Oil Disad 2 - Scholars
Oil Disad 2 - Scholars
Oil Disad 2 - Scholars
Oil Prices
Reuters 7/15 (“Tight supply, strong demand raising oil price: Bush”
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSWAT00978920080715)
President George W. Bush said on Tuesday that speculators are not to blame for higher oil prices and it
is the market fundamentals of tight supplies and strong demand that are pushing up crude costs. "The
fundamentals are what's really driving the long-term price of oil," Bush told reporters at a White House
news conference. "Demand for oil has increased and supply has not kept up with it."
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The decline in prices is a small percentile decline – it has no impact on global oil profits
The Capital Spectator 7/16 (“PRICE TROUBLES ONCE MORE, BUT STILL HOPING FOR A BREAK”
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticle+articleid_2403169&title=Price_Troubles_Once.html)
But let's not get too giddy. Rising commodities prices generally, and oil in particular, are based on a
fundamental shift in the supply/demand equation in the global economy. To restate the obvious: demand
has risen sharply in recent years while supply growth has lagged. Perhaps we'll enjoy a break from the trend and
see energy prices fall in the wake of economic slowdown or worse. Maybe. It all depends on how much of a global slowdown we're
looking at, and how much influence the U.S. has over oil prices these days. The latter subject is open to debate, thanks to the rise of
China, India, etc. and the relative maturing of the U.S. economic growth outlook compared with emerging markets. In any case, it
wouldn't surprise us to see oil prices drop sharply from current levels. Volatility and commodities, after all, are old friends,
regardless of economic conditions. Longer term, however, it's unlikely that oil prices are due for a sustained
fall. Noise may dominate the short term, but supply and demand dictate price trends over time. That
means that while inflation pressures may ebb for a time, the respite will only be temporary, assuming it comes at all.
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Money Matters 7/15 (“Oil steady, weighs demand fears vs supply risks” (http://www.livemint.com/2008/07/15085408/Oil-steady-
weighs-demand-fear.html)
Rising fuel costs have sparked global protests and cut US fuel demand during the typical peak summer gasoline season, but robust
growth in emerging economies continues to keep their appetite to consume high. On Monday, US President George W. Bush lifted
a
presidential ban on offshore drilling to boost domestic supplies and combat soaring energy prices.
Analysts said the plan would take a decade to bring real results and offer little short-term relief. A
congressional ban on offshore drilling also remains in place, and Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid
later on Monday rejected Bush’s call to lift the moratorium. Markets were also eyeing a low-pressure system about 1,300
miles east of the Lesser Antilles that could develop into a tropical depression.
Associated Press 7/15 (“Oil rises, but back off day's high” http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5i5TtajgUpSm7KY5jf-lCJGHBB-
tAD91UAQMG0)
Also, a weakening of the dollar helped to support commodity prices Tuesday. Many investors view oil and other commodities as hedges
against inflation and a weakening dollar, and their prices tend to rise as the currency declines. The dollar fell to 105.79 yen in Asian
currency trade, while the euro rose to an all-time high of $1.6038 in European trading, before settling back at $1.5983. On Monday,
President Bush lifted an executive ban on offshore oil drilling. That alone is not expected to loosen global
supplies in the short term since a Congressional prohibition remains in place and any new wells would
take years to complete.
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Oil Prices
Oil prices continuing to decline
Associated Press 7/16 (“Oil tumbles again; prices fall over $10 in 2 days”
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5i5TtajgUpSm7KY5jf-lCJGHBB-tAD91V4HL00)
Oil prices have settled sharply lower for the second straight day, capping a dizzying drop that has left
crude more than $10 cheaper in just two days of frenzied trading. Light, sweet crude for August delivery
fell $4.14 to settle at $134.60 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange, after earlier sinking as low as
$132. The drop follows a $6.44 sell-off Tuesday, meaning prices have plummeted over $10 since Monday.
Washington Post 6/17 (“McCain: End Fed Ban on Offshore Drilling” http://news.aol.com/political-
machine/2008/06/17/mccain-end-fed-ban-on-offshore-drilling/)
Sen. John McCain called yesterday for an end to the federal ban on offshore oil drilling, offering an
aggressive response to high gasoline prices and immediately drawing the ire of environmental groups that the
presumptive Republican presidential nominee has courted for months. The move is aimed at easing voter anger over
rising energy prices by freeing states to open vast stretches of the country's coastline to oil exploration. In a
new Washington Post-ABC News poll, nearly 80 percent said soaring prices at the pump are causing them financial
hardship, the highest in surveys this decade. "We must embark on a national mission to eliminate our dependence on
foreign oil," McCain told reporters yesterday. In a speech today, he plans to add that "we have untapped oil reserves
of at least 21 billion barrels in the United States. But a broad federal moratorium stands in the way of
energy exploration and production. . . . It is time for the federal government to lift these restrictions."
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Washington Post 7/17 (“Slowing Economy Gives Way to Global Role Reversals” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/07/16/AR2008071602732.html)
Contrast that with oil-fat Russia -- a red-hot emerging market. As in many commodity-driven economies
in the developing world, soaring energy revenue has largely insulated Russia, the world's second-
largest oil exporter, from the turbulence in global markets. Its gross domestic product is expected to
grow 8 percent this year, and consumer spending continues to boom, with a 13 percent increase so far this
year, according to Troika Dialog, a Moscow investment house. "We are overloaded with money, crazy amounts of money
from the energy market," said Mikhail Bergen, a professor at Moscow's Higher School of Economics.
Neal 7/16 (Jeff Neal is Senior Writer, Options Strategist & Profit Strategies Radio Show, Market Correspondent.
http://www.optionetics.com/market/articles/19849)
Russia is still the largest market for foreign investments when looking at the Eastern European region.
The reason behind this is because Russia is by far the strongest economy. Russia’s Gross Domestic
Product increased an average of 7.5 percent per year for the last eight years. In addition, the nation’s
once large debts have been replaced with a $150-billion stabilization fund. Their trade balance shows a big
surplus of $72.5 billion and its benchmark RTS stock index has increased by 1,992 percent since 2000. Even with this growth most
analysts assert that Russian stocks are still cheap and the cheapest of any emerging market. Currently Russian companies are trading at
an average of just nine times forward earnings. This is a bargain when compared to the 14 times forward earnings of Latin American and
15 times forward earnings of Asian stocks or the 20 times forward earnings of U.S. equities.
Speedie 7/14 (David Speedie is Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University “The Rise of the Rest: How the Ascent of China and Russia Affects Global Business and Security”
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/000066)
Two, realize and accept that Russia is a global economic player, although this has to be taken in perspective. There is
obviously a highly visible Russian commercial presence in London, Europe's finance capital, and this will be replicated in New York.
Under Yeltsin, Russian GDP peaked at $200 billion. Under Putin, it reached $1.3 trillion. However, even if
Russia ascends to the top five global economies, it will still be a mere fraction in terms of global GDP of, for example, the United States,
the European Union, and China. Three, Russia's economic growth under Putin has included, as said before, a
rising entrepreneurial middle class and a robust consumer economy. Just look at the piece in The New York
Times a couple of weeks ago that showed the Turkish resort on the Mediterranean where Russian tourists were basking in a replica of the
Kremlin and Saint Basil's Cathedral. This is the new Russian consumer with money to go abroad and be where they feel comfortable.
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Russia DA – UQ – Corruption
Russia is more transparent and working to reduce bureacracy
Thompson Financial News 7/11 “Russian oil sector at 'critical juncture' – Putin” Thomson Financial News,
http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2008/07/11/afx5205986.html
'The oil sector has reached a critical juncture,' Putin said after visiting the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk where
Russia's first Arctic oil rig is under construction. He said tax cuts approved this year had already given oil companies more money to
spend on development and added that the government was considering additional tax breaks for companies operating in oil-rich regions
of Siberia. The government will also ease bureaucracy for companies opening new oil fields and develop
infrastructure in remote areas to encourage investment. 'Our energy policy will be clear, transparent,
liberal. We do not plan any economic egoism. We will take into account the legitimate interests of our
partners but we will also defend our national interests,' he added. 'We have no doubt that now, in the medium-term and in the long-
term, we will completely cover the growing demand of the Russian economy and fulfil our obligations to our foreign partners,' he
continued.
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Russia diversification
Neal 7/16 (Jeff Neal is Senior Writer, Options Strategist & Profit Strategies Radio Show, Market Correspondent.
http://www.optionetics.com/market/articles/19849)
Russia has always been known for its abundance of natural resources. They have the world’s largest natural
gas reserves, the second largest coal reserves and the eighth-largest oil reserves. However, Russia is currently in the
process of transitioning from an economy focused just on natural resources to an economy based on
domestic consumption because of the big increases in disposable income. The bottom line is that these
emerging markets in Eastern Europe, led by Russia, are worthy of taking a closer look at for profitable opportunities.
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Hugh 7/9 (Edward Hugh is a macro economist, who specializes in growth and productivity theory, demographic processes and their impact
on macro performance. “Russian Inflation: Is the Boom About To Bust?” http://seekingalpha.com/article/84286-russian-inflation-is-the-boom-
about-to-bust)
At the same time the price of Russia's Urals crude continues to touch all-time highs (it averaged $106 a barrel in the year through July 2,
compared with $60 a barrel in the same period a year earlier). Russia produced 9.77 million barrels of oil a day in
June, more than Saudi Arabia did, thus becoming the biggest exporter of the fuel. Russia also produces the energy
equivalent of about 11 million barrels a day of gas. As a result of such factors Russia's trade surplus hit a record $130.92
billion in 2007. So what could possibly go wrong? Well, the central point would be that the strong rise in oil
prices we have seen since the start of the century has only served to increase Russia’s dependence on
oil and gas revenue and has not been used to facilitate the kind of diversification which could allow for a
more stable development path. As such, the Russian economy—despite the outward semblance of "you've never had
it so good" boom times—has never been more vulnerable to sudden falls in oil and gas prices.
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Hugh 7/9 (Edward Hugh is a macro economist, who specializes in growth and productivity theory, demographic processes and their impact
on macro performance. “Russian Inflation: Is the Boom About To Bust?” http://seekingalpha.com/article/84286-russian-inflation-is-the-boom-
about-to-bust)
At the same time there is now extensive evidence that the Russian economy is overheating. The IMF in
their June 2008 Article IV Consultation Report mention three factors: 1i) the fact that inflation has almost doubled
over the past year and now extends well beyond food and energy price increases; 2) domestic demand is
increasing at an annual rate of 15 percent in real terms, while GDP is growing at 8 percent, a rate which is somewhat
above the level that can be maintained without causing accelerating inflation, according to estimates by both Russian and IMF experts;3)
resource constraints have now become strikingly evident in labor markets, where shortages are causing real
wage increases of about 16 percent annually, well above growth in labor productivity (see chart below), and unit labor costs are
now rising steadily. Domestic resource constraints are also evident in the rise in import volume growth
to almost 30 percent annually.
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Hugh 7/9 (Edward Hugh is a macro economist, who specializes in growth and productivity theory, demographic processes and their impact
on macro performance. “Russian Inflation: Is the Boom About To Bust?” http://seekingalpha.com/article/84286-russian-inflation-is-the-boom-
about-to-bust)
Russia's inflation rate remained tantalizingly frozen at its highest in more than five years in June as energy and
food prices continued to move on upwards. Russian consumer prices were up 15.1 percent from a year ago—
matching the rate in May—according to data released earlier this week by the Federal Statistics Service. As a result, the Russian
government is struggling to bring inflation down towards its 10.5 percent target after increased income from
rising global energy prices boosted domestic demand and made possible 300 billion rubles ($13 billion) of extra government spending
on items like pensions and state wages in the runup to last December's elections. The result has been a massive surge in
consumer spending and construction activity, which has pushed the rate of expansion in the Russian
economy above its long-term "comfort" capacity level. In this post we will look at the general macro economic
situation of the Russian economy, and we will see that, with output in the resource sector effectively at or near its peak, the main
drivers of Russian growth are now construction and domestic consumption. Since long-term labour
supply issues mean that Russia is unable to comfortably grow at its current rate of expansion, the end
product is rising inflation and structural distortions in the development of the manufacturing sector. Policy
limitations at the level of fiscal demand management and exchange rate adjustment mean that this
whole process is only being accelerated rather than contained. As a result, the living standards improving
boom could easily, under unfavourable circumstances, be converted into precisely its opposite: an impoverishing
bust.
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Hugh 7/9 (Edward Hugh is a macro economist, who specializes in growth and productivity theory, demographic processes and their impact
on macro performance. “Russian Inflation: Is the Boom About To Bust?” http://seekingalpha.com/article/84286-russian-inflation-is-the-boom-
about-to-bust)
The structure of Russian real GDP growth has shifted significantly towards non-tradable sectors in
recent quarters, partly reflecting booming domestic demand and the appreciating real effective
exchange rate of the ruble. There has decline in the relative importance of resource extraction - oil
output has stopped rising, and was 1% down year on year in June - and an increasing dependence on
imports and construction. In the earlier years of this century, and in particular during 2003-2004, oil
and some industrial sectors were the key engines of economic growth. From 2005 onwards, however,
the expansion has largely been driven by non-tradable services and goods production for the domestic
market, including manufacturing goods. In 2007 the wholesale and retail trade alone accounted for almost a
third of the overall economic growth. Booming construction and manufacturing contributed another 30
percent. Within the industrial sector, manufacturing - which is largely directed towards the domestic market -
was a key driver, expanding by 7.4 percent in 2007, compared to only 2.9 percent in the previous year. In
contrast growth in the resource extraction industry has virtually ground to a halt, reflecting binding
capacity constraints and the comparative remoteness (and cost) of new deposits.
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Rautava 8 (Jouko, BOFIT Online, June, www.bof.fi/bofit, “The Challenges of the Medvedev Era”)
Inflation began to accelerate in the second half of 2007, and today is a central issue of contention in
economic policy. The actual inflation figure of 11.9 % handily beat the government’s 2007 inflation target of
8.5 %. This year, inflation continues to gain steam, although there is hope it may ease during the summer
due to seasonal factors. After an almost continuous decline since 1999, inflation is accelerating (at least
temporarily). This is disconcerting for several reasons. Respondents to Russian opinion polls
consistently rank inflation as the worst threat to their personal finances. If trust in a strong rouble
falters, flight to other currencies could very well destabilise the financial system. Even small changes
can have large effects on saving patterns and capital flows. The lack of coherent economic policy
response is the inability to agree on what is causing the inflation. As in other countries, the problem can
be seen in higher food prices. Yet, while nearly a third of foodstuffs in Russia are imported, the biggest
problem is domestic. Russian food production has not managed to keep up with the boom in consumer
spending, so prices of both animal and vegetable products have shot up dramatically. A second
interpretation of the leap in inflation is that larger-than- anticipated amounts of foreign currency have
made there way into the country via the trade and capital accounts. The third, perhaps most realistic,
explanation is that the Russian economy is simply overheated. A variety of bottlenecks put upward
pressure on wages, raw material prices and building costs. All of these explanations conveniently align
with the various measures proposed for fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy.
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World Tribune 5 (“U.S. fears prospect of Saudi coup, weighs invasion plans”
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/05/front2453676.157638889.html)
The United States has raised the prospect of a military invasion of Saudi Arabia. The House Armed
Services Committee considered the possibility of a Saudi coup and U.S. response during a hearing on Oct. 26.
Saudi Arabia, with 200,000 military and National Guard troops, is the largest oil producer and exporter, with an output of nine million
barrels of oil per day, according to Middle East Newsline. The Arab kingdom is the third largest supplier of oil to the United States, with
more than 1.55 million barrels per day. The scenario was outlined by Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow of the Brookings Institution,
who cited a Saudi coup as one of several threats to the United States. "How should the United States respond if a coup,
presumably fundamentalist in nature, overthrows the royal family in Saudi Arabia?" O'Hanlon asked.
"Such a result would raise the specter of major disruption to the oil economy." The response could
include the deployment of three U.S. Army divisions backed by fighter-jets and airborne early-warning
and alert aircraft. In all, the U.S.-led mission could include up to 300,000 troops. Congressional sources said
the House hearing, which focused on future threats in the Middle East and other regions, marked increasing U.S. concern of Saudi
instability. They said the open hearing echoed a series of briefings on Saudi and Gulf Arab instability given by non-government analysts
to the State Department, Defense Department and National Security Council since 2002. The House committee was told that
U.S. concern of a Saudi coup appears greater than ever. O'Hanlon said such a coup would also
destabilize Pakistan, a nuclear power since 1998. "This type of scenario has been discussed for at least
two decades and remains of concern today — perhaps even more so — given the surge of terrorist
violence in Saudi Arabia in recent years as well as the continued growth and hostile ideology of Al
Qaida along with the broader Wahabi movement," O'Hanlon said. In his testimony, O'Hanlon envisioned a
Saudi coup as resulting in the emergence of what he termed a fundamentalist regime intent on
acquiring nuclear weapons. Another prospect was that the new regime would seek to disrupt the oil market. "Indeed, it might
be feasible not to do anything at first, and hope that the new regime gradually realized the benefits of reintegrating Saudi Arabia at least
partially into the global oil economy," O'Hanlon said. "But in the end the United States and other western countries might consider using
force." O'Hanlon envisioned a U.S.-led military operation designed to seize Saudi oil wells, located along
the eastern coast. Washington and its allies would place the proceeds from Saudi oil sales into escrow
for a future pro-Western government in Riyad. A U.S.-led military force of 300,000 would be required to secure the
entire Saudi Arabia, O'Hanlon said. He said about 10,000 troops could capture eastern Saudi Arabia, which contains virtually all of the
kingdom's oil wells. But more than 100,000 additional troops would be required to protect the wells and other vital infrastructure. "An
operation to overthrow the new Saudi regime and gradually stabilize a country of the size in question would probably require in the
vicinity of 300,000 troops, using standard sizing criteria," O'Hanlon said. "So in fact a coastal strategy, while easier in some ways and
perhaps less bloody in the initial phases, could be fully half as large and might last much longer."
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Bloomberg 7/12 (“Samba and Banque Saudi shares drag Saudi Arabian index down”
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/07/13/10228378.html)
Saudi Arabian shares declined for a third day, led by Banque Saudi Fransi and Samba Financial Group. The Tadawul All
Share Index retreated 0.3 per cent to 8,971.32 at 1.02pm in Riyadh. The index has lost 5.7 per cent during its three-day
losing streak. Banque Saudi Fransi, the Saudi lender partially owned by a unit of Credit Agricole SA, slid 2.4 per cent to 81 riyals.
Samba, the second-largest bank, dropped 1 per cent to 73.25 riyals. The Tadawul is the only Arab exchange monitored by Bloomberg
that's open on Saturdays.
