* tericr positions. The fields were generally covered with automatic weapons, so that mine removal v;as extremely difficult. Mines were generally deeply buried so that they were hard tc detect, and in many cas-:s tanks, crossed over fields only to have following tanks Most fields consisted of shallowly buried detonate the mines. yardstick mince under which were unfus^d aerial bombs of 150 to 250 pounds. The yardstick mine itself was sufficient to break $ank tracks, md when it exploded it detonated the bomb which complete A terracotta mine larger than the standard ly destroyed the tanks. Japanese mine was also extensively used. anti-tank This mine was aad had sufficient explosive power to des extremely hard tc detect, One and two pronged horn mines were troy a X*nY suspension system. encountered, but were 'net particularly effective as they were easily detected p.r.d avoided.
(b) Anti-tank guns were generally of the standard 47 mm typ^, but some large calibor dual purpose guns were encountered. As Ptat'd above, anti-tank g.uns were well sited, and their fire The 47 ram had no difficulty penetrating tank was vnry effective. armor except en the front slope Plate and the turret. Anti-tank The gun positions were usually gunnery was genr-rally excellent. uns had good fields of fire well constructed and well concealed. and good alternate fields cf fire, tyost guns had alternate posit ions, in some cases several, and this allowed the enemy to shift guns, so th*.t located positions would be empty the next day, and our tanks were surprised by fire from previously undetected guns. "and few erratic Fire discipline of 47 mm gun crews was Japanese waste rounds were observed. medium tanks with 47 mm or guns were dug, in and used as anti-tank guns.

were v 11 locrted, covering 11 feasible routes of approach for tanks The.- fields' were located into the interior cf the enemy defenses. a vicv/ cf canalizing tanks into narrow areas* .which were cover with

excellent*

In 11-o-u of the magnetic anti-tank mine, 'the enemy small shape charge which they generally hurl used They also used the charge to destroy abandoned ed at the tank. tanks in front of the lines. If the hurled shape charge lodged on the tank, it penetrated all hull armor.
a very effective

(c)

concrete and lumber placed on tank soonand track blccK welded on turrets and front slope plates proved effective counter measures for both the 47 mra fire and the sons,

(d)

Reinforced

spare

shape

charges.

3.

"Pric.r to the Ivro Jima Operation,

the following mod

*?
i

-14
..VS

*mmwmi

4J^B^h^m^H

V*

r$

4&3 tanks as ificatione were m*?.de on M

recdi^vea:^
installed on all tanks.
(27)

(a)
tanks

Tank-infantry

telephone

(b)

SCR 500 radio sets installed in twenty-seven

(c) Additional armor plate placed on forward Dart of right sr>onson en twenty-four (24) tanks mounting the Mechanized Flame Thrower E 4-5, (d)
pressure

tajiks of

Modification of interior installation of fuel and Mechanized Flame Thrower E 4-5 (24 tanks).

Substitution of modified gun for regular E 4-5

flame gun in the twenty-four (24) tanks mounting the flame thrower.

(c)

(f) Installation of anti-mine flails on two (2) M4A2

tanks with dozer attachment.

(g) Fort-"-- "^^ (41) banks had spare track blocks spot carried in brackets on the front slope welded .? round t^e tarre'u
-olate*

(h)
assembly

on a

Forty-seven bogie guCge^r.

(47) tanks had one spare bogie wheel

spot welded to the front slope plate.

(i) On fifteen (15) tanks four 2 inch pieces of channel

pine was cut
iron wore welded to the spohsons, and 1 1/2 inch soft and bolted to the channel irons.
to the shape of the spensons

(j) On thirt- en (13) tanks 3 1/2 inch lengths of 1/2 inch reinforcing red T ;ere ar welded 6 inches apart over the entire Heavy l sponson surface. 1/2 inch wire mesh cut to fit the spon
wt,-:ic?d rods, and another identical piece
son was slipped over the of mesh w?s welded to thr r-ds 2 1/2 inches from the sponson.
Three (3) lengths of reinf or- ing steel were then placed along the entire length of ths- sponson Lrcv^n the two layers of mesh. Next, 2 inch oak lumber, cut to fit the sponson was bolted to 5/8 inch studs 3 inches long welded tc the sponson and 2 inch oak was used to cover A. 1-2-3 mixture of concrete the bottom of the air space so formed. This modification proved invaluable pour so in the sir space. was as it enabled the tanks so equipped to withstand shape charges,
Tanks not equipped
exploeive-B ?nd 47 mm A? hits on the sponsens.
rt

~~JLU

(IUSiE

Subject

Operation

Reoert,

Iwo J'ima. 3er! To. 34-45, dtdlBAr>r4s

in this TiEnnzr had their* snensen oro jcctili.s nnd sh^e cnarges.
1

armor easily t>enetr?ted

by 47 mm

(k) Thr--e (3.) tanks had installed on their* snons-ons (3) sections cf o ivvcccl filled with concrete 11/2 inch thicl' three These S;Otion i;?re hoi itc5. to brackets welded on to the sponsons This rr,ouification was not as effective ?.s that and arc i-emovable, (j)( j ) abeve. described in

(1) Six (6) tanks had 1 3/4 inch lumber, cut to fit the stjonsens, bolted to brseke^s welded on the tank so as to form a 3 Three (3) tanks had 1/2 inch ol^wood affixed to inch air space. the p/nonson in the seme manner.

(m) On fifty-four (54) tanks v/rldfr1 to the tOD of hj 1 hatches.

1 1/2 inch wire mosh was

(n) On two (2) f.^nk r covery vehicles, ' M3283, a cover hatch w^rc consti'iictcc over the o^pen turret. This Diodificatio: to -orct'ct the crew of thr M3283 from small arms firo nr-c-^spry is
r (o) In fcrL:-fivo (45) tanks th n 75 mm r<"Mdy box on the ;:a ket was r- moved, and 75 mm ready racks in floor of the turret This inoclf^c uton oermittod the; carrying of aonroxiraate stalled. ly twenty-five (25) c:ccc rounds of 75 mm ammunition.
(

(t>) On tv"~ O i.T .r.m f2l) tanks salvaged M3.U, Jettison ablr, s-lf--9?ling gr.s t? n.ks were mounted in jettison brackets affixed to the- tc^ r:ar cf ':he hull. A vlv>e v/ith valve is fitted to the rubber tank, snC 1.-ads doxvn to the lower rear end of the tank rull. Ths: t-rilid were used to c^rry water for sur>r>orte-d in
fantry.

the vision cupola of tho tank This allows commanders turret hrtch vras rotated 45 clockwise. the hatch to even te the rear instead of the right side, and ksros bran ones, wire coc fron. hitting the hatch. This modification should be inccr-ocrrted in all tanks.
J

(q)

en .:n (10)

t&jiks

Thirty- -four ( o&) t?nks had from threr. (3) to four (4) Dioces of rod 1 inch by 9 inoh welded upright to the front slot)e olrte. The teui:, g c-?.bi<. io coiled around these rods, with one end remain ins fix.a tc ihe bow towing shackle, and is thus made mere ac^.-rlblc,
(r) {;>) Fifteen (15) tar.ks hrd wcodeHM?ttpAYibi|[eiMDli&gKkayfki
-ie-

Ill^UO^ltf^ioCi

!fS9SBBBBBsd

Report, Iwo Jima. Ser tfo. 34-45, dtd 18 t0r 45. /Ito#ifc-L: barrel. It, s^T^k^^imMmffh mortar, M3metal olug is, believed that Mar urftftaj(fcjpiould deeign or this ine
Operation
:

Corps

The

plug is to prevent

the enemy

? f a r>ur"oose. from dropping grenades or explos

ives into the mortar barrel.

(t) On sixteen (16) tanks the tank commander's peris cope was lengthened, from 3 to 5 inches to gj/ve increa&ed vision. Eighteen (18) tanks had their deck escape hatch modified by cutting the hatch in two, hinging it to the deck armor and securing it from the incide. \ (v) Six (6.) other modifications were made on some tanks, there are only minor differences between these modifications but and others .already described*

(v)

This organization was provided with an adequate number of laaps and other intelligence da.ta for the Iwo Jima oper ation. Due to the great inaccuracy of the basic map, however; it Since or target designation. was of little use in reconnaissance extremely important for tank units to know as much detail it is as possible about terrain well in advance of feasable foot reconn aissance limits, it is recommended' that tank units be furnished daily (or as the progress of the attack dictates) the latest avail able, low-altitude, oblique aerial photographs with the target square system over printed... Beach conditions, as reported by UDT personnel, proved very inaccurate, however; if sufficient time had been allotted to Tank Battalion Beach Reconnaissance Teams, prior to the dispatching of the LSM's, it is believed that muoh of the difficulty encountered from soft sand could have been avoided.

4.

Communications for the Iwo Jima operation were exc for a general disregard for communication security. ellent Many rad It is believed this disregard stems from three sources: io operators were line duty personnel ) they had received very little communication training; all hands were relatively unfamiliar with new type radio equipment used during the operation. Satisfactory direct communication between assault tanks and assault infantry was provided by 3CR-300 (AN/VRC-3) radios within command tanks, and by the tank-infantry telephone system installed in each tank. In this connection, it is recommended that all tanks be equipped with S'CR 300 radios to prevent the loss of necessary communication which occurs when a command tank is disabled. Command tanks were made conspicuous by the AN/VRC-3 double antennae installation. The "*

5.

except

~i

,.. ''f*

-17
.
4

.
\

T* I

>
I,
?

'

Subject:

Operation

Report, Iwo Jima,

Ser>To. 34-45, dtd 18Apr45.

assigned proved
and repair was
This organization, with 107 radio
carried on within the battalion. equipments and with five control stations, which require the con
tinuous watches of well-trained operators, is authorized (see ref
erence (c) only four (4) CP- radio operators. Reference (c) auth
orized no message center or wire section personnel so line duty men have to be trained for these sections, and removed from their normal
jobs. The SCR-510 radio equipment when employed as an SCR-509 port
able field 'set lacks a satisfactory pack -carry for ultra-portable
("walkie-talkie") operation. It is recommended that b suitable pack
carry for the radicr transmitting and receiving equipment BC-620 be
designed. It is further see commended that a cord CD-509 be used to
permit the battery case CS- 79 to be carried in the left hand. The
communications range (in,miles) of the SCR-510 radio equipment em ployed in vehicular operation willprobably prove insufficient for It is recommended that liaison purposes in a moving situation. the Tables of Basic Allowances be changed to provide one (1) SCR r 508 radio equipment per Tank Company and. two (2) SCR-508 radio equip^ ments for Headquarters and Service Company. It is further recommend ed thrit suitable 'dynarr.otcrs and' mounts be provided for 12-volt veh icular operation of the above radios. The use of 4x4 1/4 'ton truck? transport." vehicular r*l'Lo sets proved- unsatisfactory at Iwo Jima 'to due to volcanic ssh in which vehicles bogged down even when equip ' ped with chains. It is recommended that the Tables of Basic Allow changed to provide one cargo carrier M-29C (weasel) per ances be do mo any. It is further recommended tht these weasels be equipped with 12-volt power sources. The BA-70 or BA-80 battery-packs are only suitable types of power sources for ultrp-port able oper the ation of the SCR-300 radio equipment. In 9 tank (equipped with batteries) a vibrator power supply would serve to eliminate stor^ere of battery-pack operation. the numerous disadvantages It is there fore recommended that a rugged 6, 12 and 24 volt input vibrator power unit for SCR--30Q radio equipment be designed. The careful' equipping and stocking of a radio maintenance trailer for each company enabled this b^fc tall ion to do its own radio repair work. No sign?! equipment from thr Fourth Tank Battalion was turned in to the Division Signal Roor..ir Section. This Battalion's Communication Section was pble to assist the Third and Fifth Tank Battalions in radio maintenance work. Without the maintenance trailers this could not have been accompLi shed. It is recommended that a standard rad io maintenance trailer be designed and that the Tables Of Organiza tion be revised to provide one'(l) per company.
'

system of radio nets (circuits) anc frequencies adequate. Highly satisfactory radio maintenance

As stated before in LSM's at the base spite of all LSH's receiving are probably the best normal

embarked

6.

difficulties .present
/

all tanks of this organization were

camp. All tanks beached safely, in
many artillery and mortar hits. LSM's
means for lanlttfa|^|}k6f| A^lpfpfl * ; themselves-: pI i P 4
'

llnif

'\

'^

lr*

'"ifflfeW?'^**
(a)

Rccor", Iwo Jima.

SerNo 34-45, dtd 18Apr45.

Due to tnz; LSK-s small size and its uncovered tank deck, it trkeo a grer.i deal o.f spray, pnd some sea, aboard even in relatively c^lm waters, In spite of liberal pnd frequent applicat preventive, considerable rust and deterioration results ions of rust to the suspension system.

