A Critique On The Vivarana School (Sengupta)

A CRITIQUE ON THE VIVARANA SCHOOL
Studies in
some fundamental
Advaitist theories-
Dr. BRATINDRA SENGUPTA, M.A., D.Phil., Reader in Sanskrit, Gaiihak Univemly, Gauhati, Assam,
KUMAR
INDIA.
1959
First published
1959
a.d.
Price
hi India:Kb 12.00 In Pakistan, Burma & Ceylon (Corresponding Rupee-value)

In U.S. I $ 3 00 In UK.-.1
Pnbliblied
by Srimati Namxla Sengupta, B A (Hons ), 28/1, Srimohan Lane, Oalcutta-26 and Printed by K. Mukerji, at Temple Press, 2, Nayaratna Lane, Calcutta-4, India.
TO
MY MOTHER WHO WOULD HAVE BLESSED ME HAD SHE LIVED TO-DAY
Thesis approved for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts by the University of Calcutta, in 1956
PREFACE
The following pages embody the results of my studies spread over a number of years on one of the greatest branches of Indian Philosophy, viz. Advaita Vedanta. The greatness
and vastness of this branch were at the outset somewhat overwhelming to my limited powers, but it was the inspiring advice, guidance and schooling of my teachers that emboldened me to undertake and execute the work. I may here recall with a sense of genuine pride and fortunate satisfaction that it was through a chance interview wih that great savant of India of recent memory, the late lamented Professor Surendra Nath Dasgupta, that I got an idea of planning my researches. It was in the year 1951 at Lucloiow that I happened to meet
the
late
Professor
Dasgupta
in
connection
with the
XVI
Session of the All-India Oriental Conference.

first
That was my
an intellectual giant. In opportunity to meet him, he advised me to study the original texts of any School of Vedanta of Saiikara'bi following and bring out a logical treatment of the problems and theories. That was all that I gathered at this meeting, but that was like a flash of light in my obscure path of research. When I came to Calcutta I planned that I should undertake the study of at least the Fancapddika and the Pancapackkaxjivarana as* far as I could, and then write a thesis on this School. I started my studies under Professor Satkari Mookerjee, M.A, Ph.D., the then Asutosh Professor oE Sanskrit at the Calcutta University and now Director ol Nalanda Pali Institute. My revered teacher approved of my plan and chalked out my line of studies. I cannot adequately express in words mv gratitude to him for his help, advice, guidance and interest in my studies. It has been mainly lor him that I have been able to present the following pages before the learned world. My work was all along planned by him and has been executed by myself with
last
and
meeting
with such
the short time that I
had
this rare
liis
approval.
My
studies as
;i
embodied in the following pages
are sub-
stantially
thesis
submitted to the University of Calcutta for
(vi)
The thesis was unanimously accepted and recommended for the conferment of the degree in 1956. The monograph is mainly a study of two classics of post-ânkara development of Advaita Vedanta, referred to above. But as a first attempt to systematic study of the School, formulated in the two classics,, I had, out of an academic compulsion, to be more faithful and concentrated to some of the fundamental theories of the School. The first VarnakO) of the Pancapddika and the Pancapadikavivararia is practically the pillar and fountain of Advaita metaphysic and epistemolc^. The deepest recesses of Advaita are adumD.Phil, degree in the Faculty of Arts.
brated and elucidated therein.

lectics,
All
the
later
Advaitist
dia-
hover round the interpretations of this chief current of ânkara's tradition. In this respect, it is undeniable that the first Varnaka gives us
polemics,
logic
and
epistemology
the different crucial problems

true
that
and
their answers
It
is
also
Vafnakas give us some of the confirmed tenets of Sankara's Vedanta in an elaborate manner. But when once this attempt of the study of the fundamentals of Advaita has borne some success, in faithful and conscientious presentation that the other aspects iji the School can be taken up. I have in view such a future attempt to complete my studies, which I hope to execute in not very distant future. It is worthwhile here to remember that this study has also, whenever occasion has demanded it, presented the interpretations of later commentators like Akhandananda, Visnubhaitopadhyaya and Vidyaranya, Citsukha, Prakatarthavivaranakara and Madhusiidana. Thus it has been somewhat, within limited precincts, a comprehensive and comparative evahiathe subsequent
tion of the Advaitisi theories in
tators,
the light of these
commenlo
each having some kind of peculiar light lo throw to

I
interpret the theories.
submit that
have been
faithful
Padmapada and Prakasatmayati but I in my humble way to inierprefl them.
also claim to
My
have tried central theme has
been pinned to the cardinal doctrine of Advaita, viz, Btahniaii as Pure Consciousness is the primus of our Being, Knowledge, and even Bliss, which I have followed up, as faithfully as
There have been some translations ard expositions of Dr Saile^xvai Sen antl some works or authors of this School
Prof.
Suryanarayana
Sastri
have
jointlv
published a
lull
(Vli)
cxcellenL
English
translation
oi
Vidyaran)'a's
Vwarajjapra-
meyasamgraha, which I have consulted htcl^ with profit. Dr, T. M. P. Mahadevan'b recent revised edition of the work The Philosophy of AdvaiLa wilh special reference 1o BharatlLiUha-Vidydranya has also been consulted. Moreover, as by .every researcher on Indian Philosophy, the monumental Histone'> of Indian Philosophy of Protestor Radhakrishnan and Profcbsor Dasgupta have been freely consulted by me. Wherever I ha\c accepted, with or without qualification, other works, I have appropriately quoted from, or referred to them. Lastly, it should be a travesty jf I do not acknowledge
that
the
great
Sanskrit
scholar.
Mahamahopadhyaya
obliged
a
Dr
by
Jogendra Nath Tarka-Sankhva-Vcdanta-tirtha

allowing
occasion
erudition,
me
me
I
to sit at his feet to clear
many
passage on anv
sought
the
help
of
his
mature
and
versatile
fine, admit thai the printing of the work has be desired and improved. But I may assure the scholarly reading circle that the work had to be hurried through and I was an inexperienced proof-reader. Moreover, the highly technical matter of the diacritical marks was a
I must, in
left
much
to
problem in proof-reading in
thiis
my
first
venture.
Beside^,
some
unforeseen
circumstances
in
the
tampering
with
ihe
stacked books have taken away, at places, from the quality of Hence, in spite of all my good intenthe get-up of the work
tions, what with my limited technical knowledge and what with natural phenomena sometimes not predictable, the perfection in printing and get-up has been incomplete. To make
up
for the printing lapses, I
would crave the indulgence
of the
at
scholarly world
to refer to the rather copious Errata
the
end, correcting the lapses in the body beforehand for felicity T admit that it will be something to tax in correct reading. their patience and time, but 1 trust in their goodwill towards
an imperfect
required, I
in
fellow-scholar
am
If in future a Second Edition is assured that the failures in the technical side
in this Edition will
be
like the pillars of success in that side

all
the next.
Considering
these preliminary imperfections

it is
in printing
and
get-up. the work, even for the merit
worth,
<ouId not be priced higher. Gauhati University, India,

October, 1959.
Br^tindra Kumar Sengupta
CONTENTS
Pages
Chapter
Ch^pifk
Rational
of
and Vcdanta
Logical
background
1
Iti
11
Superimposed
malarial cause
Ki"!o\vlc(igc
and
its
17
4.1
Chapter
CiJAPfER
III
Critical
analysis
of
Adhvasa
object
and
and
Advaita theory of
En or
44
72
IV
Status
of
of Superimposed
substratum
73101
Sell
Chapter
ChapH'R
Ch\pii:r
V
VI
VII
Adhyasa
Advaita
theories
& Pure
liiqinr\
Ad\aitist
implications
into
differciu
102
1"3
on
Sell
134172
Self
Consciousness
as
luminous
k
173198
8c
Unitary
Ch\piir VIU
Dreamless
Sleep
Pure
Self
Ego-con'-ciousness
199
into
220
Ch UMiR
CiupiiR
Appindiv
IX
Advaita
Inquiry
the
Image-
diaracter of JIva
221251
ol
Image-character
JTva
lurthcr
examined
252 2(>8
History
of
Short
the
Vivarana
School
269272
Chapter
Rational Appyoach Towards the Study of Vedanta: The Logical Path 6- its Background.
give a
summary of the main conclusions and argumenls on most solid grounds the interpretations of Sankara's Biahmasutmbhasya as put forward in the Vivarana Scliool, it is worthwhile to try to begin with the end {visaya) of Vedantic studies. Padmapadacarya at the outset of his work, Faficapadika, notes with precision what ought to be the end and object of commencing the study of Vedanta, and how far
establishing
To
Sankara
in his Introduction to the Byahmasutrabhasya {adhyasahhasya) has hinted at them. It is customary Indian tradition to begin the study of a work or system being informed
object {visaya), end (prayojana), competent subject {adhikann) and the relation (sambandha) between the work and its object. These four have come to be known as the anubandhacatustaya or the four necessary pre-conditions of the study of a work. Hence Padmapada very rightly hints at the
oi its
more
essential
pre-requisites,
{prayojaria) of the study of
viz., object (visaya) and end Vedanta through the Brahmasutras
and Sankara's commentary thereon. He is rather cryptic, for he says that Sankara has hinted at the object and end of Vedantic studies in his adhyasabhasya by taking the cue from the first sutra of Badarayana (aihato Brahmajijnasa Br. Sut. it is Prakasatmayati, the author of the 1/1/1). But
;
Pancapadikavivarana,
full
who
has taken pains to bring out the
adhyasabhasya vis-a-vis the Brahmasutra. He has shown with masterly analysis that the first Brahmasutra referred to above unmistakably points to a
implications
of
Sankara's
logical discursion {vicara) of the highest truth of Vedanta,
i.e
he says, to infuse into the matter-of-fact silira the property of an injunction we have to add a word with an injunctive sufi&x and that should be in his opinion 'kartavya' (ought to be done). Now with regard to the knowledge (jnana) or will (iccha) there cannot be any injunction. Knowledge takes its own course without any injunctive co-ercion.
for,
Brahman,
Critique on the Vivarana School
for the conditions of knowledge being fulfilled
it
must
arise.
Will for knowledge, too, cannot be extraneously commanded by any injunction, for it is purely a psychological phenomenon which arises when we have knowledge of something that stimulates our curiosity as something valued on its own account or as an instrument of some valued end. Will for an unknown object is not valid will, but a 'dream' or a 'wish' which has
no
jfiana (knowledge)
Hence the two partg of the word jijnasa, viz., and iccha (will) cannot be the desired object of injunction as pre-supposed in the word kartavya (ought to be done). Hence Prakaâtmayati says that the word refers logically to vicara (discursion) which is related as an intermedilocus standi.
ary process with the above two meanings, just like pincers, because it is the outcome (sadhya) of will but the progenitor
(janaka) of knowledge.
Thus
refers to the injunction of vicara
of the Vedanta doctrines for
first Brahmasutra logically and hence naturally to that which the sutras are composed.
the
But
it
does not stop there, for the vicara
it
advocates
as the
is
for
the true knowledge of
Brahman (Brahmajnana)
means
of complete Liberation (moksasadhana) to the sincere seeker after Truth endowed with all the qualities {sadhanacatut-a-
yasampannasya),
who
is
the
competent subject
(adhikarin).
implied but logical meaning of the first Brahrnasutra and the adhyasabhasya of Sankara hints at the end (prayo]ana.\iz., Moksaf-y for, both these, i.e., object, viz.. Unity and end, viz.. Liberation may be plausible and true if our whole empirical life is shown to be the result of a (adhyasa). Sankara illusory, super-imposed knowledge false, has shown this unmistakably in his adhyasabhasya by pointing
This in
fact is the
to the life of
bondage
(the empirical
life)
as
false,
illusory,
and
knowledge of the empirical upon the transcendental Reality (adhyasa due to avidyaf. This
as
due
to super-imposed
fact of the super-imposed nature or illusory character of the

life
of
^
bondage has been
logically established
by showing
its
mok8asadhanabrcJimajMndyar-{Paflcapddikdviiaravam
1
Cal
Sans Series
will refer
No
to
^
P. 23
Henceforth
Edition).
will be shortened as
Vnailana and
tJie
same
{Viraiana,
handhat.astrasyuramhhaninuttavisaya'piaijo'javavatti apiatyanlhasya S7/dvidydtmaLatiam nirdisat hhdsyadvayam visayaprayojane pratifddayatiti
Pp
26-27).
Rational
laksana
&
Logical Background of Vedanta
(delmition), sambhavana (possibility), sadbhava (exand pramana (proofs) in the adhyasabhasya of âhkara. As to the first Brahmasutra which gives the cue to the determination of the object and end of Vedantic studies.
istence)
Pi akasatmayati
traces
the
origin
of
this
suira
to
the
Upanisadic injunction of saravana {Atma va're dm^tavyaji hotavyah etc. Bihadamnyaka Upammd 4/5/6) to one who has completed Vedic studies as enjoined in the Vedic dictum svadhyayo'dhyelavyah. {TaiiL. Ar. 2/15), and realized apparently the import of the srutis referring to Atmadariana (cf.
vijnale saivamidam vzjnatam Brhad. Up. 4/5/6 etavadare khalvamrtaLvam etc.Brhad. Up. 4/5/15), but his discursive faculty does not stop there, as he tries to unearth iht true implications involved in such knowledge, viz,, the
tliree
Atmani
competent subject, the true object and the real end. These anubandhas, i.e., adhikami, visaya and prayojana are hinted at in the iriUis themselves, but the logical thinker seeks the iaison d'etre of these Vedic truths in a dialectical form for which Badarayana initiated the logical method, viz., nyayaprasLhana in his Bi ahmasutras by the first aphorism,
/ithaLo Brahmajijnasa.
The
is
next question which
is
basal to the study of
Vedanta
nature of injunction in the Upanisadic passage: "Atma va're drastavyah srotavyo mantavyo mdidhyasitavyah'" {Brhad. Up. ^jblQ). The dialectical process of Vedantic studies take their origin in the injunctive precept, viz., irotavya. Prakasatmayati has taken gieat pains to show that the necessity of commencing Vedantic studies lies in the fact that the summum bonum of life appears
the discussion regarding the
in the true Realization of Self (Atmadarsana) and hence the ways and means towards that goal are worth-knowing. Thus though the perpetual injunction (nityavidht) as envisaged in the Vedic precept svadhyayo' dhyetavyah {TailL Ar. 2/15) is At the root of studying and understanding the Vedas (on the part of the twice-born), still Prakasatmayati holds that knowledge or Realization of the Self {Atmadariana) as the summum bonum of life is possible, only through the injunction noted
above.
As
to the ways
viz.,
or
stages,
srotavyah, mantavyah
takes sravana as
and means indicated in the three steps and nididhyasilavyah he the principal one, the two others as auxiliary.
Critique on the
Vivmana School
Here PrakasatmayaU
strikes a
is
new note by showmg

to
that
the origin of Vedantic studies

studies in general.
ih the injunction of havaiâ,
though the perpetual adhyayanavidhi gives the cue
Vedic
To him snavana is the principal incentive towards Atmadanana, and manana and nididhyasana are subservient to it (phalopakaryahge). The School ot Bhamat i
by Vacaspati Misra (9th. Cent A.D'.) who wrote the Bhamati on tne hranmasuirabhasya, however, traces Vedantic studies on the logical and dialectical plane to the adhyayanavidhi as the studies of Mimamsa have also the same
initiated
tika^ VIZ.,
at their origin. Sravana, ma?ia7ia and nididhyasana are not the fountain-heads of the Vedantic dialectical studies by way of injunctions. Nor even is sravana the principal means towards Atmadaiibana. These pertain to the ken ot jnana or knowledge, pure and simple, where no injunctive force can exist. Knowledge arises as soon as the conditions of It are fulhlled. Hence what these three stages can do is only to show the way towards the Realization of the Self only indirectly by focussing our attention on several indirect methods. Sravana is responsible, according to the Bhamati School, for an indirect (paroksa) knowledge of Self, as the means of knowledge is mediate; manana is also responsible for such knowledge that is indirect, but by ?iididhyasana which engenders constant concentration upon the indirectly realized Self, there arises an immediate (praiyaksa) knowledge of it. Hence nididhyasana is the principal organ of the knowledge ot the Self where sravana and manana are secondary. But all these three are never the object of any injunction, but arc only objects of factual statement (yihitanuvadaka). Prakaâtmayati has taken enormous pains to establish his view of the whole matter by way of a solid defence of the injunctive character of the Upanisadic precept sroLavya. His masterly analysis of the nature of vidhi and whether any vidhi is plausible in the matter of Brahmajnana leaves one in no. doubt about the immensity of the task. He faces his opponents' cogent arguments very logically and establishes his view thai, here in siavana there is the stamp of a distinct vidhi even
injunction
though
it is
meant
for
Brahmajnana.
this
Before entering into an examination of
question
it
is.
worthwhile to discuss in a nutshell the implications Of vidhi
Rational
&
Logical
Backgwand
l^he
of Vedanla
say that
to
5
vidhi
and
act
its
different
varieties,
it
or injunction makes
obligatory
Mimamsakas upon man
perform an
which is not otherwise required to be performed. The nature of vidhi is to make known that which is beyond any other means of knowledge as being conducive to a specific
{apmptapmpaJio vidlnh). There are three such vidhis, apuwa, ?iiyama and pansankhyd. Apuivavidhi enjoins an act lor a specific purpose for which no other means of knowledge is ever capable of doing so. As an example they cite <he injunctive pTceLepiagmhoham juhuyaL ivatgakdmah. Here by enjoining upon the person desirous of heaven the
eflect
VIZ.,
of agmholta, the imii becomes the sole means of knowing this cause-and-cffect relation between the sacrifice and its effect, heaven By niyamavidhi it is suggested that out
sacrifice
of several alternative means to get a desired result, only one is enjoined at the cost of others. Example: vnhmavahanti.
Mere
\i\
to get the result of the separation of husks from rice order to prepare sacrificial cakes, pounding {avaghata) of
is enjoined. Here other methods such as separation by nails having been the good alternative means to get the same result, only avaghata is enjoined. In parisankhydvidhi
paddy
we
get
means
that
an injunctive precept by which other probable alternative of performance for a specific purpose are discarded, so one such alternative may stand. Example : panca
Here the precept enjoins the eating of the flesh of only five five-nailed animals like the hare, by entirely prohibiting by implication the eating of the flesh of others like the monkey, so that in the matter of the eating of
the flesh of five-nailed animals, some alternative animals are prohibited as being unfit for consumption.
pancanakhd bhaksyah.
Niyama
tive
or Restrictive Injunction has got primarily a posi-
significance either for empirical
instructions.
positive injunction
to
knowledge or scriptural have recourse to one
alternative facilitates the achievement of the task.
The
exclu-
sion of the other alternatives follows by implication, as they are mutually incompatible. The adoption of one course
of action naturally precludes that of the others from the nature of the case, eg., pounding is exclusive of other operations.
But
the
pansankhyd
alternatives
has only
are neither
Here
a privative significance. mutually exclusive nor
Critique on the i/warana School
fact
incapable of satisfying the end, severally or jointly. The very that there is an express injunction regarding a course
oi action
which naturally presents
itself
and
for the adoption

is
of which an express injunction need not be necessary,

that, it
such
makes obligatory that the other alternative courses are to be relinquished. In the example cited above, man has a natural tendency to satisfy hunger by consuming food. The express injunction that animal-food should be selected from
these hve types implies the prohibition of others.
tive
The
posi-
performance is not determined by this injunction but either by natural inclination or another precept. It only puts its seal of approval on select kinds and its purpose is only to
ban the other
kinds.
Prakaâtmayati in his Viva) ana and Vidyaranya in his Vivaranapt ameyasamgraha have discussed at length whether at all any vidhi or injunction is plausible in the matter of
Brahmajnana, and if so, what kind of injunction it ought to As to the first question it is doubted whether any adrstafoe. phala or unforseen merit is possible in Brahmajnana. The question rises from the fact that the nature of the vidhis is to engender some adrsta or apurva in the specific act it enjoins so that the sum-total of apurva in the whole act (like sacrifice) may be realised. Without reference to any such adrstaphala
the vidhis lose all their injunctive force. Hence here in the matter of Atmadarâna or Brahmanjnana there should be recognised the presence of some such adrsta in the injunctive precept (vidhi) of sravana. But it is evident that no amount of adrstaphala is required in the present case where only known
But Prakasatmayati says that immense scope for adrstaphala, for it is to be achieved through the adrsta of all works merging into knowledge. These pieces of adrsla conduce to the destruction of evils antagonistic to Brahmajnana as is indicated
causes (like havana) are in
sufl5.cient.
is
Brahmajnana
also there
in the Upanisadic texts like avidyaya
mrlyum
tlrtva,
tapasa
kalmasam
hanti.
Even
in
the Vedic injunction, svadhyayo*
dhyetavyah (Tattt. Ar. 2/15) the Mimarhsakas rocognise the presence of adrstaphala for the knowledge of dharma which otherwise would not accrue if it were not known to be the
result
of
sacrificial
acts
known through
to the
the
study
of
the
all
Vedas by which an adrsta accrues
dharma
Hence
Rational
such
of
sacrificial
&
Logical Background of Vedania
the niyamadrsta in the study Vidyaranya in his Vivaranaprameyasamgraha points his finger well on this point and refers to the passage m^ the Gita in which the pada, viz., sarvam karmakhilam Partha jnane pansamapyate {Gita 4/3B) occurs, and shows that the word akhilam over and above sawam refers to acts
acts pre-suppose
the Vedas.
like
etc., over and above sacrifices etc. Hence all enjoined in the Vedas including kavana are conducive through their respective adrsta to the generation of the sum-
Lravana
acts
of the knowledge of the Self (AtmadarSana) which the highest aim of Vedantic studies.
total
is
More serious objections to the recognition of vidhi in the context of Brahmajnana or Atmadarsana have been skilfully met by Prakasatmayati and Vidyaranya. To start with the
objections,
firstly,
to recognise the existence of any vidhi in
which the injunctive formula Atma va're drastavayah srotavyo maniavyo nididhyasitavyah has been read, it will be going antagonistic to what the Upanisads speak of Brahman or Aiman as being the Independent Principle of Vedantic knowledge; for. Brahman or Aiman becomes dependent upon what is the primary meaning of the injunctive prein
i.e., drastdvyah. The Mimamsakas regard the suffix (pratyaya) to be of the primary import while the prakrti or the root becomes secondary in significance. Brahman, too, becomes
the
context
cept,
secondary and not Independent, for here darsana (the meaning of the prakrti) is of the secondary significance while the meaning of the vidhi (pratyaya) is of primary significance. Sankara himself has refuted the presence of any vidhi in the context of Atmadarsana in Br. Sut. 1/1/4: kimarthani tarhi
for
vakyani} This charge does not stand, the presence of vidhi in the precept dtastavyah it is indeed true that Brahman becomes secondary in significance while the vidhi itself becomes primary. But
vidhicchayasparsini
in
recognising
when we
consider that
the import of vidhi in iroiavyah

vidhi in that precept.
Principle of
Brahman does not become subject to we can very well recognise the Brahman is always the Self-dependent
[cf.
Knowledge (darsana)
darianaviêsanam
realized Goal. ing darsana as the goal of Brahma-hood where
svapradhanaphalabhutaIt becomes a SelfHence in recognising vidhi in sravana by regard-
Vivarana P. 35]
to
which
Brahman
stands
'8
A
Mimamsa
as the
most Primary Principle, we do not

dialectics.
fall
into any pitiall
Prakasatmayati and Vidyaranya have thus met the objection of contradiction with the Bhasya of Sankara on Brahmasutra 1/1/4.
oi
Certain other objections crop up

in the
when we
recognise vidhi
Upanisadic context. This is a serious objection, as the defect of vakyabheda in the same context {pmkarana) is
of the whole context. ekavakyatapadaikavakyata and vakyaikavakyata. As to the problem of ekavakyaia, the Mimamsakas have discussed whether we can reasonably attribute two meanings or imports to a single pakarana or subject of discourse. The problem arises from the examination in the arthavada adhikarana (Mim. SuL 1/2/1-18) wherein a detailed analysis as to the import of the arthavadas or sentences of eulogy or calumny are read along with the vidhis or the Vedic injunctions. After prolonged discussion the Mimamsakas have arrived at the conclusion that such arthavadas have no independent imports of their own, nor can they be reasonably said to have them; for that would imply splitting up of the import of the vidhi which
antagonistic
to
the real
implication
There
are
two
kinds
of
primarily attaches
itself
to
it
in any ptakarana
The
general
it has a sabdt hhavana, viz, a three-fold reference to the explicit injunctive connotation in any particular formula, such as, the object (the which-Azm), the man (the doQv-kena) and the means
Mimamsist standpoint
as to the vidhi (injunction) is that
(the hxrw-kaiham). The arthavadas only express the praiseworthiness or not of a particular injunction ^be it positive or negative, and there the third element (the how-katham) is only related to it as being eulogised or calumnised.
Thus
fully
Parthasarathimi^ra,
in
his
Sastradiptka,
very
force-
shows that the arthavadas are secondarily (laksanaya) to be related with the vidhis so as to make them valid in so far as they come within the import of the vidhis to enjoin or prohibit any act. If the arthavadas were regarded primarily to have been full of independent imports, that would surely have made them responsible for the splitting up of the import of the vidhi. But they are secondarily (lakârtaya) in unison with the vidhis and are therefore not redundant or unnecessary. They only add eulogy calumny or

Rational
&
Logical Background of Vedania
{siutyatlhavada or mndarthavada) to the import of the object ^/ vidhi, such as devaia, dravya, yajamana etc. I'his explanation ot Parthasarathi is based upon the NLlm Sut. 1/2/7 vtd/mia Lvekavakyatvai sLyutyarthena vidhanam [cf. iyuh
wadhyayavidfmeva ca prayojanavadaHhaparyavasanam bodhaprdsastyaparaiayd yan vmd tadanupapatieiLdipanyamesdm

bodhayati
yatLu,
tdiparydcca
of
laksatiasiddhih
taiaUaikavdkyaivanM
drsio'rthah
svddhydyddhyayanavidhina'nmaitavyo
Lai
na
ladvaseiidtthakalpaneiyuktam
drsia eva.
Hiiyam,
Idkârîko'pyarLho
{&dsh adlpika Pp. 6-7; Nirnaya Sagar Edn.)J.
The
a ekavakyaia or having one primary import vidhi parkarana (a chapter on a Vedic injunction) has been more clearly shown by Khandadeva in his Bhdttarahasya. He has shown that in such a Vedic sentence as Vayurvat
ksepisihd devatd (Wind is the most swift-moving Deity), the arthavdda or eulogy shows that the result of the vidhi to worship Him, viz., gift of any desired end, takes such an -eulogy as coming within this primary import. What the
is to express that Vdyu makes a gift most quickly, (cf. sa ca vdkydrthah ksepisfhatvddigunako Vdyuh svadevatdkakarmajanyam phalam ilghram pyayacchatityevamirupah Bhdttarahasya, P. 23, Conjceveram Edn.). Khandadeva further shows that there is another pertinent instance of aithavdda as in yajamdnah prastarah (the sacrificer is a handful of datbha-grass. He says that we have to admit here a secondary import (laksand) in prastara (darbha-gr3.s9) to make a uniform import in the whole sentence. This laksand makes the primary import of the sacrihcer augmented by the import of the grass by which
problem
.arthavdda does, as here,

-ol:
the
desired
end
the former is praised as defying idnanubandhitvarupaslutilaksand). related with a verb (akhydta 'as' or
all
obstacles
(valavadams-
the two imports are 'to be') in order to indicate their real meaning in the injunction, which is always achieving the desired end {ipasddhanaivam). Khandadeva, however, takes
Thus
need
stand as a hypothesis, for he shows later on that there is no to admit a laksand or secondary import in the sentences like this: yajamdnah prastarah. On the contrary, there should be an
this
ekavdkyatd by admitting two dkhydtas or verbs in such sentenThus by splitting the sentences into twain by the admices.
ssion of two verbs,
we can
nevertheless relate
them
into a single
10
sentence,
(ct.
A
and

this
is
what
is
vastutastu
akhyata-dvyayasattve
vakyalaksanayam pramanabhavah iiyadau vakyaikavakyatevpi na kacitksatih Ibid, P. 25). Unlike this kind of ekavakyaia, viz., vakyaikavakyata, there is another instance of ekavakyata, viz., padaikavakyata. Here there is no need of splitting up of the sentence due to two verbs accompanying two substantives, but there is merely a laksana in the whole sentence wherein the padarthas (imports of words) are related to vidhi accompanied by the akhyata. (cfpraâsfyalaksatiamangikrfya tena yatraikasmm pade tasyetarapadarthanvayamangikrtya vakyarthaparyavasanam, tatrarthavadavidhyowakyaikavakyata. yatra iu na tatha sarvatra vakya eva prasastyalaksanamangikriya padarthavidhayopasthitasya vidhyakhy atari ha emnvayai vid/hyarthuvadayo}^ padaikavakyateti yuktamutpaiyamah Ibid, P. 25.). It comes out from these subtle Mimamsist analyses that when there is a uniformity in the real meaning of any injunctive formula, which as has been already indicated above, is always istasadhanatva (achieving the desired end), even after the separate imports of the injunctive and the euphemistic sentences have been expressed, there is a vakyaikavakyata. But if there is somehow the import of the euphemistic sentence prominent and is not separately to be expressed by any separate verb in a sentence but is somehow related with the verb of the
as vakyaikavakyata vakyabhedasyadosaivena tena 'yajamanah prastarah'
known
injunctive sentence, there
is
padaikavakyata.
and Vidyaranya have shown that this defect of vakyabheda has been accepted under special circumstances by some Vedantins and Bhattas and Prabhakaras
Prakasatmayati
The primary implication (parama-tatparya) of the alike. whole context and the secondary implication of the vidhi (avantara-tatparya) which is nothing but the generation of adrsta, have been recognised and there the vakyabhedado.â has perforce been held at bay. A particular School of Vedantins has recognised the implication of Brahmajnana in the passage {tametam Brahmana vedanuvacanena vividisanti yajnena Brhad. Up. 4/42) which is the primary implication,
its secondary implication of yajna (sacrifice) etc., as being enjoined (vihita) in the Vedas has been recognised. Thus there is a twofold implication even in the primary
and
also
Rational
&

as
11
import or Brahmajhana here and

is
such no vakyabhedadoâ
in
present.
Similarly,
the Bhattas have recognised vidht

stick)
holdmg
viz.,
the samidh
{adhastaL
(sacrificial
over the
sacrificial
pot^
iruv
devebhyo
sutra).
samidharh dharayannanudravei upayi hi Apastamba ^rauta-suUa: PitrmedhaHere the holding of the samidh over the sruv has
dharayati;
case of agniholra sacrifice consecrated to gods (daimgnihotra) though it is read in the context of ptetdgnihotra where one should hold the samidh under the sruv. Thus by the dictum vidhistu dharane'purvatvat (Mimamsasuira 3/4/5) there is a distinct vidhi in the uparidharana (holding above) of the samidh. (cf. Brahmasutra hj 4^12,0 and 5ankara's Bhasya on it). Prabhakaras, too, have
been accepted in the
vtdhi in the same context (tisro anjahna vd pivet. malavadvdsasd na samvadei Taittiriya Samhitd 2/5/1). Here in the context of darâpurnamasa sacrifice there is a distinct vidhi in the performance of vratas by a woman in her menstrual course. This is indicated by the dictum prdgaparodhdnmalavadSo there is a clear case for vdsasah {Mimdmsd-sutia 3/4).
recognised
separate
caret,
mtrirvratarh
the
Advaitins
to
recognise
there
is
the
implications
of
vidhi
in
iravana, although
apprehension of vdkyabhedadosa in the context of Brahmajndnaj, for such recognition of the secondary import of vidhi in the primary import of a particular context is accepted in other systems, specially in both schools of Mimamsa. The long and short of the whole argument boils down to the fact that vidhi can be
the
recognised in a particular sentence (vdkya) which is of secondary (avdntara) import although it is read in the context
of a particular section bearing the primary import
tdtparya).
(parama-
vdkyabheda does not stand in the way of understanding the full implication, if we train our eyes to fix on what is primary and what is secondary in a Other vdkyas (vdkyaikavdkya) may be particular context. appended to the primary vdkyas of a particular section, yet
The
defect
of
and separate implication of a secondary nature recognised in the former without least violence to the primary implication of the whole section. Prakaâtmayati has hinted at the injunctive character of sravana by referring to a different irwh'-passage avoiding the
separate vidhi
may be
J
clear
etc.
A
He

viz.,
one upon which our discussion started,

has
referred us to
Wotavya
the
the following
passage in
Brhadaianyaka Upatiisad: Lasmad Btahmanah pandityam mrvidya balyena Listhaset, balyanca pandityahca nirvidyatha mumhj amautianca maunanca niyvidyaUia Btahmanah (Brhad. Up. 3/5/1). Here the four words as shown below are of accepted by ânkara special signilicance which has been himself. Pandityam, balyam and maunam (munih) refer respectively to sravana, manana and mdidhyasana and they have been described as the means to become Brahmana, i.e..
Self-realized or Atmadarsi.
has shown us that even

accepted passage,
vidhi,
i.e,
if
Thus understood. Prakaâtmayati we do not regard the commonly

etc.,
srotavya
as
being the source of the

passage
as
we
may
well
accept
this
such.
But
has apparently shown no reason as to this his Tattvadipana has also switching-off and Akhandananda remained reticent. But the real situation has been brought
Prakas'atmayati
by Visnubhattopadhyaya in his commentary, viz., Vivaranaprameyaand Vidyaranya in his samgraha has perhaps supplied the cue. Visnubhattopadhyaya has said that in the precept 'srotavya we can very well connect the suffix (pratyaya) to Brahmajnana even without any injunction (vidht) in it, for in the matter of Brahmajhana, havana
to us
home
R]uvivarana,
can be
regarded as a
'necessity will arise as to
means fit (arha) for it. Hence no making a vakyabheda in recognising
an injunction (vidhi) in the precept, irotavya. Vidyaranya too has upheld such an explanation for adducing a reason as to the switching-off of the injunctive formula (vidhyayaka
vakya) with reference to havana.
escape the clear
character of an
Here, therefore,
injunction in
we cannot
forms like Prakasatmayati and Vidyaranya have nirvidya, tisthaset etc. -shown that Badarayana has accepted the vidhi in Havana and Sankara has explained the terms panditya, balya and mauna
(muni)
as referring
respectively
to
iravana,
manana
and
Vidyaranya has moreover substantiated this position by showing that the repetition of the vidhyayaka
nididhyasana.^
BtaJmasutra, 3/4/47 saJia/cdryantaravidJuh pahsma trblyam vidynsaliahlnno maunasya Savlcardbhusya on ]t
:
)
'
Cf
I
tadtafo
uUnjddii at;
hdh/apandityui ad
idJarei dsrayitai yah.
Rational
&
Logical Background of Vedanla

as
13
vakya with regard to kavana,
srotavya
etc.,
and iasmad
is
Brahmanah pandityam
nirvidya balyena
tislhaset etc., in the
same branch (sakha) of the Brhadaranyaka Upamsad

havana.
viously
meant
ior giving the force of validity to the injunctive character of
Repetition for substantiating what
has
been pre-
recommended is not an error of prolixity but is a source of validity. Thus the injunctive character of siavana
not to be regarded as a mere imagination. Vidyaranya has brought in a very fruitful discussion about the possibility of niyama vidhi in the Vedic precept Atma va're drastavyah hotavyo mantavyo mdidhyasitavyaf^.
is
This discussion brings out the nature of vidhi in srotavya and the logical possibility of such vidhi. It has been admitted by Prakaâtmayati that the vidhi here is restrictive or niyama,
though not in so many clear terms. The restrictive character ol the sravanavidhi is evident from the tact that the alternative means to Bi ahmajnana, viz., sravana, restricts only itself ior the realization of the end, and hence the other alternative methods are excluded by implication. This is the true
signihcance
of
Prakaâtmayati's
analysis
itself
of
the
possible
unforeseen merit (adnta) attaching

of Brahmajnana.
to
havana
in order
to be able to restrict itself as the sole
above, and
alternative
it
means towards the goal This discussion has been elaborately made has been shown that in the matter of Brahmais
jnana too there
the scope for such adrsiaphala helping an

to restrict
that goal.* itself only towards Vidyaranya in his Vivaranaprayneyasamgraha has tried to show from the opponents' point of view that there is the impossibility of recognising a niyama vidhi in i>mvana, for he points out that in the matter of Brahmajnana there is never any possibility of other alternative methods than those enunci-
means
ated in the
i>ruii,
viz.,
sravana,
The knowledge
of
Unqualified
aspirant through an intuitive
manana and nididhyasana. Brahman dawns upon the realization made possible by
these Vedic injunctive processes.
To
this
apparently strong
charge of the opponents Vidyaranya adduces the arguments from the AdvaitisL standpoint to prove that the possibility of
atmatattvaparohsasya
sm vaduiasadJiyatvasya
al
yamdnati ad34)
avagMtadivadubhayarthataya vidMn02Japatteh {Virarana,
14
.niyama vidhi
is in no wise impaired by such a charge ; for he shows that though there is no possibility of other alternative means for the knowledge of Unqualified Brahman (nirviêsat-
majnana), yet those alternative means are possible in the matter of Brahmajfiana as such (sadharanakarena) and therefore are excluded by implication from the field by the restricHe shows that even in ordinary tive character of sravana. cases of niyamavidhi, as the pounding of paddy (vnhinavahanti), there is also
from the view-point of real sashic injuncno possibility of other alternative means for the fact that pounding alone is accompanied by the unforeseen merit (adrsta) which makes the paddy capable of being used in the sacrifice, and such paddy, to be a part and parcel of the sacrifice, should therefore be the object of pounding and of no other means. Hence other alternative means too are not logically
tion
possible in the case of such paddy, the husks of which are
desired to be separated.
Hence Vidyaranya concludes that even so in mrvisesatmajnana the alternative means are either niyamavidhi in unnecessary for the establishment of the
itavana or are to be regarded as possible in Bjahmajndna as such (as known by mind etc.), as the alternative means, to
separate husks of the
possible only generally in
paddy consecrated to some This paddy as such.
sacrifice are
analysis
of
Vidyaranya, therefore, brings out that the Advaitist admission of niyamavidhi in sravana is justifiable. But he seems to have
supplied the cue of such analysis from the Advaitist standpoint to Akhandananda and Visnbhattopadhyaya, for the latter have also discussed this problem in their works, the Taltvadi-
pana and the Rjuvivarana respectively. Akhandananda has shown us that in savisesatmajnana or the knowledge of Aiman or Brahman as qualified and not as Pure Unqualified, there are alternative means other than havana, such as perception (pratyaksa), and hence in the matter of Brahmajfiana But as to as such, these alternative means are well plausible. the question whether in the knowledge of Unqualified Brahman (nirviiesatmajnana) these alternative means are possible, he says that from the fact that they are plausible in Brahmajfiana as such, they are to be taken as such here also^.
''
klrMtmajnanamatre sadhamntard'praptih,
uta
nirviicMtmajfidnel
Rational
&
15
Visnubhattopadhyaya too in his Rjuvivarana has said that the possibility of the alternative means is from the viewpoint of a general act and this is equally true in the case of pounding and Brahmajnana.^
Padmapada
sity of
in his Pancapadika has referred to the necesthe Adyasabhasya of ânkara with reference to Brah-
majnana. We have shown above the propriety of this Introductory Bhasya of 5ankara and have said that it is necessary
as illustrating the object (visaya) and end (prayojana) of Vedantic studies. That object and that end are the necessary corollaries of the very first Brahmasutra (athato Brahmajifnasa), which, by the word atha, expresses the competent subject (adhikarin) in such inquiry. Padmapada now shows that the whole of the Adhyasabhasya and not any part thereof can suffice to bring out these, i.e., object and end. Knowledge of
the unity of the Universal

va) being the object
and the Individual Self (atmaikaiand annihilation of the false knowledge of duality responsible for the eternal cycle of births and deaths {anarthahetoh prahanam) being the end, of Vedantic studies, we cannot stop short of showing that these two are not possible until all our empirical life of an active nature is shown to be due to adhyasa, i.e., a false, super-imposed knowledge of the not-Self due to its false identity with the Self. If our empirical life were not shown to be a life of duality of the subject and object as implied in action (kartrva) and enjoyment (bhokrtva), which is false and illusory as being super-imposed on the knowledge of unity of Consciousness, we could not have shown that there is any necessity of commencing Vedantic studies having for its object atmaikatvajnana and end anarthahetoh prahanam. If our empirical life were all real, if the duality of the subject and the object were as true as the unity, then Supreme Knowledge as envisaged in
diitiye'purvlye'û nadyah. savisesatmajfiane pratyaksadifrasarat dcdanadyapraptavaft vrlhimatre dalanadipraptei mymnavannirvihsatmajndne tulyam anyatra sadhanantara'prapiermyatna tti eddhanantaraprd'ptava'pt [Tattvadlpana, Cal. Sans. Series No 1., P. 34.). praptih atah katham niyamahl nanu nirvihsatmajMne na tesam atha niyamadarianat, dalanadyapraptdvapi
vrjhisu
mmvam.
apurviyavrlhisu
sadharanaJcarena praptimapeksya {Bjuvtvarana. Cal. Sans. Series
tatra
my amah
,
tadatrdpi
samanam
No. 1
P.
34).
75
Cniique on the Vivaiana School
found it possible to the Vedantic studies would never have illusory, for, out negating all empirical life as false and real object. knowledge, however perfect, can never negate a
flash
Hence Padmapada and Praka^tmayati have harped on
this
false knowledge tune pretty long to establish that adhyasa or superimposition of the not-Self on it is oi- the Self due to the
hilation of all false
aim at the annithe starting-point in Vedantic studies which knowledge for the Hashing out of the
also, Supreme Knowledge of Unity. Prakaâtmayati has object shown at length that knowledge cannot negate any
really present by
(object)
way
of
its
association with
it
either as viâya
or
airita
negate the
covering
false,
knowledge can superimposed knowledge of an illusory nature

(dependent).
For,
true
real knowledge.
up the
He
adduces irutopapatti or
srutarthapatti as the valid

existence of
means of knowing the eternal coas true knowledge and removal of false knowledge,
empirical life as envisaged in determining the falsity of our necessity of the the effect of such false knowledge Thus the upodghala or Adhyasabhasya lies in the fact that it serves as the meaning ol introductory basis for the determination of the true as originating from the tanira or the thesis of the whole Bhasya
Vedantic studies possible at first Brahmasuira, as it makes end of such by founding on solid grounds the object and of adlmsa studies through the logical establishment
the
all
CHAP! ER H AN EXAMINATION INTO THE SUPR-IMPOSFI> KNOWLEDGE (ADHYaSA)-ITS TENABILITY

RIAL CAUSE OF NESCIENCE
iicxt
rS^
(AJlÂNA).
The
important
is
and Prakasatmayati
question discussed by Padmapada regarding the nature of conflict (viro-
dlia) between the Self (asmat) and the not-Self (yusmat). Sankara has shown that these two objects are in eternai conflict like darkness and light; hence he has endeavoured hard to establish that these two objects nevertheless become illu-
our empirical life of This is his thesis in the Introduction {adhyasabhasya) and hence the necessity of Vedantic studies. But he seems to have erred at the very outset by bringing in the analogy of darkness and light in this context. Padmapada has hinted at this apparent error of judgment and Prakaâtmayati has elaborately discussed the problem. Darkness has been hailed as the absence of light or
arises all
sorily
false
mixed up and therefore knowledge of the not-Self
as the Self.
of visual perception of colours due to it. Hence they are naturally in eternal conflict and therefore one cannot assume the nature of the other (itaretarabhavavat), One is positive
(light) and the other is negative (darkness), and therefore it is quite in the fitness of things that one should exclude the other from the same field of existence {avaslhana) and conno-
tation (paia.sljfnfihnala).
But the
Self
and the
not-Self
are
both positive exist en ts and hence there is no logical necessity, on the analogy of light and darkness, that one should always
so
exclude the other.
Akhandananda
case of light
in
his
Tailvadlpana
is
has
shown that in the
and darkness there

mutually
exclude
this
natural conflict of a positive and a negative object (bhavabha-
varupa-virodha) and hence they

other.
positive
can
Self
each
But
in
the
entities,
and the not-Self, two there may not be any logical necessity to
case
of
the
they necessarily should always exclude each other because of their conflicting nature, for here the conflict is
infer that
18
not
mutually-exclusive
character like light

intrinsic
natures,
nature without
due to their positive and negative and darkness, but is due to their own {bhasaka-bhasya-virodha). Such different
characters,
;ankara's
mutually-exclusive
can
very
well overlap in existence,
and therefore
contention
that (it is not ordinarily possible without the recognition of adhyasa for such overlapping to take place, becomes feeble. Therefore Padmapada, Prakaâtmayati, and Vidyaranya others have taken up their pens to establish that darkness is a positive entity like light and is not the negation of it. Hence
Padmapada has hinted

there
is
at the impossibility of the contention
.that darkness is a negative entity
by saying that in their case not the sahanavasthanalaksana-virodha, but there is parasparanatmatalaksana-virodha. Prakaâtmayati has shown elaborately that darkness is a positive, not a negative, entity,
it
.and
can remain at the same field of existence along with the discussion regarding the nature of darkness in such polemical works of Advaita Vedanta having apparently scanty significance, assumes gigantic importance as Sankara has connected this question with the fundamental jproblem of adhyasa.
light.
Thus
.darkness
.there
Padmapada has hinted when he says that

is
at this question of the nature of
there
is
no sahanavasthana-virodha
mutual exclusiveness
intention
is
or conflict of non-co-existence between light and darkness, but

the
more deep-rooted
conflict of
{parasparanatmatalaksana-virodha).
I
His
that
as
darkness and light co-exist as in a faintly-lighted room,

Jieat
and shade under a tree, and hence darkness is not the negative of light. But there is a conflict more deep-rooted .as of two independent entities and hence one implies the
absence of the other.
.but these
Darkness
is
two are in eternal
conflict
a positive entity like light, and hence one excludes
Similarly the Self and the not-Self, two positive Ka^^<his kind of conflict; hence these seem to be .outside the ken of illusory knowledge of one (not-Self) superimposed on the other (Self) and vice versa. This apparent absence of any adhyasa has been postulated by iSaiikara in his Adhyasabhasya of the Brahmasutrabhasya on the analogy of light and darkness as the view of the opponents {purmpak$a or iahkapaksa). In fact, iSaiikara starts from here and admits
the other.
-entities,
Superimposed Knowledge
that
&
its
Material Cause
there
19
are
adhyasa
is
not apparently postulated when

of
iwo
positive objects of eternal conflict.
The arguments
Padmapada, Prakaâtmayati, Akhanda-
manda and Vidyaranya as to the positive nature of darkness may be summed up very briefly. Padmapada has shown that Jight and darkness may co-exist and hence they have no
sahanavasthana-virodha. But it is Prakaâtmayati who is very analytic in counteracting the view that the paraspara naimatalaksana-virodha as envisaged by Padmapada between the Self and the not-Self may well be possible without the analogy of light and darkness in which the latter is the negative of the former. Akhandananda also elucidates this point
Tattvadipana. The conflict between two objects arising from their mutual exclusiveness {sahmava^thana-lakâna or paraspatanatmatalaksana) due to the positive-negative character (bhavabhavaimata) of them is not the conflict between the Self and the not-Self; tor here we look forward to a conflict of anti-thesis due to their own intrinsic nature
in his
as
between
two
positive
entities.'^
That
conflict
(paras-
paranatmaialaksana-virodha)
as
suggested
by
Padmapada
touches the core of the problem of adhyasa. This, therefore, is the true note sounded by Padmapada, and Prakasatmayati,
Akhandananda, Vidyaranya and others have harped on its tune to show that darkness and light have conflict not due to their negative-positive-character, but due to their instrinsic nature, as these two are positive entities like the Self and Thus the analogy of light and darkness, in the not-Self. explaining the possibility of adhyasa between the Self and the be possible not-Self where ordinarily no such adhyasa would
due
to
their
intrinsic
divergent
nature,
has been
apt,
the
former being of the same nature of having no existence as being both of a positive nature.
În
this
conflict
conflict in co-
of
two positive
there
entities
there
may very
partaking
well
he
the
co-existence
<;haracter of
{saMvmtMna) hut
cannot
he
ajiy
of
another entity iparaspardtrmtd).
But
in the conflict of one
and another negative entity, there cannot have therefore Here the Advaitist writers from Padmapada possibility. there is only the latter shown that in the case of light and darkness these two are positive entities. Impossibility hut not the former, for Self tliere is cnly the indicaHence in the adhyasa between not-Self and
positive
he
also
the
first
tion of
the
second
impossibility,
but not the former.
20
Critique on the
Vwarana School
Praka0tmayali has shown that darkness is not a negative {avast lianabecause it has form (tupa) and volume bheda) which are directly perceived by us. A negative entity cannot have these two characteristics. The form {nipa) ot
entity,
darkness
other
again does
not
of
necessarily
pre-supposc
the
tactile
characteristic {sparia), as air (vayu),
though
if
toi'iiilcss,
has the
the
characteristic
touch.
it
Again,
darkness
\vere
negative
ot
light,
then
could
be
the
negative of cither
univeise.
some particular light or the totality of light in the But while the second alternative is impossible on
face of
it,
the very
the
first
alternative cannot suggest that there will

is
be darkness when a lamp

brightly-lighted
light
(a
not lighted in a the absence of particular lamp) but no darkness. Heie the oppois
put out or
also
place,
for here
there
is
nents
may
say that the opposite of darkness,
i.e.,
bright
light,,
being
present cannot
account for darkness;
hence darkness,
should
pre-supposc the complete absence ot its opposite. Such a view has been controverted completely by Akhandiinanda hi his Tattvadipana where he point's out the tact that the complete absence of the opposite may be said to accompany the ptagabhava (absence at the time of non-origination) of darkness before a single lamp is lighted, but cannot then be said to accompany pradhvamsabJiava (absence at the time ii are Card bhava of destruction) and say that vice versa; to (mutual exclusion) is accompanied by the complete absence ot the opposite is absurd, for even it there is enough light there is naliually the mutual exclusion between it and darkness which inevitably should be known. Thus have Prakasatmayati, Akhandananda and Vidyaranya established I lie arguhovv-
mentative side of the positive nature of darkness. Vidyaranya in his Viva7a7ioprameyasamg){iha has,
e\er,
gone a
little
further in discussing the validity
of any
tlu*
inference in establishing the adhyasa between the Self and

not-Self.
by way of the admission of an a[>parent impossibility, at the outset has .sho\\n that like light
:ânkara
has,
and darkness, two opposite entities, there cannot apparently appear any adhyasa or false knowledge of the not-Self as the Self and vice versa. But this is admission of an apparent anomaly and he has taken great pains to establish the funda mental issue he has hi view in his svstem, vi/., adhyasa,.
Sup)intposed Knowledge
&
ils
Material Cause
21
l*admapacla, Prakasatniayati and Akhandananda have inlcrpreied ânkara's adhyasa and its possibility between the Self and the not-Self, though seeming to be impossible, in support ot the grounds of such admission. The seeming improbability ol adhyasa has been only admitted on the analogy of light and
two opposite entities, by these authors and they concentrated more on the establishment of the possibility of adhyasa. But Vidyaranya has shown by inference the imposdarkness,
have logically Vidyaranya has
adhyasa in face of the view of the opponents who argued the fallacies in such an inference. tried to prove the proposition: "Self and notSelf are devoid of any mutual super-imposition of their respecsibility of
tive natures (tddaimyadhyasarahttau) like light and darkness." He has, moreover, shown that this inference is possible
because of the fact that Self and not-Self are of quite opposite nature, being designated by two different terms like asmai And yusmat. But opponents have argued that such an inference
is
invalid, for the Self
and the
not-Self as envisaged here
cannot be proved by inference as having the characteristic of tadatniyadhyasamhitatva, if by these terms the common or Mimamsist or even Vedantic conceptions are meant. Self and jiot-Self as commonly understood refer to the body and the
-external
object respectively, but these are not the objects of
any adhyasa and consequently of adhyasabhava. Even the Mimamsist conception of Self as the enjoyer of all fruits of actions and not-Self as the body and organs does not envisage any adhyasabhava between them, for both are of the same {jada) nature. Even the Vedantic conception of Self as Pure, Unqualilied Consciousness and not-Self as anything superimposed on It, cannot logically make the former as beingdesignated by any specific term of reference like asmat and hence cannot envisage adhyasabhava between these on the ground of their different specific designations. Herein Vidyaranya' s logical analysis of the impossibility oi adhyasa (tadatmyadhyasarahiiatva) reaches a stage where any postulation of adhyasa becomes unnecessary. Imposof adhyasa has been regarded as the pre-condition al postulation for establishing adhyasa, but the former seems to be a question of irrelevant postulation for the fact that Self
sibility
and
not-Self, in
whatever way conceived, cannot be regarded
22
as ever
Critique on the Vivaiana School
tried to be
coming within the purview of absence oi adhyasa as proved by interence. liut Vidyaranya shows that
is
in the Vedantic conception there

of adhyasa
the possibility of absence
due to their different nature, tor Self, as conceived here, though cannot be designated by any specilic term, is regarded as such due to its reflected existence on the Ego. Vidyaranya has shown that the Self and the not-Self are
designated by difterent terms for the fact that the former alone
is
the determinant {visaym) of the latter (viiaya).
Herein
is
the clue to the whole philosophy of adhyasa as
advocated by ânkara.
Vidyaranya has
tacitly
followed
the
footprints of his original predecessor Prakasatmayati

Self as the opponents' very solid
expos-
ing the irrelevancy of adhyasa between the Self and the not-
ground of argument only to

is
prepare their
fact
own grounds
of establishing that adhyasa
based on very cogent logic and metaphysics. Prakasatmayati also exposed that adhyasa between Self and not-Self is
not possible on
the ground of their avowed dissimilarity. This dissimilitude (sadrsyabhava) and consequent absence of adhyasa (adhyasdbhava) were, however, not seriously objected to on the logical ground of the opponents' exposure of fallacies to such inferences, leading to an almost impossible postulation of any adhyasabhava also, leaving the two entities merely on their mutually-incompatible natures, as has been done by Vidyaranya. But Padmapada and Prakasatmayati have admitted simply that adhyasabhava is a necessary postulation on the ground that neither the Self nor the not-Self has any possibility of similarity which is a pre-condition toadhyasa. Such being the acceptance of even Vidyaranya whohas very creditably met opponents' arguments seeking to make the two entities Self and not-Self as merely two independent incompatible entities without any necessity to postulate their initial adhyasabhava, it was imperative for Padmapada and his followers to strike at the very clue to adhyasa which is the
foundational doctrine of their system. Padmapada has said that although the not-Self as the Ego etc., is always designated
a"? though the Self (aham) and the Self is beyond any such spatio-temporal designation, still the not-Self is designated as. the not-Self (yusmat) on the logical concept that the Self
(asmat)
is
reflected
on and thus
enlightens, as
it
were, the
not-Self
ledge.
diiterent
&
its
Material Cause
23
(yusmat)
The
Self
wherefrom flows the super-imposed knowand the not-Self, though appearing as
on the face of them, are really always appearing as identihed due to an adhyasa between them. The clue to the problem of adhyasa is thus enlightened by Padmapada and a whole host of his followers has explained this phenomenon their own masterly ways. Padmapada and Prakaâtmayati
have tried to establish that there is the possibility of superunposed knowledge (adhyasa) between the Self and the notSelf, although it is to be an impossible proposition due
their
to.
different
is
there
for
it.
have shown that in adhyasa necessity of similarity to be an indispensable factor Now in sopadhtka bhrama (illusion due to an adjunct),
nature.
They
no
bhramajnana one (as in lohitah sphaiikah = the' crystal-stone is reddish). But in the mrupadhika bhrama (illusion as due to no adjunct) there is not the indispensability oithis factor as some imaginary similarity as between twosimilar smells (where there is no real similarity, for smells, have no parts) can rather serve as the desired cause, or even no such similarity is at all necessary as in the false knowledge
is
there
a
is
no need of any
borrowed
similarity, for here the
purely
oi "this conchshell
is
yellowish" (pitah sankhah).
Thus
they
have shown that even the Self being reflected on the Ego can be falsely identihed with the not-Self as the enjoyer, mindbody etc., for the fact that the Self as the only Reality can be the object oi false knowledge due to its reflected
on the Ego. This false knowledge between the Self is an eternal truth and is the cause of all spatio-temporal life of actions of human beings. There is a
existence
and the
not-Self
vicious cycle of the Self as falsely identified with successive

aspects of the not-Self
and
it
is
anadi lokavyavaharanimiitam-
according to Sankara
there
is
(as
aham manusyah
no
am
a man)
Self
Here
factor.
no
for
necessity of similarity
between the
and the
that
not-Self,
here
is
indispensability
of this
Padmapada and Prakaâtmayati have

false
dehnitely opined
knowledge (adhyasa) is due to ignorance or nescience between the real and the unreal, and does not necessarily presuppose similarity between them. It is the nature of a positive ignorance to make possible this super-imposed knowledge even without any similarity. Similarity or non-similarity
2-^
Critique on the Vrvaiana School
is
not the sine qua nan to adhyasa but only a positive ignorance o the real and the unreal, the transcendental and the
phenomenal.'^
Vidyaran)a has eiaDoiatcd this interpretation by showing that adhyam, though logically an indetenmnatc phenomenon as admitted by the Ad\anists themselves inasmuch as it is held
to
be outside
is
any
logically analytic
determination
{aniwa-
.canlya),
and is a phenomenon ot our empirical life. Here, therefore, he has come out in full force of his arguments that adhyasa cannot be denied between the Self and the not-Self on the basis of non-similarity between them.
possible
He
has ably analysed the place of similarity as a necessary

for
false
factor
niiupadhika
former,
knowledge both in sopadhika hhroina and bhrama, and has shown that not only in the
but also in the latter, similarity is an adventitious condition of adhyasa, for the real spring lor it lies its material cause which is, according to the Advaitists, ajmna
or ignorance.
Herein comes up the very vital problem of Advaita Vedanta for which its masters have produced volumes of arguments for its valid establishment. Padmapada and Prakasatmayati have very ably taken up their pens for the same purpose and have handed down a rich legacy of their discursive analysis to later writers of Advaita dialectics. The problem
itself with the nature of the material cause {upadanakarana) of adhyasa which has been held to be an eternal nescience (ajnana) covering up the individual self's (jwa's) consciousness (jnana) as the real essence of all experience of
concerns
multiplicity and plurality. This postulation of the presence of ajnana as the material cause (upadana-kfuana) of all false knowledge of multiplicity has been supported by arguments
by Padmapada and Prakaiâtmayati. But the raised and solved by them is about the nature of ajnana which they postulate. The issue becomes
of valid proofs
more
vital issue
^ a jMttam,
isai/atfam,
sdd)si/am
tafJifi
ra jiiayogah
inmatam mifhi/fi/fmnopdild/ifoh
ft,
i
'T dhyasuheiuh
kinfKtniai/tityatirchiiadd'
l-di
yat u'tdana-
ipalmhWial opaffrhlfaft c mti kari/af radio; na i/adeiam na tadevam yaiha sammafam kMu. {Pfahi,tmthadranmaEd T R Chtntamam, Vol. I; P 6.) HI also SmMHenaJmirfd-a, 1/27-30.
i)i/at?u7îdfUiafada)} rai/an/atirekavati f'uh
Supoimpoied Knowledge
a perplexing
C-
ih
Maloml
Cause
25
one when one goes on lo anahsc the grammatical meaning of the word which makes it a negative entity ijnanahfmvaynpam) In the Advaita metaphysic, it is not such An entity, but a positive {bhava-rUpam)
one, lor it does not subscribe to the theory of causality ol the negative like the Madhyaimkas and the N>aiya>ikas.
Padmapada has hinted at the positive character of a]nana bv showing that it is a blind principle (.sakLi) oi avidya or nescience of the individual sell, which is false {milliya) through
and
throtigh.
17ms understood Advaita Vedanta preaches vehemently he poutive existence oi njfiaua as the pnnupia etenm ot all knowledge ot inultiplicit) and never as a negative entity which IS only the absence oi true knowledge
I
I'rakasatmayati
establishes
elaborately
it is
discusses
the
subject
and
first
that
He meets absence oi true knowledge {tallvapianabliTwa) as equivalent to the absence of the conflicting power ot true knowledge {pmltbatidhakabhava) towards nd/iyasa. He rejects the view
adhyasa.
ot the Nyaiyayikas that ptaiibandhaka or hindrance is merely the absence ot cause of the origination ot something, but sides with the MTmamsakas that in ptaliband/iaka the cause of non-origination is simultaneous with the conditions of origina-
cause {upadana-karana) of the objectic^ns regarding h only as the
the material
~Vwar ana
ii
tion {pmk(dakniane hi salt katyofpadavvodfii pratibandhakaiii V 89). But true knowledge is not the cause of iKm-origination (ptahbandhaka) of adhyma in the sense that
of
cannot be simultaneous with the conditions of origination adhyasa, such as, imperfections of the body or mind.
rrakasatin<iyaii thus sows the seeds ol the positive character of

fact that he repudiates the Mew that it is the condition oJ adhyfisa as the negative entity like the absence
ajnann lor the
His anahsis ol the causality (karanotva) ajnana towards adhyasa leaves cme in no doubt in establishing that It is really the posihve cause and not a negati\e condition This view of causality, as accepted by all Schools 1)1 Indian Philosophy, revolves round the distinction of 'catisc'
<jL
of tiuc knowledge
.and
'condition
'
The
cause
is
always
the
self-established
eflEect;
(anyathasiddhiiunya)
'condition'
is
Mne qua non precedent
to the
the
precedent to the effect as being possible by the megaiwn of some other object antagonistic to its origination,
26
Critique on the Vivatafia School
or as the temote antecedent determined by another antecedent. Again, Prakasatmayati has tried to repudiate the causality oi adhyasa in other objects like the Self (Atmd), Ego (antah-
karana) or the physico-mental imperfections (dosas) with equal vigour by showing
{pannama)
ol
that adhyasa is not the transformation any of these objects, but a false creation having
lis foundation in the positive ajfiana and is thereiore an. appearance of the Reality thus appearing. Vidyaranya has taken great pains to elaborate this theory by showing that ajnana is a positive entity responsible for all false, super-imposed knowledge of our empirical life. He has shown that this apiana is in no wise a negative entity as the absence of hindrance (pratibandhakabhava) or as the absence ot an opposite entity {viwdhisamsai gabhava), but is the positive material cause (upadana-karana) of all adhyasa. Vidyaranya has ably elaborated the cue of Prakasatmayati that the Self (Atma) or the Ego (antahkarana) cannot be the transforming cause (pannamikarana) of adhyasa by saying that though the Nyaiyayikas and Sankhyas respectively take these as the source of knowledge, yet the Self cannot be a transforming entity nor can the Ego have any contact with the object which is false through and through. Vidyaranya shows that these opponents urge that the false cognition of the two pieces of knowledge (jnanadhyasa) is due to the transformation of the Self or the Ego, as these are the seat of all knowledge. The false knowledge of these two objects (visayadhyasa) may postulate a principle like ajnaria for the fact that here after the superimposition the knowledge arises in the Self and for the matter of such super-imposition a principle of ajnana may be necessary; but in the jnanadhyasa the super-imposition between the objects having been accomplished by ajnana, the false cognition of the two pieces of knowledge arises due to the tiansformation of the Self or the Ego, the seat of all other knowledge. Vidyaranya like Prakasatmayati says that these are absurd propositions for the simple fact that false knowledge having been assigned to the Ego, the Self could never have attained true knowledge for which purpose the Self, not
as a transforming cause, but as the seat of ajnana, the prmcipia
eierna of
all
false
knowledge, should be accepted to explain
adhyasa.
its
Material Cause
2T
phrases '1 am ignorant' (ahamajnah) is the negation oi knowledge such (jndnasdmanyabhava) as directly known and realized in. such experiences. He has shown that the thesis oi Advaita Vedanta that it is a positive entit> and never a negative one is justihed by cogent dialectics. The problem becomes keener
like
as
Vidyaranya has moreover ably met the antagonists' view that a^hana or absence oi knowledge as is indicated in
when we
consider that abhdva or absence of somethhig has been explained variously, epistemologically and ontologically,
b> difterent Schools oi Indian Philosophy. Vidyaranya has harped on a very lively tune to repudiate the views oi NyayaVaisesikas and Bhatta-Mimarhsakas. While abhava is admitted
36 a separate category by both these Schools, yet there is a wide epistemological chasm between their views. The former uphold that jnanabhava (absence of knowledge) is the object oi direct perceptual cognition, and hence there is never any positive jnana as is indicated in experiences like 1 am ignor-
The latter, however, advocate that abhava is never an object of perceptual knowledge, but is known through an indirect and separate means oi knowledge, viz., anupalabdht.
ant'.
also have to admit that such experiences as 'I am ignorant' being directly realized as matters oi perceptual cognition should point to a positive entity and not a negative one, for on their own showing an abhdvavasiu (negative entity)
Hence they
cannot be directly realized (pratyaksa). However, they may hold that in such cases the jnanabhava is only inferred and not directly realised. But the Nyaya-Vaisesikas cannot be forced tf. this admission, lor they can very well explain the direct
realization (pratyaksa) of negative entities as of positive ones.
Such being the bone of contention as to the epistemological and ontological implications of abhdva, Vidyaranya has tried to establish the view of Advaita Vedanta that ajfidna as a positive entity is not the object of any or other of the pramdnas. Herein is the true note of Advaita metaphysics that has been sounded by Vidyaranya. He has tried to bring oul the Advaita theory that the nature of ajndna is never tO' be judged by reference to the means of knowledge {pramdna} but should be taken as the piincipia eiema of all our false knowledge of the empirical multiplicity and as revealed only by the Witness-Consciousness {Sdksicaitanya); hence it is said
,28
Cnlique on the Vivatana School

ib
by the Advaitist that ajfiana

borately
only sakstvedya.
This
is
the
ela-
pedestal ol attack oi Advaita writers
shown the points
of
and Vidyaranya has attack from this pedestal.
He
has repudiated the Nyaya-Vaisesika view by showing that in cxpeiiences like T am ignorant', there cannot be any absence
knowledge as such (jnanasanmnyabhava) for the simple lact knowledge of 'i' [dhmimn) at least is present there. Even such knowledge is not an inferential one, as some hold, by the admission of the absence of any pragmatic action in .deep slumber for the fact that in such a state the Self as possessing any function is unrevealed and hence no inferential knowledge of such state is possible. The Bhatta-Mlmamsakas uphold that an indirect knowledge of jndnabhava also (through anupalabdlii) h possible, hence the absence of knowledge as such {jhnna'iama}iyTibnTiva) also is such. But fo the Advaitist who upholds that no external means of valid knowledge, direct or indirect, is necessary to account lor ajnatia, but who goes on to advocate a Consciousness which is Witness to all epistemological behaviour (Saksm) as the sole revealer of Vidyaranya has, thereit, such logical quibblings die out. fore, ably borne the traditional thesis of his School and has taken cues from his predecessors' writings those of Padinapada and Prakasatmayati. Prakasatmayati has shown, as we have discussed above, that all objects, whether known or unknown, are revealed by Saknn (satuam vast a jnatataya oa This cue had been .ajnatataya va Saksicaitanyasya vtmya eva).
of
that the
the
main
thesis of all the later
writings.
It is
The
nature of ajfidna, too,
developments, as in Vidyaranya's is such a development.
not to be negatively described as being subject to this or To determine it that way is to determine tlie indeterminate. Hence njndna as jna?idbhdva becomes an
that pramana.
.endless mess of
not to be included; for
unmeaning determinations within which it is it is an indeterminate principle whose
positive nature can only be revealed b> the Sdksicaiiatiya. Vidyaranya has again been elaborate in showing that the object, substratum and ajnaria are all revealed by the same
llie SaksiSahsicaiianya in experience like T am ignorant', caitanya reveals T' as the substratum and the whole range of objects (sawamsaya) as the object of such ignorance {ajfiana).
Hence
in such places ajndtia as a positive category
is
revealed
Supenmposed Knowledge
as existing
d'
il^
Maienal Cause
29'
a substratum regai'ding an object.
But
all
thcê
This Sdksicaitanya h, however, not the remover o a j nana tor which the vrtifjnana of the anialikanana is required. In ajfiaua there is no such v}tti]nana but the only vitti oi the aniahkatatia or mind is with regard to the avidya ilself. Thus all objects, whether known by the vHlijnana or unknown as suth, are revealed by the Saksicailanya whence it follows that ajndna like the viLtijnana is a positive, but unlike it, an indeterminate, entit) revealed by and only by the Sdkpcaitanyz.. The avidydvHii is
revelations are the
of the Saksm.
work
not antagonistic to avidyd. Prakasatmayati has admirably established ajncifia by an inferential proof which makes it a positive entity existing in the same locus as jndna or knowledge. His syllogism tries toestablish that all
means
of valid
knowledge
{pi mndymjndnam)
being the means of the knowledge cl a pre\iously unknown object must needs presuppose a positive enlit) existing before them as the cause of such previous ignorance; such a positive
entity which is ajndtia is a necessary pre-condition of valid knowledge of an object the object being veiled by this previous entity which is dispelled at the first touch of jfidna being founded in the same locus, viz., Self; it is never a negative entity as the previous non-existence (pjagabhdva) oi know-
ledge but a positive one having a separate existence in the same locus, viz.. Self. The middle term (hetu) which is postulated here as 'being the
mean^ of knowing a previously uninference valid by the first seen in darkness
known object' is supposed to make the known example of a flicker of lamp
{andhakai e puithamotpannapyadlpapiabhdvai). This inference of Prakasatmayati which takes light and and darkness as two positive entities, each existing separately foundnot due to negation of the other, establishes on solid a}ndna. This is ations the positive and separate character of but is nevertheless, a principle always in conflict with jnana, the false knowledge of multiplicity in
the principle of empirical world.
inferential
all
Hence Prakasatmayati establishes on valid principle, grounds the existence of such a positive the locus of knowhaving for its locus the same Self which is
of the object of valid ledge, but acting as the veil {dvarana) Here one aspect of knowledge to be dispelled by the lattci.
^Q
fijnana, viz., avaranasakti, has
inference.
But the other
false projection is
been shown by Prakaâtmayati's by which a created for illusory knowledge of the Real,
aspect, viz., viksepaâkti,
has not been hinted at in the inference. We can, however, jtake it to refer to this aspect of ajnana as well for the fact that
valid knowledge of an object, like the first flicker of a lamp, not only dispels the unknowability of the object but also the false projections upon it due to ignorance as due to darkness. This inferential proof, however, hinges upon the positive character of darkness which is disputed by some Schools of Indian Philosophy. But Avaita Vedanta does not dispute that; on the contrary, it establishes with great labour this view. The metaphysical necessity of the positive character of darkness and ignorance is the more deep-rooted problem in Advaita Vedanta. The whole ontology of the mayd-doctrine
revolves
round
this central point.
These questions have been
discussed in a nut-shell above in connection with the examin-
ation of the nature of darkness.
The
eterna of
of
nature of ignorance as the positive but false pimctpia

all false
knowledge has been established by the proof by Prakaâtmayati. This postulation is with regard to the nature of ajndna based upon the admission of false empirical knowledge, be it of silver upon shell or of mmd-body-ego-complex upon Brahman. These false cognitions necessarily presuppose an equally false material cause (upddanakdrana); otherwise they would have appeared as true as due to a real cause or due to a manifestation of a real cause. Herein Prakaâtmayati's mind has been trained into a kind of maturity where he does not have to seek explanation of the causality of ajnana as in perceptual or inferential proofs cited above. He now exposes the avowed
postuuation
(arihdpalti)
causality of ajnana of all the empirical falsity,

his
and strengthens
hands by the added proof of postulation {aufhdpatii) that this ajnana as such a cause is itself a false, but eternal, principle having its locus upon the Self which is also the locus
of knowledge,
Prakaâtmayati's arguments as to the existence and nature ajnana are cogent and logical. But there is a very great problem as indicated in these arguments which is basal to he Advaita concept of avidya. The question suggests itself
of
Supe) imposed Knowledge
i-
its
MaLoial Cause
prool says
31
that
when
a]nana
object, object.
Prakasatmayaii
is
in his
inferential
ol
the
veil
(avaiana)
is
the
object of
veil
{svavisayavararia).
Ajnajia
never the
knowledge of any external

such
but of the
consciousness
{cailanya) revealing
The
assertion of Prakasatmayati,
therefore, seems to
be a
gToss challenge to Advaita metaphysic.
tion has been
But this quesmet by Prakasatmayati himself who has shown
that ajnana can never be the veil ol any external object which
is
never the recipient of an) effect or consequence (aUSaya) of The above anomaly has been pointed out and resolved by Akhandananda in his Tatlvadipana where he has shown that the real object on which ajnana acts as the veil (avarana) is not the external object as such but the consciousness delimited by such an object. Hence Prakasatmayati's contention that ajnana acts as the veil {avarana) of the object of knowledge stands the scrutiny of logic. The knowledge of
it.
ihe external object likewise
is
the revelation of this conscious-
ness through the consciousness delimited by viUijndria.
Thus
Prakasatmayati's assertion need not be taken at its face value. The object is known or unknown due to the revelation or
non-revelation of this consciousness.
The
object itself
is
never
known without such
previous non-revelation. Thus a]na?ia or avidya has its locus standi only upon consciousness and its determination is merely the object of empirical object ivyavahara) as due to this consciousness. This has been very
well indicated by Padmapada who says that ajnana is due only to the real principle of all external (bahya) and internal (adhydtmika) objects, viz.. Consciousness or Self {Atman), which is the determinant of it, and is revealed by the
Saksicaitanya
when
the
**
external
object
is
empirically
designated as unknown. This question has been raised by Prakasatmayati himself
by Padmapada who contended cannot act as a veil upon the blind object, for the fact that such an object is itself not a fa object of being covered by ignorance which can cover only consciousas
had been
avidya
clearly indicated
that
or
ajnana
ness {sa ca na jadesu vastusu iatsvarupavabha'iarh pralibadhnali
aiasyamesaWidyasaJctirhahyddhyatnuTcesu
anijathS
rastn<,u
taf^rarupasaffd-
matrdnvhandinyahhyu'pagantai yd,
iPaHcafadiko,
mithyarthdvahhasmupa'paftoli.
Pp
96102)
32
Critique on Ihe Vivarana School
Prakasatmayati and P. 106). ; Vidyaianya have discussed this one ot the most vital problems oi Advaita metaphysic to show thai the external object is nevei the object of the covering by ignorance. They have tried hard to justify that the veihng of visaya (external object) is due to the veiling of consciousness and never directly so. The common language dupes us in these cases as when we say ghatah ajndtah (the jar is unknown), lor what passes as the object of
ignorance
is
is
Pancapadikd
taken as the external jar.
lliis dialectal
anomaly
sought to be dissolved b) a very deep dialectical analysis oi the nature of the external object and the influence ot ajna?ia
it
on
This
deeper
episLemology
of
Advaita
Vedanta
is^
icvived masteriuUy bv Prakasatmayati and Vidyaranya Prakasatmayati shows first of all that ajnana never creates any effect or consequence (alisaya) upon the external object,
not the real object ol ignorance. or unknown cannot be the object of the veil (cLvaiana) created by ignorance. His thesis, is that previous ignorance of the object can in no wise be
it
v/hence
loliows that
it
is
The
external object being
known
established
from its present knowledge, for it involves mutual dependence {paraspay Id my a) and absence ol a univeisal rule
for such
postulation
In
its
the
ever-revealed
Self
(in
(Ahiia),
the
present recollection of
past
knowledge
pralyabhijna-
jndna
as in so'ham) cannot logically postulate any previous or intermediate absence ot knowledge or memory (jnanasimtya-
sity of
Herein therefore theic cannot be an) logical necesprevious absence of knowledge and the present knowledge of the Self. Vidyaranya has practically analysed these aiguments and has shown thai the dialectal usage like 'the jai
bhava).
cal
can be explained in consonance with the ontologiof Advaita Vedanta. PrakasaLrnayati had shown that the usage of common parlance as ghafah ajitalah can be explained even without the recognition of any veil'
standpoint
h unknown'
and ajnana are both revealed by appeat to be revealed in adhyasa or false super-imposition. This relation of vuaya and amana is not due to any intrinsic nature of the former for the fact that the latter can only be related with the Self {Almu)' ,[Cf. atmMrayam almavisayam ajnana7n.] Vidyaranya has also shown that the unknownncss of the object is dispelled by
the ghala.
visaya
upon
The
the Saksicaiianya, and hence both
Supeiimposed Knowledge
p} amanajnana
6-
tls
Material Cause
33
and never made an object ot it. Thus the (unknown) object cannot postulate any veil tor the tact that it is never revealed by itself but revealed due to its superimposition upon caiLanya; whence it follows that the veil
{iwaiana) oi ajhana can only take the latter as
its
locus standi.
then to explain the unknowability oi the external object? Prakasatmayati had said that ajfiana along with its Hence (external) object appears as super-imposed on Saksm. it has no eftect upon the object which is designated as
How
unknown. But there is a false projection (viksepasakii) of ajndna which creates, as it were, an effect, though false, upon the external object which therefore is said to be unknown as This false projection, such, but known as another object. created by ajnana which covers up the consciousness delimited by the external object, thus makes the object unknown due to the veiling of the consciousness. Hence though the external object is not the object ot the veil of ignorance, it is not on
that account
always
revealed,
is
for
the
pramana'jnana
arises
when
and the false projection The false projection makes the object appear as vanishes. unknown by the non-cognition of the object as such, and the
the
ignorance
dispelled
real cognition of the object
is the function of pramatiajnana. Vidyaranya has rightly pointed out, as we indicated at
the outset of this discussion, that Prakasatmayati's inference regarding the positive existence of ajnana appears on the face of it untenable lor the fact that he had used in his sadhya (major term) the expression svavisayavarana; but after what Prakaâtmayati has himself said and Vidyaranya has so ably established, it is clear that the avarana as referred to by Pra-
kasatmayati docs not directly rcier to the external object, but l^he false projections {viksepa) created by only indirectly. ainana have their locus in Consciousness which is thus veiled and made to appear as the visaya. The external object, being
the creation of ajnana out of the false projection by which only the Consciousness delimited by it is veiled, therefore,
appears as being the object of the veil of ignorance, which, in

fact, it is
not^"
'"
tiul-ii/ad'ijudai m/i/c
Iv
rajahuhjvpOdmamapV'wmastMnsnmam
cal-
tatn/avi/avaJhai/akaficiia 'phdatah
aiaianatvam na tu sal^sadityaviroihah
34
Critique on the
Vwarana School
even
PrakasatmayaLi has exposed the opponents' charges that if ajnana be recognised as being responsible for the false
it
projection (viksepa) of external objects though

as a veil
really acts
upon Consciousness
(caiLanya),
the further complic(viz.
ations of the non-cessation of the material cause

inspite
o.f
ajnana)
the cessation of the knowledge of false projection,
corollary of its not bemg a material cause Prakaiatmayati has adhyasa force themselves upon us. therefore not only shown the false projections out of ajnana by which it makes them the objects of false knowledge, but
and consequential
of
has also taken great pains to establish that when the false projections cease due to true knowledge, there is also the cessation of the material cause (ajnana) also w^hich is responsible
lor
analysed
has likewise projections. Vidyaranya too problem of ajnana as the material cause (upadana) of adhyasa and has shown that true knowledge puts a stop to the viksepa (false projection) as well as the material cause (upadana) itself. Vidyaranya is more analytical in considering the problem, for he shows that there come about the horns of a dilemma to the Advaitist who recognises ajnana If he does not recognise as the material cause of adhyasa. the cessation of the material cause itself along with its false projections (viksepas) by true knowledge, then the question of Salvation which is the complete cessation of ajnana according on the lo the Advaitist becomes a meaningless hypothesis other hand, even if he recognises its cessation, yet he has to
such
false
the
postulate infinite pieces of ajnana to explain fresh false cognitions even after the cessation of one for the fact that the
cessation of one piece of ajnana cannot account for the ultiSalvation. Thus by postulating an endless series of ajnanas or by postulating that ajnana is not the material cause of adhyasa, the Advaitist becomes a topsy-turvy dogmaPrakaâtmayati has met such arguments and Vidyaranya tist. has ably analysed the chain of arguments of his predecessor. To meet these charges Prakaâtmayati has shown that even if the viksepas are said to be exterminated due to the true knowledge and lose themselves into their cause (ajnana), there
mate
{Vivaranaprarmyasaihgralia,
P.
151.
Published
by
Vasumati 'Sahitya
Mandir, Calcutta.)
Super impo6ed Knowledge

is
its
Maieual Cause
35
no legitimaLe ground or thinking that the cau.e remains cK'cn after the Hue knowledge has appeared. This argument
ol Prakasatmayati has
nileience ni ^v^hich he has
ihus false projections as well as then- basic material cause. Ml, ajnana, are negated by true knowledge. This has been proved irom the empirical process of false knowledge as in shell-silver {iukii-iupya). The true knowledge of the shell
appearing as silver does not only negate the silver but also along with it the absence of true knowledge {svapragabhava)
is the ajfiana of the shell. Here however Vidyaranya seems to have made a technical error in putting in the syllogismone of whose members he designates as svapidgabhava,
when appears as a posterior category, extermniate. all previous false categoriesthe basal as well as the consequential,
been elaborated b> Vidyaranya bv an shown that the true knowledge,
which
for after all the laborious endeavours to prove that ajnana as the material cause is a positive and never a negative entity,
and after his analysis that it is something other than svapragabhava (svapragabhavavyatinkta), Vidyaranya seems here to have committed an error which may be brushed aside as technical without imparing the general metaphysic he has
Prakasatmayati and Vitiyaranya explain the re-appearance of ajnana after the destruction of one manifestation of it, it does not do any harm to the Advaitist position if we recognise difIiave
tried
to
support.
to
Secondly,
tried
show that
to
ferent empirical manifestations of ajnana for different pieces of false cognition which we have as springing from one
fundamental ajnana (millajnanay^. Prakasatmayati has moreover met the charges of opponents that ajnana cannot act as a veil (avarana) to Self (Alma)
or Consciousness (caiianya) for the fact that the latter is a Self-luminous Principle and can never have any lessening of Consciousness. Consciousness according to the Advaitist being the self-evident, self-luminous and self-existing Eternal
Principle cannot have any lessening due to a veil; hence it cannot have any necessity of dependence upon auxiliary conditions which can take away from its revelation. Thus
"
mula]fidnasi/aivd>ast?ia.h7ipda
rajaiadijupdddnani
i,a?idd7iydsi'?ia
intaitanta
iti
kdl'pyatdm
[Vnmana,
sul'tihadijUdnait-
109)
36
Critique
on the Vivarana School
Consdousnes& as the reveaier of all objects by itselt is never Vidyaranya has to be the object ot any veil due to ajnana. also analysed that Consciousness cannot have any veil either due to Its intrinsic nature or due to any extrinsic factor on which it has to depend; tor it is itseli evershining and is seltluminous. Thus by a consistent perusal ol the Advaita standpoint it becomes a paradox to say that apiana creates a upon Consciousness which is the witness (aval ana) veil (Saksm) to all empirical phenomenon. But such charges cannot stand the scrutiny of a logical analysis which Padmapada had hinted at and which has been elaborated by Prakasatmayati and Vidyaranya. Padmapada had said that the presence
lit
oi the veil ot ajfiana
upon
selt-shining
and
seli-evident Consci-
ousness
is
justihed by the tact that the temporal
and
is
spatial
non-revelation ot the Self, the seat ot Consciousness,

that
it;
due to
the power ot avidya, the pnncipia etejna of a positive nature

IS
undeniable, which creates such a veil (avarana)
upon
have proved its existence upon Consciousncsis by deductive reasoncharacterised his reasonmg as Prakasatmayati has ing. anumana (inference) or arthapatii (postulation). Thus he has, argued that the Self being pre-possessed of the collocation of all factors tor its revelation is sometimes the object of nonrevelation. Hence such empirical non-revelation must needs posit the presence of some veil acting (though falsely) upon
Prakaâtmayati
following
the self-shining Self;
and
him
Vidyaranya
whence
of
it
follow^s that the veil is
due
to
positive
principle
ignorance
which
covers
the
Sell
This kind o deductive reasoning, according to Prakasatmayati, may be either inference or postulation, but Vidyaranya has designated it as inferential argument only (anumanasiddhatvat).
It
does not
mak^ much
difference
dialectically
if
we can prove
that the vy at ireky anumana (inference by a nega-
tive analogy) resorted to
of the Nyaiyayika's view
by Vidyaranya is on the acceptance and not the Vcdantic view which disPrakaâtmayati's
cards
such
inference;
but
more
in the nature of postulation (arthapatii)
Vedantic substitute for vyatireky anumana, the second choice of Prakasatmayati on the acceptance of his opponents' view. Be that as it may, this much becomes crystal-clear that
arguments which is which is
arc
the
Padmapada's postulation of the
possibility of an'
Supoimposed Knowledge &
iLs
Material Cause
31
action oi hindrance due lo a positive ignorance (apldna) of

the Selt has been logically established by Prakaâtmayati and Vidyaranya by deductive reasoning. Prakasatmayati has again brought in charges against the Vedantic theory ol the pobilive nature (bhdvarupatvam) of a j nana, although he had laid securely the giound ol such a These charges have been raised by opponents who theory. have tried to justify that the derivative meanings oi the negative particle {nan) can make ajhdna something other than what the Vcdantist has estabiished. This kind oi aiter-
charges and their answcis by Pral;asatmayati

the fact
that
it
is
necessary tor
makes the position more sound.