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Gulf Times 7/17 (“No revaluation on council proposal: Sama economist” http://www.gulf-
times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=230410&version=1&template_id=48&parent_id=28)
A top economist at Saudi Arabia’s central bank, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (Sama), said yesterday that the kingdom won’t
revalue or depeg its currency from the dollar after a proposal to appreciate the riyal by 20% was submitted to the Shura Council this
week. “I don’t see any change in the value of the riyal happening,” Saudi-based Sama economist Fadi Alajaji told Zawya Dow Jones in
an exclusive interview. Inflation in Saudi Arabia, the Mideast’s largest economy, is running at a 30-year
high, fueled in part by the riyal’s peg to the dollar, which drives up the cost of imports and forces Saudi
Arabia to mimic the US’ currently loose monetary policy. In May, annual inflation in Saudi Arabia hit
10.6%, compared with 2.96% in May 2007.
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Pollack 7/15 (Kenneth M. Pollack, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy. “How the Middle
East Wastes Its Oil Wealth Squandered Riches”
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews+articleid_2394912&title=How_the_Middle_East.html)
You might think that $140 per barrel oil would be good for at least one part of the world, the Middle East.
It's too soon to tell for certain, but the region may well turn out to be the part of the world that suffers the
most. As painful as the current (or coming) oil-driven recession will be for Americans, it does seem to be persuading us to make the
sacrifices necessary to diminish our reliance on oil. Over the long term, that could prove a huge boon for our economy, our environment
and our national security. In the Middle East, the situation may be reversed. Right now, the region is experiencing an economic boom,
creating the opportunity to address the deep-seated political, economic and social problems that have spawned terrorist groups like Al
Qaeda. That's certainly what the people of the region hope. The danger is that the way that the rising revenues are
being spent will more likely worsen the region's instability over time. And that's a problem, because
problems in the Middle East have a bad habit of becoming big problems for the rest of the world. The
Middle East isn't Las Vegas: What happens there doesn't stay there.
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Venezuela DA – 1NC
Venezuela’s GDP at record highs
Venezuela DA – UQ – Econ Up
Venezuela’s GDP at record highs
Venezuela's economy grew by 8.4 percent last year, but is starting to see a slowdown. This year it should
expand by 5.8 percent and next year only by 3.5 percent, according to IMF forecasts. Argentina's economy
will see a similar trend, albeit not as marked. Last year, its economy expanded by 8.7 percent. This year it
should grow by another 7.0 percent before expanding by 4.5 percent in 2009.
Has participatory democracy been good for Venezuela? Since the people gained popular power in 1998,
the poverty rate has dropped from 54% to 38.5%--30% if food and health subsidies are factored in;
millions have gained access to free health care; half the population is enrolled in free, public education; and
over 5 million acres of fallow land have been turned over to rural people for agricultural development. The
economy has been growing steadily since NED funded attempts to overthrow the government in 2002.
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The next several months will bring increased inflation, more shortages, and greater internal strife
within Chavismo. CARACAS—To any observer walking through the streets of this city, the poor
performance of the Venezuelan economy is a powerful revelation. The basic elements of Venezuelans’
daily diet are missing; it is hard—sometimes impossible—to find milk, chicken, or flour; and there is a
shortage of medicine and other products essential to good health. But as the state budget continues to
increase due to a dramatic rise in oil revenues since 2003, wages have been frozen for years despite the
government’s claim to operate on the people’s behalf.
Boom times are waning in oil-rich Venezuela, even as world crude prices soar. Inflation is nearing 30
percent, the highest in Latin America, and annual economic growth slowed to 4.8 percent in the first
quarter, a four-year low. Analysts say President Hugo Chavez's economic policies are hindering private
investment and growth just as he hopes to boost support ahead of November's regional elections. Many
point to the economy as his Achilles' heel.
Foreign direct investment fell to $646 million in Venezuela last year, about half its average for the
previous four years, according to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Analysts warn that slowing flow of capital is a drag on the country's annual growth rate, which slowed
to 4.8 percent at the end of the first quarter from 8.8 percent last year.
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Venezuela DA – UQ – Oil Up
"Venezuela has a difficult president, but also has lots of oil and will pay its debts," he says. "It raises the
classic point: the client has money to pay its debt. But does it want to pay? I think Venezuela does." Kassim
says that some market analysts may be moved by other factors than purely economic analysis to have
developed such contempt for Venezuelan bonds. "With all the oil they have, Venezuelan bonds are
delivering yields of 10.5-11 percent. It doesn't make any sense. The market doesn't like Venezuela, but I
do."
Non-OPEC countries are expected to use up their reserves by the late 2020s, according to Calderon. The
most important future OPEC producers will include Venezuela, whose reserves are the worlds biggest,
surpassing those of Saudi Arabia, the former energy minister said. Calderon denied that Venezuela's oil
production had declined, and put production at more than 3 million barrels a day, as opposed to other
estimates of 2.4 million barrels.
Chávez encouraged countries to pay part of their debt in “goods and services,” assuring that “a
distinct market will be born in Petrocaribe” which creates “opportunities for integral development.”
Chávez also proposed that Petrocaribe nations create mixed enterprises with the Venezuelan state oil
company PDVSA to extract oil from the Orinoco Oil Belt, where Venezuela has some of the world’s
largest oil reserves. This way, each country in Petrocaribe would produce its own oil supply, strengthen its
economy, and be less affected by the soaring oil prices, Chávez explained.
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More ev…
Alvarez & Hanson 6-27 (Cesar & Stephanie, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/venezuelas_oilbased_economy.html)
Venezuela has an estimated 78 billion barrels of proven conventional crude oil reserves and an additional
estimated 235 billion barrels of unconventional extra-heavy crude oil in the Orinoco Belt region located
southeast of Caracas. If development in the region can turn this extra-heavy tar-like oil into a more
marketable commodity, Venezuela’s total reserves could rival those of Saudi Arabia, reports the New York
Times. Oxford Analytica notes, however, that PDVSA will struggle to develop its heavy-oil reserves in a
timely fashion given its lack of infrastructure investment and the ongoing oil nationalizations. Oil industry
experts suggest that PDVSA needs to invest at least $3 billion annually into its existing fields just to maintain
current production levels.
The Market Oracle 8 (Financial Markets Analysis & Forecasting online publication
[http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article5187.html] China Raises Fuel Prices: Is this the End of the Oil boom?/ June
23, 2008)
Worst of all, Mexico's production crisis is deepening: In April, Mexico's oil output fell to a nine-year low of
2.8 million barrels a day, mostly because of a decline in the Cantarell field. Think that's scary? Consider this:
At current rates of decline, Mexico will become a net oil importer by 2016, and maybe sooner, according to
Mexico's Energy Ministry! And it's not just Mexico. Venezuela, another big supplier of U.S. imported oil,
is hemorrhaging oil production due to the slipshod management by its deluded president, Hugo
Chavez. Result: The combined net oil exports from Venezuela and Mexico to the U.S. dropped by
414,000 bpd in just five months recently. That's an astounding annual decline rate of 32% a year!
Johnson & Cohen 4 (8-12, Stephen & Ariel, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1787.cfm)
During its 20-year history before Chávez, PDVSA built a reputation for smooth operation and competence,
but the 2002-2003 national strike devastated the oil giant. Some 35,000-40,000 skilled workers, including
fire fighters, walked out while spillage and fires ensued. Production capacity dropped from three mbd to
600,000 barrels. Chávez fired 18,000 skilled managers and workers, further undermining PDVSA's
precarious situation.17 To regain and maintain pumping capacity at an estimated 2.5 mbd, PDVSA engineers
reportedly "goose" wells by pumping air and water into them to coax Venezuela's viscous petroleum to the
surface, endangering the long-term viability of existing fields.
Despite recent high oil prices that have provided a fresh infusion of cash, PDVSA remains in disarray.
Venezuelan economist Gustavo García calculates that this year's internal investment fell from $5 billion to
$4.3 billion while salaries went up 60 percent despite no apparent increase in productivity or number of
employees.18 Without reinvestment in equipment and maintenance, PDVSA will not be able to maintain
current production levels. Moreover, Chávez has reportedly channeled between $1.6 billion and $3.7 billion
from PDVSA into a special account that he is using to finance social programs to influence voters in the
upcoming referendum on his presidency.
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Venezuela DA – UQ – Diversification Up
Venezuela’s economic diversification up
Alvarez & Hanson 6-27 (Cesar & Stephanie, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/venezuelas_oilbased_economy.html)
Hugo Chavez took office in 1999. Since then, Venezuela’s economy has remained squarely centered on oil
production. In 2006, Chavez announced a nationalization of oil fields managed by foreign companies, which
resulted in an increase of the government’s shares in these projects from 40 percent to 60 percent.
Government officials argue, however, that economic growth efforts are not solely focused on oil. Venezuela’s
ambassador to the United States, Bernardo Alvarez Herrera, wrote in a 2006 Foreign Affairs essay that the
non-oil sector, which includes mining, manufacturing, and agriculture, grew 10.6 percent in 2005, “indicating
an important diversification of the country's economy.” Yet even if the country is working to diversify,“oil
still predominates,” says Miguel Tinker-Salas, a professor of Latin American history at Pomona College.
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Dutch disease constitutes at least some degree of threat in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia
and Brazil. The threat is currently greatest in Venezuela and Bolivia. In fact, Venezuela’s stagnation in
the wake of the previous oil price hikes of the 1970s qualifies it as a classic victim of this disease: slow
growth as manufacturing and agriculture are hamstrung by the appreciated exchange rate; low
employment creation in productive sectors; and the resulting high levels of “informalization” and
inequality. Bolivia’s level of inequality still shows Dutch disease’s impact on tin from earlier times. Mexico
(now) and Brazil (when its oil becomes a major export) are less likely to suffer ill effects from energy exports
because they are bigger, more diversified countries, and probably also because their decision-makers will
have a better handle on how to deal with the problem.
While Venezuela is engaged in a massive effort to diversify its economy, it still remains dependent on
oil profits which, under participatory democracy, support social spending. Community members are
involved in decisions about whether or not to develop oil resources and, for the first time in Venezuelan
history, indigenous nations most affected by oil development, take part in these decisions.
Kay & Quispe-Agnoli 2 (Stephen J, Myriam, Atlanta Fed's Latin America Research Group,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KXG/is_3_4/ai_93610810)
Venezuela, for example, is more dependent on oil than any other country in Latin America with year-
2000 petroleum-export revenue accounting for approximately 23 percent of gross domestic product,
half of the government's revenue, and 86 percent of exports. Consequently, the Venezuelan economy
undergoes cycles of expansion and contraction associated with the price of oil. The economic swings are
exacerbated by the fact that fiscal policy has traditionally been procyclical, with government spending rising
during the boom years and shrinking when revenues fall. An oil stabilization fluid is a tool that governments
can use to enact countercyclical fiscal policies that could potentially reduce the disruptive impact of a sharp
drop in the price of oil.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 39
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Venezuela DA – UQ – Inflation Up
Inflation skyrocketing
Cancel 7/8 (Daniel [http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=a_s9FFSShDfI&refer=news]
Venezuelan Inflation Surges to Five-Year High in June/ July 8, 2008)
Venezuela's annual inflation rate reached the highest in five years last month as the easing of price caps on
foods caused supermarket prices to surge. Consumer prices rose 32.2 percent from a year earlier,
exceeding the 31.4 percent median forecast of 12 analysts surveyed by Bloomberg. Monthly inflation was
2.3 percent, according to the central bank's benchmark index of prices in Caracas.
Nevertheless, the economy slowed sharply in the first quarter of this year (see chart). That came as a
surprise to the planning ministry, which had forecast growth of 6.7%. To make matters worse, the
government's inflation forecast of 12% for this year has proved even more wildly optimistic. This is
particularly bad news for the poor, Mr Chávez's main constituency. The price of food is rising faster than
the overall index. According to the Centre for Documentation and Analysis (CENDA), a group linked to the
trade unions, the cost of feeding a family of five rose by 2.4% in May and stands some 60% higher than
the minimum wage, even though this was recently increased. For the first time in the past three years, the
living standards of ordinary Venezuelans are declining.
In Thailand, inflation has jumped to a 10-year high of 8.9 per cent. In Russia, inflation is running at more
than 14 per cent; in Argentina, 23 per cent (unofficially); in Venezuela, 29 per cent; and in Indonesia, nine
per cent (with analysts predicting 12 per cent next year).
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On Sunday, Ali Rodríguez, the new Venezuelan Finance Minister, detailed ministry plans to take on the
“immediate challenge” of inflation by investing Venezuela’s “overflowing” oil revenues in a broadened
state apparatus to stimulate agricultural production and gradually leave behind “state capitalism.”
Rodríguez recommended that inflation “be combated in two directions, on the one hand, the stimulation of
production principally in the food sector and, on the other hand, we must carry out a very prudent moderation
of consumption.”
President Hugo Chavez's government has been battling South America's highest inflation rate. The
Central Bank says monthly inflation has slowed to 2.4 percent in June — down from 3.2 percent a
month earlier. The Central Bank said Tuesday that price increases have slowed primarily in the food
sector, partly due to an increased supply of agricultural products
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Alvarez & Hanson 6-27 (Cesar & Stephanie, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/venezuelas_oilbased_economy.html)
Venezuela's proven oil reserves are among the top ten in the world. Oil generates about 80 percent of the
country’s total export revenue, contributes about half of the central government’s income, and is responsible
for about one-third of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Increases in world oil prices in recent
years have allowed Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to expand social program spending, bolster
commercial ties with other countries, and boost his own international profile. Though Chavez has threatened
to stop exporting Venezuelan oil and refined petroleum products to the United States, its biggest oil-trading
partner, experts say a significant short-term shift in oil relations between Venezuela and the United States is
unlikely. The medium-term outlook for state oil company PDVSA is questionable, however, and analysts
draw links between PDVSA's profitability and the political stability of the country.
Cibils and Scott 1 (Vicente Fretes Lead Specialist, LAC, The World Bankand Kinnon World Bank. Washington,
D.C http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/lacinfoclient.nsf/e9dd232c66d43b6b852567d 2005ca3c5/fe8ed
dae8d8fdec985256b0b005a28b9/$FILE/C-II.pdf)
Over the last ten years, the structure of the economy has changed: Venezuela has become more
dependent on the oil sector with the share of oil–GDP in total real GDP increasing from about 21
percent in the early 1990s to about 26 percent in the late 1990s.3 At the same time, the share of
agriculture in total real GDP decreased from about 6 percent in 1990 to about 5 percent in 2000 and
manufacturing decreased from about 13 percent to about 11 percent.4 The service sector (including
government, commerce and other services) remained at about 47 percent of real GDP. Finally, reflecting the
failure of exports to diversify away from the oil sector, and the impact of the overvaluation of the
domestic currency on the external competitiveness over time, the share of non–oil exports to total
exports remained, on average, below 25 percent.
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Sullivan & Olhero 8 (1-11, CRS Report, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf)
Since Venezuela is a major supplier of foreign oil to the United States (the fourth major foreign supplier in
2006, after Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia), providing about 11% of U.S. crude oil imports, a key U.S.
interest has been ensuring the continued flow of oil exports. Some 68% of Venezuela’s oil exports are
destined for the United States, highlighting the dependency of Venezuela on the U.S. market, and oil exports
account for the overwhelming majority of Venezuela’s exports to the United States. In 2006, Venezuela’s
total exports destined for the United States amounted to $37.2 billion, with oil products accounting for $35.1
billion, or 94% of the total.106 The December 2002 strike orchestrated by the opposition reduced
Venezuela’s oil exports, but by May 2003, Venezuelan officials maintained that overall oil production
returned to the pre-strike level. Venezuela’s state-run oil company, PdVSA, owns CITGO, which operates
three crude oil refineries and a network of some 14,000 retail gasoline stations in the United States. The
Chávez government has benefitted from the rise in world oil prices, which has increased government
revenues and sparked an economic boom. As a result, Chávez has been able to increase government
expenditures on anti-poverty and other social programs associated with his populist agenda.
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US demand is key
Yet, despite Chávez’s tendency to publicly insult American leaders and whip up anti-American sentiment, the
United States and Venezuela remain mutually dependent. Chávez relies on U.S. oil demand to sustain the
Venezuelan economy; roughly 60 percent of Venezuelan oil exports are destined for the United States.
Threats by Caracas to divert energy exports to China are not credible in the short term, given the
tremendous infrastructure and transportation costs such a shift would involve.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 43
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Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
Inflation itself is a problem, now running at 19.4 percent. But it should be emphasized that double-digit
inflation rates in a developing country such as Venezuela are not comparable to the same phenomenon
occurring in the United States or Europe. Inflation in Venezuela was much higher in the pre-Chávez years,
running at 36 percent in 1998 and 100 percent in 1996. It has fallen through most of the current recovery,
from a 40 percent annual rate (monthly, year-over-year) at the peak of the oil strike in February 2003 to 10.4
percent a year ago, before climbing again to its present rate (see Figure 3). Over the last three months it
appears to have stabilized at 19.4 percent.
Because of its large current account surplus, large reserves, and low foreign debt, the government has a
number of tools available to stabilize and reduce inflation – as well as eventually bring the currency into
alignment – without sacrificing the growth of the economy. It appears the government is committed to
maintaining a high rate of growth, in addition to its other goals. Therefore, at present it does not appear that
the current economic expansion is about to end any time in the near future.
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Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
The current uptick in inflation is fueled by a combination of shortages and the accumulated effects of three
and a half years of very rapid growth. How serious of a problem is this increased inflation, and could it lead
to an economic crisis and/or the end of the current economic expansion? First, it should be kept in mind that
there is no consensus in the macroeconomic research on inflation as to how high it can go without a negative
impact on growth, with some studies finding a threshold of 20 percent or more – a threshold that Venezuela is
just now approaching.31 Second, it should be emphasized that double-digit inflation rates in a developing
country such as Venezuela are not comparable to the same phenomenon occurring in the United States or
Europe. Inflation in Venezuela was much higher in the pre-Chávez years, running at 36 percent in 1998 and
100 percent in 1996. Although much of the public does not understand this, it is real (after-inflation) growth
in incomes— and employment – that affects people's living standards, not the rate of inflation per se. This is
true so long as inflation does not spiral to the point where it actually reduces real growth. So far, it does not
appear that inflation in Venezuela is getting out of control. In the last 3 months it has stabilized at about 19.4
percent. Beginning in February of this year, the government reduced the value added tax, in an effort that
probably contributed to stabilizing the inflation rate. It is also worth noting that inflation has fallen sharply
through most of the current economic recovery, and has only risen over the last year. In the last year it has
risen to about half of its peak in February 2003, which was driven by the oil strike of that year.