(b) The LSI' is an extremely rough rider, even in little sea wpy, ncl most of the embarked troops were se s -sick a e-ood prt of the" time. Quarters for troops are cramped with no space avail Health, combat efficiency and morale able for school or exercise. suffered as a result.
p

(c) Due to the fact thst LSM's travel in the tractor groups, briefing, conferences, coordination- snd liaison between tank and infantry units are rendered very difficult. It is believed that most of these difficulties could be overcome by transporting tanks from the base to the raost forward staging area in AF's, LSD's (not 1 LGM leaded) or even LST's and then transferring them co LSM's for the final, short move to the objective.
Surrpliee. in Clrss I, IIand IV were adequate through On Teg -clus Ten (10) days a fifty (.50) ver cent allowance of clothing v/r& issued to trooDS. Individual equipment lost or destroyed, was r^'ienlshed the same day. On Dog t)lus Twentyone (21) dr./s clothing was issued to twenty-five (25) t>er cent of f H the troops in the great oot need c The Battalion wp.s subsisted' on 'K fl rations for the first two days and on "G rations and some 10-IN-ONE On Dog plus Seventeen (17) days, through Dog plus Sixteen (15) days. oor table flyt>roef galleys were set wo in each company area, and af

7. out the

operation.

H 3" rations were issued. an inspection by the Battalion Surgeon, Ammunition, as usual, w?s plentiful with the exception of 75 mm HE As a result this organization was forcsd to use nor supercharge. charge HE which is normally used in the 75 mm tank gun only for mal indirect' fire missions, The following ammunition was expended by the Fourth T a nk Battalion during the operation:

ter,

Onliber .30, beltc-J 75 mm gun, HE, woer charge 75 mm sun, >C, with PD fuse HE, norcr.l- choree 75 mm sun, ' 75' om gun, P,
T

1, 316, 575 rounds.

1, 895 rounds. 1, 395 rounds. '3, 882 rounds. 1, 472 rounds.
'"

48 fuse
yfi^U

-19

Subject:

Operation

Report.

Iwo Jima. SerNo. 34-45, dtd 18A0r45. .50 num

No accurate

count ws made of caliber .45 ball or ammunition expended, but very few rounds were fired* ber of T 105 fus^s were ejcponded,

'
?

I small

Iwo, or Cue to the rugged terrain 8. Infantry-tank tactics had to be abandoned. Tank tactics thodox were improvised, snd in many cases basic principles of employment This was never done b: cause of ignorance of were disregarded. fundamentals; it was done because the tactical situation warrant ed certain calculated risks* Tank units ware e*ger to suroort the infantry,, -nd they did everything physically and mechanically doss ible to furnish that, support If it is certain that tank support of infantry and vice versa was less on Iwo than in -previous operat ions, it is equally certain that the terrain encountered made this Errors were made by tank units situation a foregone conclusion. and by the infantry units they were supporting, but these errors were realized- at the time/ m d corrective measures were immediate Some tactical errors were easily traceable to the ly initiated. loss of so many key personnel in both the RCT's and the Tank Bat talion.
9. combat lessons, ommendations.

Experience

\^;.: encountered on

gained on Iwo Jima, weighed with previous

justifies the following additional comments and rec

(a) Tank, -*rir,y, medium, M4A3 should be replaced by Tank

he*vy, M 26 (also known as Tank, Army, medium T 26, T 26-E1
Army, k4 series tanks are extremely vulnerable
and Ok.nerrl Pcrshing). fire, magnetic mines, shape charges and field artillery. to 4? mrr> AT This if e^peci^lly true in operations against a well manned, heavily fortified position, or in a slow movinp* situation over difficult terrain wher? the -YA loses its maneuverability. The gun 75 mm M3, nri^pr'y arr.airi^nt of the YA. series tank is not effective Tank, th^ reinforced concrete positions. The M 4 against well constructed. series t^nk, with its increased weight from many modifications and suspension system has to much its narrow track and bogie- volute pressure successfully negotiate loose sand or heavy go to ground The M26 presents the following advantages ing. over the M4.

It is shorter, wider and lower, presenting a

lower sillouettej in spit a of this, it weighs 44 tons, the addit
ional weight being caused by increased armor* Since it is now
evident that YA series tanks can not srfely be loaded in LCM's, i
Jtfg tke -M26 in Aim
this increased weight wouxd not effect

(1)

"

.'

.':' SMo^JiJcri Report, Iwo~~ Jima. Ser No..34-45, dtdlBApr4s. . f-f''-^f- * #'""$*
*"~

(2) Till' #p'fjEravels at the .as peH. ; the M4 7 design shourd give- it greater 'maneuverability end the former's "' .action.

a^nfo

'

(3) The primary armament of the M26 is a high vel gun, which should be much more effective against fort enemy than the 75 mm. ified positions
ocity 90
khj

(4) The M 26 has torsion "bar suspension with six (6) lla-rc independently sprung fogies and very wide tracks which should give it excellent floatation.

The K26 has a rear drive sprocket. The M4 ( s prominent front drive sprocket is very vulnerable to shell fire and is easily damaged in breaching obstacles. The number of tanks in a platoon should.be increased to four (4) including one Bulldozer, tank mounting. This would en able the Platcon Leader to employ his platoon as sections in assaul The dozer is invaluable, and is essential on fortified positions. in heavy going. The present allov/^nce of one dozer ver company is wo c fully inad c quat c ,

(5)

(b)

oroviding- on 2 E 4-5 -ocr section.

(c) Th-: CB. !TJ :"lpma throw c r ws -nrob^bly the most val single vea^on c-nro^oy^d on Iwo Jimp in s-nite of considerable mechanic-1 failures. It is recommended that a four (4) tsnk t>l~ toon of CB, TSFI or .Gimllar firm? throwing tank .be added to It is further recommended TO F~^6 that a-^ rOr>riate maintenance servicing e-TuiDiaent tools and s-oare T)?rts be t>rovided.^ The and present allowance of TZ 4-5 flame throwr-rs is adequate and would lend itself well to the platoon organization mentioned in (b) above,
uable
t

(d)
added stacles.

to TO F-76 for reduction of

x \

Gnc- tnnk-niount'. d 7-.S inch rocket launcher should be fortified positions and tank ob

(b) The CinCPCA unit of fire is inadequate in that it too little HE =-ni too much j\P contains Most firing ?s in all past operations, w?9 done wix;h HE- It is recommended th*t the- unit of fire for c. mecium trnk ehould be:

-21

WCMSSfF/FP

r&

V* i- %z

61 U QCSOOS69I. C

illlkl?fl\\^ Ml1 11 1 11 1 Ml 111 . v\ IH winVwrr T -4

MJI lm-irlifr WB*M. 1 M
V II Sq*.*^

'

SX 'HIHOMN3AV3HIHOd SX 'HIHOMN3AV3TidOd AHVban HOHV3S3H swuv aaNiawoo

-.

Subject:

Operation

Report,

Iwo Jlma. ScrNo. 34-45 ,dtdl8Apr45. fuse

25 rounds 0 rounds 10 rounds

75 rounds

- 75 "mm HE, supercharge /|M *48 - 75 mm APC, J/BD fuse ftfeSiJl. - 75 mm Uannlster. - 75 mm IT (Siroke).
T

If cpnnister is not available, 90 rounds 30 rounds 10 rounds Present

- 75 - 75 - 75

then the recommended

T

unit isj

ram HE, supercharge,

mm AFC,

fuse K6641. mm W (Smoke)*

'

V/BD

J/M

48 fuse

fjlow?.nces of caliber .30, caliber 45 end caliber .50 T ": oriL?.l charge KE for indirect fire r;;i^sions could be ?re adequate. p sin? 11 sudolv in division dumiDS when needed. Con obtained from crete fuse T-105 should be included in the tank unit of fire.

(f) Headquarters and Service Comoany maintenance sect ion' should be eviuiyped with a tank recovery vehicle M3283 to fac ilitpte recover and repair. In many instances on Iwo Jima two retrievers were needed on recovery missions, and two were seldom available. (g) Dse-o water fording kits were installed on all tanks, 1* The but were not need jd *"-s ?11 vehicles h^d a dry ramp on landing. adax>t;r stacks, which r-:r-\}.^ed on the tanks, afforded -orotection for tpnk engines nnd r^diPtors from near miss roortpr and artillery bursts. It i? rocoirirrnc . a chpt deet) wter fording kits be furnish ed s>nd installed r^ior to v.\/?vy .amnhibious o-oeretion whether or not and hydrogr^ohic information indicate their necessity reconnaissance
f

(h) It is r:.coirin?-nded that tank battalions be authorized (4) LVT 3's on the b-sis of one per company to replace four (4) four 2 1/2 ton 6x6 trucks. This would give tank" units a vehicle cap rearming nd refueling them ov:r very Trough terrain or loose able of sand, and before b:ach and. road conditions could be improved for wheeled vehicles. (i) Cn; lieutenant, H2conna.issa.nce and Liaison Officer, In order to properly coordinate in should' be added to TO ?-76 fantry-tank attacks it is .essential thrt a tank liaison officer be with each assault BIT and' at the ROT CP- The addition of one officer would make this nossibla, Th.: Company Executive Officer OP, and the Hrconnais^nce ' and liaison Officer -uld brr r-ont to the the Mrintenanoe Jffic-.r to each of thejLT's in a normal attack

I
Ji

<:

(j) The Commrnding Offlp^r of Company should hold r CrJor fnd his executive officer v.^hfli^ii^ rQtilWlmm'w* %

a^anfc

-22-

uNtwsiro

UNITED STATES ..PACIFIC FLEET

AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

W0

JI

TIRST SUPPLEMENT TO N.AKPO SH O T O INFORMATION BULLETIN

NO.1M-44. 10 OCTOBER 1944

- wi" -*
CTNCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN NO. 9 - 4 5 10 JANUARY

SEP 271945

Supplement No

CINCPOA Bulle ****** f i M f *

"

"" ~

10 Jan.. IS45

OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ^. # , ... . , ^ ,. * , , , . . . , , . . ; , . . . . . . .,. . , . . . -. 1

PART. I ^ . M I L i r A R Y

SURVEY ^ . .....*......:.. ................. . .

1 - 1 1

F O R T I F I C A T I O N S . . ..... . . . . . . . . . , - . . . . , . . , . . . . . , . . . . 1 - 3
O b s e r v e d D e f e n s e s . . . . . . . - . . , , : . . , . . . . - - <1
R e p o r t e d D e f e n s e s * . . . . . .... . , - ..*.- , l - * 2
Infantry Defenses * . r ^ . . . . . . , 2
Air Defenses . * * . . . . Z
C o a s t D e f e n s e s v . . . ^ > . . . . . . ... .-. - 3

ESTIMATED PLAI^ OF D E F E N S E . . .. . . . - . . . .
General* ...... .
t.

...

..

. .-.

# ?

Disposition as determined from the

Organization of the Ground . . . . . .
Description of Defense Areas

Area A . . . ,
f

, . . . . . . , . . 6

f r

Area 3 . . #

. . . 6-7

A r e a D . . . . . , , , . , . . . . , . . , . 7
Reserve Area * . ?^8 Caves* . . . t 8

TAKK AND BEACH OBSTACLES # . , . . , . , . . . . ,

G-eneral , . . , 9
Antitank Ditches and Holes . .9^-10

Gasoline Drums Small H o l e s , Wire . . . . . Landing Craft. . . . , . . , , * , . , . . . # . 1 0

. * . . . . . . . , 1 0
. . . . . . . . . . * . 1 0 - 1 1
, , , 1 1

PART I I ^ NEARSHORE, BEACH, AND S O I L 0 O J J D I T I O N 3 . .. 1 2 - 1 4

NEAHSHORE CONDITIONS OFF THE MAIN BEACHES OF

1W0 JIHA f . . . . . . , . . . . , , *

BEACH CONDITIONS OF. I?0 JIMA.^ * . m # . >,., * , f 13

Soil Texture , . . 1 3
Soil Material. f . . . * . % . , , , . . . 1 3
Physical Properties t # f % 1 3
. Traffic^bility * * . * , ... * . . % ^ 1 3
. Engineering.Properties ,.. . . #, t,f, . . 1 3
, Compaction and Stabilization * * . . * . 1 3
Excavation # * * f . f . % . 1 3
SOIL CONDITION INLAND FROM THE B E A C H -*..,. ..., . .* . . 1 4
.