as
Ihis
is
technically
cess
known
a
oi
lixiiig
the sthunajiikJianananyaya or 'the proVidyaranya, too, has pole in the ground'.
is usual with him more analytiAjhana has been described by the opponents as the absence ol knowledge {jndnabhdva), antagonism to knowledge {.nanaviiodha) which is miUiydjndna or ialse knonledge, or
analysed these charges and as
CulK
something other than knowledge, such as the impressions Prakasatmavati and Vidya(sarhskdni) ol false knowledge. ranya have replied that none of these alternatives is included in the concept ol a f nana masmuch as the instances of such alternatives
cannot
explain
is
salislactorily
the
non-revelation
of
In deep slumber (susupti), for example, the non-revelation oi Ihahniasvarupa
Bnihmasva>upa which
the effect of ajhdna.
cannot postulate that

for
it
is
due
to
any of these alternatives,
such non-revelation of BtaJimasvarupa is neither due to the intrinsic nature ot B)ahma?i which is self-luminous nor due to Its distinction from jiva which is (ontrary to the
Upanisadic tcachhig ol" unitv. Again it cannot be due to any piaiibandJia or hindrance of false knowledge (nulhxdjndna) which is absent in deep slumber, or of its impressions which are incapable of being hindrances or ol absence ot knowledge
(jndnabhdva) that
is
accidental
in
ever-present revelation
its
of
last
Brahman or any
action (kayma), or
impressions
The
(karmaptaiibandha) is of action the hindrance point of developed by Prakaf5atmavati and more so by Vid)aranya who show that the ka}mir hindrance as envisaged here will cither make the inlmiicsiraal Self (Brahman) always non-revealed as or a result whereof karmas themselves will not be revealed
38
will
A
make
that part of the Self revealed by which they them-
selves are illumined
and the other part unrevealed
as a result
whereof a mermaid-like hypothesis will have to be accepted. Prakasatmayati has more fully analysed the absence of any karmzc hindrance to the Self when he has shown that the karmas according to the opponents {Mimamsakas) are not revealed by the Self or according to the Vedantists do not act as such a hindrance to the Self. Hence Prakasatmayati and Vidyaranya have repudiated ably all other alternatives to positive ajnana as being possible ones to explain the nonrevelation of Brahmasvarupa. They have further shown that this positive ajfidna is free from all such charges, for the fact that it is of immediate experience as being revealed by the Witness-Consciousness (Saksm) but acting as a veil upon the
revelation of the other aspects of Consciousness,
viz.,
delimita-
tion
by
the
object
is
etc.
revealed by Saksin
at all a hindrance
a fact
is
This positive ajnana as being of immediate experience, whereas

if
it
the karmic hindrance
either indirectly experienced

it
is
is
which
all
not, because of the nature of
the karmas which are

analysis.
impressions (samskaras) in the last

further weighed
difference
Prakasatmayati has
still
the charges of
some opponents who postulate both

ence
and
non-differ-
{bhedabhedavadin) in all kinds of existents and who therefore do not recognise such a positiye ajnm^ as the creator of all empirical life and not negated till such life exists. On the other hand, they hold that false knowledge (bhraniijnana) or absence of knowledge (jfianabhava) or their impressions are sufficient reason for the false cognitions of our
empirical
there
is
life
and do not make
it
unreal, for the fact that
not only
non-distinction from
Brahman
but also
from It which is also true. The dualistic philosophy of bhedabheda as referred to here by Prakasatmayati refers to Bhagavat Bhaskara's philosophy as distinct from the Bhatta School of Mimamsa which is dualism in specific relations and not in all relations. This distinction has been made clear by Akhandananda in his Tattvad'tpana. However, Prakasatmayati and following him Vidyaranya have very ably refuted these charges and have shown that the dualistic realism negating ajnana and admitting a kind of mithyajnana
distinction
Superimposed Knowledge t
tails
its
Material Cause
39
to establish its own issue, for the fact that such milhyajnana between the anatma (not-Self) and Atma (Self) turns out to be a true knowledge due to the metaphysical position of dualistic realism, this kind of miLhyajnana is not
false
for
making the
distinction
distinct as non-distinct
because of the
are
fact
true. both fmthyajnana of the bhedabhedavadins by taking a familiar example of two species of cow viz., khanda and munda (names attributed to
that
and non-distinction
such
Prakasatmayati
has
refuted
difterent
varieties
of
cow on
their physical
broken and ungenerated horns). the negating judgments like 'this munda-cow,' there is invariably
distinction
'cow'
He
is
attributes of has shown that even in
and non-distinction from both these species.
not a kha7}da-cow but a reality of both (bhedabhedd) of the genus Even the negation of one
mutual
(khanda) in the genus (cow) by another species {munda)' cannot account for falsity inasmuch as the character of the genus (gotva) as modified by one species (kliandavyaklyavacchinam) is not the ground of such negation but such character This argument of dualistic as modified by the other species. realist applies equally to the other side, that is, the absence of falsity in the jiva which is the ground of both kinds of revelation as the not-^Self as well as the Self. Thus the ground of negation of one, say the not-Self, is not jlva appearing as such, but as the other (Self). But such negation is impossible here, for jlva is the ground of both the (real),
of the not-Self and the Self. Thus false knowledge (bhranlijnana) of the Self and the not-Self becomes uujustihable in the tenets of the bhedabhedavadin. Thus have Prakasatmayati and Vidyaranya taken gteat
revelations
pains to establish the Advaita concept of positive ajhana as (ad/iyam). the material of all illusory empirical behaviour
Padraapada's faint suggestions have been worked by them in every detail and they have discussed the problem from all meeting all possible charges. The next question aspects, about adhyasa as introduced by Padmapada is with regard
adhyasa upon Brahman and proofs for Padmapada has hinted that the the empirical life appears as distinctly experienced than is apparently no tliere illusory world, for in the former
to
the presence
of
establishing such
presence.
40
Critique on the
Vwarmia School
latter.
experience oi negation as in the

in ajnana.
Hence the lormer not
being the object oi any negation ieems to have no grounding
This suggestion of Padmapada, however, is faintly Prakasatmayati elaborates its real implications. He says that though it is a fact that our empirical life can be proved to be due to a super-imposed Jcnowledge (adhyasa) between the Sell and the not-SeJt and therefore is negated by the real knowledge ot the Self, still such knowledge being of an indirect (paroksa) jiature as testified to only by the iruiis cannot have any direct bearing upon the negation of the direct experience of such The negating knowledge should be as direct existence. (pratyaksa or aparoksa) as the negated knowledge (adhyasa) is, and hence Padmapada' s suggestion that there can logically
hinted
at
and
be no negating knowledge and hence no possibeing due to adhyasa, st.i ids to reason. This being the charges of the opponents (puivapaksa), Padmapada has undertaken the task of adducing proofs to adhyasa in the empirical life and Prakasatmayati has elaborated them. The former has just mentioned that there being the necessity of adducing proofs to adhyasa, the Bhasyakara ânkara has laid down the laksana or the definition of adhyasa in order to show Prakasatmayati has taken the cue from such its possibility. suggestions of his predecessor and has analysed how adhyasa is supported by proofs and how it is a fact in our empirical life. He says that the empirical life is based on the superimposed knowledge of the not-Self upon the Self which fact is attested to by perception, inference, postulation (anupapatlt)
on the face of
it
bility of the empirical life,
and testimony of Scriptures. The testimony of Scriptures is not the sole guide in the determination of such knowledge. Perception such as of the body as the Self (aham mamisyah), inference from the empirical behaviour which is due to the
knowledge of duality, and postulation of it from the fact that is much below the transcendental Reality which alone is unnegated and therefore it cannot but be false as it is negated,
it
are the proofs for the existence of adhyasa in the empirical

life.
as it has been hinted at above, PrakaSatmayati further analyses the question of the possibility of adhyasa to meet the opponents on their own ground. He sa)^ that so
still
But,
Supenmposed K^wwledge & Us Material Cause
41
Icng as the nature ol adhya!>a is not dearly brought out, nu amount ol dialectical arguments will be able to make a complete negation of it as being false ior which a correct analysis^ of the nature of adhyasa is a pre-requisitc (avidyait/aipasti haranaya laksanameva vakLavyam Virarana, Pp. 141-'142).
Taiivadlpana has further clarified the position by saying that such a coir eel analyse will go to prove ihe thesis that our empirical life is due to adhyasa when such nature of it will be obvious and Imally the possibility of the negating knowledge will be an addfed testimony to the existence of such adhyasa. The whole argument therefore comes to this
pre-requisite
dialectical
Akhanddnanda
in his
that the analysis of the nature (laksana) of adhyasa is the to show that it is a fact {sadbhava) and
farst
the proofs follow from such showing of the fact and are indirect but are added testnnony to strengthen the thesis. the faint suggestion of
life
Form
Padmapada who
said that the
empirical
seems to be unnegated unlike the illusory world and hence the necessity of the analysis of the nature {laksana) of adhydia arises, we can construct a legitimate structure where
laksana
is
the foiemost pre-requisite
whcnct iollow
all
nece-
ssary proofs to the existence of adhyasa.
Padmapada has moreover brought out the implications of ihc possibility {sambhava) of adhyasa over and above its nature
{laksana) and existence {sadbhava). He has said that the separate enunciation of sambhava seems to be redundant ior the fact that it is implied whenever there is sadbhava But
the direct experience of facts is sometimes seem impossible by more power! ul evidences experienced before, is ably elaborated by Prakasatmayati who shows that the separate enunciation of sambhava is necessii.iled by such facts. Padmapada's contention is that in the matter of adhyasa the ground of falsity, ie. Brahman that is Pure Unqualified Existence, cannot be properly said to be sudi ground whence it follows that there should not be any falsity in ,the empirical world. But J5ankara himself has shown that this
his analysis that
seen
to
contention
lity,
1 e..
is not tenable for the fact that adhyasa is not only a matter of empirical proof but also of metapliysical possibi-
whence
it
is
is
Brahman
to be admitted that the ground of adhyasa, regarded as such without doing any violence to
Its metaphysical nature.
Padmapada has
also
shown
that the
42
Critique on the
Vwarana School
view, that there cannot be any falsity in our empirical life

Existence,
because of the ground of super-imposition being Unqualified not legitimate and hence is the possibility
{sambhava)
of
adhyasa
is
also
to
be
separately
stated.
Prakaâtmayati's contention which follows Padmapada's that, such apprehension of the absence of possibility {asamtact that
bhavanabuddhi) of adhyasa is prima facie untenable for the Brahman, the ground of such super-imposition, being known fully, there cannot be any super-impositions at all, not to speak of its possibility or impossibility, and secondly. It being not known as distinct from the not-Self, there cannot be an apprehension of impossibility of adhyasa. Prakaâtmayati hits upon the right nail to bring out the opponents' charges {purvapaksa) as indicated by his predecessor. But Padmapada's contention that the apprehension of impossibility is legitimately claimed by the opponents is elaborated by Prakasamayati who says that the prima facie case as established can side-tracked that indirect above saying be by {paroksa) knowledge of Brahman, and not direct (aporoksa); knowledge of It, as being distinct from the not-Self, can be a ground of the opponents' charge of the impossibility of adhyasa. Thus understood Prakasatmayati's analysis of the purvapaksa is more accurate than his predecessor's for the former shows the real contention of the opponents upon which For, adhyasa seems also is based the reply of the Advaitists. to be untenable according to the opponent's view on the aamission of the indirect (parokm) knowledge of Brahman, and the Advaitists also reply by the admission of such knowledge to prove the possibility and actual existence of adJiyasa in our empirical life. Padmapada says that such a charge is
'voiced by the
of adhyasa by saying
Bhasyakara himself when he introduces the topic aha ko'yamodhyaso named? He says that the interrogative sentence used by iSaiikara refers to both a question as to the nature (laksanaprasna) as also a denial of
:
the possibility {sambhauanak<iepa) of adhyasa.

is
This therefore
the substance of the controversy as to whether adhyasa is
possible or no, from the points of view of the Advaitists

their opponents.
and
Vidyaranya has also closely followed these discussions and has shown that laksana, sambhavana and pramana (sadbhava}
Supenmposed
K?ioiuiedge
&
ils
Malenal Cause
43
are all necessary pre-rcquisiles and hence have lo be separaLel) staled to prove adhyasa. His arguments have been on the Imcs
indicated by his predecessors and he has expressed them in verse to pro\e the thesis oi his SchoolJMoreover, he has brought out the logical necessity of laksana and sambfmvana
by referring to their role in establishing a position in to the pramana which is capable to do it. He has us to a verse whereby he has shown that laksana and -vana are necessary not only to meet possible charges
to establish the position
relation
referred
âmbha-
but also which can be arrived at only by the

-.
pramana.s but only with their co-operation^
^'
f/urusisyau
vadinau
id
,iftsi7p
quiuh
2îiria"âdlitâsamylt(ii(7n.
tntix cuuduihaii (atit, -iivadmte'Ua yt'dhifusê
.<isi/siwi
juaii
innnddiHi/Otha
{Vi uianai
laksonain
sambhdi andpiamdnaiica
P. 170
)
1
kal/ii/atc'dhi/Jsasiddhai/r
ft ame,i/a?amgi aha.
^'
mdnasidd/nsra hd-nandf tacrddhi/almmdijcsii q'ludnaiiapi dmbhanom mniblidittah fiutij run/dm p(d*uh t^ddhi/ela hetinul na tasya fietubhiofidtiam ulpalaiinci a i/o Ixttnh Cilmtlha, {if Nirnaya Sagar Ed P 217 )
1
,
mnnddlnnO me i/nsidd/i
CHAPTER
III
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF ADHYASA k ITS PROCESS, WITH A DETAILED ADVAITA THEORY OF ERROR AS CHALLENGING OTHER
THEORIES (KHYATIVADAS)
Now we
problem
Ciller
into the real field o the very important
sought to be analysed in its nature defines it as srmiirupah paratm puivachstavabhasah. This definition ot adhyasa has been .iiiahsed b) hair-spiit discussions by the later dialecticians ot Advaita Philosophy, and Padmapada and his followers have
is
of adhyasa
which
(laksana) by Sankara
when he
very
ably clarified
this
laksana.
sd'ys
As
to
first
the
first
expression
i.e.,
sm]luupah, Padmapada
refers
to
that the
member,
simLi
the object ol recollection
{karmant ktm).
But the
grammatical justification of such interpretation as given by Padmapada himself has been elaborated by Prakaâtmayati and Akhandananda. They have shown that this karmani ktin
is
justified
by
Panini's
very
rule
akartari
ca
karake
s&mjnayam {Panmi, 3/3/19), for though there is the express condition of sanijna for such pialyayas (as ghah) to be used 1)1 cases other than the nominative (akai(a)i), still the conjunction 'ca' can make them to be used in places other than samjna in all cases other than the nominative. Thus the grammatical irregularity is avoided by Padmapada and his foUowers^"^. The compound, however, is analysed by Padmapada as smaryamanaiupamiva yupamasya (Upamana -garb ha baliuvrihi) which means that the super-imposed object (like silver on shell) is similar to an object of recollection but
merely recollected as such. The second alternative is untenable for the fact that the object is not merely an object of recollection but of direct experience {spastampuro'vasthiiah'avabhasanat Pancapadika. P. 160). It can be said in this
not
''^
"(>hd\a''l'arian
Uifi'/uti
tt'ti
ca
'sf)i/yain
sutrcna
luatnu
uifâOflflfsarhjfiai/dintiasaihp'laijamajn
ifi/nitJiah
snlradcayamadhihrtya samjnayam' iti MraJce hhaiR Jeartrvyatmkte ca Jmrake samjMynmn ngJianddirvidhiyata iti na
<ut)ariif)dha
{Tattvadipava
Pp
158-159.)
CtUical Analyse of Adhy'dsa ^

connccLioii
tary
AdvaUa Theory
oj
Enoi
45
thai
Vacaipalimisra
viz.,
hit,
well-known commenhai>
on the Brahmasuhas,
as
B/idtnalT,
act o superuuposition
similar to recollection
recognised the {^nnlnupa),
lor
lalse
according
lo hmi, the knowledge oi super-imposition is owing to the falsity ot tiic super-imposed, and is, there-
lore, similar to
smHi (recollection) but noi pure recollection. But Parkasatmayati ponits out the opponents' charges and meets them \er> ably to deiend his predecessor's nuerpretalion. He points out, irom the opponent's side, that the superimposed object cannot be logically said to be snniiar to an
object ot recollection lor the fact that
direct
in true
it
i->
the object ot one

illusion,
experience along
with
ttic
substratum ol
is
as
knowledge the generic term
the object of one direct
experience
along with the specific attiibute. Hence the opponents urge that there need not be any question ot similarity with an object of recollection in the picsent case and hence any knowledge oi a i elation with stich recollected object is out ot place. But this view is shown to be untenable on the tace ol it b> Prakas'atmayati who points out that \îthout a relation with the previous true knowledge (as 'this is silver'), no false appearance ot siher on a shell is apprehended, lor true knowledge and lalse knowledge are both due to a relation established between the diflerent attributes ot an object. Prakaâtmayati seems to suggest that lalse knowledge like 'this
silver' pre-supposes the previous experience of true knowledge as established by a relation or the objcci and iis specific
is
attribute,
but
later
is
on
the
relation
ot
the
specihc
attribute (rajalam)
rity
revealed as clinging on, by wa\ ol simila-
with the recollected silver, to the substratum but falsely through a7id Ihiough. This seems lo be the logic of Piakasatmayali when he says that the super-imposed object is
similar to a recollected object
(real)
and there
is
a knowledge
or relation with the siibstiatum of illusion (sainsatgasamvil)'*''

as existing in
Prakasatmayati further analyses the knowledge of relation illusory cognition and raises the objections ot
the opponents to such knowledge only to
meet them
logically.
The opponents
'"*
urge that though this knowledge ot relation
nah}
parnmdi thrdath
ii
)af nsath
cdonukaravabhiUanyCitmtdmandn'VTnu
Hami>aigasajhvi(i(tm,s/'(bhf'ua/i
salyatc
lallum
[Vnarana, P
159),
46
is
Critique on the
Vivamna School
sought to be proved as existing between the substratum and the (super-imposed) object ol illusion (by way of analogy with real knowledge of an object and its attributes), yet the super-
have no part to play inasmuch as it its absence such knowledge of relation falls to the ground. But Prakaâtma)ati shows that this suggestion is not a very sound one even to the opponents' position, tor instead of denying knowledge
imposed object seems
to
turns out to be a non-entity and hence in
of relation by the denial of one object (the super-imposed) they try to establish that this object is rather the factor which makes the determination of any knowledge possible. This
view of the opponents is put to severe criticism by Prakaâtmayati who exposes that the knowledge of relation does not jdepend on the superimposed object but is self-revealed and its turn. The position t) Advaita reveals the object in the cryptic sentence as follows by Vedanta is brought out yaLhasamvidavabhasadhlnatvad a)iha6aLLdnPrakaâtmaâti ikayaiya {Vivmayia, P. 159). The opponents may urge that
the determined knowledge of the existence of the object ot
super-imposition
the
ihe dcLerminant of (arthasaLLaiLiscayali) is knowledge ot relation {'âuwitsaUaimcayah), but Prakasatmayati shows the fallacy of mlinite regress {a7iavastha) in
such a position
inert (jada)
for,
the determination of arlhasalda
(exiv
is
tcnce of the object) cannot be
due
to the object itself
which
and incapable of revealing anything, and also it cannot be due to another determination {mscayantayarn) which lands one into legtessus ad uifinilum. Thus the opponents' view is shown to be wholly untenable without the recognition of the knowledge of relation as a self-revealed tact by which the object is revealed, which is the Vedantic position. But
further Prakasatmayati raises the possible objection
that
the
knowledge of relation depends upon the existence of the super-imposed object, as is proved by the fact that ncga tingknowledge (as 'this is not silver') is possible because of the negation of the object {rajaiasya nuidhyamanalval Akhandananda). But he himself shows the untenable character of such a position by bringing out that the previous knowledge
of super-imposition (as 'this is silver') is independently originated without the least dependence on anything extraneous pnd hence the contention that the negating knowledge pre-
Critical
Analym
of
Adhyaâ
&
Advaita Iheoyy of Eno,
47
supposes for its (negative) relation with the object of superimposition the wotor-action generated by the object of negation (rajafabhavajna7iap7ayukfo vyavaharah-ÂkhB.nd2in^nda.)
IS
knowledge of relation as established in the case of illusion is not an impossible hypothesis but is to be logically recognised as the self-revealed and independent entity for the possibility
oi the experience of the object of super-imposition which is revealed by it, but can never originate the former. Akhanda-
and makes it inferentially proved over and above landing us in the fallacy of infinite regres.. Hence Prakasatmayati s admirable analysis leaves one in no doubt that the
knowledge
also unsound. The motor-action generated by the object of negation can in no wise prove the self-revealed character
of
nanda
in his Taitvadipang lucidly summarises these arguments"

.
as^^tDttbws
frmvastddhau (pU7va=puwasa?hvii) uitat oitarasid dhetna vyavahaiadistddhiriti svaia eva samvmmscya iti vakiavyany lathaca ladbalad arihamtlvam vakLavyamUi
7iartha-
bhavasiddhhityarthah {Tattvadipmia. P. 160). The nature of the negation as explained by Prakas'atmayati is due to the knowledge of two kinds of which one
points to the illusory existence of the object of super-imposition whose existence is negated, while the other to the tri-
temporal
object
{traikalika)
negation
of
that object.
illusorily
Hence the
is
of
super-imposition,
though
perceived,
tri-tcmporally negated.
shows that of these two kinds of knowledge (nasiyatra lajatam and mithyaiva
is
Akhandananda
the first refers to the tri-temporal negation negation of the phenomenal silver (kalatrayanisedhasya laukikavtsayalvam Tativadipana, P. 161) and the second to the negation of the very existence of the object of superimposition which is illusory out-and-out (mayavivariarupyavisayaivam Ibid.).
tajaiamahhat),
which
Prakaâtmayati has moreover shown that the object of super-imposition cannot be explained as existing there by any other process than the contact of a very positive nature
(spasta)
known by
ween
it
with the object which bears resemblance as being the negating knowledge which shows that the object
is due to a clear relation established betand the substratum of super-imposition, and he brings out the fact that the conative action flowing from such know-
of super-imposition
48
Ciilique on the
Vivaram School
iedge unmistakably proves such a knowledge by contact with the object of super-imposition. Prakaâtmayati has explained that
the definition of adhyasa as given by 3aiikara
and
as elaborated
by
his disciple
and
follower,
Padmapada,
refers to
adhyasa, to both of which the dehnition equally applies.
two kinds of This
dhyasa
twofold adhyasa as explained by Prakaâtraayati refers to arLha(super-impo sition of the object _ upon jl substratum)
and jnanadhyasa (super- Imposition of the knowledge of the former upon thV kiibVledge of the latter). He says that both
"thesekinds of adhyasa should be explained by one laksana as given by iSahkara, for in adhyasa there is not only ihe superimposition of the object upon the substratum but also the super-imposition of its knowledge upon the knowledge ol the The object being supcrlatter which is more fundamental. impose d^ up,on_the_substratum generateTTEe^false knowledge of super-im position which is "the na ture oF ddTiyasa'' Thu^
Prakaiatmayati's analysis
definition of adhyasa
is
is
very consistent"!!!" so far as the

all
concerned, for
dehnitions should
be as precise as possible. has
Akhandananda
in his Tallvadlpafia
brought out the implication of this explanation of Prakaâtmayati by saying that the super-imposition oi the knowledge may be excluded il only the super-imposition of
the object
is
sought to be defined. ^*'
îLakEsatmayati.-CxpJiiins
that_m the jcase of the super-imposition of the object upon

the substratum the definition refers to
"
the object
!>
imila ii Ur
a rT object o f recollection appeariiig;^ on the substnitum

il
whence
follows ât_ the object
is
false,
though having a contact
WHEjhfelsense. which. sees under the strees of pre-cognitionai impression of 3i similar object of recollection that^ ij5 real^^
tjie
present o bfcct that
is (alse.
Inthc
case of the super-imposij;
uon_pJJknowl<^ge, however, Prakasatmayati explains ihat tlie knowledge_of_the superimposed object is similar to the rccollection (of th e obfecl) appearing on"" tKc^ knowledge _ of the substratu and hence is false as being the J^nowledgc of an object whi ch has a false contact with the se nse dujped ii nder Ifie "spell of avidya with ajclear succumbing to the pvc-cognitional impressfoh (p urvamibh avasamskara)
*''
>jadyap)/artha]fidnudhyil'ia!iinianyaiar(ncueA<ih'riyalarasiddhih,
tathd-
'IH/(0
flificlln/a-âlalmnnsya
plunCulhyase'mniblHn enavyuitdh
syctC
iudarlhant.
p)t/uig
nod('sta'vynmityart7iah--Tattiad)'p(tna
162.)
Critical Analysis of
Adhydsa
& Advaita
Theoiy of Error 49
This two-fold explanation of the definition of adhyasa by Prakaâtmayati in which he has fully brought out the significance of the process of super-imposition is, however, open to a common charge and Prakasatmayati clearly avoids it. Adhyasa either of the object or of its knowledge upon ?. locus where false contact with what is presented makes it possible, may be said to have no actual recollection of the object (which is real) but only a similarity with such recollection and its object (whence it is false) but the objection may be that except in the case of actual recollection, there should not be any scope for the object of super-imposition to be due to any previous knowledge or any samskaia (that which rakes up the previous knowledge), for only in the case of actual recollection this is admitted. But Prakasatmayati ably answers to this objection by showing that in every case of cognition except that is born of pure sense-contact, there is inevitably a part played by the previous knowledge. Thus even though in the case of adhyasa there is no actual recollection, there is unmistakably no knowledge born of pure sense-contact but
;
of a false sense-contact with the object that bears a similarity with the object of recollection that is due to a previous knowledge, and hence not purely contactual nor really pre-cognitional but somewhat of a half-way house between the two. Thus Piakasatmayati's analysis and explanation of the nature of
adhyasa leave one in no doubt about the falsity of it which is born of no epistemologically valid process but of a process
beyond valid epistemology.

Prakasatmayati has brought out more serious objections adhyasa as upheld by the Advaitist from the viewpoint of other Schools of Indian Philosophy. Illusory knowledge has been a very knotty problem in Indian Philosophy and every School has discussed it from its own peculiar point of view.
to
Hence there have grown up
subtle
dialectical
controversies
with regard to this problem. Prakasatmayati has brought out these opposite viewpoints and has step by step eliminated them as inadequate for the explanation of illusory knowledge. Thus the very first viewpoint discussed by Prakasatmayati is Prabhakara, the JîrsamsiE^ who. does jioL recognise any
of
false
ledge
knowledge (^. hymivadin)î2ihMk2i!C2i holds that knowmay be of'lwo kindsthat which is born of valid means.

A
30
which is born of recollection some mediate processes which separate the origination of valid knowledge from the sensecontact (as the knowledge of an invariable concomitance between the probans and probandum vyapiijnanam in the case of inference), but the second is originated upon an object by an immediate process of samskara (impression of a previous Hence Prabhakara's contention object) by the sense-contact. is that knowledge can never be false, there is no such knowledge as mithyajnana, but is always true, either recollective or contactual. He seems to suggest that in recollective knowledge, too, where there is recollection of one object upon another (anyasamprayukte caksusi yadanantaramanyavisayam jnanamutpadyate) there is no non-validity in the knowledge which by itself is true as due to a samskdia (yadanaîtaram) which is raked up (udbuddha). Thus Prabhakara's recollective knowledge has its validity in the samskara^ no matter whether it is false or no. Similarly, contactual knowledge is always true as due to some mediate epistemological processes. Prabhakara's analysis, therefore, excludes false knowledge altogether and rehabilitates in its stead a two-fold distinction Even recollective of knowledge which in itself is always true. 'knowledge which is ordinarily excluded by the major Schools Indian Philosophy as not giving us valid knowledge of (prama) except by the Jainas and the Madhvas is recognised by Prabhakara as not antagonising with valid knowledge but rather as hanging on to it as one of its aspects, for recollective knowledge has, if no validity, a veridical content. Thus
(pramanajnanam)
and
is
that
{smrtih).
The
first
due
to
Prabhakara's
is
contention that ayatharthafnam. is a non-etre based upon his two-fold classification of knowledge that is
Prabhakara's contention that recollective knowledge can very
all true.
well substitute false knowledge (ayatharihajnana) in so far as

is
it
and hence an object may appear upon another by way of recollection by

to a samskara
due
(pre-cognitional impression)
the obliteration of any distinction (bhedagraha) of the recollec-
and the perceived, is sought ground that the posterior negation

ted
to
is
be established on the only of the smaranabhirecollection
mana
or
the
conative
action).
corollaries
of
(such
as
vyavdhara
or
Prabhakara
suggests
that
the
doâs
Adhyasa
&
Advaita Theoiy of Error 51
(subjective or objective drawbacks) are responsible for calling
up
the similarity which makes the samskara of recollection at
all effective in
producing a specific object on another. Hence seems to be a continuity of experience between the recollection and the perception through the agency of the similarity-impression (sadnya-samskara) of a particular object, and as long as dosas stay, they keep up this continuity which in fact is never a fact but appears as such due to very successive presentations of the two psychological processes. Prabhakara's
there
knowledge where knowledge, and the apparent unreality ( as in illusion) of knowledge is explained away as due to extraneous circumstances like dosas and samskara which produce only wrong actions and never false knowledge. This knowledge of recollection or smrti is as veridical
analysis applies to all kinds of so-called false
he upholds
the
view
of
reality of all
and even
valid means (pramaiâs) one object upon another due to such recollection ((like silver upon shell) which is (as he says), there is no falsity in knowledge as is proved b} the negating knowledge of only conative corollaries such
as
the
knowledge
in the
born of other
of
origination
as actions (vyavahara).
Prakasatmayati replies to such a position by showing that (absence of illusion) is never a logical concept, for this term cannot logically establish anything which can explain (where there is a shell). cognitions like this is silver Absence of khyaii (khyatyabhava) is a too wide term to include
'Ukhyati
experiences in dreamless sleep (msupli) into the category of such cognitions. Knowledge of conative actions upon a different .object (anyatra pravrtttheturjnanam) is also a too narrow term,
for such actions are not universal.
Knowledge
of
many
things
-whose difference
{aviviktanekakarajnanam) cannot also be said to be the cause of such true knowledge for the fact that there is a difference between the shell and silver which are denoted by two terms. There is a cognition of duality in such knowledge as is evident from the two terms of different
is lost,
connotations.
establish
Thus the evidence of perception itself cannot an absence of difference to explain such a knowledge
as the other. Prakasatmayati analyses more elaborately the view of the 4ikhyaiivadi Prabhakara and shows that on no account can
of
one appearing
52
there
be a logical possibility o the knowledge of man) whose difference is lost {aviviktanekapadarthajnanam) by eliminating the possible alternatives to such a view. He shows that the knowledge of different objects whose difference is lost cannot account for error in knowledge for the fact that it becomes a dubious hypothesis. Akhandananda in hi> Taitvadipana clarifies the view by showing that such a view to account for error is untenable, for it cannot prove the origination of error universally and even consistently. The knowledge of two different objects as one unified cognition aS' in those cases of genus-species relation where there is both
objects
difference as well as non-difference
ledge as khando gauh
khanda-cow)
{bhedabhedavadtn s knowis not error, nor even
the knowledge of perception and memory giving a unified judgment is alone an explanation of error, for a unified judgment of two perceptions as in the judgment aham manusyah
can very well account for the falsity of the knowledge. Nor also the judgment regarding a generic and a specific object
(samanyaviSesajnanam) can be said to have a relational knowledge and hence excluded from the category of error
also there
is
,
for here
is
a knowledge of different objects
whose difference
lost,
the relational knowledge
(samsarga-jnanam) being a
the case of their explanaas
non-etre to the Prabhakaras
who
advocate a clear-cut difference

the quality-object
of various knowledge-processes in
tion of error
relation
ledge.
and no other factor such
(gunaguni-sarhbandhah) can account for such kno^v-
Moreover, there is a clear recognition ol diffciencc between the generic and specific objects which is tapa]>lc oi negating the unified judgment and there is thci'cforc no possibility as the Prabhakara holds that such unified judsînenlfi
arc outside the category of error.
of error
is
The Prabhakara
contcnlion
lh(^
further vitiated by the fact that there should at
time of peception of this (idam) be always a clear-cut chslinc

tion with the recollection (silver), or else to explain the distinction
third knowledge
all
has to be admitted,
as
whence
it
should follow that
knowledge
is
is
having
lost the distinction
{fnnviktapadarihajfimam)
false.
Hence
Prabhakaru's
absence of distinction
always with regard to a unified judg-
ment and hence
that
judgment has a unificdly related object
Adhyasa
&
Advaiia Theory of Error 53
<as 'thissilver')
psychology
without any distinction, and thus their whole the ground for the fact that their recognition of a unified object without distinction will tantamount to
falls to
shown
the recognition of a relational judgment whch in fact has been to be not possible in their theory. Moreover, the
object of recollection as advocated by the Prabhakaras as having an obliterated proportion (smHiptafnosa) is' not easily
understood, for the fact that smaranabhimana (the quality of being recollected) which they try to establish and which in their opinion is obliterated remains inexplicable. It is not included in pure recollection {smrti), for when smrii remains
smaranabhimana cannot be obliterated. Nor can the vice versa be correct, for smaranabhimana being gone, smrii will not be debarred from originating its effects. Nor can a totally different thing as smaranabhimana be conceived.
"If
it
be
are
argued
by the
etc.,
experiences of space, time
Prabhakaras that previoucm along with the perception of
the
object
afterwards, then
it
smaranabhimana, and these are obliterated can be said that even in true cognition, as
a previously cognised person
I saw)',
remembrance
as 'This
is
of
(pratyabhi]na)
he
(whom
previously experienced space,

obliterated.
Here also and 'he'. So there ceases to be any clear-cut distinction between the two kinds of cognition, in both of which smaranabhimana in the nature of previously cognised space, time etc., is present. Hence the Advaitists conclude that in recollection (smrti) where an object is revealed, no other knowledge of any other thing
etc.,
is
time
are also perceived
and not
there
non-recognition of difference between
'this'
exists
it
except that the particular object remains revealed as was perceived. The knowledge of other things (as space, time etc.) is due to inference born out of the previous perception of the object of remembrance, for when the object was perceived previously, those things were also perceived and they are inferred in the recollection of the former afterwards. The
knowledge of other things being mixed up afterwards with the pure recollection of the object accounts for false cognition
of the object along with those other things; truly speaking, in
This is the (smrti) the pure object is recalled. reply given by the Advaita Vedantists to the Prabhakaras in.
lecollection

54
Critique on the Vwai/mia School
respect of ihe nature of smrtzJ'^^
(Author's article
on "The
Problem
torical
of Nacre-Silver in
Indian Philosoph)"
169-170).
Indian His-
Quarterly, June, 1952, Pp.
Prakaâtmayati's analysis of
Advaita point
.
of
imHi and its object from the view has been more elaborated by himselt
recollection of
at
"With reference to the verbal
an
this
is
object (paddi
aspect of re-
padarthasmrti).
collection
Padmapada had hinted and tried to show that here also
there
a pure object
without any other auxiliary object perceived along with it. Prakasatmayati has shown by way of elaboration that both in abhihitanvayavada* and anvitabhidhanavada* there is the verbal
recollection of successive
words
till
is
the last
and a
clear link
among such
knowledge.
ive
jêlation
bits of recollection
responsible for the verbal
This link
of
is
established by the words in the success-
recollection
among
meanings by the impressions of a such words and their meanings which arc roused
their
there
Dy the words themselves. Thus in verbal recollection, too, is a clear recognition by the Vedantists, as all olhei
views, that the objects of recollection

ings) are
(viz.,
the successive
mean-
pure objects raked up by the impressions obtaining between them and the words, and there is no scope for any other knowledge such as that of words related with their mean-
such knowledge will end in a regressus ad infinitum by depending on another knowledge and also in obliterating the functions of words altogether. Thus the verbal recollection is due to the impressions ol a relation obtaining
ings, for the fact that
"
karoti,
"tasmudartJiamatravisayajndyiajani/O
.<fmrti,iartkamaimmai a
imiifi-
na 2ûna}na.nenawsa}/lkTtaih pldnamain anyatM nilapldnnt intc'in smrtih syat" {Vtvamna, P. 180), * abJithitanvayaiada- The Bhulia Mimamsists regai-d a judgmeutal connection between words and their meanings in a sentence as issum^j out of meanings as expi eased by words {i}adabh%hitarbha). Such raoanmgs
or connotations are coalesced together duo to capabib'ty {yogxjaLa], necessity (akanhm), proximity [asatti] etc, in a judgment This knowledge of coalescence as born out of the expression of the meanings hy words in a judgment is neither perceptual or immediately known nor is it representational as in
ledge.
memory or indirectly cognised but is a third variety of knowIt is opposed to the Nyaya view which regards the knowledge of
as
a judgment
N'yaiyriyikas
born out of pure

their
meanings rake up
as
memory.
to
belonging
this
words which without expressing the Some, however, erroneously regard th& school, but Jayantabhatta in hi*
Adhydsa
&
Advaiia Theory of
Enor
55'
between successive meanings of words.^*^ Padmapada has moreover pomted out the possibility oi smaranabhimana from the view-point of the Prabhakaras who seek to justify error by its obliteration. Prakaâtmayati has worked upon the charges against any such possibility as hinted at by Padmapada. He first shows that this smamnabhimana cannot be established by itself or by any external fact, for it is not determined by itself nor by any pramana nor by any pramanaphala. Akhanda-
nanda in
either
that there
by saying objects of smrti and pramana by way of recollection of auxiliary objects such as space, time etc., or by different cognitions of different objects. Thus there is no possibility of smaranabhimana and no obliteration
clarified this position
is
his
TaUvadipana has no difference of
of
it is conceivable. Prakasatmayati has moreover shown that the recognition of the triad of the subject, the object and the
act pre-supposses
its
diflEerence
before any actual
or
memory is pure recollection. Thus
from the perceptions of them born, either by way of inference there is a logical difference betof the
ween recollection and perception before memory. Padmapada has very ably pointed out that the view
Prabhakaras that error can be explained by the supposition of

Nyaijamanjarl has rejected this view like the other view of anvitabhidhana. (Of. matadvayamtifldantu nasmabhyam rocatetardm kuto'nvitabladhanam vd kuto vd'bhihitdnvayah).
.
amitdbhidhanavddaThe Prabhakara Mimamsists hold that every meaning that is expressed by a word {paddiiha) is inevitably connected with another meaning of another word [faddrthdniara). There is no
jioddrtha or
connotation that can stand
independent of any relation or
connection in a judgment. Even where there are no other relata, they would hold the verb to be' [asU) etc which may be related with any connotation. The words expressing such related connotations in a sentence are as much a means of valid knowledge [p-iamdna), as the judgment itself. No word without being related in a judgment can give any meaning by standing apart; in other words, every word should be related with its connotation to any other word wjth its connotation in a judgment so that we can know each connotation m a judgment as a related or synthetic Thus the Prabhakaras do away with the Bhatta and the Nyaiyayika one views of the validity of the judgment only, which coalesces together the connotations expressed by words. * "tasmdt huddhi&amarthyasambandhdt 'padebhyah paddrihaTndtrcsu amrtaya iti siddham" {Vtvaiam, P. 184).
56
Critique on the Vivaram School

is
a recollected knowledge (smrtt) that
valid,
is
untenable for
is
the fact that there
is
some kind of knowledge that
neither
purely perceptual nor purely recoUective but purely illusory and hence false in itself. Padmapada has worked out in detail
by showing that the obliteration (pramosa) of Prabhakaras accept, viz., of previously cognised aspects of the objects, is wholly untenable on the ground that this smaranabhimana-pmmosa is not responsible tor error as
this conclusion
what
the
is
evident
from
the
fact
that
inference
(anumana)
pre-
supposes previously cognised (paroksa) space, time etc, or at least the previous cognition (puruanubhava) of these and they
remain
in the shape of impressions {samskaras) only but
are not found to be so present in smiiti where these
which samskams
do not present themselves as really calling up such previous knowledge of the different aspects of the recollected object. Thus there is a clear-cut distinction between inference of cognition (jnananumana) and recollection (smrli) in which the latter is unadulterated with the previous knowledge of the different aspects of the object for which the Prabhakara supposes and advocates an obliteration {pnamosa). Thus smrti being with regard to the pure object {suddham vastu) should be a different category of valid knowledge altogether and cannot in any way generate false (miihya) knowledge (such as, of actions) by the obliteration of some parts. This is the greatest rejoinder to the Prabhakara theory and Prakaâtmayati following Padmapada has brought this out
quite ably.^^
Vidyaranya has very clearly shown that the Prabhakara contention of smaranabhimana or the quality of being recollected as previously cognised, remains inexplicable. He has suggested eight alternatives to mean smaranabhimana and has
shown
tion),
that
(2)
none
is
tenable.
These are
(1)
smrti (recollecrecollection),
smrteranya
(something
other
than
" tasmdt puTLapramanasa7hsM)a8amutthataj/a tadi ismjavabhasitramatyam snnti/i, na funali praUttto'rtfiato va'dhikorhso'etti i/asj/a dosvnimitfah * * # # ato nanyasamprayoffe^ni/aiisayajrldnani ftamosah pankdfyate
Bmrtih
{PaftcapadiM, Pp. 186-188 ) na pramdnas'mHidhairdsyameva jMnasya Tcintn planamapi{Vivarana, P. 188.)
ato
kmtcadjyyasah
trtlyaih
hhranti-
Adhyasa
&
Advaita Theory of Error 57
'($)smrtigatadharma (some quality of recollection), (4) purvanubhava-vihstatvenarthagrahanam (the recollection of some

aspects of
kaicit
the previously
cognised object),
(5)
svagaia eva
smriimksah (some mode of recollection of its own), (6) purvdnubhavagocardd visistajneyanimitto viiesah (some special object of recollection distinct from that of previous cognition) (7) phalahhedajanakatvam (the quality of producing different effects in recognition), (8) smaramilyanubhavah (the perception such as 'I remember'). Vidyaranya's analysis is more analytic than Prakaâtmayati's, though the former has taken the cue from his predecessor and his analysis has brought out more ably the nature of smrti as opposed to the view of the
that is to say, that smrti is never with regard to the auxiliary aspects of the object but always with regard to the pure object. Vidyaranya has shown that there should be a
Prabhakaras,
difference between the vyavasdyajanya smrti and anuvyavasdyajanyd smrti by way of bringing out this conclusion from the
Advaitist
there
is
standpoint.
He
says
that
in
vyavasdyajanyd smtti
recollection of the pure object (ghatamdtram) but in

is
anuvyavasdyajanyd smrti there

previously
recollection of the object as
known
(by which the auxiliary aspects are implied).
Hence Vidyaranya has concluded that smrti^ to be pure, can never rake up along with the auxiliary aspects of an object their anuvyavasdya or a recollective knowledge that as vouchsafing for their
knowledge should be presupposed, and hence is always with regard to the object as such or an object bereft of any relation with anuvyavasdya or recollective knowledge,
is
but having relation with vyavasdya or pure cognition that

a priori to anuvyavasdya?^
Vidyaranya's
analysis
of
the
Prabhakara view has been
more
to unravel
the incompatibilities and to bring out the has shown that the Prabhakara contention
Advaita view.
He
"' amivyavasai/Qnd'jiidnagocaianum.anMia ra janyeyath smrtirvyavasdyajanyayah gJw.taindtragocarSi/dh smrteranyd. na cdnaya'pi svajanako'nuvyatarhi, anuiyavasvasdydhhyah visayihnyate., him, furvdnubhavo siddham vimatd 'flyendnubhuto vyavasdyaviiisto ghata eva. ata etat faddrtliasmrtirna svamulojMna-viiiatamartham grhandii, smrtitvdt {Vivarana$mrtivaditi. padani hi avasambandhes'tarthesu smrtirh janayanti
^rameyaaamgraha
Pp.
195-195).

58
A Cnitque on
the Vivarana School
is untenable tor the fact that here is no logical ground to suppose that the object of super-imposition (silver) is not the object of perception as the substratum is (as according to them there is no knowledge of relation:samsargasamvit between them but there is only a continuity of experience naman-
taryena pratibhasah); hence an illusory silver (mithya rajal) has to be accepted as the object of direct experience.^ Vidyaranya has carried his analysis a bit further by showing
"
that the object of negation (msedhavisaya)
is
with regard ta
illusory silver,
the phenomenal silver (upon shell)

as the object of illusory
and not the

is
tor then the illusory silver (pralibhasikarh rajatam) being there
knowledge
never the object of
tri-
which all negation implies. Thus the Advaitist view, as brought out by Vidyaranya^ is that the silver is the phenomenal {vyavahai ika) one which being falsely taken into knowledge when one sees a shell before
tcraporal negation (traikahka nisedha)
him
is
negated tri-temporally and

silver,
is
the object ol ncgation.

(prali-
But the
bhastka)
object of super-imposition being the illusory
there
is
the direct experience of such silver in
This dual role of the silver wherein it is knowledge and phenomenal (vyavahanka) at the time ot negation, has to be accepted to explain the knowledge and negation of it logically. The charge of ungrounded negation in so far as the phenomenal silver is never the object of false knowledge {aprasaktapratisedha) is ably refuted by Vidyaranya who shows that the phenomenal silver, though never the object of illusory knowledge, is falsely taken into the knowledge of the substratum
illusory {pralibhasika) at the time of false
(shell) as it generally appears {samanyopadhau prasakielj) and never into the knowledge of it as it is. Hence even the negation of an object (say, a jar) on the ground is with regard to the jar as it is capable of being known (though not actually
în which case no negation of it would l)c possible) on the general aspects of space, time etc., of the substratum (ground). Thus the Advaitist theory as brought out by Vidyaranya is unchallengeable and Vidyaranya's analysis has
illusory knowledge.
known
**
yatM'prutihhusanieia
mtthydiojaimya
suHijiiunena
nhasanayogya175).
S!/asmdbMrabJiyu'pa(famat-{Vivarana-prameya.saihgraha,
P.
Adhyasa
Advaita Theoiy of
Enor ^9
been more
decessors
accurate and thorough-going than
suggested.
We
have
shown above
that
what his preAkhanda-
two kinds ot the silver in" his Vidyaranya has supported what his predecessors, Padraapada and Prakaiâtmayati, have said with regard to the nature of the object of illusion. The object o illusion, according to his predecessors, is similar to the recollected
Tattvadipana.
object
nanda has
just hinted at these
never recollected as such (na also harps on the same tune and shows that this similitude with the recollected object pre-supposcs the previous cognition of the silver (which was true) but which
(smaryamanasadnmn) smaryamanam). He
and
becomes false in illusory knowledge being related to the substratum by a through-and-through false relation. He only hints at the impossibility of adhyasa without such previous cognition and seems to bring out his predecessors' logical analysis to the forefront by saying very clearly what is hidden
in
it.^^
Vidyaranya's analysis of what his predecessor Prakasatmayati hinted at is very clearly done and it leaves one in no doubt about the episiemology of adhyasa. He shows that the object of illusion being born of impressions (of previous cognition) is never to be seriously challenged on the ground that it is not recollective knowledge, pure and simple, {smrtibhinfiajndnaivdi), for he says that contactual knowledge, pure and simple, becomes upddhi (the hindrance to any valid inference)to any such inference. have shown above that Prakas'at-
We
mayati has said that except in such contactual knowledge, there is a r61e of samskara (impressions) in every kind of knowledge,
knowledge being not born of pure sense-contact has its origination. But Vidyaranya puts it more logically and shows that this upadhi of pure contactual knowledge is co-eval with the probandura (sddhya) in the example (drstdnta, viz., "as in perceptual knowledge") [the probandum being samskd} ajanyatvdbhdvavat], but not so with the probans (hetu) in the minor term (paksa, viz., adhydsah} [the probans being smHibJiitinajndnatvdt]. Vidyaranya's logical
illusory
and
to admit samskaras for
'"
na
hyanannbhutarajatasi/a
181).
rajatahh dntirdrsycde
{V'n arana'prameya-
samgrahaP,
^0
analysis
Critique on the
Vivamna School
is
-contactual
comes to this knowledge recollective knowledge
that in adhyasajnana there

as co-eval
never pure
with the diflerence from pure (that recollective knowledge being a fact), whence it follows that the probandum, vi/., samskarajanyatvabhavavat is never proveable in the paksa, viz., adhyasajnana.
This logical analysis of Vidyaranya proves, therefore, that adhyasa has to admit samskaras as well as some sort of sensecontact, though false, and is therefore neither born of pure contactual knowledge nor of pure recollective knowledge.^^ Prakaâtmayati has thereafter brought in the Nyaiyayika view that the silver (object of super-imposition) is present elsewhere as a real entity but is brought forth upon the shell with which the sense is in contact, being associated with any dosa (defect) and is thus taken into knowledge upon the shell which
present before. The recalling of silver upon shell is, according to them, due to the similitude between them and hence the Nyaiyayikas conclude that the knowledge of silver is purely perceptual (grahanatmakam). "The Nyaiyayikas conclude
is
that in mistaking a piece of nacre as a piece of silver, there
pieces of knowledge as the Prabhakaras hold, but a third variety of knowledge where the piece of nacre is cognised as being qualihed by the knowledge of the piece This erroneous knowledge arises, according to the of silver. Nyaiyayikas, due to an abnormal contact of the sense-organ (viz., the eye) with the object (viz., silver which is absent in the present case but present elsewhere). This abnormal psyare not
there
is
two
chosis
is
what
is
known
as jnanalaksana-sannikarsa or connec-
due to the prc-occupied knowledge of that object in the mind, though the object be not really present." (Author's article: "The Problem of Nacretion of the sense-organ with the object
can bo understood if we nndorbtand Indian logic as sddhymya ryupaJco i/astu hetoiai'yapaKa'itatlkd sa vpddhiJi, viz, that wliicli is co-oval with sadhi/a or probandum but not so with Iietu ov probans is tho upMhi. In valid inference if any factor is shown to be such as not existing co"*
Vidyaranya's
logical
analysis
tlie
nature of vpftdhi whicli
is
defined
extensively
is sought to be established while so existing with the sddhya in the known cases [drstdnta], then the whole inference seeking to establish the sddhya in any palcm (minor term) becomes fallacious for the absence of such coextensive addhya on the strength of a weaker httu in the foltm.
with the hetu by which the sddhya
the paksa,
Adhyasa
6-

Historical
Silver
in
Indian
Philosophy"-_/dmn
Quatierly,
June, 1952; Pp. 164-165).

incompatibilities
upon this view when he exposes the and Prakaâtmayati works upon this elaborately. This view which is known as anyatMkhyativadd cannot stand the scrutiny of logic, as Prakaâtmayati and Akhandananda expose it to it. Prakaâtmayati says that the
hints
Padmapada
may be: (1) Knowledge of a different form with regard to a different substratum (anydkaram j'nanam anyalamhanam), (2) Knowledge of an
alternative interpretations to anyatjiakhyati
object appearing as a different object
(vastuno vastvaniardL-
mand
avabhdsah),
(3)
Knowledge
parinate
differently
(anyathd
is
an object transformed vastuni jndnam). The first

of
interpretation
untenable
on
the
face
ot
it,
for
the
Nyaiyayikas cannot admit the object and the revelation ot knowledge as different when they have to oppose the direct apprehension of an object as it exists. The object cannot
assume a different form when it is in contact with the sense it cannot produce a different form (dkdra) in knowledge which is contradictory. Nor can the object be said to be the object of actions flowing from such knowledge (of taking one thing as the other) for the fact that neither by way of intervention (vyavadhdna) nor by way of immediacy {aayavadhdna) can the object be said to be the object of such motor-actions. When, for example, from the knowledge of a tiger, a cudgel is brought in, the cudgel, being the object ot motor-actions flowing from the knowledge of the tiger, cannot be said to be the object of the knowledge of the tiger. Hence
for the fact that
Prakaâtmayati concludes that such difference in the object due to the motor-actions produced by the sense-contact cannot be logically established.^* Akhandananda in his Tattvadipana. has shown that over and above these two alternatives in the
first
interpretation, two others are also untenable.
Firstly, the
object cannot appear as different
due to any
benefit accruing
from the knowledge

yatvam), for
of the substratum
{samviijanitdtisayd^rait
when the
object
is
destroyed {pradhvasta)
ceases
**
tasmat
tadakara
evalambanamiti
189).
nanydharam
jMnamanydlam-
hanamamjatMkhyaUriti{Yiiarana, P.
.62
different object
to have ever been wrongly perceived; secondly, appearing as a is never possible if the object be a future one,
the objectivity of appearance (bhanakarmatvam) is never possible till it will be produced, or even if the object is said to be revealed by way of motor-actions (vyavaharavimyatvam) due to the appearance, then many ancillary properties of an object will have to be admitted as coming within the spliere of such appearance.^ ^ Prakaâtmayati has more-
where
.over
khyaiivadm
repudiated the other two alternatives of the anyathawith regard to the meaning of anyathakhyati.
viz.,
The
second interpretation referred to above,

as a different object,
is
knowledge of
not plausible for the fact that unless the Nyaiyayikas admit an illusory {mithya -aniwacamya) relation between the knowledge and the object of appearance as the Advaitists do, no knowledge of This impossuch appearance is ever to be contemplated sibility is due to the metaphysical stand of this School where there is complete difterence between the generic object and hence no real relation can be its specific attributes, and
an object appearing
effected between them; nor is there any unreal relation as they do not admit it. Thus a void relation {iunyah samsargah) can never come into the knowledge in such cases. Even the recognition of difference and non-difference (bhedabhedau)
cannot account for error, for then valid cognitions like 'this is Hence the Nyaiyayika being impelled on the horns of a dilemma, would rather prefer a
a khanda-cow' will be erroneous.
real relation (samsargasatyaia) to
an unreal (anirvacariiya) one, but that would make his theory of error a precarious hypothesis inasmuch as the relation being real, no negating knowledge would ever be possible, or, there would be no distinction between real and erroneous knowledge, and thus error
-^
kim-dhararfakatvamulambanatvaml
alio
via
aamvitprai/id'tai yava-
Jiuravisayatvmnf
samvijjanitatUai/dsrayatrarn't athavd. hhdsamanatvam'^
na
tntlyah,
'pradhva^taderavisayaticeprasangat.
mqd
catvrthah
hk&aa-
mdnatram bhanafi'armatvam uta tatprayvktai^yavaharansayatvam'l n&dyak,

na dtitiyah ndntariyakatayd 'lyaialu/raIcaladhautajMnammyatrnfatieh, tasmdt vtsayatvam vahtavyam, tacca ndtreti iuhUrandlan\,ha' natvamityahhiprdyenopasamharuti-tasmat taddkdra tti. [Tattvedlpana,
ii8ayasy,a
hlhansâddderaiimyaiupatieli
taddfcdrarpakasya
IcaTadhautamaluderapi
P.
189).
Adhyasa
6'
Advaita Theory of Error
63
and negation would indiscriminately appear in every piece of valid and invalid knowledge. The Nyaiyayika might suggest
that his anyathakhyati refers to the knowledge or revelation of ^n object transformed differently (anyatha parii:iate vastum
rjnamm), and
it
is
the shell that
is
transformed as the
silver.
Padmapada who has shown clearly that such a view is untenable, on the face of it, for the transformation having been real like that of milk into curd, there would never appear .any negating knowledge (badhajnana) afterwards. Hence to
But
it is
admit any such transformation is to admit the reality of knowledge in such cases of error. This alternative of real transformation of the substratum into the illusory object is the very
old
view
of
anyathakhyati
as
advocated
by
Bhagavad
Bhaskara,
therefore,
who
not
admits
the
both
difference
and
but
non-difference
.(bhedabhedau) in every relational knowledge.

N\aiyayika's
own,
is
This view is, borrowed from
Bhaskara.
Prakasatmayati says that

epistemological realists and
ledge, that
it
the Prabhakaras
who
are
who
never admit
falsity in
know-
Xhe Nyaiyayikas and others
have brought out the views of the opponents, viz, who recognise error in knowledge (bhramavddins) by way of showing the fallacies in their systems. Hence the above account of the Nyaiyayika view of anyaLhakhyativada is from the viewpoint ot the Prabhakaras who, says Prakasatmayati, are out to demolish any theory of error in Itnowledge, and hence who next attack the Buddhist theory of
aiinakhyativada.
It
is
well-known that except the Madhyaof
mikas,
all
other
Schools
Buddhism
subscribe
it
to
this
Mmakhyati theory
of
of error which explains
from the angle

argue
there-
an
it
epistemological idealism.
is
Hence
these Schools
is
that
the consciousness ivijnana) that
the sole cause ot

it is,
the appearance of all the empirical

fore, the
phenomena, and
ground of
all
the appearances.
all subjectivists
"Now
the advocates
of atmakhy'dtivada are
in so far as they recogobject of knowledge

is
nise nothing outside of knowledge.

is
The
only a form of knowledge which alone

its
and
sent;
objects are inseparably connected

is,
Knowledge true. and invariably prein
hence there
so
to say,
identity
them.
64
CiiLique on the Vivarana School

existent only in
falsely
They hold
and the
present
that the piece of nacre
is
knowledge
it
error arises only
when we
suppose
is
to
outside
of
knowledge.
their recognition of the fact

IS,
Their argument that whatever form
starts
be with
perceived
without another perception to the contrary, true, real ; but its negation is possible only when such another stronger perception to the contrary arises. Hence they hold that when we
have to do
itself.
negate the knowledge of silver on a piece of nacre, what we is to admit only the negation of external manifestation of silver which
It
is
is
internal
and not
of the piece of silver
better
and
wiser, they hold, to
acknowledge such
a standpoint, for in doing so, we arc logically precise being (Author's article "The Problem at the same time concise." Philosoph)" Indian Historical of Nacre-Silver in Indian
:
Quarterly
tion
of
^June,
silver
1952,
P.
160).
This
to
external
this
manifestais
which
is
according
thcorj'
the
object of negation
raked up by an impression which had
been imprinted, so to say, upon the series of momentary bits ot knowledge (jnanasantati or vi]nanasanlali) and this impression though separated by a gulf of such momentary bits oi knowledge, can call up the silver by way of similitude. They go even to the extreme of admitting an eternal chain of impressions regarding an external object carried down through the momentary bits of knowledge and the calling up of the object by the maturity (paupaka) of this impression-series (xmana)?^ Prakasatmayati brings out the fallacies to such a view of the Buddhists from the viewpoint of the Prabhakaras who attack the aimakhyaii doctrine. The Prabhakaras according to Prakasatmayati point out that the silver which is held by the Buddhists as the objective projection of the subjective existence is never capable of being accounted for in error. If it is not born there, it can have no appearance, and if it is held to be born, it fails to be subjective, for an objective basis of such appearance (say, an external object perceived before) has to be admitted But the Buddhist argument being that the subjec>
tive silver
is
only projected as external under the influence of

eva
"
tttj-jamjajnanasantana
{Vivarana,
taraditifanadivasanaprapitam
saihsMrah, sa ca tatMrtdha-jMnCmrajatam ImddhyuMro hahirvadavabhdsafe
1P2)
CiUical Analysis of Adhyasa

iiiipertections (dosas)
t"
Advmla Theoiy
of
Euoi 65
which
IS
subjective in ot an\
adhering to the knowledge (or, say, silver) itselt, Prabhakara^ charge them with
externally projected silver
;
lion -origination
tor,
they
point out that the causal knowledge ot the externally projected silver being prior to the object has not the capacity to rc\cal it, and any other knowledge devoid of imperfections
att<iched to
it
can ne\er be said to be the cause of the calling
up
of the external silver lor the simple tact thai there ceases
to be any causal nexus between a particular piece oi know ledge and a particular appearance (which is possible only under the
iniluence
of
the dosas calling
up
the
external projections
through
l-'inally
x'iisanas
if
or impressions according to the Buddhists),
the knowledge being under the influence oi these
up the external projection, then the latter being born of the knowledge of silver which is subjective should be admitted as a real (sat) category like the subjective silver, or cl>>c, the external projection of silver should cease to have for its cause ihe subjective knowledge of silver which makes the lormer appear. This admission of the realit} of the projected entity is Irom the view of the theon- of knowledge in and through lornis (sakarajnonax'ada) of the Buddhist. These are, according to Padmapada's analysis, some of the serious charges put forward bv the Prabhakaras against the Buddhists (almahhyalivadim) whose doctrine seems to callapse under them, and the Prabhakaras' stand to defend their own is given a further lease of examination. This has been done by Prakasatmayati who has shown that the Prabhakaras have exposed the fallacies to the aLmakhyativada only to give themselves up as upholding a theory which is to be put to further considerations by the Advaitists. The Prabhakara contention thai in error there are two pieces of knowledge one of the nature of perception and the other of the nature of memory both of which are true in themselves, is next sought to be examined critically by Prakasatmayati. Hence he has brought in the Advaitist position that there is a unified knowledge in error vvhich is designated as illusory as being bom of ignorance (avidya) of the substratum. The Advaita position relating to error or illusorv knowledge is consistent with its metaphysical stand where the Witness-Self (Saksicailanya) is conceived as the background of
dosas can call
66
all
CnLique on the Vivaiana School
however, there arc knowing. In empirical knowledge, empirical limitaLions of the Saksi-caiianya through the niind {aniahkamna), its urges (vrttis) and the object (visaya),bui the
is
Saksz-caila?iya
always the sole revealer of everything invoh-ed
This metaphysical position has been taken in by Prakasatmayati here in cxplaniing the Advaita theory oi illusory knowledge. In fact, here had been initiated a masterly analysis of the theory which ha!> been claboiated by a host of later dialecticians oi Advaita Philosophy. Padmapada has hinted at this explanation, though in a cr)ptic way, and Prakasatmayati and Akhandananda have elaborated it. The Advaitist argue that the recollection of which the Prabhakaras hold obliteration {pramom) of some aspects is a non-entity and in its place, a third variety of knowledge arises which can explain the origination of the illusory silver as being
in epistemological processes.
called
upon the
<;ntirely different
shell. Thus the category of illusion is an one arising out of the co-operation of several
factors, viz., the contact
(samyoga) betAveen the sense and the substratum, imperfections (dosa) in the sense and an ignorance (avtdya) pertaining to the Consciousness of the substratum. All
these factors are coalesced together as a result of which there appears the illusory silver upon the shell, the silver being the tiansformation of avidya pertaining to its Consciousness raked up by the imperfections {dosas) which not only retard the
origination of the knowledge of the substratum but help to call up the object of illusion through the avidya. Thus the Advaitists hold that there is one comj^lex whole of knowledge
in illusion into which the impression (samska)a) and imperfect cause (dusta-karana) pertaining to the calling up of the object of illusion play their part unitedly-". This shows that the
Pr^hhakara contention of the admission of two pieces of knowledge of which one, viz., recollection, foregoes some aspects {smiiip7amosa) is untenable for the fact that the Advaitist conis a complex psychosis where many a factor part to account for it is more logical and more conforming to the nature of error. The Advaitist interpretation
tention that error

its
plays
^'' huianadosah hdn/aiiieae tasi/a iakibh nmindhumura rjspsamapifudhodhai/af;, Urxjagmujatvat harana-domkihich atah <iiintal-aranasQmcd\faiha soinagrh~{PaM.ca'padihl, P, 195).
samskum'
mmhlm-
CnUcal Analysis of Adhyasa

of
error,
a'
Advaiia Theoty of Ertor 67
this that error
Avhen more elaborately discussed, would come upto is due to the transformation of the avidya or
and
ignorance pertaining to the consciousness of the substratum, it is this avidya which being aided by the extraneous
imperfections oi the sense-organ, rakes up, through similarity,
the illusor)
silver
silver,
is along with the knowledge of the by the Saksi-caitanya or the '^V-'itnessHence the object and knowledge of illusion
that
known
directly
Consciousness.
being both directly re\ealed to the Saksi-unlanya^ the avidyatnUi or the urge of avidya which is responsible tor the calling up of the object oi illusion has also a part to play,
though
it
revealed by the Sakn-caitanya

critics of
has along with the object of illusion to be directly (it being inert); but then the
is
the Advaitist contention wôuld point out that this

a
theory where there
down,
former.
for
here
there
are
complex whole of knowledge two knowledges, one of

of
falls
the
the
avidyavrlii
and the other

Advaitist
Saksi-caUanya
as
ic\ealing
answer to such a charge is clearly brought out by Prakasatma\ati who says that the rcstilt of knowledge is to be inferred from the object and not from the knowledge itself, so that the nature of knowledge as to unity or variety is the result of knowledge inferred from a unified or a \aried object and never from the knowledge itself which may be one or many without any strings attached to it to determine its own nature as such. Here Prakasatraa} ati's analysis is in conformity with the Advaitist position of the 1 elation between knowledge and its objects, that is to say, of the self-luminous character of knowledge which reveals the object, whether it be one, many or falsely regarded as one. The unity or variety of knowledge does not depend on knowledge which is self-revealed and uniform, but the objects being 'different (as one, many or falsely recognised as one) lend the
colour {akara) to knowledge as such.
ing,
The
Thus
cmpiricallv speak-
knowledge, though a unified and self-revealed entity, takes the shape of the object it reveals. Hence Prakasatmayati says that though the opponents urge that there are two knowledgeprocesses here in illusion, yet the object being a unified whole -does not bifurcate knowledge which turns out to be a unified
whole.
Had
there been two separate objects revealed
separate knowledge-processes, there
by two would have been a diver-
68
sity
in knowledge. But here the two knowledge-processes, being with regard to the (real) substratum (i.e., shell) and the unreal object (i.e., silver), both of which lose their difference in error, there appears to be a unified knowledge, though there are different knowledge-processes. The duality oi the knowledge-
situation here could not ha-ve of itself been responsible for the variety of the knowledge-situation but for the variety of the objects it revealed. But when once in illusion that variety of
objects
(the shell)
false
gone by super-imposing one (the silver) upon another where a unified object seems to be born out of such super-imposition due lo avidya backed up by impression
is
and
similarit),
the variety
ot knowledge-situation
also
goes,
away, and a unified, complex whole of knowiedoc has lo be
This is the Ad\aitist position of ihc knowledge in illusion which has been masterfully brought to light by Prakasatmayati-^. Frakasatmayati further analyses the Prabhakara \icw that the two pieces of knowledge in eiror arc bom without an^ intervening time {mianlarotpanna) and hence there need not be any unity of knowledge as supposed by the Advaita Vedantists. The Prabhakara vieiv is that the two pieces of knowledge (one of the nature of perception and the other of the nature of memory) are presented successively and without an\ iniervening time in the mind, as a result of which false action [uyavahara) and false designation (vyapadevi) flou. Hence they hold that there is hardly any ground for holding that there arises a complex whole of knowledge in error, as the Advaitists hold. This view is examined clearly b\ Prakasiltmayati and Akhandananda who show that luiinterrupted bits, of knowledge cannot alwa\s account for action and designaadmitted in adhyam.
nature
of
tion, true or false. Prakasatma)ati brings out the nature of verbal knowledge from the standpoint of the Bhalia Mimamsists and the N}aya-Vaisesikas to show that here there being Jin unbit of sucli knowmomentary cannot coalesce to give the desired unitv of meaning which is possible only w^hen the impressions of
interrupted series of word-knowledge, c\ery
ledge being
'^^
tisai/(iiarrJii?i7uiih
hi
c'î
jiJinhmiavohJiusaic,
iu/
pifinuinK huinam
,
laai/a^ca
sohiamitliyri i
mmmhyort yal mal (Ufnikatumupannah

$atycnnUh i/ujMnach
198199).
ienaiL-nt
i-
Kityfn acchim\ai)haiaWat>0]}ddl(oa
ai/o>iKii>i/ekaiit[i/ii2Ja-
ifoiiota iti
Hu'uahiTivaunia, Pp
Adhyasa
&
momentary bits of knowledge stay up to the last word which alone is thus capable to do so. Prakalatmayati thereafter draws an analogy from inferential knowledge where also Ahe knowledge of the probans {lihgajnana) and the knowledge -arising out of impressions (saihskara) merge together to give the knowledge of the probandum. This view has to be accepted in order to account for a unity of causal cognitions which are not isolated bits of knowledge arising out of a variety of Prakasatmayati has ably shown that in inferential and causes. -errorneous cognitions and in recalling of recollection (pratyabhijna), there is invariably such concomitance in the causal cognitions which coalesce to produce their effect, e.g., a unified knowledge- As to the nature of inferential knowledge specially, it is to be admitted that the knowledge of the impressions (saihskara) is a necessary factor which calls up the recollection of concomitance (between the probans and the probandum) through the knowledge of the probans (lifigajnana), impressions {saihskara) and the consequential recollective knowledge of concomitance (vyapiismrli) so that the knowledge of the probandum ensues. This view being accepted by the Mimamsists to account for inferential knowledge (as opposed to the view of the Naiyayikas who hold the knowledge of <;oncomitance associated with tlie knowledge of the minor term as having such concomitance between the probans and the probandum, Prakasatmayati shows that in illusion, too, there is a unitary knowledge born out of several factors, viz., con.the
tact
of the
sense-organ
(dosa)
(samprayoga),
impressions (samskara),
and ignorance (avidya), and not two pieces of knowledge, as advocated by the Prabhakaras. Padmapada, too, has shown that in illusion, there operates the same
imperfections
law
as
in
other forms of knowledge, such
as,
inferential or
ae-representational, but the dijfference lies in the fact that in
the latter forms of knowledge there is no imperfection or ignorance at the origin and hence they are true, while in the former there is the defect of ignorance at the bottom whence
it is untrue^s.
-"
Here
it
must be noted that Padmapada
strikes
samhandltajTianasamshdramudbodht/a tatsaJ)itam ImgijMnam janayatlti i aktavyam {Pa7lcapudika, P. 202.) Ungadarsanmya smmJtdrodhodhahatayS^nyathasiddhati at eia lirigisamsl'dra hodhal'oli^ tatah wpasaniharanamamfijapannamrtyrdanhja saihsharasy-
fosmdllingadarasofnameva
*J0
Critique on the Vioarajia School
a new note in the origination of inferential knowledge, for he does not side either with the Mimamsists or with Naiyayikub, but says that impressi07i of the knowledge of concomitance
alone
recollection
inferential knowledge (without concomitance or without knowledge of association of such concomitance with the minor term).
is
capable to generate
of
the
Prakaâtmaâti has
position of illusory
summed up
very logically the Advaitibt
knowledge which is known as anijvacai riiyakhyaiwUda by showing the logical and psychological anomalies in other view^s. For example, he has shown that in the Prabhakara theory of akhyad there is a bundle of uncalled-for assumptions, \i/.,
the recollection of the presented,

ol
the obliteration of some aspccls

Similarly
recoUeciiou, rcxogiiition of
arises, etc.
two pieces of knowledge idicrc a unitaiy knowledge

ii)
the
inconsistenc) in
NaI}aMka \icw llicrc is the ps\chologKai making the silver direclU pcr(ei\ed as present
and the
shell
elsewhere and the logical inconsistenc\ of the absence of an\

relation between the silver
inasmuch
as
\uthout
a relation obtaining there between the super-imposed and the

locus of super-imposition revealed in a unitai\ piece ot kii(,w
ledge,
the
Nai\a\ikas
theory
(alaiikikaâmiikaisa)
cannot
is
the Buddhist theory there

theory, however, there
is
of super-sen suous relation be logically established; and in the uncalled-foi assumption of the
Gxternall} perceived as the intcrnalh present

is
an
perceived on the shell
the phenomenal world.
In the Achailisl the sil\er, which fahely but the silver is never real ir. Hence Prakasrumayati shows that the
illusor\ object, \l7
,
Advaitist conception of three grades of realiiv,
illusory,
phe-
nomenal and transcendental, is consistent with the logic anci psychology of illusion, inasmuch as the illusorv silver lias u rcaiit) (illusory) which is negated in the phcnomci-'al plane. Thus the existence (salla) of silver is there so long as we }>ei cclve it and hence the silver is. so to sa\, l)orn then and
mnibhrdami'ib ai
(fatlt.iUjnnih.
I'âvnt
Pi-tdnad/nf/ofari.sni/dfnff-onihlinrdl tâni'ilninmlnUim lin-
bo(7Itfilam{TaUi adjpaiia, put />/nh III J nana* pi no 'pin-iajinunndiayr

i/ajiid)Ui7ichih7n/o
L'lii
202).
ai/f/inora
eu
viirnial
pâmrlnomasll tal-hl hJii/inajdnnlJadiWiyah eloih citrnjnanam nidmhanlijnyih ialia lai/'iqrii
nmia-jit ah/nhlii jfid- citranldndndinadvsl nldt ondrnhdhat

iJia
rnhJidsah
203-2G4)
tv
Mnwndomdatnnmhhritd)l7idi-ablid'<(ih
Patirrqiddild, Pp.
dd yalJh'nfhanvi d-
Adhyasa
&
Advaila Theory of Eiror 71
Lhcre.'" I'he position oi the Advaila \edanLists as brought GUI by Padmapada and Prakasatmayati regarding the nature of
illusion comes to this that the object oi illusion should be regarded as such that its false character becomes apparent while It is put to logical test. This ialsity {jnithyUiva) is
according to them ami uacamyaiua and logically establishes the object ol illusion as the creation of ignorance {avidya) covering
up
die consciousness of the locus, as supported b} method of agreement and difference {anvayavyath ekaslddha). The object of
il]u'5ion, therefore, is dillerent

is
from the phenomenal object and
negated by the knowledge of this object. Hence the object oi illusion and its knowledge are both created by inaya or nescience covering up consciousness of the locus that are
directly revealed
by Scikucailanya or the Witness-Consciousness, This creation of 7naya and the conscqtientiai illusory knowledge aic what is preached by Advaita Vedanta whose logic rests upon the fact that whenever there is a false objccL, there is the mixing-up of the objects ot two grades of reality, be it phenomenal and illusor) or transcendental and phenomenal. The whole logic of illusion hinges upon this contention which speaks volumes in support of the Advaitist position that illu-
sion
is
the false creation of
may a or
nescience that
is
is
itself
an
unieal entity.
All our false knowledge
bom
out of the
creation of a false object
on
a locus that
as
is
falsely got
mixed
up with
it.
This
is
known
the anuvacanlyahhyad of the
x\dvaita Vedantists
who
bring out clearly the object of know-
ledge of illusion from the standpoint of a logical anahsis of

the
possibility oi such an abnormal ps\chosis. "They hold that as Consciousne^ss is the only real source of revelation of a thing, the consciousness of the knower {piamalicaila-
tiya)
revealed through the vrlli gets identified with the Con-
sciousness
on which the thing is super-imposed (visayacailanya), and then the ignorance covering up the nacre creates the silver. Everything of the universe, according to the Advaita Vedantists,
is
the creation of ignorance
the sense that
it
is
super-
imposed on Consciousness and has no independent existence. This piece of silver is also the creation of ignorance as it has
""*
idantu'>aiMnrr/aindra]ola^y(t
rajatasyCipaiimattiom
{Viiarana,
fiuhhlfmii'mfofqoîiom
a>
ohltmale,
na
204).
12
no separate existence apart from the Consciousness (of nacic) on which it is falsely cognised. The silver is, therefore, according to them, the external creation of the same value of internal ignorance, because it is as untrue as ignorance itself. This is known as paniâma oi ignorance into the form of silver." (Author's article "The
:
Problem of Nacre-Silver in Indian Philosophy" toncal QuarterlyJune, 1952; P. 167).
Indian His-
CHAPTER
JSfEGATION
IV
:
THE STATUS OF SUPERIMPOSED OBJECT ITS AND CREATION, WITH A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ADVAITA VIEW OF THE SUBSTRATUM
Prakasatmayati has introduced an interesting discussion on the nature of maya which Padmapada had equated with avidya xvhen he said that the silver is the creation of maya {oÛo
mayamayarh rajatam
Pancapadikd,
P.
cepts have a difference according to
These two con205). some Vedantists in so far
as maya is said to be the cosmic principle of ignorance that depends on the creator (karla) and does not affect him in any
way, while avidya has quite the opposite characteristics. But Prakasatmayati does not recognise this difference inasmuch as the
real characteristic {svar iipalaksana) is the same in both, veiling of the real nature of objects and projecting of a different nature in place {iallvavabhasapralibandha'Cnparyayavahhasaits
Inksanasya
Vivarana,
P.
208)
arc
the
common
attributes
of
both.
Hence Prakasatmayati brings out the fact that mciya and avidya have the same attributes and hence the same false
sense-diseases or incantations
(aniivacantya) nature, inasmuch as the efficient causes like the
(manims) calling up the avidyaka
.or
the mayika object are due to the same fundamental prin-
<ciple of eternal
nescience
{anadyajnana).
there
is
clearly
no
distinction between
Even in the maya and avidya
'^ruli
as
is
evident
from the passage: may am lu prakriirii vidyat {fioeiasxHuaui Upanhad), ior, as Prakasatmayati points out, here maya and avidya as the two fundamental principles are said to be of identical nature along with their effects of superAkhandananda imposition (adhyasa) and projection (viks'epa) in his Taftvadlpnna clarifies the point further that as maya is the fundamental principle of cosmic evolution (which is a pro-
jection
upon
ihc Absolute Consciousness or Biahm.an), there
is,
therefore, a logical necessity to regard avidya as not a different
principle from
it
tion drawn between them
but identical with it. The common distincis based on the distinction of jiva
74
Cntique on the Vivarana School
and Isvara who are respective!) regarded as the ground {airayay O'i them (Cf. the view of Prakatarthavivaranakara in his
Piakalatthavivarmia discussed in
Dr. A. K. Raychaudhuri, P.
104).
J he Doctrine
of
Maya
b}'
But Prakliâtmayati seems
to suggest that this distinction is neither logical nor warranted by scriptural evidence for the fact that they have an identical
nature of false super-imposition and false projection in the matter of producing false creation {iatlvavabhasapralibandhaviparyayavahhasalaksanasya
Viva) ana,
nanda sums up
their identity
P. 208), and Akhandafrom the viewpoint of one funda-
mental principle governing the cosmic evolution.^^ Prakasatmayati has moreover shown that the distinction between maya and avidya on the basiî of affectation on the ground or lotus cf them is also untenable, for in boih cases there is the absence of a.lcctation due to the knowledge of negation and knowledge of overcoming of the false appearance {hadhaniscayapralikam-
jhanabhyam ]'ivmana, P. 209). Thus the distinction on this giound iS an illogical one inasmuch as both have the same piinciples at the bottom which make them operative or not. Moreover, the distinction drawn on the ground of their production which in the case cf 7nciya is dependent on the producer (jiaila) but not so dependent in the case of auidya,
is
also not
is
tenable
logically;
for
PrakS'Jatmayati
{hailTi)
mTo'd
not dcpcndcnl on the producer

ctsw
of
shows that il, but its
efficient cause-*
Even
avidya.
efficient
cannot be stopped bv the producer of maya."he so produced bv the application of its cause, such as. ihc appearance of two moons by the
eye-ball
pressing of the
bv the
linger.
Here
in
wjmdhika
hhrama there on its efficient
i"-
equalh the dependence of avidya like may a cause, and ninipadhikn hhtama like the ch'cara-
appearance created by the efficient cause of maya (like incantations) seems to persist even when real kiiowledgc dawns and, therefore, is cquallv dependent on the percipient conscious
indi\idual
efficient
"^^
who
goes on creating
as
it
by the application of
(nijupadhilia)
taî/a
iJir
cause,
in
mndynka appearance
vidiju-snhdaHâ
of
iafjnfpuil'7t(th
huti/il
proipilltitt ai
cm
'itijc
tad il)]ii aino]yl(hliinh w^timhlitu a

oiffn ifJi/rlmr'n/dsahftatj amitijmihali
'^'-
[Tatti adipaiia,
vpuitri nUni a) upmikntliOiHimmjuUain ,
!nt-
208)
iialcyah
mnnhadilôlhani Kmljutc na mfnplpi mourn nndhah

P. 209)
[Taffiit-
dl,,ttiut.
Stains oj Supe) imposed Object

reflections (p)alibiniha)
6'
of Sub.stniiiini
75
lellec-
even wlieic ihcrc
is
no locus of
tion by ihc appliealion of sutli causes.