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Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
Furthermore, since the country is running such a large current account surplus, and the government is taking
in more revenue that it can spend, it has a number of tools to fight inflation without necessarily sacrificing
economic growth. One has been sterilization, whereby the government takes excess domestic currency out of
circulation by issuing bonds. The recent sale of $7.5 billion worth of bonds by PDVSA in April, which were
snapped up by a large number of investors,32 are an example of the government using bond sales for this
purpose. Venezuela's current account surplus also gives it the leeway to defuse inflation through imports.
This is what happened through most of the current economic recovery, when inflation was falling despite
very rapid growth – excess domestic currency was converted into dollars and spent on imports. As can be
seen in Table 6, imports tripled from their depressed level of $10.5 billion in 2003 to $32.2 billion, or 17.8
percent of GDP in 2006. But exports, fueled by rising oil prices and the recovery of oil production from the
strike, grew much faster, from $27.2 billion in 2003 to $65.2 billion, or 36 percent of GDP. As a result, the
country is running a huge current account surplus: it was 15 percent of GDP for 2006. In the last 2 quarters
this surplus has shrunk considerably, but is still about 8 percent of GDP.
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Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
In sum, inflation has been rising over most of the last year but it is not an imminent threat to the current
expansion. This is likely to remain the case so long as Venezuela maintains a large current account surplus.
Nonetheless, the government will need to make sure that inflation does not begin another upward climb of
the sort that has happened over the last year. Fortunately, given the government's favorable current account,
international reserves and borrowing capacity, it has the ability to bring down inflation without a sharp
slowdown in economic growth.
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Logan 6 (Int’l Security Network, Sam, Investigative journalist “Invasion or civil war for Venezuela?”
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=15232)
For years, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has claimed to be protecting his people from the corrupt
and greedy Venezuelan elite class, represented by the Venezuelan political opposition. Now he is protecting
them from an external foe, the US, which he has accused of intending to invade Venezuela. Riding on the
rhetoric of an eventual US invasion, Chavez is building up a massive civilian militia answerable directly, and
only, to him. That militia, however, is more likely intended to deter a military coup than a US invasion. After
the 2002 attempt to overthrow his government, Chavez changed tactics, taking on a larger role as protector of
his people from the US. As such, he must continue to claim that the US will someday invade Venezuela and that
they only thing that will keep the Yankees at bay is two million trained civilians. The formation of a civilian
militia gives physical presence and weight to Chavez's rhetoric that the US will one day invade. Considering
the many rumors of a palace coup and the shuffling of military commanders in Chavez’s top brass, however, the
formation of a civilian militia looks more like another bulwark intended to protect himself against a military-
led coup d’etat. The only conventional army likely to threaten Chavez is Venezuela’s own military forces, the
FAN. In the event of a successful FAN-orchestrated coup, two million hardcore supporters with military
training could be ordered to drag the country into a civil war. Given the world’s dependence on Venezuelan
oil, such a possibility would have serious international repercussions.
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Logan 6 (Int’l Security Network, Sam, Investigative journalist “Invasion or civil war for Venezuela?”
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=15232)
What military analysts call asymmetrical warfare, also referred to as fourth-generation warfare, is
characterized by war between a nation-state and a non-state actor. Latin America’s history is riddled with
examples of how asymmetrical warfare has been used to overthrow a government, such as the Cuban
Revolution, or used to prolong a struggle, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In
some cases, these non-state actors have been integrated into politics, such as the FMLN in El Salvador. Chavez
is in a position to take advantage of this history to promote his ideology of a region-wide resistance against US
imperialism. It is convenient rhetoric that veils what many believe are his intentions to deter a military coup. By the
end of 2007, it is quite possible that a total of two million Chavez supporters will have been trained and
reinserted back into their normal lives, ready to resist at a moment’s notice. It is highly unlikely that this
militia will be called to protect Venezuela from an outside invader. Rather, they could be called on to protect
Chavez’s regime from a cadre of military officers and others who want to remove him from office. If Chavez
manages to survive such a coup attempt, he may go quietly or he may seek to embody the spirit of Cuba’s Fidel
Castro and regional revolutionary hero Ernesto “Che” Guevarra by leading his faithful into a civil war. The FAN is
believed to have at least 80,000 professional soldiers, who could be forced to face two-million urban guerrillas.
A civil war in Venezuela would be intense, extremely destructive, and spell doom for the future of Venezuela’s
economy, society, and oil output. Due to the nature of asymmetrical warfare, it would be nearly impossible to
completely eradicate a group of dedicated and trained Chavez supporters.
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Briggs and Roberts 7 (Charles L. is a Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley and Venezuelan public health
physician and Associate Researcher, Emily is a master’s student in the Schools of Public Health and Social Welfare,
http://socrates.berkeley.edu:7001/Events/spring2007/02-05-07-briggs/index.html)
Three weeks after Chávez told the health minister, “Get me that program!” Misión Barrio Adentro was
nationalized. Although Chávez did not initiate the Barrio Adentro movement, his leadership proved
instrumental and led to a rollout of resources to build, stock and staff the clinics. Thirty thousand
Cuban health professionals were brought over to take posts across the country. The implementation of
Misión Barrio Adentro sparked new ideas for locally-based social programs which in turn led to the
reallocation of millions of dollars in oil revenues to finance the wide array of education, health, social
and cultural programs visible in Venezuela today.
Travel Health Service 5 (Department of Health Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
http://www.travelhealth.gov.hk/english/outbreaknews/2005/ond13march2005.html)
A research paper published in Nature estimated that there were around 515 million cases of malaria
worldwide in 2002, nearly double previous estimates in 1998 by the World Health Organization. One third
of the population in the world i.e. 2.2 billion people, are at risk from the malaria. The disease claims 1
million lives a year in sub-Saharan Africa alone, most of them children under 5 years old. Of the 4 malaria
parasites, Plasmodium falciparum is the most dangerous, which is prevalent throughout the tropics (including
Southeast Asia), and has developed resistance to most anti-malarial drugs. Health experts worry about the
situation in Southeast Asia. Many people with malaria do not go to clinics and many clinics do not submit
disease figures. There are many more malaria cases in Southeast Asia than recognised before. Global control
of malaria relies on efficient public health measures, health education, provision of bed-nets and
effective drugs to persons needed.
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Venezuela enjoys some of the highest health standards in South America in terms of infant mortality
(26.4 per 1,000 population) and longevity (73.07 life expectancy). Much of this was made possible by
government intervention. Much of the population gets its medical care from facilities and hospitals
operated by the Venezuelan Social Security Institute. Treatment at the country's clinics is free, though
there is a small charge for prescription drugs. At the public hospitals, the poor receive treatment for free,
and a small fee is charged to those who can afford to pay it. There is also a public welfare program that
provides survivor and old-age pensions, maternity benefits, and payment for work-related accidents
and illnesses. The institute finances its activities by a mandatory payment of 12 percent of the salaries of all
Venezuelan workers. The government has had great success in implementing programs of prenatal care
and children's immunization, improving water and sanitary conditions, and eliminating diseases.
The Endemic Disease Control Project helped to control malaria and other endemic diseases such as
Chagas, dengue, yellow fever, leprosy, and leishmaniasis. The project lowered the incidence and impact of
endemic diseases, and strengthened the institutions that are responsible for their control. Currently,
Venezuela is better prepared to apply modern technology to control and treat these causes of ill health
thanks to expanded training and the creation of research, diagnostic, and field support facilities.
Between 1996 and 2000, the project saved an estimated 11,500 lives, prevented 500,000 illnesses, and
treated about 3.5 million non-lethal infections. Under the project, the Malaria Directorate was able to
control malaria in approximately 408 square kilometers where the disease is endemic. The number of
deaths due to malaria dropped from 25 per year in 1995 to 7 in 1999, while the number of cases
decreased from 22,056 to 21,685. In the state of Bolívar, the time from onset of symptoms to treatment was
cut by 33 percent, diminishing the prevalence and possibility of transmission. A significant decline in
mortality due to dengue was also achieved between 1995 and 1999. In 1995, dengue took the lives of 65
people. By 1999, the number of deaths dropped to 15, and the number of cases decreased from 32,280 to
26,602. Strengthened control activities also moved Venezuela into the elimination phase of leprosy,
according to Pan American Health Organization standards. Improvements in detection and treatment
decreased the number of children affected and people incapacitated by the ailment.
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Hong 00 (Evelyn Third World Network Prepared for the Peoples Health Assembly http://www.phmovement.org
/pdf/pubs/phm-pubs-hong.pdf)
Global economic forces have given rise to a situation where exposure to pathogenic microorganisms has
increased and human resistance has been weakened. It has led to new emerging diseases and old diseases
have staged a comeback. In 1993, WHO estimated 14.4 million people died of infectious diseases. In the US,
TB rose by 18 percent between 1985 and 1992. One third of the world’s population is said to be
carrying the infection. The spread of the HIV virus, which destroys the immune cells that keep the TB germ
under control in the body, will cause many to die of the disease. With several strains of the TB bacterium
now resistant to all anti-TB drugs, the WHO admits that the disease ‘is out of control in many parts of the
world’. Diptheria has reemerged as a major killer of adults in Russia. Plague has resurfaced in India, while
malaria has returned to regions which it had been eliminated and is spreading to previously unaffected areas. Cholera has re-emerged
as a major killer in South America. Epidemics of dengue fever transmitted by the Aedes Aegypti mosquito have swept parts of
Venezuela, Brazil, India and Australia the first time ever. Yellow fever is on the increase in Africa.
Hong 00 (Evelyn Third World Network Prepared for the Peoples Health Assembly http://www.phmovement.org
/pdf/pubs/phm-pubs-hong.pdf)
The incidence of vector borne and water borne diseases climbs during El Nino and La Nina years,
especially in areas hit by floods or droughts. Longterm studies in Colombia, Venezuela, India and
Pakistan reveal, that malaria surges in the wake of El Ninos: regions stricken by flooding or drought
during the El Nino of 1997-1998 (the strongest of the century) often experience a convergence of diseases
borne by mosquitoes, rodents and water. Additionally, in many dry areas, fires raged out of control,
polluting the air for miles around.
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Brookes 8 (Heritage Foundation, Peter, Senior fellow. “Uncle Sam’s Latin challenge” http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed013108a.cfm)
Another positive note: Democratic politics, with some notable exceptions, have become entrenched in the
Latin psyche since the end of the Cold War. Free markets are also on the march, fostered by regional free
trade agreements.
So, has the United States "lost" Latin America? Nah.
While some nations, prodded by Chavez's petrodollars, have moved left and become less democratic, that
trend is balanced by positive developments in democracy and free markets.
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AP 8
([http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/0/BE358F609E1E6A16C225746E0025780C?OpenDocument]
Venezuela Says 'No Terrorists Here' After U.S. Action Against Alleged Hizbullah Supporters/ June 20, 2008)
Venezuela's foreign minister on Thursday rejected U.S. government accusations that a Venezuelan
diplomat helped finance Hizbullah in Lebanon. Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro did not specifically refer
to Ghazi Nasr al Din, who was targeted Wednesday in a U.S. Treasury Department action ordering any assets
he controls in the United States to be frozen and forbidding U.S. citizens from doing business with him. But
Maduro told reporters that "there are no terrorists here," and said officials should be going after the
assets of U.S. President George Bush. "If they want to search for terrorists, look for them in the White
House," he said. Washington considers the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hizbullah a terrorist group.
Wednesday's action accuses Nasr al Din of using his position as a diplomat and a leader of a Caracas-based
Shiite Islamic center to help the group. The main Shiite Muslim center in Caracas is the Imam al Hadi
Venezuelan Islamic Center, said Mohamad Mtayrek, a 42-year-old Lebanese immigrant who helps
manage the small mosque and community center in a two-story house. Mtayrek said the center has no
link to Hizbullah and dismissed Washington's allegations as "politics." He said he knows Nasr al Din but
declined to speak about him, saying "it's not my business."
Weisbrot 8 (Mark Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, D.C.
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3554 )
Washington's foreign policy establishment - and much of the U.S. media -- was taken by surprise this week
when President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela stated that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) should lay down their arms and unconditionally release all of their hostages. The FARC is a
guerrilla group that has been fighting to overthrow the Colombian government for more than four
decades. Chávez's announcement should not have come as a surprise, because he had already said the same
things several months ago. On January 13, for example, Chávez said: "I do not agree with the armed
struggle, and that is one of the things that I want to talk to Marulanda (the head of the FARC who died last
March) about." Chávez also stated his opposition to kidnapping, and has made numerous public appeals
for the FARC to release their hostages. Chávez had also explained previously that the armed struggle
was not necessary because left movements could now come to power through elections, something that
was often difficult or impossible in the past because of political repression. The surprise in U.S. policy
and media circles is a result of a misconception of Chávez's recent role in Colombia's conflict. A
comparison: former President Jimmy Carter has recently called upon the United States to negotiate with Hamas - dismissed as a terrorist organization by the
U.S. and its allies in Israel and Europe. Carter is not an advocate of Hamas nor of armed struggle. He has met with Hamas and called for negotiations
because he is trying to promote a peace settlement.
Grandin and Hylton 8 (Greg New York University - Professor of History, Forrest New York University -
Department of History http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3440)
We once again appeal to the media for objectivity, and to treat unsubstantiated allegations the same
way they would treat such allegations if they were made against the United States government -- i.e. to
have some standards of evidence. Interpol cannot and will not verify the validity of any charges made
against the Venezuelan government.. There are as yet no allegations that would hold up in a court of
law. Over the last month, the Colombian government's strategy has involved a media campaign with timed leaks of new documents to the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Miami Herald and other outlets, many of whom relied on the Colombian interpretation
of their meaning, and with little acknowledgement of the deep controversy surrounding them. Even if
the documents were indeed produced by the FARC, this does not mean that the information is
accurate. As Adam Isacson of the Center for International Policy, who has analyzed the documents, noted,
"We are forced to rely on accounts from far-flung guerrilla leaders who have a strong incentive to
portray their overtures to Venezuela as successful. For the FARC, getting material support from
Caracas was probably the main benefit they hoped to win from these contacts, so anything that even
appeared to hint at progress toward getting arms or cash was prominently reported, possibly in an
exaggerated way."
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Venezuela DA – Impact – A2: Chavez Bad – Oil Not K/T Chavez (1/2)
Chavez is insulated from oil prices – They govt budgets conservatively and has reserve
funding
Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
Oil prices collapsed beginning in 1981, and the Venezuelan economy went down with them.6 Is this sort of
unraveling ahead in Venezuela, as many analysts predict? Of course, the future of oil prices is difficult to
project. The July 10 short-term outlook of the US Energy Information Agency projects oil prices at $65.56
per barrel for 2007 and $66.92 for 2008.7 The risks of unanticipated supply shocks seem to be mostly on the
downside, which would increase prices. Most importantly, there is the potential for adverse supply shocks
from the Middle East, where the Bush Administration has threatened to bomb Iran if the standoff over that
country's nuclear program cannot be resolved; and the general risk of widening war, terrorism, or rebellion
there carries an unknown risk for other major world suppliers in the region. However, there is always the risk
of an unexpected downturn in oil prices. If such an unanticipated reduction in oil prices is temporary,
Venezuela would seem well-prepared to withstand it. The government has about $25 billion, or about 14
percent of GDP, in international reserves. This is much more than is needed maintain a safe level of reserves
for imports or other needs. As discussed below, the country also has relatively low levels of public and
foreign public debt, and if necessary could borrow rather than cut government spending or public investment
enough to seriously slow the domestic economy. The government also budgets conservatively for oil prices
that are far below current prices: for 2006, the government budgeted for oil at $26 per barrel, whereas the
average price of Venezuelan crude oil was $60.20 (see below). The probability of an economic collapse
brought on by falling oil prices therefore appears to be very small.
More ev…
Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
Venezuela has budgeted conservatively with respect to the price of oil, and the prospect of a collapse in oil
prices in the foreseeable future seems unlikely – as described above. Critics also point to the run-up in
government spending as an unsustainable trend. Table 5 shows the government's finances since 1998. As can
be seen, there has indeed been a very large increase in central government spending, from 21.4 percent of
GDP in 1998 to 30 percent in 2006. However, revenues increased even more, from 17.4 to 30 percent of GDP
over the same period, leaving the central government with a balanced budget for 2006. For 2007, the
government has once again budgeted very conservatively for oil at $29 per barrel, 52 percent under the
average $60.20 dollars per barrel that Venezuelan crude sold for last year. However, what the government
generally does as oil revenue far exceeds the budgeted price, is to spend beyond budgeted expenditures.
Thus, while a fall in oil prices will not cause a budgetary crisis, it could lead to reduced government spending
from current levels. This could slow the economy from its present very rapid pace, but it is unlikely to cause
a downturn, because Venezuela has a considerable cushion to deal with a decline in oil prices.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 61
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Venezuela DA – Impact – A2: Chavez Bad – Oil Not K/T Chavez (2/2)
Chavez can borrow out of low oil prices
As can be seen in Table 5, Venezuela has taken advantage of the current expansion and increased oil revenues
to reduce its public debt, and especially foreign public debt. Total public debt increased quite substantially
through the crisis of 2002-2003, reaching a peak of 47.7 percent of GDP in 2003. But by 2006 it was down to
a modest 23.8 percent of GDP. The government also transitioned away from foreign financing, leaving the
external component of the foreign debt at just 14.7 percent of GDP. Goldman-Sachs projects a further decline
of total debt to 20 percent of GDP, despite their projection of a growth slowdown (from 10.3 to 7 percent of
GDP).27 Total interest payments on the public debt, foreign and domestic, summed to a relatively small 2.1
percent of GDP in 2006.
Thus there is plenty of room to borrow, if necessary, if Venezuela were to face an unexpected decline in oil
revenues. But before having to borrow, the government could dip into its international reserves. As can be
seen in Table 6, the government's foreign exchange reserves, as of June 30 were $25.2 billion, or about 14
percent of GDP. This has dropped sharply from its peak of $37.4 billion last year, but it is still much larger
than the country's needs, enough to pay off almost its entire foreign public debt. The recent depletion of
reserves was the result of a $6.77 billion transfer to the National Development Fund (FONDEN), the creation
of an offshore account by the National Treasury for PDVSA’s tax payments in order to manage monetary
liquidity (i.e. this is central government tax revenue held in dollars and not being spent), a significant
increase in the volume of currency transactions to finance imports approved by CADIVI28, and the recent
purchase of dollars from the Central Bank by PDVSA as a result of placing $7.5 billion in international bonds
(i.e. money raised in bolivares and sold to the Central Bank in order to absorb liquidity). Therefore, these
actions do not represent any economic trend that would be expected to further deplete reserves. Also, if we
add the offshore accounts of the FONDEN and the National Treasury to the current level of international
reserves, the total is in excess of $40 billion29– with some estimates of these total effective international
reserves as high as $45 billion.30 The government's revenue from oil last year was $28.9 billion. In the face
of an unanticipated decline in oil prices, the government could therefore draw on reserves and borrowing
from financial markets for some time before any serious budget cuts would be necessary. For example, if oil
revenue were to decline by as much as 20 percent, this could be absorbed from reserves, which would
otherwise be expected to grow over the next year.