\\M<

Supplement No. 1 to CINCPAC CQ&A "" "

10 Jan.- 1945

This publication is Supplement No. 1 to CIKCPAC-CINCPOA

Bulletin Ho.. 122-44, NANPO SHOTO (Volume One). The informa tion contained herein, pertaining to IWO Jima only, is
divided into two parts.*
Part I is a revised estimate of enemy defenses on IVJO
Jima. Enclosure (A), ^Revised Map of Military Installations
and Troop Dispostions as of 3 December 1 9 4 4 % is a folded
enclosure of this report. (FOB ERRATA NOTE SEE PAGE ELEVEN.)
Part II contains a report on Nearshore, Beach and Soil
Conditions of.BfO Jima. Enclosure (3) consists of approxim ate profiles of nearshore bottom on the west side of*IWO
Jima and a map locating the areas discussed herein. This
material - r s prepared-by Engineering and Terrain Intelligence
-a Team, U.S. G-eolc'gical Survey, presently attached to JICPOA.

PART I
SURVEY
FORTIFICATIONS

Observed Defenses 4 24 6 44 33 39 1524 13 4 (as derived from study of photos)

CD
DP . ;
empty DP positions auto AA (twin mount)
auto AA (single.mount)
pillboxes
KG- positions ;
open artillery oositions
covered artillery -oositions
covcrec. artillery positions under
construction
6 probable rocket launcher positions

, .

Reported Defenses

(as derivod from captured documents

and tables of equipment of
assigned defense units)

12 4 4 14 6 10 9 8 jO 18 24-36 54 138

15/24 cm mortars (most probably 2L cm)

15 cm CD
14 cm CD
12 e aDP
r 90 mm or 81 mm mortars
8 cm DP
' 75 mm mountain guns
75 mm field guns .. . . . '
^0 mm how3,tzers (81 mm mortars maybe
be substituted for 70 mm howitzers)
37 mm antitank guns
37 or 47 mm antitank guns
tvin mount 25 mm a.uto AA
7.7 mm heavy machine guns

Supplement No. 1 to_CI!^PAG~ CIN(Sp$4| E^^et$n*$cVXE!|-$4, '

340 4 20 10 6 13,500 battle
map,)

^ B B I
^10 Jan. 1945

7.7 mm light machine guns

flame throwers
medium tanks
light tanks
searchlights
personnel (for detailed crier of
information, see table on,enclosed

Comparison of the aerial photographs taken on 2 September

1944 with those of 3 December 1944 indicates that the I f t O
Jima garrison is carrying out an intensive construction
*orogram. This program iricludes the strengthening oi 4 T '

the dual-purpose guns was effected by :VJV-

i . . t e heavier guns from the south end of the island to
rg .h the north end, There are no ThdicatiDriG that the garrison
has been reinforced, and *the general plxi for defense
appears to remain unchanged.
Mines have beon planted and tank anr1 boat obstacles
have been constructed extensively along the main beaches and
inland,.-particularly in the southern part of the island.
Barbed r';ire entanglements have been observed- only in a few
olaces; however, it has been reported that a quantity of wire
was or hr.nd in April 1944.
Infantry Defenses. The heaviest concentration of in fantry defenses on IKC Jima is in the southern half of the
island in the vicinity of Airfields No. 1 and Mo. 2 and the
food beaches in that area. The northern half "itii its rough
const and unfavorable- landing areas has less heavy entrench- menus, the defenses being confined to works of limited
extent at the narrow beach at the north end. of the island
and outposts elsewhere along the rugged coastline.
Air Defenses. Heavy concentrations of automatic anti aircraft jans are located in the area of the two operative
airfields. The concentrations of dual-purpose.guns (8 cm
ai.d 1? cm) are between the airfields and north of Airfield
In addition to the 25 ii twin-mount automatic anti ?n aircrT.ft listed in the tcubul^tion of reported weapons, the
autbmctic antiaircraft batter-ie-s a^ear to consist of single-
mount 25 i m and 13 mm, of usual type. There is also the
u probability that- 20 m a aircraft automatic "uns have been
; taken frora planes and adapted, on Improvised ground mounts,
for antiaircraft missions". This has "been observe^ to be a
cocunon practice of Ihe Japaneea in augmenting the antiair craft defenses of their airfields or seaplane bases.
Many of the automatic antiaircraft batteries, though
installed primarily for antiaircraft defense, urobably may
be utilized ap.ainst personnel and landing craft.

\\

Supplement No. 1 to CINCPACCIKCPCA B u l l e t i n No. 122-44

".;" "'

W Jan,

Coast Defenses* $*6ur cdast defense pruns and 24 dual-

purpose guns have been observed,' Four other coast defense
guns have been, reportea, but they have not. been de.tected in
the aerial Photographs taken up to 3 December 1944, Large
emplacements, 'classified as covered artillery emplacements,
have been constructed along the teach in the southern portion
of the island. Some of these are nossibly easeraated coast :
defense guns. However,i many bear striking resemblance to concrete "positions found on SAIPAI* which housed field guns
err/ployed in antiboat and coast defenae missions.

;j f-\

Supplement No. 1 to CiNCPAC ^CINCPOA Bulletin No, 122-44 f '-09

10 Jan, 1945
-:

ESTIMATED PLAN OF

- the -ground : . on IWO JIMA inifcwes that' the Japane'se garrison- there Is
applying the lessons learnedly their ill-fated garrisons-on
islands already occupied by us*. Their beach defenses are
organized 'in depth, and the tactical localities are covered
by extensive antitank defenses and by what appears to be a
carefully worked put "fire net". The fire net, so-called by
the Japanese, combines the fire of machine guns laid on final
protective lines with that of the light artillery of the in fantry units, similarly sited to lay down flanking fire upon
the beaches.
There is no evidence to indicate a massing of artillery
beyond that of batteries. Past experience has indicated that
the Japanese infantry is reluctant to forego close support "oy
the artillery in favor of general support by massed guns.
Of especial note is the fact that the field ^orks are
adequate for only four out of the nine infantry battalions
known to be on the island. The five battalions in reserve
therefore are available for counterattack, probably locally
as soon as a landing has succeeded, and in a general all-cut
counterattack which should take place D-night if the doctrine
laid down in documents captured on PELELJU is followed,
Above all it is to.be noted that the Japanese are leorn ing bow to fight defensively and how to get away from the
rigid perimeter defense that they had so fixedly adhered to
until recently. They are beginning to understand the advant ages of an active, fluid defense and the uselessness of beat ing against our well established beachheads* In consequence
it may be expected that if their plans for counterattack fai-i to dislodge a landing, the remnants will fall back into the
high pround in the center of the i8land and carry out the
"cornered rat" defense encountered on PELELIU*
Their antitank tactics and their antitank guns thus far
have proved inadequate. The extensive use of antitank mines
and traps, combined with "close quarter attack units" using
hand-placed antitank charges, and the uae of field and moun tain guns in antitank roles, are their present solution to
this problem. It is probable that the covered artillery em placements, which are located at the rear of the flanks of
many of the combat groups, contain 37 or 47 mm antitank guns.
Likewise, infiltration probably will be undertaken " y raiding
b units with the mission of knocking out command posts and com munications, and to destroy artillery, tanks, and mortars
with explosives. Such tactics may be supplemented by counter-
landings from landing craft or by swimmers. Such landings
have b#eri planned in ether areas, to coincide with the landing
of our last wave or to occur during dusk or early darkness*
Disposition as determined from the Organization of the
It appears that IWO JIMA probably has been
divided into four Defense Sectors, as shown on the accompany
ing Military Installations and Troop Dispositions Map, One
battalion of the reported garrison appears to be committed

Hf , ^ ^ M # M %

Suppiemen
OiOOA B
.*" ? * < *

a m 1946

to defensive positions in each of the four sectors, with the

remaining five battalions held in mobile reserve probably in
the north end of the island in the vicinity,of the -Headquart ers Area* ; . < ,
As previously reported, the principal concentration of
entrenched forces is in the southern end of the island where
both-east and west coasts provide unbroken landing beaches. .
approximately 4,000 yards in length. These positions, con-,
sisting of pillboxes and entrenched rifle positions, are
organized in depth and provide all-around defense. They
appear to have been extended and strengthened since the report
. . .
based upon the aerial photographs e f 2rSeptember 1'944. r .However, this should not be construedto Indicate % rein~
forcement of the garrison 'forces* .The. addled positions a p " / p - / .
ear to be alternate and secondary positions for the three
battalions whose primary positions were previously, observed.
in these Sectors, Definite gaps between units stand out
particularly in the beach area, but these appear to. be cov erable by the fire of automatic weapons and rifle fire from
squad positions. Also, the photographs of later date reveal
that some machine gun positions formerly reported as open em~
placements have since been pillboxed* Still more positions
no doubt,will be covered and strengthened as time permits^
The positions in depth are Iocate4 so as to be able to
deliver fire at the waterfs edge. Covered emplacements for
mobile artillery and antiboat guns dispersed along the. high
ground ,back from the beaches appear to have been increased
in number* Numerous, covered artillery, emplacements have
been constructed and are under construction at the beach. Some of those positions are dispersed among the infantry
positions ard nome are situated" at the beach around the^ cra ter, sited to fire flanking fire along the main beaches*
The positions in t . south end of the island have been
he strengthened by the extensive use of antitank and beach mines
and obstacles. Minefields appear to have been laid along the
south beaches forward of the troop positions, Mines and
antitank ditches have been used to close gaps between units,
and to deny arr>roaches to the Interior and rear of the . .
positions* . .
In the north end of the island where the coastline is
rugged and broken by steep rocky cliffs, there apparently .
. has.-been li'ttle or no change in the infantry positions.
The beach at the extreme north and flanked on Tioth .sides by
rocky cliffs still contains the only visible concentration
of troops found in the north end of the island* The defenses
of this beach appear t o " e positions for approximately one
" b battalion, deployed three companies .abreast~ along the beach,
strengthened by automatic weapons emplaced in pillboxes and/,
prepared positions on the embankment*overlooking the beach V
and able to deliver fire'onto the beach* The rocky coast line flanking this beach on both sides s.till appears relativ ely free of defensive installations.- There are no indications
of strengthening or extending the previously reported posi tions, which appeared to have been prepared for.small put-
post or machine gun units covering beaches and small draws
ifhih penetrate the cliffs. This is probably due ,to the fapt

Supplement N <

_
w

CINCPOA BulljlMmm 922m~

~~

"

TtTJan, 1945

that the rugged terrain provides natural firing positions

for the riflemen committed to the beach defense in these
sectors*
Reserve forces of the reported garrison consisting of
approximately five battalions probably are held in a mobile
status;,-1 be shifted into sectors under attack for the -pur pose of reinforcement and counterattacks
Qesprlption of Defense Areas Area A. This area covern
the southern flank of both the vulnerable landing areas on
the.-island. The battalion defending this sector has construc ted a well developed center of resistance with the strong
points designed for all round defense and connected by a net work of communication trenches.
One company has taken up positions around the north side
of the orator and along the beach on the northeast and north . west s t . s of the crater * Automatic weapons of the, unite of
ife this company on the beach are emplaced in pillboxes' and are
sited so as to be able to fire either to the eouth or do*m
the good beaches to lay down mutually supporting enfilade
fire in front of the adjoining company.
Within this strongpoint, below the crater on the north western side, are six clover leaf shaped emplacements. These
are probably 29cm (8in,)rocket launchers, though they may be
for 150 m r "mortars.
i Another company, organized with two platoons forward
and one in support, is entrenched along the east bea.oh in
the north end of Area A, The terrain Immediately behind the
east beach rises gently to the crest. The support platoon
and automatic weapons are emplaced on this slope behind the
beach positions and can deliver fire onto the beach,
A third company is organised along the west beach with
three platoons abreast. The bulk of the company appears to
be emplaced in a line of defense along the commanding ground
which rises abruptly just inland from the beach. However,
e l * & positions sited in depth, but not connected, have been
-ui prepared in the northern part of the company area. These
positions appear to provide the flank defense for the north
flank of the battalion sector's western beach. The position
of this company is connected with the,other units of the area
by a-network'of communication trenches,
3 tn Apea J. This area occupies " ' e northern three-f oufcths
of the western beach area and appears to be defended by a
battalion with three companies abreast. Each company is
organized in depth, but they do not appear to have placed as
much emphasis on all-around defense as have the units in
Ararui A and C,
The beach in the southernmost company's defensive sector,
is narrow, and the terrain rises abruptly inland to a steep
embankment This company is deployed with two platoons en-.
trenched ?t the beach and the third platoon entrenched on the
. bluff overlooking the beach behind the southernmost platoon.
From thece positions the third platoon is able to deliver

1H7T945

flanking tiv^^fhvJftM^gl^mWeen platoons

In the northern end of Area B the beach becomes much' ' .