Il comes u> llns then that Piak.lsatnia)ati, loUowiog Padmapada, does not admit an) logical distinction between 77iaya. and avidya, though conceptually there are two such terms. He elaborately brings out the fact that these two terms have the same cause, same effect and same means of destruction; hence there is logicall) no ncccssit) to draw a line of distinction between them. The\ arc of similar nature in the
matter of the production of

hallucinations of magic
etc.)
effects (such as, illusions of sense,
by depending on
their
is
efficient
cause (and not to speak of the material cause which
ajnana).
Thus Prakaâtmayati defends

silver
his predecessor's analysis that the

is
(of
illusory
perception)
His conclusion is strengthened b) .sîiti, smrtt, sutm and Bhasya of the Vedanta School where these two terms are used in identical universe of Thus Prakasatmayati refers to the >sr2/i(z-passage: discourse. tasyahhidhyanndyojanattatioablmvad blmyascante visvamayamvrttih {îretasvatma Upammd), to the .m??// passage: taralyavklyam vitatam hudi yasmin jiwesilr, yogi mayamameyaya tasmai vidyalmane namah (Piinhm), to the Bynhmasutru mayamWrayh iu ka) l-^nyenanabhioyakiawmupattmt (.'5/2/3): avidya, the 5/ia,9Va-passages where maya, avidyasahti, to mayasakli have been used,^^ and to the Pancapadika-pa.ss2ige: nvtdya mayak';aram ; even he refers to Mandana's Brahmasiddhi: evameuey am avidya maya mithyapratyayah. From all
these sources he draws the conclusion that
mayamayam
yajafnm
Pancapadik'a)
created
by maya
(ato
maya.
arc of identical nature, but are designated differently

their
effects
and avidya due to
projective
{vihsepa)
which are in the case of maya predominantly and in the case of ncidya predominantly
veiling (acchadana).'^'^
lem of
^^
Prakaâtmavati brings in a logical discussion of the probfalsity (mithyaWa) from the viewpoint of direct experitasmfldaridi/fn
arIrisai/(/>T7/e>
'pi'dhiahHudhu
also
vf.
pranidndni mstulni rn
{ndhyraablidsi/a
of
Brahma-sutrai^);
fiankava's
Bhmya
qu
Br
Sfif.
1/1/17, 3/2/3
nuldJini yni ahdrc
cnil'aLi
^' fmmdUaJ(,9anaiJci/(ld
dvagamud chasmlnnapi
rmtvni tilsêpaprddhdni/rim
harahliodah
mnyd
211).
dfthddana--prdd1idny(^vdvidijeti vyai o-
[Virniana,
V6
^nce of the
tof
it.
Ciilique
071
he Vtvarana School
illusory object as well as the negating knowledge shows that the illusory object like silver cannot be real because of the direct experience of it, for then it would be directly experienced by many at the same time; for the
He
object of real knowledge
is
a universal object
vate one as the object of false knowledge.

(dosas)
and never a priHence false know-
ledge presupposes the existence oL imperfections or drawbacks

create false objects,
which help the fundamental principle of ajnana to but real objects are never so created.
tliat the silver cannot he through and through being directly
Hence
illusory objects arc privately experienced while the real
ones are universally experienced, so

said to be real, but
is
false
known
bcnig
-hell
bv
the
Sakpcaitnnya
or
Witness-Consciousness
as
super-imposed
on the consciousness delimited by the

Prakasatmaâti shows therefore that the
through njhTDia.
direct experience h\ the
tion of ignorance
makes
in
SahucaHanya of the silver it illusorv and false.
as the crea-
VicKaranva
the Aiew
his
Vivaranapxtuieyasamgraha
logically
defends his predecessor's stand

that there
iIliisor>is
when he
s\]]ogisticallv refutes
and the
as
silver,
is
.'hows that thcic
no difference between the real siher both being uni\cisallv perceived. He a lundamcntal difference between the two,
to
the latter
is
due
noi
ouh
(shell),
its
existence
also
on the
*this'-
aspcct, ic,
the substratum
but
ccllo(alfon of lactors, sue!)

(ajnFnm).
[Cf.
as,
the defects
due to a greater {dosas) and ignorance
cunalnjh snrvahgrahvam
cet
UiklJdamafmagaiotx'ac)
chaiikJyidivndi h
tm.
idamamsamal agnlnivasyopadJnli>al
hikfldaniarii-
mayarajalam
sFwncchinne
iu
douijanâbuddhyahlthiyaklc
lalo
caitame^ dhvaîam
,
nirdosniiua
T/,)]
gihynfe
Vivnranap^ ameyammg) aha
(Vasinnafi Edn. Pi
Prakusat-
mayati goes further and analyses the nature of negating knowledge to show that the silver
falsitv
is
such.
lie deinics milhyViiva or
as:
alvom nama
proved
to
{Vhmana, P
prniipannopadhlwahhTuinprainogiUmmeva
21B).
millwit
An
object
is
false
\\hcn
is
it
be non-existent on the sul)stratum on which appears. The nature of negation proves it, for the silver kiioxcn to he non-existent on sliell. Hence that which ncjiratcd on the substratum is false {hadhavim's'o imlhyatvain
ru<n)Ynw,
is
is
213).
Prakasatmavati has shown that the negated silver cannot
Status of Supenrnposed Object
&
of Siibsliatum
7T
buL be the creation ot ignorance (ajnana) and can ne\er be present elsewhere (auyalhakhyali) ot the Nai)a}ikas or in the consciousness {atmahhyati o( the Buddhists), nor can it e\eii
be a really recalled
terated
these
silver,
the difference with which
is
obli-
{akhyaii
of
the Prabhakaras), for he
alternatives
cannot
explain
the
shows that all nature of negation.
These views can at best establish that the negation of siher means that it is known as such distant or mental siher or a^ a purely recollected silver without any possibility of the losb
of difference with the perceived substratum.
Hence the
through
con-
clusion
is
inevitable
the
that
the
silver
is
false
and
negating knowledge is of \\^holh cancelling the presence of any silver on the substratum (the silver being
through,
as
illusory or
praHbhasika
exists so
long
as it is perceived
and
ih
cancelled as soon as the knowledge of the substratum dawns).
Such negation, therefore, makes the

shell as illusory or
falsely
silver
perceived on the
it is
having
its
existence so long as
perceived
on the
shell.
is,
This nature of negation

cisms b) opponents
however, put to several
criti-
who
attack the Advaitist îew of illusion
and the negation of the false object. They hold that negation may mean any of the following alternatives, but none of these can stand the scrutiny of logic, and hence negation
{badha) of the Advaitists
the
first
is
never possible.
Of
the alternatives,
one suggested is the hindrance to any one seeking an object but running after a different one {anyar'thmo anyalja
pravrttuiirodhah)
lalse
;
this
is
not a universal rule for the fact that
knowledge does not necessarily engender an incenti\e to run after the object (of false knowledge) as is proved b} completely detached individuals like sannyasms not to be so involved. Hence they having false knowledge and the negation of it cannot be said to have been hindered in their tendencv to get the object. Moreover, even if there be such a tendency, ihat cannot be said to be hindered by an intervening hindrance coming on the way; as from the knowledge of water on a desert, a man may run after it but may be stopped on the way b\ the sight of robbers or serpents; but such an intervening
hindrance
to
his
tendency
is
not capable
to
engender his
though.
negating knowledge.
is
Hence the second

tendency
alternative suggested
is
that the capability of such
retarded,
78
actual
CuLique on the Vivarana School

cannot be so (pravrUiyogyata-viccheda/j) untenable for the fact that even if such a
tendency
also
is
but
this
letardation
of the capacity of running after the object is admitted, that retardation once originated should efface any the same person; but further illusion of the same nature that is far from the case, for the person may very well be
afi-ected
on a
that
different occabion
The
third
alternative
that
the
.objects
are
perceived
by the same knid ol illusion. knowledge of difference of negation is non-diftcrcnt as

logically
is
{aviviklalaya
inconsistent;
established
as
pialipannasymnveko badhah) is also for, if the knowledge of difference

different
to
be
from the knowledge ot the objccis {padTothajhaudi I) ikiaih vinekagMhaiuim TalW'idlpaiia, P. 2 i5). then in all knowledge where the objects arc inst kiiOA\n as nondiflcrcnt and then as mutually different (a^ the opponents argue from the nature oi their case that the knowledge ol difference is born later than the knowledge of objects), there should alwavs be a negating knowledge preceding the kiiow-
kdgc
of the object but this
is
psychologicallv not true.
Heiue
the opponents
may
revert to the position that the knowletlgc
is responsible for the knowledge of iiic between them, but that would kill their own theou of a knowledge of iion-diflerence as that would be never pos-
of the objects in itself
difference
sible.
The
fourth
alter)iati\e
is
that
negation
implies
the
knowledge of mutual exc]usi\cness of objects known as of the Fame nature {amaluuuia jnaiiiJajinasyelawlayTihhTampraUpalfubadhah), but this would invol\e negation in cases of vali<l knowledge as of an object and its qualities (such as Suhio ghatah the jar is white) for the fact that the object (jar) .mcl
its
quality (whiteness) arc later discriminated as such
that
is
is
to say, the previous
knowledge of the
jar being ^vhiie

its
later
analysed into distinct cognitions of the object and
quaiit\.
knowledge of negation but a \alid knowledge of the object-qualitv-relation. The Jaina theory, more.o\er, advocates that all o])jects arc composed of diffeiencc-nonthis is not a
But
(hhedabheda) for the fact that non-absolulism (onekanlavada) is the basis of the phenonicn.il Avorld hence this ilicory, accepting as it does the knowledge of non-diflcreiuo preceding knowledge of difference, would render all knowledge
;
dHlerence
iiH
hiding \alid knowledge
false.
The
fifth alternative is that
the
Status of Superimposed
^destruction of
.tion
Object
&
of Substratum
79
knowledge (jnanasya pradJwamsah) or the destrucknowledge {anhasya ca samvidvisayasya) is negation; but this is logically impossible, for knowledge being xnomentary (according to the Buddhists) cannot be the object of destruction of a subsequent moment. The object too is incapable of being destroyed by the knowledge of it when it is known as such (p) ahpannaive'pi kiui iadvisayena badhah 1 attvadJpa?ia_, P. 215) or when it is not known as such but known as of a different knowledge {pai iipannatve anyavisayenn Ibid), for the first knowledge strengthens the knowledge ol the object and does not negate it, and the second knowledge cannot negate the object of a different knowledge. The
of the object of
ôbject
being not
known
of
as such
it
is
never the object of negation

iasyaprasakier
-na
by
the
nisedfiah
Tattuadipana,
is
knowledge
{aprattpannaLvena
P. 215).
Hence the conclusion
of the
.opponents
logically.
inevitable that the theory of negation as advocais
ted by the Advaitists
in
no wise
his
possible, psychologically or
Prakasatraayati takes
lish
up
of
the
Advaitist
theory
negation
pen very creditably to estabby controverting the
^charges
is
levelled by the opponents. He shows that negation not impossible, as the opponents argue, from the Advaitist point of view which explains it quite satisfactorily. Negation, according to the Advaitist, means that ajfiana or positive
ignorance which
;iroyed
is
the material cause of
all
illusion
is
des-
by jhana or true knowledge created falsely by the former. Now êffect of illusion, is out-and-out false with its material cause (ajnana) by the
along
with the object this object, being the and is negated along
dawning of true knowit
ledge and the object falsely orcated by
is
it
also obliterated
whenever there
\{karyakarena
is
the actual presentation of
nam
Tativadlpana,
The
definition
parinafajnananivrttirbadha
P. 215), of
through ajnana^'\ ityanugatam laksa-
adhyasa as s^nHkupa by iSankara has
"been sought to. ])e explained
by Padmapada and. more

referring
to
.elabo-
rately
by
Prakasatinayati
is
as
the
nature
that
of
in
Mhyasa
"*
which
false.
Prakasatmayati
analyses
aplunasi/a
mvrtUrbadhah
{Vivarana,
svaMryer/a
vartamanena
'pravillnma
vQ.'saha
jnanena
P. 2X5).
80
suggested by this word adhyasa there are three factors as between the Firsdy, there is a contact {samprayoga) smiltrupa. there is the impression sense and the object; secondly, the previous knowledge, and thirdly, there are
{samskara) of {indriyadosa). These imperfections, such as diseases of the eye the origination ot three factors conjointly contribute to It has been adhyasa which is materially due to afiana. adhyam is unified elaborately discussed by us above that out of the three factors which are the sluice-
knowledge born
gates,
so to say,
of
the
primal a^nana to create

tries
it.
Here,
therefore,
Prakasatmayati
to
evaluate
of
the
significance
ol
ot
the
word smrLhiipa used by Sankara in the

and' shows
are
definition
adhyasa
they
that
all
cases
adhyasa
imph
and are diflcrcnt Iroiu perception ipmiyakâ) recollection {smrli) as much as from analysis which the basic proposition of Prakasatmayati' s
that unified
cognitions
This
are
is
seeks to
Padmapada's issue that dream-experiences from the viewpoint of opponents who explanation offered ior challenge the Advaitists on such an Padniapad<i adhya'â. thc understanding of the problem of
elaborate
not
illusions,
in dream-expeiibegins from the opponents' viewpoint that sense the of contact cnccs there is no possibility of
responsible the object and hence one of the factors nol. illusions but are a^ for illusion being absent, there are impression-; (x'asana best recollections {smrli) as due to mere
xvith
. or
But he ably shows that in dream-experiences being recollections inasmuch demonstrate that these are directly experienced, and goes on to
samskara).
is
there
no
possibility of there
'a<^
all
sion, are present here.

Licaliy
responsible lor iUuthe three factors stated above, that are It is Prakasatmayati wlio more systenia-
and coherently
in
general,
exposes
the
Advaitist
conception
ol
illusion
taking
the
cue
from
his
pralccessoi's
Prakasatmayati anahsis beginning with dream-experiences. shows that dream-experiences as illusion cannot be explained
au-av
lor
as
either
fact
perceptual
that
{snahana)
is
or
the
recoUective
{smilij
the
there
not
sense-object-contact
or absence of direct experience respectively; hence he concludes, from the Advaitist position, that there is in such ilhisory experiences (within which dream-experiences are also included)
a
t/u'rd variety
of knowledge
(Irltyamidath
vijnanam svaya-
Status oj Superimposed Object
&
of
Substratum
81'
7nevoktadhyasalaksar}a)n
all
Vivaranaj
is
P. 218) that is the cause of

is
false appearances.
This knowledge
mithya ajnana or a
positive ignorance
hold.
In
not a negative one as the Advaitists. dream-experiences, as Padmapada and Prakaâtis
and
uiayati hold, there
the presence of the three factors respon-
sible lor illusion as backing
up
the creation of objects
due
tO'
this positive principle of ajriana.
Thus
the
mind {antahkarana)
ground of a contact (sarhprayoga) with the falsely created by making the percipient capable of knowing these ol^jects as though present combines itself with the defect (dosa) due to sleep and impressions (samskara) of previously cognised objects and thus makes dream-experiences illusory.
as the
objects
From this analysis of the nature of Padmapada and Prakasatmayati go on to

illusion
dream-experiences
strike
at the cue production of
to the Advaitist position of the nature of the
of
from the viewpoint of the consciousness as the locus apiana. This Advaitist position is clearly brought out by Prakasatmayati who shows that the creation of illusory objects cannot be explained without reference to the
all
kinds of
locus of ajnana, the material cause of all illusions (adhyasa).
silvei
admitted by the Advaitist that the creation of, say, the upon shell is due to the transformation {parinama) ofi avulya or primal nescience, but from his viewpoint that everything is super-imposed on Consciousness inasmuch as it is the only real source of revelation of an object, it should be granted that the silver created by ignorance is really super-imposed on
It
is
the consciousness (of shell)
on which
it is
falsely cognised.
is
The
Advaitist position as has been brought out above

illusory silver
is
that the
the creation or transformation of ignorance
only in the sense that the Consciousness (of shell) which is. reflected on the peculiar xnjti (knowledge-urge) born out of th'eîmperfect sense-contact (due to diseases of the eye etc.) with
the substratum of illusion,
is
the locus of the ignorance creat-
ing the
silver.
This
is
the basic conception' of Advaita Vedantzfc

logically.
and Prakasatmayati hints at it very super'-imposed on the consciousness

ceived
gets
The
is
silver thus
(of shell)
directly* per-
when
the consciousness of the fcnower (pramatrcaitanya)
identified
with the
Consciousness
of the
substratum
being revealed through the mitabkamrf,avrtti. Sankara's definition of adhyasa. Prakaâtraayati's analysis of
{visayacaitanya)
6.
82
CnLique on the Vivarana School
where he says that something perceived before is supcr-iniposed on another substratum (pataha puwadisljivabluusah) is ba>cd on these iundamental concepts of the Advaitist position.
Padmapada shows
locus in
feet
it.-^'"
falsely (viva} tale) as the shell created
us that the consciousness (of shell) appeals by igiioiance having its

b\
Prakasatmayati elaborates this
keeping his
(contact,
solidly
on the above Advaitist conceptions of adhyasa.

mentioned above
is
He
It
says that the triad of conditions
impression, imperfection)
the efficient cause of adhyaha, lor
helps the material cause of it which is avidya or ajmna (primal nescience) to create illusory objects. But at the bottom of such adhyasa the consciousness of shell or the consciousness of knower is the locus of all ajnana inasmuch as it is the onlv
ground on which the external object therefore has no independent existence,

perceived silver
this
is
is
supei -imposed
^j'hus
and
the e\teinall>
is
falsely
its
equivalent to
creation by ignorance
super-imposed on consciousncbs and Thus ignorance
does not create silver if the silver is not supposed to be superimposed on Consciousness and this is in Ad\aiiist mcu the vivaila o Consciousness, though there is the pininamo o!
ignorance.
tion
Hence the siher is false for onh its super-imposion Consciousness guarantees its originaiion at all. So
Prakasatmayati concludes that the false appearance of an upon another substratum is possible because of the fan that Consciousness, the only Reality, serves as the basis of the
object
false object so appearing, for
super-imposition implies the aptranscendental.
pearance
of the
is
phenomenal on the
universal
Advaitist law
in dream-experiences
This and waking

<>{
experiences alike.
In dream-experiences the Consciousness
the knower directly perceives the falsely cieaied objects and
the consciousness of the substrata of illusion is not active iheic for the fact that they are non-existent. But in waking evpejiences the substratum is externally present and hence there is
caiiaiiya) getting identified
the possibility of the Consciousness of the knower (pranmijwith the consciousness of the subs-
tratum {visayacaiianya) and thus the vhnyarailatiya may be said to be responsible for the appearance of ilic silver which
'* ta-iifu
<ut
at a If,;
mm
tadnvar'-himiupayohaacaitanyaifhti' I hh/a-kiTcflraJamho-
faff
{PtmoapadikO, P. 218).
Suitus of Supei
is
imposed Object
d-
of
Sub^HaLum
83
laJ.el> supcr-iiiipobcd
on
il.
'Iliu6 PrakrisaLina)au
concludes
:haL con-^ciousncss utlicr as WiliiCb. {Saksiuuinnya) ^^^Lhout
any
limraiious or as liuiiLed by ihc knowing mnid {nnlalihamnarwc/uiina) or the knoun objecL (tnyiyavacchtiuw) is ilic ground of the appearance ot ihc false object super-imposed on it. The SaksiuulaKya the last anahas is the Witness a all ignorance
(ajfMiin)
and
is
its
eilects
(false
objects)
ac
cordino'' lo
the
Ad\aiiist.^^
This
fbh
the
the
nue
Advaitist position
ol
and Prakasatniaxati very
\(>ices
position
is
his
School.
The
true 'note
of
Ad\aiia nietaph)sics
ol
all
sounded here, lor the fact that the Witness-Consciousness (Saksicailatiya) is regarded as the witness
also
effects
ol
ignorance
situation
But Padmapada has exposed

Prakasatniaxati-s
the
real
Ad\aitist
wherelorin
analysis
Padm.ipada has shown thai 'in no doubt about the laci that the objects perceived are superimposed on the Saksicmlanya and hence internal He does not stop there, for he goes on to sho^v
di cam-experiences
ad\anced more elaborate!).

there
is
ce^
that not only in dream-experiences but also in A\akino experienthe vJâyacaUanya, though the giouiid oi the revelation of The external object is identified with the p)auianaca}lanya and
'Cbjcct
ihe p) amah an! any a, and hence all levelation of the external is nothing apart from the inlernal realiiaiion of the (on^cioin content of knowledge. Thus ontologicalh. Padmapada
.^ho^vs
is ^\ith
that
all
experience, be
it
ol
dreams or of waking
:
life,
regard to objects that should strictly speaking be said to be primarily the -result of this internal realization the extcmaliity
of objects
is
not present in dreams but
is
present in the
waking life ; yet the externalit\ is possible onh on the assumption of this internalization of the conscious coirtent {Q}Ua)apaiokfinubhax'aJi) ol the objects which are revealed in the
TA'aking life^*,
^'?a)iaiia
In
nhluamdhimbanain
hJid^dhdrPita
'tihdvaih
"^
[Yuaraaa^
(ailuoyampi a
adlyldrd
219).
anydi aicltiiinatatid
cf
id
also
aridi/aira
luhyadom\
nimiftalditmupelsuifd
ca
luiafd^dituw
sf/lîfaifaiii/asya
rajatdi acchedajvundisaya-
paiuvnnamdnd
si a/cdit/pna
naha
sdl'Sicaitani/fT'iim
p>atlpadyate{Vivaro7}a,
hJiidyatc]
Pp.
197-198).
i
jdqaianfi'pi
puiinunajfulnddanyadantmapaiol,vinuhhnn'tiinn
eha) upapraJcusanat.
ato' i} tai
ism/aa-
rtt/uTparo/aatu
apm nT:v~ii) iihliardi
nunthltd
jKqnittpJi
[Panrapddiho,
cia
'jdgarant'iiyaitlio^nnhhiiyatc.
anyatlid
jadfui/n
yndcdidnu-
P. 221).
84
A Cmhque
From
this
on Ihe
ivaiana School
true note of the Advaita
meUphysic sounded
b) his predecessor, Prakasatmayati showed us the real hiipUcations of adhyasa due to avidya or ajnfnia that creates the false
objects,
but
is,
along with the objects, the witnessed events in

(Saksicailanya),
(like
the Ever-witnessing Consciousness

in waking
either wîth
or Tvdthout any channel of expression

lite).
the vimacailanya
this
Prakasatma}'ati furthei
shows that
view
of his predecessor should be taken as real explanation of his

position, for he says that the Saksuat/cmya free from all limitations
is
the real bockground of

analysis
all
revelation of
objects'^''.
Thus
into.
Prakaâtmayati's
visaya (object),
of
I
Consciousness
or
cailanya
pjamana
(tn
(ijnanns)
and p)amal] {aniahkaranay

of
this
has no real or me/ aphy steal division but oiiK a division based
on
ignorance'".
is
The
ical implication
Ad'.aitisL
niela-
ph)sic
thjt ihe (objects apart
from
their superimposition
fit
,
on
Consciousness are inert and blind entities not

tion,
lor
levela-
should follow
and hence should always remain unrevealed whence it tliat no relation with the p)ainah or mind as the subject of knowledge would be possible at all Prakasriima\ali ha"- further shown that the Ad\aili,t position that Cônstiouaness IS One, Undivided is ne\er viiULcd b\ die explanations offered h\ Jiimscll and his jDreclecc-ôr as to the revelation ol
objects.
The
invidious distinctions of Consciousness are

{pfalibkasiha-JiliedainaiiUneua
due
to
ignoiancc
Vivaiafjfi,
all
P.
22i) and hence as
Padmapada and Prakasatmayati have shown

the process
that the revelation ol objects, either in dieam-life oi in waking-
shown abo\e, these disand epistemological values". Still these raasiers have all through maintained the glainoiu' ol the high idealism of Advaita Wdaiita and as e\piessed In
lilc,
is
accountable for b)
tinctions
have
theii
empirical
^''
7ii&kislfJifttiiIi('n'(nti
((iitatu/diiidfKniidbinf'/naindddi/a
ili/tf-ifd
if-^rniianadhiharojiidi ahfididth
,vin
ah niir/l/,ifif/i
jiramnnalo
nii
/;/ i/i/n aft
ca
hi itlu
I't
lit
{Viruiana.
^"
220)
hlnilifola
fintibhdi'ilnhlicdiimavffncna
ilijaithah
[Viuunna. P 221) '' Those implications

n,nija
iiavc
m
) I
iiis
Tulii (KlljXtna thus
boon \oi'y fmck brouglu out by Vkluiiidu âno'î/a pin iifrf main luljutuf if^ pi/ahninih
I'l)
yi/ni raiW}/or/i/a/in7Umw(lcl'i'i(lisam't/, n) (iH(t/i ifahid i/fff,
yal
(If
I'UaioHaKuh'lfii(hti/nti
jj?aflfii/>>-
(hti aJi(im-p)ah/(n/<i?t
<l iifipil
r//iaf(l(ll}in>~n rilaiitai/'l
rl)
'^jiallinpajianiul
t
agT) a/ildi '^fuh&l
nsaJi
Uamnijal di yaf dduftai old) fujh iil ddr nh

P.
222)
itOM a-
tlfidnaijumifunfliiih'Jjnr
nf
Status of Superimposed Object
6-
of
SubUratum
83
Prakaâtmayati,
division, without
Consciousness
is
without any transcendental
any
real heterisation into the internal
and the
external, but
is
One Undivided.
But
all
these divisions are
due
ing
to the tinge (uparaga) o the
known
objects
and the know-
mind on Consciousness (cf. Thus Prakasatraayati can fully

due
those
it
the view ctduparagartha vritih).

establish the Advaitist position
that the intermediate dimension

to
(madhyamapanndma)
or
is
is
also
ignorance
objedts
(pydfibhdsika)
is
borrowed
from
upon
which
\il
reflected.
Otiherwise
devoid of parts (tihamsa) cannot have any real dimension hence the intermediate dimension is as imaginary as the infinitesimal (anu) and largest (mahat) dimensions, which are other poles of attack from the Naiyayika view
being
;
-where the partless object (like the atom or the sky) is of either of these two dimensions. Padmapada has brought in a very lively debate as to the Tcal implication of the substratum of adhyasa, that has been
designated by ânkara as paraira to avoid, as we have seen, superimposition on the absence of substratum (niradhisthanabhrama).
This term, therefore, avoids the two extreme cases of non-desigit ought to have designated as also over-designation (ativyapii) to that which it ought not to have designated. These two extreme cases have been established in Indian Philosophy as vitiating a logical definition by making it either too narrow or too wide. Padmapada's
nation (avydpti) to that which
endeavour on which his followers like Prakasatmayati further elaborated the arguments shows that in all experiences, of dream-life or of waking life, there is a positive substratum of super-imposition, and that is, as we have discussed above at length. Consciousness delimited by the knowing mind or the known object though it is in the last anahsis transcendental
Hence super-imposi{Saksicaitanya). on the absence of substratum (niradhisthanabhramavada) as upheld by some Schools of Indian Philosophy like the Madhyamikas is logically untenable. Thus Padmapada's and liis follower's analysis avoids the one extreme o narrowness (avynpti) to dream-experiences which too have been shown to
Witness-Consciousness
tion
"have a
substratum like the waking-experiences of for this reason that a searching examination of the dream-experiences had been undertaken Sy Padmapositive
illusion.
In
fact, it is
86
Critique
on the
Viva) ana School
pada and particularl), his followers, PrakasatmayaLi and Akhandananda. But now Padmapada turns to the othcr extreme of wideness (ativyapti) to show that in those suspected cases of adhyasa where there is a super-imposition of something upon some substratum there is really no adhyasa and hcntc such a definition can mclude these cases ot adhydsabhava (absence of adhyasa). This is the argument from the opponents" (pUrvapaksa) and the point ot view typical case of such possibilities is also from the opponents' point of view^ This
case
is
of super-imposing
Brahman upon
external
name and
form (namarupa), that 'is, external objects or phenonlena, This super-imposition has been established in the Upanisadi* for facilitating devotion (iipasand) to B)altman (i e., nuni^Brahmefyupfislla). But the opponents show thai in such super-imposition there is no niherent dcfcd in ilic
efficient
cause (karanadosa) as in the case of the optical
illiisioi.
a disease of the eje, nor the revelation of a LiUl object as in the case of the optical illusion of snake on lopc,
is
there
there
is
a fahc
itselC
it.
snake;
for
here
die
arc
object
of
imposition
i^^
Biahman homage to
and no
defects
responsible foi
doing
Such being the o}>ponciih' * i^w, Padniapadj slu)U'> thai this kind ol super-imposition is lealK not (also and tIierek)iL the appichcnslon ol too wîdc a dehnition to include this case also is n<>L tenable Prakasalma)ati also harps on this tuuv. to show thai ihis kind o{ supcumposilion of Biahmaii is noi
Tcall) false (or the fact that in
adhyasa there is the false Jmoaupon another but here there is nierclv a menial function {mamsi hiyJi) of conceiving ol IhnJnnau as imposed on the external phenomena lliis distiuclion ol ,)ii'iuaj faiic iion fnmi knmoJedge is based upon a psvcholoi>j(a! anc. cpistemological analysis b\ PadmapJda and J*rakaCi(ma\a(i. The mental functicm {wannsl Jniya) is due lo a will bom out
ledge of one
of Vedic
injunctions to
peifonn
cciuin acts
of
devotion.
the
ac
s
These acts spring from iljc will of the uiind to c;bc\ mandalorv injunctions of Vcdit precepts. Ilcnce will to
i<.
towaids a certain direction inspires the ad in thai directiDn but this win with regard to objects not (ullv knov\n bu. known only hv indirect means as testimonv. Knowledge. hoi\
ever,
is
not the result of an\ psychological will bui
is
boii
Sialus of Superimposed Object
&
of Substratum
87
whenever its condition^ are fuifiUed. Knowledge takes its own course whenc\cr iu conditions are present and no amount of Will to know oj unknow can be o any effect in its sphere. This is the true philosophy of knowledge as distinguished from
action as sounded by
Padmapada and Prakasatmayati. Hence they show that such mental act of super-imposilion of Brahman upon external phenomena can never come within the purview
and hence cannot
is
of knowledge,
also
come under the purview
of adhyasa where there
conclusion
is
always a false knowledge. Thus the that as such mental acts are enjoined, there is
only a functional and no cognitional aspect of these superimpositions of Brahman upon external objects.''^
A very interesting interlude to this discussion has been introduced by Visnubhattopadhyaya in his Rjuvivarana where he has brought out the true Advaitist philosophy of such
Brahmadhyasa'i for the purpose of upasana. He has shown that the answers of the Advaitist writers like Padmapada and Prakasatma}ati are based on the puwapaksin's (opponent's) viewpoint, for the fact that such super-impositions have been sought to be explained, or rather explained away, as real mental juncliom. But the true view of the Advaita metaphysic denies these super-impositions as in any
the fact
tiiat
way
a
real,
for
the mental
functions flow from
pre-existent
adhyasa born of ajnana of the real, transcendental Brahman without any name and form. Hence Visnubhattothat is
padhyaya's analysis touches the core of the Advaita metaphysic by exposing that the mental functions of super-imposition of
Brahman upon
spring in Vedic
external objects or
as
phenomena
are real only
tentatively so long
these
are considered real
injunctions.
all
But should
ett'ects
functions be said to be
real,
unreal
having their not these mental of ajnana veiling the
transcendental, nameless, formless
Brahman}^^
era codonuvasdclicchato'nyst.ho]/atva'n rtK/nasl krn/ai.\rr, najfuinam; jneinannchi piunasya hi clvskikaranajanyaiî/a risai/o nuthyfothah, na hdranaihayattatiadlrchdmicltato ânayitum nivartayiivih id Sal-yam]
*-'nta
fapaftoh
fjpkmmeia
'^^
darkuult afn
taihd.
vidhifanyainmispechap'ayatnanbaP. 2251 anirchatopyanista]na.na' pldiwsyn jtvnhnlaMranam bhuvah [Vuarana, P. 225). udhdndnnidnabl Iriyeli loLksanamul'tam,, ifarotia safi/ati omahfflhrtyaiia frasiddhahhrdntim mtyatlrydptl'h, ata evoktam prandlujablMve'pHi. afhavd Brahmasarratui
[Pailcapudd'd,
dntya
ndmna
v pd&anacldMnud
namm
JSrahmddhyasiiaryamiti,
fddrSa-
88
Cnlique on the Vivmana School
A
be
of
very interesting study of the various views of illusion

as set forth
{khyalwadas)
by iânkaia
in his
made from
illusion are
the
explanations gi\en
h)
Adhyfuabhasya can Padmapada and
According to Padmapada the various views, necessary for ânkara to expound in his Adhyasabhasya, only to bring out clearly his own view (cl. malmlaranyupanyaiyafi-AvauiaiaparUuddhayc udhyasasvarupe Pancapadika P. 227). Padmapada has said that the first vievv of illusion set forth by âhkara as lam kecil anyakanyaPrakasatmayati.
dharmadhyasah
the aimakhyativada of the Buddhists or the anyalhakhyalivada of the Naiyayikas. Prakasatmayati shows that the almakhyaUvada of the Buddhists can be verj well designated by this \iew, and the anyalhakhyalivada of Naiyayikas can also be included in it
ill
vadanti
refers
to
either
by
pointing out that
tlie
object of
super-imposition
,
is
the
external (and not internal as the Buddhists hold) one,
eg sihcr
upcn .shell. Ihe ^ccond view expressed by Sankara (keen In yaba yadadhyaâh ladvivekagrahambatidJtano hhramn ill) ib held by Padmapada and Piakasatma\ati as icferring to tlic
akhyalivdda ot the Prabhakara School of
Mfmamsa
view as expounded by Sankara (anye hi yah a yadadhya'iah, in) is tasyaiva vipanladha)matvakalpanamacnhsale taken by Padmapada to refer to the asalkhyaltvada ol the sUnyavadm or But Prakasatma) ati the Madhvamika School ol Buddhists goe! on to show that this third view icters to a varict) of the
The
third
anyalhakhyalivada of the Naiyayikas. Tallvadlpana shows that this view ol
Akhandananda
Piakasatmaâti
in his
le.sts
upon
is
its
(i.e.,
the asf,umption that the shell appears as the silver wliidi
and therefore the negation of the subslratmii what appears upon Uie sub^'tiatuni (i.c shell) a*^ the object (silver); thus a variety of aiwalJmkhyaUvada or the
negation,
silver) is
,
view of appearance of an object cxiMcnt elsewhere than (he

substiatum
first
is
possible.
To make
say
a comparative
study of
in
this
pioblcin,
we can
a
that Vacaspatimi^ra
his
HhainalJ
has given
difTereni interpretation of these definitions of illusi(m
made
b\
l>) (ih
mdbli pi rniPiiahi ijdpHh.

I
nthai
(1
codt/ai
<l(hi\u
)/af
>
lafsafi/nfi ama/ifilli/yri-
fi
n/apfu
til
id,
siddhaiifa-} ddisiddhaiiiii/i
atna/ifjl/,
tfi/dfin/rtpfj/dpitda-
jidi/of/df
fadaiujlk'hejuii) a <a
panhdio^pi [Riinhwana,
224)

Status of Supe} imposed Object
&
of Substratum
89
bankara in his Adhyasabhasya. Vacaspali says that the fir^t view refers to all the varieties of Buddhist aimakhyati, the second refers to the Prabhakara School of Mimaihsa and the third refers to the anyaihakhyaiivada of the Naiyayikas. The
third
view,
according
of
to
anyalhakJiyalivada
the
Vacaspati, refers only to Naiyayikas for the fact that
the the
ol' illusion (i.e., shell) appears as vipantadhatj?mlvavan or as an opposite object like sihcr that is present elsewhere than the substratum. Govindananda in his Ralna-
substratum
p\abha has however said that the hrst view is of the three Buddhist Schools the Yogacaras, the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas, and of the anyaihakhyaiivada of the Naiyayikas, the second is of the Prabhakaras and the third is of the
.asatkhyativada or of the
of Buddhists.
mnyavndin or the Madhyamika School' Govindananda 's contention is that the vipa}Jfatiruddhadha)
to
dliarma means a
existence,
i.e.,
ma
or
an opposite
nature oi
asat
or sunya (non-existence) that appears (the the
silver according
and through and

existent
Madhyamikas is non-existent through appeals upon the shell that is also nonasadadhistjianam asad bhasate). It is interesting to
it
note that Govindananda's explanations appioximate more to the view of the Vivarana School. The first view of illusion
and anyat hakhyaiivada
according to both of these Schools refers to aimakhyalivada equally. This view is possible because
of the fact that both these khyaUvadas are of the same class of
saikhyali where in the one, the internal object appears (atmakhyati),
while
in the
other,
the
external object
appears
{bahyahhyah).
The next important
question arises
when we go
to examine
the definition of Jsahkara as to the nature of adhyasa from a
Pludy of the particular words of this definition.

has
Padmapada
shown
tliat all
the different views of illusion (khyativada),
ab illustrated
by Bhasyakara himself, have no other way out but to admit a common characteristic that the Advaitists drive at; and that makes all the different views practically boiling down to the anirvacanlyakhyaiivada of the Advaitists. This there is an of the fact that the admission characteristic i%
appearance of an object as another which it is not (sarvafhapi tvanyasyanyadharmavabhasalam na vyabhicarati iSahkara's adhyasabhasya). This appearance is of the false, illusory

90
Cjiiique on the
Vivmana School
pada has shown that in

tiyadharmadliyasa-ili
(miihya or aniwacanlya) that the Advaitists establish. PadniuanyaOathe fiist view [lam kecit
vadanii
Sankara's
adhyasabhasya^
thf
internal {atmakhyali) or the external (anylhakhyali) object (as

si]\er)
is
appears on the shell and therefore the appearing object
Even in the second view (keciitii yaba yadadhyasah ladvivekagrahanibandhauo bhuima ili Ibid), Padmapada has said that e\en the Pxabhakaras {akhyalivadins) who do not recognise lalse knowledge have to admit the appearance of one
false.
as
the other where
cognitions.
Prakasatma)ati
the
both the objects are objects of distinct has shown that in akhyaiivada
tliere is at least in
mind
knowledge of relation binding

that accounts for the unitar\
the two cognitions as one,
and
experience of illusion.
aic
lost in
Hence the Prabhakara view that there two disunct cognitions the diflercnce of which is niercK
illusion
illusory cognition.^'
cannot account for the unitary experience oi In the third view ariye hi, yaira yada-
dhyasah
iasyawa
(!ankara's adhyasahJiasya),
vipanladharmalva-kalpanamacaksaia Padmapada shows that there
lii
is
an
is
appeajancc of silver (cither asat or non-existent or existent elsewhere than the substiatum by way of the appeal ance of
the negation ol
false.
the substratinti)
upon
nature
is
the shell
and that
Padmapada's
the
anal\si'> of the
tlie
ol
iUusion shows that

the
fact
word
pa)(iha in
it
dehnition
necessary for
that without
the nature of ilhision
would have been withoul

that
a locus
{mrad!uslJidnadh\Ti\(f)
illogical
But he has said
such
view
and hence is the necessitv of the word pmafui in the definition to show tliat adh\ma is possible onU iqxni ais
locus {sadhisljianadhyasa).
He
ex{x)scs
the inconsistencies
in
niradhislhanubhrama and Prakasatmayati elaborately discussesthese. 'PrakrL4alinayati sa\s that the ûnyavddi or Madhyanuka Buddhist argues that ilkisioa may appear even without any
satnyoga or sense-con tac i
tions
for
which only the defects due to
axndya (avidyadidom) and hiiprcssions of previous false cogni{pRyriabJnamasnnishfoa) arc sulBcient; hence according to
is
the Madluaniika, the third factor which

"
111
held necessary b}
mmâff/dhJihndrt'-^
a/Jii/rtfn ddiin'tpi
mu)hi'>fiih
i'(Jci(u
ya
/ii/ao/nprdi/ali
{V'liwuna
mthnafga] hiiamh
238).

the VedanList,
sary in
viz.,
&
of
Suhsbatum
is
91
a sense-contact with the locus,
illusion
where no
is
means
the
contactual
unnecesknowledge
{pramanakaii anam)
at all
necessary.
Madhyamika
criticised
to
establish
But this view of the nimdlnsthmiahhiamavada is.
vehemently
by
Padmapada
and
Prakaâtmayati.
Prakasatmayati says that, without the admission of knowledge

of
regarded as unnecessary b)
some object upon some locus which latter factor is also the Madhyamikas, even cases of true knowledge can come within the purview of illusion. Hence the basic principle of illusion is violated by the
Siinyavadi
of the seed
who
does
not
recognise
the
locus
of
illusion.
Padmapada next brings out
the argument from the example
and sprout {bijat'ikw adrstanta) given by the Madhyamikas to show that there are mutually existing loci of the Consciousness {smhvii) and the object (rajalam) and hence no third locus of illusion need be admitted, but the process of illusion should be explained by the origin of illusion which is
nothing but the projection of the internal as the external. This is the fundamental admission of all the three Buddhist Schools, viz., Yogacara, Sautrantika and Vaibhasika, and the Madhyamika contention is totally untenable for the fact that the analogy of the seed and sprout Qnjahkuradrsiania) cannot c^:tablish the mutuality of loci in the Consciousness (samvit)
and the object (rajatam). There is a very great difference between these two sets of origination, vi?., the set of seed and sprout and the set of Consciousness and object, psychologicallv and epistcmologically This is the basis of Prakasatmayati's contention. He against the Madh}amika forceful arguments shows that in the case of seed and sprout, there is no mutual
dependence {Uarelamhayam) but a legêssus ad infinitum for the fact that the chain of seeds and sprouts pre-supposes different causal series, and hence no mutual dependence can arise, but only an infinite regiess in the causal chain arises. In the other
at the case viz., consciousness and object, however, there is foundation of origination the fallacy of mutual dependence and hence the question of regressus ad infinitum does not there is no mutual' arise; so the Madhyamika cannot say that
dependence
(rajatam)
in the present
case also as
in the other
case.
Padmapada shows
that Consciousness
(samvit)
is
and the object

the
being simultaneously born, there
inevitable
5>2
A Cnlique
of
on the Vivmana School
Taliacy
Akhandananda
cUpima.^'^
mutual dependence and not the absence of it.^'' also strikes at this argument in his Taltavasuggestion that there
is
The Madhyaraika
a chain of
the causal series of the consciousness and the object as being
and posterior dependence on each other cannot also if the prior and posterior serit h of consciousness and object has a chain of existence (puruupruxiamuLlcu otia) abyanvilatvenadJuslhmiani) then the Buddhist tenet of flux (ksanikavada) which is the basal tenet in this philosophy will fall to the ground for the fact that the prior conscious state will be carried on to the posterior object not in 'the stream-like manner as the Buddhists suppose, but in its own nature as such. Prakaâtmayati also shows that in the thcie is a chain of case of seed and sprout as well,
of prior
stand the scrutiny of logic, for
existence as
the present case, even
if
their simultancit)
ui
existence
is
not proved by experience.

is
This chani
seed
ol existence
the case of seed and sprout
a logical necessity for the
tact
\\ill
that without such recognition
the
and the sprom

the seed and
is
not have the causal series established, ie, there will be

to the question of their causality.
if
no end
Thus
is
the sprout are causally established,
their co-existence
to
be understood.'^'"
of existence
Hence
the logical conclusion
that a chain
must be recognised even here and the seed and E\en li iL be argued that there is no such chain ol existence between the consciousness and the object as between the seed and tlie sprout (thus denying the previous explanation), that argument
the sprout have an infinite series ot the causal nexus.
cannot equate the
sets of
origination h\ the matter of absence
ot mutual dependence.
For, as
it,
Padmapada
is
is
hints at
it,
and
.is
Prakasatmayati elaborates
there
a far gieatei
difJeieuce
betAveen the two sets of origination as
proved by experience.
The
is
cause-and-effect relation ])etwcen the seed
and
the spiout
proved by experience in some cases and from such cases this relation is proved in unexperienced cases, and thus the
^'
iha
i)iiii(nyaif)jdi'ii
S(X>iii
lUi
t/atlinjattinHirnO/imiif.r
fai/oiGVctnirtiiin.
iilniaûh.
'"
!ofo
ihi)lj}i(it(imrl(ii[Panrapil(lila
PP
240-241)
(uim/o/t
Mi/iitpalainhlinihltui'tataiiootaUirniujnJaiiilthfuUh/arthuh
[Lm
'I
240)
iti\ui\, i/,'tu
filjadisî'diii (iifilrn(itK~ik(lnl'i('nj<i
roiii
)Uaf\ adlti/arthdh
'">.,,
24i)
Status of Siipe) imposed Ohjfcl

fallacy of infinite regress does in
of Subsiraliim
93-^
and-effect relation by
no wise vitiate their causedependent on the fallacy of mutual dependence, but in the case of the consciousness and the object, the very fundamental fact of the cause-and-effect has to be assumed even here without anv other relation experienced place of its occurrence, and thus even at the origin there is the fallacy of mutual dependence which \itiates the whole system of origination unlike the case of the set of the seed and the sprotit. Thus to equate the two cases is illogical and unsound, and thus the case of the Madhyamika that there
making
it
is
the admission of the muttial loci of superimposition in the

to
consciousness and the object on the analogy of the seed and

establish the case
the ground without any valid proof to on such an analogy. Akhandananda in his Tattvadipana puts these arguments to show the difference of the two sets of origination in a syllogistic form to bring out ^^ the futility of the analogy brought in by the Madh>amika Padmapada has unmistakably shown and Prakasatmayati has elaborated upon it thai all cases of illusion are with regard to a substratum that is present, and hence the negation of the false object makes a revelation of the substratum upon which cognised. Hence any object was falsely the super-imposed
the sprout falls
discussion of
I
the nature
of
negation
all
'this
{badhakajnanaparya-
oca nay a) brings out the fact that

{sadhisl/iflno
errors are
upon a
subs-
tuUum
ot
bhramah), and
what the nature

the
ol perception rc\eals as
an added proof to a unihed experience

{rajatnin)
substratum (idam)
is
and the
object
Thh
nature ot negation
bhowii h\
Prak7iCitma\ati followhig his
predecessor as a universal law

if
in all kinds of error, for even
as
is born mediately through inferential or verbal proofs, \et the knowledge of negation always accompanies the knowledge of the substratum, and hence any consistent thcor\ of error should achnit this
the knowledge of negation of the objects
basic principle
of adhyasu. Thus Padmapada and Prakasatmayali show that even in the Sdnkh\a theory there is the
primal Matter (fnaJnIi) as the fundamental principle of the

" iimafuM
iirnwifi.<-t/in
1
janîii'iiiolairnal
lHirn,liiJiiiul\ijafi
('if
Hthunatrn ndih
dosni/a
'puishdo
tu
samiuha'taiayoradlmlltamldhislhcyuhltr,}nmill(inauiiiftiIcahft7i>ar)H/idh(iporamparef-
,jsi/a
acidaiiaiuinilufr'lf
yaHha7i{Talf,ad,i><"w
242)
^4
negation of
A
all
Cntique on the Vitmana School

the primary elements (trigunas) in
is It,
for the
.Saiikhya view that prahji
the state of equilibrium {samya-
vasiha) of all primary elements advocates the negation of all

these elements in piakrli, thus bringing out the fundamental
principle of Matter as the ground of eternal negation of
all
cosmic elements. theory of prahLi
This metaphysical evalution of tiie Sankh}ais hinted at by Padmapada in order to bring out the nature of It as the ground of eternal negation of all cosmic elements whence Prakasatmayati's analysis inakes this position still clearer by showing that prakrii as the primal Matter is the fundamental ground of the cosmos, and hence
negation of
is
all
the elements
m
is
It
is
feasible,
but
Its
negation
fund.i-
never practicable, for there
no other ground more
mcntal than puikHi where it can be negated. Padmapada and Prakasritmayati have moreover shown that iroin the Advaitist
standpoint there
is
a very cogent argument to
show that
all
adhyasas that are due to ajfiana that is directly experienced by Saksicaitanya or the Witness-Consciousness along with the
object falsely cognised, have this fundamental ground which makes all adhyasas revealed till they are not negated by true
-of
Thus the Advaitist position about the revelation adhyasas by SakpcaiUmya which directly experiences their material cause or ajfiana is clearly focussed by Padmapada and
knowledge.
Prakasatma>ati to bring out the ground
{adlnsijiana)
of all
-errors.
Padmapada and
Prakas'atmaâti, while
bringing out
this Advaita ontology in the sphere of error, have strongly repudiated that this adhisiJiTiua or ground is also the object -of negation inasmuch as along with the object of the external world, the Consciousness that is the only witness of the false
Ikit such a untenable h)r the fact that Consciousness is never an object of negation and hence it is the etertial ground where all false appearances arc negated. Akhanclananda in
object should also be regarded as being- negated.

is
view, they say,
his TnUvadipana elaborates this idea when he says that Consciousness as such is never negated but its' relation with tlic external objects (false or true) can l>e negated."'^ Padmapfida
.shows and Prakasatmayati elaborates the point thai the object

^"'samhand^Kuiîsfrddmyn (Tatfiadipana, P. 243).
hri(Vnjatie*/)i
na hti'dlasya hadhimtetyarnuth
Status oj Supe) imposed Object
&
of SuhsiiaLum
95
of super-imposition is also not a non-entiiy, for otherwise it <:ould not have appeared in knowledge, and the nature of ialse knowledge should have no meaning if the object of buper-imposition is supposed to be a non-entity. Prakasatmayati then elaborates the point that the object of superis
imposition, according to the Advaitiuis, is not void (sunya) but negated in sat or the existent (substratum) and hence is false
^45).
bhramasyasativam nama J'lvarana, P. not void for the fact that it is the object oi negation, and hence it is different from sal as also from
{sadvyavitUmatmm
The
object
is
and is therefore aiiDvacamya or miLhya (false). If were a complete void, it could not have appeared as such and hence would not have the necessity of being negated. The negated object being anirvacaniya or false at the time of appearance is, therefore, neither existent {sat) like the substratum nor non-existent {asai) like a void object, but is an appearance
asai,
it
of the sal and

is
is,
therefore, negated
Thus Prakaâtmayati shows

object,
by the knowledge of it. that the object falsely perceived
never an asat object while appearing but an amtvacamya and may be accepted as asat when it is destroyed hy true knowledge of the substratum as all objects become non<entities after their destruction (pradhvamsabhava). This analysis of Prakasatmayati brings out the fact that destruction {pyadhvamsa) of the object, true or false, supposes its absence {abhava) and from this point of view, the
nmrvacamya-oh]tct
negation
may
be
said
it.
to
be
an
as
asat
after
its
and never before
ôry has been accepted by Bhatta-Mimamisakas as well as by the Advaita-Vedantins, though there are epistemological differences in their views. Prakaâtmayati following Padmapada brings out this fact that sbhava as a category can be accepted with regard to an object iit the time .of its destruction (pradhvamsa), and then the illusory object also comes within the purview of pradhvamsabhava at the time of its destruction or negation by the
Jcnowledge of the substratum.
a separate calethe Nyaya-Vaisesikas and the
Abhava
Thus
there
is
practically
no
^tyantabhava or complete absence of the illusory object while it is perceived, but only an absence in making when its perception is negated by a more real perception of the
substratum.
'
^6
C)iiique on the
Vitmana
ScJ'ool
This negation, however, docs not make the anyalkakkyali position of the Nyaya-Vaisesikas happier, for Praka.satma>ati shows that this negation can in no way prove that the object
of super-imposition
is
present
elsewhere.
Padmapada
hatl
such a contention from the point of view of either experience or postulation {aiihapalh). Prakaâtmayati shows that the capacity of speech never trans-
hmted
at
the impossibility oi
cends the impoit {abhidhana) 'of the sentence in question and hence the verbal knowledge {sabdapiana) of negation cannot transcend the import it can convey and that is the negation
of the illusory object as being related to a specihc space
timc^**
and
Akhandananda further with it not really related clarifies this point by a very logical analysis in his Taltvadlpana. He says that the verbal knowledge always conlorms to the import of the words (padasanmtl/iya) when the sentence is
ill
used in the priniar) sense (muhliyav)lh), but when it is us<d the secondary sense {atnuk]iyav)lh) then it can transcencl tin-
sphere oi import piopcr (ab/tid/iaiia) b\ suggesting (lahynia) But as here in the caj>e of ncgauoii of something else than it
no scope for transcending the aplierc oi import no question of its suggesting something else Hence the case than it, eg., 'presence at a difTerent space' Naivauka and thai of the (ihnaof anyathakhyaliviidut lifi\alivadin Buddhist arc refuted b\ the prool oi verbal knowsilver there is
pioper, there
is
ledge {icibdajnaua).
'
Prakasatmayati show's that this negation cannot es'abltsh

b)
postulation thai
the object of
superimposuicm
is
present
elsewhere because of the fact that the natuie of negation \sould
be an absurdilv
in
if
it
could not establish the presence ol the

it
is
object elsewhere than where
negated; he sa\s that e\en

betueeiv
present
(sihei
the Naiyayika-view of anyalfia/ihyalf, the relation

(shell)
the substratum
and the
objecl
thai
is
'"
''
iMAf(nU4ala[as(tmhmUt(ii)i
i/ufia
rnlyam
roiofaiii iJojiai/iii {Panrnjuldi/ fi, V 245L vndln/(u ^fli/rnthwjnud'ixldaLaitK tuftn 'ia<JaS(hii(iii
fh^l<i,nai)(ihli(nn\iroiliam
i/<ilia
hodlnufui
laLsyafc
'sound hiuitdhiuu
ifi/Odfiu,
hamukhtiauftyn hndhalam
nova
rasi/a
pfido'<dii,fnf/n/ri/ilmMnn'(pl/i
lyatd'thd
hilaU'uUa
pada-tlmaith ydl ilranuoii iniihlhlidi ddfnfiu
'<nmfnlliiidt'iiii'<)dln
im
utfjaryam
Hi'ilt
dciduimai
246).
(itfifia()ad/iaiam)i(i^(i/ii.it)l/i(ifd,
(</H,i/d~
iK.lihilntaitdi,
nhtnhiffti)ada)thmam'iifig,ibodlianmaiiHnffttifiddrdLyU'<ufl}i'ir
~(Tnth
od'iixnia,

status of Superimposed Object
&
of Substratum
97
elsewhere) of super-imposition,
ledge,
is
when negated by
its
true know-
negated without postulating
presence anywhere else
than the case of illusion in question; so also in the Buddhist view of atmakhyati, the external projection of silver that is internal, when negated, is not recognised as being present
elsewhere than the case of illusion in question.
He
also showsis
that even in the Prabhakara-view of akhyati there
also
no
such recognition that the negation of a particular sacrifice postulates its presence elsewhere for in the jyottstoma-s^LCxi^CQ where the injunction for the order of exit of the different
;
rtviks
(priests)
is
laid
down
as:
advaryum
sacrifices
prastota samianuyat, tamudgata, tarn pratiharta, tarn
niskramantam Brahma,
are
also
down
holding the kaccha (loin cloth) of respectively precedent priests is broken^ For instance, if the pratiharta-priest breaks the order, the expiative sacrifice is saruasvadaksinayaga (sacrifice where the sacrificer has to pay everything as a daksina or gift) but if the udgata-priest breaks the order, the expiative sacrifice is adaksina-yaga (a sacrifice where the sacrificer has to pay nothing as daksina or gift). The Mimamsists consider the;
lam yajamanah, there the expiative if this order of exit by
laid
implications of these different expiative sacrifices and arrive at
some
definite conclusions. For example, if there is a simultaneous break in the order by the pratiharta-priest and ihe udgata-priest, they lay down the injunction (vidhi) of optionH
;
performance of any one of the above expiative sacrifices but if there is a break of order in succession (i.e., if the pratihartapriest first breaks the order
the
first
expiative sacrifice of sarvasvadaksina-yaga
and then the udgata-priest does so)' and the next
one of adaksina-yaga tie with each other to claim performance. Here the Mimamsists conclude by the injunction paurvaparye purvadaurvalyam prakrtivaditi (Jaimimsutra) ^meaning that alternative weaker than the thereby the first is second for the fact that the second becomes unnecessary without having any scope. Hence here the first alternative 6f sarvasvadaksina-yaga is negated by the latter alternative of adaksina-yaga, but PrakaSatmayati shows that this negation o the former does not in any way make it present elsewhere than this particular place of its possibility along with, another alternative. This Mimamsist analysis of negation of an.
7.
$8
alternative
Critique on the
Vivmana School
by another
is
brought out by Prakaâtmayati to show
that the akhydiivadin Mimamsist cannot also the basis of postulation (arthapatti) o the
make negation
as
presence of the
negated at some other place than the place where it is negated. The akhyaiivadin, though not recognising false knowledge,
recognises negation as in such cases of
two
alternatives
and hence
the possibility of postulation (arihapaiii) to prove the existence of the negated elsewhere than in the place of negation is
rejected altogether.
The akhyativadm's
alternative
contention
sacrifice,
that
in
is
the negation
of
the
expiative
there
only the negation of the 'propensity to action' (pravrtti) is also rejected by Prakaiâtmayati who shows that such negation is not negation proper, for even if such propensity is accidentally retarded to one who is ready to sacrifice by the presence of a king or the raid of robbers, then the sacrifice is not
said
to
be
negated,
it
for
the
accidental
cause
of
retarda-
tion being gone,
will automatically
again be in progress.
This fact of the impossibility of the presence of the object somewhere else by its negation at a particular place is also challenged by Praka^tmayati from the standpoint of the Naiyayikas themselves. He shows that ihe Naiyayikas who are anyathakhyativadtns cannot establish that the absence by way of destruction (pradhvamsabhava) of an object, say a jar, at a particular place does in no way establish its presence elsewhere, for the destruction of the object means only a specilic kind of absence (abhava) and nothing else. Thus the pratiyogin (object) of negation (nisedha) in illusion (bhrama) on the substratum (anuyogin) that may be a particular spatial or temporal adjunct of illusion can never be said to be present elsewhere on a different spatial or tempoial adjunct by the fact of negation.^^ This impossibility of proving ihc presence of the illusory object elsewhere which is the view of the anyathakhyalivadm Naiyayika is shown by Padmapada and more elaborately by Prakaâtmayati from the opponents' argument based on the proof of postulation (arthapafti); but this proof of postulation is resorted to by the Naiyayikas who do not recognise it as a proof, only from the
" i/atFia praiipannadeie nisiddlimya ghatasya no doiantarc sattvam, cvnm protipnnnadesahalavmtusarvopadhau nmddhasya na prafdyoffitvcna
jirafipannasarrojyddJtau sattvasiddhmbfailha7u{Vivarana, P. 247).
&
of Substratum
99
standpoint
of the Advaita Vedantists who along with the Bhatta-Mimamsists recognise it as such. Thus the dialectics o Padmapada and Prakaâtmayati here reveal the fact that jcven if the Naiyayikas accept their view of postulation as a proof of valid knowledge, they cannot even by that proof establish their contention of anyathakhyati. Thus the illusory
object as silver is shown by them to be false through and through (amrvacaniya). The object of negation and the object of appearance in illusion, however, are regarded by them as of different status of reality. This fact has been well brought out by Prakaâtmayati, Akhandananda and Vidyaranya, as has been shown above. The fact of negation does in no wise prove its previous existence that is negated afterwards at the time of negation
;
for the object of negation
is
always the empirical
that is always absent on the substratum (shell). The object of appearance, however, is illusory (pratibhasika) that is experienced so long as it exists. Thus there is no suggestion in negation that the
silver
(vyavaharika
or
laukika-paramarthika)
object
is
is
the previously existent one that
is
negated afterwards,
but
it
before.
the eternally negated one that was falsely perceived This is the Advaita-view of mrupadhika-nisedha or
negation of the object that is not limited to any particular period of time, but is, as negated, beyond all temporal existence of illusory perception {pratibhasika-satta). Thus either by experience or by verbal testimony there is no chance of the anyathakhyati contention to survive the test of reason. As to the significance of the words in the definition of ndhyasa, Prakasatmayati, following Padmapada, shows that the word smrtirupa refers to the illusory nature of the silver because of the fact that it is raked up through impressions (samskaras) and is akin to the previously cognised This characteristic of being born silver (purvadrstavabhasah).
of false and defective contactual knowledge is indicated by the word smrtirupa. Therefore the two characteristics of con-
but defective cognition and recollective cognition through impressions are complementary to each other and indicate the illusory nature of the silver^^. Prakasatmayati
tactual
'
pun adrstapadena
samskarajanyatvam
siddhamityetadanglkaroU-
100

lies
shows that the proof of illusory perception
in all cases
still
of error in the appearance of the real as the unreal, but there is the sanction of experience in every-day life as
the
dual appearance of the moon. Visnubhattopadhyaya in his Rjuvivaiana brings out the implication of this kind ol laying special emphasis on the empirical over and above the
common
logical
aspect
of
error
by showing that the contention of
supported by tlie empirical aspect over and above the logical aspect of proving this ^K The example iukiika hi rajatavadavahhasate of the empirical aspects of falsity The first purpose as shown by Prakaserves two purposes.
mithyatva or
falsity is
lies in the designation of adhyasa as the appearance one (the shell) as the other (silver), but the second purpose is served by the suffix vaii which shows that the designation (laksana) of adhyasa is associated with the designated {laksya).
i^tmayati
of
falsity of
the adhyasa.
Thus
there
is
a clear case of the estabor illusory character

is
lishment of adhyasa along with

{mithyatva).
it is
its falsity
The
character of falsity (mi(hyalva)
such that
not to be proved by the reality of the object at auothct' place, for it is false by itself or illusory by origination. Padiua-
pada shows
'this-ness'
is
that the contact of the false silver
is
defects (dosas)
which adhere
to the senses (tndnyas),
due to the and the
[idanta) of silver is, therefore, not non-con tactual due to the above contact. PraLasalma}ati deals with the problem by showing that the 'this-ness' of silver is not false for its being a characteristic of silver, for it is the ground of the contact of the sense with the false silver. Aklianda nanda clarifies the position in his TallvadJpana when he says that the direct perception of the false silver is due to the knowledge of the ground of adhyasa due to scnse-contac( inlo which consciousness (caitanya) is reflected. Thus the direct
but
'sah/nmiti'
tmhUaiasya
vaujai Ihyam
nclyaha
'mtiieii'
satnitiai/aya
dosajanyati aziUdhyaithath
249)
s'mrtml'pahiSesanamityaif,haJi~(T(iffi adljtana,
^'ii/dpdam
hhuhiiisamhandho
pramanayultibhydm
lahaydalcsanayonlio
laksanam
haihain
lalnyanlpuA-ani
nnvfi
i
siddhycf.
pramfujena
uta
yvLliianuLcdaya
7/ir/JiyiiHain
ifyuha
sankdm vtnirdkanmvimfmarh
In
vmlpyam
t'athl
nf/nfaloht
vyclpfam
lalsye
250),
krtdal-mnasya
'niatmtyancna{Rpnixarana, P,
6"
of Substratum
101
perception of false silver
is
possible because of such super-
imposition on the Consciousness reflected on the yonder thing (idam) that is the ground of illusion.^
"*
tndnâsamprayoge
janitam
yadadfitsthanajn&nam
-pratibtmhitacaitani/am tasminnadhyasddaparohsatS
{Tattvadlpana,
tasminnantaryeA
P. 254).
CHAPTER V
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADHYaSA
THE
ADVAITIST VIEWPOINTS
THE PURE SELF ON ITS ROLE IN ADHYASA CULMINATING IN NO

IN
ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT
Prakaâtmayati analyses the nature of adhyasa between the
Self
and the not-Self, and following his predecessor shows that asmat and yusmat, the two words used by Bhasyakara liSankara to refer to these two respectively, are amply borne out as such by the fact of their respective nature. The not-Self that is revealed by the Self is the yusmat and the Self is the Consciousness reflected on the Ego (ahankara). In illusory knowledge
of the two, the Self as Consciousness reflected a&
on the Ego serves it. not-Self on Consciousness, pure and simple, cannot be the ground of any adhyasa, and hence Consciousness is delimited by the Ego to
the
basis
super-imposition
of
the
appear as the
not-Self^^.
This
Self or
asmai not being the
adJmihana or ground, pramana or the valid means of knowledge and the drastr or the mind, there cannot logically be any possibility of
locus of any defect or dosa pertaining to the
super-imposition of the
not-Self. The Self or Consciousness being free from all defects cannot be the seat of the defects pertaining to these three factors indispensable in the origina-
tion of super-imposition, the factors being not different
from
the Self cannot also transfer their defects to the Pure

Self,
Self.
The
having no chance of being taken as Pure, for its reflection on these factors is always implied in any adhyasaj, and being, therefore, never a distinct scat of super-imposition, cannot be the ground of any adhyasa. This being the charge
therefore,
of the opponent, Prakasatmayati following
Padmapada shows
that the Self as Consciousness

""
is
never dependent upon any
nirafkjanasya
caitanyasydsmadarthc' nidamamaasi/d/idl rnu
(>hasyatve.na (i/usmadarthalaksanu'panno'iia/ikdro'dhi/mia
255).
asmadarthe.
ahannt%
ih
{Pafirnpddd'd,
ladmtt-
fratihhdsa
ityarthali~(y ivurana,
Pp.
254-255)
asmacc/iabdasya {Tattvadipana, P 254).
yo'itho'kankdrah
idawanidnmdtmahmtmwvu.
Adhyasa
of the factors
is
&
Pure SelfAdvmtist Implications

it
105
for Pure Consciousnessi not to be confused with external loci of super-imposition which have their pure bases as the ground of adhyasa for their being revealed by knowledge as such and such (their qualified existence), but Pure Consciousness is ever unalloyed and its reflection on the particular
is reflected, is
on
whicii
self-luminous.
Hence
it
not the criterion to make it equate with the former. having no measurable shape and therefore it is not like the act of knowing (samvedana) that depends on the external factors, but is ever self-revealed and therefore ever Pure Consciousness. Prakasatmayati answers the possible objection that the Self is not revealed in full, though it is partless, like the sky, by saying that it is selfrevealed {svayamjyotih) and is not revealed like the sky by another entity which is consciousness. Thus the Self is independent of any extraneous object for its revelation and is therefore never unrevealed. The Self is, however, not an object in which the quality of êlX-revelation ,adheres, for Prakasatmayati says that it is the nature of the Self to be selfis
modes
It is either infinitesimal or infinite
revealed without depending like other revealed objects upon the revelation by extraneous causes, and hence the Self is self-
revealed not as an object having the quality o self-revelation
but as the only Reality as such. The self-revelation is also not a produced process, but is the very nature of the Self and hence is not to be regarded as taking away from the Self's pure nature as such that is eternally unqualified. Prakasatmayati further clarifies the point by showing that the selfrevelation of Consciousness that is Self is the determinant of other revelations that are dependent on it by various all channels of expression (Cf. jnanajanmaprayuktatvat karakapeksayah
is
Vivaiana,
P. 285).
Self-revelation of Consciousness
not born for the fact that it does not depend on anything extraneous but its own revelation, and hence it is not to be confused with a produced process depending on Consciousness. Self-revelation of Consciousness, therefore, comes very near the Prakasatmayati Consciousness". is "Self-revelation mark
:
brings in the analogy of the

also
is
lamp
locus,
to
show
that
its
revelation
but Akhandananda in his Tattvadipana clarifies it by the proof of inference. He says that whatever has revelation by itself is not to be said as havnot born on
its
own
104
Critique on the
Vivaram School
as the revelation of the
ing that revelation born on

is.^^
it,
lamp
In the self-revelation of Consciousness also there is no birth or production on it but there is only the natural form oi Even it cannot be said that the mind or antalikaraiâ its flash.
is
the locus of its birth or production, for Prakasatmayati emphatically declares that Consciousness as such is not produced anywhere except the revelation of its own nature that
adheres to the Self and that nature is the revelation of the object to the mind by its innate power of a self-revelatory
character.
adjunct of Consciousness that
Hence the antahkarana or mind is only a limiting is reflected on it and hence a