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Declining Venezuelan oil revenue prevents Chavez from protecting regional democratic
stability – Causes secessionist oil grabs
Weisbrot 8 (Mark Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, D.C.
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3554 )
The whole controversy is an illustration of the vast gulf between most of Latin America, which now has left-
of-center governments, and the United States foreign policy establishment. For Latin America, Chávez is a
friend and important ally who has promoted regional economic integration and growth - even helping
to create new institutions for this purpose such as the Bank of the South and UNASUR. He has shared a
good part of Venezuela's oil wealth with his neighbors, even helping some to deliver on their electoral
promises, thereby contributing to democratization in the region. He has tried to promote a peaceful
settlement to the conflict in Colombia. He has been democratically elected repeatedly, and to the region
his government is as legitimate as any in the world. For Latin America's leaders, these considerations
far outweigh any differences they may have with his rhetoric or confrontational style vis-à-vis the United
States - which after all, did support a military attempt to overthrow his democratically elected government in
2002.
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Sullivan & Olhero 8 (1-11, CRS Report, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf)
A key decision for President Chávez will be how he proceeds politically in the aftermath of the defeat of the
constitutional reform. In the past, the President has resorted to harsh political rhetoric and polarization to win
at the ballot box, and ensure his popular support. The defeat of the referendum, however, could be a sign that
such hardline tactics may no longer be as successful. Some observers think that the defeat could cause
Chávez to use more pragmatic political tactics that would appeal to moderate Chavistas and those supporters
that abstained in the 2007 referendum. Such an approach might enable the President to regain strong popular
support, or enough support to again attempt efforts to achieve passage of constitutional reforms in the future,
particularly the elimination of presidential term limits. Other observers contend that it is unlikely that Chávez
will refrain from hardline tactics to enact his radical agenda, especially given now that he is term limited until
early 2013. Such a strategy of continued polarization, however, could be counterproductive for the President
at the ballot box if it alienates moderate Chavistas. Moreover, at this juncture, the government’s attempt to
impose any unpopular policy that affects civil rights or the state of democracy risks triggering widespread
street protests by an energized student movement and the political opposition.
Checks prevent Chavez from threatening democracy and fomenting anti-American regimes
Johnson & Cohen 4 (8-12, Stephen & Ariel, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1787.cfm)
The good news is that the majority of Venezuelans do not support Chávez's evolving dictatorship. Opponents
have succeeded in petitioning for a referendum to recall him from office on August 15. Democratic
governance and free markets are making slow strides in Latin American countries formerly ruled by
dictators. While oil resources give him power, countries can buy oil from other vendors.
Alvarez & Hanson 6-27 (Cesar & Stephanie, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/venezuelas_oilbased_economy.html)
Critics of Chavez think he should be pouring money into infrastructure to ensure a sustainable oil industry
rather than allocating so much for social and foreign policy initiatives. According to the Wall Street Journal,
PDVSA “spent just $60 million on exploration in 2004, compared with $174 million in 2001.” But Vicente
Frepes-Cibils, the lead economist for Venezuela at the World Bank, says “investment is increasing” and
Venezuela has an accumulation of reserves including outside funds ranging from $10 billion to $15 billion
that it is planning to use for oil infrastructure.
High oil prices solves poverty, health care and unemployment in Venezuela
Schuyler 0 (George, Department of History University of Central Arkansas
[http://www.soc.uoc.gr/kousis/KOIN1/Health/NeoLiberalismHealth/NeolibHealthVenezuela.pdf] Healltth and
Neolliiberralliism:: Venezuella and Cuba/ 2000)
During the last two decades, low oil prices, rising debt and lagging foreign investment drove Venezuela into
an economic crisis. Pressured by the International Monetary Fund and advised by neoliberal gurus such as
the Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, Venezuela transformed its development strategy from state-led
industrialization to neoliberalism: open markets, free trade, exports, privatization and limited government
spending and involvement in the economy. In the 1980s, per capita gross domestic product fell by 20 percent
or more. By 1988, real wages dropped by one-third, to their 1964 level.18 Unemployment and
underemployment rose steadily, inflation soared and income inequality widened. By 1989, poverty was
150 percent more than in 1980 and continued to engulf Venezuelans in the 1990s. A study by the
Catholic University Andres Bello indicated that 57 percent of Venezuelan families lived in poverty while a
labor union claimed that only 10.2 percent of Venezuelans could afford to buy the basic supply of food
deemed necessary for adequate nutrition and health.19
Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
There is much evidence to contradict this conventional wisdom. Venezuela suffered a severe economic
growth collapse in the 1980s and 1990s, with its real GDP peaking in 1977. In this regard it is similar to the
region as a whole, which since 1980 has suffered its worst long-term growth performance in more than a
century. Hugo Chávez Frias was elected in 1998 and took office in 1999, and the first four years of his
administration were plagued by political instability that had a large adverse impact on the economy. (See
Figure 2). This culminated in a military coup that temporarily toppled the constitutional government in April
2002, followed by a devastating oil strike from December 2002-February 2003. The oil strike sent the
economy into a severe recession, during which Venezuela lost 24 percent of GDP.
But in the second quarter of 2003, the political situation began to stabilize, and it has continued to stabilize
throughout the current economic expansion. The economy has had continuous rapid growth since the onset of
political stability. Real (inflation-adjusted) GDP has grown by 76 percent since the bottom of the recession in
2003. It is likely that the government's expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, as well as exchange
controls, have contributed to the current economic upswing. Central government spending has increased from
21.4 percent of GDP in 1998 to 30 percent in 2006. Real short-term interest rates have been negative
throughout all or most of the recovery (depending on the measure—see Figure 4).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 67
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More ev…
Sullivan & Olhero 8 (1-11, CRS Report, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf)
Venezuela is using windfall oil profits to boost social spending and programs to fight poverty. Beginning in
2003, the Chávez government began implementing an array of social programs and services known as
misiones, or missions. As a result of the booming economy and increased social spending, poverty rates in
Venezuela have declined. The U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reports that
poverty fell from 48.6% in 2002 to 30.2% in 2006, with extreme poverty falling from 22.2% to 9.9% over the
same period.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 68
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Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
The poverty rate has decreased rapidly from its peak of 55.1 percent in 2003 to 30.4 percent at end of 2006,
as would be expected in the face of the very rapid economic growth during these last three years. (See Table
3). If we compare the pre-Chávez poverty rate (43.9 percent) with the end of 2006 (30.4 percent) this is a 31
percent drop in the rate of poverty. However this poverty rate does not take into account the increased access
to health care or education that poor people have experienced. The situation of the poor has therefore
improved significantly beyond even the substantial poverty reduction that is visible in the official poverty
rate, which measures only cash income. Measured unemployment has also dropped substantially to 8.3
percent for June 2007, its lowest level in more than a decade; as compared to 15 percent in June 1999 and
18.4 percent in June 2003 (coming out of the recession). Formal employment has also increased significantly
since 1998, from 44.5 to 49.4 percent of the labor force.
More ev…
Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
The poverty rate has decreased rapidly from its peak of 55.1 percent in 2003 to 30.4 percent at end of 2006,
as would be expected in the face of the very rapid economic growth during these last three years. Table 3
shows the poverty rate since 1997, by household and population. If we compare the pre-Chávez poverty rate
(43.9 percent) with end of 2006 (30.4 percent) this is a 31 percent drop in the rate of poverty, which is
substantial.21 However this poverty rate measures only cash income – it does not take into account the
increased access to health care or education that poor people have experienced. As we have shown
previously, taking the most conservative estimate of just the value of the health care benefits – what the poor
would have spent on health care in the absence of these new programs – would lower the measured poverty
rate by about 2 percentage points. 22 Of course, this is a very conservative estimate of the value of just the
increased health care benefits to the poor, since in the absence of these benefits, most poor people would
simply have gone without health care, and therefore suffer from worse health, lower income, and lower life
expectancy. So the value of these health care services is much greater than the amount that they would have
spent out-of-pocket in the absence of the government programs.23 The situation of the poor has therefore
improved significantly beyond even the substantial poverty reduction that is visible in the official poverty
rate, which measures only cash income.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 69
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Venezuela DA – Impact – A2: Chavez Bad – A2: Heg
Chavez doesn’t undermine US hegemony- Latin American countries are not influenced
Petras 4 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University
[http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/682] Myths and Realities: Venezuela's Chavez and the Referendum/
September 2, 2004)
Evidence to the contrary is abundant. Brazil under Lula has sold oil exploration rights to US and
European multinational corporations, provides a contingent of 1500 troops (along with Argentina, Chile
etc) to Haiti to stabilize Washington's puppet regime imposed through the kidnapping of President-elect
Aristide. Likewise in the other Andean countries (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia) the elected
regimes propose to privatize public petroleum companies, support ALCA and Plan Colombia and pay
their foreign debts. The Broad Front in Uruguay promises to follow Brazil's neo-liberal policies. While
Chavez promotes the regional trading bloc MERCOSUR, the major members Brazil and Argentina
are increasing their trade relations outside the region. In effect there is a bloc of neo-liberal regimes
arrayed against Chavez's anti-imperialist policies and mass social movements. To the extent that
Chavez continues his independent foreign policy his principle allies are the mass social movements and
Cuba.
But a defeat of imperialism does not necessarily mean or lead to a revolutionary transformation, as
post-Chavez post-election appeals to Washington and big business demonstrate. More indicative of
Chavez politics is the forthcoming $5 billion dollar investment agreements with Texaco-Mobil and
Exxon to exploit the Orinoco gas and oil fields. The euphoria of the left prevents them from observing the
pendulum shifts in Chavez discourse and the heterodox social welfare--neo-liberal economic politics he has
consistently practiced. President Chavez's policy has always followed a careful balancing act between
rejecting vassalage to the US and local oligarchic rentiers on the one hand and trying to harness a
coalition of foreign and national investors, urban and rural poor to a program of welfare capitalism.
He is closer to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal than Castro's socialist revolution. In the aftermath of the
three political crises--the failed civil-military coup, the debacle of the oil executives lock out, and the defeat
of the referendum--Chavez offered to dialogue and reach a consensus with the media barons, big
business plutocrats and US government, on the basis of the existing property relations, media
ownership and expanded relations with Washington.
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Logan 5 (Sam, Writer for ISN. “Venezuelan nuclear technology is a long shot” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
Chavez has a strong track record. He has engaged Argentina and Brazil for assistance in developing
so-called peaceful nuclear technology. Argentina and Brazil have tacitly agreed, effectively giving him the
regional support he covets. The reality that Chavez does not have a group of Venezuelan nuclear scientists
cannot be ignored. He needs to borrow the expertise from elsewhere. He does not know how to build a
reactor, or operate one. And his neighbors in the region, while having demonstrated an ability to build
and operate nuclear reactors, are still subject to international pressure in the form of the IAEA.
Additionally, the countries in the region that do have nuclear energy required no less than ten years to
build a reactor. If Chavez is serious about bringing nuclear power to Venezuela, he would need at least
ten years, if not closer to 20, to realize the first kilowatt of nuclear power output. There is currently little
guarantee that he can stay in power that long. Producing nuclear power would allow Venezuela to
export more oil and generate additional revenues for the state treasury. If Chavez manages to stay in
power long enough to take advantage of nuclear technology in Venezuela, he is likely to use the extra energy
to alleviate domestic need for oil he would rather export. Herein lies the strongest chord of truth.
Logan & Cirino 5 (1-26, ISN Security Watch Staff, Sam & Julio, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
Argentina is interested in completing the sale, but is adamant about meeting international standards and
expectations for transparency, which means it would register its intent with the IAEA. The IAEA, in turn,
would monitor the process closely and is likely to request a complete review of the plant once the facility is
installed and operational in Venezuela.
There is no guarantee, however, that Venezuela will yield to the will of an international agency, much less
one that has been ignored and badgered by countries around the world since its inception.
There are questions in Argentina, however, as to whether the transfer of the technology required to operate a
mid-sized nuclear reactor would constitute a “dual-use” situation. This is a touchy subject. It is difficult to
see how Argentina would benefit from transferring technology necessary to operate a dual-use nuclear
reactor. The international pressure would be fierce.
More ev…
Logan & Cirino 5 (1-26, ISN Security Watch Staff, Sam & Julio, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
Brazil’s capacity to enrich uranium is certainly attractive for Venezuela. But the Brazilian government
is hesitant to bring more attention from the IAEA to this continent, which is exactly what would
happen if the two countries announced a deal to share nuclear fuel enrichment facilities.
Regional alliances are stronger than the fear of upsetting an international regime perceived to be
largely controlled by the US. But these alliances are trumped by sovereignty and national security
considerations. Neither Brazil nor Argentina would benefit from a nuclear weapons program in
Venezuela.
“There is nothing concrete,” insists Brazilian presidential foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia.
He argues that Brazil’s nuclear program is transparent and protected from any military use.
Aurelio Garcia goes further to speculate that in any initial phase of a nuclear program in Venezuela,
Argentina would provide the reactor while Brazil would provide the enriched uranium. He believes
that neither country would provide enough technology transfer to allow the Venezuelans to take
complete control of the process.
Logan & Cirino 5 (1-26, ISN Security Watch Staff, Sam & Julio, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
Brazil’s capacity to enrich uranium is certainly attractive for Venezuela. But the Brazilian government is
hesitant to bring more attention from the IAEA to this continent, which is exactly what would happen if the
two countries announced a deal to share nuclear fuel enrichment facilities.
Regional alliances are stronger than the fear of upsetting an international regime perceived to be largely
controlled by the US. But these alliances are trumped by sovereignty and national security considerations.
Neither Brazil nor Argentina would benefit from a nuclear weapons program in Venezuela.
“There is nothing concrete,” insists Brazilian presidential foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia. He
argues that Brazil’s nuclear program is transparent and protected from any military use.
Aurelio Garcia goes further to speculate that in any initial phase of a nuclear program in Venezuela,
Argentina would provide the reactor while Brazil would provide the enriched uranium. He believes that
neither country would provide enough technology transfer to allow the Venezuelans to take complete control
of the process.
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Logan & Cirino 5 (1-26, ISN Security Watch Staff, Sam & Julio, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
Any use of a peaceful nuclear program to conceal or hint at a nuclear weapons program would come as
a fringe benefit, an ace up Chavez' sleeve, but nothing more than that. This prospect is something to
watch out for, but will not be a threat to regional security for at least a decade, if at all.
More ev…
Logan & Cirino 5 (1-26, ISN Security Watch Staff, Sam & Julio, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
Additionally, the countries in the region that do have nuclear energy required no less than ten years to
build a reactor. If Chavez is serious about bringing nuclear power to Venezuela, he would need at least
ten years, if not closer to 20, to realize the first kilowatt of nuclear power output. There is currently
little guarantee that he can stay in power that long.
Logan & Cirino 5 (1-26, ISN Security Watch Staff, Sam & Julio, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
Producing nuclear power would allow Venezuela to export more oil and generate additional revenues for the
state treasury. If Chavez manages to stay in power long enough to take advantage of nuclear technology in
Venezuela, he is likely to use the extra energy to alleviate domestic need for oil he would rather export.
Herein lies the strongest chord of truth.
Venezuelan oil output is limited. Many suggest the country's oil output has declined and will continue to do
so. Chavez’s intention to pull together the region with the carrot of generous oil export contracts and other
financial incentives suggests that over time, he will need more money, more oil, and another reliable source
of energy.
Logan & Cirino 5 (1-26, ISN Security Watch Staff, Sam & Julio, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
Yet sources within Venezuela are convinced that Chavez’s nuclear announcement is more political than
actual.
“The nuclear plan is [hollow],” Venezuelan journalist and political observer, Manuel Malaver told ISN
Security Watch.
Malaver argues that Chavez has embarked on a strategy similar to that of the North Koreans, threatening the
use of nuclear technology and leveraging heightened international tensions to ensure access to resources and
technology that he could not obtain otherwise.
“I don’t believe Chavez has an interest in developing nuclear [technology], which would take years,
considering Venezuela does not have nuclear scientists,” Malaver said, adding, “for Chavez it’s more
important to demonstrate that he has the support of the region in his desires for nuclear technology than to
actually have the technology itself.”
NYT 5 (10-27)
José Goldemberg is a physicist who as minister of science and technology in the 1990's led the dismantling
of Brazil's nuclear weapons program. While he says he worries that even a flirtation with Venezuela will hurt
the reputation of two countries that have won praise for renouncing their nuclear arms programs, he does not
think much will come of Mr. Chávez's campaign.
"This is braggadocio," he said. "It's a way of challenging Bush, of making themselves feel important and
forcing the United States to pay attention."
NYT 5 (10-27)
With relations between the Bush administration and Mr. Chávez so hostile, Washington has little leverage
over Venezuela. But that is not the case with Brazil and Argentina, which have extensive ties, and the United
States seems to have decided to focus its efforts there.
"We consider partners like Brazil and Argentina to be responsible partners on issues like nuclear power and
proliferation," said Thomas A. Shannon, the assistant secretary of state for hemispheric affairs. "We fully
expect them to act in a responsible fashion."
NYT 5 (10-27)
The technology is quite advanced, and because of the system of safeguards and inspections, there is no way
to divert it" into weapons programs, said Elías Palacios, an Argentine scientist who is co-secretary of the
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. "If it's economically profitable
for Argentina, there's no reason why it shouldn't be done."
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***Venezuela Answers***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 76
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Cibils and Scott 1 (Vicente Fretes Lead Specialist, LAC, The World Bankand Kinnon World Bank. Washington,
D.C http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/lacinfoclient.nsf/e9dd232c66d43b6b852567d 2005ca3c5/fe8ed
dae8d8fdec985256b0b005a28b9/$FILE/C-II.pdf)
In the environment provided by the low and unstable real income growth, with high dependency on the
oil sector and inconsistent economic policies, real wages and employment opportunities have decreased
significantly over the last decade. The deterioration in real per capita income, employment and labor
productivity—despite the problems and limitations with the data and the methodologies—indicate that
poverty in Venezuela has increased. Indeed, while there is no consensus on the level of poverty, poverty is
unambiguously higher in the late 1990s than in the early 1980s. Moreover, inequality increased between
the early 1980s and late 1990s. This finding is statistically robust, despite changes in computational methods. Poverty and inequality have,
however, remained below the average for the LAC region throughout the 1990s. Other composite welfare indexes and social indicators also show that the
living standards in Venezuela deteriorated significantly during the 1990s.