. wi'der.and the terrain inland from the beach rises much less
abruptly* This part'of the area is defended by two compan ies of the battalion, each deployed with twoplatoons forward
and oneplatoon in support. The forward platoons have pre*"
pared entrenched positions in depth along the beach and on
the :r<ntle elope behind the beach. The* reserve platoon of
each company- has prepared supporting positions along the
bluff overlooking^the beach. These entrenchments apparfntly
contain theprincipal automatic firepower. They are situated
no ao to be able to deliver fire onto the beach. There is a
possibility that additional infantry from the*garrison reserve
has been committed to the defenses in this area.
0. This area occupies the northern two-thirds of
the eastern'beach area and appearn to be defended by a batta lion r>rith three companies abreast* Each strong point is organ ised in'depth with twoplatoons forward and one platoon in
support, and'providing altaround defense for each company as .
veil, as for the battalion, the gaps between the battalion
areas andbetween the o^n^p4s 'dthin the area are covered
by automatic weapons ar*4 r?*&?X vmits entrenched to cover the
gaps with riffle fire.''$f jfttpport platoons of each company
"tci are entrenched on the slope behind the forward platoons" and
located oo as to be able either to deliver fire~ at the
water's edge or to counterattack to assist the forward
platoons* The extending and strengthening of positions
observed in recent photographs hasbeen most conspicuous in
this area* Alternate and secondary positions have been
prepared* Covered artillery emplacements have been installed
on the slope back of the rifle positions. A program is in
progress for the construction of concrete positions along
the beach which probably will contain mobile artillery for
antlboat missions.
Area, D This area comprises the entire northern part
o f the inland* One battalion appears to be committed to the
. defense of this section and has its"three companies in line
along the rough coastline of precipitous cliffs andbluffs.
which are cut by one narrow beach, at the northern end of
the island* The one narrow beach has rough inland approaches
which rice to a bluff a few hundred yards from thewaters
edge* This beach is defended by an estimated company in
field works at the beaches, backed by additional positions
inland on the bluff. The latter positions probably arelarge ly for the battalion supporting weapons. The two other
companies, flanking the" aforementioned, apparently are
divided into small detachments covering drawn and ravines
that cut up through the cliffs extending on around the island
from the northern beach.
Reserve Area* Documentary evidence (dated April 1944)
indicated the location of the reserve area as shown on the
map, and in all probability the garrison reserve (of five
battalions) is stil}. located in this area in the center of
the north part of the island* This reserve force probably
has been retained near the Headauarters area andunder

Supplement No. 1, to- (KCIACl^fCPOA BulletA| f|s f - f S ^

_ , ' .
.*

HTJan. 1945

Headquarters control, to be used for counterattack and rein forcement in areas against which an,assault is launched. It
is. estimated that from this location.the reserves can reach
any part of the island on foot vithin one hour. However the
presence of the many revetments- for trucks ar>d other vehicles
indicates that motor transportation may be available to the
reserve forces. Since on several islands recently occupied
by u l 3 s was the plan of''the Japanese garrison to'launch an
f. # all out counterattack on D-night, before, our forces have had
time to thoroughly organise their beachhead, it is probable
that'on this island also the Japanese plan to. use their re?-*
erve, similarly. .
Caves. It appears thflt the enemy".has taken full ad-.'
vantage of the suitability of the rugged terrain for the .
preparations of caves and other cemi-rnaturfil shelters for the
protection of personnel, stores, and ammunition against
aerial and r.aval bombardment.. These shelters or caves are
diapers.ed throughout the r.orth end, of. the. island. Some are
isolated or appear to be related to a " isolated unit or
n" installation. Others are concentrated near building and
barracks areas. There ara three" notable concentrations of
CPVGG as 3hox:n'or: the accompanyi^gr map.

Supplement t:oi I to GINCPAC-*

C1N0PQA Bulletin ICo, 122*44

10 Jan. 1945

island, tank -fad*Wacn mines and obstacles have been en k W

ployed extensively* The location of these defenses is
shown on jSr-closure (A) by overprinting .in red.

GenerajU i, !&&%>^k^$

ajaLsMe level end of the

In addition to the construction of tank obstacles

along the beach and approaches inland, the garrison has
constructed antitank defenses between the two operative
air strips. Tliis second line of tank traps appears intend ed to limit the inland penetration of our tanks and to serve
as a barrier from behind which, counterattacks na3r be launch ed.
Antitank Ditches and"Holes, V-type antitank ditches
have been prepared throughout the level portion of the
island', at the beach, and inland covering the avenues of
tank approach to the more vital installations. (For loca tion and distribution of tank ditches see Enclosure (A).
The30 obstacles often consist- of a line of unconnected,
short segments of trench.
In some places inland from the beach, tank ditches
have been prepared in a broken line, the length of the
segments of ditch being 20-3C test and the interval be-
tween ditches being approximately 20 feet. In tiost places
where this type of ditch has been resortea to, there also
appear holes approximately 10 feet in diameter, located
soviet Ames in the interval between the short ditches, and
at other times in a staggered pattern forward of or be hind the interval between ditohes. It may be that these
holes have bean- blasted out to close gaps in the barrier,
or preparatory to the lengthening of the ditches. However,
it is also possible that immediately prior to a threatened
landing the enemy will bury perhaps as heavy as 500 lb.
bombs, nose up, in these holes as improvised mines.
Holes as described in the preceding paragraph also
are observed to be dug, or blasted, in a continuous line,
. and not as a part of an intermittent ditch system. Locat ed principally in the area northwest of the East Boat
Basin,'-approximately 500 yards inland, these may be either
the preparations for a complete chain of inverted bomb
nines or the result of initial blasting to simplify the
construction of a tank ditch. Short lines of holes of
this type also are found in connection with two sections
of antitank ditch on the eastern beach, about 400 yards
southwest of the East Boat Basin.
Recently dated captured documents on the defense of
other islands reveal that instructions had been issued
for the placing cf bombs, nose up, fused and armed, dur ing the night before the landing; the timing being de signed to prevent destruction of the minefield by our
bombardment, These empty holes on IWO J 1 I may well be
T/A the preparations for sueh minefields.

Supplement _ CINCPOA BulleTiiTNO. 122-44 . Throughout the' island there are alc-o nature! bar riers to tanks provided by terrain features, spne of which
have been rendered more effective by digging. These are
considered natural barriers and are not covered in this
re.'ort. .
Gasoline Drums. Fartially buried gu no-line druns are
observe^ at the"waterfs edge on both the east and we&t
teaches ill the scuthwestern part of the island. These are
placed in systematic design an4 regularly spaced,"with
intervals of 15-20 yards between drums. On the east1 beach
the minefield is generally two'drums deep. However, on
trie ws>st beach the doj-th .varies from one to-tliree drur\e,
depending presumably on *Am suitability .for^-landing on
the particular section of beach. This typs" of obstacle presents a -ntenber of possibil ities. CIL'CFAC-CINCPOA Translations No. 6, 27 Kovmber
1944/ pages 69, 70, 71, 72, contain detailed instruction .
to *>,he encriy for employing gasoline to check laming for ces. The drums on T./O JIJIA. may be wired for electrical
ignition'with the intentiou.either of the burnir-.g gasoline
running out over the water to check lending craft, or of
/ ignition at the rxocent t!r.; arapaili.ous tractors or-tanks
reach land to make a wall of firo before thera. An under* ground observation poc-t (indicated on the overlay by an
open triangle)Was observed on the west beach. This ob servation post is located in the center of the greatest
concentration of drums, has a view of the uitire west
beach, and appears to have no particular relationship to
ti>e': other groana defenses in tiic area. It is possible
that this position contains the control'sys tem for the various circuits taat will ignite the drums.
Ther'e is also the possibility that these "drum-iuines"
be erxuippca witn pull-type detonatorc, with attached trip
wires, which would ignite the drums when either personnel
or :tanks came in contact .with the wire.
Small Holes/ Tners are fields of snail holes'in 'sys teraatic p^Xteras located on bho e&ut beoch and at other places inland. These hcles ere approximately three feet in. d^a metsr and, &ltho\-t?h empty, aro c*d3uiV,le for burying a number of y p j of /.ilnos, ' or antipersonnel,' inc inverted 150 lb, bombs p ^ioud-nose upj'--fused, and armed. Inland, hol^s of' this j?.e can be' found along the shoulders of TJUUL in th;: urea of the southern air field. No .reat number or thoae c-.n be seen, but the use of minds, eeperial3y.:those improvised froa^-boubs cmplaced in the sbculucr^ of roarlo, is standard Jap-.jrer-e practice, and they c m bo expected to bo encountered at intervals through the 1 G l d Wire. Barbed ' . i e ent'.-r^.Ierients are visible along
.'r some of the snaller beaoiiOJ^ i - the northern section cf
r the island. It is not possible to say, j.udgiiv from the
available photos, whether or not wire has besrj creot-ed
along tho two main (oast Rnd wost) beaohos, although there
are some shadowy incicat*lory that rdcht' bo^low wire or
merely high-water narko. ^
10

Supplement No. 1 tq^StfpPAC CINCFOA Bulletin Iiri#Ife r H

., aro

available at n ^ r b y islands for poas&jbl^ us,e..in attempts

to reir:.foroc this island, Distances to nearby islands
would otratch tho cruising s^pigSh/of the Japanese largo
landing barge, but numerous fishing vessels and other
siuall seagoir^.v&5sef3.s,,|Qr:e:^iml^^:%^.ph%-9.-strinQ, of
islands. T A G capacity of this*large 'type'landing barge
is 7 0 m o n . " * %^r.r*v r~.L

mm

12 lar^P .typir rlandin^*barges South of t Bast Beet Tard

3 ISH; (264i0^)-.w-.?olcei;.-pii Vbaach

.west Post 'T ' '"'' ""

1 largo typefcarsos,..-^.6 in revettiaents

4 largo i-ypo tiirtv<'.it.probable i n covered shelters

North of .West 15oati Yard. ' ., 2 l a r g a * .typo'.', b a r g e s

_ _., .. ..'
.. .... , ' .
..: .

HAfiA JIHA (VD5^9J^11 Deci

33. lar^fee typo barges^
70. large type barges approx

In the t a b l e o f ' r e p o r t e d defenses of Enclosure (A) to' ParAt X - 'Revised iviap of I l i i i t a r y I n s t a l l a t i o n s and Troop Bis p o s i t i o n s an TvO JBiA as of-3 December 1944:r - t h e . c o r r e c t i o n s should "be -nade.: ...-.,.. . , - T.or 109th D i v i s i o n (-2nd I^izddBxi^ade).

Under 70 nm Eov/itzer-,. change \Z t o read Under 7^7 mi EMG,- olxa.nce 35 to : read:.2S .

For .26th Tank Hesi Under Iledium.Tanks, change 20 to r e a d 22* 'Chance t o t a l s a c c o r d i n g l y . ; :. ;...;""' . _ . 11

Supplement No* 1 to CINCPAC CINCPOA Bulletin No, 122*>44 |1 ' .. ; . . ; . .

_ 10 Jar*1941

> ^ ' ' PART II '

NEARSHORE,, BEACH, AND SOIL CONDITIONS

IWO JIHA
NEARSHORE CONDITIONS OFF THE MAIN BEACHES OF I0 JIKA
The two significant beaches of IWO Jima in the NANPO
SHOTO lie on either side of the tapering southwestern pen insula. The island rises rather abruptly from the surround ing sea floor. In general the nearshore slope off both
beaches is mild to gentle (l in 100 to 1 in 60, steepening
southward along each beach)* Further out the bottom has a
moderately steep slope (l in 15 to 1 in 20) to considerable
depths* ,
In detail the nearshore slope shows somer--irregularly
ties* The accompanying approximate profiles of the near-
shore bottom off the west beach show an offshore bar in
three out of five cases and a pronounced shelf in the other
two. Wave patterns indicate that the bar is fairly continu ous along parts of this beach* The approximate course of
the bar is shown on the accompanying map* The least depth
(at lowest low water) over the bar ranges from six to 18
feet, 12 or 13 feet being average. There appear to be two
high points, perhaps with six foot depths, one off the north
end (see Range A) and one off the south end of the beach*.
Outside the bar the steep offshore slope begins at about 20
foot depths* Inside.the bar,is a shallow trough. Inshore
from the trough the bottom slope is 1 in 40 to 1 in 30, belgg
steeper to the south. The slope of the beach up to the high
water line is probably about the same; above that the slope
is considerably flatter but in places the high water line is
marked by a one to three foot bank of sand* Near the north
end of the beach, basics and spits of loose sand occasionally
form at or just under the water level, interrupting the
bottom slope. These are transitory features; moreover,
there is every reason to believe that the main offshore bar
also shifts constantly. Hence, details on charts and pro files may not remain long in position*
In general the east beach resembles the west beach, and
an offshore bar is present along parts of it* Hovever, the
mild nearshore slope continues out to depths of 30 to 35
feet before breaking off, and there may be a second bar near
the edge of this shel*1. In addition the three rocks called
PUTATSU NE motrndt thd be&dK one1 ^Eird cf the distance
from its south end. These are shown on all raeps and charts,
The bar off the northeast end of the beach is Irregular and
probably rocky and continues northeast to the rocky point
3,000 feet east of the northeast end of the beach. Except
for this bar and the rocks, the offshore details may be
expected to shift.
Except near FUTATSU NE and off the extreme ends of the
beaches, the bottom is fine sand, fairly loose though gen erally net as loose as the sand above the high water line.
The sand is firmest after heavy storms* It is least firm
on the crests of bars or in srxnd banks and epits, especially