;
revelation of objects takes place
the modification
(lurtti
or
pannama)
ci the antahkarana
is
the locus of such revelation
of Consciousness for the purpose of
knowing the object and
hence is secondarily designated as Consciousness {antahkaPThis 259). jnanatvopacarat Vivarana, ranapariname
reflected Consciousness that
is
carried
on
to the vrtti or pait-
nama
of the antahkarana
is
the epistemological process of the
production of consciousness or knowledge. Prakasatmayati further brings out that knowledge is not an object adhering to the Self, for then it will turn out to be
seat
of revelation
and then
self-revelation
will
be jeopar-
Revelation even in the inert object is not produced, though such an object is revealed at a point of time by Consciousness, for production of revelation can take place in the
dised.
well be that the mental knowledge that

;
and hence the opponents' argument can very is born in the inert mind cannot be said to be produced but Prakasatmayati ansconscious object,
wers that there
is
not any possibility of production of cons-
ciousness even on the inert mind or antahkarana, for as has been well brought out above. Consciousness is never produced but is only limited through different channels. Thus
-Consciousness always refers to self-revelation
and
it is
never a
created or a destroyed object.
The
creation or destruction
refers to the external objects, such as the objective flame by the revelation oi the light of the lamp {pradtpaprabha) or the solid objects due to dust etc., when the reflection on the mirror
" vlmatam
avdhayopadhav na ^&yaU,
praMhf,r(lt, jiradlfapraMiavati
-{Taftvadi'pana,
259).
Adhyasa
6-
Pure SelfAdvaitist Implications

is
105
not
self-
{darpanapraiibimha)
revealed
polished
out.
These
are
but
other-revealed.
(Here
Prakaâtmayati
stresses
upon the
also
objectivity of the material illumination o the flame
though he has maintained sufficiently that it can be regarded as an analogy to prove self-luminosity of Consciousness. Cf. andhahare pratha?notpannapradipaprabhavai
of the lamp,
Vtvaranttj P. Consciousness is self-revealed as is 101). expressed by the term pmjnanaghana and hence is not to be equated with external objects otherwise revealed, (cf. vi^fia-
namanandam, prajnanamanandam Brahma

ported by the grammatical sanction.
etc, also refers to

it is
the quality of knowledge adhering to the knower and
sup-
Hence, therefore, jnana
means jnairtva or the quality of the knower and it is, therefore, sanctioned by Panini's rule karaiâdhikaranayosca (Panini,
:
3/3/117). The opponent, therefore, seems to say that it is a quality through which the knower knows the external object
and therefore it adheres to the knower. The opponents' view seems to be that jnajia can be justified by adhikarane lyut and there is no necessity of bhave lyut. Prakasatmayati seems to suggest that words have the primary significance in the meaning of the root (dhatu) and secondary significance in other meanings (such as karana^ adhikarana etc.). Thus Akhandananda in his Tattvadipana says that the root-meaning is the primary one because it is generated first whence the meaning of the karana^ adhikarana etc are originated and hence the root-meaning has the first consideration. Hence jnana should refer to the root-meaning, that is Consciousness, that is not produced. He also says that the root-meaning does not necessarily pre-suppose action, for even some roots have the meaning devoid of action. '^^ Prakasatmayati has said that the opponent cannot escape by saying that jnana does not refer to bhave lyut but to adhikarane lyut and hence there is the possibility of the reference to the quality of knowledge adhering to the knower, for as words having scanty significance in bhava
,
"
kai anad/nkaranayordhatvaTthapraUpattifia.peksataya
hilambitaprati-
patttkatvad
####
dhati,arthasya
jjlfjnasya kriyatmahaUiarin
hiydimakaHam,
furahsphurukattdttaddirayanam yuhtam casiddham, na ca dhatvartJiatvdt aknydtmdkasydfi dhatvarthasya 'gadi hadcmmkadese,'

ca
ityddau prmiddhatvddUyartliah
{Tattvadipana,
Pp. 260-261)
106
as well as having primary significance in the root-meaning, jnana should always refer to an unproduced phenomenon that or is born when we empirically attribute suffixes in bhava even in the harana or adhikafana as the opponent says.
Prakasatmayati takes little or no pains to refute the karay^cb. or adhikarana aspect of the suffix as the bhava one, and it is Aihandananda who clearly brings out the real situation o the primary import of a word. Prakasatmayati further states
that this Consciousness
fore,
is
a never-ending Reality and, there-
not a
series of revelations
which are born and destroyed
in
an
eternal chain of temporary bits, for such temporal origi-
nations are not the nature of Consciousness or Self. Here he looks askance at the Buddhist Yogacara conception of a series
of bits of Consciosuncss {kânika-vijuana-vadin).
Prakasatmayati examines whether
it
is
possible for
any
on Eternal Consciousness that is Brahman. He first poses to show that the veil of ignorance cannot reside in Jiva or the individual Self as it rests on the Universal Self. Padmapada first shows this aspect of ignorance and PrakasTitmayati harps on his tune more fully. Padmapada and Prakasatajndna
to stand
mayati
try to establish successiuUy that
ajnana
may
reside
Brahman^ but before doing that they both show that the veil of ignorance automatically hangs on Jiua as well. Prakasatmayati states that jTva being not different in essence from Brahman, the veil and the projection created by avidya hang on Jiva thougli they are referred to Brahma?i. Hence Jwa should be taken as
the locus of the effects of avidya for the fact that he
oj the same status as
is
in essence
Brahman, though under the influence of

is
ignorance, a false division
that are said to be referred to
created. Thus the effects of avidya Brahman automatically arc referred
to Jiva as well. This
is
the true significance of PrakasJitmayaii's

to
analysis of the effects of avidya with reference
Brahman
and Jiva, wherein he follows his predecessor's anal) sis but makes it more elaborate and clear. He says that the two things referring to the same locus but having no causc-and-effcct
relation, are not different in
kind but only
different in aspects
Thus according to PrakaSatmayati's explanation, Jiua and Brahman are in essence non-different and hence the former being limited by ignorance is an aspect of Brahman. The reference to both Jiva and Brahman by the
of
the
same
thing.
Adhyasa
6-
Pure Self
Advmtist
Implications
107
same universe of
of
by the examination (Chandogya Up. 6/8/7) where the two words Tat and Tvam refer to the same undifferentiated existence that is one but under the injHuence of
discourse is substantiated
like
Upanisadic
passages
Tallvamasi
ignorance they appear as differentiated as
Brahman and
jTva,.
This elucidation
Akhandananda-'"'''.
is
brought out in the Tattvadipana The second question that arises in
by
this
connection
is
analysed
all
by
Prakaâtmayati
to
show
how
avidya can at
tinctions.
create effects
on Brahman, the
undifferen-
tiated one Existence having
He
follows his predecessor's analysis
no qualitative or quantitative disand brings out
the logical possibility of this problem. He says that avidya or ajnana can rest in Brahman as it is supported by valid proofs, such as, testimony of Scripture {irutipramana) and postulation based on it (srutarthapatti). The scriptural testimony can be found in passages like anretena hi pratyudhah &: ani'saya socati muhyamanah. Prakasatmayati shows that in dreamless sleep (susupti) there is the non-revelation of Consciousness which is never so; hence it follows that such non-revelation has a cause
that acts as a hindrance to the
self-revelation of
Consciousness,
hindering phenomenon (pralibandhaka) of Consciousness cannot be false knowledge, lor in such a state all knowledge dies out. nor also any impression (samskara) of false knowledge for the fact tha.t such an impression cannot be a pratihandhaka nor also any karmic hindrance is justifiable to^ veil Consciousness. Hence the sruti refers to a positive ajnana by the word amta (anriena hi pratyudhah, ta ime satyah kamah unrtapidhdnah) as different from false knowledge, or its
this
Now
Prakasatmayati
On this logical basis, impression or the karmic hindrance. shows that there are other irw a'-passages which all refer to a positive ajnana veiling Consciousness,
and creating all kinds of illusory behaviour. Thus the im^-passage anisaya Socati muhyamanah refers to the illusory conduct of the Jiva that does not see his real nature. Again,
dravyanistham
kdryaledrcmahhavahinaxjordravyayoh sdnidnadJhikaranyam&kaso'yaih Devadatta dravyaikatvdt jlvagatdreato BraJimano'nya na codayatinanu vdnmmbhdsah vi'paryayd%%ti

*'
nanu
itivat,
Tattvamasyddivdicyam dklianddHha{Vivaram, Pp. 261-262). nistham akdryakdranadravyaindtra-vrtbitve nati sanidnddhikrtatvdt 'so' yam Devadatta' %tivat {Tattvadipana, P. 261).
*****
tti
JOS
6rMi?-passages

na
iarh
ya ima yajamnyadyuspravHa jalpya casuirpa ukihasascaranti and avidyayamaniaiie vartamana nanyacchreyo

like
vidatha
makamantaram
habhuva.
nihmena
vedayante refer to the ajnana that creates a hindrance to the real knowledge of Brahman or Atman (cl. nihara ajnana
avidya)
and the consequent
of this ajnana
jantava h
Bhagavadgita)
(cf.
also
conduct of Jiva flowing out ajnanenaurtam jnanam 'tena muhyanlt

illusory
Prakasatmayati
following
Padmapada
tries
to
establish
ajnana on the proof of postulation or arthapaiii. But before doing so, he sounds a very cautious note about such a method adopted by them. He says that establishment of ajnana on any valid proof will tantamount to saying that ajnana is a valid concept and not a false and illusory {anirvacamya) one that the Advaitists are out to establish. Hence Prakasatmayati makes it clear that the valid proof of arthapaiii or iruti only makes ajnana to be a concept other than non-existent (asat) and does not establish it as a valid concept for the nature of ajnana is such that it is different from a non-existent entity as also from an existent one it is difterent from both and hence it is called anirvacamya or mithya (false or illusory). The nature of ajnana as such is only directly
;
;
revealed to
the
Sahsi-caUanya
to
or
the
Witness-Consciousness,
and
is
not revealed
the
ordinary
proof
means of knowledge
of
{pramanas).'^
Praka.4atmayati's
postulation
in
ajnana comes from the two-fold fact that is well-established on scriptural evidence and that evidence being supplemented
by other
proofs, such as perception
and
inference, postulation
or arthapaltt serves as an added proof.
The
two-fold fact
is
with regard to the destruction of bondage, i.e., liberation from bondage, at the dawn of the transcendental knowledge of unity between Brahman and Jiva (Brahmajnana or Btahmat-
maiky ajnana), and the injunctive precepts of kavana etc., for (dauana) of this truth. These two facts arc unchallenged being based on the .sruti-cvidencc and supported by cogent logic. Our life of bondage and the steps prescribed toward Self-realization arc all facts that cannot be
the realization
""
aha
ra saks'ivedyasyajMnasya
pramamirartMdrydi^tUh pradariyate
lU
ifi
na
fasiju
pfamdriaT edyatvaprasangah
{Vii'orana,
P.
265).
Adhyasa
denied
ledge
;
& Pure
Self
Advaiiist
Implications
109
these facts only cease when real, transcendental knowdawns on the human mind. No bondage exists there and no path still plays its role; ever)/thing stops as if by the magic-wand of knowledge and all our hectic life of
spiritual
fact,
progress
attains
its
culmination
On
this
two-fold
in
Prakaiâtmayati
builds
that
up
his
proof of postulation
knowledge dawns, the life of bondage must needs pre-suppose an eternal nescience covering up the real knowledge, and secondly, the paths prescribed toward Self-realization (danana) musi also pre-suppose such a nescience that is active till the goal aimed at by the paths is not reached. The goal of atmadana?ia is not to be proved by the paths leading to it, it is a realized fact, selfevident and self-luminous; what the paths prescribed indicate
before real
is
ajnana, for he says
that the goal
is
not realized
destroyed
till
the eternal nescience playing
its
by the paths thus prescribed. Akhandananda in his Taitvadipana clearly and succinctly brings out this hint^^ Prakaâtmayati examines at length and in a masterly way establishes the Advaita view of ajnana and its locus and object. The problem is a complex one when judged from the vast and varied opinions growing round it. It is worthwhile to confine ourselves here to what the School
is
part
not
of Vivarana brings out regarding this problem.
Prakaâtmayati,
following his predecessor, says that
argument that Jlva being non-different from Brahman cannot be the locus of any
the
ignorance as
Brahman
is
not also the locus of
it,
does not stand
the scrutiny of logic.
This type of argument aims at dislodging the possibility of ajnana on Brahman from three sides, but He shows that all the sides are exploded by Prakasatmayati. the jirst possibility of this argument is that ajnana is possible only on the admission of difference between the locus and the object, such identity of J'lva and Brahman acting as a hindrance to such a concept. Prakasatmayati shows that ajnana does not necessarily pre-suppose such a difference but can very well have
as
its
locus iaiiaya)
and
object {vtsaya as the object of the veil

is
or avarana) the same thing, and that

"^
Unqualified Conscious-
mvartyavidydmantarenaxidlilyamanam darsanoddescna havanndi nwpafadyamdnamavidyam gamai/ati, nu ca BrahTnasvarvpabodhandrtham

sroanadt
vidhlyate,
lirahmanah
265).
svaprak-dsatvendnyaniropelsatrddityarfhah
(Tattmdipana, P.
210
iiess
(cl.

keuala
mrvibhagacitireva
SarhsksepaMnraka);
.darkness being the veil (avaranatvat) and different from action (aknyatmakatvat) has the same thing as its locus (as the rooin where it exists) and object (the 700m that is covered).
Hence
it is
like darkness has the
evident diat ajnafiu as an inert (jada) principle same thing as its locus and object, and
hence ajnana need

.between them for
not necessarily
its
establishment.
have in
is
this respect this
a difference Darkness and ignorance same characteristic, though ignorance

pre-suppose
often said to adhere to a locus different
from the object
janah etadvisyakajnanavan, i,e., this man=i/z^ docus, has ignorance, in this matter = i!/?e object); but Prakaâtmayati dismisses this argument by saying that this two-fold aspect of ajnana is only a passing phase in the real background The second possibi.of it as having the same locus and object. lity of the above argument is that ajnana is not possible in
(as
we
say, ayarh
Unqualified Self-revealed Consciousness that is Brahman that But Prakasatmayati shows that is antagonistic to the former. the real antagonism between ne&ciencc and Consciousness lies
not in Unqualified Consciousness as the locus, but in Consciousness as limited b) the subject, the means etc., that being in
true consilience with a falsely created object dispels nescience; hence Saksi-caitanya or the Witness-Consciousness being regarded as the locus or ajnmia, there is no antagonism as this
Consciousness
directly
is
known by
only the Witness or revealcr of ajnana that it and by no other pramana

I
is
Prakasatmayati makes an elaborate analysis of
he probo])tain-
lem
of ajnana
and
its
is
relation to
the locus,
i.e
Bâliuian.
He
shows that there
no contradiction in any relation

all.
ing between the two, for, after

or Nirviiesa
lose
its
Unqualified Cônsc iousncss
Brahman being
the locus of any ajnana docs not
all-knowingness (sarvajnatva).
He
shows that there
in
no contradiction in Brahman's nature of all-rcvcaling and allknowing characters even though ajnana hinges on it for, as
;
he analyses the fact, there may be three-fold apprehension of such contradiction, but none of these is real contradiction at
all
The
first
apprehension
is
thai rcvcalcdncss
{hhammanalxm)
iri-
entails <;uch contradiction,
but he thows that ajnana in the

pre-originational,
exist
cxistcn'tial
tc^nporai
n
ft
of cr-origina ting effects
existence
its
and
may
in
the revealed
Brahman
Adhyasa
ilhat
is
&
Pure SelfAdvmlist Implications

of
is
111
the
home
;
many
to
aspects
of limited
Consciousness
(janya]nana)
that
say,
that
though there are many
channels of the revelation of Brahman, still it does not lose own nature even if ajnana is held to adhere to it. Limited consciousness is only a phase of Brahman and it does not in
its
any way make

sive,
itself
its
bound
to the contradiction
it is
of such cons-
ciousness, for in
at the
own
nature
all-knowing and all-perva-
falsely
same time being the Witness of ajnana that may it. Even the revelation of Brahman is not antagonistic to the ajnana which has its locus in Btahman, for, as Prakaâtmayati says, there is no contradiction in the revelation of the ajnana itself. Now this revelation of ajnana is due to the locus that is Brahman which as the Witness of it is not
adhere to
in conflict with
it.
revelation
of
Brahman
Prakaiatmayati also points out that selfis not in conflict with ajnana that
adheres to it, for he says that only inert objects (visayas) that are other-revealed are not the loci of ajnana and hence cannot
be at the same time revealed and the witness of ajnana adherthus there is an inevitable conflict between them. ; It is only samvedana qua samvii that is not revealed through any
ing to them
channels or vritis and is only the nature of Brahman that has no conflict with ajnana of which it is merely a witness and not Prakasatmayati then analyses more a dispeller by any means fully how the all-knowing character of Brahman can accommodate itself with the ajnana that adheres to it. He shows that the third possibility to deny the existence of any ajnana in
Brahman
(the other two possibilities have been shown and examined above) is that the unity of Brahman and Jiva that is the. main thesis of Advaita Vedanta is apprehended to antagonise with ajnana adhering to Brahman inasmuch as its allknowing nature will be impaired by it, but he dismisses such He shows apprehension by bringing out the real truth. that this unity does not in any way hamper ajnana as adhering to Brahman for the fact that though there is nity, still that unity is divided as between the himha and pratibimba (the Reality and its reflection); so there is no those tronflict of the characters adhering to Bmhman and
adhering
unity.
to Jztâand hence ajnana is Hence Prakasatmayati concludes
possible
that
the
to
even in presence
the
all-
of
ajnana
in
Brahman
is
not
antagonistic
J12
Critique on the
Vivarana School
fact
knowingness of Brahman for the

the unity of
its reflection all
that
Brahman
being,
existence
is
the locus'Of ajndna in the sense that
(praUbimba) as a limited Entity shares the qualities

its
of being such a locus, whereas in
transcendental Existence
(sarva-
which
jnatva)
is
Unity {aikya) there
is
really all-knowingness
But he says that the Consciousness per se is the real locus of ajnana which abides in Consciousness par excellence, i.e., Absolute Btah?nan and not any JJva. His paradoxical statements here (as jlvahayatvopagamat Vivarana, P. 268 & sulyapyaikye pratibimhaimanya'
and
ever-freeness {sadamuktatva).
dhyastasyamatvaderbimbe adarianat
sanat
there
avadataiayascavirodhadar-
loc. cti.)
seem not
to disturb the general standpoint
he
has taken, but only try to hush
up
the possible charge of
being no sarvajnatm (all-knowingness) in Bjahman. shows that sayvajnatva and ajuanairayalva do not antagonise in the same locus {euam saruajfiatvavidyasiiayaluayoh
He
satyapyaikye'virodhat
analysis
Vivarana,
P.
268)
Prakaâtmayati's
and view-points on the relation between Brahman and Jwa will be discussed below. Thus unity of Brahman and
Jiva
one sense establishes ajndna

the fomer.*^^
as
adhering to the latter

unity,
self-revelation
as the reflection of
xhus
and all-knowmgness
of
Brahman
postulate ajnana inasmuch
as a veil is often seen on it, or otherwise no such positive ajnana would have been possible but only the negative absence of knowledge if there were difference, other-revelation and littlc-
knowingness in Brahman. Thus Prakaâtmayati adduces here an additional proof of postulation (arthapatti) to establi&h the presence of ajnana on the locus of ajnana.
Prakaâtmayati introduces a very interesting discussion as
between Brahman and Jiva though they are Here he says that there are various views as to this question. The first view is that it is due to the limitation of the antahkarana or mind, the second view is that it is due to a charaaeristic called atireka that can bring about both difference and non-difference, the third view is that it
to the difference
essentially the same.
"=
tasmdnnaiki/amavidyasrajjatvena
268)
virudhyaU,
kintravUlyameropa'
pMayati {Vivarana, P
vadhamala evarthadjlve JJTahmaararSiâprahasar.chadikfmdya Icalpi/afr * * * # afo'r)admddhavidyaimcchinnunmtajimnirhha8a>ii>adamtkarmom

îrahma{Pa7Lcapadika, P.
269).
Adhyasa
is
& Pure
Self:
Advaitisi Implications
113'
due
to their intrinsic natures.
misses the alternatives by showing that covers
Prakaâtmayati entirely disit is only ajnana that
Aiman
atmajnanam
Vivarana,
and
hangs
P.
on
269).
Atman {Atmavaranam But Prakaâtmayati seems
to make here a departure from the standpoint of his School when he says that ajnana is responsible for the avaccheda of Brahman that is Jiva, for his School advocates, as has been established in his Vivarana, that ]wa is the pratibimba and
not avaccheda of Brahman. But this seems not to conflict with his general philosophical background where he es-tablished Jlva as pratibimba; herein he only makes a slip-shod term that is not his philosophy but is only an approach to understand his philosophy. Thus Jiva here becomes created out of nescience or ajna?ia
and
that
is
what
is
meant by
calling it
an
avaccheda; in reality, according to Prakaâtmayati, however, it is a pratibimba. This Jivahood is due to ajnana and this
cause-and-effect series is beginningless (anadi) like bijankurapra-
vaha (the
is
series of seeds
and
sprouts).
This anadi avidyapravaha
at the root of all the creative principles of kartrtva, bhokirtva
etc.,
is
which
also being beginningless
and
false constitute
what
called Jivahood.
Prakasatmayati dismisses first of all the arguments of the who hold that it is antahkarana that is responsible for the difference of Brahman and Jlva. He analyses that the
opponents
antahkarana can in no wise be responsible as such for the fact that it is itself false and created by ajnana. Hence no true avaccheda of antahkarana can be postulated for such difference to be possible ; and if the falsity of the avaccheda of antahkarana be accepted, then the primal ajnana itself becomes so
responsible.
Thus
the dialectic of Prakasatmayati centres round

itself is
the fact that the antahkarana
the offspring of ajnana
and in no wise capable by itself to account for the difference of Bxahman and Jiva ; hence antahkarana being dispelled by true knowledge of Self cannot stand on its own merits any difference between Brahman and to account for
Jiva; thus the alternative course of recognizing that anta^^ along with ajnana that creates it should be hkararâ recognized as accounting for the difference between Jiva and Brahman, comes up for consideration, but that alternative, too, is untenable, as shown by Prakasatmayati and Akhandananda.
8.
114
Critique >on the Vivarana School

in this view the recognition of
They show
that as there
is
two
principles whereas the one primal principle o ajnana is sufficient, this view should be discarded and the views that ajnana
is
Brahman and
the only principle to account for the difference between Jiva should be accepted.^^ xhe ajitaJikaraâ can-
not also be said to be a true emanation of

authority of the sruti
it
(cf.
Brahman on
is
the
the
tanmano'srjata), for the fact that

(sddi
being created by avidya

transformation
P. 270)
or sotpattimaitaka)
illusory
(vivan tamanavidyadhithanatvam
Tattvadipana,
of
never true, though it is or eternal nescience. Thus Akhandananda hits upon the right nail of Advaita Philosophy by saying that though created, it is the vivartamanavidyadhisthana and hence necessarily false and illusory, Prakasatmayati ably answers the alternatives of the delimitation (avacchedakatva) by aniahkarana and shows
that
Brahmacaitanya and hence is not the substratum of anadi avidya

the
none
the
to
of
these
its
stands
subtle
the
scrutiny
stage
of
reason.
The
aniahkarana
as
in three
(3)
is
(suksma)
being
the
(2)
regarded
subtlety
delimiting
adjunct
:
comes
in
things
existence
(avacchedaka),
partless
state,
^(1)
decrease
parts,
in
for
the the
causal
fact
state.
The
hrst
alternative
impossible
that
it
composite
substance cannot exist in partless state, or else

at all.
ceases to exist
The second
alternative
is
also untenable for the fact
whole cannot remain, or be composed of parts. The third alternative too becomes inconsistent for the fact that the aniahkarana being existent in the cause {hat anamevasthitam), in itself becomes non-existence and hence incapable of serving as the avacchedaka which it is sought to be again if it exists as the effect also
that the parts being decreased, the
else it ceases to
;
is no question of subtlety. Hence Prakasatmayati concludes that the only other alternative in favour of the case of aniahkarana being left and that being "existence in the cause along with the impressions of effect",
(karyamapi)
then
there
we have to dismiss this one also on the ground that the causal existence necessarily implies that the cause is illusory and not
"'
antahkara7iasyavaccJiedakafvamicchaiS*jmna8j/apjfaracr7i^dakatvcmi'-
yata eva, antah7sarana8yaiopitatven5'jMnatmakatvat, tata ubhayoram' cchedakat vakal'panayam gauravanna tSvadantahharanamevdvacckedakamit}/arthdh{Tattradl'pana, P. 270).
Adhyasa
real
dy
Pure
Self:
AdvaHist Implications
115
and hence
nescience;
distinction
that cause turns out to be nothing but ainana
or
of
otherwise
destruction
of
the
false
knowledge
would
case
never
for
is
solidly
refuses the
Hence Prakasatmayati antahkarana and along with it

come.
the
as
case
for
atireka
property
that
non-difference
cannot
also lost. Aiireka being regarded can bring about dijEerence and be said to make the difference bet-
ween Brahman and Jiva

avidya that
is
possible without the acceptance of
really at the
bottom of such
a
differences.
The
between Brahman and Jlva and hence there arises a mutual dependence, is also neutralized by the counter-argument of Prakasatmayati that it is all the same in the case of aiireka also; and moreover mutual difference is not a strong argument in cases of eternal dependence as we find in the case of bheda (difference) on the one hand and the differentiated (dharmtn) and the differdifference
argument
that
avidya
presupposes
entiator
(pratiyogm)
in
on
of
the
other.
Hence
all
the
argu-
than avidya fail, and the case of the Advaitist that it alone is responsible for the appearance of difference between Brahman and Jwa, gains its own ground. Prakasatmayati winds up the arguments and establishes this position by saying that this avidya^ though hinging on Brahman, not only obscures it but also creates an appearance of difference between Brahman and Jiva ; this is the function of avidya the empirical plane where this appearance of difference is always obtruding upon the existence of Jiva till the transcendental truth of unity is not vouchsafed to him. Even the bimba of face that is reflected on the mirror is not merely obscured by it but also is made to appear as the pratibtmba on the mirror and thus the difference of the two is created by avidya or ajMna hinging on the consciousness of the facial expression {bimba) that is reflected (pratibimba) on the
other
ments
favour
adjuncts
mirror.
Prakasatmayati brings out more fully and clearly the locus is Pure and Unqualified Consciousness by showing that the other alternatives cannot logically hold good. It cannot be held that Consciousness as qualified by the avidya is the real locus of avidya for the simple fact
of avidya that
that
there
are
no
logical
proofs
in
support
of
this-
lid
view..
A
The
Critique on the
Vivaiam School
ignorant' where the
antahkamna
that
empirical justification from feelings like 'I am 'I' refers to the Self as reflected on the empirical is very feeble in view of the fact that all
of 'I', but are nat oa by Consciousness limited by some adjunct or the other but by the Pure Consciousness or the Witness-Self (Saksi-caitanyd), Prakaâtmayati pays back the opponents on their own coins by the same force of arguments
feelings centre
round the experience
account
revealed
which
silence
is
them in
is
their
view that aniafykaraiia on which

all
the Self
reflected
the revealer of avidya as well as of
empirical feelings of a direct nature, as these experiences and the antahkarana itself jointly depend upon the Pure Self, as,
and the act of burning depend upon the only whence we say, 'the lump of iron burns'. Prakaâtmayati in one word dismisses the argument by showing that avidya and antahkarana arc both dependent on PureSelf whence it follows that we ascribe wrongly ignorance or nescience on the antahkarana but not on the real locus upon which it is super-imposed. The antahkarana itself being an
a
lump
of iron
locus,
i.e.,
fire,
eftect
of avidya cannot be the locus of
it/'^
The
is
empirical
justification of expressions like
T am
"
ignorant'
to be sought
in the acceptance of Pure Self as the locus of ignorance
and
then also we can explain satisfactorily the presence of ignorance even in the dreamless state of sleep (susupti). Prakasatmayati shows the evil cficct ol rcjârcbiij^ the view that the Self reflected on the aninhkarana is the locus. of avidyaJ in that the explanation of ultimate liberation from
nowhere
else
bondage (bandhanaia) becomes a myth for if the inert (]ada) antahkarana be regarded as the locus of avidya then it wili also have to be regarded as the locus of illusion {bhrmUi) a*
;
well as real knowledge (samyagjnana), for depend on the same locus. But then the
these three tilings

inert aniakkaraiia
having realized real knowledge, the Self will not be liberated from bondage, for it is that the Self that h in bondajrc and that has to be liberated from it. True it is that the Self as Pure Brahman is neither in bondage nor has to be liberated
from
it,
yet
to
explain
satisfactorily
the
phenomenon
of
**
anfaM'ararja'iydjvonaJcdrya/.umna
tadfdrayati'nlcnppanff.
iiaca
tUyamtpapattih
tasya
ani/atM8iddhatvdt{Tattvacllpana,
P.
272).
Adhyasa
&
Puae
Self-.
AdvazList Implications
117
.bondage and liberation that are due to the play of avidya, it is wiser to hold Pure Self and not the Self qualified by the
antahkarana
destruction,
as
the
locus
of
avidya
as
well
as
its
for
otherwise
logically
consistent
theory
of
metaphysic cannot be constructed.^^ Prakaâtmayati here introduces a view that ajnana has its locus not in the Self qualified by antabkara'iâ but in the antahkarana itself. This view is grossly illogical, for it cuts at its own roots. If the Self is admitted by this School as
the locus of limited knowledge (ktficijjnatva), as is necessarily done, then the Self becomes the locus of ajnana because it has sometimes the absence of knowledge. But this School may argue that ajnana as a positive entity belongs tx> the axkiahr
karana whilst absence of knowledge (agrahana), false knowledge {miihyajnana) etc., have their locus in the Self, hence the antahkarana and not the Self becomes the locus ol ajnana. These arguments also lose their force when put to logical examination, for ajnana to have as its locus should be designated the antahkarana as an entity different from knowledge (jnanadaneither
yat) or antagonistic to
alternative be accepted, then

.disease of the senses
knowledge (jnanabirodhi). any psycho-physical
If
the
first
defect, e.g.,
may come within the category of ajnana and may very well be accepted as having its locus in the ianiahkarana which is inert (jada). The second alternative also is .untenable for the fact that if knowledge and its opposite stand on two dijfferent loci the first on the Self( which is the only locus of knowledge and not the inert antahkaraiâ) and the second n the antahkarana, then the antagonism between knowledge and its opposite will have no useful purpose to serve, for, this kind of antagonism proceeding from two diJBEerent loci will not be able to make knowledge the destroyer of its opposite. Even if the antahkarana be accepted as the karana or means of knowledge of the subject that is Self, and the ajnana as the opposite of knowledge being seated on that means (karana) there will be no logical evidence to show that
**'
iatasca
liistasya
tmyaiuqnatvamityarthah
{TattvadTpana,
mu/itdvananvayacctnmatrasya
P. 273).
sarvatranugamat
X18
Cnlique on the Vivatana School
knowledge in the subject will necessarily destroy the opposite knowledge in its means. Even the knowledge oi the antahkarana of a man gone to susuptt (dreamless sleep) as devoid of any actions or functions (liyamana) cannot suggest the cessation of the ignorance of the man, lor he is said to have ignorance again when he wakes up. Thus the inference of the cessation of ignorance in a deeply-sleeping man by another man from the former's state of the antakkaratâ as devoid of any actions, is not possible, because of the fact that such knowledge of the absence of any actions is due to the previous presence of actions and not due to the cessation of ignorance. Even as psycho-physical defects ajnana cannot be said to have its locus in the antahkarana, for then sense-organs may also become such loci. The argument that the anldhkaraiâ is beginningless (anadi) while the sense-organs are created in time (sadt) and hence the latter cannot be the loci of ajnana which is. beginningless while the former can be so, is also a very weak one, for if we accept satkmyavada or manifestation Irom au existent state in the cause, that will apply equally to the senseot
organs as also the antahkarana.

ses
it
is
From
all
these logical analy-
clear that
the positive ajnana as spoken of in the
irutis as anrla, nihara etc.,
must
necessarily
have
its
locus in
the conscious seat or seats whicii have knowledge,

it
and hence
follows that no unconscious aniahkarana can be sucn a locu-s. but only Consciousness {caiianya). Tliis ajnana is a beginningless (anadi) entity that has its locus on Brahman, lor, it is not generated in process of time. Padmapada sayj, this in
when he brings out many Jwas under the inliuence

clear terms
ciple*^^.
that
Brahman appeals
this
as so
of
beginningless
prin-
Praka^tmayati
is
clarifies this
position by showing that
not only
Brahman
a beginningless Principle, but also the
on it is such. Not only is but also the principle ol illusion is beginningless in point of time. This is borne out, as Padmapada says, by the Bhagavad-Gita which speaks of I:>oth pnikrfi and purusa as anadi'^'^. Here prahli refers kj the prin<ipl'e
veil of ignorance {ajnana) that rests
the ground of
all illusion
"' atoîiddisiddTwvidydiacihiminantMfn'atiirhlhustliipadaBickuruHiim meci{Pariraj}adih'i, P. 269).
Jhah13/20)
"
qiiakijim jmriisaHcaiia hiddhyanodl nblu'na'i>i [Bliaqai ad-Ollu
Adhyasa
of
&
Pure
Self:
Advattist Jmpiications
119
mnya
as is
vidyat.
As
borne out by the Wuti: matter o fact, in the

are
six
mdyam
Advaita
Self),
ciL
tu prakrtim
School
of
(the
Vedanta
there
(1)
beginningless
principles
(2)
{sada-
nadayahfK
cosmic Self
ness), (4)
(5)
Jjva
(the
(3)
individual
Ua
as
Creator),
mhcddhd
(Pure
Consciousr
of
Jiveâyaorbhtda (the difEerence between the first two), avidya (nescience), (6) taccitoryogah (relation, though false, nescience with Pure Consciousness). Prakaâtmayati's.
is
analysis of ajnafia
consummate when he shows
that
it has-
not only the locus {asraya) in

(visaya)
in
Brahman.
is
Brahman but Brahman as the
also the object

object'
(visaya)
of ignorance
admitted in both the chief Schools of Advaita
viz., the Bhamati as well as the Vivarana, though divergence of opinion on the locus (asraya) of ignorance between them. The .Bhamati School does not recognise Brahman as the locus of ignorance, but regards Jiva as such.
Vedanta,
there
is
However, Prakasatmayati here shows clearly that there may be the charge of logical or metaphysical inconsistency in admitting that Brahman is the object {visaya) of ignorance.
The
that
opponents, as Naiyayikas, may urge against the Advaitins ignorance (ajnana) to have Brahman as its object (visaya) cannot but be unrevealed (anavabhasamana). There is, therefore, no logical consistency in the Advaitist position which tries to show that ajnana has as its object Brahman that is revealed while that ajnana is also revealed {avabhasamana). But if the opposite view is to be accepted, ajnana has to be regarded as unrevealed {anavabhasamana). The
Advaitists press forward their arguments and show that this revelation of ajnana does not conflict with the concept of
ajnana which as such
is
illusory
and hence depends only

;
on
its
illusory revelation
as
its
(pratibhasa)
is
hence ajnana, though

presented
to
it.
having
object
Brahman,
is
illusorily
Saksicaitanya
This is also borne out in the revelation of ajnana in such judgments as "I do not know the meaning of your word" {tvaduktamartham na janami) where the process of not-knowing is not unrevealed
:
and hence
revealed to
to the subjective consciousness.
Thus
the Advaitist position,
*'
Jiva
lio
visudahd
8ada.smuka'ma7iddai/ah
{Saiiisksepa-sdriTaka).
cit
tatha
'jliesayorhhidd avidya taccitoryogah
i20
as
brought out by Prakaâtmayati, tallies well with the revelation of ajnana to Saksicaitanya that is partless (?iiramsa) ; but of the Allto the bhoktr-caitanya where there is a limitation
pervading Consciousness, ajnana
is
not revealed as the false
creator of the plurality of the empirical processes from which Such revelation is possible only it {bhoktrcaiianya) is distinct.
to the Saksicaitanya which is self-revealed and as a result of relation wherewith all knowledge of duality and plurality is
revealed; thus the distinctness of

plexes
tent
is
it
from the mind-body com-
dependent on the self-revelation of Saksicaitanya, and hencd ajnana, though having it as its object, is not inconsisas
knowledge of duality and
being revealed as illusory, responsible for all false plurality. The bhokticaitanya, on
the other hand, is not the real vouchsafer of ajnana and hence not the object of it. This deep metaphysical signihcance is ably borne out by Prakaâtmayati.
This analysis of the logical consistency of the Advaitist

conception of the nature of Saksicaitanya, apart from bhoklrcaitanya, as not antagonising with the concept of ajnana as creating a veil upon Brahman that is its object in all kinds
of dual, illusory
knowledge
is
challenged by those
is
who
try to
establish that the empirical Self as the bhokia
not necessarily
processes, for
in consonance with the empirical falsity of

.the
its
processes might well be conceived of as sub-ordinated to
the former. *5^
The
logic of this School lies in

is
admitting that
as the Witness of the illusory empirical processes from which it is distinct, cannot be said to be such a Witness of the distinction of the empirical processes for they argue that this knowledge
;
the Saksicaitanya, which
regarded by the Advaitists
by a third knowledge. But their if the knowledge of distinction is indeterminate with regard to the dharmin and the dharmas before the third knowledge which shows their determination as such, then the knowledge of distinction could never arise at all for before the third knowledge, the knowledge of distinction is well-established even by the knowledge of the Self itself as 'I', the reason being that the knowledge of
of distinction
is
possible
argument
is
feeble inasmuch as
{Pancapadika,
" manusyo^ hamiti

P,
mithyaivaihatahhiniandt. nana
gauno'ymh
na mithyu
276),
Adhyasa
&
Pure
Self:
Advaitist Implications
121
ihe object itself can produce the knowledge of its distinction from other objects.'^ Prakaâtmayati refutes this position by
showing that the nature of hhoktrcaitanya as sub-ordinating the empirical processes and not necessarily falsely owning them, is not logically tenable. He advances many arguments by taking the cue from his predecessor, Padmapada, and
5hows that the view

is
of sub-ordination of the empirical processes

its
{gaunatva-paksa), inspite of
arguments to establish
its
cause,
defeated^by the admission of the view of the false appearance of those processes (rmthyatva-paksa). The opposite School (gaunavadin) argues that the empirical processes of the mind-body complex appear as related in the same substratum
(samanadhikaranyam) with the Self and this relation is the {samanadhikaranyam gaunavasub-ordination of bhasah Vivarana, P. 277), for the Self as distinction from this relation cannot exist. Even the scriptural and inferential proofs cannot be said to account for the falsity, and not subordination, of those processes, for, they say, that the false appearance of the pre-existent (jyestha) proof of perception cannot hold good here, even though there are cases like the empirical illusion of the perceptual appearance of two moons in place of one where the former perceptual proof is negated by the latter perception of one moon. The logical argument for holding this view is in the analysis of the negation (badha) by the latter proof for, accoding to this view, where no logirelation
cal analysis of such negation takes place as in the case of the
empirical appearance of two moons, there may easily be the negation of the former perceptual proof even by the latter
inferential proof which establishes the falsity of the former appearance (though this negation of the foimer appearance of perception is based on the latter perception of the substratum, yet there is an inferential process denying the appearance ol" something on some other thing which is due to adhydc>a) but in the present case, this School argues, where there is the necessity of logical determination of negation by the latter proQ|s (scriptural or inferential) of the former perceptual apperance, such latter proofs cannot be logically established For, if such latter proofs are to be logically as doing so established as negating former appearances based on the per;
"
'paduTthaj'flanameva bhedajfianamiVivajana, P. 276),
122
ceptual proof, then there will invariably arise the fallacy of
mutual dependence (anyonyasrayatva) because of the fact that the latter proofs, being established, will determine falsity, and
falsity
this
being determined will make their processes valid.^^ Thus School concludes that the empirical processes pertaining to the Self are sub-ordinate (gaum) to it and are not false (ml thy a). This School does not, therefore, admit the Self as
distinct
from these processes (which are

it
false)
nor
as undiffer-
entiated from them, but admits
which is designated by 'I' (ahankam) and having the mind-body complexes as sub-ordinated to it. This, therefore, ig. an echo of the bhedabheas the Self
davadin
who
Self
from the
does not regard the empirical processes as distinct nor as undifferentiated from it, but as the real
manifestations (of a subordinate nature) of the Self. Prakaâtmayati further examines the view of the gautâ-
way
vadin and shows that neither by way of implication nor by of experience can it be said that the Self is distinct from
for, if the empirical processes which are sub-ordinate to it by implication the Self as bhokta is said to be distinct from the mind-body complexes, yet that implication docs not come up in actual experience where the latter are seen to be superand the experience of imposed (adhyasta) on the former
;
distinction
can only establish the sub-ordination

latter
(gaunatva)
and not super-imposition (adhyastatva) of the

former.
upon the
meets the possible charge against super-imposition by showing that although the Self is revealed in full (visesma) without any part! being unrevealed, yeC adhyasa is possible on it, for it is possible for adhyasa to take place even in those places where there is the revelation of the object without any exterior elements being specially differenPrakaâtmayati
tiated
from
it
as unrevealed; thus it is
seen that the letter
'a',
having no specially unrevealed differentiation of itself from its lengthening or shortening which are the qualities of the sound
only,
is
made
to
imaginary
'"
qualities,
be the substratum of super-imposition of these and so, the Self, though having no speci'pravrttau
agamanumanayoh
pravrttiJi
{Paficapadika,
tanmithydtoam
tanmitltyatvc
tayoh
P.
278).
sai'padihhtamamvartane.na hddhahapratya^yobpadai aft a yuktito hddhyahadhahatd micetavya, na ca

P<i)asfarasrayatu'pQtddttya''thah^TaUvadi'pana,
tatra
datMtvam,
iahyate
niicetttm
P.
278).
Adhyasa
&
Pure
Self:
Advaiiist Implications
123
ally unrevealed diflEerentiadon of itself from anything outside it, becomes the substratum of those imaginary qualities adhering to the mind-body complexes. Hence Prakasatmayati concludes that adhyasa of these qualities upon the Self, though it is fully revealed, is possible due to those qualities being wrongly attri-
buted to the Self which is undifterentiated (here differentiation becomes really unrevealed) with the unconscious objects
mind-body complexes, the real seat of those qualities. of the opponents (gaunavadins) that the distinction of the Self from those unconscious objects is experienced and not merely implicated is also shown to be logically untenable
like the
The view
for,
if
such distinction
is
experienced, then the question of

to
the qualities being sub-ordinated to the Self as the distinct
knower does not require
well established in experience.

qualities
although the Self is logically {ahampratyaya), yet the question of sub-ordination in which the Self is distinct opens after seeing that the Self is known as the substratum of those qualities whence it is
inferred that this knowledge
be logically established, for it is. But the gaunavadm contends that proved as distinct from the Ego-
imposition.
is of sub-ordination and not superPrakasatmayati replies to this contention by show-
is not vouchsafed by the hence the logical method cannot in any way establish the distinction of Self from the Ego-qualities, but can only merge into the exposition of the real nature of the
ing that the knowledge of distinction

logical analysis;
Self.
are
Thus known
the gaunavadin's contention that

as distinct
those qualities^
ordinated, loses all

latter
from the Self to which they are submeaning to the adhyasavadm for, the
;
(the Advaitist)
is
not satisfied that the distinction of
those qualities has to be logically esablished in view of the fact

that those qualities are always super-imposed
on the
Self.
is
Hence
what the
only an indirect knowledge of distinction that is established by indirect proofs as inference, but it cannot on that account take away from his position that the real nature of the Self as the direct knowledge is only capable of vouchsafing to us the superimposed or false character of those distinct qualities. Hence even if those super-imposed objects are not indirectly known
for the Advaitist
as distinct
logical analysis can
do
from the
Self,
the Advaitist contention of adhyasa
is
not vitiated in any way.
The gaunavadm
tries to
know only
124
indirectly the distinction of those qualities

tries
from the
Self
and
to explain that their experience along with the Self is maintainable on the assumption that those objects are sub-
ordinated to the Self and hence they are in some way to be related with the Self. But he forgets the fundamental problem in such knowledge of relation that is due to a false superinjposition,
the Self.
and not Thus his
true sub-ordination, of those objects

analysis
upon
of the knowledge
of distinction
becomes an indirect weapon with which to crush the direct knowledge of false relation between the Self and chose qualities. The Advaitist position is clearly brought out by Prakaâtmayati who shows that it is the only consistent position to
explain the relation of the external objects and their qualities
with the Self that shines in its pure light, and no amount of logical analysis can dispel the false super-imposition of these upon it: it is only possible by the most direct knowledge of the Self that is Pure Consciousness upon which everything else is a chimera. But the Advaitist on that account does not totally divorce the utility of the logical proofs from his system, for he says that the indirect knowledge established
logically is also
a necessity for revealing, though indirectly,
the
The Advaitist contends that a case for adhyasa of those qualities upon the Sel^ because when the indirect knowledge establishing distinction
false
is
superimposition''^.
there
is
not sought
as such, the direct
knowledge of the
Self reveals
the super-imposition of those qualities

this
upon
it.
But when
contention
tries
who
the
to
sought to be challenged by the gaunavadm show that even in this explanation whcie
is
Advaitist
of
recognises
adhyasa,
to
is
there
is
sub-ordinatioii
{gaunatva)
replies
those
this
quaJities
the
Self,
PrakFisatmayati
for
that
contention
not
tenable;
to
ihc
sub-ordination of the qualities

'-=
is
antagonistic
the direct
vicarena'pi
nukamprabyayasya
ryatLnUdlmai lAai/afiamapachtam,
yauhlibajnannlabdhmtit,
cheti
'panliarati
ktntu
mriada
si-aru'pamabravtmyo'hampiatyai/ah,
lyatvelah atastasydnusandhdne yakta iti{Ynmona, P. 280)
purrai adad/iydâ
na
tmhyahhfdauiayabvamitt
llpatyahJiaiO'pntdt
kdbhrnah
jfidnasya
âi/na/ram
tarhi ahath mammi/aJi tairahaata tti. yuHayo y add' nvsandhjy ante taddyi pmoksati anndpaiobsatvamit,i{Ta1tvadl'pana, P. 280).
pu'iptak
tatodhayctuHiketi,
Jcirttvtii. ahJiedarisayatva vijJrasi'arWpamatravisayaU.amityaha sariad&ti tarJn ryatirt-
iankate
ttyasi/a
tatka-
>
Adhyasa
experience
decessor
letter
'a',
&
Pure
Self.
Self:
AdvaiList Impltcaitons
125
his
of
the
Prakaâtmayati
that
following
in
pre-
Padmapada shows
there
is
even
the
case
of
the
super-imposition of the qualities of shortening or lengthening on it, because even though the sound 'a'
is
known
to be distinct
ties
are not so known,
irom those qualities, the latter and hence we cannot explain the
qualishort-
ening or lengthening of the letter *a' but by a reference to the fact of super-imposition of those qualities upon the former. This knowledge of distinction that adheres to the letter *a' and not to its qualities, however, makes the knowledge of distinction to adhere to both the objects even though distinction is not primarily cognized in one.^^ Prakaâtmayati further examines probable charges against the adhyasavadtn and shows that his position is in no way incompatible. He shows that the direct experience of the Self even after the knowledge of distinction does not conflict with adhyasa^ nor does the logical analysis of the Self as distinct clash with adhyasa; for, either the direct experience or the logical analysis only shows the real nature of the Self and nothing more. But adhyasa as a positive fact is shown to exist in the Self, even though the direct experience or the logical analysis of it reveals it as a distinct Entity. This is a reply to the gaunavadm who tries to falsify adhyasa on the
ground
knowledge of the Self. But the by Padmapada. Prakaâtmayati and Akhandananda, shows us clearly that adhyasa is in no wise incompatible even in the distinct experience of the
of the
distinct
Advaitist position, as brought out
Self,
for
it
is
the
it.
nature of avidya
to
create
false
superin
imposition
on
Hence they conclude
that
even
the
direct experience of the Self, the
knowledge of distinction can-
not do anything more than establishing the object of such' experience, that is the Self, for it is the nature of the ancillary
means (such
not
to
is
as the
knowledge of distinction that
is
indirect)
over-step the limits of the original means, if latter
means
of the
tion,
is
Self,
not afEected by the former. Hence the direct experience being in no way affected by the knowledge of distinc-
revealed.
Even the
logical analysis of the Self as distinct
cannot clash with adhyasa^ for such analysis being indirect cannot
^^
akdrmya
vyatireke'pi
hrasvadcravyaUreTcddadhydsah
%ti
codayati
126
dispel direct adhyasa.
Adhydsa
it is
as a positive fact
has to be recog-
not in any way in conflict with the knowledge of distinction, for it is the creation of the enigmatic avidya'^\ it is only in conflict with the real Knowledge of the
nized in the
Self,
but
own light as one, undivided, and Knowledge can put a stop to all cognitions of duality -md plurality created on the unitary Self^. Thus Prakaâtmayati and Akhandananda, following Padmapada, refute clearly the view of the gaunavadm, and show that without the assumption of adhyasa upon the Self, there can be no consistent explanation of Pure Self, which is not only known as distinct but whose real Knowledge is in ihe inevitable conflict
Self that shines forth in its
that
with distinction (of the empirical processes). This is the fundamental issue in the Advaitisi conception which shows that such distinction in no way affects Pure Self, which shines
forth in
its
own
iLi.
light,
although he accepts the super-imposed

(hayoickatiad
P.
280).
nanvanubhava
anyatararyatinJce,
bhedasj/etaretara-
vyattreJcah siddhyaUtyahatanneti,
{Vioarana,
yavktikajMnemkarasya hrasvad vyahrttyahhi/wpagame adhyasanubhava iti kathamuktam^ na cor-akarad Jirasvasya vydnttipiatUyabMoad adAyasdnuhhaia ttyapt iankyam. akarasya hrasvad vyaviUipratltisambJiaiad
-4tyatTafiaakaraf,yeU
tvddekatra
P. 280)
'*
*****
prthakttajilajie
fibhaktvasya bJiedavyavahara-Larcmaanyatiapi tajpiunam syatiTattvadlpana,
"
ato
tistliitap'attbandhakrdanadyaiidyak'itQvi
mdrajalameraitatavidyakrtatvut [Pamapadila., P. 280). tathafiialiompratyayasya svatisayapratuthitasyaiia aatastadekapradehadipratisthitaivamapi, dutam dehadiinsayatvavi9odIn svavisayapraU!.ikatvam<jw.m,pratyayasya,'

abo
yuUya
krtam,
iisayavivecave'pi svavtsayopadarsanena tatproUsthaU amatram nadhikamodathiam s\ avisayajâtuthatvaflca dehadtsvahcmmamdbhimamna na virudhyata ityuktam (Pancapddikd, P. 281). nanupuramdtmahisayo'pi yuHiptdnasaniiidhdndt ryathiktavisayo'-
hanipratyayah
mnetydha
ato
yukiya vtsaiânvecane'piti
riaUîratyahmhhavatlti
jJldndntarasannidhdndt-pldnaThr-svovisayadadhikavisayam
bhdvah
gaunat-
{Vivarana, P 281). bhedabodhad adhydsasya nivrbiatvdt kathamadhydsatvam

vamiti
tato
diittyakalpam pratyd/taktft-Mi
">
taihdhitâsya
eso'rthahaham'
Watyayasya dehddipi atisbliatvamapi dntamiti mmbandhaJi. tarJd delta eva dtmd sydditi, tatrd/ior-svavisayeti, lyatinktMmapratiathasyetyarfhaJi. tarhyubkayam syaditi iai/rdha tadeketi. aptsaodo'vadharanartJio
drsta-
padenanvsajjatc.
de/iddiprattsthatve
heiumahaanddlti.
virodhiteti
ahamprati/aya-
mdtrasyddhijdsavirodhitve'pi sahakdnjanurodhdd purvamiti, sahakdnsamiidJidvapi 'aUni
âvkate \ianu
manusyah' ndtirekaradhttyani,
%tydkanetyaheU{Tattvadipana, P.
281).
Adhyasa
if
Pure
Self:
AdvaiUsi Implications
127
knowledge of distinction ol the empirical processes which are

revealed by
this
it
as such.
The gaunavadm
fails to
take note of
fundmental fact and just tries to establish that the Self which is affected by the knowledge of distinction of the mindbody complexes makes those sub-ordinated to it, but in that case the knowledge of the Self will ever continue with the sub-ordinated mind-body complexes, even though their distmction is known; for such distinction is indirectly known on logical analysis to exist in the Self which is not freed from such knowledge that only makes the distinct complexes as sub-ordinated to it. This position has been clearly brought out by Padmapada, and following him by Prakaâtmayati and
Akhandananda' ^
Prakasatmayati further sho^vs that even the knowledge of the as is sought to be established even by Advaitist, does not conflict with the direct knowledge of nonfor, he says that even this direct distinclion (in adhyasa) knowledge of non-distinction which is created falsely by
distinction
;
avidya
proofs
by the logical (yuktisahita) and testimony of the srutis. Thus the direct perception of adhyasa in which there is a false nondistinction of the Self with the mind-body complexes is very
established as false
of inference
may be
well negated by the logical analysis of the real nature of
it
which brooks of nothing outside of it from which it is to be abhmna (non-distinct). The knowledge of distinction in itself is illusory in the Pure Self and hence it is not logical to show that the non-dis'tinction (aikya) of it with those complexes which are the creation of avidya^ though directly perceived, is false, illusory; the knowledge of the Pure Self is the only real Knowledge. Thus Prakasatmayati shows that distinction, in the Advaitist position, can be accepted only tentatively, for ultimately that knowledge of distinction, which is accepted by the gaunavadms and hence in their opinion is in conflict with the aikya of the Self with the distinct empirical processes which are therefore sub-ordinate to it (with a real existence of their own), is not accepted by the Advaitist; for he shows that the real unity of the Self has nothing to do
"
tena na haddcidafpi 'manusyo' JiantUii pratyayo gaunah
(Pancapadiha,
128
Critique on the
Vivmana School
with the knowledge o distinction which persists so long as. there is adhyasa; in adhyasa there is only the logical necessity of distinction which makes the distinct unite falsely, but in the
ultimate knowledge o unity, such knowledge of distinction is also shown to be false. This is the real Advaitist position o
the knowledge of distinction as existent (only as a logical necessity in adhyasa) and it is tacitly hinted at by Padmapada
and Prakasatmayati.
From
is
this analysis
Padmapada and Prakasatmayati
try to
show that in Pure
Self there is the possibility of
adhyasa which
all
is
existence that the Pure Self in
the creation of false avidya, the veil of the real unity of its self-luminous character
otherwise there would be no possibility of any adhyasa upon such a Self tor the reason that distinctions of the empirical processes would be absent ultimately in it which shines forth in its self-luminous character without any part being unreveal-
But avidya makes it possible that it has non-revelation false) in its pure light, and hence distinct empirical processes are falsely super-imposed on it, though, actually to admit any distinct process outside it is speaking,
ed.
(though
to go against the reality of the Self as the negation of all distinctions.

It
follows,
therefore,
that
as
Pure
of
Self
may
thus
become the substratum of adhyasa

of
the necessary corollary

all
the existence of avidya,
the ctealrice
distinctions.
Thus adhyasa
hhasah
;
of the empirical existence does not go against

it
the definition of
for here the
by Bhasyakara Sankaracarya paralra puiavaPure Self becomes the substratum {para:
lra) of adhyasa of empirical existence {poravahhusah)^'^ Prakasatmayati shows that the three-fold factor necessary for adhyasa,
viz.,
the substratum {adhisihana), defective auxiliary condition
an auxiliary condition {sams' adhyasa upon Self: for, it has been established that Self becomes under the influence of avidya the substratum, avidya is the karanadoâ (the defective auxiliary
{dosa)
and the
persistence of such
kard), are all present in this
" Brahmaimaikabvasy&'pi tatsi/orupasifdnavahhaaanmh purvahcSakofdraAitaprakdsdcchaditamonimiUam irvtitadaj tli^paUiBomarpitani, tantiirnUMhan/carddhyaaaScU samhMvyate {PafLca'pddtkd, Pp. 282-283). svayampmkMatvepyavtdyaT/d' grliyamandviiesatvdd atmam'dhi^fJidnayogyatvalcathanena par&vabhdsaJy 'foratra iti laJeâ^drhao darhtah
{Vtvarana, P. 282).
Adhyasa
condiLion)
if
Puie
Self: Advaiiisi Implications
129
evident
tries
and the persistence (samskara) of

Pure
Self there
it is also
from
its
eternality {anadiivat).
Thus Prakaâtmayati
arc
all
to
establish that in
the
possibilities
of
adhyasa of the empirical existence and hence it does not go against the definition enunciated by ânkara. Padmapada also brings out these possibilities being present in such adhyasa, for he shows that Pure Self is the substratum
(taisvariipasyafiavabhasanam), that there
sistence of
is
the defect of
is
amdya
{pmkasacchadiLamonimitLam) and that there
the eternal per-
it whence it also follows that adiiyasa is with regard to the previously cognised object (pu7-vadrsia) that resembles a
This previous cognition (purprojective potency {viksepasakti) present in avidya which not only eternally veils Self, but eternally projects objects (which are therefore pre-cognised)
vadrstatva), however, indicates the
memory-image (smrii-rupay^.
upon
it.
Prakasatmayati
following
is
Padmapada
also
shows
the possibility of a unitary knowledge of the super-imposed and the substratum, although the substratum (Self) is strictly speaking not an object like the
that in such adhyasa there
substratum of ordinary illusions, as the rope (in the illusion of snake on it). It is quite -possible to make it a substratum on the ground that something is possible to be super-imposed on it, and hence such knowledge of the substratum (Self) is
possible and possible as born (janya) and not eternal or nitya due to its adhyasa with the empirical processes. Thus though Pure Self is eLernally known, it becomes the substratum of
adhyasa as the substratum of a knowledge born out of its false associations with such processes. Hence it is quite possible tO' admit adhyasa on it following the definition laid down by
ânkara''^.
bility of the
is
the question remains as to the psychological possiPure Self being the substratum of adhyasa, for it seen that the substratum and the super-imposed (in adhyasa)
Still
arc the objects of the same process of knowledge (as 'this is silver') where the same means of perception play their r61e.
But
''*
in the esse of the Pure Self

a7uiditmcca purvadrstai
I
it is
quite outside the ken of
am
s7iirfi>Crpatianra
^*
visktavisayo'paraLtdkaicTia 'janyate
{Pafieajjndiku, [Vi}aiana, P. 283)
283).
Atmano'oisayati
e'î aropi/asp/nna)u74
mnjajMnabJiavavadadlmthanatiam
{Tattvadipana,
P.
283)

230
its possibility
any means of perception and hence the difticuUy arises as to of being the substratum. This question is elaborately discussed by Padmapada and Prakaâtmayati who
Their
Pure Self ca?i be the substratum of illusion. arguments centre round the nature o the Pure Self in illusion and stop at the point of establishing its possibility of being an object of the means of perception and
establish that
hence a substratum. The objectors to the Advaitist definition of adhyasa point out that the Pure Sell being alwa)-.*. a non-object (avisaya) of any means of knowledge cannot, logically and psychologically,
be the substratum
of
is
illusion.
vijnana or the Vedantic susupti

objectivity of
not, as the Vedantist
The Buddhist may
though there is no knowledge in either; lor the opponents will argue 4:hat both vijnana and susupti can be the substrate of illusions in the former case like illusion of the objective world and in the latter case like the illusory potency (adhyasa-samika) a) ol ihc -cosmic world though there is no katman at that time and lientc
reply with equal force, substratum of illusion,
no
particularised
illusion,
because in these states the super-
in the same process ol Akhandananda in his Taltvadipana brings out this fact clearly and thus suggests that in Advaita Vedanta there is no finality of the stage of su.supli due to its absence of
states
imposed and the

knowledge.
are revealed
kmmans {kanmaivabhava)
stage of nil illusions, for
as being although it
is
regarded tJic admitted b>
groui'dlcss
this >\stcni
\hnl this stage of

all
is
akhi lo the realization

Jt
ol the Fiivc Self as beielt

it
modihcations, yet
has the potcnc) of avnlya hidden in

thus
clear that even the
and hence can be the
()!>ject ol
,
the same process ol knowledge

it
-with the avidya-sani\ha)a
is
Is
Puic
Self as present in the susupli-sVdgc
not completely out.sidc any
piocess of knowledge
objects
as
being
purely
unniodihed
by other
quite possible to be the object (uisaya) of knowledge in the same process with the avidya-mmskTna Sijuilar is
is
but
also the case of the Buddhist vijnana which is not outside ihc process of any knowledge as the ground (ad/nsfhana) of illusion but can be the object (visaya) of the same kind of knowledge with the external impositions like momcntaiiness
(kmnikalva).^^
ttisat/e'jn
iuvu'eilanc
kmmkatcmhjdrojm dnta
ifi/aânk)/a
dntti ito'~
Adhyaia
& Pme
Self:
Advaitisl Implications
131
Ihc
iox the
VI say in
difficultieb ot the Advaidst still remain to be answered, opponents argue that the Pure Self cannot be both the
(the Selt as such)

It
and the
visaya (the external illusory
impositions).
goes
against
the
fundamental
grammatical
{visayin-
conception to assert an object as both

Seli)
the subject
answer this charge, J^rakasatmayati ably replies Irom the Advaitist point of view to sliow that Pu)-e Scli as such being not the ground of the impositions oi the visayas is made to be reflected {piaiibimbiia) on the transparent auLahkaiana by the force of avidya, and hence becomes the ground of the illusory super-niipositions of
{visaya=i\ot-S&\i).
and the object
To
the qualities adhering to
it
as the object of the
knowledge of
is not taken as splitting up its own intrinsic partless {nmajhsa) jiature for the purpose of the knowledge ot the superimposed vnayas, but is the reflected object on the aniahkarana \vith
aham
\o be
(aharhpi alyaya
knowledge
of
'I');
thus Pure Self
\*hich
it
gets contact for the

all
ground ot
illusions.
it
cent substance, makes
purpose of its being known as the the aalahkaônaj the translupossible tor the Pure Selt to be really
Hence
known
hence
as
is
the
ground
ol
the impositions of the visayas
and
no
pos-
the ical initiator of the whole process of illusions;

if
otherwise,
the Pure Self Avere not even reflected on
it,
process of illusion
sible.
on the Pure
Selt
would have ever been

the
This
selt-identihcation
with
antahkaiana,
Selt,
jnirror ot reflection, so to say, of the
Pure
the
is
the leal
basis, background and businessman of all kinds of illusions upon the Pure Self. Prakasatmayati analvses the nature of adhyasa on Pure Self which by its reflection on the
finiahkarana
appears
in
two-fold
;
character
it
which
is
the essential requisite of impositions
for,
is
seen that the
knowledge of both the superimposed and the substratum is revealed in an act of super-imposition. In the case of the imposition of the external objects and their qualities on the Self
(that
is
reflected
on
anlahkaratia), there
is
this two-fold revela-
tion, for, as
iiwijn at
I
Padmapada and Prakasatmayati

ill
clearly bring out, in

fl-antenausayo
futui
ntti
pamw
rodaifufAfiafilfi
yruftiimatiamotniano'hhyuiKigalam athamadhi'ithnnatrain ttynsafilcya aha Imreti.

iiduld
suiiipfii
I'aimattdbliaie
adlii.^f!i/fn(aopi/ai/o}fil'a-
hiiddlinphinane
,',[if)
I
safi
kmmatt
nujf aniapraj/ojoJcannfynrfJiaJt
{Taffi adlpana,
dhh/ii tlpaiudJienadht/a-âhhai rimcpalahdlLeh
Pp
292 301)
1^2
this
say,
A CnUque on
act
the
Vivamna School
Sclt
ot
super-impositioii,
the
gets
idcmilied, so to
with the anLahkarana that reflects its conscioubiicss and hence appears as both the Sell and the a?ilal,ikataiia, whicli, like a ball o iron being designated as burnuig (when the quality of burning really adheres to lire which rests on the
red-hot iron-ball) makes it possible or the Sell to partake ot Thus the Pure Sell as the ground ot adhyasa its character. does not conflict with partaking oi the qualities of the
itntahkmana which in
its
turn
reflects
its
consciousness
its
and
makes possible for
itself to
make
the Self appear in
two-fold
character. The Self thus becomes the ground of adhyasa which is only the imposition on itselt of the ajUaf.ikamV'd and its qualities whence it follows that it (the Self) should appear as the real Witness ot the changing states ot the anLahkarana and also as the anialika)aua quaiidcd b> is those qualities. In this process ot imposition which being reflected initiated by the anlahkarana, Pure Self on the aniahkarana appears as both the detached Witness and the attached Ego. This is the true interpretation of the nature of adhyasa on Pure" Self, as amply borne out b>
Padmapada and Prakasatmayati. Unless this fact ot the primary indispensability of the aniahkarana as the initiator of all the paraphernalia of adhyasa on the Self is recognised, Self as. Pure Self becomes eternally detached and ne\er comes within
Henceforth follows an unending process, adhyasa like that of the bod) (sa)l) adhyasa), the senses (mdny adhyasa) and the like. In the adhyasa of the body -processes on the Self, we have a deep-strung imposition resting on the
the orbit of adhyam.
of
aniahkarana on which the Self is reflected and on the induyas. through which the impositions of the organs are iirst made for making the body-processes really known as superimposed on the Prakasatmayati further shows that even the anfaljikaraija Self. may be the conscious seat of adhyasa by the reflection of the Self upon it, and hence the Ego-consciousness (ahamka)a)r tl>ough belonging to the category of the not-Self (idam), is. said to be the seat of the conscious slates in adhyasa. The ledhot iron-ball becomes the seat of the quality of fire (i.e., burning), but fire has this quality independently of the iron-ball the iron-ball only partakes of the quality of fire, though it has not that quality by itself. But the Conscious Self is always>
Adhyasa
reflected
6^
Pure
Self: Advaitist Implications
133
on the antahkamna for Ego-consciousness {ahamkam) and wherever any imposition on the Self takes place, the Egoconsciousness becomes the primary means for that thus the
;
Ego-consciousness becomes the seat of all conscious states in adhyasa and does not appear as mixed with the quality of the not-Self (idam) but rather as the conscious basis of all adhyasa.^^
'^^
ea
ai/o
da/iatUi
(kiffMjtiai ihstasydynetaj/asasca
dtabupydvabliasaiad
cdify&ca
'a/iniitiipulah/ip''
tiyiipalabdhiti ai isisl atmano' ntahl'm anasya

asdd/itli ana-k) ti/ojiJa)
ilram'ipijdi
abhdsah
al'tamntmddid) w yameta
âsU a-
/uitiuniisfamai ah/tdsaCa iti bkniah diiM-hi-premdspadaiupem parindmitaddgamdpdi/adrashu'tppndliamkduH isayddist amttsi/utacaitatij/a> fiperta, aliamiti
ca, su) lalokusaksdam diaiiru.2}yamitydha sarvaloka* * * * ayo da/iatUydddi ayaJi-pindadivat al'Oitrtvepi ilarLunahnyd&rayalcotinihshptatayffliaml'diasydiahhdsalh samhhaoatiU pun a-
ri/nnttaulpe7ifi
iti
t.nlsiko
-^
idduiain siddhdntl rodayati

iiiatramilyutturena
kafhannti
ai/alipindacyaljreJtena hahnerdahana-
A'lii/dsiayaii at ada/iathluiavyafupkcndtinioii
ffianihena
pratipudayati
jndnahnyddai sandt ahama efdt{Vnarana, Pp 302-303).
CHAPTERVI.
AN EXAMINATION INTO THE NATURE OF TI-IE SELFITS OWN STATUS VIS-A-VIS THE OBJECl^ k AN ADVAITIST INQUIRY INTO CONSCIOUSNESS DIFFERENT THEORIES.
:
Prakaâtmayati then takes up the pen to refute with

force the opposite viewpoints
all
In doing brings out so, he closely follows his the full logical development of these views culminating in the Advaitist position. He shows the Saiikhya viewpoint which
infers the Self as existing as
on the Self {Aiman). predecessor, Padmpada, and
an
entity because
it
ii>
rcdcclcd
on
This iDlciencc is based on the universal concomitance of the reflected and the subsThe Sankhya-view about leflcction ot tratum ot reflection. ihe Self is that it is reflected through the anlahkamnaviJLi on the anlahkarana and is, therefore, known to exist as the lellccthe antahkarana that
is
unconscious.
ted entity
is
But, according to the Sankhya-vicw, the Self whicii

is
pure consciousness
first
reflected
on the buddln or
of
intellect,,
the
unconsciou.>
product
Pnakrn.
therelore,
PrakasaLma}aLi's
analysis
of
the
Saokhya-infercnce,
defect.
seems to suftcr
Sell
from a technical
unconscious
The
reflection
of the
on
is
'ilic
bucldhi
which according
to
the
Sankhâ-thcor)
acted
seems to be responsible for the sensing of the object
makes ihe knowledge which is indeterminate a determinate one, and Imalh, ilic ahaiikara or the Ego (which is a .separate principle in tht
upon by
the manas or the
mind
w^hich
Sankhya-view being the second unconscious product of PkiJiiIi) makes thai knowledge a thing inducing the Sell to act diileiently as the oxvner of the knowledge-process. Thus the Saukh>aepistemology gives us an analysis of knowledge when- the buddhi, the first unconscious product, being i tiansparcut
entity reflects the consciousness that the Self
ti's
is.
PiakaCumaui
presentation of the Sankhya-inlcrencc
is,
therefore, a broad
and somewhat loose one because of the fact that he speaks ot the anl.ahka}ana as the reflector of the light ot the Self. In the Sankhya-view, the anlahkarana is a generic leriri includ-
Advaiui Inquity nilo Different Theonei on Self
135
viz.,
ing the three functional entities ni the knowledge-bituatian, the huddhi (intellect), the manas (mind-which again is a
i.e.,
Thus while anlahkarana, is responsible for originating knowledge through various channels Prakasatmayati takes
by-product of ahanka)a) and the ahanka)a (Ego).
the generic entity,
to prove, thotigh loosely, that the Consciousness that is the naluie of the Sell according to the Sankh) a-view is reflected on 'this generic entity, though buddhi, one of the aspects of the
it
antahkaiana,
i%
the reflector of
it.
Howc\er, Piakasiitmayati
seems to suggest the Advaitist view which accepts the antahkaiana as a specific term almost equivalent to the manas (mind)
^\hich reflects
the light
of
the
Self.
Thus
this
anal) sis
of
Prakasatmayati seems to
sufi:cr
and
is
not antagonistic to
from the Ad\aitist predilection the general Sahkhya epistemological
standpoint which accepts a reflection of the Consciousness (nature of the Self) upon an unconscious entity. The second target of criticism is the Nyaya-Vaisesika \iew
\vhich also infers that the Self
is
the seat of qualities
{giuitas)^
such
as,
desire (iccha), hatred (dvesa), pleasure (mkha), pain

etc.
(duhkha), knowledge (jnana)

the Self (Alman)
is
The
Nyaya-Vaisesika theor\ of
that
it
apposite (yogya) qualities
some specific (visesa) and {gunas) which inhere in it and in

possesses
no
lities
is
other
object {dâvya). Thus they infer these quaincluding jhana (knowledge) on the Self which therefore
an
object
it.
(dtavya)
having
that
specific
quality
inher-
ing in
Prakasatmayati, therefore, gives us the syllogistic

these qualities on the shows that these qualities like knowledge, desire etc.-
form of inference about the inherence of

Self.
He
being specific qualities (viiesagimas) are
known
b} single sense-
organs (ekendriyag)ahya) but these being absent in the five mahabhillas (gross physical elements) must inhere in one of the
remaining four
objects
is
{dravyas)
(the
number
of
dravyas,
according to them,
hcda (time)
nine).
But
this inference will
out of the remaining four objects, three
show that
^\-iz..
dik (direction),
and manas (mind) have no specific qualities for in them only generic qualities inhere. Hence he concludes that the
ninth object,
i.e
,
Alman
(Self) is
the seat of these specific quali-
(drstanfa) gi\en h\ Prakasatmayati in establishing this inference is the case of smell (gandha) which being a specific quality of the element
etc
ties like desire,
knowledge
The example
13b
of earth (ksHt)
A Cnlique
on Lhe Vivamna School
is negatively shown to be excluded Iroin the probans (heiu) of the inference (syllogism) where "not inhering thus gandha in the remaining eight objects" is an aspect being a specific quality of ksili is not included in the probanswing (it inhering in one object i.e., ksti) and therefore cannot
;
be included in the probandum-wing

other than the Aiman).
as
(it
inhering in an object
a vyaiireki
Thus
this
is
anwnana
sought to be established by Prakaâtmayati'^^. Here the example {drpmila) is a negative one owing to the absence of
any other positive case of concomitance. But this example given by Prakaâtmayati should not be taken to refer only to gandha, but to other specific qualities like lasa (of water), rupa (of light) etc., which inhere specifically in those elements,
hhutas or elements (bhutacalusfaya). This gap seems to be bridged over by Akhandananda in his Talivadipana wherein the example is gi\cn as gandhadi ^(yalha gandhadi Talivadipana, P. .S04).
for
refers to four
he
logical
PrakasatmD\ati\s
next
analysis
is
with
regard
to
the
analysing the logical syllogism to

Self
It IS interesting to read side by side PrakaSatmayati's manner o bung out the Naiyayika-theory of the and Citsukha's (along with that ot his commentator, Pratyagrupa). The latter's mdebteduess to Prakasa.tmaj'ati's way of analysmg wiJl bo
"-
conspicuous.
Ci
N atjiydijiLa-V aisailcdbca icchddaijo

bhutacaivstaê,
fjutiah,
pijlni i/uilniiahdbhftlat'Lendriyaginhi/atai/''/
drai yacyatinLtasyaiva
vikesagunatidt
gunahlnatvdL
rihsagundh test adi static adistayandhmal,

dranjani
safi
diukidamanarnvh
nirm-
faniesddicchddigvnavat
onyadet dfj/ictiu/nuiumate
(Vitmana, Pp. 305-304)

icr/iddhidmastadi a
>
i/ai
yatniLtad}at ydsntdi
12)
am
N ai ijdi/ilddnija' pi
so-
'dhayeyuhiC'ttsulha,
gaiulhaiadityddina
aciddiritah
tathdhi icclbddayo gunah amti/ufre. sah (fôuiddd t/a< dl^ntimpi at yaksul rut gunatie sthite, nanatu'niaiojdttmattayd inyatatliUdraiyahyavacchcdakatayd hiicsagunati e ca sidd/ir sati, in had ayah
I'i
gunaii ddiupai adttt

siddhe,
iia
admaityalo
dintdinnitdnptidnitdfidrife,
Aaimimscidairaye
sati
fdrat
f^parâradnicsaguâ/i,
salt
piafyalcHafre
i
akdranagunofuivakatiat,
Jidpj/dkdiaitsesagundh
ptatynl-satrc
aydi add/ai i/uhhdnt dd

iidpi
vd
hahyendnyapratyal'Mtidt,
dtlkdlastddhdi/dih
inauwsdih
ict
riiesagmatcdddyddind'stadiarydhayatcdiuipopattait
fiddai/o'sfadraiyaryatinl'tadrai j/diraydh,
tcsi a}}upapadi/(ntidiu'i*if
ifi
ffiinatrdd,
yannairam tannaitam yathn qondhddl

[N.B.
Lei afaryatiirlu'noh a
sidd/ii/iiNnyanajjrasadtnl'Pp. 12-13)
OiUulM
{Taftrnpiadlpilcd)
& Nuymapio'^ddini
published from Nirnaya Sagar Press].
Advaiia Inqut7y into Different Theonei on Self
137
âutrantika School of the Buddhists which tries to establish tie Prakasatinferability {anumeyaiva) of the external objects. mayati following Padmapada hrst gives us an idea of the
opposite viewpoints which make either the Self or the external objects as being known to exist by some sort of an intellectual analysis. His method is to refute all such views to estab-
own, i.e., Advaitist view, which is very significantly by his predecessor, Padmapada, in the cryptic sentence (Pancapaviz., piamatr-prameya-pramiiayastavadaparoksah dika, P. 304). This sentence is the fountain of all the refutations which Prakaâtmayati poses to perform, for all the opponents' viewpoints are based either on the inferability -cf one or the other of the three factors mentioned by Padmalish
his
stressed
pada (pramair, prameya and pramiti).