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Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
In sum, the performance of the Venezuelan economy during the Chávez years does not fit the mold of an "oil
boom headed for a bust." Rather it appears that the economy was hit hard for the first few years by political
instability, and has grown rapidly since the political situation stabilized in the first quarter of 2003. High oil
prices have certainly contributed to this growth, as has the government's expansionary fiscal and monetary
policy. Containing and reducing inflation, as well as realigning the domestic currency, appear to be the most
important challenges in the intermediate run; in the long run, diversifying the economy away from its
dependence on oil is also a major challenge.
However, the declining public debt (as a percentage of GDP), the large current account surplus, and the
accumulation of reserves have given the government considerable insurance against a decline in oil prices.
This favorable macroeconomic situation has also left the government with much flexibility in dealing with
inflation and the related imbalance in the exchange rate. Since the government is committed to maintaining
solid growth, it does not seem likely that it would sharply curtail economic growth in order to bring down
inflation, as is often done. This is especially true since it has not exhausted other alternatives. Therefore, at
present it does not appear that the current economic expansion is about to end any time in the near future.
The gains in poverty reduction, employment, education and health care that have occurred in the last few
years are likely to continue along with the expansion.
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Cibils and Scott 1 (Vicente Fretes Lead Specialist, LAC, The World Bankand Kinnon World Bank. Washington,
D.C http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/lacinfoclient.nsf/e9dd232c66d43b6b852567d 2005ca3c5/fe8ed
dae8d8fdec985256b0b005a28b9/$FILE/C-II.pdf)
The performance of the Venezuelan economy over the last decade has been dismal, and economic
policy makers have been unable to cope with the oil cycles and the general decline in real oil prices (and
real oil revenues) over the long–term.1 This has resulted in low economic growth with bursts of inflation
and recurrent recessions. Over the last ten years, real GDP per capita growth averaged –1.2 percent per
year and the inflation rate averaged about 40 percent per year (with a declining trend over the last five
years). For the same period, real non–oil GDP per capita growth average about –2 percent per year. At the
same time, as the economy failed to diversify, it became more vulnerable to the boom and bust cycles
generated by the oil sector (see Graph 1).
Cibils and Scott 1 (Vicente Fretes Lead Specialist, LAC, The World Bankand Kinnon World Bank. Washington,
D.C http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/lacinfoclient.nsf/e9dd232c66d43b6b852567d 2005ca3c5/fe8ed
dae8d8fdec985256b0b005a28b9/$FILE/C-II.pdf)
While the economic plan includes important initiatives, the main challenges for the Government remain to
sustain stability and growth, without major social disruptions, to diversify the economic structure over the
longer term, and to improve the living standards of the population. To restore and sustain stability over the
long term, the non– oil fiscal deficit must be reduced through the adoption of measures to enhance
non–oil revenues and control expenditures. Moreover, the strong links between oil price volatility and
public sector expenditure must be reduced (this could be achieved by imposing an inter–temporal budget
constraint through the full implementation of the oil stabilization fund). To complement these policies, the
external position should be strengthened through a combination of exchange and monetary policies.
With regard to the exchange rate, to ensure external competitiveness of non–oil exports, a more
flexible exchange rate regime could be adopted to adjust prices to significant and protracted changes
in the terms of trade, thereby avoiding the full adjustment through real wages. In turn, a restricted
monetary policy of high interest rates cannot be used as a substitute for non–oil fiscal adjustment and
a mis–aligned real exchange rate, as high real interest rates will delay economic recovery and growth.8
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St. Hilaire 4 (12, “Dutch Disease, Oil and Developing Countries,” http://209.85.141.104/search?q=cache:-
hwrE75a6uYJ:www.business.ualberta.ca/cabree/pdf/2004%2520Fall%2520UG%2520Projects/Dutch%2520disease,
%2520oil%2520and%2520developing%2520countries.pdf+Mexico+%22Dutch+Disease%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=
5&gl=us&client=firefox-a)
However, this did little to stall the impending crisis and the 50% reduction in the price of oil in 1986 did
nothing to help the situation. In 1989 the IMF stepped in with loans and the price increases related to the
reforms necessary for the loans caused rioting and the worst violence the country had seen since it became a
democracy. The increase in the price of oil in the 1970s caused Venezuela to be affected negatively
although its peak oil production point had already been reached in 1970. Because of the increase in the
price of oil the government relied completely on oil revenue and like Mexico, was reluctant to take steps
to prevent a crisis. The IMF had to impose the increases in domestic prices necessary to complete the cycle
that played out. Protectionism through government subsides and spending held domestic prices low
enough to remain competitive imports. In this sense Venezuela was escaping Dutch Disease. However,
these prices were supported not through true market value but through borrowing and extra revenue.
As soon as those avenues shut down so did the government’s ability to control domestic prices. The
sudden jump in prices imposed by the IMF caused recession so severe that rioting was induced. Another case
of the lack of value-added industry creation led to the eventual downfall of an economy given the opportunity
to grow. Essentially, the government had relied completely on revenue from oil because these revenues
were so large. The Venezuelan government bet that the price of oil would continue to rise. This was
risky bet even with the trends of the seventies; the price of oil was so high because of the decisions
made be OPEC not because of true market value. An eventual return to market value caused the sharp
decrease in prices and Venezuela lost its bet. The development of a domestic traded manufacturing sector
simply did not occur. Therefore, the revenue from oil was spent primarily on imports. Because nearly all
industry was supported through subsidies the country was unattractive to foreign investment. Also, high
tariffs on imports and exchange rate manipulation had protected the domestic market. Thus, Venezuela had
avoided Dutch Disease only temporarily and as a factor of having little traded manufacturing that was
truly competitive to begin with. Traditional exports of oil, iron, coffee, and cocoa made 95% of the
exported commodities in the early 1980s. The closed economy, while initially protecting against the lower
prices of imports could not sustain this position. The decision to depend further on the high price of oil in
the early 1980s led the country into a tailspin that would deteriorate the economy. According to the
Economist, Venezuela is currently suffering from a 27% drop in real GDP between 1998 and 2003. This
has created a poor majority in Venezuela and with little real recovery since the economic crisis their
current president, Hugo Chavez, seems to be stretching for a solution. His main focus is on attracting
foreign direct investments in the oil industry. Whether and how Venezuela will recover from its crisis still
remains to be seen. Chavez is a politically controversial figure and he has been unable to turn the country
around. Two patterns have emerged through the discussion of these two countries. The first is a reflection of
the oil price increase in the 1970s. While North America, and doubtless the rest of the world, suffered
through the temporary increase in oil prices the developing countries with oil seem to have fared much worse
in the long run. The increase in the price of oil, in both cases, caused an unprecedented increase in
revenue for these countries. Combine this fact with the lack of wise government in both places and
economic ruin results. Many postulate that Dutch Disease is only a temporary structural problem concerned
with the adjustment of the economy to the acquisition of the resource however it seems that developing
nations can suffer lengthy consequences. This is especially the case where the increase is related to the
sale of oil and no other valuable industry is created from this wealth. It seems that developing
countries do not have the capacity to deal properly with the large inflow of resources. Perhaps an
analysis of an Arab country belonging to OPEC will shed some light on the whether the control of supply can
aid in the avoidance of Dutch Disease.
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IPS 3 (Inter Press Service, August 20, “Industry: The Murky Business of Oil”)
"The reason corruption is so rampant in oil-exporting countries is not difficult to see," Terry Karl, co-author of
the CRS report says in a telephone interview.. "There is no other commodity that produces such great profit --
and this is generally in the context of highly concentrated power, very weak bureaucracies, and weak rule of
law. 'People rob', the finance minister of Venezuela once said to me many years ago, 'because there is no reason
not to." Of the eleven members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Indonesia,
Nigeria and Venezuela are listed in the TI Index. The TI report says these are among most corrupt in the
world at positions 96, 101 and 81 respectively. The other OPEC members are Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- hardly examples of transparency. Big oil names are also
directly linked with corruption.
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Stack and Daragahi 8 (Megan K., Borzou, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers, July 17,
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-fg-oil17-2008jul17,0,6710073.story)
But vast oil wealth comes with risks. All three countries are struggling with inflation, which might
slowly erode popular support. In Russia, public spending doubled from 2004 to 2007. Oil and gas revenues
are expected to surpass $178 billion in 2008, nearly $33 billion more than originally projected. The
International Monetary Fund, wary of inflation, has warned Russia against rampant spending. Inflation in
Iran has aggravated a devaluation of the currency. Political changes wrought by the oil windfall also may
backfire. Venezuela's output is declining in part because skilled engineers and foreign companies are
fleeing. Analysts say sanctions, brain drain and dearth of foreign investment have badly hurt Iran's
potential output because of a lack of modern techniques. For now, however, all three are riding high on
oil revenue.
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Weisbrot & Sandoval 7 (Mark & Luis, Center for Econ Policy Res, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/indicators)
However, Venezuela has a large cushion of reserves to draw upon before an oil price decline would begin to
squeeze its finances. A decline in oil prices of 20 percent or more could be absorbed from official
international reserves, which at $25.2 billion are enough to pay off almost all of Venezuela's foreign debt.
This does not include other government offshore accounts, which are estimated to be in the range of an
additional $14-$19 billion. With its low foreign debt (14.6 percent of GDP), the government could also tap
international credit markets in the event of an oil price decline. Furthermore, a collapse of oil prices does not
appear to be likely in the foreseeable future. The July 10 short-term outlook of the US Energy Information
Agency projects oil prices at $65.56 per barrel for 2007 and $66.92 for 2008. The risks of unanticipated
supply shocks – especially in the volatile Middle East − seem to be mostly on the downside, which would
increase prices.
Alvarez & Hanson 6-27 (Cesar & Stephanie, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/venezuelas_oilbased_economy.html)
Opinion is divided over the effect of Chavez's policies on Venezuela's economy. Some economists say the
tremendous rise in social spending under Chavez has greatly reduced poverty and pushed unemployment
below 10 percent, its lowest level in more than a decade. According to a February 2008 report from the
Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research, not only has unemployment dropped, formal
employment has increased significantly (PDF) since Chavez took office. But other economists express
concerns about the country's high inflation levels. The IMF has forecast inflation of 25.7 percent in 2008 and
31.0 percent in 2009—among the highest rates for any country in the world—and according to news reports,
the country is already experiencing food shortages of goods such as sugar and milk. Francisco Rodriguez,
former chief economist of the Venezuelan National Assembly, writes in a 2008 Foreign Affairs article that
income inequality has increased during Chavez's tenure, and further, Chavez's social programs have not
had a significant impact on infant mortality rate or literacy rates among Venezuelans.
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Bremmer 7 (Ian, President of Eurasia Group. “Hugo Chavez's Most Dangerous Enemy?” It's Chavez Himself
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/11/hugo_chavezs_most_dangerous_en.html)
In proven and unproven reserves, Venezuela is believed to control some 270 billion barrels of oil, the
deepest supply in the world. As crude prices lurch toward $100 per barrel, President Hugo Chavez would appear
to hold the only weapon he needs to further tighten his grip on domestic political power and extend his
foreign-policy influence. But a close look at how his government milks the country's cash cow suggests he has
serious cause for concern. Chavez remains popular at home, but if Venezuela's economy turns south and state
spending on popular social programs is substantially cut, he may not be popular for long. His fortunes
increasingly depend on the future of Venezuela's oil production, because the government's cash comes almost
exclusively from the country's state-run energy giant, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). As recently as the mid-
1990s, PDVSA hoped that joint development projects with foreign firms would lift production to 6.5 million barrels
per day (bpd). In 1998, the company produced about 2.9 million bpd. Output has since fallen to around 1.6 million.
There are two main reasons. First, during a power struggle with Chavez in 2003, PDVSA's workers went on
strike. The president retaliated by firing 18,000 of them, including the vast majority of the company's most
talented and experienced engineers. Nearly five years later, the company has yet to recover from the loss of
expertise. Second, Chavez is bleeding the company of the revenue that might be reinvested in aging
infrastructure and new equipment. He has diverted $12 billion into a fund meant to subsidize health and
education projects. Some argue that this is a worthy undertaking, but this spending represents three times the amount
devoted to oil exploration and the maintenance of PDVSA's existing assets, the source of Venezuela's future income.
In addition, all these subsidies are awarded off the books. It's impossible to know exactly how all that money is
really being spent. The company's profit margins fell by about 25 percent in 2006, despite the surge in oil prices. In
the first quarter of 2007, the company took on $12 billion in new debt. These are official figures; the reality may be
much worse. The broader economy is already in rough shape. The most optimistic estimates put core inflation at 20
percent, and the real figure might be closer to 35 percent. Foreign investment in the country is severely limited by
Chavez's habit of voiding contracts with international firms, creating product shortages across the board.
Venezuela is a net importer of virtually everything except oil and remains deeply dependent on its neighbors,
including the United States, for goods and services vital to the country's economy. Convinced that oil production
will rise and that high prices are here to stay, Chavez has aggressively antagonized the United States, his best
oil customer. He has essentially awarded exclusive rights to future development deals in the country's oil-rich
Orinoco belt, believed to hold the largest petroleum reserves in the world, to CNPC (China), ONGC (India), LUKoil
(Russia), Gazprom (Russia), Petrobras (Brazil), NIOC (Iran), and Repsol YPF (Spain). He has repeatedly
threatened to divert oil exports now destined for the United States toward consumers in Asia. Herein lies the
shortsightedness of Chavez's plans. The new prominence of foreign state-owned energy companies comes at the
expense of multinationals like ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. Chavez has squeezed these and other
international companies operating in the country by tearing up existing contracts to seize a bigger share of
their profits. If the economy slows further and Chavez needs more cash, he'll find it a lot tougher to push
around the state-owned firms of would-be allies. In addition, Venezuela needs access to U.S. energy markets,
because crude oil shipments to America represent more than half of the country's total exports. Chavez can't
simply redirect that much oil toward China and India. Venezuela has no direct access to the Pacific Ocean. Its
rusting tanker fleet must pay transit fees to use the Panama Canal, and it takes a Venezuelan tanker seven weeks to
reach East Asia. More to the point, neither China nor India will have the capacity to refine that much of Venezuela's
heavy crude oil anytime soon. Hugo Chavez's most dangerous enemy is Chavez himself. His quixotic rule
continues to generate damage that his ministers must scramble to minimize. On May 1, the Venezuelan president
proudly pledged that his country would withdraw from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank,
institutions he considers appendages of an "evil empire" based in Washington. His finance minister was among those
taken by surprise by the announcement. Chavez apparently didn't know that clauses in the country's IMF agreement
stipulate that withdrawal from the fund could trigger a large-scale debt default as other lenders were freed to demand
immediate repayment of $21 billion in sovereign debt. Informed of this by his ministers, Chavez has now begun to
hint that the time might not be ripe for such a bold move. Chavez has also announced the state takeover of
Venezuela's largest telecom company and power utilities along with several ambitious energy projects without a
clear plan on how the move should be executed. In response, the country's stock market plunged 20 percent in a
single day.
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Alvarez & Hanson 6-27 (Cesar & Stephanie, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/venezuelas_oilbased_economy.html)
Under Chavez, however, the company's mandate has drastically expanded. In 2002, Chavez redefined
PDVSA’s role to include the government’s social priorities. PDVSA must now spend at least 10 percent of its
annual investment budget on social programs. This money is funneled through the National Development
Fund, or Fonden, an investment fund set up in 2005 that is not included in the government's budget. Peter
Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based center for policy analysis, says that
Chavez’s gradual takeover of PDVSA has given him an enormous bankroll to pursue his political and
economic ambitions.
Shifter 6 (Michael, Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign
Service [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060501faessay85303-p0/michael-shifter/in-search-of-hugo-ch-vez.html] In
Search of Hugo Chávez/ June 2006)
To be sure, Chávez's capacity to govern the country is not unlimited. A drop in oil prices, although
unlikely in the near term, would prove highly problematic for his plans. There are credible reports of large-
scale corruption within the regime and, as evidenced by infrastructure problems, major inefficiencies in the
economy and the public sector. Shortages in basic commodities have begun to appear sporadically, the result
of prolonged price controls. Incipient splits within Chávez's amorphous coalition could become more
pronounced and create problems for governance. And although Chávez remains personally popular,
polls indicate that the population is becoming increasingly dissatisfied over a variety of key issues.
Chavez uses oil revenues to increase his influence in Latin America and fund guerrilla
groups
Johnson & Cohen 4 (8-12, Stephen & Ariel, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1787.cfm)
Hugo Chávez is no democrat. At home, he has concentrated the powers of the state in his presidency,
expropriating budgets from municipal governments, strengthening the national police, and packing the
Supreme Court with cronies.23 Abroad, he appears to be in the initial stages of creating a confederation of
nations opposed to the United States that is sustained by oil and united by an improvised nationalist ideology.
History suggests a future of conflict and poverty, both for those under his rule and for all those who are allied
with him.
Other countries in Latin America share some of Venezuela's economic characteristics--abundant resources
and high rates of poverty that make them easy prey for populist demagogues. A bloc of states united in leftist
authoritarianism and oil extortion could ignite the flames of armed confrontation again in the Western
Hemisphere. To avoid needless conflict as well as a possible energy crisis, the United States should help
direct Venezuela back toward democracy, develop alternate sources of petroleum, and engage Latin America
more effectively to help allies strengthen democratic institutions and market economies.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE
1990S, 95, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html //.
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the
global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to
security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its
provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century
offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to
war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their
leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less
likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not
build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more
reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates
for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own
citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor
international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more
difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect
competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable
foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
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Oil prices drive fuel Chavez’s inefficient spending which hurts Venezuela’s economy
Ashwell 5 (Nick, World markets Analysis, September 14, “GDP May Reach Double Digits in 2005, Says
Venezuelan Official”)
Central bank director Domingo Maza said yesterday that GDP in Venezuela is likely to grow by 8-10%
over 2005 as a whole, well above the official forecast of 5%. The chief factor behind Venezuela's
stronger-than-expected performance is high oil prices, according to Zavala. These are allowing sharp
increases in public spending; the price of Venezuelan crude has averaged US$43.35 per barrel so far this year
- well above the US$23 assumed in the 2005 budget. Zavala forecast GDP growth in the third quarter of 10%
year-on-year, above the 9.3% recorded in the first half of 2005 (see Venezuela: 19 August 2005: Oil Industry
Underpins Double-Digit GDP Growth in Venezuela). He also said that annual inflation should end this year at
less than 15% (see Venezuela: 2 September 2005: Consumer Inflation in Venezuela Accelerates Somewhat in
August Amid Rising Food Prices). Significance: As ever, the performance of the Venezuelan economy
remains heavily dependent on the trajectory of oil prices. Rather than taking advantage of bumper
revenues to strengthen the public finances and diversify the economy, the administration of President
Hugo Chavez is cranking up social spending at a remarkable pace, while undermining investor
confidence by embarking on an expropriation campaign of 'unused and under-used' land and
corporate plants.