12

-"-

"

"

Supplement No* 1 td 011101sAfti CXNOJOA Bulletin No, 3"" f orm ed or a e' ,l9hlf t ing. rfepidly, B A H CONDITIONS OF IO ,JIMA .^ -. EC Soil Texture, Katerial of, s.ancl .size,. coarser than #05 m # and largely. l'net\'th^;l : .Bim/''fti.ef.pBhti9ra of the :beaches m a r ^ finer, textur4 than "the., iendeiv the south end near / SURIBACHI Yamahas;a/nar.row, ^iv^elly beach, ' Soil .Material*' The, sand i s coijippsed; o "fragment a l
volcanic "material, probably disintegrated lay^ with some
; . . .'... ,
ash. A gather easily abraded,materlal, ; . ,' : Physical Proper fries. Loose. sti*uctureloss sand.
?<>orly graded(narrow sie ; d i s t r i b u t i o n range). Very well
^drained; very high*peraeabi!ity; very.lo w moisture reten t i o n . Subject to wind\0roslon and to;water erosion in heairy r a i n s , Easily transported and eroded:.by waves and currents* Traffioabilitv> T&0 trafficabillty of this beach soil
is low for wheeled vehicles, especially when it is dry, Be*
cause of lack of fines (binder)~ and poor grading, traffic*,
ability is only slightly better when the sand is wet. It
also would be difficult and tiring to move over it rapidly
on foot. Movement for tracked vehicles should be easier.
It is recommended that r^ts, such as wire fence or light
landing mat, be used for &Ting vehicles ashore and for ,
temporary roads.
Engineering; Properties. (Evaluations in accordance
with Army Aviation Engineers Technical Handbook #5^255).
Classification; Poorly graded sand (SP aviation
engineers; A~3 public roads adminis^
tratlon).
Dry weight per cubic foot; fairly high (100 to 110
lbs.).
-Void ratio; fairly low (,45 to .55),
Porosity; fairly low (30 to 35$),
Moisture retention against gravity: low (less than
) , j).
Bearing ratio; (load supporting power in relation
to crushed stone; crushed stone supporting power
equals 100): 10 to 20.
Compaction and stabilization. Can be compacted best
by disking and ponding. Must be confined to serve as sub*
grade or foundation. Addition of binder (clay and fine
sand) should aid in stabilizing this material. If properly
compacted and confined should have fair load-supporting
power but for best results gravel or crushred rock should be
added, A bituminous binder might have a weak, but temporar
ily adequate, surface.
Excavation. Very easily dug by hand, but excavations
will not retain steep walls without support because of the
looseness and coarseness of the sand. In places along the
beach, ledges of hard rock may be encountered, chiefly near
ends.

Supplement j o , 1 to CXNCPAC
t-. CJ&CPOA Bulletin ~~~'
oil at higher inland locations is older,, has
weathered more and may be expected to contain more fines,
(binder)-./- The amount of fines in the soil increases pro**
gressively from*the beach inland* especially where there is
much vegetation. The soil probably becomes more trafficable
accordingly, although the major part of the central ridge of
the island is somewhat sandy* The wide north end of the
island is covered with clay and stony clay sails, which are
very variable in depth* Bare rock is exposed in many plaaes
and in low, level places the soil jnay be as much 5s six to
eight feet de#pf belt; of this latter type of soil appears
to extend about one third of the way down the central ridge*
Some sand may be. mixed with the surface soil of nearly the
whole island as a result of wind erosion,.

14

UNITED SPATES
AND PACIFIC
HEADQUARTERS OF THE

S
Xfl C&D5F

SOG/as
CONFIDENTIAL

Eron: To :
Subj s

^ Colander in^ '

v

Pacific Fleet'and*Hcifib; "

: '

" Ocean .Areas*

* Distribution Liet .
^ W*, X TO OINCPAC-CINCPQA BiLletin KoJ 122*44i; HANPO SHOTC
v
> +

V o 3 , m a e . . ( } n e . # , / , .. . -"

.,. -.

"'[.

. " ^ .''" - '.' '

'[.

if

*
pubjeot publication is .furnished herev/ith'as,/Indicated on <lfs . ! tribution list, Jhis dissemination is based upon initial distribution of' the
basic Bulletin No 122*44-, on IS October 1944.. ' ' . v '''. .. '' [
2. v .v yi^s publication neeU not be repor"ted and when no longer of '
. should be desvtroy;e4 . No report of destruction .is necessary* *t ' ' .

s. p.
Bncl: ' -.-, '

/ >

i
/

By direction;

1. Subject publicatipn DISTRIBI3TION LIST:%

U1S Reading P a n e l , WEGS, 1/ashington, IXJ - - * - - - - * . - 14 ( I n c l J MS Gapt P e r s & i f e t l Branch "

,MIS T r a i n i n g C e n t e r , Camp R i t c h i e f IB.
Operations Div, V.'JXJS, Washington, DC) '
CO AAF, A t * : AO/LS I n t e l l i g e n c e , Washington, DC - - - - - - - 12
( I n c l s A l l ^-continental A^F o r g a n i z a t i o n s )
Chief S i g n a l O f f i c e r , ' T t o Dept, Washington, DC- - - -.' - - .r - ' " ' 2
( I n c l J CQ, A r l i n g t o n H a l l S t a t i o n )
G-2 Western. Defense Gorairfand, ^ P r e s i d i o , San F r a n c i s o o - *i. - 2
2
G-2 4dv GP, iilaslcan Dept, APO 9 8 0 , S e a t t l e - - - - - - ' - ' - - - - l US Array U n i t , ;?est .Cqaat* VQ..Box 6 5 1 , T r a c y , Cal* - - - - - - . - - 2
Comdt, MLS Language S c h o o l , F t iSnelling, Minn - - - - - - - - - 2

m m

msikft

...'.''

' *-

. D i r M i l I n t e l , G e n H Q , New D e . l h i , I n d i a - * . - - - - - - - - ' 2 - D i r o f J n f ( g X f . - S & C f A P O 4 3 2 , N e f / Y o r k - - - ^ . - - - - - - - - 2

..3GS ( I n t a t ) A d v Hq E l e v e n t h Array^ G p , . S E ^ C , A P O 4 3 2 , N I - > - * - * ' 2
. G - 2 U S I ^ B u r m a - I n d i a , Jfe?f D e l h i , " I n d i a - - - . - - - - - - - - ^ * 2
2 , A-v2 XX B o b b e r C o m m a n d , r ABO 0 3 , New Y o r k - - r - ' T ' T " * " * ' * . ,. ,, v
r

. -.

(Continued Reverse

Side)"

6 January 1945

Serial DIS-061330,

DISTRIBUTION LIST (i

ARMY. PACIFIC & STOPAff 0/E AAFPOA* JPPOL1953 (inct All Pacific AAF) G-2 Tenth Army* APO 357G-2 ArPoSerCom, APO 455-

Cfrs
200

25 2 $ , APO 33 Corps/ APO 235* *' " 5 G-2, APO 7 - - - - - - - 5 2 7 - - - ,- - -; - - 5

G - 2 , APO 9 6 - - - - - - - - - -

?f

.*?7- * :* ; ' ' * .- - : ;- !: 5 ;" 5

ai;. w _ - - - -* 5

^ 2 ^ . A ? 0 . 98? r ..r- - - - r 5 6-2,"imy GafFbe,A'PO" 264- * -r 2 ^ DI AldiiF SRPA, APO" 923:*Oii 3 Ast DI AAP SWPA, APO 923 - 3 G-2 USAF SR7A',t APO 500 - - 2 APO 442 * 4 APO 502- - 2 45, 707-* - - 1
COE, 6HQ SWPA, APO 500 - - 2
NAVY;
COMINCHfWashington,DC- - 2
CNO,Waahington,DC- - - - - 20
(Inos M I , M I 2 , \ 7 h i t e h a l l : " . ; I)ip,A(amty,Vlhitehall) Burvero,Washington,DG - - - " 3 Cndt,NaviTarColl,Ilewport- 1 Cbdt, 11KD - 1 Cmdt, 12N3} - .1 Cmdt, 13ND - - - - - - - 1
Com'Jesoeal'rpn- - - - - - 1 ConEhilffpaPfeio,PPO'SPiego 6
Acorn T r Dot, P t Hueneme 1 Hydrographer, TTash^DO- - 1 CoKilirlant, AIC- - - - - 1 N/.VY> PACIFIC & SWPA: ComSoPac - - - r - - - ComNorPac- - - - - - - - USNIO,BBI (incsCOIS-BEl) CocHa7^SeaFr,on- - - - Dis I n t e l Off, 14HD- -, - ComBatRonONE - . - - - - ' CoraBatRonTVK) ComBatDivsPac- - - - - - e a ComDesCriiPac * - - - - . - ConCrtiDivsPao-.- - - - - e a CouiDosRonsPac- - - - - - e a ConDesDivsPac- -. - - - - e a ConSubPac- - - - - 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
1
1

ConCoriBivsiPae - - -a 1
. ConffHIRD F l e e t - - - - - - 10
ComFIFTH F l e e t - - - - - 3
ComSE3/E3OTH F l e e t * - - - - : 3
ConiFwdAreaGeiiPac - - - - - 5
RepComDesPacCenPacFurd- - 3
RepGomDGSPacSoPac&TFleet 2
ComSorvPac - - - - - - - 4
Island Commanders- - - -ea 1
Ddr Adv Base Off,Pac - - 1
Com7thFleetIntelCenter - - 45
D/E,Royal Australian Ny- 1
Coroi^mphibForPac- - - - - 50
ConffHIRnPhibFor- - - - - 10
ComPhibGroups- - - - - -ea 2
ComTrainCoiaSubPac- - - - 1
P a c i f i c B a t t l e s h i p s - - -ea 1
P a c i f i c Cruisers - - - -ea 1
Pacific Destroyers - - -ea 1
AchrHq leather Central - " X Fleet Chart Distr Off- - 1 AICNorPac- - - - - - - - 1 EachPacTasForCom - - - - 1

maxim CORPS:
Comdt, USMC-, - - - - - - 5 M r o f i v i a t i o n , T/ash,DC * 2 G - 2 , FMF P a c - - - - - - - , 2 CG MarForcos, W - - - 1 CG .THIRD P h i b Corps B
CG FIFTH P h i b Corps-, - - 8
CG e a c h MarDiv - - - - - 1 $
I n t e l l Off, "QHMiU - - - - 150 I n t e l l Off, UlXmi - - - 130 , CoruiirPac- - - - - - - - - - 720 (For d i s t r i b u t i o n , as appropriate, t o CG/lir BIFPac, ComMarFAirV/est, CoraASCUBhibFor, GomCarTransRonPac, ComAirSoPac, ' Com/iir7thFleet, Com/drNorSols, GofiJ&ir-Gi . ComFAirWest^ ComFAirillanieda, CoiaFAir-' S e a t t l e , CoE^AirshipsPac, GomNATSPac, ConCarTasFors, ComEsCarFor^ ComCarDivsj C a r r i e r s , CarAirGroups, GarSquadrons> Seaplane Tenders, Fleet /dryings, Squadr o n s , MarAirWings, iferAirGroups, MarSquadrons, Bat-Cru Aviation U n i t s , NavAir & Seaplane Bases, IntexTronTVJO),

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS

3 1695 00539 4283

LEGEND
COASTAL DEFENSE GUN DUAL PURPOSE GUN DUAL PURPOSE POSITION (EMPTY) AUTOMATIC A A GUN
2 - 15 CM CD 5 -12 CM DP 4 - 8 CM DP 12-25 MM TWIN MOUNT 8-AUTO AA I - INF BN

AUTOMATIC AA GUN (TWIN MOUNT) ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT COVERED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT COVERED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT PILLBOX MACHINE GUN RIFLE PIT RADAR SEARCHLIGHT UNDERGROUND ENTRANCE OR DUGOUT MAIN ROAD SECONDARY ROAD PERSONNEL TRENCH (COMMUNICATION TRENCH WITH RIFLE PITS BUILDING ANTITANK TRENCH HOLES MINEFIELD OF PARTIALLY BURIED GASOLINE DRUMS FIELD OF SMALL HOLES (PROBABLY / \ OR FIRE) UNDER CONSTRUCTION

FOR INVERTED 63 kg. BOMBS)

/
EXACT LOCATION OF HQ OR
OF RESERVES NOT KNOWN.