is
perfectly within the limits of logic
Thus Prakaâtmayati when he digresses from
the opponents' viewpoints on the Sell (as the Sankhya and the Nyaya-Vaisesika viewpoints) into the Buddhist view-points on
Ihe external objects.
His business
is
to establish the Advaitist
theory that in an act of knowledge the Self is the direct and immediate sine qua non, i.e.. Consciousness, which, therefore,
explains the directness of the means of knowledge (pramiti) but ihe external object is revealed diiedly as the object ojc
Consciousness
us
to
Thus
the Advaitist position of knowledge refers

of"*
the directness
the ground
of
all
Consciousness,
which
is
being
diversified
into
knowledge, i.e the pramatr^

different kinds
prameya and pramiti

of directness.
all directly
directly
known but by
and
its
The
subject, object
result of
knowledge are
are
all
revealed for the fact that the ground-Consciousness

e\er-revealed
Reality,
being
directly
the
diversihcations
without being dependent on any indirect method of knowing. This is the true significance of the Advaiitist interpretation of the direct revelation of the pramalr^
revealed
prameya and pramiti which is hinted at by Padmapada. Without such direct and independent revelation of these three which
are Consciousness circumscribed, the Advaitist cannot establish
which recognises only the directness of Consciousany intervening method to establish that directness; the only conditions for such directness to be established are the different limitations of the ground-Consciousness which are known as the subject, object and result of knowledge, though
his position
ness without
138
Critique on the Vivamîa School
essentially directly revealed

is
in
no way
veiled
it
whenever the ground-Consciousness, by any ignorance. In the matter ot the

said that
it is
external object,
as the object
may be
related to the subject

it
whenever the subject comes in contact with
through the mediator called the aiUalikai ana. Now this. antahkarana going through its vrtiis makes the object revealed, and thus the former two {antahkarana %c vrtLi) being directly revealed by the ground-Consciousness, the latter becomes revealed by the light of that self-same Consciousness. In this context we quote below some significant lines from Dr. D. M.
Datta's
The
Six
Ways
of
Knowing:
"Whatever be
this
theory
of the Jiva or the individual Self, every Vedantin holds that

light of Consciousness
knowledge there is present the self-shining transcendent which imparts to the object its character of immediacy. Consciousness in this aspect is called the Saksi
all
or the witness.
It is so called
because
it
is
conceived as the
no part in the ever-changing process of knowledge, but only lights it up or passively witnesses it. However individualized, finite, and determinate the sell or
consciousness
impartial* spectator which takes
may appear
to be,
it
retains yet this aspect oi
transcendence.
In consequence of
this
unanimous
assertion of
the existence of the witnessing light of consciousness, we also discover a common point of agreement among the different views as to the function of the antahkaiana, in perception.
For the three different views referred to abo\e, naincl> the and avaranabhibhava, are found when analysed to contain the common element that perception takes place only when the object is brought into
theories of abhcdabhivyakii, ciduparaga
connection with the
self
or the witnessing consciousness, eithei
by the revelation of an identity between the two through a removal of the differentiating factors or by the tinging of the
self with the form of the object, or by the removal oi the veil of ignorance that hangs between the self and the objc< l. The nature of the relation that is established between the witnessing consciousness or the self, as the passive observer (saksi), and
is admitted by all to be one of adh>asa. erroneous identification of the one witli the other." However, Prakaâtmayati has from this Advaitist standpoint brought out the status of the external object in its known
the object perceived
I.e.,
state as revealed,
and has given us a
logical presentation
ot
Advaita Inquuy inio Diffeteni Theories on Self
IJ^y
Lhe Buddhist theories oi the Sautrantikas and the Vogucaras. In doing so, he has Liied to show that the two Buddhist Schools have, by very subtle reasoning, established that the external object IS known to be present only indirectl} in knowledgt
either entity
as a
purel)
interred
w-a)
entit)
or as a purel)^
revealed.
subjecli\c
not in
am
tried
is
disLinctiv
iheories ha\e
to
give
an
analysis oi
These Buddhist knowledge where

account
external
object
ot
revealed
not
on
its
own
but
an inferable oi subjective entity that is revealed as a contingent factor in knowledge. The Advaitist can accept such a view of the contmgenc} of the object in knowledge for the fact that it is revealed when
its
on account
indirect establishment as
relation with it, even the ground-Consciousness is brought Hence the object is revealed only through some mediation ot the aniahkarana but not as an indirect contingent factor, because it is revealed unmistakablv under the superintendence ol the grotmd-Consciousness b> its mediated relation with it,
hence the Buddhist theories stand condemned before the court of the Advaita epistcmologv which is based on no ambiguous or half-hearted admission of the revelation of the object in iis direct apprehension. The Sautrantikd theoi} admits that the object is only an The logic of the Scfiooi inferable cntit)' and nothing else. springs from the admission that the object is only known by its reflection on the subjective consciousness {samvedana) on
which
it is
imprinted, so to say, whence

is
it
follows that such a
due to some reflected entitv which The example of the reflection of the is the inferred object. face on the mirror or ot red tinge on the crystal-stone explains that the object is to be inferred from its existence (by reflection) on a substratum on which it ought not normally to be present.
leflection (of the object)
Thus
that
it
the object becomes only a secondary entity in the sense is to be inferred, like the face, by its reflection on the
subjective consciousness
on which
it
ought not normall) to
appear.
Thus
the Sautrantika lays stress
on the
object as
it is
knowledge from its impress on the subjetive consciousness which is purely the entity per se without any normal tinge of the object that is only accidentall) revealed as an inferred existent after the flash of that consciousness. Thus the object according to the Sautrantika turns out to be
inferred to be revelaled
i40
A Cniique on
the Vivayana School

there
always an interred eniity in ihc knowlcdge-piocess
is
dueci apprehension in such a process. Frakaiatjnayati criticises this view of the Sau'ti-antikas by showing that the inferred object to be apprehended ni the inferential process in knowledge should at least be recognised as a dueci appiefor
its
no place
hemion without which no knowledge would be

logic of the criticism lies
possible.
The
in the fact
that the object to be
inferred by knowledge
may have no independent esse but cannot on that account be said to be not directly apprehended as a matter of fact, the directness of the apprehension of the object is too hard to deny when the object is the object of an immediate cognition which, on the admission of the Sautrantika,
is
impressed with
the
its
tinge.
Thus even though we know an

on the
is
object existing dependently
reflected tinge
it
impresses
upon
subjective
consciousness
{akararpaka
cognition,
visaya)
on
which normally no such tinge

object be the object of
directly without
present, yet
my
;
direct
when such an it must come
entity into
directly into
my my
any further dependence on another reflected cognition otherwise, the object not coming
cognition for
its
necessity of
dependence on
a further reflected entity, the inferential proof to establish the inferable character ol the object from its reflection will
stand self-condemned. Hence Prakasatmayati holds that the Sautrantika should recognise that the objea should be directly
apprehended
as
the reflected
entity
(whose existence
is,
no
doubt, established inferentially) in an act of direct cognition. This concession being made by the Sautrantika will land him
into the
dilemma
as to
why
in cognition as perception
the object is not directly revealed without necessity of its inierability.
Thus the Sautrantika

of
position comes to end in the recognition
the direct apprehension of the object even without any

process to establish
its
inferential
existence,
thus leading to
the threshold of the possibility of the revelation of the object

-directly
in
direct
apprehension.
The
inferential
if
proof
to
establish
the
existence of
the object,
carried
extreme of further inferential justification for its heing dependent on a further reflected entity), will antagonise itself with the knowing of the object directly at any time. l his point is brought out by Visnubhattopadhyaya in his
on to the knowing (as
Advaita Inqiuiy into Dzffere?it Theories on Self
141
Rjuvivarana in interpreting the criticism of the Sautrantika theory by his predecessor, Prakasatmayati^''. Prakaâtmayati refutes with equal zeal the Vijnanavadin's. or Yogacara's theory of external object which is regarded as the
objective projection of the subjective consciousness (vijnana)
is
and
revealed not
on
its
own
merit but on the merit of the subjective
consciousness with which its existence is identified. Thus the Yogacara position does not recognise any objectivity in the knowledge-process bui only the revelation of the subjective consciousness as the objective consciousness, though, in fact, vijnana
is
the
only Reality that
is
revealed in any knowledge-process.
The
Yogacara theory, therefore, gives scanty or very askance look at the revelation of the external object which being projected out of the alayavijnana or subjective consciousness is only tinged with. the objective hue (pravrttzvijnana) and therefore is not in any way to be known directly except being revealed by virtue of its identity with consciousness. This extreme form of Idealism denying the status quo of the object in knowledge is seriously challenged by Prakasatmayati. He shows that the external object is known directly as the object of knowledge
and is therefore an object of direct revelation (tdatn The Yogacara conpasyamityanubhavat Vivarana, P. 305). tention that though the object is identical with consciousness
{vijnana), its externality (bahistvam)
is
distinctly perceived,
and
is
therelore in an act of error, the negating knowledge (badha-
jnana) refers to only the negation of this externality that

presented outside and not of the internality of the object.
contention
is
severely criticised
is
that not only the externality
This by Prakasatmayati who shows perceived as distinct from the
'*'
SaiitianfiAaiya/ti
yadi
isai/dtutrndnajfldnc.
sdlsudiisayu
eiaiabJta-
spran,
t
prali/aJcsep-i/avahlid^foifuM.
lastaiidjjurddhah
Jietuh
iia
ceil
isai/asi/andi ablidsaudd
anehdnfo
ityammdnajvdrK anumdnajMneiyi limbfi-
hhutai laaydvahhdsah
jtrat%]1ld)idrfhasyn
bimhapmassaratiasydpratibhdsattdd
ammdndnudaya
sydt
a-parolsm yai ahdrayogyai isaydi abhdsai irvddham

304-305).
cdnvmdnamitt{Vumaria, Pp.
ammwDdnvdayu
tyuktam.
tfyanena
sad/u/opiafUan
qâlcsadharmatiddapiailtai-
im bimbabMlavisaydvabhdso'styeia, vanv- anioudnajfidne bimbapurasmrapiatibimbaUena cdnmldntihatd; tasydpyavydpeksdyah Pp. ii arana, tvdditA/dsanfeya dilsa7idntaramdha-^paroksavyavah3reti{Rjm
304-305).
J42
internal consciousness, but also the object itself which is sought to be established as identical with internal consciousness by the
Yogacara is perceived distinctly as exter?ial {bahisthasyapi Even if the Yogaajataderaparoksyai Vivarana, P. 305).
'i
cara to save his solipsistic position regards the externality as idential with consciousness, then even that externality will
have to be sacrificed in the situation of a negating knowledge where he regards this externality alone as being negated, for here the externality being internalised will remain un-negated like the internalised object. Hence the Yogacara being impelled on the horns of the dilemma must needs recognise the direct apprehension of an external object as object of knowledge and never as the identically internalised entity with Thus Prakaâtmayati concludes from the -consciousness. Advaitist point of view that the object is revealed as the adjunct (upadhi in knowledge) of an act of direct apprehension without any further mediate processes. Thus the object immediacy is revealed whenever its becomes directly unchallenged by any other thought-process. It is a necessary adjunct in direct revelation of knowledge and hence becomes {tasmadavyavadhaan object of such direct revelation nena samvidupadhita visayasya Vivarana, P. 305). Akhandananda in his TaLtvadipana says that the sense-organ like the cê being mediate in the direct apprehension of an object is thus the mediate not itsell an object of direct apprehension processes being not depended upon, the object is directly revealed. But even the Advaitist has recognised the modifications (vrtiis) of the antahkaraiia in direct apprehension of an object which has to be brought into contact with the sell -shining Witnessing-Consciousness and hence there is some recognition of the mediate process of the villi ; how then to justify this position of
Prakasatmayati
rtLulty
Akhndananda has
tried to resolve the
diffi-
by saying that the consciousness of which the object is an adjunct in direct apprehension is necessarily channelled through the necessary modifications of the mind when it goes out through the senses to the object thus the general Advaitist position being recognised, the mediacy in the direct apprehension of an object is resolved to this necessary and logical
;
ouJict
of the Consciousness in which

;
revealed
the object is directly otherwise in other cases of knowledge such as infer-

Advaila Inqmyy into Different Theories on Self
<ence,
143
the
object
becomes
kuoAvii
through
other
mediate
processes like pat a ma) sa or resemblance of the establishment
of a univcisal concomitance
probandum) on the
object to be interred and hence
(between the probans and the is not
directly apprehended**^.
Prakasatmayati examines critically the vie^vs ol the opponents

v'u
,
Prabhakaras
the Nai-yayikas, Varttikakara, the Bhattas

as to the nature ol the Self
and
the
and shows
that in all
these theories the Self becomes unexplained as the locus of
knowledge which
it.
is
sought to be established ex hypoLhesi in
In
all
these theories the Self becomes the substratum of
knowledge which somehow or other inheres in it by some extraneous processes and, therefore, advcntitioush established on it the Self is conscious not on its own merit but on the merit of the adventitious quality of consciousness adhering in it from without If this hypothesis be accepted, then the Self as conceived by them to be a mere substratum of the quality of consciousness becomes known like any oLher object of "tvhich any knowledge accrues to it or, in other words, the Self becomes somehow known by the knowledge-processes resting on it, and therefore not shining its own light of Consciousness. The
;
Advaitist position
Sell
is
clear in this respect for
it
establishes the
not as a hnowahle entity but only as Consciousness as such From this point of view, Padmapada and Prakasatmayaci have shown the masterly ways of criticism of the opposite Schools wherein the Self is explained by some sort of a connection established between it and consciousness. They show that such extraneous relation being sought to be established between ihcm, the Self will cither turn out to be unknown or rather cease to be the reality of direct apprehension. The
Advaitist position
is
very clear-cut and logical in so far as he
explains
not different from Consciousness but Conscioumess as such. This view of the Advaitist is hinted at by Padmapada when he says that in a knowledge-situation
the
Self
as
every necessary and essential factor

far as Consciousness
^^
is
directly revealed in
ô
is
revealed in the most direct manner.
ralsusotpannam
c/U'susanuti/ntjmttt, j/w
liscsonatiflt
n/raottuitt/aiiha?i
vevfi parol syap)asahqah'f

I
U akufabt
adilyai thah
'Talti adlpana,
adhanena caksvso p'lanaim cdrtvmeyasi/api sumi idi isesanaf,samricchahdena indilycn thasauifi a}foqa]Mnasi/a
P,
305).
144
Ci tuque on Ihe Vivarana School

dh'cctly revealed
Thus he has
analysed that the object
i^
when
it
becomes the object ol such direct revelation (piameyam kmmaivenapat oksam) for which a direct relation has to be established between the Witnessing-Consciousness and the object and in that manner the v]itis of the anlahkanana transformed
into
the
form
of
the
objects
play
the
role
of
the
mediator.
is
Hence the
its
object as a necessary factor in knowledge
held by the Advaitist to be directly revealed

direct revelation as
when
the condi;
tions for
it
an
is
object are fulfilled

is
hence
is
that the indirectly perceived object
not the object of
direct revelation although there
a vrtti connected with the
antahkarana and revealed by the Witnessing-Consciousness, for here the mediation of the vrtji is only indirect in the sense that it only dispels the ignorance about the exuLence of the object {asattapadaka ajhana). Hence the object being known as
merely existent
is
not known as the content of direct experience.
Apart from the

ciousness per se
object, the resultmg
knowledge (pramili)
is
also
directly revealed in
is
an
act of cognition, as the Self
being Cons-
also directly revealed {pramah-pmoiitl,
puuauh
parokse eva kevalarh na karmaiaya). Thus Knowledge and Self being independent of any other mediating entity, unlike the object, are both revealed as they arc, or in other words,
directly
apprehended
as such.
There are no
solicitations
on
(which are essentially one in the Advaita theory) for any other mediating cognitional function Hence the Self stands in no need of to be directly revealed. sell-vindication, but is eternally vindicated in its direct revelation for consciousness is the very identical nature of the Self.
the part of these entities
;
Consciousness
too
is
direct
and immediate
ai>
consciousne.ss
even though there are objective obstructions on the way ol its directness, for in indirea cognitions the object being indirectlyrevealed makes the conscious content of knowledge an indirect presentation. Here consciousness being revealed on iis own
merits only has an objective reference in indirectness which therefore is a necessary appendage to itself. But in directly
revealed objects, consciousness is never called into cjûcstion on the ground of its directness, for such a question becomes an anachronistic one in trying to prove indirectness by an afterprocess
which has no existence when the consciousness

is
is
directly revealed with the object; consciousness here
direct
AdvaiLa Inquiry mlo Dtfferenl Theories on Self
14^
and immediate as it is free from any objective impediment by way of an indirectly revealed object due to the indirect vrtti of the mere disappearance of the ignorance about its
existence without any reference to the disappearance of the
ignorance about
all,
its
revelation {abhanapadaka ajnana).
Above
cogni-
the
Self
is
revealed
directly
In
an
act
of
Herein the Advaitist position is logically far more consistent than in other systems which advocate its knowahiliiy, some way or the other for the Advaitist holds that the Self being in itself Consciousness is directly revealed whenever direct knowledge appears on the scene. The Self is the key-note of all our experiences and hence it is never to be made an objective content in knowledge. It is always the pure subject which is consciousness per se and hence does not for a moment solicit the direct revelation of itself to be established by knowledge. Its directness is self-established like consciousness and hence is always the pure subject as conscioustion.
;
and never the subject by consciousness. Thus it is that the opponents' viewpoints are miserably wanting in the fundaness
that the Self
mentals of experience, the viewpoints which try to prove is anything but Consciousness and is not directly revealed in a direct apprehension. To admit that position is to deny the Self either by committing it to the category of a further knowable substance or by making it never to be revealed in direct apprehension. Herein therefore the cryptic
remark
in Advaita epistemology as well as metaphysics,

all
Padmapada has the most stupendous significance and Prakasatmayati tightens up his belts to vindicate this position against
of
swords.
Prakasatmayati
Self
is
shows
that
according
viz.,
to
the
Nyaya-
Vaiêsikas following the Varttikakara,

directly
revealed
only
;
by
is
an
Udyotakara, the extraneous relation
when in an act of cognition the Self has a relation established extraneously with
(samyoga) with the
that
to say,
mind
the
mind which
(cf.
organs
is related with the objects through the senseindriyarthasannikarsajanyam jnanam pratyaksam),
then the Self becomes an object of direct appehension as the most fundamentally related principle with the mind^^. The
*''
"JJtina
dtmaTruinahsamyogajanyapiatydismu'paroksdh''^
halfayanti
l:alcum-Nyaya-Vais''B%hanusdrinah
{Vivarana,
iti
Vdrtti-
P.
305).
10
146
Ciiiique on the
laatana School
resultant knowledge (pi am tit), according to the Nyaya-VaLsesikas, is directly levcaied only as being inherently i elated
{sarnaveia) with the Self
therefore, the resultant
through its lelation with mind here, knowledge which is directly levealed as
;
the Self vouchsafes for

^{samavela)
its
directness as being inancntly prcbcnt

this
Self
in
itself.
And
being
directly
revealed
through some other relation (aimarnanaJisauiyogah) the resultant knowledge lying in it is also directly revealed, but only through an inanent relation with it. But Udyolakara and his followers hold that this resultant knowledge of the object {prameyagaia pramiU) is due to an identical relation (Lddatmyasambandhat) established with another cognition w^hich ultimately vouchsafes for the directness of the knowledge of the object'''*. This view of the followers of Udyotakara lays stress upon the fact that in an act of cognition, not only is the resultant knowledge as being inherently present in the Self cognised, but also the knowledge of the object as being identically related with another cognition that is born of the contact between the
sense-organ
and the object
is
directly revealed.
Hence
in this
view there is the direct revelation of the knowledge of the object (prameyngata pramiti) only when an identical knowledge is born through the contact of the sense-organ with the object due to a relation of identity (iadatmyasambandha) between the cognition 'A' and the cognition 'B* (of the passage
Tatlvadipaiia, f.n. 86) Thus the K'sullaiit knowledge to be directly revealed should not only be known to inhere in the Self but also to be directly cognised through an identi<,al relation between it and a second cognition. This is in keeping with the general position of the Nyaya-Vaiêsikas who admit an anuvyavasaya in every act of primary cognition (vyavasaya) which depends for its revelation upon the former. Hence Udyotakara's analysis of the direct revelation of the resultant knowledge (pramtti) recognises the general Nyayaoi
Vaiêsika standpoint according lo which knowledge is no douf)t inherent in the Self and hence known to exist in it in an
inanent relation, but, moreover, has to admit another tertiary

cognition related with
""
it
in
an
identical
relation
(fadafmya)
ra/isusd
sanu/ulctdrtliena
bdddttm/aâmhortdhof,
jiiditdntaiamupajdyate,
Unuimrohnyam
pramiLtnt yarthah
{Tattradlputiu^
'/iraniith tfci^/f/tk
P. 305).
; ;
Advaiia Inquiry into Dijferent Theories on Self

lor
its
147
Nyaya-Vaisesika These by Padmapada when he sa.ys-pramatr-pramJtT punaraparokse eva kevalam (Pancapadika). Prakaâtmayati says that Padmapada's reply is against these Nyaya-Vaisesika theories from the viewpoint of the
ultimate
direct
revelation.
theories
have
been
tersely criticised
Advaita
Vedantist.
He
says
that
the
it is
Self
is
never the
object of any mental cognition, for

of the object.
self-revealed without
depending on any mental act simultaneously with the revelation The mental act has its justification elsewhere than in the revelation of the Self for by it the mind only knows the object and the act becomes an auxiliary to the knowing of the object hence it has nothing to do with the
; ;
revelation
of
the
Self
that
is
itself
revealed.
Here
is
the
keynote to the Advaitist theory of the Self that establishes ir as a pure subject and never as the object of any other
being self-revealed, the object is the mind has at all any status and function, but the revelation of the object is in no wise responsible for the revelation of the pure subject of cognition, for it is independent of any function and process necessary for knowing ot the objea. The object is revealed directly by the consciousness of the Self (pramatrcaitanya) no doubt but it depends for its revelation on some extra-solipsistic
auxiliary process.
Self
The
revealed by the mental
act, if
(entity
and
its
process,
viz.,
the
mind
its
or
the
antafykararia
vrtti.
(according to the Advaitist) and

Self,
function or
The
however, does not so depend on any other extraneous (entity which attempts to reveal it by consciousness limited, as in the case of the external objects. Thus the Advaitist
is no doubt revealed by but does not on that account become other-revealed for revelation by an other implies another limited (Consciousness that is in essence revelation per se, and the Self is revelation per se. Thus the Advaitist position is as clear
position comes to this that the Self
vrtiif
as day-light that
no amount
is
of vrtii or function pertaining to
an
extra-solipsistic entity is at all responsible for the revela-
tion of the Self that
self-revealed
with consciousness.
The
Self, therefore,
by being in essence one being independent of

it
any other process or principle extraneous to amenable to the empiric mode of directness
is
nonetheless
say
as
when we
"my
self",
"thy self"
etc., as
particular conscious centres involv-
148
Critique on the Vivamria School
ing the knowledge of the external objects.
Tins particular
as
phenomenon
in Advaita Vcdanta
is
known
apaw/isavyaaa-
harayogyaiva or the capability o direct empiric denotation. Hence basing his arguments on the Advaitist standpoint, Prakaâtmayati says that the Self is not separately revealed by
another process of cognition involving dependence on extraneous entities for being revealed through consciousnesb, as the external objects which so depend for being revealed by Hence he concludes that the revelation of the consciousness. Self being self-established, there is only an empiric necessity for it to be denoted as such when the knowledge of a particular object, so to say,
is is
presented to
Self,
it
in fact, the object

Sell,
revealed in the light of the consciousness oi the
but
is
which under such empiric necessity, becomes particularised as being directl)' denoted (aparoksavyavaharayogya). Hence there is only an empiric denotation of the Self under particular knowledge-situations, but it is on that account never revealed by any other extranenonetheless
the
known by
ous cognitive
It will
process^''.
not be improper and out of place to quote a French scholar in Vedanta, Dr. Olivier Lacombe, who in his wonderful thesis L'Absolu Selon le Vedanta ("The Absolute according to the Vedanta") has made, in a very remarkable manner, the following observations. quote these in original to
We
which an English translation
will
be added
reference a un objel ou a un sujei done sans repli ni dualiie internes (loc. oil. P. 118). "La conscience est done aussi pleine que letrc est picin, et F^tre est la plenitude m^me; la plenitude infinie. Mais r^tre, nous le savons, se d^tend et s'apaise dans la pure indctcrmination. La connaissance de F^tre aussi bien que la connaissance en tant qu'^tre doit suivre la mC^me loi, pratiqucr la
et
"La connaissance est mddpendamment de toute
transparence a soi-incme, conscience
m^me
vertu,
quasimorale de deLacheraent dans

itself
all
la
rithcssc"
{loc, cit.
P. 119).
(i.e.,
"Knowledge
it
is
*'
is transparence to Consciousness independent of
self-revelation)
o[)j(.'ct
reference to an
rdiiuaii
rtsayanuhhm asamhandhddp a vtsaym aflrifmamhtful,

{
jiland
Titarnm 'pai-ikaJ'pi/a matiaso'nvaj/m j/nHrchdcalpamVi/ogaf; tuantnrcnatmaparol-sa eva(Vivarana, P. 306).
tmmM
rimi/afru-
Advatia Inquiry into Different Theories on Self
149
or to a subject and hence without either any fold (i.e., stratum) or any duality of the internal" (P. 118). 'Consciousness is therefore as full (purnd) as Existence, and Existence is the same Fullness of Infinity. But as we
understand. Existence relaxes and appeases (calms)

in pure indetermination.
as
itself
is
down
good same
(i.e..
Knowledge of Existence
as
Knowledge in
so far as Existence should follow the
law, practise the same virtue quasi-moral in the richness Fullness ol Consciousness)." (P. 119).
Prakasatmayati now leads a tirade against the NyayaVaisesika theory of the direct revelation of the resultant knowledge {pramiti), either as inanendy perceived along with the Self or as being identically revealed along with another cognition that vouchsafes for the directness of the objective knowledge. He shows the graves dug by the protagonis-ts of
such theories and lays bare that the Nyaya-Vaiêsikas can never logically establish the directness of knowledge. The inanent relation of knowledge with the Self that is extraneously related to the mind (samyuktasamavayat) or the identical relation with another knowledge in the objective knowledge seems to
establish
that
the
directness of the cognition

it
is
due
to
an
has to some other cognitive process or this being contrary to the psychological theory of the Nyaya-Vaisesikas cannot stand the scrutiny of logic.
objective reference
function.
But
cognition "A' depending on the cognition 'B' for direct must needs recognise different psychological apparatuses, i.e., different contacts with the mind (which through the sense-organs is related with the object). But this being
revelation
The
once recognised, when the cognition 'B' arises the cognition having disappeared will never be directly revealed. Hence successive states of cognition cannot hope to reveal any previous moment in the chain and the cognition *A' being regarded as not present at the time of the cognition *B' will anta'A'
;
gonise
itself
with
knowledge,
cognition.
i.e.,
The
is
fundamental principle of immediate presence of the object at the time o simultaneous origination of the two pieces of
the the
admission of the the Naiyayikas hold, the psychological activity continues for some time involving particular modes of the sense-object-contact. Thus they
Naiyayikas,
for
cognition
also
untenable on the
own
when one
cognition
arises,
150
Ciitiqiie
Oii
ihe
ntuioia Sdiajl
a primary acLivily
hold that in the

the
hrst instance there
is
in
mind (adau ma?iasi kriya) aftcx which there is disiociaLioii {hiyalo viboi: the mind irom the previous, cognised object hagah); when this, dissociation ol the mind takes place, the
previous,
cognised object along with
its
cognition
so
is
toiail)
destroyed (vibhagat pUrvasamyogavinasah)
that
the
uiniti
becomes psychologically capable to receive the sensations oi the succeeding object at this stage the mind becomes associated with the succeeding object (puwasajnyogavmasal uitmasamyogah) as a result p which it receives through the senses the sensations ol the object oi which knowledge arises in the Self (utlatasamyogat jndnajamli). This being the psychological standpoint of the Naiyayikas who admit the origination of knowledge in the Self when the mind has passed through several modes effecting a contact between the senses and the object, it becomes illogical on the pari ol the Naiya>ikas to admit the simultaneous origination ot the two pieces of
;
knowledge, for the shnplc fact that the succeeding piece of knowledge which is regarded as the guarantor ol the directness of the previous one cannot hope to have it simultaneous!)" along with the origination of itself which being separated irom
the preceding one b> several moments point of origination will never vouchsafe for the dnectness of the former stmid-
This logically irreconcilable position ol die is brought out luil\ b\ Akhajjuaaaiida in his Tattvadipana^^. Tho. \iew ol the Naiyayikas that the directness of the knowledge ot the object is due to an identaneously.
Naiyayikas
fidnasamnye
iiJiaiah tata
manasi
hnifCt
talo
'libhagah
falah
pfai-mami/otjaiif/Hid-
7ttbaiajsa7hyog(ld
pumajanirityaneJtoksananlarnhe-iia
ya7ndna}n('mrmfaiasammnmayam<Uulai<u n\<mvoh
sc/nidfijasam
luira
pfa rajfldnasynvmihdnania
iti
qinaî/ndan7iasi/atoh
sahdrmtfiunamini/afu
of
kmf.'i/uin
pfn loltaiarcdaxayoi-niraitiyanivailakahhdwnn
hhdsya-blidsaL'ufdtHKiiapaltlclj'
{/or
15-17
(It
P
lanm
,
306)
cf
also
Tnfi rapradtv'd-d
Cilsuklm,
Pp.
lifirai/cna
i
manahsoiiu/ogvna
nitr
qhatdtuibfn'ilirjumtd
i\dd}fah
'lasdymydin
^mnyoydntatcyui
U'naii'nnitrya
aJiiin/tu mdijoiii -praii
hmituikduilntayd
yaitgapmhjdyiHjdl
jnnaLasi/a ryai asdipmipt

kaxina^-yn
îfj,
lajjahyd>nn-ya>utii<nfit>>tpt
<a
prtifytfiptpiirip'iyr
tûfiinrf/i ip'nia/'irfi!, titdt'cn
f-
"
% fafdii
flrifjya/i
pilri
(fhnla]j~idiio<(mp!'<niihiyv
,
nui/u/ini
Ici'iyd,
fftfi>
rifi/idf/ff/i,
mamip>(ptrn>d,Mih
Into
jfidtidufataniitifitncku-
/^â\i(ti
i!amht'no(pfi(lyfiii)dna.^yn
jfidnmip'i parole ml in/d
piln iijiidiuujrfthahaf'
I'dfiiijKipaftcfi
Advaiia Inqimy into Different Theories on Self
151
tical relation established with another cognition (samyukiatadaimyasambandhat) cannot also be accepted for the simple fact that when such a position is accepted, the cognition being directly revealed as belonging to the Self, the qualities of the Self such as its magnitude (panmana) which is anu or atomic according to the Naiyayikas, as well as of the object, such as its taste, have to be revealed in that same act of direct
cognition. To this the Naiyayikas reply that those qualities being incapable (ayogya) of direct revelation by the posterior cognition will not be directly revealed for they are the objects,
of direct revelation
tion,
by other cognitions save
this saving cogni-
but the Advaitists reply with equal force that the former
itself is
cognition
incapable {ayogya) of direct revelation by any
further cognition.
Herein has been initiated the fundamental

revelation
position of the Advaita theory about the status of knowledge in
the
matter of direa
that
is
of
it
(aparoksaxiyavaharayo-
gyatva),
to
say,
the approach through
the idealistic
towards the self-evident status of knowledge. Prakasatmayati has here uncovered without any ambiguity the idealistic standpoint of Advaita Vedanta towards the problem of knowledge. Knowledge, according to the standpoint, is
interpretation
self-luminous (svaprakasa), that
is
to say,
is
directly revealed
without
(avedya).
being
it
subject
to
any further cognitional function

is
This Advaitist theory
the basis of Advaitist idea-
Knowledge and Reality are inseparable, and hence Knowledge being equated with Being is not dependent on any other means for being directly revealed, (cf "La conscience de I'Stre aussi bien que la connaissance en tant qu'^tre doit suivre la mSme loi" ^Dr. Lacombe, loc. ciL, quoted above). Knowledge is the highest principle in Advaita metaphysics and hence there is no necessity of any other
lism, for in
it is self-lumiinstrumental principle for its being revealed nous on its own merit. The Naiyayika position reduces knowledge to a resultant product of psychological modes in which there are found activities of diverse kinds and degrees such as those of the mind, the sense-object-contact and relation with the Self. Hence the Naiyayika is bound to be dragged into the enigma that confronts him, viz., how knowledge is revealed. He, therefore, tries to solve the enigma by resolving knowledge into epistemological division of 'known' and 'know;
^$2
ing'
Critique on the
V war ana Schajl
whence the known-ness of knowledge becomes an unavoidBut when knowledge is equated with Reality that is known on its own merits without any further process or mode to reveal itself, it becomes directly revealed without being known that it is so that is to say, knowledge becomes a self-luminous principle mdependent of any further necessity
able hypothesis.
;
of knowability like the

idealism.
external
is
Knowledge which
object. Hence, in Advaita denoted as Cii or Caitanya
.(Consciousness par excellence) has always a self-evident directness, as
Being or Reality has
it.
the Advaitist point of view in the most
Thus Prakaiatmayati expresses unambiguous way when
that Knowledge is invariably revealed as soon as it and hence is not the object of further epistemological process. Knowledge or Consciousness is unknowable by any other entity and hence is self-luminous ; the inert matter is
he
says
arises,
not capable to reveal the living spirit of Consciousness and, moreover, no other intelligent process is required for its revelauon.
Hence
revelation by 'other'
own
merits.
being eternally "free" is outside the orbit of and within the limits of revelation on its This aspect is the cardinal principle o Advaita
it
metaphysics, for herein we find that Consciousness or Knowledge is equated with Being or Reality, and one of the indisit is clearly brought out. That the aspect of its unknowability (avedyatva) on which hinges the whole philosophy of self-luminosity {svaprakaiaLva).
pensable aspects associated with

aspect
is
pre-supposes as one ol its indispensable the quality of avedyatva, and hence Prakaâtmayati's masterly presentation of this aspect touches the \ery core of this Advaita theory. As a matter of fact, he had initiated here the faithful presentation of the Advaita theory which in
factors
In
fact, self-luminosity
course
details.
of
centuries
passed
through
The
vigorous
dialectical
enormous dialectic method employed by
(date-CzVca 12th 13th Cent. A.D.) in his Tattvapradiptka on the problem of self-luminosity of knowledge has taken this aspect of unknowability or avedyatva as the most indispensable factor; in fact, his analysis of svaprakasatva as avedyatve salt aparokâvyavaharayogyaiva
Citsukhacarya
unknowable by any other epistemologicd i>ro(css capable of empirical usage) is based on the fundamental theory of avedyatva. This characteristic of self-iumiyet
(though
Advaila inquiiy rnio Dijjoeni 1 heones on Self
153'
nous knowledge has been expressed by Prakasatmayati by the logical argument as follows Consciousness or Knowledge, whenever it exists, is never the negative receptacle o revelation hence it is not known by any other knowledge^''. But
:
Akhandananda
syllogistic
in
his
Taltvadipana
clearly
brings
out
the
form and shows that the inference drawn by his predecessor is not vitiated by any fallacy. Thus he shows that the inference put in die syllogistic form would stand as follows Consciousness or Knowledge is not to be known by any other kowledge, for whenever it exists, it is never the negative
:
receptacle of revelation; whatever ]s not such, e.g, absence of negative receptacle (i.e., whatever is the negative receptacle of revelation whenever theie is existence) is not such,
presence of not-known-ness (i.e., is not not-known by any other knowledge), as for example, the jar^. Here Akhandananda shows that the inierence of his predecessor must be a purely negative one (kevalavyaiireki), for here the
c.g,
only case ol the concomitance of the probandum and the probans can be found in diat of anubhava or Consciousness, and
nowhere else; thus there being no other positive case of concomitance, the only course left to validate the mlerence is
to show that the negative example proves vhe negative of concomitance between the probandum and ihe probans, and thus to conclude that the concomiiancc between them is not fallacious. Still, the doubt may linger in the mind of ihe opponent as to the existence oi any unreal element in the
probans.
i.d.n
Hence Akhandananda
of asiddhi
says that this possible

if
doubt
is
be expugned by showing that

possibility
in the probans there
no
or
unreality,
the probans will
be
to prove the presence has a concomitance. Thus ihe possible unreal clement {asiddhi) in the probans is with regard to non-revelation even in the case of existence, thus rendering the probans a doublful one. Such cases of an un-
perfect
and hence there
will be
no bar
o the
probandum with which
it
real
probans
auubha} auub/mt
is
known
,a
as
svarupasiddha helu (or unreality as

jnananta-
"''
n&ija
K'K/ann/atasiddliih
""
{V%i aiana,
-uasattOyum 'piuLmavyaiiiehadananacca
306).
n/h
dhuratiat,
na
na pmnantaiagamyak irasattayam yadeiam, na tadetam, yatha ghata
pmkasavyatirekavittyarthah^Tatti.a-
dipana, P. 306)
15^
.i
Cutiquf on the i'lvaiana Sdiool
to the very nature o the probans being related with tiic minor or paksa) svarupasiddha or unreal in Hself is that t)'pe oC reason which does not exist in the subject and therefore cannot afford the basis for any reasoning, as lu the proposition,
;
"the
lake
is
a substance because
it
has smoke',
"Unreality
attributed to the middle vitiates the whole system of ialerential argument. It affects the subject, and the relation of the middle term to the subject and the relation oi the middle and the major terms" {Post-ânkara Dialectics by Dr. A. Saslri, P. 63). But Akhandananda shows that this apprehended unreality on the probans cannot stay, for if it be accepted as true,, there will be doubts etc., even when one has the knowledge of an object for his knowledge being unreveaied (possibly), he will not be able to conhrm his actual cognition even when it is born. But that will be going against the most fundamental epistemological facts and hence the possible unreality in the probans cannot be accepted. Even then the didSftculty
;
remains
etc
,
as
to
the status of pleasure
{sukha),
pain (duhkha)
arise
which
also are never non-revealed
whenever they
thus they too will turn out to be oi the sauic status <is Consciousness or Knowledge which on the basis of this principle has been established as self-luminous. But pleasure, pain etc.,
being qualities of the inert aniahkmana or mind, according to the Advaitisis, cannot be equated with knowledge the
domain of self-luminosity. This problem has been posed by Akhandananda, but he seems to have by-passed it by throwing an apparent solution to it. He has shown that tliese qualities being of the nature of armbhava are included in it and hence there is no difficulty in reconciling that they are at piece witii
anubhava.
etc.,
are alwavs
What he seems to suggest is that pleasure, puin known to exist and therefore never severable
;
from knowledge they are qualities of which knowledge arises whenever they arise. This is the peculiarity of these (juulitics which, though belonging to inert material world, are different from other objects, as such objects are not such as
necessarily entailing knowledge of their existence. Still the answer of Akhandananda is not the linal s<iy in \hc Advahisi conception of self-IuminosUv. Pleasure, pain
etc.,
i)cing
a!wa5's revealed
whenever
hj
ou'u
mmils hut
ihe\ exist are not revealed on their knouledge-process hence wcmftu.yam

:
Advaiia Inquiry inlo Different rheo]ies on Self
255
prakasavyatirekMarianam, though apparently relevant in their case, is not finally so, for there is not only no absence of revelation but also no absence of revealed-ness (by knowledge);
revelation (prakasah) and revealedness (prakasyalvam) are the distinguishing marks of self-luminous knovvrledge and otherqualities like pleasure, pain etc. This is the true answer to the problem posed by Akhandananda as regards pleasure, pain etc., from the Advaitist point of view'^^ Prakasatmayati next examines the Bhatta theory of self-
lummous
luminosity which according to them resides in the known-ness {jfiaLata) adhering to the object {visayanislha) and not in knowledge which is only inferred (anumeya) from such a quality of
the object. This JBhatta-theory tries to prove, as against the Prabhakara-view, that knowledge or Consciousness {samvit) is not self-luminous, but only a quality known as jnaCala residing in the object that in every piece of knowledge is self-luminous
and from it the knowledge (jnana) is inferred. This selfluminous quality makes knowledge {jnana) to be inferred in the Self and therefore knowledge as a product adhering to the Self is sought to be established by the Bhattas by
the inferential proof. Now Prakasatmayati challenges this Bbatta-theory to show that knowledge as sought to be inferred by it from the quality of known-ness (jnala(a) is impossible to
originate, for
as is
li
known-ness
is
shown
lo
be present in the o&ject
done by the Bhattas,
it
will never
make any knowledge
to
be inferred in the Self. 11 any activity of the Self is regarded as making such knowledge (of the object) possible, then the reply from the Advaitist point of view is that this activity is either of the nature of a modulation (panspanda) or of the nature of a transformation (parinama) both of which are untenable in the Self. The first alternative (modulation) is impossible, for the Self according to this School being all-pervasive, cannot have any modulation or vibration as in an external instrumental cause, such as the axe (which can be wielded
to produce
an
effect).
The second
alternative (transformation)
is
also is untenable, for to accept it

"'
to contradict the Bhattas\asattai](lm

dintli/e/ia
ddi/cua
ral'dieiia
hcU middhlmuddhuiali
saiidfJimh
.^xjadityarihaTi
'prahtda-
'hi/afnilfafi p
/ijvd^fij/dm
yilii
rakStena
jmtndt-
svhhildmi .wdhanrn
Itiimiham
iiirmyati
svhJiadinumain
mnknfrena
pafvsdn/fub/idi ddifi/(affiaJi~{Ta(iradipova,
Pp. 306-307)
^^^
position.
-i^
If any transformation of the Self is held to be %ht knowledge of the object, then knowledge being a transformed effect must be co-extensive with its material cause, as the jar is
xo-extensive with clay. But to accept this is to make knowledge originate in the Self independent oi any known-ness adhering to the object, as is supposed by the Bhattas. l^he Bhattas may try to defend their position by saying that 'although It IS admitted that a transformation of the Self with regard to
an
objectless
very well
make
must generate some uniqueness {aiisaya) in the object and hence it must be admitted that the transformation (knowledge produced by a mental action) in respect of a definite object adheres to the definite object and nor to the SdP^. This modification of the Bhattas seems to suggest that in knowledge
IS
extensive with the Self yet in the case oi a definite objective {sakaimaka-knya^phala) knowledge, the transformation as the result of a definite mental action {knya)
{akarmapannamaphaia) knowledge-situation may the transformation (which is knowledge) co-
a defimte objective content, the mental act generating some kind of transformation of the Self makes the object the seat
that transformation,
that
is
where there
ôf
to
say,
a quality
is
known-ness which adheres to the object
known
is
as
knowledge as involving a subject-object reference or mfeired from it in the Self. Thus though the the object. It knows it through a transforming
self-luminous
and
being purely objective in content in so far as it concerns only the quality of known-ness adhering to the object and not to the knowledge as such, makes knowledge a deduced phenomenon. In every piece of objeaive reference Bhattas admit this self-lummosity of known-ness adhering to the' object but what they seem to mean by an "objectless knowledge-situation"
'
deduced knows psychosis which

Self
{akarmakapannamaphala) perhaps
refers
to
the Self's innate

as a just-
Zl^^^^l^"'''"'^^^'
tlicy make ThcvZl
hZT^^^l' 'T ^'^^^^^' ^^ P"^^ ^^^^k~-^^^^^ ^û^h '"''''' P^-^S^âtmayati
criticises this
'"^ P"'''^^ ^'^^'""'^ (known-ness) in the object, -u^ either the object itself as conscious or the Self as
Advaila Inquiry inio Diffeyent I'Jieones on Self

not necessarily conscious.
157
to the empirical universe of
these two alternaiivcs are fatal knowledge and hence the Bhattas cannot propound any of these. If it is held by the Bhattas that to be the seat of consciousness is to be conscious, then the object on their own showing being such will turn out to be
Now
a conscious entity.
this
If
the Bhatias
to
save
themselves /rom
is not merely be the scat of consciousness, but to be the seat of the generation oi consciousness, then sense-organs and the mind
awkward hypothesis
say that to be conscious
to
also will equally
ciousness;
conscious,
if,
it
become conscious as the generator of conshowever, to make the Self only as necessarily is held by the Bhattas that the known-ness adher-
ing to the object makes the Self conscious as it alone is capabJ^ of generating the necessarily transforming action {jnana) for the origin oi consciousness (which capacity is excluded from the other unconscious instruments ol knowledge, such as, the mind and the senses), matters do not improve ; for in that case,
there will be
ween
an act
the subject
no adequate ground for a necessary relation betand the object. The object is the object of adhering to the Self and ii in a knowledge-situation, the
object pre-supposes a known-ness adhering to it, it will not necessarily make the act of the Self which reveals the object a sine qua non; nor will there be any inference o knowledge
possible in the Self,
tor the act of transformation and the object of transformation are co-extensive in this supposition.
is to say, the act of transformation which is responsible knowledge or anubhava having its aim fulfilled in the object which is the seat of known-ness or jnaiata will never call in any separate knowledge as being present in the Self, which phenomenon is sought to be inferentially proved by the Bhattas. These logical and epistemoiogical anomalies in the Bhatia School have been very cogently brought out by
That
for
Akhandananda
in his Tallvadipana.^^ Hence Prakasatmayati concludes that in the Bhatta-theory there is no room left for the directness of either consciousness {samuii) or the Self (Atma)
"* J:i7)i
ir/Opmat artiam''
sarmidasrayatvam ceianatiaprai/ojahamf. tajjananavia ddyc îsa^fosyau a ceianaioi'pattmiyuJia samiidasrayatvce^

Livi
iH
dnfv/e'pt
samii]ja7ianai j/updruLattamutrarh
aii
vitaJtsiiam
samw-jjanuliajauvaxyapwa^
am"
iti
rikcHpyadyam
gidmaJb''
dusayati
no
uta
cefi.
diitlyam jyratydJia-visayeti
'mayd goto
ityatra svagatagamihriya-
158
Citliquc on
iJie
ivaiana School
{la^tnad
by way of an objective content in knowledge duayorna karmaiaya'paroksata V ivaiana, P. 307).
To
placed,
this
it
awkward conclusion
very
of
difficult
into which the Bhaltas aie

ibr
is
logically
thcni
to
establish
the
directness
consciousness.
Their epistcmological posi-
do,
tion becomes inadequate \o explain, as they themselves iry to how the Self as well as Consciousness are directly revealed;
directness, according to them, comes to these two only by an objective reference {ka) maiaya) ni a kuowicdge situaWhen it is proved that this 'objective reiercace' makes tion. it imposssibie to establish a direct relation between the Sell (knower) and the knowledge, either by makmg the Self not necessarily conscious or by failing to ettect any jusliliable relator,
tion
it,
except the selt-established quality of consciousness
adhering to the object, then either the Self is never directly revealed or the consciousness having its locus in it is never
required to be directly revealed
will go against the
will even
;
now
both these hypotheses
common
epistemological experiences, nay,
make all knowledge a myth and a mirage. Can the Bhattas succumb to these devils ? Herein, therefore, Prabhakaras come forward with a word -of explanation of the epistemological problems. The Prabhakaras try to establish that at least one of the factors in direct
revelation
is
self-luminous.
By
relegating the Self to the cate-
gory of the knowable, they show that consciousness as the ground in all such acts is independent ol any objective reference, and is self-revealed. Pramiti or anubhava, as they call
it, is
the resultant consciousness which

cognition,
is
always the background

object. In an act and cognition are
of direct revelation of the subject

'Of
and the
object
direct
the
subject
revealed {Inpulipmiyaksa of the Prabhakaras), hut consciousness (which they designate as samvH, more coherently speaking)
is always self -illumined the subject is the substratum of knowledge and the object is the field of knowledge knowledge its(>lf
; ;
kmmatvum
f<>
graniusî/oimlahdlaw, faduid mmjHlam aqatiu tdihiifularmatram risaymydnahhayute, touiia
n<hlaniili,<,f,'r,,H
si/adrmi,/m,'^fliafr(r
ih,arthaf,
>
mnmamaieMjMnaknyajanyanvbhav aryapiafrnt
Ufhato
ma,/a
idifa/r ifyamiUaro riujddha ityakmhyar-imimlmakTu/atatiMayoim' '"dhtkunionjuniyamamia planunmnlUntynhtt sra(ma7ilfi^{T'afitudipnfni, P.
Advaita Inquuy uiio DifJetenL Theoiid on Self

is
J^9
the
as
self-illumined.
Thus
of
the Frabhakaras
try
to
establish
self-luminosity
sathvti^
consciousness
which
a
they
designate
between it as pramiii or anubhava and knowledge as pramana. They hold that samvit or consciousness being the background of all our
all
but
the same
make
distinction
epistcmological purposes,
ject
it
is
selt-luminous unlike
;
the
sub-
knowledge still, our epistcmological arc not fully met for the fact that consciousness cannot arise of itself under particular situations ^vhen the aid of some instruments must be called in. These epistcmologiobject
of
and demands
cal
instruments they
designate
as
pramana
or
means
of
knowledge which are generated by the activity of the subjeci. Thus the Frabhakaras recognise the instrumentality of some
channels for the revelation of consciousness and these being the four-fold relation subsisting between the outer and the inner world (catusLayasanmkat sa) are what is required of the
subject for
situations.
the revelation of consciousness
This
four-told
relation
is
under particular amongst the object

as
(artha), sense-organ (indriya),
mmd
far
(manas) and Self (Atman).

responsible for
is,
This subjective activity

the
{pi amatrvyapara)
revelation
of
consciousness,
however,
it is
logical
desideratum
in
so
as
is
the
an epislemochannel of
for
all
consciousness,
whose
revelation
the
result
.epistcmological
Hence the Fiabhakaras make a distinction between pramanaphala or the end or result in an epistcmological situation which is consciousness {pramiii or anubhava, but more coherently speaking, samvit) and the means which is the four-fold relation {catustayasanmkarsa known as pramana). While the former is self-illumined, the latter is always inferred (anumeya) from the resultant knowledge and hence is an inferred cognitive process. This pramana or inferred cognitive process is not self-illumined,
purposes.
but is a, posteriori postulated in a knowledge-situation. Thus while the Frabhakaras make samvit as the final self-luminous
consciousness, they also keep
room
that
for the inferability of the
partake of the resultant knowledge. The Frabhakaras here enunciate a theory as opposed to the Buddhist theory of the Yogacara School which recognises that it is one consciousness that is the instrument
(vyapara)
particular cognitive processes
and the resultant
(phala)
in
an
epistcmological
leo
situation.
Critique on the Vivarana Schaol
ness
They hold that the momentary bit of conscious{ksamkavipiand) is transformed into the objective lonn which is not extraneous something, but a mode of the inner consciousness which takes up the objective hue. Thus one and the same consciousness is known as both alayavijndna or
consciousness
the subjective consciousness as well as pravrttivijnana or the

objective
and
is
known
differently
under
Hence tbe Yogacara's pramaria and pramiti are but the two aspects of the same phenomenon of consciousness. Thus it is saravedana which is pramufia when it refers to an objective world which is the universe of discourse in a knowlede-situation, that is to say, when by an
different universes of discourse.
activity (vyapara) the objective world is known as a transformation of consciousness. Again, it is pramiti when it refers to the subjective world of consciousness on which the hue of the former world is' seen tO' be existent. Thus there is but one principle to work through the subjective world of "knowing" and the objective world of "known", and not two principles which are admitted by the Prabhakaras to explain the epistemological
phenomenon
But
of
the
direct
revelation
this
of
consciousness
interpre-
(samvit).
Prabhakaras
reduce
solipsistic
tation to the charge of the presence of the objective distinction of the two kinds of revelation one of consciousness {samvit
which is directly sell-lumiuous and the other of the means of knowledge {pramcma or pramalrvyapara) which is always inferred from the resultant knowledge. They show that the object is revealed as an object of consciousness through the cognitive activit) of the subject (which has been proved to be always inferred from the resultant knowledge) and thus knowledge always implies that it has an object on which the subjective cognitional apparatus works but not so with the subject or Self itself. For, the Prabhakaras show
;
or pramiti or pramanaphala)
is never the object of any cognitive activity, but revealed in an act of cognitive activity which reveals the object. This revelation of the Self, according to the Prabhais
that the Self
karas, is therefore not like the objective revelation of the outer world, nor like the self-luminous revelation of consciousness
(samvit) but an
"automatic revelation", so to
say,
whenever
in
any cognitive
activity has
an object
to reveal.
Thus both
the resultant knowledge as well as the cognitive activity, the
Advaila Inquiry into

Self
cliffere?it
Theoties on Self
161
is never objecdfied by any cognitive activit>, but, tliough not self-luminous, is always "suggested" as being revealed^''. The position of the Prabhakaras will be more clear if we
examine the nature of the
Self as
direct revelation of this Self will
advocated by them and the be more intelligible. The
is the substratum of knowledge, an act of cognition it is revealed as never the object but This subjective revelation makes it clear that as the subject. the Self is revealed in a direct act of cognition as the mere locus (asraya) of knowledge, in which act the object is revealed as the "known" entity and hence as the ''objective" entity, and knowledge, speaking broadly in term of samvil, is revealed
Prabhakaras advocate that Self
for in
self-luminously.
never
tion
"objectively"
Thus the Self, in Prabhakara's contention is known but always becomes revealed by
itself
is
something of an "automatic suggestion" in ever} act of cogni-
Knowledge
is
self-revealed
or
self-luminous
and
revealed as the subject of thai knowledge. Hence to identify the Self with Consciousness [samvU) or with object
the Self
(visaya)
is
logically incompatible
ii
has a peculiar status in

in the epistemo-
the epistemological world.

logical
The
distinction
world obtaining between the Self and the object is well brought out by Akhandananda in his Taiivadipana where he
says that the object is always
of
which
it is
with reference to the knowledge the object, whereas the Self as subject has not to
wait for a reference to any knowledge of which it is the object, for it is directly revealed in knowledge whenever the objective
reference of knowledge
is
known
''^
Prabhakara view the Bhattas hold a very different and unique view of the Self. They say that whichever is directly revealed is known as the object of knowledge ; outside reference to the objective character in a knowledgesituation, there is nothing as revealed. Thus even consciousness according to the Bhattas is never self-luminous but is
this
"*
Against
framitiramibfiavah
pramd/jaiii tv
si
ayam/prakaiah
framumphalam,
tadhalenetarat
q>rahmate,
pimnatmiupuraJt fhalaUngo nityanumeyah, tatra

,
aandluyate [Paitrapddd'd,
*"
ami dam jdnfimi' ifi piamrffiirplfmai i/dparali Jcarmarisayah mfitmaisai/dniihTim ddc>r(f 7unutfdt 'aJiamiti' pjialc tiyTi/e canutisw/ah, dfmd tii
^
all
P. 308). andfmakarmakanvbhavairayatvendtmavifSparasamhkave prtliag
kaipana na yiihtetyaha
netyaheti [Tattvadlfana,
jilana-
P. 309).
11
1(^2
(jnanata) adherrelerence to the cognisedncss quite Hence their cpistemological stand is inff to the obicct. Prabhakaras who hold that in a direct different from that o the consciousness is self-luminous and the act of cognition, at least there is substrate of knowledge. Thus Self is revealed as the to hold that in an act of enough scope for ihe Piabhakaras rule to hold that everything cognition there is no hard and ast cognition. But the revealed as the "object" of should be argument that this view by the logical Bhattas controvert known to be the object ot nothing is revealed without being concomitance between revelacognition; thus they admit a cognition. anything that is revealed tion' and 'objectivity' of be regarded as the Hence in their view, the Self also must never without any reference to ''obiert" of a cognition and such an can it be levealed. But the Bhattas by
-known" With
intricate logical and cpisadmission are involved into a very "known" as an "object' temological fallacy for, the Self being for the Bhattas to maintain in a cognition, it becomes difficult
;
this objetivity
the ''subjectivity" of
The
cognition. -the Self in the same act of to say, \he principal element in cognition, that is referred to in knowledge ; the object it is that which is directly in knowledge, therefore, the is the object of knowledge and far as it is known. objective reference is a sifie qua non in so however, is the secondary clement in a knowledge-
object
is
The
subject,
situation, for it
is
leferred to
as
the possessor of knowledge
been first estabthe objective element in knowledge has becomes the term of reference lished, and hence the subject only in the cpistemoafterwards. It is the universal rule not and active sphere of logical sphere but also in every conativc (grammarians) lay down this reference. The Vaiyakaranas The subject object. universal rule about the subject and the (gunabhuta) because it is the substrate or the locus
when
in any is not the first term of reference always the substrate of action. Its action primarily refers to the object which is sought to be acted upon by the aaion belonging to the subject hence the object is
;
is secondary of action (kriya)
it
action, though
it
is
always the primary (pradhana) term of reference in any action
which
well
seeks to infuse into the object the

this universal rule,
meaning
of action.
Hence judging from

justified
to
charge
the
Bhattas
the Prabhakaras are on their hypothesis
'
Advai.a Inquiry info (Ujjeyent Theories on Self

that the Self
tion.
163
is both the subject and object in an act of cogniThis wilful bifurcation of the Self entails the logical inconsistency from the \iewpoint of the cogent law of the
an action. and the object Here Prakasatmayati from the viewpoint of the Prabhakaras brings out this inconsistency against the Bhattas'-"^. But the Bhattas reply to this apparent inconsistency by showing that there is no logical defect in their view of the Self which is both of the nature of inertia and consciousness (jaâbodhatmaka Atma) The Bhattas say thauthe Self is of the nature of both an inert and conscious principle, that is to say, contains the preponderating qualities of inertia and consciousness under particular circumstances. Hence conscious the same Self is
diversified status of the subject
object.
itself as the inert (jada) entity being known as the This two-fold conception of the Self according to the Bhattas is not logically or epistemologically untenable, for as they say, -the Self is not only conscious, but also conscious that it is conscious as an object of consciousness, though not always necessarily simultaneous with the object. This cognition of the Sell as the conscious element in knowledge cannot be overlooked, for it is quite true, logically and epistemologically, that the Self is known in an act of cognition. Thus
(bodha) of
the analysis of the Bhattas regarding the nature of the Self

takes note of, al least as they claim, the fact of the cognition
of
the Self as an object of thought. "According to Kumarila," as Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it, **the self is not manifested in every cognitive act. The object-consciousness is not always appropriated by the self. * * 9^ * * * While the self is not manifested as the subject or the object of the objectconsciousness {uisayaviiii) sometimes there occurs along with the object-consciousness another distinct consciousness, viz., self-consciousness (aharhpratyaya), of which the self is the object.' (Indian Philosophy, Vol. II., P 411). The objectivity of the Self becomes clear with reference to the unconscious or inert (jada) element in it and the conscious (bodhatmaka) element
in
it
plays the r61e of the subject of consciousness, or rather,

It is
self-consciousness.
significant
to
observe here the subtle
"
tatra
kathamehasydih
rirvddfiaru'padvayd.nvayahl
ekasî/a
kartuica
kriydyamehasyaiva hartrivena Jcarmatvena ca guomhhdv&t harmnnaica pradhdnydtf

"P
rupadtaye tairupyapra3angdcceti{Vivarajia,
309).
264
difference
Critique on Ihe
iviuaua School
in objccl-conscioub-
between the
in
wSclf
participating
ness
and
sell-consciousncss.
Fnibliakara
is
ever)
act ot
object-consciousness
there
is
at
the
would liold same time
that
selt-
consciousncss;
alwa}s the
tnpuripialyaksa or percepsimultaneously
ot
tion of the triad,
viz.,
the subject, the object and the cognition.

is
Hence when
revealed,
is
in an act of cognition the triad

a's
the Self
the
uncoîscious
substrate
is
cognition
revealed along with the object which
the
Thus Prabhakara's self-consciousness is not a a different moment than o^jgect-consciousness. But Kumarila, out of the empirical experiences, makes a logical distinction between the two and hence his epistemological presentation
;
known clement. phenomenon of
of the "objectivity" of the Self stands to reason.

that object-consciousness does not
necessarily
He
suggests,
imply simulia-
neously self-consciousness for these are of different

of experience.
it it
moments
Hence when the

In
Self
is
conscious of an object,
is
not necessarily conscious of

the
Self
itself,
becomes self-conscious
of
this
posteiior
is
consciousnes
of
Kumarila
though on reflection, momeii' of ii^ an ohjccl an object
mental
perception
(manasaprnlyaksa).
Hence
to
know
i\\
one's Self in
an
act of cognition,
one has
to "objectit)" it
self-consciousness.
Padmapada, PrakasTitraa\ati and Akhandrmanda have well brought out these theories of the Bhfuns in order to expose
them only
the further investigations ot lie Prabhakar<is."" that the Bhatta conceptions of the Sell and cognition have not been well received by the Prabhakaias and
to
Thus we
find
hence Padmapada and his followers arc preparing the grouncf the Prabhakara theories lo be expressed more fully but only in order to be met with from the Advaitist point of view.
for
This task therefore is a rechauffe of the Prabhakara stand lo be criticised from the Advaitist viewpoint Now, the main
^'
irfi amifi,
fKi/'u)
lahmuhbfo flian/anip/th fnrtfiiia/inh 'jiramoiah am /iifHific/Ki prai/idpjamfih prnmpi/ann h/i(lsa-7 ilpah rtdahampiah/at/uhiin qt-ahi/nrpn-
npa
almd
tasmdihdamnmdmUnl imh
hJnmwlmnujf.cntrti
c
liximvijanmiHifodam upntnlt.
ohidathiupufiDl /)ram(lfiamiris-i/a~[Par~iff/pridi/.n,
f'/imhprati/ai/ay/npi
'^"j.h i/a,
309).
(/fiaf,(ldipr(dijai/nfidii/att
amifi/d-
dntn/a(jodf,asi mft/jasi/flfmu/w
Imtifinm,
diai ijiHithaL-ahodliukrirapuldhfiniiciut hodlultmahadiari/riL-rnapuldhroniena hwnudiam, olo Jiol-fadosu
'J^^''f>fnp)rn/(nnJjampramutrp-amcifnriiihhrmirCip(ai adih -{Taff.i odlpanu, P,
Advaila Inquhy into diffeienl Theoties on Self
165
objection to the Bhalta theor\ of the Self from Prabhakara's point of view h that the Self conceived in its two-fold aspect
entails a great logical inconsistency, and hence such a Self cannot be conceived at all. The Prabhakaras point out that the inert or unconscious aspect (draoyatmakatd) of the Self, as conceived by ihe Bhattas, cannot be legarded as the Self in" its conscious aspect (bodhaimakatd), for tlie former aspect is
common
to
both the Self and the
not-self;
hence
it
cannot be
said to be the special characteristit of the Self.
Then what
remains to be called the true aspect of the Self is consciousness (bodha), but this consciousness being a principle which does not admit of any parts, it becomes difficult for the
Bhattas to maintain that
.subjective
it
as well as
the objective aspects, as

therefore
should be transformed into the is held by th

a real
Bhattas.
This
becomes
problem
for
the
Bhattas to hold consistently which of the aspects of die Self should be regarded as the real basis of it as both the subject
and the
object.
Any one
of
the
two aspects being unable

is
to show the Bhatta position a tenable one, the Bhdtta

to leave this illogical conception of the Self.
forced
Hence Padmafrom the
pada has concluded that

Bhatta point of view
is
this bifurcation of the Self
challenged by the Prabhakara on the
ground that the
Sell,
consistently speaking,
pan
ing
or aspect {anamiatvdt
{apaiindmiivdL
Pancapadikd,
P.
cannot have any 309); hence the
Bhatta theory should be legarded as non-transformIbid) to all intents and purposes to be conceived in the way the Bhatta conceives it to be. The Prabhakara advances the aigument against the Bhatta as to the 'objectivity' of the Self as the latter takes it to be possessed of. The former argues that the conscious aspect (bodhatmaka)
Self in the
oi the Self has to
the Bhatta, for
be admitted to be the object of knowledge by he does not so admit, his own thesis suffers from inconsistency. The Bhatta regards the Self as both the subject and object in cognition, as has been indicated before. The objective element in the Self is due to the unconscious
if
Qada) aspect oi it that [bodha) element. The

-entirety,
is
objectively
known by the
is
conscious
Self,
however,
^self-perceived in its
for the
Self reveals itself as the object.
self-luminous,
ii
mental perception {manasapratyakm) of the Hence though the Self is not knows itself through the mental perception
166
that being a separate
phenomenon
objectifies tiie Sell in that
perception.
is
Hence
seU-consciousness, according to the Bhatta^
due
to a separate
itseli.
moment
is
of nituition that helps the Sell to
perceive
This
possible
it,
due
to tire element of con-
sciousness (bodha) inhering in

to stultify the Self as a
for the Bhatta does not seek.
mere unconscious entity (jadapadatlha)
like his counter-part, the Prabhakara.
of the Self
makes
its
objectifying the unconscious independent of being known by any cognizer. The mental intuition only helps this '1'consciousness to be revealed in the Bhatta view. "Kumarila, however,-" as Dr. S. N. Dasgupta puts it, "thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception (manasa pratyaksa) as the substratum of the notion of T' or in other words, the self perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its own nature shines forth in consciousness as the 'I'." (Hutory of Indian Philosophy Vol. I. P. 400). Again, as he says, "The self is no doubt known as the substratum of 'I' but the knowledge of this self does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects, nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of objects but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition which we represent as the 'I'. The self does not reveal itself as the knower but as an object of a separate intuiThis is indeed diftcrcia from tive process of the mind.
ness of the T'
T'
the
own
The mental intuition nature shine forth in the conscious-
conscious
^but
the I'-consciousness
is
Prabhakara's analysis." (Ibid, P. 401). Thus the conscious part of the Self, according to the Bhatta, mu'>t needs know itself
as
"consciousness as the 1,"
or in other words, the mental

bhavali
intuition must needs reveal the Self to itself
if the Bhatta docs not (bodhalmaka) of the Self should know itself as an "object" in cognition (at least, in the mental intuition), he commits a very great inconsistency, for his Self would not then become svayarhpraka.<a and saihvidah aya.
svasamvedyah sa when Prakaâtmayati by way Prabhakara against the Bhatta admit that the conscious aspect
else
(cf.
3dbarabhasya),
and
to
nothing
Hence
of analysing the charge of the

says that
Now,
the sophisticated logician might very naturally object to
Prakasatmayati's
unphilosophic
to
usage
of
the
term
for,
svayamin
prakam with regard
the Self of the
BhaUa,
no
Aduaila Inquiry into different Theories on Self

School
of Mimariia
167
(self-luminous).
ing to a strictly regarding the nature of the Self according to the Bhattatheory, it can be said without any fear of being contradicted that here svayamprakasatva of the Self does refer to the
the Self regarded as svayamprakasa is This rather loose usage of language is jarrlogical ear, but judging from our analysis above
svasamvedyatva of it, as the Bhaltas regard il to possess. The Prabhakara therefore advances the horns of the dilemma
to his counterpart, viz., the Bhatta, that
if
the conscious aspect

its
of the Self be not the object {visaya) in cognition,
cons-
ciousness
is
called in question; for,
its
self-cognition (svasam-
vedyatva) cannot be established
if it fails to
be the object of
is
such self-cognition, and also

irayatva)
as also jeopardised;
its
conscious character (samviddof self-cognition

it
is
the "knower" or "cognizer"
on the other hand,
if
admitted
as
an
"object"
its
conscious character cannot also be established, for
the prameya or the objective element belongs to the realm of the not-self as the unconscious entity per se. Thus the Bhatta
is
caught between the two horns even on his

its
own
admission,
that the Self cognises itself in

ness {bodha)
lish
two-fold character of conscious(jada), for
and unconsciousness
its
he
fails to estab-
how
the Self in
entity,
conscious aspect can

as consciousness
know
itself
as
an unconscious
inasmuch
cannot belong
to the realm of the "object" or not-self, and unconsciousness cannot belong to the realm of the "subject" or Self. Thus the mental intuition of the Self, as held by the Bhatta, becomes a myth, for it fails to give an adequate explanation of the
phenomenon
conscious
of self-cognitionôr self-consciousness in the Self's

of
reflection
as
moment
conscious
entity.
itself
every self-consciousness,
the
self
not
only
knows
In but
also knows it as a conscious entity, and if that conscious entity has to be relegated to the realm of the not-self in the Bhatta's over-emphasis to explain the phenomenon, his case cannot
stand to
^^
strict logic^.
Hence the Prabhakara shows
that his
grdhalaru'pasyafi liaayataya nddhnasti va na vat na cet svayam-
prakdsati a-samvidasrayatva-siddhyoranab hywpagama.tasiddhifrasangah,
matayd siddhiicet tatrdha-prameyasya ceti {Vhaiana, P 310). anubhavdmse svayampraMsati ddyahJiyupagame^pyahamhdraaya grahyatvddidamamiatvam, tato "nedamamSaJi^^ tti granihdnupapatUmMankya,
gTahyatvasiddhimdha-taHmdditi
kar-
[Tattvadlpana,
P. 310).
168
Critique on the Vivayana School
explanation as to the
phenomenon
of self-consciousness can
be
logically established if the Self is regarded as the conscious

is>
substrate that
however,
nition including self-cognition.

say that in
known as such in every act of cogThus the Prabhakara would

(samvii)
every act
(grahya)
of consciousness
the
Self
is
referred to as the subject (giahaka), the external

as
phenomena
the object
sannikarsa) as the
triad
is
and the four-fold contact (calu^âya" means of knowledge (gyaha'â)', hence the
(inpup'
always revealed in every act of cognition
pratyaksa) according to the Prabhakara theory of knowledge.
Hence on the admission of the Prabhakara the Self is, no doubt, an inert entity, but is not on that account a grahya or knowable entity like the external phenomena; for, the
Self
is
always revealed
as
the
substrate
is
of
knowledge
inert
in
of
contradistinction with
not-self
which
the
object
knowledge, through and through. Thus for the Prabhakara in every act of cognition, there is a self-revealed principle of consciousness which he designates as ânwU wliich vouchsafes for the subject
as the subsitaie
as
and the object

oi
as
the
field
and the means

implies
for
the
uistrumenL
cognition.
His
is
object-cognition
rily
(visayaprdkalyani),
therefore,
always
for
necessa-
the self-cognition
(atmaprakaiyam),
a
different
is
there
of
no need
itself as
consciousness.
him The
to
recognise
as
moment
self-
Self
the subject
ever conscious of
in his view the
the substrate of knowledge,

establish
and hence
Self as the conscious seat of cognitions is a sufficient

sis
hypothesuggesi-s
to
seli-consciou^nciss.
Prakaâtmayati
this aspect ni the
Prabhakara theory when he says
thai, accoid-
ing to the Prabhakara, the Self has a predilection towards the

aspect of substrate of knowledge
and hence cannot belong

this
to
the realm of
that the Self
that, as
not-Self'-'''.
It is
on
point
ol
the Prabhak.ira
object
is
is
necessarily revealed
when
tlie
kiio^/n
we have
seen, the Bhatta raised a strong note oi piotcst

his explanation of the Self in contradiction to
and put forward

ness
the Prabhakara's, so
that
the
phcnoniciioii
of self-conscious-
could be adequately explained He started with this iheory of tlie Self as both 'conscious' dwd 'unconscious' and
t-nnt
'
KldiTat/apa/i-snpr'fifai/'t'/iama/i
sirUllii'moilaiiuimho^hamkarah
\Vt>a,'u,<',
P. 310).
Advaita Inquhy uiLo dijieteni Theories on Self
169
known,
showed
the Self
that
is
when
in an act of cognition the object
is
not necessarily known as the substrate of the cognition. It is self-perceived in its entirety as the unconscious aspect being known by the conscious through a mental intui' iion (manasa pratyaksa). The nature and function of the mental intuition through which the phenomenon of self-perception originates have been discussed at length above. After all has been said and done, it is to be admitted that the JBhatta has made the Self at the moment of self-perception a Janus-like entity that through the process of a mental intuition "shines forth in consciousness as the
'I'
" (Dr. Dasgupta).
But the Prabhakara's analysis of the entire Bhatta position reduced it to an illogical concept which the Bhatta tried to
construct
to explain the phenomenon of self-consciousness. Padmapada and Prakaâtmayati have shown that the Prab-
hakara
Jaas
won
the day from his rival, the Bhatta, b)
dis-
regarding the illogical concept forced into the jReld by the Bhatta to explain adequately the phenomenon of self-consci<)usness.
The Prabhakara's position of the revelation of the even along with the object, therefore, stands as the last This interforte of the Mimamsist interpretation of the Selfpretation, however, is sought to be controverted with all vigour
Self
by Padmapada and They show that the
specially
his
follower,
Prakaâtmayati.
is
Prabhakara's analysis of the Self
any-
thing but' satisfactory from the viewpoint of the Advaitist

fore refutes vigorously the Prabhakara view that
ject as ahahkara or the
it is
who
regards the Self as self-luminous {ivayampiakasa), and therethe sub-
Ego
for the
Ego
is
never self-luminous,
but
is
is
lighted
as
up by
the self-luminous Self which will
i,bown
School.
identical
with Consciousness.
undertaken by the illustrious
be This supreme task commentators of the Advaita
To controvert the theory of the Prabhakara and to bring out the Advaitist position with regard to the problem of the knowledge, Prakaâtmayati following Padmapada Self and shows that the Self cannot be equated with Ego, the notan unconscious entity that has to be revealed in the light Thus he adduces arguments to prove that the -Self is not different from Consciousness and is self-luminous without depending on any further process of cognition. The
self,
ôf
the Self.
no
Critique on the
Vivmana School
is
Prabhakara holds ihat the Self

Self,
revealed as the substratum.
of consciousness along with the revelation of the object.

therefore,
is
The
according to the Prabhakara an unconscious locus of knowledge which being related to it makes it the cognizer in a knowledge-situation. Thus the Self is sharply divided from the self-luminous consciousness (svayamprakaSa
sarhvit) in the Prabhakara's analysis of
it.
Padmapada
offers
several alternatives to the
Prabhakara
to justify this
bifurca-
and consciousness in order to show that none and hence the Self as the unconscious Ego cannot be logically established. The Ego. as such is at poles asunder from the Advaitist conception of Self as the self-luminous principle of Consciousness. Hence
tion of the Self of the alternatives can so justify
Akhandananda's possible objection is justified by his own words when he says that though the Ego should be established as distinct from the Self, yet by establishing the self-luminosity
of Self, Prakasatmayati
is
perfectly within
the limits of
the Advaitist explanation of the not-self as not self-luminous
and hence
never
the Ego being an unconscious principle per i>e can be equated with the self-luminous Self^"^. The first alternative of Padmapada is with regard to the Self as the
consciously
revealed
principle
and
the
knowledge
as
the
originated result (pramanaphalam) being regarded as revealed

unconsciously.
native to
That show that
is
to say,
is
Padmapada throws
this alter-
it
just
possible that the Prabhakara
might mean that the Self is only revealed as the seat of knowledge and hence as a consciously revealed principle, though it in itself, unconscious is, but the resultant knowledge as originated by the means {pramanaphalam jnanam) is revealed only as the unconscious instrument in the cognitive process. Thus it is thai the Prabhakara might easily claim to have established that the Self is revealed not merely as the unconscious entity but as consciously expressed as the substratum of knowledge, while the instrumental knowledge, that self-luminous consciousness also illumines, becomes merely a channel in the cognitive process to remain unconscious in its function with regard to the originated result. Hence sounding as it
;
^"'
<i/iankaras)/dfmufi'e
abhihitp'riflfmati-am
''im
''^rt//>ia/ifl,<aUfrsdd/iancna
itydmnhyaha
ahankdrasijeti.
stdtlhmtind
8a(Jha7iiyarn,,
ahanh&ra
P. 310).
itv
(if},ii,nu(Wi(l>ah
(ihi-ajnahrdatiCit,
g/iafftrafiTattiaclljJam,
AdvaiLa Inquiry inio different Theories on Self

does very
171
against any logical consistency, this alternative by Padmapada {kimatma caitanyaprakaso'nubhavo jadapraka&a,h Pancapadika. P. 310) does not go illogically against the general Prabhakara standpoint of the inputipraiyaksa in an act of cognition. For, Consciousness (samvit) as a
much
suggested
self-luminous principle reveals the pramana or the intrumental cause employed by the subject (pramatniyapara) which is always inferred in an act of cognition. Thus the self-lumi-
cognition
nous samvii is regarded as the real resultant in an act of which pre-supposes the instrumental causes (^la-
mana
pada's
or
pramatrvyapara).
alternative,
though
Hence strictly speaking, Padmasomehow reconcilable with this
pramana-aspect of cognition which can be said to be an unconscious mode, does not very cogently be thrown to the Prabhakara. For, the Prabhakara can very well object that the
by Padmapada is labouring under a morbid state of complacent challenge. The Prabhakara would never allow anybody to suggest that the resultant knowledge (pramanaphalam) is ever jadaprakasa, as Padmapada suggests.
alternative suggested
It is,
it is
on the
contrary, the very opposite of being ja4aprakdsa
self-luminous {svayamprakaia) as the revealer of the subject,
act of cognition. In out the position of the Prabhakara, Padmapada has himself shown that the anuhhava or pramiii
fact,
the object
and the instruments in an

bringing
while
of
the
Prabhakara
is
is
distinct
it
from pramana
as
being
self-
luminous.iî
when Padmapada himself makes a topsy-turvy suggestion to the Prabhakara? The suggestion seems to be due to Padmapada's method of analysis
at all reconcilable
How
in which he merely enumerates possible alternatives with regard to the nature of the Self and Consciousness, and hence seems to suggest that this first alternative is also a possible one in
the Prabhakara theory, though actually it is not. Hence Padmapada's suggestion, as elaborated by Prakaâtmayati, tries to establish the self-luminosity of Consciousness from the Advaitist
pramanaphala of the Prabhakara

^"^
point of view, discarding the possibility of making the to be ever regarded as reveal-
prakdSate,
framitkanuhhavah svayam/prdkaiah fiamanafJidam, tadbdenetarat pramdnam tu pramatrvyapdrah pKcialingo nitydnumeyah-^
(Paftcapddikd, P. 308).
nllddi'jildnaphdam
anuhhamh
bvayamprakaiamdno
grahyamidaihtayd,
^72
Cniique on the Vivmana School

itself
ing the subject and the object,

possibility is finely suggested
remaining unrevealed. This by Akhandananda and also by
Prakaâtmayati in examining this plausible alternative possible viewpoint of the Prabhakara.^^^
from a
yVndani
'annlanKujrV mhhamyaii,
r,^
giahuuani
canumujHujanU
(/ (iiiiajxidJ
yuldam-
310)
i"'>
'
i.s>
a,s,i,la,
hlulvin''--{Viroi,n,o,
P. 311).
CHAPTER
VII
AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE ADVAITIST CONSCIOUSNESSITS SELF-LUMINOUS AND UNITARY