Sullivan & Olhero 8 (1-11, CRS Report, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf)
Despite the country’s oil wealth, economic conditions in the country deteriorated in the 1990s. The
percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty (income of less than $2 a day) increased from 32.2% to 48.5% of
the population between 1991 and 2000, while the percentage of the population in extreme poverty (income of
less than $1 a day) increased from 11.8% in 1990 to 23.5% in 2000.51 In 2002-2003, the country’s political
instability and polarization between the government and the opposition contributed to a poor investment
climate, capital flight, and declines in GDP. The national strike orchestrated by the opposition from late 2002
to early 2003 contributed to a contraction of the national economy by almost 9% in 2002 and 7.7% in 2003.
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Johnson 6 (Stephen, Hertiage Foundation. “Is Hugo Chávez a threat?” http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl938.cfm May 1, 2006)
Biographers tell us that Hugo Chávez trained for a radical career ever since childhood, though no one guessed he would be president. He learned Marx
and Machiavelli from a neighborhood historian but seemed disinterested. In the Venezuelan Army, he joined a group of left-leaning officers that secretly advocated
Marxism and military rule, calling themselves Bolivarians after the Venezuelan patriot Simón Bolívar. They got little notice. When Chávez and a handful of fellow
officers attempted to overthrow President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992, few took him seriously. When Pérez got impeached a year later on corruption charges, people
saw Chávez as a reformer. Released from jail in 1994, he formed his own Fifth Republic Movement and promised to clean up government and relieve poverty.
Venezuela’s political parties were running on empty. Its caretaker state, based on exploiting natural resources and distributing profits through social spending
Venezuelans living under the poverty line had gone from 27 percent
programs, had become sluggish and inefficient. Since 1980,
of the population to more than 50 percent. Chávez called his predecessors “squalids” and referred to the
capitalism they espoused as “savage.” The public brushed it off as rhetoric. The mainstream daily newspaper El Nacional and TV networks
Venevisión and Televén even supported Chávez’s candidacy. Chávez in Power Opinions changed after he was elected in 1998. Instead of governing by
consensus, which was what Venezuelans had become accustomed to, he led by confrontation. Politicians, civil society, and the commercial
sector fell into paralysis. He had the constitution rewritten to consolidate his powers and extend his mandate.
In 2002, an uprising took him temporarily from office, but he came back a crusader, successfully linking his cause
with the state. Thereafter, he attacked opponents with a vengeance. He enacted a “social responsibility” law permitting the government to close radio and
TV stations for airing content that “causes anxiety.” Another imposed jail terms for even mildly criticizing the government. In the background, prosecutors began
rounding up opposition leaders for show trials conducted by provisional, handpicked judges. In August 2004, the president survived a recall vote by padding electoral
rolls and intimidating opponents. Now politicians from opposition parties seem increasingly unwilling to run against him or his candidates. Outside his borders,
Chávez threatens non-leftist states. Financed by the national oil industry he directly controls, the president
sees himself taking over Fidel Castro’s leadership of the Latin American left and strengthening hemispheric
ties to such rogue nations as Iran and North Korea.
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Washington Times 7 (Richard W. Rahn, Director general of the Center for Global Economic Growth, a project of the FreedomWorks Foundation.
“Collapsing Venezuela” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/jan/21/20070121-102603-4793r/)
If Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez deliberately intended to sabotage his nation's economy, he
would be hard-pressed to do anything different from what he is now doing to his country. It has been widely
reported that Mr. Chavez has been increasingly taking control of the oil, telecommunications and energy
sectors, as well as the media. What has not been reported is the full extent of the corruption in Venezuela and
how this ultimately will destroy the economy. The financial scandal taking place is far bigger than Enron, and
may ultimately even exceed the U.N. "oil-for-food" scandal, the biggest financial disgrace of all time.
Venezuela has had a rapidly growing economy for the last few years, due to high oil prices, but the house of
cards is about to collapse. The former Venezuelan representative to Transparency International, Gustavo Coronel, has documented how much of this
corruption has taken place in a report published by the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. Forty years ago, Venezuela had become a
functioning democracy and was experiencing solid economic growth, but beginning in the mid-1970s
corruption increased. Partially as a result, Hugo Chavez was elected president in December 1998 on an anti-
corruption platform. In the years since, Mr. Chavez has been dismantling the independent political institutions
and sharply reducing transparency. He has also stripped the Central Bank of its independence and
misappropriated much of its reserves. Some of the funds have been used to buy billions of dollars of Argentine bonds, to buy influence in
Argentina. That country has not been able to sell bonds in the international markets since its 2001 default because Argentina still has not come to an agreement with its
private creditors, despite having extensive and growing foreign exchange reserves.
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Washington Times 7 (Richard W. Rahn, Director general of the Center for Global Economic Growth, a project of the FreedomWorks
Foundation. “Collapsing Venezuela” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/jan/21/20070121-102603-4793r/)
The Argentine bonds were then sold by the Venezuelan government to cooperative local banks at artificial
rates as a way to get rid of the bonds. Venezuela established exchange controls several years ago to try to reduce
capital flight, which immediately resulted in a parallel (black or free market) market, giving Venezuela two
different exchange rates (the official and the black or free market rate). The government uses the existence of
these two rates to reward "friendly" banks and "intermediaries" (some of whom are known terrorists). Since
2004, the Venezuelan Central Bank has transferred about $22.5 billion to accounts abroad by the Chavez
government, and about $12 billion of that remains unaccounted for. It has also been reported that the gold reserves
have been removed from the Central Bank. Mr. Chavez has also set up a "development bank," which operates
without transparency. As the Chavez government takes over more and more of private industry, it also ceases
reporting on the financial results of those industries, such as the state-owned oil company, which operates
Citgo in the U.S. Mr. Chavez announced this month he will take over the privately owned telecommunications
and power companies, and we can expect that shortly after he does so his government will also stop reporting
their finances. Increasingly, Mr. Chavez uses the massive oil revenues the country receives, as well as other
government revenues, as his own private piggy bank.
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Washington Times 7 (Richard W. Rahn, Director general of the Center for Global Economic Growth, a project of the FreedomWorks
Foundation. “Collapsing Venezuela” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/jan/21/20070121-102603-4793r/)
Where has all the money gone? It has gone to buy foreign political influence and loyalties in places like
Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and even the United States (notably to subsidize some New England fuel oil consumers
through a company controlled by members of the Kennedy family). The money has gone to buy weapons from
Russia, Spain and elsewhere, endearing those countries to Mr. Chavez. The money has gone to local cronies
for inflated infrastructure and economic development projects and to buy the loyalty of government officials
and supporters, including judges. The Venezuelan economy will collapse, despite massive oil revenues because
we know socialist economies perform poorly. While the rest of the world has been moving away from socialism
for the last quarter-century for good reason, Venezuela is becoming socialist. We know governmental use of central
banks to basically print money to cover expenditures results in rising inflation and eventually monetary
meltdown. Venezuela no longer has an independent central bank, and inflation is already up to 17 percent
and rapidly rising. We know countries thrive with economic freedom but decline without it, and Venezuela is
now down to 126 out of 130 nations in the 2006 Economic Freedom of the World the most rapid decline ever
(in 1995 it was No. 75). And, finally, we know that when a state becomes totally corrupt an economic collapse
always follows. Mr. Chavez and his cronies had already been spending far more than they were taking in before the
recent drop in oil prices. Without a big jump back up to $70 a barrel or more for oil, the Venezuelans will be
increasingly squeezed, and you can bet the blood from the innocent Venezuelan people will be drained long
before those on the take from Mr. Chavez agree to have their looting stopped.
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Four of the region’s more developed countries – Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela – have shown
the worst performance. As a group, they’ve seen moderate poverty balloon from 11% to 25%, while
extreme poverty jumped from 2% to 10% (WB). In all four cases, the data are incomplete and sometimes
inconsistent, but the extent of problems in these relatively large countries raises doubts about prospects
for halving poverty by 2015.
Despite the country’s progress, the percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty (household income of less
than $2 a day) has increased from 32.2 percent in 1991 to 48.5 percent in 2000. Likewise, the proportion
of those living in extreme poverty —below $1 a day— rose from 11.8 percent to 23.5 percent. This
increased poverty is accompanied by a widening inequality gap. Currently, the richest 20 percent of
Venezuelans receives 53 percent of all income, while the poorest 20 percent accounts for only a three
percent share of the country’s total income. Most observers agree that the biggest obstacle to stable
growth in Venezuela is the country’s polarized political climate. A successful conclusion to continuing
efforts at mediation of the country’s political divisions would be a strong factor in favor of improving
Venezuela’s prospects for growth and poverty reduction.
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Chávez has also used oil money to buy weapons, which he justifies by invoking the threat of a U.S.
invasion. He has purchased combat helicopters and 100,000 AK-47s from Russia and has struck a deal
with Spain for some $2 billion in military equipment. Although it is uncertain whether the deals that have
been announced will actually materialize (Washington has tried to block arms purchases from Spain and
Brazil), it is clear that such moves are part of Chávez's mission to increase his own power vis-à-vis the
world's only superpower.
Military expenditures are also funded by the government's flush coffers. Between 2004 and 2006,
Venezuela spent roughly $4.3 billion on weapons, according to a January 2007 Defense Intelligence
Agency report. As part of deals signed with Russia in 2006, Venezuela purchased 100,000 Kalashnikov
rifles, twenty-four Sukhoi-30 fighter planes, and fifty-three Russian helicopters. In March 2008, it
hired Belarus to build an air defense system.
Sullivan & Olhero 8 (1-11, CRS Report, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf)
As noted above, the Bush Administration has expressed concerns about Venezuela’s purchases of military
equipment. Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples expressed concern in February
2006 congressional testimony about Venezuela’s arms purchases, maintaining that Venezuela was seeking to
increase their capability for their own defense and to operate elsewhere in Latin America and the Gulf
area.122 State Department officials maintain that Venezuela’s military purchases from Russia go far beyond
what the country needs for self-defense. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld cited concerns among
neighboring Latin American countries about Venezuela’s military purchases and also a concern that the
assault rifles could end up in the hands of terrorist groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia.123 President Chávez criticized Secretary Rumsfeld for suggesting that countries such as
Colombia are concerned about Venezuela’s military purchases. In January 11, 2007 testimony before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte expressed
concern that the President Chávez’s military purchases and moves toward developing his own weapons
production capability are increasingly worrisome to his neighbors, and could fuel an arms race in the region.
Johnson 6 (Stephen, Hertiage Foundation. “Is Hugo Chávez a threat?” http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl938.cfm May 1, 2006)
He has proposed energy cartels, such as PetroCaribe and PetroSur, to integrate Latin America’s state hydrocarbon industries under one roof minus the
participation of private U.S. companies. And, despite controlling the seventh largest oil and tenth largest natural gas reserves in the world, Chávez
announced last May plans to acquire nuclear technology from Iran, fueling fears that he may try to develop a
bomb. He is friendly with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas and allowed FARC units to camp out in Venezuelan territory. His
government granted FARC commander Rodrigo Granda Venezuelan citizenship before he was captured on a bounty and sent back to Colombia. His new regional
satellite TV network called Telesur bashes Colombia for its relations with the United States in addition to beaming Marxist propaganda throughout South America.
Chávez opposes the planned Free Trade Area of the Americas while advocating his own Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA)—a notional aid network to
be financed largely by Venezuelan oil profits. Although the highway from Caracas to its international airport lies in disrepair, he has committed more than $3 billion a
year in aid to Latin American neighbors and has bought up Argentine and Ecuadoran debt, which is passed on to international financial markets. Chávez
has
embarked on an arms buildup to scare Brazil and Colombia. He has announced plans to buy more than a
million rifles and acquire armored vehicles and new attack aircraft from Russia. Recently, he called for
Britain to leave the Falkland Islands. In the United States, his government has paid lobbyists up to $100,000 a month to polish his image before the
public and U.S. Congress. It reportedly funds the Venezuela Information Office, a public relations firm operating under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Although
they claim no direct link to the Venezuelan state, pro-Chávez activist groups called “Bolivarian Circles” have surfaced in Miami, Chicago, and other cities.[2] After
years of persuading fellow OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) members to suppress petroleum production to raise prices, Chávez has negotiated
with selected U.S. Congressmen to sell small amounts of discount heating oil to poor neighborhoods in northern U.S. cities, to help these lawmakers to gain political
clout.[3] By meddling in U.S. internal politics, Chávez hoped to drive a wedge between the American people and their government. A Call to Action Whether
Venezuela’s President Chávez is a serious threat or a threatening buffoon depends on your point of view. If he cuts off oil shipments to the United States, other
suppliers can step in. If he buys Russian MiGs, Washington could theoretically send his neighbors F-16s.
Chavez supports terrorism and intends to acquire nuclear weapons from Iran
Johnson 6 (Stephen, Hertiage Foundation. “Is Hugo Chávez a threat?” http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl938.cfm May 1, 2006)
Moreover, how much trouble can Venezuela cause with an annual gross domestic product comparable to that of St. Louis, Missouri?
In fact, Chávez has made good on all his promises except to curb poverty and corruption, which have increased under his rule. He has successfully corralled
opponents at home and has targeted the democratic, free-market West. His diplomats
actively support radical parties in such countries
as Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Mexico. He hopes to link Latin American
radicals with Middle Eastern jihadists and exploit nuclear technology with Iran. One should not take that lightly. But his
menace could also serve as a wake-up call. Elsewhere in the region, powerful presidencies still impose agendas out of touch with public desires while subservient
legislatures and judiciaries fail to curb their excesses. In most countries, party leaders, not voters, choose candidates who are placed on lists and elected according to
the proportion of votes collected by each party. Today, half the countries in Latin America have poverty levels at about the 50 percent mark. Most of those economies
are still manipulated to shield state or family-owned monopolies while placating the middle class and poor with social programs. Increased trade helps established
industries and contributes to economic growth but fails to create enough jobs to keep up with population growth, which will increase by 200 million in 20 years. The
region cries for change, but whose vision will prevail?
Chavez will use oil funds to acquire a nuke and go to war w/Columbia
Brookes 8 (Heritage Foundation, Peter, Senior fellow. “Uncle Sam’s Latin challenge” http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed013108a.cfm)
Fortunately, Chavez's outlandish antics, such as a UN speech where he referred to President Bush as "the devil," undermine his appeal. Many Latin
Venezuela is awash in oil profits, which
Americans see him more as a disruptive hothead than the model statesman he fancies himself. But
Chavez is using to consolidate power at home, bankroll Leftist pols across the region, provide cut-rate oil to
amigos like Cuba, buy billions in Russian weaponry and back guerillas in Colombia. He's also chummy with
Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The two nations have signed a number of joint-venture deals, but
the real worry is the prospect of Iranian missile or even nuclear (weapon) proliferation to Venezuela. Castro's
Mini-Yo also hopes to squeeze the United States by cutting off oil shipments, too - if he can find a new customer base. (Venezuela produces 15 percent of our
imported oil.) Happily, Chavez failed to win a key ally when Felipe Calderon won the 2006 presidential election in Mexico, an important US trading partner. But US-
Mexico relations are a mixed bag - complicated by thorny issues such as Mexico being a prime source of illegal immigrants to the US, and the preferred transit route
for more. Another problem: narcotics trafficking. Calderon has felt obliged to call in the army to deal with the drug lords; he's even asked the United States to help
fight gangs, narco-gunslingers and corrupt cops. Chavez gets along far better with Bolivia's Evo Morales and Ecuador's Rafael Correa, two populist leftist leaders
who've gotten financial support from him - and take many political cues from him, too. Each is looking at rewriting his nation's constitution (as Chavez has tried to do)
to consolidate power and nationalize energy resources. Bloodshed
and civil strife can't be ruled out, especially as indigenous
peoples are politically mobilized. Then there's Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega. Chavez backed his campaign, forgave Nicaraguan debt and
provides aid. Some worry Ortega still longs for the bad ol' Sandinista days. Ortega and Ahmadinejad are buds, too. On a recent visit, the Iranian leader claimed he and
Ortega "have common interests, common enemies, and common goals." On an earlier visit, Ortega honored his Iranian guest with two of Nicaragua's highest medals
of national honor. Ortega has supported Iran's nuclear ambitions at the United Nations, while Ahmadinejad has promised Ortega hundreds of millions in public-works
projects.
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Logan & Cirino 5 (1-26, ISN Security Watch Staff, Sam & Julio, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
Argentina and Brazil have the capability and technology to deliver all of Chavez' requirements to effectively
execute a nuclear energy program. And many observers do not discount the fact that Chavez has the money
and the political connections to take such a program and bring it close enough to a nuclear weapons program
to ensure a believable bluff.
Logan & Cirino 5 (1-26, Investigative Journalist & Historian, ISN Security Watch Staff, Sam & Julio,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13286)
What worries observers in Washington, however, is not Brazilian or Argentine intentions - which many
consider to be carefully thought out and to have benign motivations - but rather Chavez’s constant
communication with Iran and North Korea. Though this is not alarming at present, it is worth careful
consideration.
If Brazil and Argentina are not willing to provide the technology transfer required for an independent
Venezuelan nuclear program, it is possible that both Iran and North Korea will be more accomodating -
especially North Korea, considering its need for fuel and Venezuela’s abundance of oil.
Both North Korea and Iran are relatively advanced in the field of nuclear technology, an area where
Venezuela has literally no experience or technological know-how. Neither country would suffer adverse
effects from a nuclear weapons program in Venezuela.
Considering their antagonistic stance vis-à-vis the US, it is more plausible that North Korea and Iran would
support Venezuela’s intention to at least threaten to acquire a nuclear weapons program.
It is plausible that Chavez has already invited scientists from both countries to Venezuela. The confirmed
installation of a North Korean embassy in Caracas reinforces the possibility of North Korean scientists in
Venezuela.