8-12 CM DP
2 - 8 CM DP
17-25 MM TWIN MOUNT
10-AUTO A A
I - INF BN

UNDERGROUND OP

AIRFIELD
/
J

Ao. 2
r-

EASP^oSrBASIN
2-l4cm OR 3-l2cm GUNS REPORTED TO BE HERE BUT CANNOT BE SEEN. ^

REPORTED
I -12 CM DP 15-25 MM TWIN MOUNT v 9-AUTO AA \ I-INF BN

2 n d MIXED BRIGADE (109 th DIV) I I I I 15I 81 12 ["l2T~ 1 I3 6 | 2 I 6 | 4I I I 4.700 145 th INF. REGT. 6 4; 6__6 36.108 3T400 2 6 t h TANK REGT. , 20 10 300 MORTAR BN. 12 700 24 TWO IND. AT BNS. 16 /36 800 GUARD FORCE (NAVY) 4__[4 4 30 750 ONE AA AIR DEF. UNIT 6 |0_ 2 250 TWO AA AIR DEF. UNITS 24 2L 4 500 AIR BASE PERSONNEL 500 CONST. PERSONNEL 1-500 5 9 t h ANCH. BRANCH 25 ADDITIONAL GUNS 4 ' TOTAL 12 1 4 1 4 I 14 | 6 I 10 1 9 1 8 I 18 I 18I 54l ilO2|34o| A I 201 10 I 6 [ 24 /36. 13.500

^STRENGTH

OBSERVED so.
.DP AUTO TOTAL
m ^vn.u wn rii_i_ luilnn

L4 10. 4_4__3j5

_ .

AA

1 2 1 2 1 14 1 1 101
n v q i l L U U II1M1 nv C DLLN

1 I 1 |*44| 331
ntrLHOCU Tlin Ol mm

lYlUKIMHS.

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND ESTIMATED TROOP DISPOSITIONS OF

IWO JIMA
(SULPHUR
APPROXIMATE

ISLAND)
IN FEET

SCALE

2 - 1 4 CM CD
4 - 8 CM DP
x 6 - A U T O AA I - INF BN

ENCLOSURE (A) OF SUPPLEMENT NO. I OF CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 122-44

/ y PROBABLE /20cm ROCKET / \ LAUNCHER / POSITIONS OR ' POSSIBLE/ MORTAR POSITIONS.

BASED ON STUDY OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS FOR PERIOD 2 SEPT. 4 4 TO 3 DEC. 4 4

REPRODUCED BY 30TH ENGR. BASE TOP. BN. USAFCPBC NO. 1375 FEBRUARY 1945

1 1

These profiles were constructed from aerial photographs of waves. As none of the pictures examined had satisfactory wave images off the east beach, no profiles could be constructed for that beach. In the absence of timed exposures, the relatively inaccurate wave period method was neces sarily used, and the profiles can be considered rough approximations only.
The location of the profiles is shown on the accompanying map. The pictures
used were:
8l9BS-M?0-55-2-V (JICPOA-8419-187) Exp. 14(?)
B518-819BS-4M3O-4O (JICPOA-8528-200) Exp. 9,10
B282-38BS-4M30-I4O (JICPOA-8530-202) Exp. 6,7

Nearshore, Beach, and Soil Conditions

IWO JIMA
Enclosure (B) t o Supplement No.I to CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin N o . l 2 2 - W . 10 January 1915 49'

RANGE A
1600
-f-

1400

1200

Distances in feet from shoreline 1000 800 600 400

200 o

\\

jRook projeotioni
= P"
I-

-h
/
u

-t~

10
m

=:

-/
_

These islands have disappeared

20

KANGOKU ROCK
HANARE ROCK

-/

Hi Millr\~~ rom pho tos of 25 Oct. 1944. 30

Approximate crest of bar

RANGE
1600
_i1_

B
48200
- - j . ^ -
^

1400

1200

Distances in feet from shoreline 1000 800 600 400

-

-4
-f-J-

^ * ^

1
h

1.
1

to

7 / ii

20

4-

rom jnotos of 25 Oct. 1944.30

2.

RANGE
1600 1400
1200
-

C
200 , ^" - ^
,* >

Distances in feet from shoreline 1000 800 600 400

^^

10

- - ' ""

:|r~::::::::=::--!-::::=: ^ ^
J
f ^

20

Frorr ph otc)S Dt 2 5 0 ci iy^ 14.

30 2.

RANGE
1600 1400 1200

D
200

"iRock projection
it:
O O

Distances in feet from shoreline 1000 800 600 40

High point on crest of bar

10

46"-

20

Bigh point on crest of bar

From photos of 21 Oct. 1944

30 2

Approximate crest of bar

DEFENSE SYMBOL KEY

RANGE
60C 1400 1200
1

E
4o; <)

Distances r feet from shoreline

6 800 1000

20c

iRocky gravel beao

10
e

Ml

-**

lRocky gravel beachl

20
TOBIISHI PT.

6 COASTAL DEFENSE GUN 9 DUAL MOUNT DUAL PURPOSE GUN Q DUAL PURPOSE GUN POSITION (Empty) & SINGLE MOUNT HEAVY A A 0 AUTOMATIC A A V COVERED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT 0 RANGE FINDER 0 UNIDENTIFIED INSTALLATION B R OF * RIFLE PIT OR FOX HOLE A MAST O TOWER R D UNDERGROUND ENTRANCE E-a AIR RAID SHELTER 9 ANTI-TANK GUN O WATER STORAGE Q MACHINE GUN
<JS BLOCKHOUSE

C PILLBOX RADAR fr SEARCHLIGHT Q COMMAND POST A OBSERVATION TOWER M M ANTI-TANK BARRIER RAO0 STATION A RACK) TOWER x*AA ANTt- BOAT BARRIER M OPEN ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT MMMM. ANTI-TANK TRENCH O EMPTY REVETMENT A AMMUNITION STOR AGE ^uim.FIRE TRENCH .* SHORT SECTIONS OF ANTI-TANK TRENCH *-*-* BARBED WIRE
EARTH COVERED STRUCTURE

2445'-

DOTTIO snMOL INOCATCS POSSNLC IH1LU>TK)IS UUVION: POSITIONS MtRKED AUTO U CAN t UtEO AS AUTOWTIC WIAPONS ACAMCT aOOUNO TKOOTJ

-2Z -

Fr >nr > 0 to s 0 f

L-41209-8 1 De 1 4

30 2.

15"

16'
1

17'
i

18'

19
i

I4I2O'

21'

\u2666

N
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

'7
*:.

2\
Name

Instructors

"Rp^w

r -nnt
__.

I
-i~-W.IB.WTW*! J&*&* --T*"

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION
AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE
INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA

3UPPL E MI TO B U I IN RO. 136 45 NT L ET

Gl&aui&QBttk}Ji ohuigmi.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA
BULLETIN NO. 137-45

13

+ *
SEP 27 1945
k

JUNE^

1945

<XC~XL&S

GNCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-Jp|

Jffc

MO

Foreword
PROGRESS IVE
.

hSlttl 2 1 1985

...

CONSTRUCT lON AND CAMOUFLAGE " ; ; vi : '\u25a0 , ,/ . o.f . . DEFENSE. INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JI MA
'
\u25a0 \u0084

PRESENTED

CQJsiaUNCTjON : WITHPREPARED; .I N ;

IN STEREOSCOPIC PAIRS
0-2; SECT lON sth- MARINE DlV IS lON

The following photographs of stereo pairs, with descriptions of enemy instal lations pictured, have been prepared as a supplement to CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 136-45 titled, "Defense Installations on IWO JIMA". The latter publication presents ground photographs and diagrams of the positions presented in this publication as well as many others. It is intended that the two publications be studied in con junction with each other. Since previous publications have dealt with most of the antiaircraft defenses, primary consideration has been given to casemated coast defense guns and covered infantry and artillery positions. Each installation is shown in the varying stages of construction and camouflage which took place from 15 June 1944, ' date of first aerial ; photographs, to 19 February 1945, date of invasions/ : ?

Table of Contents
TA 217 G (H) 10 cm Dual Mount Shield Guns TA 216 E (SE) 150 mm Mortar Cave Position 2 Gun Battery (One 12 cm, One 14 cm) CD Guns TA 216 G (SE) Battery 15 cm CD Guns 2 Gun TA 216 D TA 219 A 2 Gun Battery 15 cm CD Guns \u25a02 Gun Battery 12 cm Naval Guns (Short) TA 183 X 4 Gun Battery 12 cm CD Guns TA 183 4 Gun Battery 14 cm CD Guns at foot of Suribachi TA 132 K,L 3 Gun Battery 12 cm Howitzers TA 217 A Triple Mount 25 mm AA TA 217 L Blockhouse TA 181 C (SW) Dummy Covered Artillery Emplacement TA 197 V (SE) TA IVB V (SE) Blockhouse Mortar Positions (150 mm and 81 mm) TA 198 X

........ ..... 6-7 8-9 , . . 10-11

4-5

2-3

12-13

.... . .. .

14-15 16-17

18-19 20-21
22-23 24-25 26-27

28-29
30-31

Command Post TA 198 C Mater Collection and Storage TA 218 V (NY) Mortar Positions TA 131 J Casemated 12 cm (Short) Naval Gun TA 132 R Camouflage TA 163 X
\u25a0

............. .............

32-33 34-35
34-35 34-35

"*****festoon'

-* *

'*f

PROGRESSIVE

;GONSTRI^gO^

\u25a0$

M.M-

i&'M-.&:ffi~M "-si.

>

:i.-^te

D^SE

INSTALLATIONS ON IWQ

JjMA.

10 cm DUAL MOUNT SHIELD GUNS TA 217 G (W)

Orientation sketch for

Road \u25a1 Building Gun positions

right member

of stereogram

#3.

marked by x, and lettered A, B and D. CP marked by x, :and lettered Ci i

Stereogram

. fl

- These

l^i, June 1944 pictures show the nature of ;the terrain before construction began. The whitish, irregular area between C and D is a typical water collector; the pipe leading to the storage basin is visible running northerly.

Stereogram
,

#2 #3
#4

- These. llDecember - These

\u25a0

1944 pictures show work has begun on the revet ments. , B is the farthest along.

Stereogram
\u25a0

'

12 January 1945 photos show something in B, and the spiders of the gun mount in D. The square excavation for the CP is visible ' . 'at 'c. . \u25a0. . .
\u25a0\u25a0-\u25a0 \u25a0
\u25a0

\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0

\u25a0

\u25a0

\u25a0

Stereogram

- The guns

are installed at B and D on these 4 February 1945 photos. The rectangular object in A is well below ground level in com parison with B and D. Note the rangefinder just southeast of C.

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION AND CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

f^OTfl^sGEf M

|)F DEFENSE

INSTALLATIONS G^JlffilmWff
?

ON IWO JIMA.

**t

10 cm DUAL MOUNT SHIELD GUNS TA 217 G (W)

STEREOGRAM No. 1 15 MAY 1944 ESSEX 52

SCALE 1/4800 010 1 200'

N

STEREOGRAM No. 2 11 DEC. 1944 VDS-7B N

SCALE 1/10,000 010 1 200'

STEREOGRAM No. 3 12 JAN. 1945 SCALE 0' VDS-218 N

1/5500
200

STEREOGRAM NO. 4
4 FEB. 1945 010 1

VDS-34C
200

SCALE 1/4750

JICPOA 50531-204

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA CINCPAr-nwrPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

150 mm MORTAR CAVE POSITION

TA 216 H (SE)

STEREOGRAM NO. 1

2 SEPT. 1944
N
010 1

CVL 30-20(P)

SCALE 1/5250

'

-*

STEREOGRAM NO. %
12 JAN. 1945

VDS-218

SCALE 1/6500 0 200

STEREOGRAM No. 3

4 FEB. 1945

VDS-34A

SCALE 1/4600 0 200*

,/

-*

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CffUP^CtiCipCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

f#Ji> JjJiE J|F C^Hlsf pff>fp.|l|pNS ONJWOJIMA. |\l UILif f\ fj IIfT11

150 mm MORTAR CAVE POSITION TA 216 H (SE)

Orientation sketch for
right

=-

member of

stereogram

#3.

Road 11 1 111 1 111 Cliff line Cave entrances Indicated by x, and lettered A, B, C and D. The entrances were all connected by a series of intricate passageways that provided cover for the mortars, ammunition storage, and living quarters. The mortars fined from the cave entrances.
v

Stereogram

#1 #2

- These

2 September

Note the natural

12 January

1944 photos show beginnings of cave entrances. vegetation and absence of large piles of spoil.

Stereogram Stereogram

- These #3 These

1945

pictures show an increase

in digging activity.

i
's

4 February 1945 photos s,how large increase in spoil. Lack of camouflage would indicate digging was continuing. Amount of spoil indicates extensive works.