CHARACTER.
However, Prakasatma>aLi analyses
of the Prabhakara in order to
this possible hypothesis
show
that
anubhava or
consci-
not of the same status as the sense-organ like the eye which itself remaining unconscious or unrevealed can vouchsafe for the revelation of the objective world. He shows that the sense-organ belongs to an altogether different category from that of consciousness, for the former is not ihe rcvealer of objects on its own jnerit? but on the merits Consciousness is always selfborrowed from consciousness.
ousness
is
luminous and even it the Prabhakara stoops to accept this position, he accepts it with some reservations, for he tries to show that the pramana is not self-luminous inasmuch as it is the instrumental cause of the resultant knowledge (pramanaphala) that is self-luminous. This reserved acceptance of the self-luminosity of consciousness by the Prabhakara is, as we have indicated fully above, the target of criticism, for if we strictly follow the Prabhakara cpistemology we shall merely take the possibility of the unrevealed 'pramaij,aphala' but
the
actuality
of
is
the
pyamana or prainalrvyapara.
unrevealed
there
(as
consciousness
ever to be
in
the
Even if pramana-
stage according to the Prabhakara),
of the pramanaphala also
it may be that in the stage may be such a possibility.
But unrevealed con'scionmess as the rcvealer of the objective world is an epistemological myth. Thus even if the Prabhakara tries to show that the phenomenon of consciousness ispossible as the sense-organ like .the eye to remain unrevealed,
Prakasatmayati
all
is
out to controvert
this faint stiggestion
with
the force at his
ever self-luminous
command. He shows that consciousness is and not due to any other conscious pheno-
menon. Hence the category of the sense-organ being unconscious and therefore dependent on consciousness for the revelation of objects and of itself is distinct from a self-luminous.
IT
.entity.
Cnlique on the Vivarana School

'the
Here Prakaâtmayati brings in the example of

of
light
the
lamp'
(pradipaloka)
to
prove the phenomenon

as
self-luminosity.
is
But the opponent may object that
regarded as self-luminous, so the light of the lamp cannot be regarded as such, and hence the light of the lamp (the example in any inference) becomes oi the same category as the sense-organ. Hence the proof of inference
consciousness
being
unestablished
it
due
to
the
failure
of
the
example
(drstantasiddhi),
also fails to
make
the self-luminous cate-
gory of consciousness a logically established one. Thus consciousness can very well be of the nature as the first alternative seemingly tries to make it, i.e., unrevealed in itself (jaâprakaia). To avoid any such logical conclusion, Prakasatmayati clearly guards himself against the charge of the same nature
of the unconscious sense-organ
and the self-luminous
light of
self-
lamp. luminosity
the
one
is
He
shows that there are two varieties of

of the type of consciousness
and the other of

that the light of
the type of the light of the lamp.
True
it is
not of the same nature as Consciousness which being self-luminous is the generator of knowledge the former is, however, far from being the generator of knowledge, for it
the
;
lamp
only reveals the objective world
when
it
is
objectively veiled.
Thus
the two inasmuch as the light of the lamp reveals the objective world by dispelling the objective veil, while consciousness reveals the objective world by dispelling the epistemological veil.
is
Still,
there
fundamental
difference
between
Prakasatmayati
continues,
there
is
variety
of
self-
luminosity even in the light of the lamp ; for it dispels a veil on the objective world and is not dependenl. on any oilier
similar principle for this act. Hence it cannot be included in the category of the sense-organ, as the logical conclusion
was leading us towards it; unrevealed and is never by

the objective world.
for,
the sense-organ
sense-organ
is
out-and-out
itself
the dispeller of any veil

like
on
is
Thus
the
the
eye
never capable of
itself to
generate knowledge (as self-luminous

.the
ii
not very logical to conclude that self-luminosity of the light of lamp cannot be established and hence self luminosity of consciousness is also untenable. On the contrary, sclf-luminois
consciousness) or to reveal the object by dispelling of darkness (as self-luminous light of the lamp). So
veil
the
Consciousness as Self-lummous
sity of the
&
Unitary
115
is
-vvcll
light
of
the lamp
and of consciousness
vestablished,
by their nature of revelation of the objective world by themselves, whereas the sense-organs cannot reveal objects by themselves but by depending on other factors of knowledge."^ Thus it is that Prakaâtmayati concludes that consciousness is self-luminous as it is independent of any other conscious principle of the same nature with it and hence can by its revelation make revelation of the objective world possible directly without any intervening moment, as the light of the lamp This syllogistic approach towards the problem of self-luminosity of consciousness has been made here by Prakaâtmayati by taking the example of the light of the lamp. In fact, Prakasatmayati has all along been discussing self-luminosity of consciousness from the viewpoint of the light of the lamp, that is to say, from the viewpoint of independence of similar prakasa or revelation ^-^ Thus the
svaprakasatva
in Citsukha's analysis of the concept of seems to have been suggested by Prakasatmayati.^"' Hence this syllogistic conclusion arrived at by Prakasatmayati to establish self-luminosity of consciousness seems to include both material and intellectual illumination as being on the logical plane, at least, though not in the ultimate metaphysical plane, similar concepts, with regard to (sajatiyapra^revelation independent of similar revelation' Prakasatmayati further elucidates his Masaprakaiyatvam). point by showing that the light of the lamp is not revealed
third
alternative
due
to a similar revelation like the sense-organ, the eye, for
the eye does not reveal the light of the lamp which is by itself The light of eye has no part to -of the nature of revelation. play in the revelation of the self-revealed light of the lamp,
i aloha2)raMyatvam 'prasiddham tadavym adhdnenaloJiena hnyate, na taduhhayaih haroU caksuh] ajfldnattadandlokatvdcca {Viiarana, P. 311).
^"^
tathdhi
jtidnaprakasyafi dd ajnanavirodhmo^nyade
tamovirodhitayd
vhJhOiyam
^'^'^
ajUdnanivrtti-tamonivi ttydhJiyani T attvadlfana,

ca
P.
312).
ragamyatdsiddMh {Vivarana,
anubhavali
ratvdt)
anubJiarasya
svasattdydm frakdsavyatiiekddaiiandcca
jndndnta-
na na yadevam na tadevam, yatlia ghata ityarthah
P. 306). j'^dndntoragamyaA svasattdydm 'prak&savyatirehavidhu-
{Tattvadvpana,
306).
"* sandfly aprakaMprahaiyatvam
{Tattvafradljnka,
P.
3.
Nirnaya Sagar
Edn)
i7<5
A
the former
Critique on the
Vivararia School
Jtor
is
only necessary for the establishment of the

oLher-revealed
(i.e.,
contacts
with
the
the
light-revealed)
objective world.
Hence Prakasatniayati
is
concludes
emphatiis
cally that consciousness

is
never other-revealed, that
to say,
never umevealcd luiieneve) H exisli (ivasallayam piakaiavyatirekavidfim alvat), for, ii the Prabhakara evei assumes that ic is so as he does in the case of the pramana or piamalrvyapFua from which there may be a possible doubt with regard
to
pramanaphah
it
also, there is
no
ccrtaint)
ol the validity ot
knowledge, for knowledge

certifying that
is
may
be believed to arise without

it
revealed whenever
arises
epistemological
uncertainty
always
attaches
itself
and thus an to know-
unwarranted uncertaint) all behaviour and action.^ " Prakasatmayati further examines the possible arguments from the opposite side that seek to show that thereneed not be any such uncertainty for the fact that the consciledge at
ot
its
existent stage.
it
But
this
knowledge when
arises
will
nullify
ousness as belonging to the subject {pramair

ously revealed)
that
is
consci-
may
and the object

of
vouchsafe for the existence of the subject through a mediating unco7isaous levelation
(jadanubhavabalal).
He
shows that
this
modified hypothesis
the Prabhakara cannot stand the scrutiny of reason inasmuch as the unconscious mediating revelation cannot directly
{saksat) be the cause of the revelation of the consciousness as belonging to the Self (though this position is controverted by the Advaitist, as Consciousness and Sell arc not different categories) for there is no need for such revelation directly through any mediating principle, because Consciousness as such is directly revealed if it be said that this unconscious mediating revelation reveals the consciousness of the subject by effecting the relation with the object {viâyoparagahelut;
x/at).
Prakasatmayati
(buddhi)
or
says
that
such
modification
of
(as
the
the
intellect
of
the
mind
{antaJjkarana)
Sankhyas and the Advaitists respectively recognise) can be accepted by the Advaitist, for it only makes the subject (jnair or pramair as limited by the adjuncts like buddhi etc.) dependent on the modification. But when the Self or Consci" tasmad ryamhitapradt'pasj/evanith/tai'mi/npyaprakgiamonafrp pradtpa
^ral-aiasyei a risvasijanarahfiOHajfrasafiffa iti'~{VivaTana,
312)
Consciousness as Self-luminous
ousness as equated with
is
it
& U
71
nary
177
there
is
regarded
as self-luminous,
no
logical relevance
its
to
admit dependence on the modific-
ation for
the
revelation.^ "^
Hence
or
to establish their position,
the Prabhakaras might attribute unconsciousness (jadatvd)

activity
to
of
consciousness
the
process
through
is
which
by
consciousness
position
also
logically
this
untenable.
alternative
mediating h revealed, but this What Frakaâtmayati

is
unrevealed
means
to
suggest
that
the
activity
through which there is a revelation of consciousness might be regarded as a necessary pre-requisite, and this activity being
always present consciousness as a self-luminous principle can be established. Thus even though Prakaâtmayati had previously reduced that the Prabhakara position is untenable from the point of view of the unconscious mediating revelation
(pramana or pramatrvyapaya), yet if there is again any bility from the Prabhakara's point of view that there
necessary
sarhvit,
possiis
a
of
activity
(cetayaliknya)
is
before
the
revelation
and ungrounded. an uncalled-for iegtessiu ad infmiium and, therefore, will never be self-established. Thus the necessity for which its aid was called will never materialise. Prakasatmayati shows that this activity (cetayatiky-iya) being unconscious in itself (for it is as unconscious as the prealso illogical
then that possibility

activity
For,
this
will
entail
vious unconscious mediating revelation),^ " will require a fresh

activity for its revelation,
and
so
on ad infinitum.
Thus
will
never be any landing-ground for consciousness to be revealed. In fact, the Self being in unison with Consciousness from the Advaitist point of view, there will be a merely uncalled-for tegressus
ad infinitum to assume any cetayalikriya, for the former
is
always self-luminous. Thus consciousness being never dependent on any activity must be self-revealed, and both Padmapada and Prakasatmayati now indicate the Advaitist position
by showing that the

"' cidatmaiJ)aL'<Uasi/a
'"^
Self
is
not
known through
self-luminous
fn
iada?inhhaidd/iinutu'nui)apanneti/akafanna
mhnifi~{V\ia)una, P 313) Here again Prakasatmayati hints ai the possibihty of the unconsciousness of the amihharaphda (cf prnvamihlim aYthalacaJiaclanipanvhharaphalam{Vnmana, P 313). though in fact, there is no actuality of it. In fact, it proceeds from the assumption of the Prabhakaras as io
siat/ampial-diacaifani/imiablidio'pi
the
p7aw(~/nci-!^tage
remaining unrevealed
12
.coiifaciouaiicis,
luminous.'""
.the
but is Consciousnesss pei ê and thcrelorc beltThis prepares the ground for examination ot second alternative posed by Padmapada to Prabhakara,
ior in this alternative there is the posing o the question, viz., are both the Sell and Consciousness self-illumined ? This
Advaitist on obvious no schism between the Thus this alternative is shown to be Self and Consciousness. illogical by Prakaâtmayati, following Padmapada, for the fact that there cannot be any cogent theory ol mutual dependence and an interrelation between two entities of equal status. Hence Akhandananda in his TatLvadJpana shows that firstly, the Self and Consciousness, being both self-lumin-
assumption
is
not
accepted
by
the
is
grounds, for in his opinion there
hold), like
be mutually dependent (as the Prabhakara will two equally conscious persons,"" and that secondly, there cannot be any relation of consciousness to Self for the
ous, cannot
fact that
t
no such
relation
is
possible
hy
itself
as
that will
be of the same category as the objective world and not self-luminous nor ihrough any oihei entity as
entail the Self to
Self
that will also necessarily entail the previous 'knowing' of the which will go against its self-lumhiosity Thus the JPrabhakara, being impelled on the horns of the dilemma, will
not be able to establish relation between the Self and Consciousness logically.î' Even if the Prabhakara tries to establish that even though the Self is related with consciousness as being conscious, )ct is not revealed as such; just like the consciousness belonging to a diflercnt person is not revealed to me inspite of the fact that such consciousness
is
revealed to the subject ot consciousness.
following
him Prakaâtmayati
rch
controvert
i
this
Padmapada and hint. They

i
^"^ /)iu)'iatj(i/)hah'na
jiradlpt'uvra
hayaindfmfmam
cftju/afe,
fmhl
'CClni/aftliiijrnHv
rHansi/f't/H
usflinptamfujdliiPailriqmddd,
313)
a'^f/K'fi
pradlpmf/idnh/afvrirretaj/nlikrlt/raiai
fiamnnaphah.np.tl {Vnnrana, P. 313), "" mitxTnuhlmiaii, nanyonyrulhlnasiddhihiu,

iaifui'adityarthali~-[Tattoadlpana,
(Imai/afikiru'd
rifhlati/K'nafrftf,
pinumdiiadi/ah
;
m Mm samndatmammbavdhnh
ca
visayatvaprasanga/i.
P.
313)
i^rena
(ff/iyatr
'>
virnnii'na''
scagrahanamantanna
srajtratiyogil-asamhandhagrahanrtsum
ham
napi
dnflyah,
hJiai fil, nragm(Vmugrahamxmanlmi'na
'tadriscnitmamhandhagrahanayogat tadgrahanam vdryam yujyate si aprakasafi at 'mdl\<lf~{Tntft ndtpana, P. 313).
na
ra
fad
Consciousness as Self-luminous
&
Unitmy
179
show
that there
is
no
necessity that
the Self should remain
unrevealed although it is the seat of consciousness and is conscious, tor the analogy of other-resting consciousness being unrevealed to me is not the logical basis for such assumption.
For, as they make it clear, there is a fundamental difference between consciousness belonging to the subject and consciousit should follow inferred in that subject, whence ness logically that former consciousness being clhecily revealed to the subject is never unrevealed, and the latter one remains
unrevealed to the inferrmg subject. Thus the Self as conscious being related with consciousness should not be equated with the latter category of consciousness inferred to the individual, for
Self that
it is
is is
to the individual always revealed as such.
The
conscious (at least in the Prabhakara contention of
dualism)
not unrevealed to the conscious individual, which,
on
Vedantist interpretatioii, can be equated with jlva.

its
Hence
with
the ]Jva being unseparated from
Self as being related

as revealed,
consciousness always experiences
it
as his consci-
ousness
is
always revealed to him.

individual
jiva
Thus
the Self which a
particular
experiences
within
may
be
unrevealed to another individual, like his consciousness. But the Self or Consciousness does not on that account become unrevealed to the particular individual^ ^^. This is the crucible of the Advaita dialectic of self-luminosity (svaprakasatva) that is brought out by Padmapada and Prakasatmayati, and their exposition by way of controverting the Prabhakara view is
leading us towards the Advaitist view of the
Self,
clearly
bu
being regarded as self-luminous like Consciousness in which there is complete exclusion of their being revealed to other individualized centres {purusajitai asamvedana) is surely an indication that there is no dualism between them, but they are one tn essence of
;
imperceptibly
for, as
we
see here, the Self
self-luminosity.
There
as
is
therefore
or,
no room
for
their
ever
even though related, as unrevealed, for the Self as Consciousness is always revealed by
being
regarded
unrelated,
itselfii^
iniiusdiitaiasamiedanaLadaii/avadhunuditt
rrt,
'^^-
samdnnmiti hlidiaJi {Vuaiaria, P, 314). ^'"^ paidfmanastu tyaiahitatLunna s\ aprabObuti am, hidfinana&tu avyaiaJiifatidt siapra/id6ati:a?ii
fttmanyapi
tat
[TattLad'ipanu,
P. 314).
The
third alternative
put forward b)
is
PacliDapfida
is
and
elaborated by Prakasatma) ati
that the Self

it
and consciousness
this alternative
as
mhering
in
makes
it
unconscious levealcd" '. But
seems to go agauist the ver) iunddmentals of
the problem as it tries to make the Self revealed on the strength of the self-revealed consciousness. The alternative primarily aims to make the Self unconscious (jadasvaiupa) pose and the consciousness that is self-revealed vouchsafes for its
revelation.
How
can
it
be consistently said that the Self
is
on the strength of the sell-revealed consciousness? Akhandananda in his TallvadTpaua tries to bring out the real implications of such an alternative loUovving in\he foot-steps
revealed^
He sa}s that it is a logical question to ask the real implication of trying to establish the Self as a revealed entity when this alternative only makes
of Prakasatmayati.
is
what
ness as
analyses
self-revealed" \
this
But he shows
that
ConsciousPrakasatmaxatt
show that
bemg
ni
of his predecessor, Padmapada ' to really untenable for the lact that consciousness regarded as inhering in the Self to make it
it is
alternative
revealed
Prabhakara. To make consciousness a completely detached principle from the Self will rather go against its revelation hence it must be admitted that the Self is not unconscious,
no u-ay a valid theory. The Self being relegated to the realm of the unconscious cannot be made conscious on the strength of consciousness inspite of the best endeavours of the
is
is necessarily conscious. That being admitted, the Advaitist position comes very near the mark, for the Self then becomes conscious by iuelf without its dependence
per se but
extraneous principle like consciousness. To achieve this objective Prakasatmayati analyses very cogcntl) the leal implications of this alternative. He shows that consciousness as a separate principle which is self-revealed should either be a quality {giina) or an object {dmvya) or an act {kauna), but none of these suppositions makes its nature established
as th^^
on an
Prabhakaras want it to be. Akliandananda shows that the Prabhakaras as the Naiyayikas rcgarcl it as a gum, the Sankh'^
''"f""m>raka4ah
si
r>
7in",i,v"
alma
jm}o'^rmupoJ,--{Pr,rpnd-,hn.
''"samidah
apramatvcna HthamntmanastarlapManamI
314).
raiyadlu-
kaTmijadia{Tattiadl'pma, P.
Consciousness as Self-lummous
yas
&
Unitary
181
as a diavya and ihe Bhattas as a katma (ct. guna ili SankhyamaiaTarktka-Prabhakamdjstantyokiain^ d) avyamiit manusrlya, katmeti Bhattamalanusare\ia TaUvadipana. P.
314).
Prakasalmayati reduces
to their
the
supposilions
tries to
4iavya
oi
untenable character, and
oi guna and show that the
supposition of guna necessarily leads us to the Advaitist theory
To do this, he shows that kanna or act, as the Bhattas hold it to be, lor, to make it a kaima is to rob it oi its nature of revelation {prakasaLva) and eflect {phalatva) of the instruments of -cognition. What Prakasatmayati means is that the Bhatta
the self-luminosity oi the Sell.
^consciousness cannot be a
recognises revelation (prakasatva) as the characteristic of cons<:iousness,
Jity ol
but this characteristic being inferred from the quaknown-ness or jnalaia (as he does recognise consciousis
ness as self-revealed) there

consciousness
as
the possibility of revelation of

eflect.
an inferred
Hence Prakasatmayati'
suggestion brings out these aspects of the Bhatta contention
but shows that
it is
untenable. Revelation, even by the indirect
is not tenable in the Bhatta contention of consciousness as an act (karma), for the Bhatta regards consciousness that is revealed as the effect inferred from the self-luminous kno-^^Ti-ness (jnaiata). It has been said above that "this self-luminous quality makes know-
method
of inference, of consciousness
ledge (jnana) to be inferred in the Self and therefore knowledge as a product adhering to the Self is sought to be established by the Bhattas by the inferential proof," If consciousness is thus reduced to an effect by regarding it as a produced
resultant revelation.
cannot be said to be revealed, for an act is not the This aspect is clearly brought out by Akhandananda when he says that an act does not make for
act,
it
then
the revelation of itself as the resultant of the act {kriyaLue
gamyadivat sarhvedanasya piakaSaivam na bhavati). To save this unwarranted conclusion the Bhatta may seek to establish
that revelation of the act
is
possible because of the fact that

act)
he recognises consciousness (the

{pyamanaphalaivat-Talivadipana.
untenable.
is
as the resultant
still
produa
P. 314),
his position is
he thus makes the act the resultant itself The act is what is the process and the resultant is what is the effect and the two can never be equated. The resultant is the end of the process and is not
For,
which
untenable.
J82
C)ilique on ihe
itself.
Vnnnana School
brings oiil this position,
p) akasaivamil'
the process b)
clearly
Akhandananda
when he
vacyam
it
;
sa)s:
yapi
na ai kaimaLve
ptamanaphalatval
knowledge
as
;
phakUaasyamipapallcrilyaU.liah
is
TatLvadipana.
P. 314).
If
regarded
strictly as
an
act,
must be regarded
in the object
the act ihat originates
sonic
result
(phala)
otherwise the subject and the
object cannot be related in

starts
knowledge.
Hence the Bhatta

makes
from
this hypothesis,
that jnataLa or knownness of the
object being the resultant of the

sus which adheres to the Self,
is
knowledge-situation
the act of knowledge an inferred product or strictly the p)oces-
and
of
the resultant of knowledge
self-luminous known-nessadhering to the object. Thus it is clear that the Bhatta theory trying as it does to make knowledge adhering to the Self as an act cannot by any stress of the imagination make it revealed. This is the substance of the position maintained by Padmais
revelation that
the qualit)
pada, Prakasatinayati and Akhandananda against

position of knowledge as an act (knya).
the Bhatta
Prakaâtmayati next examines the Sankhya view of knowto it is an object {clrcwya). The Sankhya conception of knowledge regards vrili or the reflection of the pu7usa or Self that is consciousness per se on the
ledge which according
unconscious principle of hiiddhi

inert matter (p)ahrU).
(intellect),
the
the
first
product of
lefiec-
Thus Pure Consciousness beuig

intellect
ted
on unconscious
makes
lor
origination
of
empirical knowledge through the injli or psychosis or modihcation generated by buddhi.
But
this
empirical vUlijnana is
according to the Sankhya an object, a product that is of the same status as the external object belonging to the hhaulika
or elemental world.
To
refute such a static theory of
know-
ledge Prakasatmayati shows that such a view will either
make
the Self as nol fully cojiscioiis of Uie objecl or as cotiscious of all ihe objects simuHajieously at the origination ot one know-
do harm to the epistemolomankind. If knowledge be regarded as an? object, as the Sankhya suggests, then it will be cither of inlmitesimal {anu), middle (madhyama) or infinite (tnaJial) dimension (parimam). If it is infinitesimal or middle in dimensionr, then knowledge will reveal only a part of the object with which the Self through the anlahknram is in contact. But
ledge.
alternatives will
gical behaviour of
Both these
Consciouinesi as Self-luminous
&
Unitary
183
never being realized h) the
that will spell disaster for the full knowledge of an object as Self. Akhandananda, suggesting as
this position,
he does to defend
untenable.
also
shows that
it
is
finally
even by contact with a fractional part of the body, sandal-paste can similarly knowledge, even make the whole bod) fragrant though connected with a small portion of the object, can
says in favour of the position that
;
He
possible for the Self to have full knowledge of it. But he shows that revelation of an object supposes a contact established between the subject and the object, but knowledge being of infinitesimal or middle dimension cannot establish
make
such a contact ^w julL The analogy of the sandal-paste cannot stand, for knowledge is not a component {savayava} entity, for which reason it cannot also be conceived as extending (viiaranasllay^'''. The middle dimension of knowledge will, moreover, make it dependent on the avayavas or compon-
not possible for knowledge, a partless entity. held to be of infinite dimension, then it will: make the Self, the substratum of it, as possessing infinite knowledge at any particular moment of cognition. But empincally,
ent parts, but
If
it is
knowledge
is
the Self
in
it.
is
Thus
never infinitely conscious when any knowledge irises, in no w^se can the Sankhya hold that knowledge
can ever be a component entity (dravya) which position jeoparHence dises the empirical universe of the Self's knowledge. Prakasatmayati proceeds towards the analyses of the remaining alternatives as to the nature of knowledge as held by the Naiyayikas and the Prabhakaras. He shows that according to this view, consciousness or knowledge is a quality {gw}a) adhering to the Self which is its substratum. Thus knowledge attaches to the Self which being inert according to these Schools becomes conscious of the objects whenever such attachThus the quality of consciousness makes the ment occurs.
Self,
otherwise
this
unconscious,
as
conscious,
Prakasatmayati
view of consciousness as a quality adhering to the Self and making the latter revealed through it. He says that this view of the Naiyayikas and the Prabhakaras unnecessarily supposes consciousness as a distinct quality belonging to
examines
^'^
harkandanah'mdoi^tu
sucw/avafrenfu ayavaprusarpanadi dru

314)
vyLtpikd-
tayahehitxaih yuktamitijarihahiTattcadlpana, P.
1S4
the Self
Critique on the
revealed.
to
Vwaiana School
If revelation be the
and making
then
it is
it
mark at
the
that
as
Self,
it is
better
admit,
establish
as
'i
self-revealed or self-Juminous.
do, o postulate ihe Sell

as
the
Advaitists
unconscious
and
then
is
to
it
possessing
the
quality of consciousness
a greater step in the epistemological of the Self it makes an unnecesand Consciousness by making the
;
and metaphysical conceptions

sary schism between the Self
fallacy of postulating it as unconscious. To avoid these tendencies that lead to the essential nature of the Self, bein^ unrevealed b> itself, the Advaitist holds that the Self is essentiis self-luminous, and not the seat of Hence Piakasatmayati following this Advaitist theory shows that Consciousness like the light of the lamp is not dependent on any other si?nilai enlily for its revelation. This
ally Consciousness that
consciousness.
Consciousness again
is not born or originated in the Self which being essentially Cojiscioustiesi does not wait for such Consciousness to originate. Thus the Self is notliing apart
from
a
Consciousness which being revelation in essence ^created or originated entity, for such revelation
is
never
is
eternally
present without any previous absence of it^^^ Hence the Self being eternally conscious is self-luminous and not dependent on any extraneous consciousness, as sucli extraneous consciis never originated in it, but is the eternal nature of ic. the Advaitist position as brought out by Prakaâtmavati following the slight hint of his predecessor, Padmapada,
ousness
Thus
(iuiT-
yeyi kalpe'nicchato'pyatmaiva cHiprakaU apadyaie: Pancapa4ika, P. 315) brings out the full implications of the Advaitist conception of the Self and Consciousness. In doing so, he folentity for revelation (âjdliyaprakasania)anairapeJisyam) as established on the analogy of the light of the lamp. Here also he brings out more elaborately that such self-luminosity i.s not the essential mark of Consciousness alone, but also of the Self as being in -essence Consciousness, like the sun in essence being reveJaaon and not anything apart from it. Thus hcreiji also he brings a material illumination, the revelation of the sun, as being
lows faithfully the characteristic of self-luminositv as expounded by him, viz., independence of any other similar
Consaomness
as
Self-lummous
&
Unitmy
185
the example (dislanla) to establish self-luminosity of the Self

as not being different in
ness.
e,',scnce
is
Irom self-luminous Conscious-
down
that
Hence Prakaâtmayati
is
driving at the thesis he has laid
of self-luminosity (svaprakaiaiva) self-luminous

as
and
is
showing
that the Self
being in essence one with
Consciousness.^^
The
discussion as to the nature of knowledge, as conceived
is carried on for further examination by Prakasatmayati following the hint of his predecessor, Padnupada. The discussion centres round the view of the middle
in the Sarikhya view,
dimension {madhyama-panmanatva)
knowledge that is a knowledge as an object (dravya). It has been already examined by them as to which hypothesis this view will lead to, and it has been shown
of
possible alternative in the Saiikhya view of
for,
its
that such a hypothesis cannot work well, knowledge, a partless entity, dependent on
it
will
make
parts (avayavas)
view which is an absurdity. Yet Padmapaa by a hint opens this possible alternative for fmther discussion, and Prakasatmayati and Akhandananda examine it fully. Padmapada says that it is granted that knowledge is of middle dimension (madhyama-parimana), an alternative making knowledge dependent on its parts. But this granting itself is vitiated by the fact that knowledge or consciousness is not dependent on any other entity or entities (like its parts) except the Pure Self
(Jfman)."'' From Akhandananda try
possible alternative
able. Prakasatmayati
this
faint
suggestion
Prakasatmayati
and
to bring out the full implications of this
and
after full scrutiny reject it as unten-
shows that even if knowledge or 'onsciousness be regarded as of middle dimension {madhyama-parimana), there may not be any inconsistency in making it dependent on parts for, it may be urged that though knowledge or consciousness is dependent on parts, it is all the same dependent on the Pure Self, as an earthen jar {ghata), though dependent on ifj component parts {kapalas), is dependent on tlic ground {hhufala) as its locus (adhislhana). Hence knowledge
'
si/dt,
dtmuiva jjml-dkaguna Hi i^radiimradatmd svayampral-usa na'}aij(it<>\ prakrUagunatvat, atmamjaiyahhicurdt ddityddipiahasagnnavadifydtmana svayampi akdia iti tadeta(/tinatie safi
^^^
ba ra 'jvnah
&i<%iayop<WmH
daha
anicchato^-pydtiaaiva
citiprakdsa
iti
[Vi) arana,
P.
314).
"'a tathdiulliaphulamdhhavt pramdnainaÛ{J?avucapddikd, P.
315).
i86
may
well be said to have as its locus (adJmlhano) the Pure Self (Aiman), even i it is of tniddle composite dimemion. I*ra-
Jlasatmayati himself refutes this view by showing that there is. a gulf of difference between the earthen jar and pure cons-
ciousness or knowledge, both ol which aic sought lo be dependent on an extraneous locus {adhisljiana) as composite entities.
But
it
as consciousness or
it is
knowledge
is
pure and indivisible lor
the fact that

logical
not something other than the Pure Self which must pre-suppose as its locus, it cannot be said with an>
argument that there is no inconsistency in its being regarded as a composite entit\, dependent on the Puie SclJ. The earthen jar pre-suppoês ai\ extraneous locus, like the ground, but pure consciousness is not diflerent irom its.
supposed
difference
locus,
i e..
Pure
Sell.
Thus
there
is
a fundamental
in their
nature which
cannot
draw any analogy
between them. Prakasritma>ati luriher shows thjii consciousknowledge shines in its own light and hence cannot be equated with the earthen jar that is revealed by an
ness or
external
entity,
light.
The
its
lamp
light
reveals
as
the
jar
as a
distinct
but
Pure Consciousness
revealing
the the
external
objects shines in
ol all revelation,
sis
own
is
and makes
itself as
ground
analyin conformity with the nature of the Self as Pure Consciousness that shines in its own light and
of the Advaita \itw
i.e.,
Pure
Self.
Thus Prakaâtmayati's
vouchsafes tor the revelation of every other en tit) lying outside. He sticks to hi.s previously-expounded view of selfluminosity that material illumination of the light of the lamp is the ground of analogy of intellectual illumination of consciousnessa view seemingly unorthodox in the Advaitist inter-
pretation.' =ô
Yet as has been amply elaborated b> us above

thesis
on these both not inconsistent in the least. He only suggests the non-dependence of the self-luminous principle on any other factors outside itself and that may be regarded as quite Advaitist on epistemological and metascif-luminosity
is
Prakaâtmayati's
of
of
categories
illumination
physical
interpretations.
However,
Akhandananda
in
his.
Tattvadipana brings out Prakasâtraayati's attempt to adduce

^"'
pradljjena
fiakfrntaviltnad
Mai/a'ia(jatainif,/aHiif)/Mirad
cihpialoMy, anyatha hhurah~{Vivaram', P.
haKlhona
315).
piahmtamitmtd
dfminur u/mcdrapHmme/mhtf

Consciousness as Selj -luminous
further
&
(i
Uniiaiy
1S7
proofs
(cL
pramanantaâpekiaya
pycchaLt
Viva}ana.
P. 315), as springing out of the opponents'
c, upholders like
the Saiikhya of composite consciousness dependent on a locus),
on the Advaitist conception of the equation of Pure Consciousness and Pure Sell. These opponents may urge, as Akhandananda shows, that even consciousness, as the revealer of the objective world, may be regarded as separate from the
dissatisfaction
Self
;
for, it is
seen in the objective case, like the destination

the act of 'going'
(say, village) of
is
[gamiknya) that the former

(i.e
,
separate from the act adhering to a different entity

(cf.
the
subject) than itself
the grammatical dictum
parasamaveta-
hiyaphalasaliham expression karmaLvam). Thus the 'maya avagamJf (known by myself) like the expression 'maya gato gramah' (village reached by myself) may well be consistently used, even if the 'act of knowing' as revealing the meaning of someihtng is not strictly enforced as non-difterent from the subject, the Pure Sell. For, it may ver) well be said that the meaning is discovered by the Self through a consciousness that is merel)' an instrument of, and, never identical with, the Self^^^. Thus it is clear from the anahsis of Akhandananda
that the Advaitist contention of the non-difference of the Self
and Consciousness has

opponents' viewpoint
Advaitist thesis
predecessor,
to
may not
be explained further, so that the stand. This task of proving the
is taken up by Prakaâtraayati following his Padmapada, and is ably elucidated by his follower, Akhandananda. Prakasatma)ati shows that the Pure Self isnon-diflEerent from Pure Consciousness on logical and epistemo-
logical grounds.
The Pure
Self as one, eternal entit)
{ekah
sthayyatma)
of
all
is
logically to
knowledge.
is
be upheld as the abiding principle Now, epistemologically speaking, this know-
an indivisible entity that is also eternally abiding in all our conscious moments for, knowledge itself does not change from moment to moment as the objects or contents of knowle(%e do. Thus Knowledge or Consciousness having no internal fragmentation i^ not different from the Pure Self which is the ground of all our conscious moments. This knowledge or
ledge
;
^-^
'mai/('t
gato
giumuV
iî
iUfvltP
stanijafjainikiii/ansai/ati'am
'mcu/riraguiali'
iti
yatJu't
grCiinasya,
tadiadataqaleh
ifi
dtvit'tafw'p}
yujj/ata
'prammuntnnm
rnltaryfon
Hi
codymtJiah
[Tattiadlpana,
n/apadesn
P. '3I6)
JSS
Cntiquc on the Vivaiana School

is
^Consciousness as Pure Spirit or Self

fact that neither is a
also supported
by
tJie
Either shines by
able universe
.conscious
its
knowable entity like the external object own lighl and lights up the whole knowthe one, indivisible piinciple
the Pure Sell
as'
Thus moments is
<jf all our Consciousness and not
the Pure Self besides

finely biings
moments
of consciousness,
Akhandananda
:
out these argumeiils in a sUlogistic ioim thus Alma anabhavannatiit legale, sodi uidkat matvanadhika) analve mtyapawksaivat, .mmndaadiiyail/inh(TaUvadtpana. P. 315).
This
tists
probans
(helu)
is
viz.,
6a}nr>idkaunalva?iad/uka)atjalve
ol sell -luminosity as the Advaiprobans here follows from Prakasatmayati's similar analysis ol Consciousness {samvedana or mmvii) as not being the object of any knowing {anubhavadhi-
satyapyanokMlval
the
ground
propound, and
this
nasiddhika.sya
ca
xiisayavadanalnialuTit-- Vivarana.
P.
315).
is
Now,
ledge
the thesis of the Advaitists that in Consciousness there

to the changing states of
no internal fragmentation due

is
sought to be
proved
by
Prakaâtmayati,
knowloUownig
would have been double assumplioti in the case of legarding Consciousness as the object of our knowing in different moments of knowledge ; for, that position would first posit
that there
,the necessity of a
Padmapada
Padmapadn shows
that there are inner fragmentary bits in Consciousne^s wliich are
known
diiferendj
on different occasions of our knowing the
that would again lead us to the conception of a universal conscioumess {samanyaih samvitlva7n) like the universal cowhood {samFmyam goLvain). However, that
external objects.
But
would be going against the logical and epistemological acrioaty that follows from the viewpoint of the Advaitists who advocate that the momentary bits of consciousness can never be posited as distinct from the Pure Consciousness, except by the admission of the variations of objective forms' 22. The epistemological and
logical defects in
Tiess
the admission of a universal like Cons<ious-
from existent states of consciousness arc nicely brought out by Prakasatma\ati and Akhandananda. PraIcaâtmayati shows that the defect of the admission of greater
distinct
postulation
(kalpanagauravadosa)
naturally
ensues
upon
the
^-^
'na Pa vlldvuhlinrah pjfiiiufhhaia/b'
st'ogafo
lUeso
lak!>,yafp,
{Pailfapadikd,
if!
rfsai/auHC'ôpotoiiuinahliu/aJk
316)
Conscioui>ness as Self-luminous
&
Unitmy
189*
admission of such a view for, he says thai we have first to posit the existence of indi\iduai states (visesabheda) that are
;
Consciousnes:5
then to be postulated as the Iragraentations of the universal (samdnyabheda) and that will land us into un-
necessary double postulation
Akhandananda
postulation
For,
further
clarifies
the position b) sa)ing that the opponents' viewpoint leads us

to the
position
of
the
double
from which the

according to the
Advaitisl can casih

Advaitisi,
extricate himself
Consciousness as pure and indivisible is the onh Truth, whereas the differences in it are all apparent var\ing from occasion to occasion due to the objective forms Hence he can easily posit one principle the All-pervasive Consciousness, by ignoring the fragmentations altogether. But the opponent has, out of sheer bad logic, to posit both the Universal Consciousness and the fragmentar;^ states, whereafter he can
say that the fragmc-ntions are the outcome of the Universal
Consciousness.
the
Universal
But he has all the same the position of both and the indi\iduals, from which defect of
(kaljMJiaganmvn)
the
Advaitist
is
unnccessar)
postulation
immune.^-^ The Advaitist posiiion that Consciousness has no internal fragmentation {suagniahhedabhdua) is established b\ Prakasatmayati by the argument that such internal fragmentation is untenable for the fact that Consciousness as Pure Spirit but all the fragis not by ilseJj fragmented even internally mentations are due to the objective variations. This argument introduced b) Padmapada with the examples of 'consci;
ousness
of
blue'
{nllamihvH)
as
and 'consciousness
suggested
;
of
yellow'
(piiasfhvit) to establish the Advaitist theorj' of indivisibility of
Consciousness as such
likely to
is,
is
be challenged b} the opponents

as Consciousness
is
for, as
by Akhandananda, he says, they
might argue that

it
the revealer like a lamp,
has internal changes from the changing modes as from the
changing
But Prakasatma) ati and Akhandananda flickers. show that such an argument cannot stand for the fact that
"' anvbhai arycd'fihJicddljhi/iqiaf/amphiifgafai yarah'o'ahetufremnvhhai tagaitrmam. i yaJcfi/mkye tu lagJimam, n yaJctermhyarh
ramasiayanl^/amlti
hhcdapâfibJiaSasyuvpad'hihatvamiti
Idlfanam tavafi samanamiti

ta^mddeka
ei-dmihhara
ce.t,
na]
samanyai isesahhedam
l-alfyatxat
pai ikalpi/a sdmanyah/iedapratibJidsasyaupadli il'
atdyfr/i
tma
l-d'pana
adhika,
ityartliah
{Tattradlimna, Pp.
315-316)
290
Critique on the
Vivmana School
iConsciousness does noi

really existent
but
is
change due to its modes which me unchanging by itself whereas its modes arc
following
mere
reflections
on
different forms of the objective world.
Prakasatmayati,
Padmapada,
further examines
the viewpoint of the opponents who seek to cstablivsh fragmentations in Consciousness b\ the fact of the destruction and
(endurance {vinaslaxnnapâiva) ol the states of it. Padmapada seems to suggest the opposite viewpoint by showing that destruction
and endurance
;
of the states of Consciousness are facts
hence there must be fragmentations in Consciousness states which arc created and destroyed under particular circumstances of the knowing subject. Such a view, based as it is on solid psychological and epistemological grounds, is sought to be controverted from the Advaitist standpoint vehemently, fiist by Padmapada and then by Prakasatmayati
of experience
and Akhandananda. Padmapada's contention is that this 'destruction and this endurance (vinaslavinasfava) of Consciousness as its states, are themselves untenable hypotheses and
hence the) cannot be taken to bring about the supposed fact He shows that there is a 'petitio principi' in this view which naturally becomes a bad logic to prove anything. Destruction and endurance of 'Consciousness, under particular situations of objective knowof fragmentation of Consciousness.
ledge, pre-suppose that
states
of
Consciousness
situations are born (janya) to account for the
under these knowledge of the

birth
particular
moments
but
as the
concept of
is
or origin-
ation
of the states of
Consciousness
valid
only
previous destruction and a previous endurance of

of
it
when a some states
or origination
cipi'.
is
have been established, the pre-supposition of such birth is merely 'begging the question' or 'petitio prinThis kind of mutual dependence (anyonyasrayatva)
a defect (dosa) in Indian Logic, for it vitiates the whole process of syllogism by trying to prove a proposition by an unestablished middle which by pre-supposing a condition has
to
wait for that condition

hints at
thij
Padmapada
to be established first by itself. form of bad logic b^ showing the
untenability of the
opponenth'
viewpoint
of
the
frag-menta-
on the strength of ihe proccsiies of destruction and endurance of some states of it, and Prakasatmayati and Akhandananda exemplify this position further.
tions of Consciousness

Consciousness as Selj-luminous
&
of,
Unitary
191
Prakaâtmayati
colours,
vii),
say!>
that as in the case of the consciousness of

is
when
is
there
the consciousness
say,
blue (nilasarh-
no consciousness of any other colour, say, yellow {piiasamvit). Hence the opponents may argue that there is the endurance of the perception oi one colour (blue) and the destruction of that of other (yellow), whence it follows that tliere is a division in Consciousness itself as of blue and yellow. Akhandananda hnely improves upon the clarifications of his predecessors by showing that there is no point in saying that
there
a particular consciousness
i.onsciousness.
.
is absent at the time of another For absence of a particular consciousness may
mean
But
either the absence of the attendant condition (visesana-
vyavrtya) or the absence of the entity itself {vis'eavyavriiya).

either case
is
untenable
to
ness, for, the first alternative
prove the absence of consciousmerely denies the absence of the

;
and not the absence of the entity itself the second an impossibility for, absence of the entity itself is nc\er possible by the absence of any of its particular modes. Thus Akhandananda shows very logicallv that even on the opponents' theory of Uie destruction and endurance of partipaiticular
suggests
cular states ol consciousness, by the assumption of the empirical evidence of the perception of a particular colour when
absence of any otlier colour, does not stand the dialecFor, absence of consciousness can never be posited either widi the denial of the particular mode or by the absence of the temporal states.^^' Even then the opponents' viewpoint
there
is
tical tests.
may not be stayed, for, they may put in fresh arguments to prove their case. Prakasatmayati seems to suggest these fresh arguments in order to controvert them fmally. As Akhandananda says vidhanlaiena heium sainai ihayaie {Taiivadlpana,
P. 316) (he ie., Prakasatmayati seems to justify the opponents'
argument),
it
is
worth Prakasatmavati's endeavour to throw

the
overboard
fresh
completely
of
opponents'
(say,
viewpoint.
as,
Thus
colour
the
like
arguments of the opponents seem to be that

consciousness
of a particular
the follow-
ing state
^-*
viie'iananjfn-rUya viiistaryaiittUi'^ rUpsi/an/f'nitti/pfi. ddye na sarin idahhdvali trasiddlnJi [Tattradtpana, P saihx'ido' Dyaddpi darsandditi samadhanagranUid)
ihi tdo'hlifn'ddifi
77asfdnasiaiih7i('n/ast/anasiddhpriti/fUajil'i/(lha,
?ia7Ui
nlhti,
pitasaiifn
Jco'tthaht
llm
siddlii/ati,
dvithje.
tliah
316).
192
'blue')
is
Cjiiique on Ihe Vivarana School

it
seen to be born,
niusL
be admiLted that
it
ha&
separate anciilaries (conditions) of origination than the preceding one; for, there can never be the origination of two
perceptions at the ver)
same moment.
Hence
it
cannot be
denied that there

the
like
is
hrst the destruction of the previous percep-
tion (sa), of a particular colour like 'yellow')
and the birth of

particular
following
'blue').
perception
It
is
(say,
of
another
colour
above-mentioned charge of anyonyasiayalva (mutual dependence and consequential 'pctitio principi') is urged bv the Advaitists. Padraapada'sv argument starts from this inevitable failac} of material logic t^ which
here
that
the
down In fa<pt, there grounds for the opponents to stand on toêfend their title that there must be diMuions of Consciousne^ôn the evidence of the destruction and endurance of the partithe opponents' arguments necessarily boil
are
no
logical
the fallacy of opponents cannot prove that there are any destiuction and any endurance of conscious states that inevitablv beg the question of their previous origination. Thus the hint of Padmapada has been elaborated exhaustively by Prakasatmayati and Akhandananda who are trying to support their predecessor more fully. As a matter of fact, Prakasatmayati has shown clearly that this
cular states or
of
modes
consciousness.
Thus
'mutual dependence'
starts
in order that the
'petitio principi'
is
against the opponents' arguments to prove
the fragmentation of Consciousness.
He, moreover, shows that
such
position
the
of
the opponents
who^,,^k
to
prove
their
thesis "by
admission of i-he__,,:^^ff^^*^^Qj*g^^^
will
thlit4fe0K-:îtiated^bx:The defect of unnecessar^|'^"^^" tion {kalpana-gainava-dosa); for, as he shows, originaH^^ ^^ conscious states implies origination of the state of consrf^"^" ncss {samvidah utpatii) and the origination of the obie^*^''^" coloration (vuayoparaklakarasya ca)
make
thus
imphing unnecess^^^
the' Advaitist
postulation
there
is
of
two originations.
But
in
v|^^
there must be heterisations of Consciousness through particular mQ^^^ ^ expression and who therefore are involved in endless, v^'^niean-
merely the birth of the objective coloration in so -*'''' as consciousness is never and under no circumstances postula^*^^' as being born Hence the Advaitist view is more consis'*^"^ and coherent, both logically and epistemologically, than- ^^ view of the Sankhyas etc. who hold that ii/temal
Consciomiiess as Self-luminous
&
Unitary
19^
here.
ing hypotheses challenged by the Advaitists, as has been shown From this rather elaborate examination of the opponents'
as to the possibility of
view
samvidbheda,
it is,
a^
by the way,
shown by these Advaitist teachers that even the Buddhist (i.e., Vtjnanavadm or Yogacara) theory cannot logically stand. This Idealistic School of Buddhism suggests that there are endless bits ot momentary consciousness which arise in a particular perception {ksanikavipmnavada); but as these numerous states are very similar to one another, there is no knowledge of their actual difference owing to the defect of the very akinness itself. They compare consciousness to the light of a lamp which has numerous momentary flickers, all of the very same nature. Thus the Vijnanavadin' s contention is that these actual fragmentations which we know as single units of knowledge
may be taken
tations.
as
accounting lor the actual fact of such fragmen-
But Padmapada and, following him, his followers have shown clearly that such a view also is logically untenable The argument from very fine similarity of conscious states vs, untenable, for, here also there is the fallacy of mutual dependSimilarity which !>eeks to establish the division (bheda) ence. in Consciousness must therefore beg the question of division in order that similarity between two divided states may be
established.
Thus
the inevitable anyonyasrayatvadosa vitiates
the whole cycle of the syllogistic inference and hence nothing is proved. This is very aptly suggested b) Akhandananda
thus:
bhede siddhe sadrsyakalpana, tasyani ca siddhavarh tato hhedadhigalau bhedasiddhih ititaretarasrayaprasanganmaivam
liyaha
iannirakaroiJii
(Tattvadtpana,
is
P.
316).
Hence
the
Vijnanavadin's or Yogacara's theory of the existence of actual
fragmentary states of Consciousness
shown
to tumble
down
on the
logical scrutiny of their case.
Prakaâtmayati further
shows that the Vijnanavadin's contention that the difference between different kinds of Consciousness is not recognised on account of the close akinness amongst them stands a very simple charge even on his own theory; for, he shows that the Vijnanavadin's consciousness, even though fragmented, is, nevertheless, self-revealed; hence even on his own admission there must be very little difference with the admission of the self-luminous Absolute Consciousness from the viewpoint of
epistemology.
13
Thus
the Vijnanavadin's self-revealed conscious-
194
Ciilique on the
Viva} ana School
nes should naturally reveal the dijfference subsisting
the various
moments
o consciousness, in the
amongst same way as those

Vijnanavadin
moments
commits
are
themselves
revealed.
suicide
Thus
by
the
not admitting the revelation of the diflEerence as well. Vidyaranâ in his Vivai ana-prameya-i>amgraha has further substantiated this point by showing that even Suresvaracarya in his Brhadaranyaka-
an
epistemological
bhasya-variiika has referred to such a logical conclusion that
the upholders of self-luminosit)

xevelation
of
(including the theory of
self-
must lead themselves to. Sure^vara's analysis, howevei, springs from the untenability of .any fragmentation in the Absolute Consciousness, on the basis lOi the absence of any pragabhava (absence due to the previous non-origination of an object). His argument shows that such pragabhava alone can vouchsafe for the origination of an object, and naturally. Absolute Consciousness must also be regarded as being possessed of pragabhava Then and then
the
Buddhist)
only can
we
But
4:his
as that is
say that it admits of fragmentations {bhedas). untenable on the very face of it for the fact that
also i& revealed to the S'dksin of the Advaitist
pragabhava
all
like
other
objects,
it
cannot be
presupposed of
in
it
is
the
Absolute
Consciousness.
Thus no bheda
itself, as
logically
tenable, as the Vijnanavadi Buddhist
seem to
Consciousness shimng by
dij0Eerence
a principle,
suggest. Hence must not depend
to be fragmented; if that is so, should also shine forth in the same light of Consciousness.^^^ The contention is that the Advaitist also recognises such non-revelation in the case of the
on any extraneous condition

in
fragmentations
Jivas
who
are in essence
Brahman,
as established
bv the dosa
as
(eternal hindrance) like avidya
(nescience).
But
of
there has
different
been no
such ground
of
established in
the case of
the
moments
Consciousness,
is
non-revelation
untenable.^^s
difference
fur-
amongst them
'-^
logically
praka^tmayati
tasmadeLawa samvidanadth anaditoam ca ^'^"Oa'^Jô.taraliitatbut taduhtam Sitreivaraiartttke, hdryam sarvairyato drslam pragahJiai apurafisamm tasyafi samvitsahsitvat pragabhdvo no samvidah-{Vtiarana-
prameya-samgraKa, Pt. II P 72), *** n'dlanamanyatedyatvena tathatie'pi svaprakaiasamvinntsthahJiedasyavihMianaifogat na ca svapml'oSabrahmatMt} dvibJuli anani nidarianlyam.
,
tattacidydvaranasya
ptamanaih
sud'hitatiair[I'bid,
72).
Consciousness a^ Selj-lmnmous
ther
analyses
\x
Umiwy
195
this point in order to substantiate fully the view over against the opponents' view. Thus he tries to bring out, pom the opponents' viewpoint^ an intercntial prool for the establishment of their theory that there ma) be the dilierence (as supposed) among the different
Advaitist
moments
forth by
of
Consciousness.
is
The
s)llogistic
argument put
him
known
faces
ence
based on
samanyaiods) lanumana (an inferof general assumption). This kind of

as the
a conclusion which is arrived at by an assumption in which another similar gene) at fad is taken as the ground. The inferential syllogism suggested by Prakasatmayati is based on the assumption of the universal concomitance subsisting between the 'probans' QieLu) of 'being revealed by a permanent internal illuminative cognition' and the
suggests
syllogism
probandum
bitb
{sadhya) of 'having diflerences
among
the similar
This vyapti or concomitance is imposed on Consciousness by the opponents (i.e., Vijhanavadi Buddhist who admits of the existence of such probans through the assumption of a general fact and this* general tact is the case
of the light, say of the lamp.
of something.
lamp being revealed by
this abiding light of the Prakasatmayati has taken it to be without the strict Advaitist conception ol a difference between malenal illumination and inteUecLual illumination) admits of the difference in flames of every moment. Similarly,
itself
Now
(as
the intellectual illumination of Consciousness also admits of

difference
among
its
moments, being
itself
self-revealed as the
one
abiding
syllogism lays
(buddhi), viz
for
,
shows that this emphasis on the two aspects ot the cognition sthayi (permanent) and prakaia (illuminative),
principle^-''
Akhandananda
must be the recognition of the selfluminous cognition whether of riiaterial illumination like the
the fact that there
light
of
the
Consciousness,
^-"
lamp or of the and these two
intellectual
entities
illumination
like
must be
abiding.^^s
mmridah
j i alfii
mchsi/apiatihaddJiabJiedarabliasaJi,
sthclt/iptaMsabuddhi-
vedyaitat,
^'^
oditi/anumntmh
saJri/ate
(Fiia?a??a,
P.
217).
i'
'>
buddhii edyoti adityuktc gJiafadau vi/aiicdrah, tadmtham 'pi aMsef ispânam prakaia Hi buddhih jjrakuiabnddJhih iadiedyatLaditymthah.
stiidyi'
îbpannamdtrai inastapradlpadiryrivrttijai tliam

buddhiiedyatvaditiyu/cte
ghafadm
tyavicdraJi
'sthaylti' riiemna/n. tadmtham 'piakuseti'
{Tattiadipana,
317).
196
Cntique on the Vivaraiia SchooC
following his predecessor, Padmapada, show& that this type of inference cannot be maintained to prove the proposed conclusion the opponents drive at; for, the inference
Prakaâtmayati,
itself
is
opposed
to
the
experience and contrary to further
an inference based on the general assumption cannot be maintained it it antagonises with the direct experience of particular instances which are sought to be proved by inference as possessing a specific quality (like bheda here); moreover, opposite valid reasoning (iarka) can nullify an inference as proving the particular probandum. Here both
reasoning.
these factors are present and, therefore, the inference
at the very foundation.
is
Now
wrong
Prakasatmayati shows that our experi-
ence of the so-called bits of Consciousness does not prove that there is a difference among them, but on the contrary, proves that those bits suppose an abiding Consciousness that is extended through all moments. This empirical proof cannot be doubted, for, without the recognition of such an abiding
principle
explained as
behaviour.
no moments of Consciousness can be satisfactorily all the moments presuppose the existence of this
permanent background in the origination of our empirical
The
opposite valid reasoning (tarka) that

is
arises
with regard to the charge levelled by the Advaitists which has been brought out above, viz, that bheda ox difference among bits of Consciousness should also shine forth in the self-same light of selfluminous Consciousness, had there been actually such a
difference
existent.
against this inference of the opponents
Akhandananda
Advaitist
have
Hence Padmapada, Prakasatmayati and given us enough grounds from the
standpoint to establish their viewpoint as being based upon very solid arguments, both empirical and logical, to triumph over the viewpoints of the opponents. Padmapada's analysis of the nature of Consciousness leads him on to the analysis of the Self as connoted by the former, whence he tries to explain how empirical moments of Consciousness can also be justified. This apparent division in the
logical
analysis
of
the Self
is
as
Consciousness,
as
admitting
say
that
of
moments, Prakasatmayati and

Advaitist
empirical
explained
of
not
unjustifiable
by
the
Akhandananda.
the
Self
They
as
interpretation
needs explain
how
the different
must empirical moments in our

Consciousness
Consciousness as Self-lmmnous
<daily existence arise
&
Unitaty
197
ation.
from the standpoint of that interpretHence Padmapada is perfectly within the limits of logic when he seeks to explain this phenomenon. Padmapada says that the different empirical moments are explained if we recognise the Self as the permanent principle of Consciousness, and not jeopardised for, the Self as such (cf. iasmaL
citsvabhava
evatma
Pancapachka.
P.
317),
is
only
mani-
fested in particular
moments through the
particular psychoses
taking place in the mental entity (antalikaiaiui-vittts); in fact the Self as Pure Consciousness, the abiding principle of all
experience under these particular processes or psychoses, is delimited as such and such temporal and objective knowledge; the objective content of Consciousness makes for such objective determination of Consciousness.'^"
argues that there
may be
empirical
Hence moments of
the Advaitist
Consciousness,
even though the Self as Pure Consciousness is the only Reality. Herein, however, sets in a fresh and very serious problem that the opponents try to urge against the Advaitist. They point out ihat such a recognition by the Advaitist will make
his
position precarious by making the Pure Self the Ego (ahankam) or the "I'-consciousness as the experiencer of all
the empirical cognitions of the objective world. ^^'^ Thus the Advaitist finds himself in a very tight corner by admitting the empirical moments of Consciousness which is, however, non-
from the Pure Self, for, in such a position, his Pure no longer remains Pure, but becomes the Ego, the ahahkara, as the experiencer of all such moments. Prakalatmayati ably refutes this charge of the opponents by bringing <out the real Advaitist view according to which the Pure Self is independent of all the empirical and psychological states or stages, but these states demand the delimitation of the Pure
different
Self
Self as Consciousness for the
purpose of pragmatic behaviour.

is
Hence when the

^^
subject of any knowledge
referred to, the
tana
frameyahhedeno'padliiyamuno'nvhhatabhidhdriiyahark
nimitfikrtya
it't
lahhate
[PaHcaimdiha. P. 317). "" visayanuhhahameva

U'dhanharali
samctttah
codayati
'ahamiti' diasttpardmarsadatina 'bddhamata eieii' {Vivarana,

rarnyate
Pp. 317-318). vi<(ayd7iuh7iavani7nitto'nidamdtmafco'hanh~irah bddhamata e i {PaficapddiM, P. 318)
198
A
Self
is
referred to in
{drastr) and hence becomes as an objective relation in the knowledge otherwise the objective world would not have been brought in contact with the subjective consciousness, whence all our pragmatic life would cease.^^^
Pure
designated
^^^ drastrriipena paramarsasya vimycknuhhavo mmittam, amjatha drastradivibhagasunyaicmmatrahobhasah sijdditl hhavaJi {Vizcerana, P. 318)
CHAPTER
VIII
AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF DREAMLESS SLEEP (SUSUPTI) FROM THE ADVAITIST VIEWPOINTBRINGING OUT THE NATURE OF THE PURE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE
EGO-CONSCIOUSNESS.
the Pure Self based upon the suggestions put forward by his predecessor, Padmapada, gives rise to a very vital and interesting study of the state of dreamless sleep (susupti). Padmapada shows that the opponents' arguments of the
in our conscious
life,
Prakasatmayati's analysis of the nature of
revelation of the
Ego {ahankara) as the Advaitists' Pure Self, should also be carried out in the state of dreamless sleep^ wherein his theory obviously fails. Prakaâtmayaii and Akhandananda further examine
as the Advaitists' this analysis
able conclusion that the opponents'
and come to the inevitEgo cannot be said to shine
Pure
Self or
main argument
against the opponents'

all
Pure Consciousness does. The viewpoint is that in

the functions of the inter-
dreamless sleep {susuptt) where

at
all,
nal and external organs cease, the

the Sruti:
Ego {ahankara) cannot shine
but the Self as Pure Consciousness still shines {cL atrayam purusah svayarhjyotth). In the dreamless sleep, then. Pure Consciousness cannot be said to have been brought to a cessation, for that would mean that Consciousness has left the body by making it, consciousness-less an absurd proposition. In dreamless sleep, what then is actually the
state
according to the Advaitists.

its
The
functions of ail the
organs being stopped. Pure Consciousness or the Self shines

forth in
own
on
;
light,
it.
with the fullness of avidy'd {nesctcnce)
There is knowledge-situations, no rising the Pure Self illusory world luminous principle as the mere
lying passive
of the all-engrossing avidya.
active in susupti, the
state at least, the
no creation cr destruction of and falling of th-^" dvidyaka or

alone shines forth as the
self-
substratum of the passive state Thus when the Ego is no longer
Pure opponent
Self shines
on
and hence
in this
loses all the force of his
arguments.
200
This
ca
A
dialectical
Critique
on the Vivarana School

is
method
brought to a very fine logical con-
clusion with the help of a syllogism by
natma, asati pratibandhe tasmm satyanavabhasamanatvatj ghatavadttyarthah {Tattvadipa?ia, P. 318). [The Ego cannot be regarded as the Pure Self, for when the latter shines and when there is no hindrance, the former does not shine (as in susupit) ; as the pot ^which does not shine in that state, though there is no hindrance to it when the Self shines out)]. As the pot does not shine out like the Self in susupit when merely the Pure Self 4is such endures and not as the subject to any objective reference, so it cannot be held, logically or epistemologically, that the subjective or objective reference in knowledge can be the Pure Self. Thus the Ego as the Pure Self is an untenable
prayogah bhasamane
ahankarah,
Akhandananda
(tatha
hypothesis, at least
is
if this
stage of the shining of the Pure Self
considered.
The
cessation
of
the
is
organic
functions
in
susupti, therefore, suggests that there
at least the necessity

(e.g.,
of these factors for the revelation of other references

jective) in
sub-
knowledge, while the Pure Self is independent of them. It endures as the Witness of the full, rarefied state of avidya, but is not caught up within it as being dependent on other extraneous factors like the subjective or objective state
in knowledge. This is what is suggested by Prakaâtmayati and Akhandananda in their analysis of the stage of suûpti and the nature of the Pure Self in it, as distinct from the nature of the Ego which is meaninglessly sought to be equated by the opponents with the Pure Self. Luminosity of the two in
susupti
is
at poles asunder
and
this fact
alone vouchsafes for
the distinct nature of the Pure Self in susupti.
may argue on by saying that the shine in susupti, not because of the fact that it is distinct from the Pure Self (as the Advaitists contend), but because of the fact that there is no revelation of the Ego, as the subject must depend on the revelation of the object (cf.
opponent, however,
The
Ego does not
visayanubhavanimiito drasir-rupavabhaso'hamullekhah, tadrahite susupte kathamasya prasahgah Vivarana, P. 318). Akhandananda elucidates this point by showing that the knowledge of the object (visayanubhava) must be regarded as the basis of
the
revelation
itself
is
of
the
object
(visayavabhasah),
(jada).
as
the
pre-
object
unrevealed or
inert
Knowledge
DreamUiS Sleep
Pure Self
&
Ego-coiisciousness
201
supposes an objective factor as

Jience there
much
as the
subjective,
and
must be the revelation of the object when knowledge arises but this epistemological necessity does in no wise pre-suppose that the Self as Pure Consciousness should remain
;
unrevealed,
when
the objective
or
the
subjective
factor
in
knowledge is such. To do so is to commit an epistemological suicide by debarring the rise of the Consciousness at any stage of our lifewaking or dreaming. The Ego-consciousness is, no doubt, co-eval with the objective consciousness, but in the
6usupii-sia.ge
higher
Consciousness
prevails,
transcending
logic in
life.
both.
Thus
the opponents' arguments

life,
is
may have good

the
our waking or dreaming
but not in
dreamless
The Pure
Consciousness
ever-revealed
and
self-luminous, be
there any subjective or objective revelation or not.

in dreamless
Hence
to
argue, from the absence of the revelation of the objective factor

life,
that the
Ego
is
naturally unrevealed,
means
that there
is
the self-shining Pure Consciousness and not what
the opponents try to establish, viz., that the Ego is the Pure Consciousness, but unrevealed in that state. Such an argument makes their logic all the sadder in so far as their Consciousness becomes an unreliable master, himself falsely depending on so-called reliable servants. These facts have been very
summed up by Akhandananda in his Taitvadtpana where he has shown that Pure Consciousness is not dependent on any other factors for its revelation and hence is quite distinct from such dependent entities like the Ego^^^ As to the question raised by the opponents that the Ego cannot be revealed in susupti because of the absence of the object and its revelation, these Advaitist writers have further shown that the Ego as seer (drasta) being dependent on the seen (drsya) (cf. drastwam sapratiyogirupam Vivarana, P. 319), cannot be regarded as independent of any such factor (nispratiyogirupam) as Pure Consciousness. The Ego, therefore, falls to the category of the unconscious, which however becomes the consci'Ous seat in knowledge (cf. sa cedamahamarthafy Vivaraâ, P. 319). Thus it falls short of the nature of Pure Consciouscryptically
atmanali samxi'^'- visaydnuWiovasyat niandkaiafiunna tatsddhaJcattam dtupatvacca na tadahlnasiddJiitvamiti/artJiah {Tatiiadipana, P. 318).
202
ness
is

as the latter
and hence cannot stand revealed in susupti

its
in
own
merits.^'*'^
Prakaâtmayati,
still
following
the
his
predecessor,
elaborately
examines
first
possible
Padmapada,. arguments of the
opponents towards the nature of the

the Atman.
state of susupti vis-d-vis,
dependence which the Advaitist urges, against the admission of the Ego as the Self shining in susupti, is vitiated by the defect of asiddhi or untenability of and hence the charge against the Ego as the its own nature The opponents argue that Self in susupti is worth nothing. the Ego, being conceived as distinct from the object on which it is said to depend, can very well be regarded as the Self in
analyses that the probans of
He
on a counterpart
(sapratiyogiWa),
susupti.
This Ego-consciousness
is
nevertheless
the bhoktr-
consciousness (consciousness of an enjoyer), but in susupti it

is
alienated
from the
as
visaya-iela.tion
Self.
(cf.
of
admission
the
and hence is not difficult paraguyavritam drastrrupam
bhoktrtvameva, tadabhave susuptavanubhuyata iti codayati The force of these argunanvahamiti Vivarana, P. 319). ments rests on the assumption by the opponents that when in
susupti there
objects, the
is
no
possibility
of
the
apprehension
of
the
tada319).
Ego
naturally seems to be unrevealed

tatha
bhave
katharh
pratibhasah
Pancapadika,
(cf.
P.
Akhandananda brings out the full implication of this argument by showing that the opponents' analogy of the 'dependence on a counterpart' (sapratiyogitva) in the case of the Ego,
as not militating against its being regarded as
the
Self
in
susupti where
articulation
it
is
naturally unrevealed,
(sabda)
of
sound
which,
provided by the though not naturally

is
revealed as qualified, appears to depend on some factors like shortness (hrasvatva) or length (dirghatva) when we use it as.
'short* or 'long'^^*.
But Akhandananda points out

logical
that
if
we
judge
from
deeper
view-point
(gudhabhisandhi),.
yhataiat [Tattvadlpana, P. 319). ^^* visaydnubhavdbhdi e susuptau ndhamidlekhaprasaJctiJi, tannimittat^ddahaniullthhasya, yathd 'pradekamdtra.'panrmtaiiii pratiyoginirapekmtayapratlyamanaw, hiasvasabdolhkhitayd fratifattau 2>'>cd'%yoginamafeksaUf
>
^^ândtmahdhankara sydditi hhdvah (Viiarana, P. 319). ahankdrah ndtmd, sapratiyogikatidt, vinas%arabvdcca,
tadiadityaithah{TatUadlp(ma,
320).
Dreamless Sleep
Pme
up
Self
&
Ego-consciousness
203
the opponents are caught
in their
their
own
net o argumentsof
view.
and cannot therefore
establish
point
This
deeper logical analysis will show that what the opponents iv^ to suggest here is vitiated by their own arguments previous!) held for, when they hold that the Ego is not dependent on any counterpart in the susuptt-stue, it must be regarded that
;
it is never dependent on such a counterpart. But that will be going against the fundamental position of the opponents who
hold that the Ego is so dependent at other states of our life, viz., the waking and the dreaming. Even if the opponents admit the previous supposition, that admission will entail them in the difficulty that the Ego should be revealed at all But that is. states even without the objective counterpart. never an epistemological fact. Hence the opponents are put into insurmountable difficulties by trying to hold that the Ego in the susupii-stdite on any counterpart, is not dependent
while
the
it is
in other states, for that
makes
their position
all
more precarious by
sound
the exposure of the unstable nature of
the analogy of the 'shortness" cannot save the opponents froni. being dragged into such a position. True it is that the sound (say, of *a') is not short or long as the particular spatio-temporal ethereal vibration, but is such wheneve} we wish to atliculate it as short or long, then depending on the shortness or yet the Ego cannot be length of our mode of articulation the Ego.
or 'length' of
also
;
The argument from
be naturally independent of any counterpart (mspratiyogikam) but becoming so dependent whenever the objective counterpart is brought into relation with it, so that the objective reference always determines its dependence on
said
to
Such an impossibility is. other factors {sapraiiyogikatvam). not merely epistemological as trying to make the revelation of the Ego always present (which is not the case), but also logical. The difference in the nature of the Ego in different states only pre-supposes that in the susuptista.tQ, it is not the
Ego
that
is
This distinct entity
revealed but a distinct entity other than the Ego. is the Pure Self as Consciousness (as held bv
the Advaitists) which shines forth in its own light and is never dependent on anything for its revelation. This Pure Self or Pure Consciousness is not, like the Ego, to be conceived as. being distinct from the other factors which are depended
204

for
distinct
its
upon (pamgvyavttta)
which
so
it
is
from
the
not-Self
depends;
it is
shining in
own
light so that other
objects are revealed in its light, and cannot reveal itself.^^^ If, Jiowever, the opponents still argue that there is no harm if in the susupii-stzte the Ego-consciousness remains, the Advai-
answer that when a man gets up from this state he ought remember (smyji) that Ego-consciousness of susupti, as he remembers the previous day's experience of himself. But that is far from the case. Even if there is no universal rule of remembrance {smrii) after experience (anbhute), yet the Ego as not distinct from the Self should also shine like the The opponents cannot But in no way is it a fact. Self. avoid this charge of absence of remembrance of the Ego, if it
tists
to
is
of
experienced in susupti, by holding that the Consciousness the Ego being permanent cannot rouse up any smrll
through any residual impression (samskara), for even though the Ego is experienced, they cannot say that its experience is permanent. The Ego-consciousness rises and falls with every kind of our experience and thus the opponents must needs regard it as possessing some sort of samskara to make for the rise of its remembrance. If they do not accept this position, they will never be able to account for the fact of remembrance from their standpoint for, even the remembrance of the past day's experience of oneself must be regarded as a fact and they cannot account for it but by accepting that the Ego-consciousness is not permanent, but vacillating, and thus paves the way
;
for its
ently
remembrance afterwards. These facts are very and cryptically summed up by Akhandananda
prag
nirastatvat
consist:
anu-
bhavasrayatvasya
thah {Tattvadtpana. P. 321), meaning thereby that the Ego does not belong to the category of the enduring Consciousness, but to that of the distinct not-Self, which is rising and
^**
pariharo
bhavatyevetyan-
tatasca
visayoparaktasapratiyogihas. vahMvasyahanMrasydtmatvant
îisuptdvanubhavaviruddhamidamapatsyate ityaha tatakca vuayoparageti. dtmanastu sarvatma/eatvanna paragvyavrttatd, ahatmcpaTdgddeva vyavrt-
P. 321). sapeksatvdddtmanMcdnapeksatvdt kathamabheda ttydhasapratiyogikasydndtmatvam cei, taihi tvanmate'pyatmanah /iaidgiydi-rttatvddandtmatvdpatah itydsankyatmanah pumatvdt vydvrjttatvdsiddlnntydKa dtmana tti. ahamityukte vyavrttatd prathate itydiahkya prat1ianamanyathayatiakcmitir{TaUiadlpana, P. 321).
aJiahkarasya
fataSceti
tyavabhasah
ityarthdh {Vitarana,
Dieamlei^s Sleep
falling,
Pure
Self
&
Ego-consciousness
20?
coming and going,
to the
Witness of the Pure Conbci-
ousness.
The Advaitists, however, are not in an> tight corner toexplain their position of the remembrance of the EgoThough they hold that the Absolute or Pure Consciousness
ever-enduring, they explain their theory of knowledge, including remembrance, with the help of vtHis or mental modifications. They hold that the anÎjLkarana or mind being a
is
translucent entity has the image of the object painted on it whenever it is in contact with the object, directly or indirectly, and this imprinting of the object is through the modification it undergoes towards apprehending that object. This modification of the translucent mind to apprehend directly or indirectly, any particular object is known as the vrtli. Now,
therefore,
Prakasatmayati
of
explains
the
ti)
remembrance
mental
tact
the
Ego
of
{ahankci'i asmi
Advaita theory ot with reference to.

that there
is
this basic principle of
modification
knowledge. the nature

the object
is
He
of
says
Ego {ahankarakma
brought in conthe
possessor
as
antahkaranavrtti)
when
directl^y
with the subject.
The
I-consciousness
of the objective reference in

reflective
knowledge
is
the primus of all
knowledge, and hence the mind is modified into the form of the Ego which owns the knowledge. In this way, the Ego being the reflector of consciousness (for, all vtLHs are the modes of Absolute Consciousness which expresses itself through the subjective and objective aspects of knowledge), becomes perceived in reflective knowledge along with the
objective aspect.
Thus
there remains a trace
(samskara) of
the Ego-consciousness whenever a particular knowledge sub-
This trace or impression of the Ego-consciousness like other cases of remembrance, becomes the instrument for the remembrance of the Ego in subsequent moments. Thus
sides.
in
all
in the re-reflective judgments
on the Ego, the knowledge

Ego-consciousness
as
of
the
previous
moment
of
expressed
through the vrLH becomes roused up in remembrance through the trace or impression of that knowledge.^^^
'*"
aharh%rtfxjavaccJiinnamiitdntalikaranam
caitavya'^ya
vimyabhuvamd2'"^'^'''
padyate,
tadvrtii-samskarajanyas'inai anaiac chinnamaii taJikaranam

sviaranopa'puttih. {Vivarana,
smrtyanvbhavatvdechddakamiti
aJiafikdrdMrd
Pp
321-322).
kacidantoJiJcaimoxrttirutfadyaie,
tasydm
vittydia-
206
A To
C)iiique on the
Vivaiana School
.cognition of the
state,
defend the Advaitist position of the absence of any Ego (ahankara) as the Self in the susupuPrakasatmayati following Padmapada shows how in that
state there is
(iiikha)
no cognition o happiness
or
pleasurableness
as
pertaining to enjoyment of the objective
pheno-
mena) adhering to the Ego. The opponents argue that when one gets up from dreamless slumber, he is often seen to speak This phenoof his pleasing sleep (sukhamahamasvapsam). menon, therefore, they argue, points to the cognition of the Self as a pleased (sukhi) entity and this pleased Self is designated as the 'I' or Ego when that state is remembered. But Prakasatmayati dismisses this argument altogether by showing that there is no cognition of any pleasure (sukha) during deep blumber (susupii). This cognition of pleasure in susupli cannot be taken to postulate the Ego as the Self, the mete .enjoyer or happy entity without any objective reference; for, the Ego is never perceived as the Self even as a mere happy
Happiness or pleasurableness is not a fact of the unhappiness or unpleasurableness is. In that state the Ego's functions are all stopped ; the objective world also ceases to function as being known in any way. The Pure Self or Pure Consciousness alone shines in its own light with the fullness of avidya-seeds lying embedded in it as being merely revealed. In such a state, therefore, happiness adhering to the Ego can hardly be postulated, for the
entity.
smuptt-stB.te as the absence of
Ego
Is
as
is
happy
What
is never cognized and hence never recognized. absent psychologically as being a blind-folded entity
also epistemologically non-existent. Thus the state o susupti merely postulates a state of the absence of unhappiness which characterizes the other states, viz., jagral and svapna. Even such an absence is negatively realized by the
Self
which is absorbed in its own unvacillating nature. Hence Prakasatmayati says that there being merely a verbal reference
(sabdajnana) and no perceptual reference (pratyaksa-jnana), an implied meaning (laksana) can very well be imposed on ^mkha as duhkhabhava}^' Prakasatmayati following Padmahhioyahtaih caltanyam vrttivihiatantohJearanasadhaham. tasyaica vHtemase tatsamsMradantcJbkaratiakaram smaj (mamupajayate{Tattvadvpana, P. 321). "^ mukJiyasukhasambhahad duhkJiabhaoasya lahsyasya sampratipaii7iatidt~{Vn.arana, P. 322).
Dreamless Sleep
Pure
Self c^ Ego-consciousness
207
pada also shows that the Ego being perceived as happy should be happy with regard to an object ; but such a position is not and cannot be regarded as true even by the opponents. Hence it is a logical inconsistency to speak of the Ego as happy (in the susupii-stzte) with no object of happiness. On the contrary, the Advaitist is strictly logical by saying that there is merely the negative feeling of the absence of any unhappiness with no subjective or objective reference, for such an absence of unhappiness is, in the negative way, our own experience in
xecognition.^-'^s
Even physiological phenomena like lightness body are incapable to postulate any sukha in the Ego, for such phenomena are purely dependent on the soundness or unsoundness of the physiological organs produced after the slumber. The fatigued limbs of the waking state depend on Ahe slumber for being refreshed and rejuvenated, and that cause being variant with different persons and circumstances,
of the
physiological easiness (like lightness of the body) or uneasiness ensues. Hence these phenomena have nothing to do with the
feeling of
position
any happiness during the slumber. Such being the from the Advaitist standpoint, Prakasatmayati has very well contended that the Ego is never remembered as 'cnjoyer' {bhokt]) in deep slumber (susupti), but merely the Pure Consciousness of that state stands as the present Egoconsciousness of being associated with the
state.
remembrance
of a
This remembrance in no wise makes the Ego as having been happy previously, but only the previous state of pure negativity (the absence of any unhappiness) is now associated
in the experience of the Ego.^^^
The
ever,
crucial
and
final position of the Advaitists
is,
how-
brought out by Prakasatmayati
who
explains
as
borately the
phenomenon
of
duhkhabhava
more elabeing remem-
bered from their standpoint.