NYT 5 (10-27)
But Lawrence Scheinman, who was assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation and disarmament in the
Clinton administration, notes there is "a prestige factor involved" in having nuclear reactors, and prestige has
always interested Mr. Chávez. No matter what Mr. Chávez says now, if Venezuela acquired the technology to
produce nuclear energy, he would have uranium and fuel that could be used to build a bomb.
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Zulauga 5 (Felipe, wrier for visions of South America. “Venezuela…A Good Neighbor?” http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/clas/publications/Visions_vol1_issue1.pdf)
Although Chavez indicates that the development of nuclear power is to be for peaceful purposes only,
his statement in May was not well received in the majority of Venezuela’s neighboring countries or in the
United States. But why is Chavez’s idea regarded with suspicion by the international community? Why is his
initiative viewed as a threat rather than a positive development? The most likely answer can be summed up
by security and stability reasons, as Venezuela is seeking a more secure position in the global context.
However, this ambition engenders concerns in the Latin American region and could potentially generate
serious repercussions for the entire Latin American community Among these concerns is determining the true
reason as to why President Chavez aspires to acquire nuclear energy. According to Douglas Mackinnon in an article
from the Houston Chronicle, the real reason that Chavez wants to develop nuclear technology is for the
purpose of developing nuclear weapons! It may be hard to determine the credibility of this statement, but
considering Mackinnon’s source is a high ranking official for a Latin American government, it should not be taken
lightly. It is upsetting and almost incomprehensible to conceive of the Venezuelan government developing
nuclear weapons. This not only poses a threat to the stability and security of the Latin American region, but it
also has the potential to cause a nuclear crisis at the global level. If nuclear technology is developed in
Venezuela for the purpose of acquiring nuclear arms, the country will violate the Treaty of Tlatelcol, which
prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America. This treaty, signed by 23 Latin American states, has been the
pillar in maintaining nuclear security for the entire region and sets an example for other regions to
successfully achieve nuclear-free zones. However, if Venezuela officially decides to break the treaty by
achieving nuclear power, it is probable that other countries with previous intentions to develop military
nuclear capacity - such as Mexico, Chile, Brazil and Argentina – will follow suit.
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Brookes 8 (Heritage Foundation, Peter, Senior fellow. “Uncle Sam’s Latin challenge” http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed013108a.cfm)
Maintaining - or regaining - America's influence in our own neighborhood will be a key challenge for
the next US president. The perceptions are especially grim these days. Latinoamericanos accuse Uncle Sam of
neglecting their needs at the same time they chastise us for unwelcome meddling. And the rise of leftist anti-
Yanqui leaders has many Norteamericanos lamenting what they see as a precipitous decline in America's influence
to the South. One anti-American is on his way out, though: the "Bearded One" - Fidel Castro, who'll join other
communist cronies in the dustbin of history any time now. On death's door for months, Fidel has turned running the
government over to his "First Brother," Raul. Sadly, Havana's communist cadre will likely retain their nearly 50-year
death grip on the Cuban people. Meanwhile, Venezuela's caudillo president, Hugo Chavez, intends to replace
Castro as leader of the Latin Left. While his political fortunes have been on a rollercoaster, Chavez has made
a sport of taunting the United States in both word and deed. He'd like to place a kindred anti-US spirit at the
helm of every Latin or Caribbean nation. Just last week, Chavez urged countries in the region to form an
alliance against the United States - proposing that Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba and Dominica become a
unified military force.
Brookes 8 (Heritage Foundation, Peter, Senior fellow. “Uncle Sam’s Latin challenge” http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed013108a.cfm)
Fortunately, Chavez's outlandish antics, such as a UN speech where he referred to President Bush as "the
devil," undermine his appeal. Many Latin Americans see him more as a disruptive hothead than the model
statesman he fancies himself.
But Venezuela is awash in oil profits, which Chavez is using to consolidate power at home, bankroll Leftist
pols across the region, provide cut-rate oil to amigos like Cuba, buy billions in Russian weaponry and back
guerillas in Colombia.
Oil money allows Chavez to check US influence in Latin America and acquire nuclear capability
Dr. Cohen et al. 6 (9-6, Heritage Foundation, Ariel, Stephen Johnson & William Schirano,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/em1010.cfm)
Mentored by Castro, Chávez is keenly aware of prior defeats and how to avoid them. Though freely elected,
he has replaced Venezuela’s checks and balances with a crony congress, silenced critics with draconian media
laws, and placed the state oil company under his thumb as head of the National Oil Council. Unbridled by
popular will or economic sense, Chávez wants to block U.S. influence and become a power unto himself—
picking up where Castro left off.
Courting Outside Partners. Soon after his election in 1998, Chávez began to curtail 50 years of U.S.–
Venezuelan military cooperation. Finally, in 2004, his government asked the U.S. military mission to leave
Venezuela’s armed forces headquarters in Caracas. Anti-drug operations and training of Venezuelan pilots in
U.S.-supplied F-16 fighters ceased. Shortly thereafter, Venezuela began to seek arms from Russia. The Bush
Administration suspended arms sales in May 2006, and Spain and Sweden are withholding weapons with
U.S. components.
Chávez has signed contracts worth $3 billion for 24–30 military airplanes and more than 50 helicopters, has
agreed to buy some 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles to arm a new reserve force, and reportedly is seeking
short-range surface-to-air missiles. During the last week of July 2006, he was in Moscow to finalize the
purchase of the Su-30 supersonic fighter-bombers and Mi-35 assault helicopters. He also signed an
agreement to purchase a Kalashnikov weapons and munitions plant.
In Belarus, Chávez announced a strategic alliance with President Alexander Lukashenko to keep “hands at
the ready on the sword” against imperialism. Iranian President Ahmadinejad awarded him a medal and
promised collaboration on developing new oil fields. In China, Chávez pledged to shift more petroleum
exports to Beijing. Meanwhile, ties with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il could facilitate the acquisition of
intermediate-range missiles.
Venezuela is replacing some military equipment that has fallen into disrepair, but setting up a Russian
weapons plant and striking alliances with state sponsors of terrorism (Iran, Cuba, and North Korea) is
alarming. Chávez already allows Colombian rebels to resupply in Venezuela and funds like-minded
Bolivarian movements in neighboring countries. Venezuelan Kalashnikovs could help them go from street
marches to armed attacks. The Su-30 will be Latin America’s most advanced attack aircraft. With North
Korean ballistic missiles, Venezuela could threaten neighbors and the United States, and a gelling global oil
alliance could limit U.S. imports at a critical moment.
More ev…
Johnson & Cohen 4 (8-12, Stephen & Ariel, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1787.cfm)
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is systematically leading his country into dictatorship by provoking
internal conflict and characterizing his internal opponents as traitors. Beyond Venezuela, he sees himself
replacing Fidel Castro as the leader of Latin America's radical left--uniting the region against U.S.-style
democracy, free markets, and American influence.
Chávez derives popular support from fellow ideologues and a small but committed segment of Venezuela's
largely poor population, and he is beginning to use the hemisphere's dependence on Venezuelan oil to
encourage leftist movements elsewhere and to pressure other countries into acquiescing to his activities. By
politicizing and mismanaging the state petroleum industry, Chávez is jeopardizing vital U.S. interests in the
Western Hemisphere.
More ev…
Johnson & Cohen 4 (8-12, Stephen & Ariel, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1787.cfm)
The bad news is that Chávez has consolidated his hold over Venezuela's public institutions and is
manipulating the electoral system in his favor. Increasing global demand for petroleum has given him an
international power base, and his anti-American political agenda--fueled by petrodollars--could threaten
nearby fledgling democracies and flourishing markets.
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Johnson & Cohen 4 (8-12, Stephen & Ariel, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1787.cfm)
Beyond the hemisphere, Chávez is preparing to shift PDVSA's customer base toward Asia and an
increasingly oil-thirsty China, making Venezuela less dependent on petroleum sales to immediate neighbors.
A deal signed on July 14, 2004, to build oil and gas pipelines between the Maracaibo Basin in Venezuela and
the Caribbean and Pacific coasts in Colombia may seem innocuous, but it would enable Venezuela to ship
petroleum to China without using the Panama Canal. This would make it more critical than ever for Chávez
to secure a pliant government in Colombia to keep this facility operating in Venezuela's interest.16 Chávez
would thus have the luxury of cutting deliveries to those who opposed him, forcing them to seek other
sources at greater cost. By destabilizing and replacing democratic governments in hydrocarbon-rich Bolivia,
Colombia, and Ecuador, he also could achieve a regional energy monopoly that could support rogue regimes
and frustrate U.S. interests in the hemisphere.
Chavez promotes regional anti-Americanism and nationalism which crush international coop,
especially on drugs and terrorism
The opposition’s momentum appears of little concern to Chavez, who continues to direct his rhetorical fire
at the United States. At his final election rally he cried, “We are confronting the devil," (BBC), a
reference to President Bush. The United States has remained quiet in the run-up to Venezuela’s elections but
U.S. aid to Venezuelan organizations, some of which are critical of Chavez and the government, has irked
Venezuelan officials (NYT). The government’s hammering on the United States has trickled down to the
streets: A recent poll conducted by the Associated Press and Ipsos shows that half of Venezuelans think
the United States is a military threat (PDF) to their country.
From the outset, it has been clear that Venezuela, with a population of 26 million, is too small a stage for
Chávez's ambitions. Chávez has taken full advantage of a confluence of favorable factors -- lots of
money, Latin America's political disarray, U.S. disengagement from the region, widespread hostility to the
Bush administration -- to construct alliances throughout the Western Hemisphere and beyond. He has
skillfully managed to establish himself as a global and regional leader, using oil money and brash anti-
Americanism to attempt to construct a counterweight to U.S. power. Chávez's close friendship with
Castro has been integral to this project. In exchange for Cuban teachers and doctors, Chávez furnishes the
financially strapped island some 90,000 barrels of oil a day. Castro probably also provides Chávez with
strategic advice, along with some military support and intelligence. More and more, Cuba and Venezuela
are important referents for each other. When Venezuelans mention "the embassy," they now mean the
Cuban, not the U.S., embassy in Caracas. Chávez's aggressive oil diplomacy has also enhanced his
influence. Last year, he inaugurated Petrocaribe, under which Venezuela will provide 198,000 barrels of oil a
day to 13 Caribbean nations with "soft" financing for up to 40 percent of the bill. Chávez has also given
high priority to the countries of the continent's southern cone, especially Argentina and Brazil, which
are central to his plan to launch Petrosur, another regional energy initiative that he has pledged to
largely bankroll. He has bought $2.8 billion in Argentine bonds and $25 million in Ecuadorian bonds and
has substantially underwritten Telesur, a Latin American alternative to CNN.
The primacy of petroleum has also given Chávez leverage beyond Latin America. He defended his
visits with Saddam Hussein and Qaddafi on grounds of Venezuela's membership in OPEC. He has also
worked to forge stronger ties with key countries such as India and China, in keeping with his declared
intention to eventually direct Venezuelan oil away from its current principal market -- the United States. He
has vowed to build a pipeline through Panama for trans-Pacific shipments, and PDVSA opened an
office in Beijing last year.
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More ev…
Podur 8 (Justin. Writer and activist. “Colombia’s war and Venezuela’s foreign policy” http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3112)
Chavez's rule in Venezuela coincides with the rise and fall of the last peace process in Colombia. He
came to power in 1998, the same year the demilitarized zone was declared in Colombia. He was Venezuela's
President through the declaration of Plan Colombia in 2000 and its implementation, and then through the years
of Uribe's rule in Colombia. Throughout those years, analysts have argued that one of the true targets of Plan
Colombia was in fact Venezuela, its oil, and its revolutionary process (4). And indeed, border incidents and
troubles over the past several years, as well as tensions between Chavez and Uribe, have shown that Colombia
is a base for attacks on Venezuela. In March 2003, Colombian 'irregulars' raided across the Venezuelan border
and were answered by bombing from the Venezuelan air force (5). About a year later (May 2004), dozens of
Colombian paramilitaries were arrested on a ranch near Caracas on a terrorist plot (6). Some later confessed
and were charged, while others were returned to Colombia. Around the same time as the paramilitaries were
infiltrating Venezuela (March 2004), Colombia made a high-profile announcement that it was going to acquire
several dozen tanks, from Spain, for posting on the Venezuelan border (7). The deal had been made under
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, however.
Nigeria DA – 1NC
Nigerian growth is up
Oil is key
Financial Times, The Banker, “Nigeria - Fuel Injection - High Prices And New Finds Mean
Nigeria's
Dependence On Hydrocarbon Exports Will Go On, Albeit With A Greater Emphasis On In-
house Refining. John
McCarthy Reports,” April 1, 2007, lexis
Since the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, Nigeria's oil and gas industry has grown to become the
single largest contributor to Nigeria's economy, turning over about $25bn annually and accounting for
more than one-fifth of gross domestic product (GDP). Soaring oil prices over recent years have
seen the Nigerian government reap a revenue windfall. By the end of 2005, high oil prices had
propelled Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves to $28bn, up two- thirds from the $17bn recorded a
year earlier, enabling the government to pay down Nigeria's huge foreign debt and invest in some
strategic infrastructure improvements.
Nigeria DA – UQ – Econ Up
Nigeria’s economy has a positive outlook
In absolute terms, Nigeria’s banking sector enjoyed very good growth through the year to December 31
2007. In local currency terms, total assets, total loans and total deposits increased by 58%, 96% and
60% respectively. The loan/deposit, loan/asset and loan/GDP ratios all rose. Relative to other countries
surveyed by BMI, these achievements are even more impressive. Of the 59 countries surveyed, Nigeria
ranks second in terms of local currency asset growth, third in terms of both local currency loan growth
and local currency deposit growth. However, it needs to be remembered that all three of the ratios are
rising from very low levels. Nigeria’s rankings in terms of its loan/deposit, loan/asset and loan/GDP ratios are
36th, 39th and 53rd respectively. In a country with per capita GDP of US$1,114, deposits per capita are just
US$334.
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Nigeria's crude oil production fell almost 4 percent in the first quarter following the sabotage of oil
facilities, crimping economic growth, the central bank said. Oil production slid to 2.05 million barrels
per day, while economic growth slowed to 6.5 percent from 7.8 percent in the previous three months,
the Abuja-based Central Bank of Nigeria said today in a quarterly report published on its Web site.
Forecast revenue is at risk because planned production levels may not be attained. Before the attack,
government had, through the minister of finance, Shamsudeen Usman, said the country was producing 1.8
million barrels per day. With the shut in of an extra 200,000 from Bonga (which brings Shell’s total to
400,000), current production would be as low as 1.6 million barrels per day. Industry insiders say it may be
lower. It was 2.7 billion in 2006. For contributing 30 percent to Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
the drop in production has implications also for projected GDP, which is put at over 10 percent by
government and 6.1 percent by the Economist Intelligence Unit. These projects may be revised further
down. The inflation fears of the Central Bank may now be confirmed as the shut in triggers further
rise in the international price of crude. And because our refining capacity is short handed, the nation would
import fuel at higher prices with the full inflation implications. With further inflation, the thought of meeting
the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty becomes mere conjecture.
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Nigeria DA – UQ – Oil Up
Nigeria has vast future oil reserves
Rice 8 (Xian, The Guardian [http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jul/14/oil.internationalaidanddevelopment]
'The best thing that could happen to the country is if no oil is found'/ July 14, 2008)
The twin islands of São Tomé and Príncipe squat in the Gulf of Guinea. Their nearest neighbours are
Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. All have found significant reserves of oil, much of it
offshore. In 1997, a tiny Houston-based company called Environmental Remediation Holding Corporation
(ERHC), which had no history of oil finds or production, decided São Tomé might have its own deep-water
deposits. In return for near-exclusive mineral exploration and exploitation rights for 25 years and a half share
of profits, ERHC offered São Tomé $5m and its marketing services. São Tomé, heavily in debt and reliant on
donors to fund most of its $30m budget, was desperate for cash. The deal was signed. Industry watchers such
as Mohamed Yahya, of the UK-based peacebuilding NGO International Alert, would later describe the
contract as "one of the worst in the history of oil". And ERHC's gamble paid off. Seismic data showed
there could be up to 11bn barrels of oil under the sea around the islands. The most promising area was
north of Príncipe, in waters also claimed by Nigeria.
We shall begin this discussion by reviewing the available gas resource. It would be necessary to express that
the estimated oil reserve in Nigeria is put at 33 billion barrels (28 of which are in the Niger-Delta and 5
in the Deepwater),while our gas reserves is about 187 Tcf (27 Tcf in the Deepwater and 160 Tcf in the
Niger-Delta).
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A hastily-called oil summit ended in the expected 200,000 b/d Saudi production increase, pushing Saudi
production to its highest in 30 years, but well short of the 400K-500K b/d analysts advised needed to
make a meaningful impact on supplies and offset recent production declines resulting from militant
activity in Nigeria. Arguments continued to rage on the root of the price gains, with producers claiming
speculators at fault and others pointing to burgeoning demand from developing countries. Cuts in gasoline
and diesel prices in China led to a 3.5% drop in crude on Thursday, before analysts dispelled expectations for
a demand drop, and prices again headed higher. However, on Sunday Niger militants announced a
ceasefire, although still remaining unwilling to participate in upcoming peace talks. Nigeria's
production is now at its lowest in 25 years.
Oil production in Nigeria is at low ebb in Nigeria and this gives concern to not a few given that it earns the
most revenue for the country but there is a bright side and you don't have to be a sadist to see it. True oil has
been a factor in Nigeria 's growing revenue profile not because we are producing more but because the price
wouldn't stop tracing an upward path. In fact oil production is responding to gravitational pull from a
combination of factors including militants attack and the cut back on capital expenditure by the oil
majors. This has resulted in cuts from a position of 2.6 million barrels a day two years ago to about 1.3
million barrels. This should bring down revenue but not so since the price of crude keeps rocketing from
pent up demand by China and India , unrest in the Gulf and activities of militants in Nigeria 's Delta region.
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Nigeria DA – UQ – Diversification Up
Nigeria’s economy is diversifying
Amaefule 8 (Everest [http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art200807083205446] Nigeria loses 30% of
budget revenue to N’Delta crisis/ July 8, 2008)
The minister said the reforms initiated by the present administration would soon help the nation to leave its
current six per cent growth rate. He said, “The Nigerian economy is rapidly transforming; the
contribution of non-oil sectors such as real estate, services, telecommunications and agriculture have
shown remarkable improvements. “Currently growing above six per cent GDP rate, the economy is set to
depart from the six per cent group to an economy with superior GDP growth rate.