-\

?;

1,

PROGRESSIVE ;CONSTRUCTipN AND

'i

CINCPAC-Ifl

ivnire,,.
r
i

CAMOUFLAGE

OF DEFENSE

INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA

.--4

2 GUN BATTERY (ONE 12 cm, ONE 14 cm) CD TA 216 G (SE)

Orientation sketch for

right member

of stereogram

#1.

'""^ /X
\u25a0'

*^ J "**, ?&' >"V..r I S/^ v ?^ y J (/\.,/ "fe /

% c
/>

Road

Path
ni1 1 im Cliff line M'lim uiiiiline

, tf

u'uhi\ nC

VJ/

'"%

i/o f

Gun positions Indicated by x, and lettered C and D were empty on capture.

A and B.

Stereogram

#1

- These - These

2 September 1944 photos show minor activity in area, at A in particular.

Stereogram 2

11 December 1944 photos show much work has been done since A has been casemated and camouflaged. B, C, and D appear to be empty.
stereogram 1.

Stereogram

43 #4

- Shadow - These

prominently.

definition on these 12 January 1945 photos make A stand out B and C have nets stretched over them.

Stereogram

photos of 4 February 1945 show the gun in B. The tufts of grass comprising A's camouflage are readily seen. C has a net stretched over it. D is still empty. Ground reconnaissance re vealed A to be 140 mm and B to be 120 mm.

AyA

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION

AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE

INSTALLATIONS
>.

ONIW^IMA.

MS;,J

12 cm and 14 cm CD GUNS TA 216 G (SE)

STEREOGRAM NO. 1
2 SEPT. 1944

CVL3O-20(P)

SCALE 1/5250
0 200

'

STEREOGRAM No. 2
11 DEC. 1944 VDS-7B
N

SCALE 1/10,000
0 200'

STEREOGRAM No. 3 12 JAN. 1945 VDS-218

SCALE 1/5500 200' 0'

n^^^

STEREOGRAM No. 4
4 FEB. 1945 SCALE 0> VDS-34A

1/4600

200'
N

JICPOA 50531-206

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA

QQUHEENTIAT

15 cm CD GUNS
TA 216 D

STEREOGRAM No. 1 4 JUNE 1944 N 0'

CVI33
200'

SCALE 1/7100

STEREOGRAM NO. 2 N 2 SEPT. 1944

/
N

CVL3O-20(P)

SCALE 1/5550 0 200

STEREOGRAM No. 3

11 DEC. 1944
010 1 200'

VDS-7B

BCALE 1/10,000

STEREOGRAM NO. 4

12 JAN. 1945
N

VDS-218

SCALE 1/5500 200' 0

STEREOGRAM No. 5 4 FEB. 1945 SCALE 0'

VDS-34A

1/4600
200

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND^CAMQUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA. CINCPAC-GNCfOA BULLETIN 137-45jf n

jJ^#S M||

2 GUN BATTERY 1$ cm CD TA 216 D

I
'

%U!
of stereogram

/'VV l-J

vwv^

Orientation sketch =Road "inn Cliff line

===

for right member

#4.

Communicatipn

Gun positions

trench (wire) Indicated by x, and lettered

A- and B

Stereogram

#1
2

- These - These - These

4 July 1944 photos show the excavation for A. flaged spoil is a giveaway to activity in this area.

Uncamou

Stereogram

2 September 1944 photos show A has been camouflaged no evidence of casemate. There is a rectangular excavation at B. The spoil has been camouflaged with small plants and bushes. 11 December 1944 photos show the casemates Camouflage discipline is good.
finished and

Stereogram

#3 #4

-camouflaged.

Stereogram

- This 12 - These

January 1945 photography clearly shows the direction of fire to be southwestward, covering the 7/est 3each.es Camouflage has been improved. Shadow definition aids greatly in picking out the installations. Note the shallow communication trench leading in from the south.

Stereogram

4 February 1945 photos are included to show how easily the installations might be overlooked based on this one sortie.

*lJ

'*

'

*"

'"

r r->

CINCPAC-ClNCPO^p.ill|37-^5.

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION AND * CAMOUFLAGI

> \u0084
\u0084

DEFENSE

INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA

2 GUN BATTERY 15 cm CD GUNS TA 219 A

Orientation sketch for right member of stereogram #1.

===== Road

/ l/t

Stereogram

r **f% / >\

APP/ NORTH

"Mil.Cliff line
Trees
Gun positions indicated by x, and lettered A and B.

#1 These 15 June 1944 tarp

a

or net over it. B has a ramp to facilitate spoil removal. 1944 show the two guns in position.
No

photos show two rectangular

excavations.

A has

Stereogram

#2 #3 #4

- These

photos taken 4 July attempt at camouflage.

Stereogram

- These 2-September 1944 photos show guns in position and well camou bushes have been planted in the spoil and tied onto the flaged
guns themselves.

At this date the guns have

no

been casemated.

Stereogram

- In these

4 February 1945 photos the guns have been completely casemated and camouflaged. The concrete has been liberally covered with earth. The field of fire is clearly indicated. The battery OP is visible between and about 50* behind the guns. Note the tunnel entrances to the positions. All casemated guns on the island were connected by shallow communication (wire) trench of the type coming in from the west in this stereogram.
pictures taken 9 February 1945 add nothing to stereogram
#4, but are included to compare the amount of detail shown in
photos of about 1/5000 scale and the amount of detail shown in
photos of about 1/10,000 scale.

Stereogram

#5

- These

10

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA

CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.
5

15 cm CD <HJNS TA 219 A
STEREOGRAM NO. 1 15 MAY 1944 ESSEX 52 N

SCALE 1/6150
0' 200

STEREOGRAM No. 2 4 JUNE 1944 SCALE 010

1

CVI 3 3

1/7250
200

STEREOGRAM No. 3 2 SEPT. 1944

CVL3O-20(P)

SCALE 1/4750
010 1 200'

'

STEREOGRAM No. 4 4 FEB. 1945 SCALE 0 VDS-34C

1/4550
200

STEREOGRAM No. 5
9 FEB. 1945 VDS-35C SCALE 1/9550 010 1 200

JICPOA 50531-208

11

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

12 cm NAVAL GUNS (SHORT) TA 183 X

STEREOGRAM No. 1 N 15 MAY 1944 ESSEX 52

SCALE 1/5050 0 200

STEREOGRAM No. 2 2 SEPT. 1944 SCALE 0

CVL3O-20(P)

1/5400
200
\u25a0

STEREOGRAM No. 3 12 JAN. 1945

\-\ M^^^^^^h %^^L 4MM||

VDS-21A

SCALE 0'

1/4850
200'

STEREOGRAM No. 4 4 FEB. 1945 VDS-348

SCALE 1/4800
0

200

'

m3 11
N

\u25a0*

STEREOGRAM No. 5 9 FEB. 1945 VDS-358

12

PROGRESSIVE

" CONSTRU^R^ AND^IA^buFLjS(i |)cSnSE ijyi CIN?PAG-#lb|gPOA BwfofWsl t fJ

(

INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA.

W-45s

f|HBHBH|

2 GUN BATTERY 12 cm NAVAL GUNS (SHORT) TA 183 X

*%//\u25a0

>/ I
north

Orientation sketch
i iiiithi Cliff line

for right member

of stereogram

#1.

A 4 **-

&,

\
#1 #2 #3

Gun

positions

indicated

by x, and lettered

A and B.

Stereogram

- These - These

photos

sites.

taken 15 June 1944 show

little activity at the gun

Stereogram

photos taken Z September 1944 show much activity at A and B. Brush has been cleared. There is possibly a gun at A.

Stereogram

- In these

12 January 1945 pictures both casemates have been com pleted and well camouflaged. B is much easier to pick out than A using stereogram #3 above, but by comparing #3 with #2 both are readily discernible. 4 February 1945 photos, B is readily seen. Its flreport stands out prominently. Due to the quality of the prints, Ais hard to distinguish.

Stereogram

#4 -In these

Stereogram

#5

- Both A and B are

easily seen on these 9 February 1945 photos. Note the amount of vegetation that has been cleared from the plateau between #1 and #5.

13

*PROGRESS^ terffT|UCTION CINCPAC-ClNCPoMlliHfii

is iJ ~'

AND
'

CAMOK

OF DEFENSE

INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA

.{.

s j
~M

4 GUN BATTERY 12 cm CD GUNS

TA 183 W

APR,

Orientation sketch for

:=:

V w

"/NORTH
/n

= Road
d

right member

of stereogram

#1.
y

'""nil cliff, line House Gun positions indicated by x, and lettered A, B, C and D.

3tereogram

#1

- These

Stereogram

#2 #5

Stereogram

activity.

photos taken 15 June 1944 clearly show activity at B, C A does not show much and Din the form of circular excavations.

These photos taken 2 September 1944 show much improvement in camouflage. There are no casemates built at this time. These photos taken 12 January 1945 clearly show well camouflaged casemates in all four locations. A, B and G are easily discernible. D can readily be verified by comparing stereogram #3 with stereo gram #1. Stereogram #1 shows location Das a hole in the cliff; stereogram #3 shows it filled in. These photos taken 4 February 1945 show all four casemates
clearly.

Stereogram

#4 #5

Stereogram

These photos taken at 20,000 feet on 9 February 1945 show all four casemates clearly.

Progress in camouflage discipline as shown in this stereo setup is character istic of the whole island. Note how the houses have been toned down. Note how the water catch basin 50 feet west of B has been camouflaged with brush and stones to break up the outline of the cement drainage area. .

14

CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

fcQNRDENTIAC

12 cm CD GUNS TA 183 W
STEREOGRAM NO. 1 15 MAT 1944 SCALE 0 ESSEX 52

1/5050
200

'

STEREOGRAM No. 2 2 SEPT. 1944

CVL3O-20(P)

SCALE. 1/5400
0 200 1

STEREOGRAM No. 3
12 JAN. 1945 SCALE 0'

VDS-21A

1/4850
200 1

STEREOGRAM NO. 4 4 FEB. 1945 VDS-348

SCALE 1/4800 0 200'

STEREOGRAM N0. .5
9 FEB. 1945

VDS-358
N

SCALE 1/9600
0 200 1

15

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA.

14 cm CD GUNS TA 132 X, L
STEREOGRAM NO. 1 24 MAY 1944 ESSEX 52

SCALE 1/5950 0' 200'

STEREOGRAM No. 2
4 JUNE 1944 CVI 3 3

SCALE 1/7250 010

1

200'

STEREOGRAM NO. 3 SEPT.

1944
0' 200'

VD4-87A

SCALE 1/10,000

STEREOGRAM No. 4

JAN. 1945
N SCALE 0

VDS-218

'

1/5450
200

STEREOGRAM No. 5 FEB. 1945 VDS-34D

S.CALE 1/4650
0 200'

STEREOGRAM No. 6 3 FEB. 1945

28PR5MC21-1
ALT. 100 FT.

'

.
\
\u25a0

16

:iS

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE J^gALLATIONS ON IWQ JIMA. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45. r

If

4 GUN BATTEHY US tm CD GUNS AT FOOT OF SURBACPII YAMA TA 132 X, L

Orientation sketch for
right member

=-
Gun

of stereogram

#1.

Road

Trees

iiiiiiiii Cliff

positions

indicated

by x, and lettered

A, B, C and D.

Stereogram

#1

- These

photos taken 15 June 1944 show four clearings in the trees. Ground location would provide good coverage of approaches to East and West Beaches.

Stereogram

#2 #3
,/4

- Photos

taken 4 July 1944 show that work is progressing in the four clearings they are enlarged spoil has been removed.

Stereogram

- Photos - These

taken 1 September 1944 show concrete, uncamouflaged case mates in gun positions A and B, and a gun on concrete pedestal in gun position C. Position D is awaiting its gun.
photos taken 12 January 1945 show all four positions com pleted. Dirt covers the concrete. The natural camouflage is particularly effective in these photo 3taken during bright sun light. Possible AW weapons are noted on B, C and D. photos taken 4 February 1945 clearly show the nature of the positions. Dirt has been mounded up over the con crete, vegetation planted on it. The fire ports and directions of fire are clearly visible. Each emplacement definitely has an AW on top of it. Ground reconnaissance showed the AW to be 25 mm dual mount. Photos taken under a 14,000* overcast.

Stereogram

Stereogram

- These .excellent - These

Stereogram

#6

C and D are, Note the and to the west of D.

3 February 1945 obliques show how

effectively camouflaged

twin fire slits on the rocky outcrop above

r^K

* s

fcHAiSt

17

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA. fINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

3 GUN BATTERY 12 cm HOWITZERS

TA 217 A
|
Orientation sketch for right member of stereogram #3.
Road Trail
uiuijr Cliff
"-

/" '7

C APP. NORTH

i J

Trench

Gun

positions

are shown by x, and lettered A, B and C.