?
The
Advaitists
urge that the
unatah duhTchasambandJii muhttviIa/csanaiasthdsayhbandhiHdt sammatavadityasanhyaha tadahhfiva iti sarikcdpa/casi/a sahdolhkhitatvdttatra lakiand yuktetyartJiah {Tattvadlpana, P 322).
{Paficapddihd,
nami
P.
"" vyapadesofi 'sukham suptah, na hificinmayd cctttamiti*
driyate
P.
322).
" tasmdnna
oTiuhhute'pi na
susvptau
'mdtrasydhankdrasya
323).
bJioktrtayd' pi ahanwlUhho' nusmaryata iti smrtiniyamah sat yam dtmanyanusmaryamdne tdvanahamityeva smrtiniynmaJi syddityuLtam [Vivarana,
208
fact
Critique on ihe Vivarana School
of the experience of duf^khabMva is not possible tO' postulate even in the susupti-state for the fact that there is neither the knowledge of the counterpart (pratiyogin i.e.,
duhkha) nor can such a negative feeling adequately explain the self-shining Pure Consciousness lying unvacillating in its
own nature (svarupdfiandanubhavah).
Hence
the Advaitists
urge that the real state of the Self in suupti is the intrinsic blissful state and, therefore, on the one hand, the limited happy Ego is repudiated, and on the other, experience of any negative feeling (like duJjikhahhava) is excluded as being the
real intention.
The
Witness-Consciousness that
is
ever unveil-
ed becomes established in the intrinsic blissful nature, whence it is merely inferred that a negative feeling of duhikhabhava is present there. As a matter of fact, such blissful nature being the real nature of the Witness (Saksm) is not veiled by any ajnana which is not destroyed by it ; but is rather itself revealed. Thus in waking life there is a faint realization of bliss as manifested in love, but is not fully manifested as in
this state because of the
working of avidya.
susupti-stB.te
is
The
Advaitist,
therefore, declares with firm conviction that the

like
jnanabhava,
in
the
duhkhabhava, merely postulated
{arihapattya gamyate) and not realized as the real state, for,
the happiness or knowledge of the Ego is only the goal of exclusion by such negative ways of knowledge. In fact, (he real blissful or conscious nature of Pure Self is fully manifes-
The ajndna being manifested by Sdksm in the susuptimerely postulates the absence of knowledge of the Egoas being connected with the objective world. In fact, the Pure Self is that Witness-Consciousness of all avidya at that
ted.
state
state
ledge as the
and cannot be said Ego is.

is
to
be the seat of the absence of know-
Prakaâtmayati judges the Advaitist thesis that knowledge

or jndna
antagonistic to nescience or ajnana in particular
modes
is is
state there
of the former and shows that in the susuptino destruction of ajnana for the fact that jnana not roused with any particular mode. The state of suupLi
(vrttts)
is
the state of ajnana in the unproductive form, i.e., when it has nothing particular to create to which any particular subject has to be referred. But in the waking or even dreaming,
state,
there
is
always particular modes of knowledge, and the-
Dreamless Sleep
Pure
Self 6" Ego-consciousness
209
ajnana creating the objective circumstances in such particular modes is destroyed whenever a particular mode of knowledge rends the veil lying on objective consciousness. The Saksin or Witness-Consciousness is here related to the objective world through subjective modes (vrltis) in order to have effect of the unity of the inner and the outer world {ahhedakhwyakU). This is undoubtedly the primus in all epistemological processes, but in the susupti-^t2iie the epistemological processes themselves being stopped, the objective and the subjective worlds^ are not necessarily to be brought into any unity. This is the true philosophical approach of the Advaitists in regard to the susupii-sta.te. Hence Prakasatmayati says that the avidya or ajnana, when lying in its primal state of avyakrta in suiupti,. is not antagonised by Consciousness which as the Witness only reveals it. But in other states like the waking, there is inevitably an antagonism between particular jnana or mode of knowledge and particular ajnana or mode of veiling between the
objective
and the
at
subjective
susupti
is
poles asunder
worlds. Hence the state of from the two other states with
regard to the destruction of ajnana?-^^ Prakasatmayati follows up the Advaitist thesis, as elaborated by him, that in the susupti-î2i\.Q there is no duhkhabhava oijnandbhavaj but pure bliss or pure consciousness reigns there as the very nature of the Self, The state of jnanabhava, like du}ikhabhava, cannot
of
be supported by the Advaitists on the ground of the absence remembrance of the Self as being connected with the objecThis kind of argument cannot save the situation,tive world.
which is sought to be revived, that there may be the inference of jnanabhava from the absence of the objective reference in for, as Akhandananda points out, such inference susupti suffers from the fallacy of vyabhicara. There is no universal' concomitance (vyapli) between the absence of the knowledge
;
^*"
nanu-jdgarane^pi
ayuti
P. 324).
na
aiasthaiiScbainsisfasi/apldnasya
ghafddijnaum irodhtadarsandt
l)is
annhMyamdnamajndnam
katharh
jndnaviroclM
jdffarane'pi
smuple'nvbhmdt, patavagamasamayc
{Vii arana.
tasya
ca
Visnubhattopadhyaya in
the
implications
of
the
expression
Upr.iv arana has very aptly brought out avasfMvtsesavtsistanydjMnasya. cf :

:
sarvdjfLat'oam Ddmdiasthdviiesah,
He also says tena viststasyetyaj thah ekairayatie sati yadiisayamajMnarh, tadiisayajMnena mntdhyate
14
210
Cntiqiie on the Vivaiana School
of the Self as being related to the' objective world and its absence of remembrance as such ; for, it is well seen that even when the Self has full knovviedge of the objective world, it is
remembered as such, thus making the inference of the previous absence of the knowledge of the Self in a partiticular way in the i>usupii-st2itQ from the probands of the
often not
absence of remembrance as such, a vyabhican inference. Hence what the Advaitists can say with regard to any such infer-
ence of proving
is
the absence
ot
knowledge or of happiness
is
that in the susupti-st2ite. there
only the unparLtcularised
realization of consciousness
bliss
and unpaiiiculansed enjoyment of

only possible, but no solid inferen-
whence
it
follows that a postulation {arthapatti) of the

is
particularised opposites
tial
proofs of such conditions can be adduced, for such proofs
are fallacious being grounded in the defect of vyabhtcata.
These analyses
ot
the
susupti-sia-te
from the Advaitist

which con-
standpoint give rise to further problems which are posed and

replied by Prakasatmayati.
fronts the Advaitist
is
One
of such problems
that in the suûpti-stzte,
the Witness-
Consciousness or Sakstcaitanya being the revealer of the primal
ajnana and being in the permanent blissful state, how could there be any rememberance ot such pure states of consciousness and bliss with no ajnanakarya remaining at that state ? For, such pure states (or, rather state) of the Sakncaitanya are eternal (avmaiiji) and hence no impressions {mmskaras) can
be- postulated in
it
as giving rise to the posterior
remember-
ance of such states. The reply of the Advaitists as given by Prakasatmayati is that the âksicaitanya being eternal in its
real state
is
not so as being qualified even in the i'W5wp/i-sLate

is
how
is
it
that there
qualification in that state?
Prakasat-
mayati gives a very pertinent reply. He says that the state, not being the state of moksa or liberation, has yet the play of ajnana to qualify the Sakstn. This i^lay is not like that in our waking or dreaming states, yet there is some internal
qualifications of the Saksin as Saksin, as the revealer of ajnana
as the blissful. In other words, there is, (as he explains a threefold modification of the ajnana or avidya lying in the unruiTled state; for, the viksepaiakti or the projective power
and
of
it is
totally absent for the absence of
any objective experi-
ence.
The
avaranasakti
is,
however, futile on the Sakîcaiianya
Dreamless Sleep
for such a veiling
Pure
Selj
&
Ego-consciousness
211
power does not operate upon the latter Such power is operative when the Absolute Consciousness or Brahmacaiianya is veiled due to its nonrevelation as such but as something other of the unconscious realm. The eternal nescience hinges upon Brahmacaiianya so that its real nature is veiled and its false nature is revealed. This nescience is rent into nothing by the realization of that leal nature with the rise of the transcendental knowledge in the shape of an akhandakara vrtti or an undijfferentiated pure
which reveals
it.
consciousness of such real nature.

to such a rise of
sible
Nescience
is
antagonistic
any vitti, but it is not on that account imposon Brahmacaiianya which is veiled by it till the rise of
It hinges
it
upon such caiLanya for its own possibicould not have been postulated, as ]ada or unconscious entities are not veiled for they are never revealed by themselves. What has no revelation by itself is not veiled, and Biahmacaitanya does not mean that any avidya will not vcome to its precints, for it does not antagonise with it, but rather makes impossible, by the fact of its own real nature to ,be veiled and superimposed upon. It is only when that slumber of nescience cannot exist any moment when the transcendental knowledge in the shape of an akhandakara vrtti arises that Brahmacaiianya becomes a confirmed antagonist to the former as light is to darkness. But Sakîcaitanya being the Witness of all our moments of life through which objects are known, unknown and faintly known, is never the locus of any ajnana, for it is ever in its leal nature without
that VI iU.
lity,
otherwise
caring for the possibility or impossibility of avidya. mere passive Witness of the whole of our life be
It is
it
the
of
the
vyavahanka or prahbhasika stages, for, it merely reveals every kmd of experience of life, from that of mistaking a rope for a snake to perceiving an object as 'mine' or 'me'. It is only in
the transcendental or paramarthika stage that that Brahrnacaitanya as undifferentiated Pure Consciousness alone is realized with all the necessity for the Witness and the witnessed being reduced to nullity. This being the state of susupti where the
Saksicaitanya
is
alone revealed
it is
as
the
blissful
and
as
the
very cogent logic to hold that the ajnana has a triple function or modification even at that state. This triple modification is not projective of any viksepa for all objec7iescience-revealer
212

It is neither of the avara?j,a
tive experience is absent there.
not veiled. What then is the nature o this triple function of ajnana ? PraEasatmayati has here laid out a very He has here shown that this vital conclusion of his School.
for Saksin
is
ajnana being revealed by the Saksicaitanya

the SaksiUi for the Sakscaitanya being
these three states.
Self
is
is
nevertheless modi-
fied into piecemeal consciousness of itself, of the bliss

itself
and
of
eternal
is
not eter-
nal as being revealed in susupti being realized in

operative
and through Thus the ajnana as associated with the Pure even when it is revealed by the Saksin, in
life.
susupti, thus vouchsafing for that triple nature being possible
of
remembrance in our waking
quote here the very vital lines from the PancapadikaSaksicaitanyasya "nanu-ajnana-sukhanubhavyoh, vivarana
:
We
cavinasinah sarhskarabhave
k&tbamutihiUisya
trayanamanus-
maranam
vat
syat ?
ucyate-ajnanagatacaitanyabhasaianmopadhit-
ajnanasukhasakswikalpanubhavasya ajnanavasthabhedena caitanyabhasandm bhinnatvat tadvinasasa.'fhskaraja-smaraiîam ajnana-sukha-saksicaitanyakaram ajnanaviîstai-mairayameva sambhavyate, nantahkaranairayamiti" (P. 325). In this passage, Prakasatmayati gives us the logical explanation of the remembrance of the susupti-conscionsness^ through the modifications (vrttis) of the ajnana itself in its triple mode as the Saksin,
the
blissful
and the
nescience-revealer.
Herein he
strikes
very vital note in the Advaita systemfication of the nescience) has
The
avidyavrtli (modi-
Schoool for the

cessor,
first
been enunciated by him in his time in Advaita system. Even his prede-
the originator, Bhasyakara ^ri have not recognised any vrtti in the avidya which is responsible for all the vihepas of an illusory nature in our waking and dreaming states hence in the susupti-stzxe also there is no necessity for postulating such vrttis. They have held that the object itself is illusory and
:ankaracarya
himself,
;
Padmapada,
and
illusory object is revealed to the Saksicaitanya, it capable of producing a recognition or remembrance of itself as such, as it leaves an impression of illusoriness pertaining to the superimposed object as modifying the Saksicaitanya, the
whenever an
revealer of
it
in other words, the posterior recognition of the
superimposed object is made possible even without any a priori avidyavrtti. But it is Prakasatmayati who for the first
Dieamless Sleep
Fiae
Self '^
Ego-conscwusness
213
time postulates the necessity o CLvidyayriM in the case of the experience of illusory objects, and he thus even here in the not 3usuptt-st2ite brings out the existence of the avidyavrtti
operative in any projective
form {avaranaâkti) but floating triple mode.

It is
way
(vikiepasakti) or
any veiling
in
the
as the
mere
falsity
existing
significant,
therefore, as Prakasatma)ati has
brought
its
out, that in the susupii-st3.te, the Self as Saksiu remains in

blissful
and
is
nescience-free
(mukta) state
hence the Self of

only in so far
siimpti
the recognizer of the a

is
pnon
it
states
as avidyavHii
operative in the tripartite way.
The
is,
Self
is,
therefore, the recognizer of

fore,
what
was,
and
there
there-
no incongruity,
is
as
apprehended, that the ahankara or
Ego
it
the recognizer, in the
waking
state,
of the Self in
its
pjiori states in sumpti.
Further interesting studies in the controversy ranging between the recognition of avidyavrtti in susupii (and for the matter of that in any state) and non-recognition of it can be made from the monumental work Advaiiasiddhi of Madhusiidana SarasvatT and its masterly commentary Laghucandnka (Gaudabrahmanandi) by Brahmananda SarasvatT. Mudhusudana has very ably analysed the problem in its pros and cons, and has shown the viewpoints of the two Schools in a very logical way. The two Schools have been represented by him as the School of Suresvara's Vartika (i.e., Bi hadaranyakabhasyavat ttkn) and the School of Prakasatmayati's Vwarana. Vartikakara, he shows, has apparently been in conflict with Vivaranakara in so far as the possibility of any avidyavrtti in the susupti-sisite is concerned but on clearer scrutiny he shows that Vartikakara could not but admit some sort of vriii even at that state. Vartikakara apparently says that the state of susupti can be compared with the state of pralaya (dissolution of the universe), and hence there is no need for any remembrance of the nescience hanging
;
in the susupti-st2.te. Rather, this nescience
is
ever attendant on
the
Self,
effects.
and in the waking Hence there is no
life
we
are inevitably
necessity
it
bound by
postulate
its
special
to
the
existence of any avidyavrtti so that
afterwards as having
is
had
its
revelation to the Saksin.
should be remembeied Suupti
a state akin to complete dissolution

of the avidya are necessary.
modes
and hence no particular But over against this %iew.
214
Cttlique On the Vivcuana School
Vivaranakara has
brought
out
the
tripardlc
avidyavtkii in
susupti to account for remembrance.
Nevertheless, as Madliu-
sudana
says, there is
two, as Vartikakara has
only an apparent divergence between the had to recognize some sort oi vHti
which is unique (and not tripartite) lo explain recognition or remembrance. We quote below the apt passage-, iroxu li.e two
\\orks cited above:
"samskamjaiiyavidydtnliyaivc
,msuptiviiislajnanabha72a{
t.ulyasamagnkalkeualajnanai'iue Lu paramanatvopapatleh. ala eva karyopadhivinaiasamskrtdharavahikalvameva vat ajnanamal)a7neja pialayopaitiaui siisupluilyGbJiipielya aui sausupia]hana'>inaia).iairiapaki tuni. lama Vu) hkaku) a padaili
:
cohlain
'7m
susupligavi}7'iima7ii
ita
najfiaiisamiU
s7tulLh,
(1).
hfdu'
bhiila-
dyavyavadJiaiia'val
hyahnaslhamalliab/icik.
na
kaUiiprk
yayatn.
pralyak
7ia
cagatmspigiksyaie.
(II).
svaythadesah
pai-
artho'riho xnkalpasiena sa smrtah'.
ilyadyavyakUapiakiikatanîiu
Vivaianakataislu 'abhavaptalyayalambana viiliiyUdê'Li
Yogasuhainisaretm tamogunal uiakciva} ariatnaiialambana

advriiih
sumptirityabhiprelya
Laduparaklacailaiiyayya
nasenaiva
nasattaikalinajfmrianuhhavaiantta<>a7nska)avai'C7ia
kimcidavedisam'iti
smara?mmabhyupeta7nil i
aia
Vai'lika-VivaiaUâsli-Brali-
nayorapyavnodhah.
inaTie
sai7i
evoklath
Vaiikakanaik
'71a
cedaiiubJiaiHwyaplilj
sudUprasyabhyupeyale
siisuploluwiili dhlh k777ibalad bhaael'
navedt-
ttyadi. abJnpiayas-
iu -uarriitah, evanica
Saksya]nana.sukhaka}aslisio'v2dyaxnJiayah,
susuplyakhyaikaiva
va
vtltirityo7iyaddiar\
iÂdx'ailasid/u
Nirnaya Sagar Edn. Pp. 558-559.)

"tathacanurmlyadivrtlinasasya
krle
vritiravasyakl.
hetulayah klplnfveua pia-
sukhaivena ]agoramadhye'pi latsiTirlisambhavena suiuplyuitayameva .nikhamasa?niti smrtinlyah-a bijabhavah, lasmat sumplau sukhakaui vritiravasyakl. saivajnanakara susiiptufadaviâyakapi latsukpnkuhca-citsvai'iipasyaiva
avasiha
tatsmriihetuhj
vrttimalrasyaiva
.
nTde
Ladvisayesviva
sma^yala BhamatyamadhyasabhasyaslhayamuklaiJ}, iatha cailadrsasnsuptdu svarupasiikhe cokianubhavo 72a cedabhyupeyale, 'iiaill
talrapi S7nrtihetulvakalpanal
jnalalvena hi sa)vaih
dhisiadubhnyavisayika kirhriibandhaneiyaneyia tadubhayavisayakatva7iurodhena saumplavrUii-avaiyaki. talaica ia^yamevajnandkaratvam svikrlya tadubhayasmi teiâjnane'pi

smrtifva7na7%ubhavika7ii napalapaniyamili jnapilani. varTiita
itt.
vedisam'iii
Dreamless Sleep
Pure
Self
Ego-co7%sciousness
215
Vivaranasya yo'bhipiaya uktak, sa eva 'na ceddyadivartikasyeh
yarthah"[Laghucand)ika
Sagar
{Gauâbrahmanandi),
Nirnaya
copious quotations from the two of the works oi Advaita Vedanta, following in the main the Vivarana School, it is evident that the avidyamtti as enunciated by Prakasatmayati has been one oi the greatest contributions towards the epistemological explanation of dreams and illusions and pure states of the Self's existence as
latest dialectical
Edn P. 559]. From these rather

;
dreamless slumber. All our moments of life whenever avidya has any existence by way of projection as in dreams and illusions or by way of veiling of the underlying conscious-
in
waking life of difference and distrust or by way of a passive element as in our dreamless slumbei, we have a logical and epistemological necessity to admit an avidyavrtii
ness as in our
which is created, even though avidya is revealed directly to the Witness-Consciousness along with the object which it superimposes or projects. Whenever there is any avidya to be revealed directly to a Witness-Consciousness, there is a corresponding vrth along with the object that is differently acted
the avidya, or in other words, the avidyavrtti leaves the remembrance of the falsely cognized phenomenon whenever the avidyaka state ends. Till the rise of the transcer.
upon by room for
dental consciousness, everything is phenomenal or illusory and avidya exists as a force till that sute is reached. Hence relatively every moment of our lower and lower experience of the phenomenal or illusory worlds is negated whenever its relative truth is dispelled by a higher truth. Such relative truths are
all
avidyaka
till
the rise of the transcendental consciousness,
and hence
higher
up To come back
such states are remembered as such as in the electicism of Truth.

all
we
rise
to our original discussions
we can conclude
consis-
this discussion
by showing that Prakasatmayati has very
tently given us his
own
views as to the state of susupti.
To
controvert the
Yoga
slumber
is
a state
view that susupti or dreamless of the ahahkara or Ego and hence it is the
(Patafijala)
Ego
dra:
that
remembers it (cf. abhavapratyayalambana vrttirniYogasutra), he has solidly established the Advaita
view of susupti as the pure state of the Self (Atman) state brimful with unruffled avidya as revealed to the Saksin ; hence
-^^
it is
^'i
Cntique on the Vivayana School
always
the Seif that remembers the iw^wîa-siatethe Self that is attended with nesdencethus vouchsafing for the
samskaras and imupti to be revealed to the waking Self, and not to the waking ahankara, call this Self, as Prof. K. C. Bhattadiaryya. has done in his Studies in Vedantism, 'a lower dimension' q Reality. The ahahkara cannot be regarded
as
the recognizer of the states of the Self in susupti, for that will bring in an obvious epistemological difficulty. Hence, as
Akhandananda and Vidyaranya have brought out, it is the Self that is both experiencer and recognizer of the states of
susupti, while the antahkarana merely vouchsafes for the expression in words of that a prion experience.
{antahkaravâm
II.
tu
smrtasyanhasya
sabddnuviddhamvyavaharamapadayati^
Vivarana-prameya-samgrahaVsiSumsiii
Edn.Pt.
P.
80).
Thisjiew
of the Vivarana has
been very clearly brought out by
Prakaâtmayati, and it seems striking that his analysis of the susupti-stzxt strikes a very significant originality from his predecessor's viewpoint. His analysis of the nature of the Self as
the Witness, blissful and nescience-revealer esse in susupti had not been formulated by any of his predecessors so cogently and forcefully. His advocacy of the tripartite avidyavriti in susupti is a landmark in Advaita thought. The
susupti
bliss
IS
the revealer of avidya
and
its tripartite
Witnessing Self in mtti so that
nescience-revelation are the states which are also revived in our waking life. The positive states of bliss and nescience asrealized in susupti have been rather unacceptable
and
to Padmapada He has rather subscribed to the negative experiences of absence of sorrow (duhkhabhava) and absence
hy
of particularized knowledge {jnanahhavaf^K These facts will rather go against the analysis of Prakasatmayati who has amply demonstrated that experience of any abhava caimot be logically established in susupti, for the expedience of the pratiyogm or counterpart is also absent there. Thus it is only
postulation (anhapatfi) that such abhava
is
merely
later on.
Hence Prakasatmayati
it
known
is
reconciles his
predecessor's
analysis
^7ia
by saying that
tat
is
not the real Advaita view, but

smaranam,
svape
svMSnubhaiasamslarajam
sumaramario duhhhalhavanimittah{ParicapadiM,
him
tarUl
322)
Dieamlesii Sleep
Piiie
Self
&
Ego-co7isciousness
217
jxier-ely a suggestion from the opponents' point of view to exclude their interpretation of Ego's experience of such posi-
tive experience^^^.
Thus
a very significant exposition of the susupti-stdXt of
and following him AJdiandananda and Vidyaranya have also added fruitful supplements to that exposition. This exposition of ihe state of susupti is not only a psychological analysis of the mind but
the Self has been given by Prakasatmayati
is
rather a corner-stone of Advaita metaphysics; for,
it
is
this
problem which analyses the state of the Pure Self as unmoved by any objective factors except as the Witness of the uncreative
mass of avidya that is the only blind principle without calling up the subjective leaction toward any objective world. It, therefore, gives the clue to Advaita metaph^'sics of the nature of Self as experienced in and through our psychological and epistemological moments of existence in waking, dreaming and dreamless states. Prakasatmayati, following Padmapada, shows that there is an essential difference between the lahahkara and the Atman. Akhandananda brings out the real intention of Padmapada by showing that the Advaita view on the nature of the Self is essentially different from the The tirade of TSfaiyayika and the Prabhakara views on it. these two Schools on this point as made by attacks on Prakasatmayati, has been brought out in fuller details by us Akhandananda here reminds us about these two above. Schools which seek to make Self a known entity. He merely suggests here that the Naiyayikas who seek to make the knowledge of the Self as different from the knowledge of the object, but at the same time depending on the mind, commit a logical and psychological fallacy by making knowledge of the Self (either vouchsafed for by the latter through an inanent relation, or being vouchsafed for by another knowledge in a
relation of identity) assume a dual r61e of a subjective process involving an objective counterpart. But there is no bifurca-
tion in knowledge which as a system is coherent and unitary. Again, the Prabhakara theory of the Self as the seat of
samvit or consciousness
^*2
fails to
make
for the invariable revel a-
tika-harenohtcmiti,
sarvatMpi siisupte^jnmasukhanubhava-sambhaiat asambaddhamidam satyam, paramatarndsntyedamiiktam na svamatamiti
na dosah
{Vivararia,
326).
218
Cuiique on the Vtvamna School

tr}'
tion of the subject however mucli they
to establish it
by
the tlieory of tripulipratyaksa; for knowledge
of
the object
cannot necessarily generate revelation of the subject in every act of knowledge, as the subject is sought to be revealed like the subject becomes the primus of all the object. Unless revelation, how can one vouchsafe for its invariable revelation,, however clearly the object is known. These factors of diflSculty, as brought out by Akhandananda, stand in the way of the real analysis of the Self, and thus the chasm between the Ego and the Self becomes wider and more gaping to be shown by Advaitists. (cf. niladipratyayadanya eva manojamta aLmavlsayah pjatyayahj ialsadhakam yannaiyayikadimatarh tanna sambhavatij karma-karlr-yuodJial samvidasrayaiaya aimasiddhiriLi yad guru7iocyate tadapyasangalam anyakarajnanasymiyasadhakalva samhhavat; pMis^sat svaprakasatvamityarthah. svaprakasatvameva tatropasamhrtam^ talah kathamuktamahahkarabhedasyapyupasamhrtih lairaha ahahkareti, ahahkarasya visayanubhavadhinasiddhitvadatmanaica iadvaiparilyad bhedahi loc. cit. P. Thus the Ego being different from the Self on logical 326).
and epistemological grounds,
Prakasatmayati,
following
his^
predecessor, shows that the sruii or scripture also supports this
Advaitist view of their difference.

scriptural testimony
is
Akhandananda
says that this
necessary because the logical proofs for
such difference to be established need always to be supported by

sruti.
Hence
Pxakas'atmayati has given us
some reference to
logical. In the Upanisad we find an interesting discussion on this aspect of difference between the two. Here we find that the Self or Brahman is regarded as omnipresent; {Sa evadhastat so,
scriptural
testimony over
and
above the
evoparistat).
all-pervasive.
The
But
highest
Reality
is
the
Self
that
is
even there the Ego {ahankara) is also^ regarded as partaking of this all-pervasive nature of the Self, (athato ahahkaradesah), which nature is, however, again ascribed to the Self {athata aimadeah). Thus
there is a clear indication of the fact that the Ego, which we regard as omnipresent and equal to the all-pervasive Self, is falsely regarded as such: in fact, the Self is the only omni-
present Reality.
The
scriptural evidence of the ascription of"
is, however, never meant to the absence of difference between it and the Self, in the
all-pervasiveness to the Ego,
show same
Dreamless Sleep
Pure Self
&
Ego-co7isciousness
219'
way
between the individual self (Brahman) has been sought to be established. Prakasatmayati vehemently opposes such an apprehension which is not without justification. But he shows that there is a fundamental difference in the concepts of the jiva and Brahman on the one hand and the ahahkara and Atman on the other. There is fundamentally the recognition of difference in the former case {jioa and Brahinan) at every step of our existence and the sariptures therefore trj-- to establish that there is really an absence of difference and difference is merely an illusion. But when in the case of the ahahkara the illusory difference makes the Self appear as nondifferent from ahahkara, this non-difference is, however, as false
as the absence of difference
(jiva)
and the Universal
Self
as the loss of iight of the real nature of unity. Unity of pva and Brahman is one of the theses of the scriptures, but thisunity never means false unity. False non-unity (as in jiva and Brahman) is as bad as false unity (as in ahahkara and Aimaji). While the first is due to nescience in its veiling capacity or avaranahkti, the latter is due to it in its projecting capacity or viksepahktiM^ Now, therefore, the question arises as to how two objects falsely known as unitary can both be omnipresent. If the Ego is omnipresent like the Self, the Ego should not be regarded as different in essence from the latter, as the jiva is in essence non-different from Brahman.. The difference of jivahood from Brahmanhood is false and hence both are of equal essence. Is the Ego then such an entity, in essence not different from the Self, although this essence which is sought to be claimed to be same by the opponents is shown to be false in so far as the essence of the Self as self-luminous {svaprakasa) is not same in the Ego and the Self? Is not the charge of the Advaitists based on this faUe unity springing from
the losing sight of the essence
that in
the not-Self
is
never
^^'^
tatra
yuklam hhedena 'pratifannayorj'na-Biahmanotehatia&iddhyarahafiMtas^ya

iti
thastadupadesaJi,
fv
pm vamn dtmail-atra'p') att'patteh

piinastadnyudaseTia
prfhaff-
upadeso hJiedesiddJiyartJia
upadisatltyarthah
gamyate. Biahmanah paioTcsasya pratyaksatmulchyCdmatva.'m-
vasiddli aye'Ii amatmatvamupadisya
{Vivarana,
P. 327).
iastie
ahanharatmanoTobJiedasya
samslararalntanamapi
I'imfAt
siddhafiaf
nabhedhapratipattyartham prtlmqiipadesa'^ya
ityarthah{Tattt adipana. P. 327).
hhedapratipattyartJiam-
220
Cyiiique on the Vivarana School
present in the
way
the not-Self
is
is
conceived in the light of the
opponents.
The Ego
sharply divided from the Self in the

fitra is
-essence of self-luminosity, but the
not so in essence from
Brahman.
essence of
To
circumscribe the fiva within the limits of non-
is false and such diflEerence of the two But the Ego is always the projecting play of avidya and is ever circumscribed; thus it is never the Self and hence never omnipresent. To answer such a charge, Akhandananda very skilfully shows that the omnipresence of the Ego is merely a secondary implication like the famous arundhaflnyaya. As the Ego is the immediate object of our perception, the Self which is experienced as a mediate principle in sO' far as omnipiesence is concerned (for none directly experiences his Self as
Brahman
concepts
is false.
omnipresent, but only indirectly through the huti), the ruti
makes the Ego secondarily omnipresent; but this attribuis due to the fact that the Self as the pnmaiy omnipresent principle should be established as the most directly experienced. The very minute star called Arundhati is shown to a newly-wed bride, but as that star
first
tion of omnipresence
is
ordinarily invisible directly, the direct sight of the star is
made by
the direct showing of a bigger star beside

is
it
but the
direct sight of the bigger star
of only secondary importance,
while the primary importance of directness is attached to the Arundhati star. Thus there is no contradiction or inconsistency from the Advaitists' viewpoint if the Ego is regarded as omnipresent secondarily only to show that the Self is primarily omnipresent as a directly experienced principle.
CHAPTER IX
A DETAILED EXAMINATION INTO THE STATUS OIOTHER THEORIES REGARDING THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSCULMINATING IN THE TRUE ADVAITA CONCEPT OF THE IMAGE-CHARAECTER (PRA TIBIMBATVA) OF THE JiVA,
The
Advaitist
is,
therefore, faced with the questions regardIf it is established that the
ing the nature of the Ego.

entirely different in essence
Ego
is
which is self-luminous {svaprakasa) while the former is luminous with borrowed light (paraprakasa), it becomes evident that the Ego is a false creation as being superimposed on the nature of the Self and hence the full nature and status of the Ego should be brought out vis-a-vis the Pure self. This task has been amply executed by Padmapada who has made full exposition of the Ego in its
Self
entirety.
from the
Prakaâtmayati has further analysed the exposition
of his predecessor whose implications have been fully brought
out regarding the nature of the Ego. The implications, as brought out by Prakasatmayati, come under the following headings: (a^ the nature oi the
m aterial
state.
cause
(b) the
nature of the
nature^ Qf__^Le_ g^j[îg!^L!^^^'^*LiL^ ^ nat ure oj itself: (d) the means oj knowledge of it; (e) thejiature of its rnanifestationsi_
(f)
the"naturel) f
its
^wtfÂa
Now
each of these problems
from the opponents' reluctance to admit the Advaita view of the Ego that it is not the Self. This has been very cogently brought out by Akhandananda. He sa}s that an object like the Ego must have some material cause which should determine its status as real, illusory or totally imaginary. TTie Ego should have a distinct status of its own that is neither equal in essence with the Self, nor a real or imaginary entity. If it is equal in essence with the Self, or in other words, if it is regarded as of the same status with the opponents put forward a theory Self in deep slumber,^ the tdudti lias beeiTmore than fully exploded above. This theory, as we have tried to leave no stone unturned to expose, contains
is
shown
to spring
222
Cyitique on the Vivarana School
serious epistemological, psychological

ties
to merit any serious consideration.

i
and metaphysical difficulThe Self is of a h igher

of
'dimension' of Reality
is
n every
s tate
omJij^^hut^thtJE^
HeDce_.that
not on that account anywhere near the,, Self

is an_.entity
Ego
belonging; to the region of the not-Self^
Never-
theless, it is
a positive entity and therefore should be referred
to a material cause.
Now
this material cause is

as real
(as
not
real, for
that
would make the Ego
the Self);
it
cannot also
be imaginary {asai) for that would make for a cause-and-eftect relation between a non-existent entity and its product, which Hence it should be regarded to spring from a cause is absurd that is illusory {amrvacyam or sadasadbhyam vilakmnatn).
Thus
the Advaitist theoiy of causation as
manifestation {vivaita)
efficient
has
to
be
if
accepted.
making for illusor)" Even then an
cause
is
necessary and
the opponents seek to
make
the jiva or Isvara as such, that will entail difficulties; for the
former
is
limited
and
to
the latter
is
devoid of any quality to

is
make
the
Ego
a subservient entity.
That
to
?,7i.y,
Jivara
is to o_
passive a
.
s pectato r
make any
action for such
entities
lo
emerge nature S^îETihel^^^^^^musr^ which cannot be the jiature ofj.hejeH wlnrhîs visayiivam. Thus it should have the nature of visayaivam or not-Self "ancrToF that matter proofs of knowing such nature must be forthcoming.
Now
the usual means of knowledge such as perception cannot

it is
establish the Ego, nor can the Sakstn be a proof, for
ever
is..
unruffled
{kutastha).
Henre \he
as
Adyfîtifit
vjgjy
that
it
merely reveal eid_by,jiie__ 5aA.y^n

hypothesis
b eing
associated with
the
mental modifications (a /zj a^ô mw^t/r/ ^^) is the only acceptable If tlie natur? of its manifestations (kmyam) is postulated as that of doer and enjoyer (kartrtva-bhokirtva) seeing that the Pure Self as Saksin cannot have them, then a problem arises why that nature is not enduring even in the
sustipta-st^te.
These are the
lights
which Akhandananda has
the necessity of each aspect of the Ego, indicated b\ Prakasatma-yati.
flashed
upon
Padmapada has given us

all
its
the true exposition of the
aspects.
It is
Prakasatmayati
who
has
Ego in shown us eacli
aspect as expounded by his predecessor. As to the nature of the material cause his predecessor has shown us that it is the -eternal nescience (anadiravidya), as maya, prakrti, sakti, supti

Advaita Inquiry into the Image-characLer of Jiva
êtc,
223
beiii^
that
is
the
on.
upadang
avidyd as
of the
its
Egp,
Thus
is
the Egô
of
dependent
material cause
with it^for the real material cause h topad anativa) jwhidi is always higher
(anirvacantya)
.or
^
same status Brah man {a bhinnammii-_

than
^the
il lusory
wh idijs-jaupmmp osed. on
the power of avidyia
.
th e unityjof
Brahman
As to t h e nature of the Akhanclananda says, it is possessed of the quality, though false, of creating and guiding the Ego. The Ego is possessed of two aspects as its nature
efficient cause^ it is Isvara,
Atman by
for, as
vijnanasakti andT kriyasalttl or the cognitive and"^ctive powersIts
manifestations
are
those
of
kartriva
(doer-ship)
it
and
bhoktrtva (enjoyer-ship).
ascertained, for
it is
The means
of knowing
cannot be
revealed only to the kutastha-caitanya

Consciousness.
Still
the
unruffled Absolute
such
Consciousness
vouchsafes for the revelation of the Ego that is falsely superimposed on it. The Ego is revealed with no other knowledge,
but
that
is
always revealed as being in false unity with Absolute

It
is,
Consciousness.
in this
sense, as
Akhandananda
shows,
(P. 328),
Padmapada
As
calls it
svayamprakasamano'paroksah
and not
is such.
in the technical sense, for Absolute Consciousness alone

to the question of the existence of the false mani-
festations of kartrtva
and bhoktrtva
pertaining to
susupfi,
the Self
(though originated
in the Ego) during
Fadmapada
logically
shows that when

inoperative,
all
the functions of the primal nescience are

manifestations also cannot
those false
endure, as those are the
products of avidya.
The
question
posed by Prakasatmayati that the vital function (pranasakti) still remaining in iusupti, the Ego cannot be consistently said to have no function at that time, is easily resolved by himself, who shows that the vital function belongs to the p'ctna, a distinct principle of five functions (pancadha vyaparahetoh pranasya),
but the
Ego^coasists of
the
the function to
it
.ûide such
piana^
that tSe
.
Hence
prana
if
Ego
is
inoperative
does not
mean
is also inopei'ative, for the Ego can also passively guide Sut such a reply is too easily given to be believed in. Hence hemggests^^thjajj^^^^^ Ego i s_regaJ^<^g<^ ijlJts partsjrontaining the cogni ti^ and active aspects then it is better to reg ard t hat the former a spect Ts inoperative while the latter is no t
,
Lastly,
however, Prakasatmayati shows that
if
susupii
is
con
sidcred from the angle of drsti-srs{ivada (creation from cogni
224
tion)
A CuUque on
the
Vivmana School
which an old \'cdantist like Maiidana has subscribed to, this state becomes raeiely a void having no creation due to the absence of any cognition, as distinct from dreaming or waking life. Hence even the vital functions seem to be the creations from another wakeful person's cognition, but the man in deep sleep is immersed only in his primal subtle body. Prakaâtmayati, following Padmapada, analyses the viewpoints of the opponents, one by one, against the doctrine of avidya or ajnana as propounded above by the Advaitists. His object is, however, to show that in no other way than the Advaitist theory is the nature of the evolution of the cosmos
then
tenable or meaningiul.
He
first
brings out, in a nutshell, the
Saiikhya views on the bubject.
He
bho-^vs
that
the Sankhyas
do not regard as necessary the Advaitist conception of the ahankara or Ego as the product of avidya which is revealed to the Witness-Consciousness (Saksicailanya) and this revelation is possible only in three ways, viz., as a power (sakti) that is associated, though falsely, with the Saksirij or as related with the substrate, though not as a power, as a quality or guna asso-
ciated with the substrate, or as being super-imposed {adhyasta}

as the snake
is
on the rope
is
for
they hold
that
it
is
the
prakrti or pradhana that
responsible for the evolution of the

this prakrti is never,
cosmos including the ahankara and
way
as indicated above, revealed to
any Saksm
or
in any] Witness-
Consciousness. This evolution is again of three types, viz., dhatmaparinama, laksanaparindma and avasihaparinama. The first is with regard to the evolution of the series o effects like mahai or buddhi (cosmic intelligence), ahankara
wWe
(Ego)
etc.
The
past,
is
evolution are what
present and future references in such meant by the second type of evolution.
The
ences as above.
third t)pc includes the variations in the temporal referHence the Sankhyas conclude that there need
not be any evolution from Consciousness as the background o the process of evolution due to avidya but primal Matter as Prakrii is the necessary explanation of such evolution. This theory of evolution from unconscious Matter without any
is seriously challenged by Prakasatmayati. shows that the Saiikhya view, rejecting as it does any dependence on the Saksicailanya diat vouchsafes for the products like ihe Ego from Matter (Prakrti), does a positive dis-
conscious background
He
Advaila Inquiry inlo the Image-chamcler of Jiva

service
to
225-
the
epistemological
it fails
explanations of the Ego-Cons-
ciousness; for
as
'I'
the
to account for the revelation of the
Ego
subjective element in such revelation

for
its
and
merely
makes room
tive
revelation as the blind not-Selfthe objecrevelation.

is
reference
in
Thus
the
Ego without being
referred to the Saksicaitanya
ever either a blind not-Self or
a real entity with no subjective reference in the act of experience. But these are all far from the truth. The Ego is outand-out revealed by the Saksicaitanya to which however, it is^
as a
product of
avidya which
is
directly
revealed to
such
caitanya, related in
some way or the

avidya
is
other.
Thus
the out-
and-out
false {anirvacaniya)
responsible for the revela-
tion of the
Ego
to the Saksicaitanya, thus vouchsafing for the
Ego
to be a false product produced out of the imposition of

Self.
the not-Seli on the
This
is
possible only in the amrua-
caniyakhyati of the Vedantists as otherwise the Conscious Self
and the Unconscious Ego could never be
related,
Prakasatmayati next examines the Nyaya-Vaisesika standpoint with regard to the status of aniahkarana. He shows that
this School regards the antahkarana as nothing apart from the manas, as an instrument (karana) in the origination of know-
ledge (jnana) pertaining to the Self (Atma).

is
Their argument
of
based on the fact that the Advaitist conception antahkarana, as an adjunct (upadhi) to the Self (Atma)
Consciousness (jnana or znjnana) delimiting as
pervasive Reality within
pirical necessities,
is
or
it
does the All-
its
own
sphere for practical and

for,
em-
never existent as such;
they hold, that
the Self as the subject in knowledge merely requires an instru-
ment
for its contact with the object, and nothing but the mind or manas. Hence for it i quite capable of generating knowledge thus the postulation of an antahkarana
that instrument
is
empirical purposes
in the subject
different
and
from it becomes perfunctory. They refute the Advaitists' argument in favour of the recognition of an antahkarana not as an instrument but as an adjunct to show that such defences are unTheir finding show that the empirical processes of necessary. knowledge (vrttijndnas) must not, as the Advaitist urges, necessarily pre-suppose an dkaya (substratum) in the antah-
karana, for
15
it
is
well within the limits of logic to hold that
226
the Self
IS
Ciitique on the Vivarana School

^
such substratum.^
Again, to
make
it is
the Self the
doer
(kartr)
and enjoyer
(hhoktr), they argue,
not indispen-
sable as in the Advaitist view that there should be

to the Self
which
an adjunct though not possessed of such qualities is
limited by the a7htahkarana,

it
is
its adjunct; for, they hold, that not inconsistent to hold that the Self is active and conative through the instrumentality of the maiias. Nor should
there be any necessity a in the Advaitist view, they argue on, of a false differentiation to be established between the Pure
a*!. Btahman and the individual Self as Jiva, for they will not admit of any such falsity in the concept of the two but a reality in their nature testifying to the empirical reality of the Self as Jiva ; and hence the Self as Jlva is too true as the
Self
doer and enjoyer to admit of any false adjunct like the antahkarana. Lasdy, the Advaitist recognition of the decay and destruction of the adjunct in death does not in the opponents' view, merit any serious consideration; for they will show that the Self is never subject to such decay and destruction and hence the adjunct to support the Self's claim to a different
adjunct after the
fall
of the
first,
is
weak
is
Nyaya-Vaiêsikafe argue that the Self

pose,
logic. Hence the never in need of any
adjunct (upadhi) like the antahkarana, as the Advaitists supbut it is sufficient for the mind to account for the
Even buddhi or intellect they regard as identical Self. jnana or knowledge and upalahdhi or cognition (cf. huddhirupalabdhtrjnanamityanarthantaram Aksapada Sutra).
empirical
with
Thus
or buddhi a distinct adjunct like the, Advaitists' anta^karana or the Sankhya-Patafijala's buddhi, but is nothing apart from the cognition that through the instrumentality of the
intellect
to
the
Nyaya-Vaisesikas
the
cannot' be
manas appears in
the
the Self.
There
is
no question of reHecting
it,
as in the SankhyaPatafijala system, or delimiting the caitanya as in the Advaita system. Here there is a cut-and-dried process of cognition that
caitanya
or
Consciousness
on
has the subject as its substratum and the mind as the instniment. Even the Sankhya-Patanjala view that the cognitive state {upalabdhi) is nothing but a reflection of Consciousness
^^'
jnanadlnamatniairai/atret}dpyvpapatter
na
panseaiidantaJiJiarmapra'
sUdhintydbMsandMh{Tatttadifana, P.
331).
AdvaiLa Jnquity into the Itnage-character of Jiva
227
on
buddhi, for
it is
the Self or Purusa as Pure Consciousness
that has the reflection on buddhi to make for the appearance of knowledge, is not paid heed to by the N>aya-Vaiêsikas. Their immutable conclusion is that the Self need have no
adjunct like buddhi or anlahkarana for knowing, that is possible through the instrumentality of the mind {lasmad-
vainiLamantahkmanam
nasti Vivamna, P. 331). To make for the Self an adjunct like buddhi in the cognitive process is to commit an endless series of subjects to the necessity of diverse
such is the Nyaya-Vaisesika standpoint. answer these rather loose forms of logic Pxakaâtmayati lightens up his belts to establish the Advaitist conception of the antahkarana, over and above the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Saiikhva-Patanjala views. He first throws overboard the first camp by showing that the buddhi and the vijnana cannot be identical, for buddhi is a substance having functions and qualities, while vijnana is never a substance. The substantiality of buddhi is proveable from the irutis (like buddhergunenatm-
cognitive processes
To
agunena caiva hyamgramatro hyavaro'pi drslah where it is said to be possessed of modification, and yada pancaiva Iiyante jnanani manasa saha, buddhisca nengate ialm paiamatmanamasnute where it is said to have modulations
cease at the time of muktt). Prakasatmayati rather pushes forward these arguments regarding the nature of buddhi as a substance distinct from Consciousness or caitanya which
-which
is
more
strictly
vijnana;
however, he
also admits
that
by
vijnana, sometimes in the hutis, buddhi

derivatively it means the means {karana Tcnowledge and not knowledge as such.
vijnayate
In such
is
referred to where
anena) of
cases,
like
vijndnam
jajnam tanute, mjnanena va Rgvedam vijannti manasa hyeva paiyatt, vijnana refers to buddhi as a substance having functions and not tO' Consciousness without any functions, or, rather, consciousness as the
Nyaya-Vaisesika view.
resultant, the
In establishing thus that

contention
buddhi
that
it
is
necessarily a functional means, Prakasatmayati has

identical with
completely thrown overboard the Nyaya-Vaisesika

is
the
non-functional
Consciousness
He, however, does not stop there, for he shows that the Sankhya-Patafijala theory of buddhi as a distinct entity from
the
mind
or manas
the former being merely the reflecting
foil
228
Critique on Ihe Vivarana School
to caitanya or Consciousness also suffers from bad logic. To* regard huddhi and manas as distinct entities on the ground of their distinct functions, as the Sankhya-Patanjala system seeka
to
do
is
without any logical necessity
for,
as
Prakasatmayati
It
is,
shows, the two entities have really
no
distinct functions.
however, Akhandananda
who shows
that vtjnana or buddhi
and
manas are both the conditions general in any act of cognition ; hence there may only be a difference in their vrltis or modifications or modulations but never in their real nature which is of making cognition arise from a condition general, i.e., a condition that is involved every act of cognition.^ ^^ Therefore Prakasatmayati concludes from the Advaitist point of view that the manas is nothing apart from buddhi ; the) are not as an instrumental and a subjective factor respectively in cognition as the Sankhya-Patanjala seeks to establish, but it is> one aniahkarana as the condition general for the empirical revelation o
Consciousness that on different functional occasions is designated as the manas having qualities like desire (kama), determination (sankalpa) etc., and as the vijnana or buddhi having activities of
modulations or modifications in empirical knowledge
The Advaitist conclusion, therefore, as brought out by Prakasatmayati, comes

(like reflection of the Sankhya-Patarijala system).
is a necessary adjunct to Consciousness for empirical purposes and it is also an adjunct for the \-arious states of Consciousness as waking, dreaming, dream-
to this that the aniahkaiana
Even the vital state (pranavyapara) belongs to such an adjunct and therefore when such a state (i.e., vital) stops in death. Consciousness is said to go out
is
less, reflective
and mental
to be revealed.
of the adjunct to a different adjunct. This in a nutshellthe Advaitist defence of antahLkaraxia as a necessary adjunct to Consciousness and as the only functional adjunct at that.
The
imtis^^^ also are in support of such a conclusion. Prakasatmayati further adduces arguments from proofs(pramanas) over and above the srutis and their implications.
"^ tijmyaU7itnet%
xijmnam
buddJiintyarthah.
svarufena bhedah; tathaca hatham tada'pcdafdlj,'' ityasayavanah<t-~fatheU. jnanofpattau manasah sadMranaMranatvad buddheicct tadrhtvahhidliandf na svarupahleda ityarlhah[TaUvad%pana, P. 332). "^ (a) 9adhl7i si apvo hhtittedam loham
(b)
(c)
hJiedadbhe,de\oi
huddhi-mmasorvrtii'
rijMnamayah manomayaJi
kasmin
tttl-ranta
safLcarati
vtkranio
bhavisyati
Advaita Inquiry
kU-Q
^he Image-character of Jiva
229
He
shows that the

to
irwf-s
a: nd
sk
their implications like arihavada
be backed up by valid proofe. is a very cogent proof like arthapatti or atzyathanic^liigîii ti which makes it necessary that there should be aa anta^ksiuria as an adjunct to the Pure Self. The proof comes to thisihnat as Pure Self is partless^ formless
are necessary, but these
-OuLd
Thus, according
his a
2ial_ysis,
there
and
all-perv asive, it s \ârdou
is
stages ofêmîricaTirfe
it
implying a
finitude orlimitati'oirimuife
an adjunct to l irait it. Hcdi T}ihîahkM-iAULi^, howevver,

qualities are
all
impemtive ThaFlEefelhoul d be such an adiun ctAsanta^kmnnaf an adjunct in the sense that its
illusoriLyssup'Cri
mpoSLîOEe^F^gn^
any such qualities i^^hese'
.
jure
Self has ^1Qi^-Jal..caJlacx3l Jiave,
qualities belong to the aztlsM arana
and are
falsely transferred
on the Pure Self, like ihieueddishness of a shoe-flower {jupakusumam) on a crystal-st:oiie {sphafika-mam)7\ Here, therefore, is introduced a discussion b^-yPrakaâtmayati, following Padmapada, of the nature of so ficdkJta bhtama or illusion due to an
adjunct.
In such, cases
ofiIllusion, there is a necessary
adjunct
like the shoe-flower or i\m cs.nt^fikarana for their qualities like
reddishness or pleasure, pâino
etc.,
to be superimposed
on a sub-
stratum
(like
the crystal slo
-ne
or Pure Self).
In nirupadhika
(cases of direct illussioa without any medium of adhowever, as in the casses of iukU-rupya (a shell appearing as silver) or aham 7nanu^ftJi (l am a human being), there is
bhrama
junct),
clearly
no need
for any adjrunct to

on
tion of one's qualities up
aa
other.
its
make for the superimposiHence here the adjunct

be superimposed
it
like the antahkarana niakesSor
qualities to
on
the substratum,
i.e.,
th-cPûre Self, but these qualities are all

falsity
necessarily false
About ck
of these qualities, suffice
to say that
as
in the appeaisance of reddishness
stone, there is no cause or* coondition that is cedent for the usual cryst-als stoae to appear
on the crystalnecessary and anteas
reddish,
such
reddishness, therefore, mustiaiecessarily be false in existence
and
even in cognition, (cf. irtîlhiyU-uam sphatikalauhiiyasya, klptapratlllsaitayoh karanab havjUsztjarihah Vivarana, P. 333). Prakaâtmayati dismis th.e apparent objections to the
ses
t lerreis a tinge of the antahkara7}a on the former (3diimits the latter, whence all empirical behaviour of the Pure- Self ensues. The objections centre round the fact that either tRis ting'e (uparaga) should be regarded
Advaitist contention that
the Self
when
2S0
Ciitique on the Viva) ana School
as merely supent?i posed

sarily
on
ihe Self (which admission will neces-
make
the analogy of the reddishness of Lhe shoe-fiower

all,
on
for
the crystal-slonc that looks reddish not applicable at

there reddishness
is
admitted to be pioduced, bciides making an
miyhoîakhyaci theory of .the,_qjLiality of reddishncssêxis tent else-
where appear oifVsubstratum) or_^Jp} oduced iUusoiilyu221L3: substratum (which admission is also fraught with the objection of thc"pioductioh of two qualities one real as of the aniah-
Thus there are kaiana and another illusory as of the Self). veritable horns of the dilemma in admiiting a tmgc of the anLahkaiana appearing on the Pure Self. Prakasatma\ ati, following Padmapada, skilfulh brings forth the true Advaitist conception of this tinge appearing on the Pure Self, î^-^.toj^' that bothjLhc-ajjove horns of the dilemma arc more apparent than reaJ ^ for ja.ccordin^_to jLheÂdvai tis t conception, there is.a. rationjtl compromise of the two horns_ _He brmgs oui _that_the t inge, a s oHongino to ila^'lLiTlalfkcuanaj^ falsel} suj>c r-impo sccl,
ontheSHfTTorTEFflw?^^ ^*^5ll_Â.^'-iR^^PS^^__(^'l!iI^ ia) on the Self/TThuVtHere is no question of anyalhakhyati where a superimposition merely of the rclaiion of an object existent elsewhere with the substratum
is
is
recognized
but here there

constitute the
crystal-
the superimposition, not merely of the relation but also of

object
tinge)
the
along
with
is
its
qualities
(which
of
the
on the Pure
Self.
The
analog)-
stone looking reddish

ties
merel) called for in making the qualiof the anlahkarana appear on the Pure Self, but thai docs
mere superimposition of Lhe relation of makes for the illusory character of the superimposed and its qualities .Prakasatmaj^ti
restrict itself to the
not
the tinge
upon
the substratum, but also
thus dismisses the apparent obje ct ion of anyalhak yali dire cted towards the superimposition .^f_thc qua liiies of the anlalikaiam
on the Pure
objection
there
that
Self.,
He
also
dismisses
the
other
apparent
of
t here
would
other
appear
two
ties--one real
andTh e
illusorj:^:zjjy
q ualishowing. tha t though
kinds
arcTwo subjects (the Self and the antahkaiana) yet they are merged into one by the act of adhyasa (superimposition) and
hence one set of qualities appears in that act. Now there mav very well be an inter-change of the sets of qualities in an act of
super-imposition, as
is
his Bhci'iya (adhyasabhasya) as
indicated by ânkara in the preamble to itaretaradhyasa (mutual super-
Advaita Inquiry into the Image-character of Jlva

imposition) o the substrata
251
and
qualities of the Self
and the
antahkarana.^^^
Now
the
this tinge of the auiafykarana
seems to be
not revealed by the

imposition
there
is
Self, for it is
the Self that gets the super-
of
tinge.
To
such
an apparent objection,
is
Prakaâtmayati's reply from the Advaitist standpoint
that
no
necessary relation between the tinge
and
its
revela-
tion (uparaktatva and bhasakatva), for though it cannot be proved that an untinged {a7iuparakta) entity is the revealer (bhdsaka) as opposed to a tinged one, yet that involves an inher-
ent want of necessity making for bad logic.
Revelation does not necessarily mean that there should be an absence or presence of any tinge (i.e., external qualities) that is revealed. Even if
the crystal-stone cannot reveal the reddish tinge of the shoeflower because the former
is tinged with the latter, it does not Pure Consciousness or Self that is the
necessarily follow that the
substratum of the super-imposition of the tinge of the qualities

of the aniahkarana also should not be able to reveal that kind of tinge.
is
For, as Prakasatmayati rightly points out, revelation
by the merits of Consciousness or unconsciousness inherent in the substratum, and not due to its being tinged- A conscious entity reveals all the falsely superimposed objects on itself, even though it partakes of the tinge of those objects, while an unconscious substratum like the crystal-stone merely receives the tinge
of the external, reflected quality

revelation.^*^
and can never vouchsafe
for its
These cryptic
lines of Prakasatmayati serve as
one
of the bed-rocks of Advaitist metaphysics for it is on a correct explanation of the concept of revelation (prakaia) as the
(svabhava) of Consciousness (Caitanya) that the whole system of adhyasa as super-imposition, though illusory, upon It, as having made the Pure Self in the light of the limited Ego etc., becomes clear, specially as the light of the
inherent nature
Pure
fait
Self vouchsafes for the ultimate falsity of the
cess of
superimposition on
accompli) but also

**'
whole proAdhyasa is not merely a fact (a a fact of un-accomplishment (a fai%

It.
anyonydtmaJcatdm cmyonyadharmdihicddTiymya atyantaviriktcÔTdJiannadharminormithyd'jMnanimittah aatydnrte mitlivniLrtya 'ahamidam mamedamHti naisaragiko'yarh lokavyarahdrdh {BiahmasutrdbMsya of iSaAfcara; adhydsahhdsya). "* jddyacaitanye avabhaaakatvanaTabhasakatvayornimUte, nopmaktatvatath dpi/any onnasmin
itaretardvivekena
miparaktatve
ifyctrtJiah
{Vivarana,
P. 336).
232
Critique on the
Vzvmana School
Consciousness
will reveal
all
non-accompli),
when
the Pure
the false super-imposition an

of superimposition of
Self,
becomes
all
the
Thus understood, the fact the Ego and its qualities upon the Pure more clearly understood, for it is the
It.
Pure
Self that vouchsafes for the unreality of the

its
is
superimpos-
ed objects and its qualities. The Ego and no doubt, superimposed on the Self, but it
that
.
qualities are,
the Pure Self
vouchsafes for
their
revelation
(bhasakatva)
by
Itself.
Otherwise, -no adhyasa of the nature of blind ballets
upon
blind substrata would have been possible, for such an adhyasa

caxtanya,
would have never been known at least to the Sakîand hence would have been always unknown. A
this conclusion of the Advaitists, the conscious objector
propos
raises his voice
once more only to be drowned in the higher
pitch of the Advaitist reply.
The
objection ensues from the
apprehension that even Pure Consciousness cannot be said to be the revealer (bhasaka) of the superimposed, for It is also devoid of any cognitive process like the unconscious entity
(say,
the crystal-stone, and this adimssioia~is*lrOTrrn^

for
as inert
A^);aî-standpoint,
substratum
the Advaitist never the admits but as Consciousness delimited in it) to
In fact, the cannot be said to have any epistemological process, like the knowledge of the tinge of superimposition, to say that such a tinge is existent, though falsely for, in that case. Consciousness or Self loses its Pure-ness. so Nor can it be said that it can reveal even without such processes,
vouchsafe for the revelation of the super-imposed.
Pure
Self or Consciousness
for It
is
the revealer
of
objects
luminosity, for, self-luminosity
may
pendent of any such processes

-objector
own merits of selfmake Itself indebut cannot by that make the

on
Its
at best
objects revealed at the same time.
Impelled by the conscious
on
these horns of the dilemma, Prakasatmayati in full
force brings out the Advaitist reply.
His reply
light,
is
that the
epistemological processes are never needed by Pure Consciousness to shine not merely in Its
own
but also for the

It.
revelation of everything superimposed
on
Thus
Pure
Consciousness, whenever revealed, makes for the revelation of the superimposed objects and is never for that matter in need of any epistemological processes. Self-luminosity of Pure
Consciousness
is,
therefore,
enough grounds
for the admission
Advaita Inquiry into the Image-chamcLer of
Jfm
233
of the fact that all super-imposed objects are naturally revealed in the light of the Pure Self that is beyond all epistemological processes. Revelation of the superimposed is inextricably bound up with the revelation of the Pure Self in its own light, for, to be superimposed on Pure Self or Pure Consciousness
means
objects
that for
there
that
is
no
or
need
for
any
are
to
epistemological
to
processes
Self
Consciousness
processes
reveal
called
the
into
in
superimposed.
there
is
Such
a
bemg when
particular
special
urge
know them
ways of immediacy or non-immediacy. But superimposed objects, like the anialjikai ayiâ or its qualities, are in direct touch with Consciousness as Saksm. Hence vrtiis or no vrttisy it can be deduced that a direct contact with Pure Consciousness makes for the revelation of the objects, at least to the Saksm. The vHtis are necessary for the pmmatj-caiiaii-
ya
(the epistemological subject), which in the form of Jiva, requires various forms of vrtii to know the external objects and even internal ones. The Sakspi is, however, ever the Witness to all these changeful vrths which are called into
being in the case of the knowledge of the external objects and are also not absent in the case of the internal perceptions of pleasure, pain and the mind all subjective states per se but
nevertheless the latter are always in direct contact with the Saksm where the vrtiis are merely logical postulates to be admitted for the explanation of later recollection (smrti) but are
not directly needed.^^^ Such being the metaphysical position of the Advaitist, Prakasatmayati takes courage in both hands to show that there is an inextricable contact between the Pure Consciousness and everything else super-imposed on It, whence,
naturally, nothing is outside Its knowledge as being superimposed. The epistemological processes, therefore, are of secondary import, for these are required when there is the operation of the epistemological subject as pramatr and hence
all sorts of mttis are postulated to
make
a tinge of the super-
imposed
(e.g.,
the antahkarana)
on the Pure Consciousness;
"* antahharanataddharmddlnam, irtthisaydhhyupagame Jeevdasa7csivedi/ati'dhJiyufagamavirodJia iti vdcayam nahi vrttim mnd sdhsivisayaHarh Jeevdmdksivedyatvam hintu indnyanumdnadijiramanavydpdramantarena edkivhayatiainiVeddnta PanhMm, C. U. Edn. P. 72).
:
234
otherwise
CiiLiquc on the Vivarafia School
all lads of the empirical and epistemoiogicai world would come and go without their being ever known in their bearings and settings, but would have only been superimposed entities without an) subjective and objective reference; Pure Consciousness would then have been the necessary guarantor oi all supcrimposition and all rc\ elation as such. Thus, as on the one side, there is an inextricable and innate relation between the Pure Consciousness and the diiectly superimposed entities like the aniahkamyia and its qualities, so also on the other side, all external objects, as superimposed on It, may be said to be revealed to It whenever such supcrimposition has taken place. Hence the gulf of the epistemoiogicai pro-
cess is not necessar) to vouchsafe for the revelation of the superimposed either internal or external ; for, it is well seen that such processes, whether called into being or not, are merely secondary to the revelation oi such objects that call
their aid
is
to be
known
in epistemoiogicai settings.
Hence
it
that the cryptic remark of Prakasatmayati : avyavadhanena citsamsarga eva pralibhasaheLuh {Vivatana, P. 336) assumes gigantic metaphysical import to understand the real implications of the remark.
been
satisfied
ledge vis-a-vis
The conscious objector has not yet with the analysis of anLalikararia and its knowPure Consciousness, as given so elaborately by
Prakasatmaj aLi Irom ihe Advaitist standpoint. He may aiûe on, that the aniahkaiana cannot be said to be belonging to
the category of the not-Self {idam), as opposed to Pure Consciousness as Self {anidam); for, it is also directly revealed with-
out any necessa)y epistemoiogicai aid, like the Ad\aitist Saknn, To this apparent objection also Prakasatmayati gives a sweeping repl> in consonance with the Advaitist position.
He
says,
though following in the footsteps of his predecessor,
Padmapada, that the Self and not-Self are two categories determined not by their depending or otherwise on any epistemoiogicai aid, but by the fact that the one is of the nature of Pure Consciousness, while the other is of the nature of being revealed by the former. This empiricai method is sufficient ground for the admission of their metaphysical difference. Thus whether there is any gulf of th-e- epistemoiogicai aid or no, as Akhandananda shows it to be impossible to. postulate any pure case of absence of such aid in our enipiri-
Advaita Inquiry into the Image-character of Jiva
2^5
cai behaviour/'^*^ the fact that the azkiabkar&m belongs to the
catôry of the not-Self

of
its
is borne out by such deeper analysis nature in contradistinction to that of the Pure ConsciIn our empirical behaviour, it should be rememousness.^^^
bered that the Pure Consciousness cannot be categorized along, with the antahkarana^ the not-Self, though there is an inalienable adhyasa between the two ; for, as Prakasatmayati bring-s out, there is also a distinctness of the aniaJjkarana which tries to delimit Pure Consciousness, but Pure Consciousness as Self h merely tinged with such superimposition of the anialikara-
na and
not-self,
its
i.e.,
qualities,
thus
making
for the distinctness of the
anlahkarana^ as belonging to the category of the
not-Self.
Prakasatmayati brings out more fully the Advaitist
reply to the apparent inconsistency as tried to be

the category of the not-Self.
shown by
the opponents in regarding the aniafykara\ia as belonging to
They
try to
show
that as the
ahankara
merely separated by the veil of nescience (ajnanavyavadhana), it should not be held to belong to the
is
category of the not-Self

gical aids to
as
there
is
is
no gulf
as
of the epistemoio-
know
it
which
directly revealed to the Sakîn.
Hence the contention of the
Advaitist,
Prakasatmayati, that the category of the
brought out by not Self is revealed
through the medium of vrtiis. while the^ category^ the~"SelF reve aled without any dependence on sii dh medlaTlslhelB. to be inconsistent by the objector wEb holds" that the ahankara is equally independent of any vrttisj as it is merely separated by the veil of ignorance. Hence the Advaitist has to justify his claim on the ahankara belonging to the category of the not-Self, and this task is ably undertaken by Prakasatmayati and supported by Akhandananda. They show that as the ahankara is separated by the veil of nescience {ajndnavyavahiia) the objector cannot consistently hold that it is nevertheless not separated by any vrtti^ and should belong to the category of the Self, as is mainfestly done by him. But the Advaitist reply would be that such a contention regarding the
IS
"* leevalavi/atireMfihdi-anna jndna!sTlydt.yaiad1ianatdyaTh jtrayojahah am

{Tattvadl'pana, P. 337). "^ arthataScitsrarupata'nidamamsatd,
â
jnatncLknydxyyax'adTidne'nttym-t'hah
{Vivarana,
caitanyaharmatd
P. 337).
cedamarhscUd
^^^
Critique on the
Vivmana School
is
ahankam
as belonging- to the category of the Self
a mere
illusory knowledge,
for_whenever the _âhankara
is
said to be
its
fP^.^5?d_by the veil of nescience, it isjaken "for Ranted thaF revelation is not inHependent "of anj w^jlatVll, .for though
there is the absence of any ordinary epistemolpgical aid like the contact of the sens with the objecjt, there isjaevertheless~ an inevitable relation with' ajnanq Ihat jnakej for its revelation j^ in facCjf^Zjî^recognjsed
bj_the^
Mong^ even
Recount for, at least,_th^ recogaition" 'OLlhe.^collection_ofJE^^ Thus the ahankara, though separated merely by the ainana, is undoubtedly an
abject of the category of the not-Self the Self standing revealed always in its own light, ^rhile the objects of the category of the not-Self are always in need of some sort oi Hiseither contactual when depending on pramanas
to ajnatia to
or merely conceptual
is merely postulated bemg dn-ectly revealed to the Saksin (kevalasaknvedya) In the case of kevalasaksivedyaiva even, there is a gulf a necessary medium of ajnana or of its own nature {svavisaya) to make for the revelation of the objects of the category of the
Av-hen
though not depending on pramanas,
as
not-Self,
(cf.
and ahahkara undoubtedly belong,

siddhireva
to
this category
vrttivyavadhanena
pratibhastta,
P.
sanrendriyavisayanamda-
rmti
tadavyavadhanajiddhirevanidampratjbhmm
tndriyasanmkarsajam
Fn;xflfl,
337;
jnanam
M=Mm^mnn^M..^7^^
mirror.
yaihahutamarthamadayahankara^yavyaâahanasiddhmakstpaii-tianvajnaneliTaiivadJpana. P. 337) Prakasatmayati bnngs out very systematically the Advaiin that of the
darihah, vrttHabdasya
vrttisab-
la)
though Pure Self or Consciousness is analysed as being tinged {uparakwith the superimposition of the
is
This discussion
iz.cn^^
is
necessitated
by the
fact that
quahties, yet It
also regarded
as
He adduces ^P^^^^ experience of ''^',"^- '^^ '''' "" ^^^ ^^- i^ ^-' tenable on sSr logical analysis. 1 strict We need not go into details of his arguments, but suffice it to say that
or
appearance of pratibimbas like the ahankara. His analysis suggests that such analogies merely make for the one-ness of the_ bimba (Pure Consciousness) and pratibimba {ahahkara),
external objects and their the substratum for the
other words, between
Brahman and Jwa.
rtfr
.\^?''^'"''
'"^
'^^^ '^^'
^^
as'the
pratyabhiûZ
Advaiia Inquiry into the Image-character of Jiva

recollection of a previpiis-or
entity js
237
an terioiL-e ntity
fr
om
an_existeiU
dh^ne-ness ofjtjie perceived, the bimbajoT_^ face' being experienced as the ^ i>i7'on e ntity froiii.the experience^f~i ts a posteriori pralibim ba can iie_said. to bA-One_with, ^ Jt:;__He shows the arguments, logically tenable, in favour of
the pratibimbas as different from the bimba, in so far as such a difference is negated from the very fact that an entity, existing outside, has a shadow niside a particular medium, like water or mirror. Praka&atmayati first tries to silence his objectors by showing that such shadows {prat ibimbas) may be regarded as transformations of the partsthe mirror in the im age of the original^ _entit]^j^6w _ 6^ whence their difference should_b e^ a thing of_thjej)ast,_fpr suchtransformation of the mirror-reflection due to _a_ particul ar entity outside may be reg;arded as the very entity itself. This^ parinamavada, proceeding from the saikaryavada theory, may be adduced by the Sankhya-Patanjala School in consonance with its metaphysical stand. But Praka&atmayati vehe mently upturns t his view, tentatively accepted, by~aying _that_^ there cannot be any real~pannamaroi the reflectio]nLft;om ks original the impossibility of
apr^^f
coun ter-pafE
This
is
TFelFeHection,
all
it
it"existsat
false,
all, is
the creation
of thTêlf's nescience
and hence
the backbone of
through and through. the arguments accumulateH^tf
Praka&atmayati on this point.

tely that if there
He
has tried to show elabora-
were a real transformation (pariiâma) of the reflection (pratibimba) on the parts of the mirror it would have endured even when the original counterpart would be removed. But that is far from the case. The reflection changes from the variations in posture, movements and prescence or absence of the
reflection of the foce
man whose
face
is
reflected.
The
be said to goout as soon as the original counterpart itself changes from the place, as in the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory which explains the destruction of an effect due to the change of the cause or condition responsible for a particular effect (nimittapaye natmitThe favourite example in this regard is tikasyapyapayah).
on
the mirror cannot
also'
that of the 'knowledge of mutuality'
{apekabuddhi) that
disappearance
of of
is
responsible
for
the
appearance
and
the
two-
ness ever involves
knowledge of two-ness (dvitvabuddhi). that there are two
Knowledge
mutually
dependent
23S
Oiiique on (he Viva) ana School
.entities to give rise to
such a knowledge. This knowledge jt what they conceive as responsible lor the appearance and disappearance ot the knowledge of two-ness. But such a \iew IS hardly tenable, tor even though the mmitta (cause or condition) sometimes is absent from a place, its naimiUikch (eftect) can go out temporarih, but nevertheless that doe^ not really mean that it is due to the absence of the nimitta ; tor
mutuality
is
It is well observed that when a difterent cflect intervenes, the xause or condition is merely intervened in its latent forceful potentiality by that temporary eftect. When a matting which is rolled up for, say, years together is spread out by the hand, the sprcadmg lasts so long as the temporary sanukara (potentiality) done with the hand is operative, after which the more powerful samskaia of being rolled up for, say, months again operates otherwise if the absence of the temporary samskara oi out-stretched-ness meant the roUing-up of the matting, there would have always been the rolled-up state generated by the more formidable iamskma of years. Thus the rolled-up state
;
being temporarily checked

able samskara
is
generated again by that formid-
and not by
^'^-
the mere absence of the out-stretch-
Prakasatmayati shows that on the be clear that the reflection of the face upon the mirror should persist even after the original counterpart is removed, for that image has a strong samskara to rise up, being reflected on a mirror many times. If that be the case, there should not be anything to stand in the way
ed-ness of the matting
showing of
this analysis it will
of its persistence,
even
if
a difl:erent image
is
reflcted, for that
different
image
is
image
mirror
strongly
(say,
merely a temporary check for the original and frequently imprinted on a particular
the image of my face daily on my own mirror). would be an absurd contention, for no one can say with definiteness that the reflection of his face on his own mirror is a persistent factor of experience. Thus the reality
But
that
of the reflection as transformation (panriamn) of
its
parts
untenable on
all
hands.
analyses
From
'''
these
Prakasatmayati
drives
e
at
very
i>nH,Haj,n,,amdtiame(li h-auoulpm/aJi
sarnhnabhui
0/itnu7i~{Vn(oana, P. 340). samHArnnhhrno sa,hi estanopaiano

_
samvestetcfi
I>unaunu.a7>
wdsiii, latJirqn xiruddJiaJ.dryotpattan
Iatha,n thjaianh-yd7,a-nimitieti~{TaUiadlpa7w, P.
340)
Advaita htqmry mlo
he Iniage-cha)acler of Jiva
239
reflec-
fundamental Advaita position about the nature of the

tion
(pratibimba).
He
the
tries
to
establish
is
that
real
the reflection,
as of the face on
inevitably ensue
mirror,
not
transformation
{parmama) of the parts

the
of the mirror, for then there
would
of
question that the reflection, inspite
should endure as having been really transformed in that form once it is imprinted from the counter-part. No amount ot arguments would be able to save its being absent at any time, for the fact of the absence of its counter-part (nimtitapaye naimiUtkasydpya'
payah), for
it is well established that this Vai^sika contention does not hold good in the matter of temporary absence of a nimitta, if there had been a stronger potentiality {samskata) to which such temporary absence of the mmitia is secondary
ihe absence of the original counter-part,
and may or may not be

.of
called in aid to explain the position
He also shows that the reflection never be a real transformation of the original counterpart, for it has no conditions precedent for origination. He puts it in a syllogistic way na darpanadau, mukhyavyaktanLathe eclipse of
its
effect.
.can
ramasti,
lajjanmakaranasunyatvai ; iasamastak& visav-avadilL (Vivamna, P. 341). He then goes on to examine the objec-
tions of the opponents that the Advaitist contention of the

-one-ness of the original counterpart (bimba)
and
its
image
untenable, for these objectors show that even posterior recollection of the one-ness is not warranted to prove the real one-ness of the two, as there is well such posterior
is
(pratibimba)
recollection of one-ness in an illusory silver (as on a piece of shell). To this rather apparently forceful objection, Prakasat-
mayati brings out the real nature of illusory objects and the absence of one-ness between the substratum and the superimposed. His analysis of badha (negation) brings out the full
,
implications of the Advaitist theory where the superimposed the creation of avidya and hence illusory (pmtibhasika) through and through. He shows that negation or badha of the superimposed (adhyasta) makes it wholly negated in its
is
own
nature (of illusoriness or falsity), when, for example, a is falsely cognised as a piece of silver, the latter is negated, not as being absent at that particular place and time (as would be held by the various satkhyativadins), but as
piece of shell
is
being wholly an illusory object that
merely cognised falsely
240
Cnitque on the Vivmana School
postenor knowledge (pralyabhtjmna) of the absence of any image on a particulai- adjunct, say, that of my face on the miiror, which does not necessarily entail that the image is ^mnns^cully false, but merely suggests that it is the image or reflections of an original counter-part with which it is in oneness. The appeorance of the original counter-part on a different adjunct or substratum as belonging to that adjunct is what is negated, but neither the appearance as such nor the adiunc
{pratibhasika) having jio real nature of its own If this be the basic principle of negation from the Advaitist standpoint It becomes evident that it does not merely postulate a relation that IS false, and necessarily which is negated aftenvards, but recognizes the tnlrumc falsity of the object itself. Hence Prakasatmayat. very rightly analyses the difference of the nature of negation that is made in the ca.e of a reflection or image (praUb.mba); here he shows that there is merelv the
" "'r'" aucfof -""^ *'"' ""^^ "'' mean that thT^' he image is m ttself false, or .jnuself false, for neiOier the image
Lf
,s
"
'"-^ '^""'^ ^''''^-
The
disappea^'
'''^^^f^'
"=^^%
the adjunct fmirrorl
ted but
to
nor the iirror only shifted lirom the original places to show that he original counter-part is the only substratum for all imaged
Tn^.
sSh
fol
Wing m
all , essence one with it being the position that PrakaStmayati so ably d^fve at the steps of his predecessor, it
appear-images that are
remains
o'udl
Sn'to tLT" 1 ^^<*m\a True it is (upadh^. T
*^
'"^^^ ^^'^-*'')
(bimba)
is
^'s.a-visVT
and the adjunct
it is
counter-part
that the
image
not negated for
Se;-nf^ra;:--sLrs
counterpart
itself.
But
as that countL-part
itrthe"^^ Zuld r '""""'^-P^^'

to
tZZ
Is
le
'''J"""
''
^""^) ^'^''^^^
becomes evident
- relation o^; that the image
êtteThe h
" *
''^''^
*"
but as
tL*
'"*"r'="'
^ toally
""^j""" ("P^dht), then, is not to be the

responsible for this
'""^ *^ coLter-part therfi; 3ome kind of a TrZ^''''^'^''^ power or potency that is
Advaiia Inquiry into the Image-character of Jiva
24t
It comes to this, then, that engendered in the place of abheda or unity due to some power or potency that inevitably makes unity succumb to diversity. This is the true philosophy of avidya or nescience, the mother of all difference and diversity.
phenomenon
though
unnatural.
is
the bheda or difference
The
totally illusory (anirvacaniya or mithya) is that
which
is
superimposed on some substratum, where ordinarily that would not be super-imposed. Hence the pratibimba, though not different from the bimba, has the appearance of a distinction, however unwanted it might be. This distinction of bheda is, therefore, totally false or illusory and what should be negated is this wrong ascription of bheda on abheda of
the
distinction
it
of
praiibimba
on
its
unity with
bimba.
Thus
becomes
clear as day-light that the quality or
dharma
of bhinnatva
not the bhidyamana for there is no bhidyamana as such, which is one with that with reference to which it is bhidyamana (different). In the case of the appearance of the silver on a piece of shell, the silver is out-and-out
is illusory,
illusory, for the silver
appears purely out of avidya on a subsordinarily

tiie
it is
tratum where
bhidyamana
so, for
is
absent. Here, therefore, not one with that with reference to which
it
is
here the bhidyamana

is
itself is
engendered by avidya, and
hence
illusory and, therefore, negated.
From
these consider-
comes out as a moot question how to determine that avidya, the generator of diversity, should be taken
ations, therefore, it
as generating illusoriness in the appearance of diversity
some-
times in the object
itself
and sometimes in the mere quality
without affecting the object. Here, as Prakaâtmayati brings, out, are considerations to be weighed carefully in determining the nature of illusion ^whether it is born out of any adjunct (upadhi=sopadhika bhrama) or is not due to any adjunct {nirupadhikha bhrama). Reserving our discussions onthis very important problem, we should presently engage ourselves in determining the nature of the praiibtmba as reflected on the adjunct which may be taken as the eternal nescience{avidya) and not any common one like a mirror. For pur-
poses of consistency it should be borne always in mind that 5uch common adjuncts like the mirror are alone not responsible for the appearance of the image, unless it is backed up by nescience present in the percipient. Hence the pratibtmba
16
242
Criitque on the Vivarana School

its
should be regarded in the light of
non-diflerence
from the
ordinarily
bimba when no nescience

intervene, to generate
it as
is
intervenes,
or
should
different from the latter. In other one with the bimba without any adthe restricted sense we have adopted, makes junct, which, for the diflEerence to appear. Thus the objection with which
words, the pratihimba
the conscious objector
ably refuted by Prakasatmayati
may come up before the who shows that
Advaitist
there
is
is
no
necessity to postulate the falsity or negation of the pratibimba
on
the
the ground of scriptural passages like Tat Tvam Asi {Chandogya Upanisad 6/^/1) which seem to be unjustified it the Tvam is not negated by Tat. Prakasatmayati's analysis shows that such passages do not postulate the negation of the Tvam but only the Unity of the two concepts Tat and Tvam
only Reality, Like posterior recollection (praiyabhijna)
of a previous experience as 'so' yam Devadatiah'
Devadatta
whom
saw previously
these
this
is
the
irwiz-passages merely
indicate that the verbal distinction involved in
Tvam
is
mere-
ly syncreticised with its Unity with Tai, as the previous experi-
ence of space, time etc. along with Devadatta is syncreticised with his perception of unity in the present context.^^^ Thus
it is
clear that there
is
no necessary negation of the appearance
the Tt/am-element, when the bimba, Tat-elemem is realized syncretically with it. What is negated is the upadhi, the adjunct, called avidya along with the false perception of the quality of bhinnatva generated by of the piatibimba,
i.e.,
the
it.
Hence while
jivatva
is
negated as being the false creation
of avidya, the Jiva as non-dij6Eerent in essence

is
from Brahman
merely realized as such, and never negated. To substantiate the trend of arguments in this regard, we can refer to the
irufz-passage :
Jivapetam vava kiledam mriyaie na Jivo

it is
mri-
yate (Ch. Up. 6/11/3) wherein
stated that Jiva
is
eternal
being non-diflEerent from Brahman and can, therefore, never die; what die are the false associations of body and senses that are left out as being unrelated in any way to the essenti"^ so'j/am Devadatta itivat tadalmyapoiam, na 2><^rartJiahadhapaiamiti paiUiarati mairamiti {Vharana, P. 342).
tadeiaddemdivaikstyaparityagena yatha so* y amity ader Deiadattasiaoupaparatvam, fadiadiacyarma'pantyagena ciitadatmyaparatvat na hadhaâfiiamasydp7tya7t7iah{TaUvadipana, P. 342)

Advaita Inquiry into the Image-character of
ality of the Jiva.
-ence of the false
Jzt/a
243
They
body
are not warranted but for the existits
adjunct of avidya and

etc.
false creations in
the
difference
of
Padmapada
the
also
suggests
this
Advaitist
interpretation
of
absence
of
is
negation
if
of
the
lealized
pratibimba, along with
i.e.,
Jwa, Brahman,
when
by
it
syncretically
saying
that
there
were any such negation, the form, of negation would have been 'Thou art not (there)' (na TvamasVti) but it is simply 'Thou art That' (^Tat Tvam Asi'). From this syncretic realization there is nothing to assert that there should be a negation of the Tt/am-element to justify its Unity with the ^flêlement. It is rather clearer to hold that the Tvam-element is really the Taêlement not different from it ; only the false associations of accretions are there due to the inherent avidya. To declare avidya and all its children as illusory does not necessarily warrant that what is not due to it illusory board of all avidya îs also but is above and therefore to be negated. Negate the avidya and 3.11 what it can touch and produce, but you can non-negatable, if we can use is never negate what such a phrase, such is the true import of the irutis. The analogy of the image of the face on the mirror, so elaborately brought out by Praka0tmayati, rests on this solid Advaitist doctrine of the reality of unity between Jiva and Brahman' The facial image is similarly not to be negated for it cannot be, as being non-different from the counter-part. The upddhi though here it is the mirror, yet being backed up by avidya. may cause its appearance, yet it is by no means negatable. The only false and therefore negatable associations are the accretions of posture and direction that are seen to follow from it. Negate them as much as you like, but the image lasts not as a false entity, but as the very manifestation of the counterpart that is in association with the mirror and revealed as
different.
to analyse the nature of the
Prakaâtmayati following his predecessor further goes on pratibimha to show that its ap-
pearance cannot be denied if there be an adjunct in contact with the bimba. The bimba has an appearance on an adjunct if the power of avidya is operative, and even then it canmot be said that the praitbimba should cease to appear when
244
Crilique on the
of
Vivamna School
as the
we ha\c knowledge
first
the
btmba
only
reality.
He
goes on to dismiss the objection of the Prabhakaras that there is no such thing as a pratibimba over and above the
bimba, which being recognised without its relation wdth the trunk {gnva),[samsargagraha = gnvasi haivenagra/mTial TalLvadipana, P. 434], appears on the mirror; truly speaking, there is no such separate entit) as the pralibimba. This akhyativada thcor) of the Prabhakaras, sa}s Prakasatmayati, is negated by
our
common
experience alone which shows the facial image as
man whose lace is reflected on the mirror one which seems to be theie on the mirror and It, therefore, not non-existent as the Prabhakaras imply. takes him no pains to show that the appearance of the image, though non-different from the counter-part, cannot be denied altogether. He now goes on to analyse whether the image should at all be existent when the knowledge of the original counter-part is realised as the 07ily real knowledge. In other words the problem boils down to this that when we ha\e the knowledge of the original counterpart (bimba) as the reality behind the appearance of the image {piaiibimba), should the This question arises from the fact, hinted latter still appear ? at by Padmapada, that a unitary entity (dravya and not ;a/?
turning towards the
and
therefore as
or giina etc ) can never be real ^vhen
it
appears simultaneously
no such diavya wdth whence it should be conceded that one of its aspects is false. So when bimba is known as true, the pwiibimba is false and should not appear
in
its
and
entirety at
two places
is
for,
such
bi-polar
existence
conceivable
any longer.
yati,
To answer such possible objections, Prakasatmafollowing his predecessor, has meticulously shown that the
appearance of the image as distinct on a different adjunct is what is false, for such duality of space means a creation, out of our nescience, of the image as existent distiyictly. Hence the creation of maya (or aoidya) as it is, we cannot but recognize its appearance, though in fact the bimba is one with the pranInmba without any spatial or temporal distinction as teaUy piesent. Such being the real position of the Advaitists, Prakasatmayati brings out that the appearance of the pratibimba
need not necessarily be expunged from our sight when we have the real knowledge of the bimba. Here he brings out a discussion, hinted at by us above but reserved for the time being

regarding illusions of two kinds-viz.,
upadht).
245
msupudhika (without
or
like the present instance of facial image or that of the reflected tree
'"^ '^^'^^^'^^ (^"^' ^ TL^^rV" T^^'^ that in sopadhika hhramasWnct He shows
for
-""^
'"''""
T'-'^'"''^'
^ ""^
^^^^^ ''^^^ ô be
re^'^\ fully known fuflv In oT"^^^^^^^^ there
^""^ "^ '"^r^ r

remaining
^^-^^
no ground fof such
'' '^' '''' "^'"^^ ^^ '^'^ -'
-^-^-
nevertheless
sucii
removed
percipient consciousness) transforms itself into the appearance of the image. In sopadhika bhramas, therefore, when the percipient consciousness has no direct knowledge of itself as the substratum of the avidya responsible for the appearance of the image, mere knowledge of the reality of one aspect of the appearance (the bimba) cannot dispel the other aspect of it (the prattbzmba). Thus in nirupMhika bhramas like the appearance of the silver upon shell, the direct knowledge of the shell IS sufficient to dispel the ignorance covering up shell-consciousness and hence as soon as the shell-consciousness is revealed, the ignorance covering it up and resposible for the appearance of the silver is no longer there. Thus there is a deep-rooted metaphysical theory to support the epistemological position brought out by Prakasatmayati to support the continued experience of the image in sopadhika bhramas. In uch cases, therefore, the appearance of the image can be expunged only when the material adjunct (like water) is
so as to
consciousness yet there is a material adjunct like water or miixor which rakes it up. Thus when raking up takes place, atmavidya {avidya pertaining to
is that even if there be "' ^^^^^'^y> ^^^- -^-y yet appeal ^l""""^'^' sopa^Juka bhramas; therefore, .a^...y~a.. is not in conflict with the appearance as otherwise of the reality, for though the real mcentive to such appearance is, no doubt, avidya pfrtaining to the percipient
appearance. But the Advaitist answer
such
and
being such
TZrr
make
the direct or immediate knowledge of itself as being the seat of the nescience responsible for such appearance. The jTva,
therefore,
for the percipient consciousness to have
as a reflection of
Brahman,
when the adjunct of avidya and time is removed, thus
ceases to appear only
responsible for
its duality in space vouchsafing for the direct know-
246
Criiique on the Vivarana School
ledge of the Self or

outside
itself.
Brahman
as the dispeller of
The
role of the adjunct, therefore,
any reflection is not a whit
unimportant, for it is the most important medium for the appearance and disappearance of the image to retard or reveal' In nirupadhika bhramas,. the direct knowledge of the Self.
avidya veiling
other on
it
up the
object-consciousness
creates
something
and hence the super-imposed comes and goes whea

is dispelled, even if the Self or the percipient be not known directly as the ground of all The knowledge of the piece of shell without any
that nescience
consciousness
nescience.
avidya is enough to show that there is no silver that illusorily showed itself upon it. The piece of shell might be pushed forward to be related with the percipient consciousness (pramatrcaitanya which is here designated as the Self) to be brought out
in
its
own
direct experience (viaya-pi atyakâ)
when
the perci-
pient consciousness also
regarded as worthy of direct experience for the directness of the shell, but such far-fiung
as in sopadhika bhramas where the object-consciousness
is
may be
epistemological steps are warranted in nirupadhika bhramas,
in
no wise
facts
veiled, yet there
is
the appearance of the image.
have been very lucidly

thus:
tasmi?i
These summarized by Akhandananda in
his Tattvadipana
Yodhitvdt
adhisthanayathatmyajnanasyadhyasavisatyapyadhyasa iti katham ? iti c^ttatra

tattvajnanasyadhydsavirodhitvam
satyapi
tarhi
vaktavyam-sarvatra
cit}
uia
kva-
rmdyah,
tattvajnane
adityaha-naceti,
kutra
sopadhikabhramadarânjnanasyadhyasavirodhitvam ? iti
idamatrabhi-
prcchayam
dvitiyangikarenotta'ramaha-kimtmti,
nahJyate, kimturdhvagravrksasya jalapratibimbitavrksasya catkyavacchinnatma'paroksyajnanabhavadajnananivrttih, tadabhavasca jalalaksanopadhipiatibandhai tatra pratibandhakanivrttya' paroksajnanenajnanadinivrttih
pretam-urdhvagravrksa-jnanasya
bhramahetutvam
(P. 344).
From
these elaborate discussions as to the nature of the
pratibimba, _Fr2Lk2isatma.Y2iti brings out the real implications of the negation of the false knowledge of associations which jTva
as pratibimba are
endowed
with.
He
first
shows
as
unfounded
the objection against the impossibility of negation of such false knowledge because of the Jiva's being a pratibimba of Brahman
not as a false entity but as one in essence with

the direct knowledge of unity may,
as
It,
whence even
explained
has
been
Advaiia Inquiry into the I mage-char aclei of Jiva
247
above, not be able to dispel the false knowledge of associaations. He shows that in the case of the appearance of Jiva,
there
is
an
essential difference
from the ordinary praU-himhas
unconremoval of the material adjunct like the mirror; but in the former case of Jlva, he is always conscious and therefore any true knowledge will automatically dispel the false associations with which the Jvua, is connected much unlike the associations falsely ascribed to the facial image as being turned toward {pratyak) the man whose face is reflected. In such cases the unconscious image and its associations are removed not by mere real knowledge but also when the material adjunct isremoved. The conscious character of the Jiva is undisputed
unlike the unconscious image, for the latter cannot move of itself without the movements of the bunba whence it is clear to say that it is never a conscious agent. It cannot also be
like the facial image, for in the latter cases they are all scious and cannot be dispelled without the physical
argued that the bimba,

knowledge, for
face
is
i.e.
Brahman should have
the real
it is
the bimba like the
man
(Devadatta) whose
reflected that is the real possessor of such
knowledge.
Here
also this essential difference of the character of Jlva as
conscious must needs postulate that it is not the claim of the bimba or counterpart as bimba to possess true knowledge as in the case of the reflection of the unconscious image of the face ; it is the agent, who as conscious possesses the false knowledge, that should also possess the
false associations
and
as
appearing otherwise
True Knowledge and

;
eclipsed
by
ation
is
with regard to the conscious Jiva
this postul-
^falsely
associated as
severed from
Brahman
in
its
accretions.
Thus
the thesis
as.
put forward by Prakasatmayati is one of the bed-rocks of Advaita metaphysics and also epistemology, for, on a correct understanding of it hinges the true import of illusory knowledge (adhyasa). Adhyasa as being due to avidya or ajnana belongs to the conscious percipient who, as being subjected ta it, must needs get rid of it by the dawn of right knowledge.
Right knowledge (tattvajMna) is the destroyer of avidya or illusory cognition which is in direct conflict with it hence no unconscious adjunct or substratum can be said to have any right knowledge, for it is never under the subjection of any illusion. Ajnana or avidya can never veil an unconscifalse,
248
ous entity, as has been elaborately discussed above, and hence The ordinary is never in need of any dispelling of it. material adjunct like the mirror or water, which is in contact with the bimba, merely creates a duality in the image-perit
ception in which sense it is false. But neither the image is the possessor of any ajnana, nor the original bimba the possessor of any right knowledge ; for both are inert, unconscious
entities
which can never have any
false or true
knowledge. In
the case of the Jiva, however, he has a special privilege of being conscious and this privilege makes him the possessor of
the false knowledge ot duality due to false accretions related with him. Though he Is non-different from Brahman^ yet it is he who loses sight of that unity and, though one in essence, falsely identifies himself wath duality or plurality of body,
mind
ty,
etc.
The
reflection
as reflection
is,
therefore,
never
false, for it is not-dijfferent
but the /lua-reflection than ordinary reflections.

Jiva
is
from Biahman, the Supreme Realiis somewhat unique in character
The
consciousness that
is
in the
facial
veiled as being severed
from Brahmarij but the
image is not so veiled, nor the face itself, for, it is, as has been already brought out, the consciousness of the percipient subject which is, under the influence of material adjuncts, subjected to an avidya {atmamoha), thus vouchsafing for the duality of the images to appear. Hence in such cases the images have nothing to do with the dawning of right knowledge, nor is the bimba or face as such concerned in any way with such an advent. The pratibimbas linger on inspite of the dawning of right knowledge, and the bimbas also are not prevented from being reflected by such dawning of right knowledge
the
so
long as the material adjunct

percipient
as
is
there.
is
It
is
only
the enjoyer of any fruits of false or true knowledge, inspite of the fact that there is a reflection or there is none. Thus Prakasatmayati's analysis of the dawning of right knowledge carries us
directlv
conscious
ptamat)
who
direct into the heart of Advaitist metaphysics
and epistemology,
that
by showing
Entity,
say,
that not because
of the fact
a particular
is
Brahman
of
is
the original from which there
should there be a recognition of Its being the possessor of false knowledge as well as true knowledge ; for no other cases like those of the facial images can
say,
Jifâ,
reflection,
249
prove that the bimbos are such entities. It is the nature of Mvidya to cling fast to consciousness and not to any mere bimba. Hence it is the nature of tatlvajnana to rise in that which is under the spell or ajnanas. Thus considered, it is no good logic to hold that Brahman, the bimba, is the possessor of true knowledge, for ajnana does not directly affect It.
Here, however,
we may
consider the plausibility or otherwise

for,
it is well known that in Advaita Vedanta, it is the Brahmati as Pure Consciousness. That is declared as being the substratum of ajnana. When ajnana is
of such an argument;
said to cling to Consciousness,
it is
the Consciousness as Self

(asraya)
that
is
veiled by
it.
At
least,
the Vivarana School does not
admit any difference between the substratum or locus
and the object (visaya) oi ajnaim, for it is Brahman That is both. The Bhamati School, however, regards the Jiva as the
locus of avidya or ajnana.
position of the two Schools,
ly maintain here that
is
Now
if
such be the metaphysical

consistentis
how can Vivaranakara

Knowledge
this
the Jiva that
the focus of ajnana
and also the an awkward

metaphysical
Schools.
locus of right
situation,
conflicts
?i2*
To
answer such
these two Pure Consci-
we should do
in
well to understand the
regard
between
it
The Vivarana
is
is
School admits that
is
both the locus and the object of ajnana for the and also becomes reflected as the Jiva in being the substratum (asraya) of ajnana. The reflection of the Jiva, in itself being the creation of ajnana, cannot be the locus of ajnana.^^^ Thus out of logical consistency, the Vivarana School has accepted this position, however much the Bhamati School may try to support that Jtva being eternal (anadi) may be regarded as the substratum of anadi ajnana without the fear of mutual dependence like the eternal seed-sprout-seiies {anadi btjankmanyaya). But the admission here by the Vivaranakara o Jiva as the locus of ajnatva or ajnana to support that right Knowledge should belong to him {Jiva) seems very much loosened in
ousness that
fact that It
veiled (vtsaya) by the ajnana
'''*
na
himhaU ahrtam
tattvajnanahrayalvam,
h'mlxi
tadainjajnatiahrtam, tadapi Jivaiiânimiitamiti hhaiak

^^^
{Vivarana,
Icevald
bl^rdntatrahrtam,
P. 346).
piiivasid-
dkrayatva-vlsayatva-hhdgml
hi 'pascimo
mrrihliagaciUreva
dhatamaso
"1/319).
ndsrmjo hliavafi nfqn gocarah
{Samksepa-lSdrtraha,
2y0
logic.

that Prakasatmayati here
We
can, liowe\er, jusLilv
tiiesv
to substantiate the difference of the Jiva
from the ordinary
images as that of face on mirror to show that it is a Conscious. Entity granted thai il is Jiva ^which is in ignorance and with right knowledge. Brahman, in the interpretations, of his
School, reflects as the ]iva, thus
making
for the duality of

is
appearance in the latter; the
latter,
however,
non-different
from the former.

is
Hence
all
duality necessarily being illusory
the product of ajnana clinging

that veil goes awa), right
when
on to Pure Consciousness ; Knowledge as unveiled and
unprojected dawns.
Such being the analysis of the position of the Vivarana

School with regard to the problem of illusion in the context
of the reflection ipratibimbatva) of
for us to understand
Brahman, it becomes easier which direction Prakasatmayati's argu-
ments even in their seemingly paradoxical presentations a& above are leading us to. It is merely not a battle of words to win the cause of logic, but it is the cogent and coherent
sis.
presentment of one's viewpoints that counts in logical analyWe think that we have amply tried to show above that
this place of paradoxical logic
is resolved by understanding, Piakasatmayati that Pure Consciousness as Brahman being projected as a reflection as Jtva ^which being one in essence with other accretions appearing as severed from
the
main
thesis of
ground of all illusions and the disappearance of But that does not in any way mean that Brahman, is the possessor of right Knowledge or is liberated from bondage, for though disappearance of illusions comes within Its purview, It is never affected by such disappearance, for It isalso not the enjoyer of any difference, though false, as Its reflection Jtva is. It is beyond all enjoyment, either of duality
It
is
the
illusions.
or of unity, for It
is
ever
One and
Jiva,
Accomplislied (Ekam Sat).

false accretions that
it
is
How
can
It
be
affected, then,
by any
for
may
as
hinge upon
Consciousness
Its
reflection,
the Jiva
that
loses,
under
false sight, the vision of the pristine
purity of that Consciousness.
So Brahman postulated
as the
ajnana as also its object in this School, is fromi the highest metaphysical standpoint an enigma for Pure Consciousness merely contacts the avidya but is never contaminated by it. It is the most general logical as well as.
all
ground of

metaphysical postulate to
testify
251
to
the existence o (Lvidâ,
not mixed up in the dirty whirlpool of it in empirical and pragmatic associations. Judging from all sides we can merely acquiesce to what Akhandananda has mildly suggested after all arguments on this point sarvajnadirupe ajnanasrayaivasya viruddhatvat tadinparitajtvasyajnatvamityarthaf}. eiaccangikrtyoktam, vastutastu cinmairatantrama[nana?n (Tattva-
but
is
dipana, P. 347).
CHAPTER X
THE IMAGE-CHARACTER (PRAnBIMBATVA) OF JIVA FURTHER EXAMINEDWITH OTHER HYPOTHESES

BEING PROVED UNTENABLE
From
iist
the above considerations of the fundamental Advai-
position,
we may proceed with
confidence to agree with
what Prakasatmayati has laid bare before us regarding the reflection of Jwa from Btahman. The conscious objectors may again come up with their inevitable array of charges the nature of the bad logic of dilemmatic arguments. But it is to
be borne in that the above fundamental Advaitist position does not suffer from the illogicality proved by such dilem-
mmd
matic arguments. The main dilemma flung towards such a position is with regard to Pure Consciousness losing its allits own intrinsic nature as havmg been by such knowledge also. To be more definite and >clear. Brahman, the Pure Consciousness, as the locus of all illusions must be postulated to have the knowledge of such
conscious character or
affected
illusions
also
it
to
justify
its
all-conscious
character;
and that
It is not unby such knowledge o duality (the false knowledge of all false creation that is denoted by the term samsarana). There is no via media for It. Hence, to understand the real Advaitist reply, we should do well to follow what Prakasatmayati
admitted,
will
have to be postulated also that
affected
has
knowledge of adhyasa, but that does not in any way warrant that It is also a creature bound down by that process of adhyasa. Adhyasa
himself said. He says that Bmhman as the bimba being allknowledge, it is quite in the fitness of things that It should be the substratum or locus of all illusory
meaning when it is referred to It as the locus of itself no adhyasa would be upon purely unconscious entities which are not the objects (visayas) of ajnana, nor upon a Nihil or Void for that is adhyasa upon no substratum
its
gets
otherwise
i-he postulation of
at all
Brahman or Consciousness
is,
logical necessity ^"cl adhyasa h
therefore
from the Advaitist point of view of adhyUsa,

not a dialectical process for the inclusion of
Image-character of Jiva further examined
257'
Pure Consciousness within

is
ils
process, for
It
Pure Consciousness
always outside that process.

i.e..
does not therefore, follow;
as a logical corollary
ground,
from the ground of adhyasa that such a Pure Consciousness, is absorbed in adhyasa. The
ground of all adhyasas is ultimately the Self or Consciousness (Atman or Brahman), for it is That which being veiled is also the ground of any avidya that is operative for the appearance of a purely illusory object upon such a ground. E\en in ordinary mrupadhika bhuamas of a shell appearing as silver, it is
the Consciousness of the percipient subject
(self)
that being in
union with the Consciousness delimited by the shell is clung fast to by the ignorance (avidya) which is capable of transforming itself into the false silver. But the Pure Consciousness to which the false silver is revealed directly along with its cause, i.e., avidya, is not in any way affected by the falsity of the
creation of ignorance that
is
operative only in the empirical
world of behaviour and action. Thus in the higher grade of adhyasa where the Jiva as a reflection of Brahman is mixed up "in the hfth of birth and death" the Pure Consciousness as such is merely reflected under the spell of ignorance as something other than Itself ^which the reflection as such does not
warrant. Hence the bimba or

is
Brahman being
reflected as Jiva
not a whit affected with the
falsity that is associated to
the
under the spell of nescience {avidya) as limitedHence the dilemma put forward ness, birth and death etc. by the objectors dies out automatically when we can show that all-knowledge belongs to Brahman, no doubt, but the illusory knowledge of adhyasa is merely certified to by Its presence. Really such adhyasa is in the actual empirical world
reflection
of false associations that are indulged in by the Jiva not in

his pristine purity
but under the
spell of false ignorance.^^

is
The
speciality of the pratibimbatva of Jiva
further brought
out by Prakaâtmayati when he shows that as in ordinary cases, of images like that of the face upon the mirror, the image (reflection) stays on as long as the upadhi (material adjunct
like mirror)
is
there, inspite of real
face
and the image having dawned in
knowledge of unity of the the man, so in the case
^"^ Brahmafi sratmani Jive pratibtmbe samsdram pmijadapi tatiiajMnitvad ndnvsocati ^ iattiajMnasamsarane. cdiaddtaiySMatiddivannetare'
taratra ^yatatlst7âfe
[Vkmana,
P.
347).
254
of
Cuitique on the Vivarana School
the Jiva-xtfL^ction
it
might be of the same nature of non-
jiegation of duality even after the real knowledge of unity,
the Jiva been of the same nature with the facial image.
had But
the
JIV a having no material adjunct
like the
mirror save the
out-and-out false avidya, there cannot be any
moment
of false
i.e.,
knowledge when the root-cause

avidya,
is totally
of all
such
knowledge,
destroyed at the
Knowledge
of Unity.
dawn of the transcendental Akhandananda clearly brings out this

from that of the
the Jiva
as
difference of the nature of jTiyfl-reflection
facial
image-reflection.^^^
The
character
of
reflection
(pratibimba) is finally brought out by Prakaâtmayati by an appeal to proofs of perception as well as ^mii (as well as smrti
and sutra). He dismisses the possible objection that Jiva being limited by blind nescience cannot be the conscious seat that is in essence not different from Pure Consciousness ^for the
any ajmna or posterior taitvajnana ; similarly he finds no reason in the argument that Brahman being All-pervasive cannot be reflected by limited nescience. The Jiva is a refleaion by ordinary experience of his cons.ciQm
possibility of
also
nature that is only acted upon by the limited knowledge wrought by nescience otherwise it is not different in any way from All-Consciousnessit is not in any way limited as unconscious by the nescience that acts upon it. The nature of Jiva
;
as a
pratibimba
sutra
is,
moreover,
literature,
"
substantiated
in
the
different
strata of Vedantic
^the
viz.,
the
ruti,
the
as
smrti
and
Jlva^
{Brahmasutras).^^^
Brahman
reflected
All-petvasive
as
Pure
in
Consciousness
can
as
be
on
avidya
the
same
way
is
all-pervasive
sky
studded
with
stars
appears as reflected on a limited watery surface.

the all-pervasive
possible
if
Reflection of
is not been different
there
is
an adjunct to work upon
the all-pervasive entity to make for its appearance that essence different from it ; had the reflection
altogether from the reflected, we could question whether the Teflected all-pervasive entity should at all
adjunct
as limited.
But when the
reflected entity
be reflected on an is not such
'micidhikabhramanivTttisamhhavMityalMfmijaJi rSpam ru'^jh pratirupo habhuva
{TaUvadiimna,
V.
347)
elcadha batiudhaiva ca dHyate idacandracai. ata eva copamd 8uryakadivat~{Br. But, 3/2/18).

Image-churacler of Jiva fmther examined
255
zn
reflected,
from the image which is of the image appearing on a limited adjunct but not on that account being
entity as to be dijfferent altogether
who can
question
the
plausibility
Limitation is not real in the all-pervasive entity it? even appearing as circumscribed, for this is a characteristic created out of the false bifurcation of the limited and the limiting where in fact no such bifurcation is ever true either in the one or in the other. Thus the reflection of Mrahman as Jiva should be recognized on all hands as the most authentic proof of the real unity of all existence that is running through both, but falsely bifurcated in the creation of accrelimited by
tions
of
associations
in
the
latter,
(cf.
iatpratibtrnbatvam
?ia
cidrupatvanca saUrapratipannam pratyaksapratipannanca nirakartum iakyata iti bhavah Vivarana, P. 348).
Prakasatmayati next takes up his pen to establish his
own
theory of reflection (praUbimbavada) of Jiva against another equally strong theory of limitation (avacchedayada) advocated
mainly by the Bhamati School.

study
the
It
is
rather
these
interesting
Schools.
to
metaphysical
diifferences
of
Dr.
Asutosh Sastri in his book VedanLadarsana-Advaitavada (in Bengali) has sounded a rather discordant note on the point whether the Bhamati School as initiated by Vacaspatimisra can be said to advocate avacchedavada as is commonly attributed to him. He has tried to adduce some independent arguments to show that Vacaspati advocated no less the pratir bimbamda than in any other School (Vide-VedmtadarsanaAdvaitavadaPt. I. Pp. 320-321 also P. 337). But Vacaspati has definitely advocated avacchedavada as an independent^^'' line of argument where he has not followed Mandanami^ra, his model of following, who in his Brahmasiddhi has supported praUbimbavada. (cf. Yo Jivo my an la loke siddhah sa paramatmaiva upadhyavacchedakalpitabhedastaiha vyakhyayata ityasakrdaveditam Bhamati on Br. Silt. 1/2/18 Aniaryamyadhikarana ; P. 254 Ed. M.M. A. Sastri, Nirnaya Sagar
;
Edn).
" Dr. Sastri has referred us to Blidmafi on Br. SiiL 1/4/22, 2/2/28, 2/3/43 to show Vacaspati's admission of 2^^'^*^*"^^^*^''^ of Jiva A veryinteresting study of both the views has been made by Appaya Diksita yedantakcdfatarwpanmala (on Br But, 1/1/4). He hg,s however shown his leaning towards avacchedavada towards the end.
256
A
nanu-Jiva
Critique on the Viuarana School
api
B)ahmaiallx>Twyalirekadviiaddhasvahhax>ah,
tat
kaiham
tesii
avidyavakasah'i varlameial. na ca,
lavadbim-
krpanadisu bhi^mam ; alha ca badavadatal pratibimbam labhale {Brahmasiddhi, ,(yamatddnasnddhi}avakasam tatra
Madras Edn., PL L P. 11). paramarthena abhinna api Brahmano JTvah kalpanaya milhyabuddhya bimbapmlibimhacandmuacca iata bhidyante ; kalpamkamSankhapanilJka on bhedamalramaira evanca Brahmasiddhi ; Madras Edn. Pl XLP. 32). Be thai as it may,
Prakasatmayati has exposed the weak points in the avacchedavada contentions. He has shown that this theory cannot be accepted prima facie on the analogy of universal ether {akaba) as limited by a particular container, say, a jar {ghat a). The analogy o ghalakdsa does not and cannot warrant that Brahman is also avacchinna (limited) as Jiva, for in the former analogy there is no necessity of any consciousness to be limited, Thus if ether i& as ether is unconscious, through and through. limited by the jar, there is no necessity that it should also be
limited as the conscious seat of
all
its
operations, for once limited
by the
jar, it is
ever limited in
unconscious operations. But

as Jiva
all.
in the case of
limited in a
of Brahma?!,
Brahman it is not only limited way as to be the prime mover of

for,
but
also-
Thus
Jiva
there
inevitably arises the necessity of a double Limitation in the case
when
if is
It
is
limited
senses
as
the
by the
accretions of associations as body,
etc.,
the
unlimited
(anavacchmna) residue,
all
there
may be any such

It is so
is
distinction at
(for
when Btahman
avacchinna.
in completeness, but outside Jiva also It

ted),
within the Jiva not wholly exhausto be absorbed in
should be either kept as such or
made
the limited Jiva for purposes of Its all-pervasive character.
But
the avacchedavada shall have to recognize that the all-pervasive
and
all-regulative
characters
of
Brahman
to
(sarvagatalva
and
saivamyanfrtva) should be recognized
explain
adequately
the avac-
their existence in the /It/a-limitations also.
In
fact,
chedavhdm unwittingly commits himself to by such an inevitable position ^for in the
a double limitation
first case.
Brahman
and not as sarvagata (all-pervasive), and sa7vamya?itr (all-regulative) and in the second case. It is to be recognized as both. These arguments have been very finely
3^
merely avacchin7ia
as Jiva
Image-chm acter of Jiva further examined

expressed
257
by Akhandananda
in
his
Tativadipana.^^^
The
and sarvaniyantr cannot be avoided, for it is Brahman, and not Jiva into which It So logical and metaphysical necessity is limited, that is both.
necessity o such limitation as sarvagaia
forces the avacchedavadin to acquiesce, inspite ot himself, to this
unwarranted circumlocution of thought.

da,
In the praUbimbavasaid to exist indepen-
on the other hand, when the ether dently of its pratibimba, whence the
is
latter springs
up on a
watery surface, it is not illogical to hold that Brahman too is simultaneously Itself and the pratibimba, Jiva, with all characters present simultaneously in Its reflection as Jiva. Thus giving his verdict on the pratibimbavada as the only adequate explanation for the appearance of the Jiva (cf. pratt bimbapaksa eva sreyan-Vivarana, P. 348), Prakasatmayati shows
that the upadhi for
such appearance
is
avidya
or
nescience
which
is
also illusory in itself like the accretions of false associit
ations born of
in Jiva,
Hence the elimination
of avidya
is
the only real
for the elimination of all the false associations, of difference that the Jwa creates, though falsely, as very real
way
expressions of his relation to Brahman ; in fact, not only should Jiva be regarded as one in essence with Brahman but should have the upadhi of amdya completely obliterated by the awakenThus the ing of the transcendental Knowledge of Unity.
illusorionness of the upadhi, obliterated as soon as such
Know-
ledge dawns, cannot be denied as making it continue for the appearance of duality in Jiva till such transcendental Knowledge.
into the apparent
examine the nature of the upadhi we are at once drawn anomaly as to which is the real upadhi for the reflection of the Jiva. After all has been said and done^ Padmapada has succinctly said that the Ego-hood {ahahkartrtva) is the cause of the appearance of the Jiva's knowledge of diversity as real, veiling as it does his real Knowledge of Unity
To
^" avacchinnapradeêsvanavacchinnasya
{Vivarana, P. 348)
dviffvnikrtya
pi athamameM
vrttyayogat
rrttih,
sarvagatasya
Brahmana upadhyavacchedo
niyantrtiadisiddhyartham
pnn-
aravacchmne'pi
aarayanlyam,
anavaccUnnasya
vrttyantaram-
na caitadupdabdhacaramiti
tvavacchinne
P. 348).
gaganasya
vfttyananglkai ad
dvigunlhrtya vrttymupapattth hMidh laisamyamifi
{Tattvadipana
17
258
Ctitique on the Vivarana School
(cf. sa cahankaHrtvamatmano tupam many ate ^ na bimbakalpaThus here Brahmaikatupatam Pancapadika, Pp. 348-349). seems to be an apparent anomaly in regarding the Ego-hood, and not nescience so repeatedly brought out previously, as the cause (or adjunct upadhi) for the appearance o the Jiva with Prakasatmayati his inevitable false Knowledge of duality. resolves this apparently irreconcilable position by showing that there is perfect logic in his predecessor "s remark that Ego-hood has a part to play in the emergence of such false knowledge. For, the upadhi, though undoubtedly the avidya, the creator of is that which veils the Pure Consciousness all false knowledge, Such a conception of that is Brahman without any duality. the upadhi unmistakably makes us consider how the Pure Consciousness can be veiled. If we examine the stages of our empiri-
cal
life,
we can
say with confidence that all the stages are not
equally strongly under the veil of one uniform type of false
knowledge and false behaviour.^ ^ In Pure Consciousness the measure of duality is determined not merely by ayidya, but also by the nature of false associations that ensue upon it. In our dreamless state of slumber, the Pure Consciousness has been bereft of all external and internal associations, and thus has merely the solidified avidya as existing without any projections out of it to make Itself standing in a relation with it of mere subjectivity. In our dreaming and waking lives, we are associated, by and by, with the Ego-hood {ahankartfiva) and
all
it
encircles within itself, viz., possession of the accessories
of body etc long as the
Ego-hood
first
is
is
not generated
out
of
avidya
so
active principle of duality, viz., the
mmd
is
or
^ntahkarana
built, brick
not superimposed upon the Unity that
Pure
Consciousness.
The
vast empirical edifice of our activities is
of the antahkaiana or Consciousness finds channels of expressions in diverse ways. In fact, anta^karanavrtiis are the first and foremost means of the unity of consciousness to get
brick,
by
upon the plinth
mind through which Pure
diversified.
However, the antahkarana should again have

of
its
vrttis in concrete centres like field of the knowledge
bodily organisms and thus the duality is further extended.

vyavaha) avikalfatdrat-
We
-, ^"'^"^2/as2/ataccAe?aiavi^'fl?âarafamyena /7, ^'"I/at-~{VivaTana, P. 349.)
Image-choacter
oj
Jiva further
the
its
examined
259
but also
now do not merely know through

in
antQ,lj.kara\i(i
and through our bod) and
all
attendant necessities of
a unique character. So, as Prakaâtmayati analyses, the dreaming Self is merely in contact with the antabharaiia through which it beems to be a creature of a world where his body and its unique f ancLioub are moperati\ e only a mental ^vorld creaicd out oi avulya to make such self live, move and have its being in persists. But in the waking life, the Self is knowung through the aniahkat ana, no doubt, but expressing all the physical wâ^s and means to make itself a creature oi; its self-created uniqueness that is duality. Such being the very nature of the life of Jiva, it is but natural that Padmapada should not merely make him a creature of avidya, pure and simple, but also of all the gross and }ct grosser accretions
;
that are entangling
The
force of avidya
image of
mesh of duality. no doubt, appear in the Brahman, but the Jiva means more than a nescienccinto the unlockable
Jlva^
him
makes the
is
fangled creature
he
also a fully associated being in all the
paraphernalia of such nescience

the very nature of his knowledge
Thus
and
his
Ego-hood
is
in
existence as a bifurcated
life.
being in his waking, and to a smaller extent, dreaming
However, the different strata of his existence, entailing as they do (as we have seen), diversified fonns of upadhi all children
of avidya
is
do
not
make him
different selves in such different
strata or stages.
The same waking man
goes to sleep and
again absorbed in deep, dreamless slumber. ness of his own self endures uniformly, and is
distinct or diverse in such stages.
The
distinc-
not further
For, as Prakasatmayati
and
Akhandananda,
specially,
have aptly shown that when a Jwa

distinct,
has the primary upadhi of avidya to make him
no
the
amount
of
internal
multiplication
or
as
diversification
of
upadhis will make the same Jiva as a Jiva is not made to be regarded
avidya, his internal diversifications
self different creatures
But when such by multiply as making himdiverse.
distinct primarily
under circumstantial
diversities of
the
attendants of avidya.
Prakasatmayati analvses the peculiar nature of the state

of susupii where there
tions of the
is
seen a cessation of
is
all
the gross funcsay,
body
in
the self
being
only
relation
absorbed into itself, so to wnth solidified avidya through
the
260
Critique on the
Vivamna School
there being
subtle body (lingaiarlra).
Thus
no scope
for false
knowledge {bhranti) in such a state of the physical existence, the Jiva may be said to have no knowledge of duality from Brahman. Thus the susupti-staie becomes a state without any false knowledge due to the definite working of the avidya such being the apparently justifiable argument from the opponents' point of view, it becomes indispensable that the real nature of this state vis-d-vls avidya has to be brought out from
the
Advaitist
this
point
of
view.
Prakasatmayati
proceeds
to
achieve
shows
that,
end with utmost precision of thoughts. He no doubt, the susupk-sinie is bereft of any gross
said to be outside the it cannot be realm of ignorance, and all the attendant false knowledge of The knowledge oi divisions need not be due to divisions. for its being strictly pioduced out of avidya {avidya-karya), such knowledge may be justified on other grounds as well. Such knowledge is possible in the sii m pi i-sUtc because of the fact that division and its knowledge in susupii are dependent, though not produced, on avidya {avidya-Lantra). This fact is
physical functions, yet
by Prakasatmayati and is clearly stated by Akhandananda.^*^^ But even if such a standpoint is taken up by the Advaitist, his ground must be securely laid against the possible objection that such a knowledge of divisions, though dependent on avidya, cannot be said to have originated in the susupii-s,iiiic as in the pralaya-state, for such two states are bereft of any active functions thus making all divisions naturally alien to the Jwa who is in such states of an all-ceasing existence and making avidya reside only in Pure Consciousness which should therefore be the substratum of such divisions moreover, if such divisional knowledge is admitted to be unproduced (akarya) in the susupti-sta-te, it must be admitted to be eternal and hence no relation with the avidya on which it is dependent can be said to exist. Tosuch heavy charges metaphysical and cpistemological replies should be as precise as possible and this task of precision is so ably executed by Prakasatmayati from the standpoint of
significantly hinted at
"- G*â
hliulnti-}fianamana'pe'ksyah-a
arthagala
era vihMgah
afasca
l-alpyafe
{V 11
at ana,
349
hJieda^yri
iidi '.difalarifati
am
hmtiitatfantraUum,
hliravlya-
hlK'ue'jn
hhcdopapaftmti gudhabUsandJuh.
{TatHadjpana, P. 349)

his School.
261
He
the real owner of

divisions
fast
admits that Pure Consciousness should not be all divisions and their knowledge ; such
and their knowledge spring from avidya which clings Pure Consciousness, no doubt, but it is the Jwa that owns all the false associations and their knowledge springing from the primal avidya. Thus in the susupti-stBle also there should be a Jtva who has fallen from his original purity and
to
and ever in the possession of all false associationsand Brahman is as true in the suiuptf state as in other states. But such division may be said to be only a logical necessity and not due to any positive existence and if such a logical necessity is merely of JEalse knowledge admitted, then the causal character of avidya from which such
is
who The
ever
division into Jiva
knowledge is produced may be said to be a fiction, for such knowledge may well be regarded as springing from eternity (anadi) and from non-falsity (ambhrama). To answer such charges against the Advaitist, Praka0tmayati shows that the and their knowledge are dependent on avidya divisions (avidyatayitia), though they are eternally present (anadi) and hence in susupti they are operative in the way as to make Jiva a divided being. The effects of avidya are existent even in the susupti-stzte, though not in the same physical operations as in other states and hence divisional knowledge of the Jiva even in that state is to be admitted as being under the Eternality of that knowledge spell of avidya (avidyatantra).
cannot make it independent of the influence of avidya in so far as it is not created out of the latter, for here eternality Such itself of such knowledge is under the spell of the latter. an influence of avidya is evident even in the unproduced relation of the Self with avidya (atmavidyasambandha), for such a relation exists even from eternity. It cannot be held
that the avidya, before
its
relation with the Self,
is
existent
it
and hence the relation is effected and not eternal, ^ priori absence (pragabhava). Such a hypothesis
able, for avidya
for
is
has
unten-
cannot
exist
independently without the
and not a priori absence, of the relation that subsists between itself and the Self, for avidya itself is blind or inert and is revealed only by the Self or Consciousness.
priori presence,
Moreover, such relation being ipso facto eternal for the fact of the related avidya being so it follows that such a relation is
262
not produced in any way, but is still under the spell of avidya to exist with all the baneful effects that the avidya produces.
It is clear, therefore, that in the susupti-state also there is
an
inevitable effect of division that
is false,
subsisting on avidya,
though not created
at that state for

all
being unjustified in such
a passive state of cessation of
functions.
Such a divisional knowledge springing out of avidya^, though not produced out of it, is nevertheless not attendant on Pure Consciousness, but on the consciousness appearing as This is evident from a logical analysis which will furJiva.
ther corroborate the position that the /Tt/fl-consciousness will

also
make
the Pure Consciousness appear
in such divisional
knowledge, yet will make

it
is
room
for
it
its
destruction.
For, the
division being the effect of avidya,

illusory,
goes without saying that

is
and Pure Consciousness, that

its
One and
though
all
Uni-
form, cannot be
real
substratum.
Thus
Pure
it
Consciousness will appeal as the divided /Tt/a-consciousness,

is
the latter that will be the real substratum of
the false
associations of divisions.
{viiesana) avidya
Hence
it
is
really the qualificative
real seat of all

sits
makes the qualified (visisia) Jiva the such false knowledge, and Pure Consciousness
that
its
as
merely reflected in
nature in the 7Tt/fl-consciousness,
but never on that account makes the divisions uneradicable being co-eval with itself; it is the avidya that is the crsatnce of such divisions and their knowledge which are obliterated
whenever such divisions are nipped in the very bud of avidya. Thus though Prakasatmayati holds that the divisions are dependent on avidya {avidy atantra), he equally asserts that such divisions are also false and eradicable. In Pure Consciousness there cannot be any such divisions. It only appears as an image to make for the divisions to be evolved out of avidya not as produced products but merely as dependents. Such being the status of the knowledge of divisions that ensue from avidya being dependent on it, there remains very little to add to the establishment of falsity inspite of eternalit) of such divisions. It has been shown above "that there is nothing to debar the divisions from depending upon avidya (avidyaiantra), even though they are not produced out of it, as the eternal relation of the Self with avidya is dependen on avidya Itself and hence false. Thus though avidya is the creatnce
Image-character of ]iva further examined

of
ail divisions,
267
such divisions and their knowledge cannot be said to be produced out of it, only to justify the passive state of susupti ; hence the conscious objector, lurking in his lurch, may come forward with the argument that when divisions are not produced {ka-rya) and are yet there from eternity, it can
be safely concluded that they are not to be destroyed by true Knowledge, as the Eternal, Unproduced Self is. In fact, such a syllogistic form from the objector's point of view has been posed by Akhandananda.^^^ Therefore the objector would have us admit that the vibhagas (divisions) are produced (karya) from the avidya on which they depend. But Prakasatmayati ably shows that there is no such invariable concomitance between unproduced-ness {akaryatva) and undestroyedness by Knowledge (jnananivarttyatva), when it is shown that the unproduced entities are nevertheless destroyed by Knowledge, unlike he Eternal Self, for the fact of their depending
Thus the divisions being clearly shown to have been born out of the adjunct {avidya), as in the common cases of reflection on mirror, water etc. (where, avidya is also present at the background, as we have discussed above), there remains very little to add that the avidya is the real originator of all divisions ; but Prakas'atmayati also shows that the other adjuncts which are gradual accretions like the ahankara (Ego-hood) are also the grosser adjuncts for the reflection of
all
on avidya}^^
the divisions that are enjoyed by /zt/a-consciousness.
The
real implications of the JTt/<2-consciousness as a reflec-
tion (pratibimha) of
Brahman
are,
however, antagonised with
by the School of Bhagavad-Bhaskara, the Vedantic teacher of the theory of bhedabheda (identity-in-difiference). The
Bhaskara School wants the Advaitist to admit that the Jiva should not be regarded as a reflection in order to justify his. bondage and liberation (bandha-moksau) for which purposes, he should be regarded not as a reflection, but as a real concrete entity that exists differently
a relation of identity wih

^^^
It.
from Brahman but has alsoSuch being the Bhaskara posi-
Mryatvam, aMryatie jMnanina syat, aiidyat%riktatie mtyanaditvadatmaiat ityakanhya jihhayatrd'pi tyabhicaramaha avidyeti {Taitvadlpana, P. 351.) ^** avidyatantrdndm cdmrvacanlyafvamandditvafica avidyasccmhandhak'anva mrudhyate {Vivarana, P. 351.)
aibhaga&i/Si id^/dtantiatvat ghafddicat
vca-tj/atvam
264
tion,
Prakasatmayati opposes, tooth and nail, this bhedabheda

trying
to
theory
Jiva.
tists,
expunge the
reflectional
character
of
the
He
is
shows that such a view, as advocated by the Advaibased upon solid foundations of logical and metaphy-
sical
arguments.
The
is
reflectional character of the
Jwa makes
him
for
identical in essence with
Brahman; hence
the Bhaskara
view that the image

It
not an entity (vastu) like the Brahman, and hence it cannot be the seat of bondage and liberation, proceeds from a misunderstanding of the real implications of the Jwa as a reflection. For, the bhedabhedavadin thinks that the Jwa should be a real one as an entity which is not wholly identical essence with Brahman. But the Advaitist position is that the Jlva,
is
a mere reflection of identity,
being identical
essence with
Brahman, does not exhaust

is
himself for any other associations, that are appended to him.
The
man
seat of
bondage and liberation

all
the Jlt/a-consciousness,
no doubt, but
in essence
the 7wfl-consciousness as identical with Brah;
other associations that are credited to
it
dawning of real Knowledge. Hence the bhedabhedavadin need not be unduly anxious to establish that the Jiva having no existence of his own, being a pure reflection of Brah?nan, should not be the seat of any bondage or liberation. It is well-nigh clear from the Advaitist standare negated by the
point that the

essence,
Jwa
is
real,
even as real as Brahman, in his
and thus may be a ground of illusory knowledge of divisions that is bondage as also of liberation from them. But the Advaitist does never on that account advocate that the 7Tt/-consciousness being in bondage means that Brahman also is in such a state. What he tries to bring out is that the Jwa,
being a
-of
reflection,
is,
nevertheless.
it is
Brahman
is
in the essence of
Consciousness, and hence
he who
a legitimate ground
all false knowledge of divisions that are falsely associated with himself. The adjunct of avidya makes the real nature of Pure Consciousness that is Brahman appear as Jiva, only to make Pure Consciousness above board of all the effects of it. Hence, naturally, the Jiva, though Brahman in essence, is the
and is in bondage and is in need of liberation from them. Hence Prakaiatmayati concludes that the Bhaskara School blunders when it says that the JTva is not an entity, being a
therefore
seat of all the effects of false associations with himself

reflection,
265
whence his bondage and liberation are impossible, from the utter ignorance of the real implications of the nature of Jiva as a reflection from Pure Consciousness a reflection that is real in essence with the reflected but screened by a veil
to appear not as such.^^^

It remains for us to judge the relative merits of the two types of adhyasa or super-imposition, viz., nirupadhika and sopadhika, as has been tried to be expounded by the Advaitist teachers. Prakaâtmayati shows that this reflectional theory of the Jwa supposes a reflection of it from Brahtjian for substantiating that the Pure Consciousness is tinged with the associations that enter into Jwa-hood as well as their qualities, similarly as the crystal-stone becomes reddish when the
shoe-flower
is
reflected
on
it,
that
is
to say, the crystal-stone
as qualified by the red shoe-flower
is
reddish and not by
itself.
This
is
the real necessity to admit of illusions
due
is
to
an ad-
junct (sopadhika-bhramas).
tion of the face
The
facial
image
also a reflec-
bhrama only by making a quality due to the superimposition of the directions and postures of the image that spring from the adjunct. Hence the sopadhiand
is
ka-bhramas are always trying

ence, for
this that
to
make
a superimposition of
the qualities of the false associations
on the unity of experiit

is
which an upadhi
is
is
playing the chief role, for,

it
makes' the divisions due to

logically
on an
entity that
immune
being superimposed from such divisions and

as
hence which are false. It is not, therefore, inconsistent to assume that the divisions and their knowledge are false being dependent on the powers of avidya even if they are not created out of it. Production from avidya is barred by the logical necessity envisaged in the susuptt-st2ige where there are no
workings or functions of either the external or the internal organs. Hence, even if it be said that being dependent on means a falsity or illusoriness of the depending lavidya
entities in the
same way
as the falsely created entities are false,

;
and metaphysical consistency depend on avidya means that the dependent effect is
there
is
perfect logical
for,
to
existent
as an illusory or super-imposed entity,
i.e.,
super-imposed on
^**
tasmat
Vhbhramah
{Vtvarana,
jiarasiddhantSpanp'idnavdaslto'yaih
sarvasankaraiodina
P. 352.)
266
Critique on the
Vwarana School
the reality of Consciousness. Had it not been so, we could never have maintained that the relation of avidya to dtman
is
false, i.e.,
we would have been
led to believe that avtdya

exists
has a ral relation to

relation
is
Aman
(Self
or Consciousness) for such a
never produced.
Such a relation
it is
from
eter-
nity (anadikalapravrtta), of
and hence
never created in point
time.
avtdya with
the relation
Thus though the eternally existent relation o Atman is admitted, it is never contemplated that
is true or real, being eternal, that is, unproduced. Relation of the avidya with the Self is eternal ipso facto, for
no a prion absence of the relation can be contemplated, for whenever avidya is existent it is existent as being related with the Self or Consciousness that reveals it. Yet eternality as
suggesting non-production (akmyatva) of such a relation cannot debar us from holding the utterly false or illusory character of
it,
is.
for avidya has a relation established with

Self
its
that
or Consciousness,
revealer
^never
as
a transcendental
truth like the Self, but as false as avtdya

for empirical necessities-
Divisions
and
their
on which it depends knowledge anta-
gonising with the knowledge of Unity are created
in the transcendental truth of the Self by the false relation that sub-
sists
illusory
between itself and the avidya which being eternal and makes such a necessary relation as eternal, yet as
itself.
illusory, like
To
is
late that the relation

for,
be eternal like avidyU cannot postunot necessarily false, being eternal
then we have to postulate the most devastating hypothesis, of possibility of truth in the utterly illusory entity like avidya.
These very
vital implications of the knowledge of divisions (bhedafnana), jBiowing out of avidya being jiot necessarily pro-
duced out of it, have been brought out by the cryptic remark of Prakalatmayati: avidyalantrahdm caniivacaniyaivamanaditvamcavidyasambandhavanna viruddhyate Vivarana, P. 351). Such being the nature of all forms of super-imposition that there should be a knowledge of something as different where the difterence is unwarranted, from which taking something on some other thing follows, it is to be judged as to how in sopadhika and nirupadhika-bhramas such a false identit} takes place. In sopadhika-bhramas there is an adjunct which serves for the knowledge of division to take place,, though falsely, upon a unitary existence, but there does not end
Image-character oj
the journey of
Jwa
further examined
267'
any adhyasa.
All adhyasas pre-suppose that the
qualities of a diffeient entity

falsely
which we experience must be

In other words,
imputed upon a
there are
diflerent substratum.
even
if
no
real divisions, actually speaking, between
an entity and its own nature, yet under the spell of avidya and the upadhi (in sopadhika-bhramas), we make a division firstly and then make one possessing the false divisions as the true Reality which it is not. In nirupadhika-bhi amas also though an adjunct is not operative to make one appear as the other falsely, yet there is a knowledge of division at first to make room for the appearance of one as the other. Thus adjunct or no adjunct, all bhramas postulate a superimposition of something (and tlie qualities) on some other thing. In
sopadhika-bhramas, sometimes the qualities that are real in
appearing in their
substratum,
really these
own
place are transferred

their
on some other
though
on which
existence
is
perceived,
should not be so perceived.
In the appearance of
the crystal-stone as reddish, the reddishness of the shoe-flower
which
If
is reflected
unified with the substratum
due to the mirror of the crystal-stone appears where it is naturally absent.
we
further analyse the nature of niiupadhika-bhramas
such cases of illusion where no adjunct is mistaking a rope for a snake), there is a superimposition of something (e.g., the snake) on a different substratum (e.g., the rope) on the strength of no adjunct aiding
shall see that in
(e.g.,
we
operative
avidya, but out of the avidya
itself.
The
difference of
the
not to depend on any external adjunct, like the mirror or water or crystal, for the first prcpeudetic of adhyasa to be created, viz., the existence (though false) of a
is
two
as clear here as
any such adjunct, be mistaken for the other. What, then, remains there in nirupadhika-bhtamas to make room for any quality or anything beside the object to be in the field of such an illusion ? We can say that when such an inter-mixture, though false, of the objects has been complete, not depending on any adjunct external to avidya,
difference.
Hence
inspite of the absence of
the omnipotent avidya can
make one
to
there
may
yet
be the super-imposition of the quality or
relation
Of the superimposed of a sylvan surrounding on the substratum,

as the quality of fright
may
well be transferred
which generally adheres to the real snake on the rope appearing as snake. The-
268
Critique on the
Vwarana School
depend upon an
subsidiary appendages in fiirupadhika-bhramas
adjunct, that
(i.e.,
is
the object, to which these appendages relate
frightening relating to snake). Similarly, in the case of the
upadhika-bhmma oi Ego-hood (ahaiikdra) on Brahman or AtmaHj we have no other adjunct save avidya and its powers. Here though the Jiva possessing the ahankara is a reflection {pmtibimba) of Brahman or Aiman, yet there is the reflectionn'u
reflected-relatiou
{pralibimba-ptatibimbi-bhava)
that the
between
the of
jiva
and Brahman, only

is
ahankara
as a creation
avidya
an entity that is self-evidently distinct from Brahman and stands separate by itself, but is yet superimposed on Brahman or Pure Consciousness. Hence it will be seen that when the ahankara is made to be superimposed by avidya on Brahman, there is no primary need of the adjunct (here it
being avidya) to create a mock-division, as
the case of the /Tâ-consciousness
it
is
necessary in
which without that primary business of avidya, would have been eternally the same with
Brahman-consdoiii.nes'i, thus excluding all adhyasas.
When
the
ahankara
is
thus superimposed on
Brahman
the qualities or
appendages relating to it are then transferred on Brahman, thus making the relation of such appendages to Brahman as
and depending on an entity to which these naturally Such appendages of the ahankara are primarily karUtva (doer-hood) and bhoktfiva (enjoyer-hood) and these are then superimposed on Pure Consciousness along with their real substratum, viz., the ahankara. These nice distinctions of the two kinds of bhyama sopadhika as well as ntrupadhika and their real bearings in the metaphysical theories of r^va and Br-ahman have been brought out by Prakalatmayati, and
false
belong.
'pecially, Akhandananda."''"'
"'' niivjiadhiJcadhyOâh parinisparmalitriMropddhikaJi kartHvddhyasa lathayitum [Vi-tarana, P. 352). (la) panadrstantena Jli a-Brahma-rnhMgasyaupadhikaivam siddham, '^pliafiladi fi:fantena Icarti fA adermithpatvamiti viiMgah,
iti
>i''i
i'2hld/iucara}jusarpodaJiarma7n
yuktamityarthah,
alahtako'padhimmit-
itfipdd7\il'(>ti,
'<i-lau7utija\at
ahanlcarasya mrupddhikadhyasapaiinispannatvamatrohtam, haiirtiadikamapi nirupddhikam ityuktam, atra rajjitior-
ptah'^tantcna
iin iipnd/nlfti^
/'in >^fi(t
mrupddhikatiamucyata
o7iaftkdias}/a
iti virodhamaSankya tatparyamahanirupddhikddhydaparmispanatvamatrohtam,
lai fif, fjdp) anpddhikat ramityavirodha
itQ/aTth.ahr^{Tattvadlpana,
APPENDIX
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE VIVARANA SCHOOL OF ADVAITA VEDANTA

'
To follow the Vivarana School of Advaita Philosoph), we have to begin with the original work of the School b\ Padmapadacarya, one of the direct disciples of SnjSanlâcarji^^ viz., Pancapadika, and have to go through a long chain of works bringing down its tradition. Prakasatmayati wrote his famous, commentary, Pancapadika-Vivarana, in about 1200 A.D. That
separated the commentary from the original work by about a span of four centuries. But a few other commentaries had also been written on the original work of Padmapadacarya,. viz., Pancapadika.
The Pancapadikadarpana, a ITka on Pancapadika by Amalananda, and another tlka, viz., PancapddikatJkU by Vidâ sagara were written, which are yet to be published. Now, as to the dates of these two authors, we can say that Amalananda, if identified with the authoi of Kalpataru, a fika on Vacaspatimi;ra's well-known commentar}-, Bhamatu on Saiikara's Brahmasutrahhasya, should be placed after the work of Prakasatmayati was written, for the author of the Kalpataru belongs to the middle of the 13th century A.D. Amalananda' has another work called astradarpana on Advaita Vedanta (Published in Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam). As to the date
of Vidyasagara,
we can
reasonably place
him
before Prakasat-
mayati, for the former wrote the Pancapadikatika independently
of the influence of the

ever tentative,
latter. These two hypotheses are howand whether Amalananda, the writer of the
PancapadikadarpanUj is to be identified with the author of the Kalpataru has yet to be fully examined and whether Vidyasagara flourished before the work of Prakasatmayati remains (The difficulty that lies in yet to be more fully investigated. these investigations is rarity of these two Mss.). Coming to Pancapddikavivarana of Prakasatmayati, we land ourselves in the epoch-making period of this School, and henceforward move towards a history of the dialectical litera-
270
Cn'jqiie on (he Vioarana School
iCGiiclusions arrived at in
which bases itself solidly upon the dear term^ by Prakaâimayati. The work is placed ai the end of the 12th century A.D. or at the opening oi the 13th. From the colophon of his work we know that his real name is "Svaprakasanubhavabhagavat" or simply "Svaprakaianubhava," and he wa& the disciple of Ananyanubhava (cl. aHhato'pi na namnawa yo'nanyanubhavo gujuh huwductoiy stanza. No. b, Paiicapddikavivarana). But the more commonly known name of the author of the Pancapadikavivarana is Prakas'atmaâti or Prakasatman (cf. Introductory A commentary on Pancapddikavivarana of itanza. No. 7) much obscurity has been published from Calcutta (Calcutta Ed. by Anantakrishna Sastri from Sanskiit Scries No. 1 Metropolitan Publishing House, including nine commentaries
tuie of Advaita Philosophy
M M
on Brahmasuitahha'iya
Rjuxnvarajia,
ot
Sankara),
and
to
is
known
as
the
is
whose
autlioi,
according
the
colophon,
Visnubhattopadhyaya, son of Janardana.
Janardana later took to Anandagin, also known as Anandajfiana, was probably a native of Gujerat and lived in the middle of the 13th Cent. A.D.
Tradition has it that the monastic name of Anandagiri.^
two teachers, \iz Anubhiitisvarupacarya and Mr. Tripathi considers that he was the monastic head of the Dvaraka Mutt. He wrote the famous iippanas on the Upanisnd-Bha'^yas of Sankara and the wellknown commentary Nydyanimaya on the Brahmasutrabhasya of Sankara. (Vide, Dasgupta, Htsioyy of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II., P. 193). Swami Prajfianananda SarasvatT has, however, put him after Vidyaranâ in the '15lh Century A.D.^ However, the most widely known commentary on the PahcapTidikavivm ana is Taltvadjpana by Akhandananda Muni. In the introductory verses of his commentary, it is found that
a pupil of
.ûddhananda.-^
He was
he pays high tributes to Srlbodhaprthvidhara, his preceptor, pcihaps Anandagiri (M. M. A K. Sastri's Sanskrit Introduc^
Regarding identification of Janjrdana, father of Visnubhatiopadhyaya,
Anandagiri (who later took this monastic name) and also regarding identification of Janaidana an the preceptor of ^^khanânanda, author of
.'ind
>"iot,}icv
vido^ Ta>?.asumffialia
'
famous commentary on Panrapadilai ivarayja viz, Tattvadipana, (Baroda, 1917)Introduction by Mr Tripathi. S N Dasgupta, Histoiij of Ivdiaa Philosophy, Vol. II., P. 192. Vido Vcdruitadaikimr Itihusa (in Bengah) (Pt. I. Pp. 92-93).
Di-
Short History of the Vwararm School
271
lion to Calcutta Sanskrit Serie No. 1, wherein he has also subscribed to the view that Janardana and Anandagiri are
.equal
and also that this Anandagiri is the preceptor of Akhandananda). Tradition is also very strong to regard Akhandananda as one of the disciples of Anandagiri (Mr.
Tripathi's Introduction to TarkasarngtahaBsiYodR). tradition is somewhat contradicted b) the author's own
But
this
colophon where he describes himself as the disciple of Akhandanubhilti. But this may have an appellative significance. We can put him to a period contemporaneous with Rjuvivarana by Visnubhattopadhyaya and in the middle of the 16th the Vedanfdparibhasa of Dharmarajadhmrjndra was composed which supdevelopment of the Vtvarana along with its commentary-literature.
poses the full
Another commentary on the Paficapddikavivarana was written by Nrsimhasramamuni whose date is the beginning of the 16th Century A.D. This work is known bv the name of Vivaranabhavaprakasika and has yet to be published. Still another work following the Pancapadihavivarana written by
Ramananda
SarasvatT
is
known
as the
Vivaranopareyasa, and
has been published from Benares.
whose Vedaniaone of the most well-known works on Vedanta Dharmarajadhvarindra was the disciple of :^rTmadvenkatanatha whose preceptor was Nrsimha or Nrsimhas'rama, and his date is the middle of the 16th Century A.D. This work marks a mile-stone in the histor\ of the dialectical literature of Advaita Vedanta, for it deals exhaustively with different means of valid knowledge and the cpistemologicai problems connected therewith. This work follows the Vivarana School and quotes the author of the Pancapadikavivarana.
parihhasa
is
Now we come
to Dharmarajadhavarlndia
Epistemology.
The other well-known dialectical works of Advaita Philosophy are Taitvapradjpika by Citsukhacar^-a (end of 12th Cent.
Khandanakhandakhadya by Jsri Harsa (end of 12th Century A.D) and Paftcadast (in verse) by Vidâranya (end of 14th Century A.D.). All these works follow the tenets of the Pancapadikavivarana in matters of conclusions of the Advaita
A.D.),
Metaphysics.
is
Of special interest for the study of the Pancapadikavivarana the Vivaranaprameyasamgraha of Vidyaranâ. Vid}'aranya is
2/^2
Cntique
o?i
the Vivarana School
His other important Vedanta are the Paricadasi referred to above and
rf the of
Buk^T w"nTv-' ^'J^>'"^"' ^. 14th Century A.D.< \I:^n
''"^' *^
"^'
^f
ho aourished towards
Minister o the dose
rrt-e
in
^^ to above
side
is
worL on rânûkH
--
Of
Pr^^ss:
AD
PancadaH referred
the
and the coramMlv designated Prakatarthakara or Prakatarthavivlnak^rS" Uth-13th Centur,- A.D.) known by his work. The wote the magnificent versified form of logical in Vianta known as the Sa^ksepa-tarVraka
also in verse bringing
.rt,; -of. the
Jslchoora^rr'"-""'^''^'"^' Sarvajnatmamuni (End

1 ! last
^""^ ^"îcal descendants,
verse of Samksepa-Sanraka)
of 8th Century
Advaita Philosoph^ Pralmnhl vwarana wa, written by an author having no spea^nê tt

'='"""' ''"'^ *^ didect/calTr of estaSlL 'ib'"'.^' " theories. estabhdimg the Advaita These two works reveal
Of Vedanta following the current initiated by Padmaj^da.
metaphysical
vSCya" oitSy
Luu^
&
of
"V.dyaranya and MadhavaJrya.^'.
*'
''
'
^^ ^^
'"
^ '"<^K
ERRATA
P/^ge Line
1-63
For
Nyaiyayikas Vivarlana
saravana
Read
Naiyayikas Vivarana hrcwana
svddhyayo' dhyetavyah
insert
2
3
3
36 6
9
12
svddhyayo dhyetavyah
'
'S
..-
&
before eidvudare
26
4
take their
take
its
9
12
17
2Si.
13
1
vidhanam mdhyayaka judgment

postralated
vidhmdm
mdhdyaka
judgement
possible
19
19 30
16
21
bhdvabhavafinald pastuuation
bhdvdbhdvdtmatd
postulation
].
32
34 34
35
39
2 6 38
35
ajndna
inspite
ajndna
in spite
syaivd-asthabhedd
symvdvasthdbhedd
(ko/rman)
37 37
(karma)
40
%atmas
38 39
41 41 41
41
6#.
12
karmm
judgments
Virarana
karmans harmans judgements

Vivara?ia
5
6
Akhandananda
Akhandananda
16
Form
whenct
Pancapddikd.
striydm
uttaroiiarasiddher
Taitifadtpana.
From
whence
Pancapddikd,
'Sf,riydm
,
20 27 29
31
15
44
44 44
after
TaUvatMpctna
47
47
utitaro t ta rdsiddher
18
48
48 52
53
38
40
15 #.
anyataraniredeU Taifvadtpana.
Tattvadipanaj anyataramrde&e
TattvadipatiOj
54 34
4 30
39
judgment judgment
judgmental
judgement judgement
judgemental
judgment
judgement
274
Pag>6 Line
55 56
57
29 #.
35
5
For judgment
dosunimittah
vdistajneyanimttto
Read
judgement
dosanimitiah
t/i6'Uiajneyammi f to
57 58 63 66 67 69 69 70 70
71
38
15 #.
27
12
1
1
svasambandheârthesu vyavahdnka well-known

Advaitisi
hvasambaddhesvarthesu
vyavahdnka
well
known
Advaitists
upto upto
Naiyayikas
that
up up
)
to to
25
21
39
13
after 'probandum' Naiyayika ( before Pancapadika:
and
as
74 79
81
24
9
3
but
partipannalve
praiipannatve
after 'ignorance'
after 'one'
and
81
30
Consciousness
Consciousness
consciousness
consciousness
82 83 84 84
85
29 #14
whereform
disvaham -pra tyayah
uttarotaraghatadenti
vrttih
wherefrom
disvahampratyayah
uttaroU taraghatddenti
vr,tfiih
39
40
5
87
87
35
ayattatvddicchd
ayattatvddicchd
40
39
a
prasidhyahhave' piti
88
Rjuvivarana
Vivarana.
prasiddhyabhdve' piti Rjuvivarana

)
90 90 92 93
96
97 97 98
after
adhydsabhdsya
39 36
25
Vivarana^
Pancapadika.
msistadesakdla-
Pancapddikd,
'is'
after 'this'
33
16
viHsladesakdla-
samhadham
priest
sambaddham
priest
\9
udgata
24
15
no
vyavahdrika
yo'rtho' kahkdrah
udgdld any
99 102
?05
105
vydvahdnka
yo'rtho'hahkdmh
pradipaprabhdx/at
)
30
6
12
pradtpaprahhdvat
after 'sanction"
ERRATA
Page Line
'
27
For
ariliaya
Read
amsayd
kdryakdranab hdva
107
16
107 108
35
8
23
kdryakaranabhdva Bhagavadgiia
Saksi'Caitanya
108
Bha^vadgitd Sdkdcmtcmya
sravanddi
109
111
112 114
116
117 118
39 20 14 28
16
srvanddi
sdrhVit
samvit
sawajndiva
sarxmjnmva
kdmnamemsthi tarn
jndnabirodhi dxmcchind
kdmmmevdva&thiiam
delete
after 'Pure'
21
jndnamrodhi
dxmcchinnd viddhyonddi Gitd
13/19 judgements
Prakasatmayati
in spite
118
118
118
119
120
121 121
37 39 39 39 34
1
biddhydnddi Gita
13/20 judgments
Prakasatmayati
inspite
37
apperance
appearance
pU'i'iM7rw,tma
126
126
32 34
puramdtma
jhdnam
ndfirekafiddh'^ Lyam
after pratyaksa
in line 33
126 126
127
43 44
3
ndtirekardhityam
itydha
itydha
128 128
128
129
133
26 38 39 36
8
5
fundmental Bhasyakara avidyayd'grhyamdna

laksandrhso
esse
fundamental Bhasyakara
avidly a'grhyamdna
laksandrhso
case
ayasasca
ksti
ayasasca
136
Mti
Prakasatmayati's
identical
136
142
145
145
18
Prakasatmayati^s
idential
6
31
Udyotakara
organs
Uddyotakara
organs
36
146
155
9#.
36 38
157
157
158
39 30
Udyotakara Bhatta vydpuravatvamdiram vydpdrmjatvam
Uddyotakara Bhatta
vjydpdraxmttvamdtram
vydpdmvattvam
after 'subject'
276
Pag\e Lint
162
1
;
Fo'j
Read
indtaid
the
as
jnanaid
164
J 66
25
he
"consciousness
-I"
29
39
3
the
"consciousness as the
T"
"iiedamamkih'" Pancapddikd, Prdbhakara Taj'lmpmdJipikd
self-luminous, or
167
171
''nedamaihsaJi"
Pancapadiku.
171
36
Prdbhakara
Taiivapradipika
5el4uniinous nor
cela?isydpi
175
40
19
178
178 180
180
181
33
cetanasydpi
in spite
22
33 #.
inspite
36
9
182
karma TaUvadipana pramanaphafa ival

Taitvadipajia.
conscious.
karman
Tativadipana,
J82
182
183 183
4
4
33
38-39
pramdnaphalalvdL beiore 'TaUvadipana' [ TaUvadT,pana,

conscious-
vydpihZiraya
consciousnebs.
vydpikdrya
consciousness.
188
188 188
6
9
15
Tattvad^pana.
Vtvarana.
TaUvadipana, Vivamna,
pliasamvit
189
189
28
35
21 #.
pltasmml
helulveridniibJuivlavam
principi
helulvendniibliavalmm
principii
190
191
191
4
13
pltdsdmvil
vis'eâvydvri lyd
pliasamvit
viiesavydvrttyd
delete 'on' after 'even'
191
19
191 191
36
^^
pitasamvido
siddhyati
principi
pntasamvido
sidhyoiti
92 192
J
10/
31
principii
194
195
23
16
samvidah seem
something.
vyavicdrah
samvidah seems
something.
)
wr>
195
195
20 36 # 37
7
after 'lamp'
vyabhicdtah
msesanam
citsmbhava
'I'
wsesanam
ctisvabhdva
*I'
197
197
197
21
consciousness
consciousness
39
''Jisaydnubhavnmeva
Visaydnubhavameva
ERRATA
P
Read
Prakasatmayati's
tfisaydvabJmsa
Page Line
198
I
For
Ptaka^tmayati's xMsaydvabhasah drastrvam
syat
^00
201
:201
39
31
37
38
mandkdratvdn
dmstrtvam sydtmmdkdratvdn
ladadhlnd nhahkdrah
prasaktih
sydditi
201
tadahma
ahafikdra sydditz
202 202 204 205 205 206
34 37
30
33
prasakhh
Tattimdipana.
Tativadlpana,
judgments
vrttydva
judgements
VY\ttdtM
40
5
10
delete
after 'sukha'
206 207
210
210
sukhi
sukhi
33
211
22 # 36 30
7 14
duhkhasambandhi rememberance
vyavahdrika
sdkscaitanya
duhkhasambandht remembrance
)
after 'explains'
vydvahdnka
sdhîcaiianya
212
212 212 212
213
sukhdnubhavyoh
sdksicai tanyasya
sukhdnubhavayoh
sdksicai iatiyasya
14
27
1
Schoool
avidyavrtti
School amdydvritih Smrtih

^na vdTlikakdraih
214
214
13
smrtih
20
na
tMtikakdrmh
Advaitasidhi
214 214
'214
22
26 27
31
Advaitasiddhi
Edn.
electicism
Edn;
eclecticism
215
219 219
221
25
35
222 223 224 226 227 229 231 233 233
jivahood b hedesiddhyartha 5 (Title) IMAGE-CHARAECTER anirvdcyam 12 4 pddUnattva

to
jvmhood
bhediasiddhyartha
IMAGE-CHARACIER (mirvdcyam
pdddmiva
to
34
17
delete
after 'view'
18
11
proveable
Self,
provable
Self;
37
Tiaisaragiko'yam
sdksi/isayatvam
naisargiko'yam
sdksivisayattfam
,
39
39
after
'Edn/
278
Page Line
234 237 237
25
29-30 31
For
dniahkarmia
prescence
foce
Read
(tntahkaraiia
presence
lace
239 239 239

240 243 246 246 248 249 249
249
mspite
19
in spite
m ukhyavyaktan im a m
lajjanmakarma sunyaimL
appeorance
mukhavyakiyanLai am
lajjaji
20
14
makdmnamnya tvat
8
18
appearance before na
'not' after 'arc'
30 27 #.
ajnancHnixîtih
afndndniwitih
in spite
mspite
4 9
18
18
of
delete
.
after
'Consciousness'
'it'
after 'that'
249 249 253 253 254 254 257 257 257 257 258 262 262 263 2Q6 266 267 268
focus
locus
37
19
ladapyajnatvakrLam
fifth
tadapyajnaivakrtam
filth
36 36
37
5
inspite
in spite
ajnanamvrttyaupddhika Taiivadipana
inspite
ajndnaniv) (tyaupddhika
Tativa^pana
in spite
n-u
24 40
8
prai/bimbapaksa
illusorionness
praiibimbapaksa
illusoriness
Tattvadipan'Q.
Tattvadipana,
predecessor'h
predecessor"s
inspite
35
in spite
39
16
31
dependen he
avidydianirdnam viruddhyaie
inspite
dependent
the
avidydtanbdndm
xfiTudhyaie
in spite
32
30
31
parinispanndhankaro.
2m
268
271
39
22
padhikah virodhamdidnkya nirupddhikddhydaparinispanaivam Bharmarajadhavarlndra
pannispanndhankdropddhikah VI rodhamdsankya nirupddh ikddhydsaparimspantia\tvam
Bharmarajadhvarlndra

A Critique On The Vivarana School (Sengupta)

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A Critique On The Vivarana School (Sengupta)

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A CRITIQUE ON THE VIVARANA SCHOOL

hi India:Kb 12.00 In Pakistan, Burma & Ceylon (Corresponding Rupee-value)

Session of the All-India Oriental Conference.

the short time that I

embodied in the following pages

submitted to the University of Calcutta for

brated and elucidated therein.

the different crucial problems

the light of these

each having some kind of peculiar light lo throw to

interpret the theories.

Padmapada and Prakasatmayati but I in my humble way to inierprefl them.

have tried central theme has

Jogendra Nath Tarka-Sankhva-Vcdanta-tirtha

to sit at his feet to clear

for the printing lapses, I

would crave the indulgence

to refer to the rather copious Errata

in this Edition will

like the pillars of success in that side

these preliminary imperfections

get-up. the work, even for the merit

<ouId not be priced higher. Gauhati University, India,

Br^tindra Kumar Sengupta

{prayojaria) of the study of

viz., object (visaya) and end Vedanta through the Brahmasutras

has taken pains to bring out the

logical discursion {vicara) of the highest truth of Vedanta,

Critique on the Vivarana School

for the conditions of knowledge being fulfilled

refers to the injunction of vicara

of the Vedanta doctrines for

does not stop there, for the vicara

the true knowledge of

fact of the super-imposed nature or illusory character of the

bondage has been

handhat.astrasyuramhhaninuttavisaya'piaijo'javavatti apiatyanlhasya S7/dvidydtmaLatiam nirdisat hhdsyadvayam visayaprayojane pratifddayatiti

Logical Background of Vedanta

next question which

basal to the study of

the discussion regarding the

new note by showmg

the origin of Vedantic studies

ih the injunction of havai^a,

though the perpetual adhyayanavidhi gives the cue

Before entering into an examination of

worthwhile to discuss in a nutshell the implications Of vidhi

Mimamsakas upon man

or Restrictive Injunction has got primarily a posi-

significance either for empirical

knowledge or scriptural have recourse to one

alternative facilitates the achievement of the task.

a privative significance. mutually exclusive nor

Critique on the i/warana School

which naturally presents