Stereogram

//I #2

- These - These
Due

2 September 1944 pictures are included to show the nature of the terrain and the absence of installations.

Stereogram

11 December 1944 photos clearly show a short section of trench. to poor fields of fire offered by the terrain, suspicion is aroused as to the use of the trench.

Stereogram

4 February 1945 pictures with stereogram jfl, it is obvious that installations have gone in at A, B, and C. For instance, C shows in 1 as open ground; in $2 there is a mound reached by the communications trench.
By carefully comparing these

18

CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

12 cm HOWITZERS TA 217 A
STEREOGRAM No. 1
2 SEPT.

1944

CVL3O-20(P)

SCALE 1/5450
010 1 200'

STEREOGRAM NO. 2
11 DEC. 1944

VDS-7B

SCALE 1/10,000

0' 200'

STEREOGRAM No. 3
4 FEB. 1945 SCALE 0

VDS-34A

'

1/4600

200

-X

JICPOA 50531-212

19

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA

CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.
4

TRIPLE MOUNT 25 mm AA TA 217 L

STEREOGRAM NO. 1 11 DEC. 1944

VDS-7B

SCALE 1/10,000 0 200' N

STEREOGRAM NO. 2 12 JAN. 1945

VDS-218
200'

SCALE 1/5500
0 N

STEREOGRAM No. 3
4 FEB. 1945 SCALE 0 N VDS-34C

1/4750
200*

20

't,

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.
fi
Mtji

4tfHHHHHI
\

*f
" v

/
\u25a0H

v /

mm. AA
%is&
m
\u25a0y

If ,
.^
>

'

* * *

Orientation sketch for rignt member of stereogram #3.

LJ

*
APR NORTH

-J

Truck, revetment 25 mm single mount 25 mm triple mount

The three stereograms offer a comparison between single and triple mounts at various scales and light conditions. It is probable that the triple mount was salvaged from one of the beached Jap LSTs on the ifiast Beach.

21

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO J!MA.

*&

i^NiPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45. fa* m

1l

m
1

\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0MM*

TA 181 C (SW)

PfcWKHOtJSB-

Stereogram

#1

- These - These

2 September 1944 photos show the nature of the terrain. Note the hasty trench system.

Stereogram 2

18 November 1944 obliques show a large mount of excavated earth at A.

Stereogram

#3

- These - These - These - These

11 December 1944 photos show A near completion. There are two fire ports firing north. The westernmost port accommodated the easternmost a 7.7 am MG, Note the excavation at a47mm B with concrete base already poured.

Stereogram

12 January 1945 photos show A completed. Note the OP on 7.7 MJ Position of the blockhouse. The large pile of sand to seaward would have provided much protection from direct hits by NGF. B's walls are being built as evidenced by the forms in these pictures. Note the pillbox between A and B firing west.
top of the

Stereogram

#5 #6

3 February 1945 obliques clearly show A and B finished with two pillboxes in betv/een. 4 February 1945 photos merely present tical shot of stereogram #5. a complimentary ver

Stereogram

, uK

if^ (^> n

lT *

{} !

22

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

INSTALLATIONS ONJ^OJIM^

-^CONFIDENTIAL.

STEREOGRAM No. 1
2 SEPT. 1944

CVL3O-20(P) SCALE 1/5900

0' 200

'

STEREOGRAM NO. 2 18 NOV. 1944

28PR4MC171-2

' iI

ALT. 50 FT.

STEREOGRAM NO. 3
11 DEC. 1944 VDS-7A SCALE 1/10,000 0' 200'

STEREOGRAM NO. 4 12 JAN. 1945 SCALE 0' VDS-218

1/6000
200'

STEREOGRAM No. 5 3 FEB. 1945

28PR5MC21-6
ALT. 50 FT.

STEREOGRAM No. 6 4 FEB. 1945

VDS-34C
200

SCALE 1/4950
0

'

s.

JICPOA 50531-214

23

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

INSTALLATIONS ON IWOJIMA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

DUMMY COVERED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT TA 197 V (SE)

STEREOGRAM No. 1 12 JAN. 1945

VDS-218

SCALE 1/6000
0' 200'

STEREOGRAM No. 2

3 FEB. 1945 28PR5MC21-6

ALT. 50 FT.

STEREOGRAM No. 3 4 FEB. 1945

VDS-34C

SCALE 1/4950 0
N

200*

24

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND

,CINCPAC-CINCPOA

BULLETIN 137-45.

CAMOUFLAGE

OF DEFENSE

INSTALLATIONS Ohnjj^JM^

DUMMY COVERED ARTILLERY EMFIJ&EBOTT *\ TA 197 T (SE)

Orientation sketch for

'

lla.i^j EL m 0% H t^llff*S% P\u25a0%l $ F|

right member

of stereogram

#1.
z

APP.
" NORTH.

A *-"S^ .-' i .'\u25a0* C

Road Trenches
Dummy

and letter A. letter

covered

artillery emplacement indicated by Two dummy pillboxes at B and C. dummy pillboxes

Stereogram

-
#1 These
yet.

photos of 12 January 1945 show the trenches to be shallow affairs. Two dummy pillboxes, just mounds of sand with boxes for fireports, are shown at B and C. A has not been constructed

Stereogram

$2

-
These
A.

3 February B is clearly

1945 obliques clearly show the flimsy nature of discernible as a pile of sand.

Stereogram

#3

-
These

4 February 1945 photos show that the sand covering A had been scooped up from near the walls. The trenches are mere traces, due to the fact they were hastily dug in mid-1944 and to the desertlike drifting qualities of the sand. At the time of landing, these installations would serve only as decoys.

PR

25

f CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRU||jq^

* lltl

CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA.

. ?,;al

M?

Bra 1""7

BLOCKHOUSE 198 V (SE)

Orientation sketch for right member of stereogram #2. Blockhouse indicated by 0 ; flrelanes designated as one and two.
The period of blockhouse construction on the island was
covered photographically by small scale, non-stereo, bombing run photos. The first good stereo coverage this blockhouse was the sortie from which stereogram was taken.
,of

_APP.

-. NORTH

FIRELANE/
ONE

'\^\ FIRELANE
TWO

#1

Stereogram

#1

- These

11 December _ completion. The

giveaway.

fields of fire cut

1944 photos show the blockhouse nearlng

in the earth are a dead

Stereogram Stereogram

- Camouflage has been #3 These 3 February 1945

#2

improved in this 12 January 1945 coverage.

obliques are looking up firelane two. Note the small trees attempting to camouflage the broad firelane. Note low wire and pillboxes in foreground.

26

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

DEFENSE

M
'\

ON IWO JIMA.

CONFIDENTIAL. i ri
\u25a0

BLOCKHOUSE 198 V (SE)

-i
7

27

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45. CONFIDENTIAL. CONFIDENTIAL.

MORTAR POSITIONS (150 mm and 81 mm)

STEREOGRAM No. 1

11 DEC. 1944

VDS-7A

SCALE 1/10,000
0 200'

STEREOGRAM No. 2 12 JAN. 1945 VDS-218

SCALE 1/6000 0

200

'

STEREOGRAM No. 3
4 FEB. 1945 SCALE 010 1 VDS-34C

1/4950

200

28

*PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CINCPAC;CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA CONFIDENTIAL

MORTAR POSITIONS (150 mm TA 198 X

Orientation sketch for
Road
II D

*afn<t 81 M)' \

**

'?

"**

//

right

member of

stereogram

#3.

n*

O
%

II

APR **- Q NORTH o

* \

Finished 150 mm mortar positions D Excavations for 150 mm mortar positions X 81 mm mortar positions

Stereogram Stereogram

- Photos taken 11 December 1944 reveal no activity. -#2 These 12 January 1945 photos show a road into the area, and
#1
military rectangular

excavations.

The two southern excavations

three show possi

ble concrete construction Stereogram

begun.

#3

- Photos

taken 4 February 1945 show high angle ports of two completed distinguishing them from covered artillery emplacements, emplacements. No 150 mm mortars were found in these installations. The 81 mm mortar emplacements have nets with a hole cut in them to allow the shell to pass. Since 81 mm mortars in these open emplace ments were not moved into the finished 150s, it is assumed the latter were intended for a weapon larger than an 81 mm.

150 mm

29

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA. CINCPAC-CINCPQA p-IJMMM5 -g% \u25a0; 7\ "**"J| I"f%

ifhWlal

COMMAND POST
TA 196 C

> \ L_ J
\ APR\ NORTH N

\ ~~~)

Orientation sketch for right member of

Road
CP location Indicated by

stereogram

#1.

x.

High altitude, small scale, non-stereo pictures disclosed the beginnings of this installation as a large excavation. Sven without stereo it was evident that much concrete was poured. In Stereograms #2 and #4* the narrow gauge railroad with pushcar used to cover the concrete is evident. Note the four entrances.

Sis

30

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

INSTALLATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL.

COMMAND POST TA 198 C

STEREOGRAM No. 1 11 DEC. 1944 VDS-7A

*
3

.*

\u25a0

SCALE 1/10*000 010 1 200" N

STEREOGRAM NO. 2 12 JAN. 1945 SCALE 010 1

VDS-218
200'

1/6000

STEREOGRAM No. 3 V 3 FEB. 1945 28PR5MC21-6 ALT. 50 FT.

STEREOGRAM NO. 4 4 FEB. 1945

VDS-34C
200

SCALE 1/4950 010 1

'
N

JICPOA 50531-218

31

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWOJIMA m-MiiVi CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45

WATER COLLECTION AND STORAGE TA 218 V (NW)

STEREOGRAM No. 1 15 May 1944 ESSEX 52

SCALE 1/4750
0' 200'

STEREOGRAM No. 2
2 SEPT. 1944

CVL3O-20(P)
SCALE 0

1/5000
200

STEREOGRAM No. 3
4 FEB. 1945

VDS-34C
200
1

SCALE 1/4650
0

32

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA. ' **\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 &NCPAOCINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.

WATER COLLECTION AND STORAGE TA 218 V (NW)

Orientation sketch for

right member

of stereogram

fl

Stereogram

tf-1

- These - These

15 June 1944 photos clearly show the nature of the device. A small knoll has been cleared off, slope established towards the

east, with a catch basin at the foot. The white appearance is due to the half inch layer of concrete over the water shed area.
Stereogram

jj-2

installations to be camou 15 June and 2 September all buildings and water sheds were toned down in this manner. These
camouflaged

2 September 1944 photos show the flaged with brush and stones. Between

water sheds were often confused with camouflaged

nets.

Stereogram

#3

- These

stallation.

February

1945

photos reveal

a direct bomb hit on the in

xr-\.

33

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA. CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45. WKHKKMMKK&

*
MORTAR POSITIONS TA 131 J
Positions referred to are the six clover leaf affairs arranged in a slight are. The installations were so destroyed by naval gunfire and artillery that it was hard to positively identify them. 150 mm mortar ammunition was nearby.

CASEMATSD 12 cm (SHORT) NAVAL GUN

TA 132 R

This casemated 12 cm (short) naval gun, Indicated on the map as a covered artillery emplacement, is shown in the center of Stereogram #1. Camouflage con sists of heaping beach stones up over the concrete. Stereogram #2 gives a "down the-throat" view of the installation. Note the effectiveness of the cover over the fire port. The caves seen in the background are a few of those honeycombing

Suribachl.

CAMOUFLAGE TA 163 X
This oblique stereopair shows a covered artillery emplacement camouflaged with grass tufts. Actually the regularity of the grass tufts makes the installation more conspicuous. The field of fire cut in the bank is a dead giveaway.

34

PROGRESSIVE

CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45. MORTAR POSITIONS TA 131 J

STEREOGRAM No. 1

4 FEB. 1945 SCALE 0 VDS-34D

1/4650

200'
N

CASEMATED 12 cm (SHORT) NAVAL GUN TA 132 R

STEREOGRAM No. 1
4 FEB. 1945

VDS-34D
200

L*i|

SCALE 1/4650
0'

i
N

STEREOGRAM No. 2
3 FEB. 1945

28PR5MC21-1

ALT. 100 FT.

\u25a0H
CAMOUFLAGE TA 163 I
STEREOGRAM NO. 1 18 NOV. 1944

28PR4MC171-2

ALT. 50 FT.

>

35

PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTION AND CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ON IWO JIMA.

CINCPAC-CINCPOA BULLETIN 137-45.
"'' ""$ '"'Jsw' I*i. til ! "..,'.' , UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS OF. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

13 June 1945
From: To: Subj ect

-
Serial DIS-131300
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. Distribution List. CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 137-45. Progressive Construction and Camouflage of Defense Installations on IWO JIMA. (A)
Subject

Enclosure

publication.
No report of destruction is necessary.

1.

Enclosure

longer of value should be destroyed.

(A), forwarded herewith, need not be reported and when no

By direction.

DISTRIBUTION LIST
Copies

1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2

3 9

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