IT was the most unlikely telecommunications company in Nigeria expected to get listed on the Nigerian
Stock Exchange, but listed it did last Monday and in the process made history as the first company in
highly lucrative sector. Starcomms Plc, Nigeria’s fourth largest telecommunications by last Monday’s listing
of its 6, 878, 478, 096 ordinary shares of 50 Kobo at N13.56K breasted the tape ahead of more robust GSM
mobile operators — MTN Nigeria, Celtel Nigeria and Globacom — to become the first telecom operator to
be listed on the Exchange. Before Monday’s listing on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, Starcomms
Plc had successfully raised N64.35 billion through a private placement offer. The private placement beefed
up the company capital base. However two institutional investor Actis, and Emerging Capital Partners LLC,
(ECP) divested some of their holdings from the company thus widening the shareholder base. The shares of
the company which were listed at 12.27 p.m made significant gain immediately, as it went up five per
cent after only five minutes of listing/trading to close at N14.33k. Reacting to the development Mr. Maher
Qubain, Chief Executive Officer said: “At Starcomms, we do not just cook up figures. We operate as a
transparent company and today’s history making event is meant to drive our growth. We want to become the
3rd, if not 2nd biggest telecom operator in Nigeria by 2010. This is a promise, and at Starcomms, we keep
our promise”. The historic listing presents an excellent opportunity for every Nigerian to buy into one
of the fastest growing and profitable sectors of the telecom sub-sector of the Nigerian economy.
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Commercial oil production began in 1956, and the first exports in 1958. Since that time, perhaps $600
billion in oil revenues have been accrued by the Nigerian government. The government takes a share
through a legal joint venture contract with the international oil companies of about 80 percent of the value of
each barrel of oil. Since oil accounts for 90 percent of all Nigerian exports and 80 percent of government
revenue, and about half of GDP, oil is the Nigerian economy. The country is a classical petro-state
dependent upon one resource. The book shows how this vast wealth has been stolen: Estimates from the
World Bank vary from $100 (billion) to $200 billion. It has also been wasted. The International Monetary
Fund says that oil has probably not added to the standard of living of average Nigerians. This is a stunning
indictment.
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Nigeria DA – UQ – Inflation Up
Inflation high in Nigeria
Akpe 8 (Ameto, Business Day [http://www.businessdayonline.com/energy/12322.html] Soludo warns danger
ahead over government expenditure/ July 2, 2008)
Nigeria has is oil and tampering with the resources makes the country run at risk. Nigeria's inflation rate
(year-on-year) rose from 8.2 percent in April 2008 to 9.7 percent in May, heightening worries over the
return of double-digit inflation rates in the country. Rising price levels has also brought about hikes in
the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) by the CBN from 9.5 per cent in December 2007 to 10 per cent in April
2008 and also 10.25 per cent in June. Soludo explains that any amplification in the oil benchmark would
crowd-out the private sector because of the peculiar source of government revenue.
Inflation which reached a new height of 18.41 percent last Friday as predicated by Databank Research
Department was the main factor that led to the increase in the prime rate- the rate at which the Central Bank
does its overnight lending to universal, commercial and merchant banks in order to check the supply of
money in circulation. India and Nigeria who had been enjoying stable single digit inflation for sometime
had also been hit by these global factors with India seeing a new inflation of over 12 percent.
Nigeria's inflation rate rose to 9.7 percent in May, the highest in two years, as the cost of food, energy
and building materials increased. Inflation accelerated from 8.2 percent in April, the National Bureau of
Statistics, based in the capital Abuja, said today in a statement on its Web site. Prices rose 1.9 percent in the
month. ``Inflationary pressures are here to stay'' as prices of food and fuel continue to rise, said
Bismarck Rewane, Chief Executive Officer of Financial Derivatives Ltd., a Lagos-based fund manager. ``The
moment it goes into double digit, we're likely to see a more restrictive response from the central bank.''
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On the 2nd of June, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) increased the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) by
25 basis points to 10.25 from 10.0 per cent. This would be the third time the apex bank will be increasing the MPR since it was
introduced December 2006 It would be recalled that the MPR replaced the Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR), as the bench mark for interest rate in the
economy. While the MRR represents the minimum interest rate banks can borrow from the CBN, the MPR is a short- term interest rate at which banks can
predictably borrow from the apex bank. Thus, the MPR serves as an indication for other interest rates be it deposit or lending rate in the economy
The MPR was introduced at 10.0 per cent with spread of 600 basis points around the rate, i.e. 300 basis points above and 300 basis points below. This
translates into an upper limit of 13 per cent and a lower limit of 7 per cent. The first movement in the MPR was announced on June 5, 2007, a 200 basis
point reduction from 10.0 per cent to 8.0 per cent as well as a reduction in the width of the interest rate corridor from plus or minus 300 to plus or minus 250
basis points. But that was the last reduction as subsequent movements were increases. The first increase was a 100 basis point upward review to 9.0 per cent
in October 2007, the second increase was a 50 basis points upward review to 9.5 per cent in December 2007. Later on, at the beginning of 2008, the MPR
was further increased by 50 basis points to 10.0 per cent. Also pertinent is the fact that the increases in the MPR were occasioned by one major factor, which
is the need to forestall upward movement in the inflation rate. For example, in the communiqué that announced the first increase in October 2007, the CBN
stated: "The MPC noted that year-on-year headline inflation would continue to remain single-digit in the rest of 2007, but at the upper region of the single
digit range. Overall, a combination of stable food prices and a restrictive monetary policy stance is expected to help sustain the headline inflation within
single digit. The Committee also noted the challenges arising from rising autonomous private inflows and the attendant risk of further appreciation of the
naira/dollar exchange rate. In addition, the Committee also noted the high possibility of substantial fiscal injections in the fourth quarter, arising from the
supplementary budget at the federal and state levels. Similarly, in announcing the increases in December 2007, April 2008 and June 2008, the CBN stated,
"The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) noted that the overall macroeconomic picture in 2007 has
reflected improved stability; just as the prospects for the first quarter 2008 appear good. The bank's
projections show that the year-on-year (headline) inflation could remain single-digit in the first quarter
of 2008, provided CBN continues to take proactive steps to manage the liquidity surfeit.
Market operators however said that the excess liquidity occasioned by the inflow might be short lived as the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is already mopping up the liquidity to forestall upward pressure on the
inflation rate. The apex bank according to sources issued a huge amount of treasury bills to the market as
well as a ten year federal government bond.
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Financial Times, The Banker, “Nigeria - Fuel Injection - High Prices And New Finds Mean
Nigeria's
Dependence On Hydrocarbon Exports Will Go On, Albeit With A Greater Emphasis On In-
house Refining. John
McCarthy Reports,” April 1, 2007, lexis
Since the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, Nigeria's oil and gas industry has grown to become the
single largest contributor to Nigeria's economy, turning over about $25bn annually and accounting for
more than one-fifth of gross domestic product (GDP). Soaring oil prices over recent years have
seen the Nigerian government reap a revenue windfall. By the end of 2005, high oil prices had
propelled Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves to $28bn, up two- thirds from the $17bn recorded a
year earlier, enabling the government to pay down Nigeria's huge foreign debt and invest in some
strategic infrastructure improvements.
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Ribadu 6 (Nuhu, Executive Chair, Economic & Financial Crimes Commission, May 19,
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/bbagdetails.cfm?ID=267)
For years Nigeria has suffered a string of rulers bent on looting the national treasury. Presidents,
military dictators, parliamentarians, and state governors all took advantage of their position to steal
literally billions of dollars of the national patrimony. But things are beginning to change. Corrupt
proceeds secreted abroad are being returned and senior officials prosecuted for wrongdoing. While
these successes represent the coordinated response of many agencies in Nigeria and reflect the strong support
of its President, outside observers say much of the credit is due to the work of the Economic & Financial
Crimes Commission. Formed in April 2003, it has recovered or seized assets from various people guilty of
fraud inside and outside of Nigeria, including a syndicate with highly placed government officials who were
defrauding the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). Several influential individuals, including the
governors of two states, have been arrested and are currently awaiting trial. This success has come at a
price, however. Three of the Commission's investigator's have been assassinated this year alone and many
more have received death threats. Nuhu Ribadu, a former police officer and prosecutor, has headed the
commission since its inception. He will review the commission's record and discuss the factors that help
explain its success.
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Other potential developments might accelerate decline in Africa and reduce even our limited optimism. The
most important would be the outright collapse of Nigeria. While currently Nigeria's leaders are locked in a
bad marriage that all dislike but dare not leave, there are possibilities that could disrupt the precarious
equilibrium in Abuja. The most important would be a junior officer coup that could destabilize the
country to the extent that open warfare breaks out in many places in a sustained manner. If Nigeria
were to become a failed state, it could drag down a large part of the West African region. Even state
failure in small countries such as Liberia has the effect of destabilizing entire neighborhoods. If
millions were to flee a collapsed Nigeria, the surrounding countries, up to and including Ghana, would
be destabilized. Further, a failed Nigeria probably could not be reconstituted for many years—if ever—and
not without massive international assistance.
A coup in Nigeria could cause the oil exporting country to collapse and bring down much of West
Africa with it, the CIA's National Intelligence Council said in a long-term outlook released in Nigeria on
Wednesday. The catastrophic scenario was listed as a possible risk in a long-term forecast for Africa which
also saw most of the continent becoming increasingly marginalised over the next 15 years. 'While Nigeria's
leaders are locked in a bad marriage that all dislike but dare not leave, there are possibilities that could
disrupt the precarious equilibrium in Abuja,' said the report, which was given to the press by Nigerian
lawmakers. 'The most important would be a junior officer coup that could destabilise the country to the
extent that open warfare breaks out in many places in a sustained manner. 'If Nigeria were to become
a failed state, it could drag down a large part of the West African region.'
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***Nigeria Answers***
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Africa News 4 (July 12, Daily Champion, “Nigeria: Oil: Prize or Curse?”)
Meanwhile, deep in the Ecuadorian forest, discharges from 333 wells despoil Indian homelands and
contaminate the headwaters of the Amazon. In Africa's most populous nation, sludge sickens communities
as slicks bathe Niger River banks. In the Gulf of Mexico, the Niger River Delta, and the Persian Gulf,
fish nibbling near drilling sites get their fill of mercury and other toxins and pass it on to birds, marine
mammals, and humans who eat them. Refining emits benzene, which causes cancer, and burning
pollutes the air and water with mercury, particles, and smog and causes acid rain
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Africa News 4 (July 12, Daily Champion, “Nigeria: Oil: Prize or Curse?”)
In Nigeria, Ecuador, Venezuela and Sudan, oil has widened economic divides and the wealth generated
engenders conflicts. Nigeria has suffered profoundly from political unrest fueled by oil and from
reprisals in which thousands have been killed. The corruption spawned by oil casts a vast net of social
pain that has not abated with the transition to democracy.
A statement by the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta that its 2-week ceasefire will end July
12 also helped boost energy prices. Rebels indicated they would resume attacks because of the recent
promise by US officials to back the Nigerian government in the conflict that has already shut in a quarter
of Nigeria's oil production in the last 2 years. In the interim, security forces said gunmen kidnapped
employees of a German construction firm in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, on July 11. The abductees work for
Julius Berger Nigeria PLC, a unit of Bilfinger Berger AG, Germany's second-largest builder.
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Rubin and Weisberg 3 (Roburt Rubin U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Jacob Weisberg American political
journalist, currently serving as editor of Slate magazine and a columnist for the Financial Times)
I told the President that the Mexican government faced an imminent threat of default and that, in the hope of preventing it, we were recommending that he
support a massive, potentially unpopular, and risky intervention: providing billions of dollars to the Mexican government to avoid a collapse in its currency
and economy. Then I asked Larry to explain the situation in more detail. It took him ten minutes to spell out our essential analysis and recommendation,
which we'd finished formulating in a meeting with Fed chairman Alan Greenspan hours earlier. If
our government didn't step in to
help, and help quickly, the immediate and long-term consequences for Mexico could be severe. But the
real reason for acting was that critical American interests were at stake. The alternatives to the massive
intervention we were recommending were not promising. If Mexico defaulted on its foreign obligations,
Larry and I went on to explain, the flow of capital out of Mexico would probably accelerate and the peso
would collapse, likely triggering severe inflation, a deep and prolonged recession, and massive
unemployment. And that would surely have a substantial impact on the United States. Mexico was our
third-largest trading partner, which meant that many American companies and workers would be
hurt. We presented estimates that a Mexican default could increase illegal immigration by 30 percent, a
half-million additional refugees a year. The flow of illegal drugs could intensify as well. A crisis in Mexico
might also hurt us indirectly, by affecting other countries. Fears of a Mexican default were already
producing wobbles in developing markets throughout the hemisphere, a phenomenon that came to be
known as the "Tequila Effect." Such a chain reaction could lead investors to pull back from emerging
markets around the world indiscriminately. That, in turn, could affect economic conditions in the
United States-since roughly 40 percent of our exports went to developing countries. According to an
estimate made by the Federal Reserve Board, a Mexican default and the consequent "contagion" that was
possible could, in a worst-case scenario, reduce growth in the United States by 1/2 to 1 percent a year. We
weren't proposing intervention for the sake of Mexico, despite our special relationship, but to protect
ourselves. That was our case for asking Congress to provide billions of dollars in loan guarantees, as
part of a package to be coordinated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Mexico DA – UQ – Econ Up
Mexico is experiencing economic growth
.
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Mexico DA – UQ – Econ Up
Mexico’s economy is in an upward trend
Focus Economics 8 (June 30, Global economic insight with a regional focus http://www.latin-focus.com/focus-
economics/indicators/080630_mexico_economic_activity.htm)
A more complete set of data for first quarter gross domestic product (GDP) confirms the 2.6%
expansion reported earlier. The first quarter reading represented a notable deceleration compared with the 4.2% growth observed in the
fourth quarter. The deterioration over the previous quarter was broad-based, as both domestic demand and the external sector decelerated over the fourth
quarter. Total consumption slowed from 4.0% growth in the fourth quarter to 3.3%, while investment expanded 2.7% year-on-year (Q4 2007: +4.8%
yoy). Meanwhile, the net contribution of the external sector to overall growth deteriorated, as exports decelerated from 7.8% in the fourth quarter to 5.4%,
More recent data point to a
while imports picked up the pace and increased 8.8% over the same quarter last year (Q4 2007: +8.2% yoy).
recovery in economic activity. According to the global indicator for economic activity (IGAE, Indicador
Global de la Actividad Económica), the economy increased 6.2% in April over the same month last year.
The reading constituted a strong rebound compared to the 1.5% contraction registered in March,
which had been negatively affected by the Easter holidays, and also came in ahead of market expectations,
which had anticipated economic activity expanding 4.5% annually. The acceleration over the previous month
was broad-based, as all three main economic sectors registered higher growth rates. Agriculture experienced
the sharpest rebound and expanded 7.2% over the same month last year, after having contracted 5.3% in
March. The industrial sector also bounced back and increased 5.5% year-on-year (March: -4.9% yoy).
Finally, the services sector expanded 6.7% (April: +1.1% yoy). A month-on-month comparison does not
corroborate the acceleration suggested by the annual figures, as economic activity declined 0.17% over
the previous month in seasonally adjusted terms, which contrasted the 1.01% expansion recorded in
March. Nevertheless, as a result of the strong April reading, the annual average growth rate stepped
up from 3.3% in March to 3.6%.
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More remittances are sent to Mexico in May than any other month of the year, driven in part by the number
of immigrants (a majority of them Mexican) working in construction. With the deflating housing bubble
and the decline of construction jobs in the first quarter of 2008, the unemployment rate of Hispanic
immigrants rose to 7.5%, and Hispanic construction workers now earn less than they did in the first
quarter of 2006.1 The continuing economic slowdown in the United States will undoubtedly affect
Mexicans on both sides of the border.
The quickening pace of inflation comes as the economy is starting to slow, hurt by weaker growth in
the United States, Mexico's top trading partner. The economy expanded at an annual pace of 3.7
percent in the first quarter, discounting the effect of Holy Week holidays, down from 4.2 percent in the
fourth quarter of 2007.
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Mexico DA – UQ – Oil Up
Mexico is using technology and future reserves to keep oil production high
The Market Oracle 8 (Financial Markets Analysis & Forecasting online publication
[http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article5187.html] China Raises Fuel Prices: Is this the End of the Oil boom?/ June
23, 2008)
Worst of all, Mexico's production crisis is deepening: In April, Mexico's oil output fell to a nine-year
low of 2.8 million barrels a day, mostly because of a decline in the Cantarell field. Think that's scary?
Consider this: At current rates of decline, Mexico will become a net oil importer by 2016, and maybe
sooner, according to Mexico's Energy Ministry! And it's not just Mexico. Venezuela, another big supplier
of U.S. imported oil, is hemorrhaging oil production due to the slipshod management by its deluded
president, Hugo Chavez. Result: The combined net oil exports from Venezuela and Mexico to the U.S.
dropped by 414,000 bpd in just five months recently. That's an astounding annual decline rate of 32%
a year!
Mexico DA – UQ – Diversification Up
Mexico is diversifying its market
Tiku 8 (Pran, The Street Journal [http://www.thestreet.com/story/10426035/1/emerge-richer-with-six-sizzling-
markets.html] Emerge Richer With 'Six Sizzling Markets'/ July 14, 2008)
Mexico, the eleventh-largest country in terms of population, benefits from NAFTA, but it has also been
decreasing its reliance on the U.S. by diversifying exports. Mexico is producing industry leaders like
America Movil(AMX - Cramer's Take - Stockpickr), which continues to build a footprint in Latin
America, and cement giant Cemex(CX - Cramer's Take - Stockpickr), which is expanding globally,
taking market share and even buying companies in Europe.
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When it comes to remittances, though, the weak dollar has had a powerful, if often overlooked impact. The
strengthening peso means that the $7.3 billion sent home in the first four months of the year lost about
$366 million in value compared to last year's exchange rate, based on numbers from Mexico's central
bank. But the dollar's biggest impact in Mexico may be on Pemex's oil profits. Oil money is crucial for
Mexico since it accounts for 40 percent of the federal budget.
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Mexico DA – UQ – Inflation Up
Inflation in Mexico has hit a 5 year high
Rota 8 (Valerie [http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=aIDSsULInmG0&refer=news]
Mexico's Peso Holds Near Five-Year High on Interest-Rate Spread/ July 14, 2008)
Mexico's peso held near a five-year high on mounting speculation the difference between Mexican and U.S.
benchmark lending rates will continue to widen, drawing investors to the nation's higher-yielding securities.
The peso has risen 5.8 percent this year as two interest- rate increases by Banco de Mexico since October
have swelled the spread between Mexican and U.S. lending rates to 5.75 percentage points, the biggest
since September 2005. Mexican central bankers will raise the key rate by a quarter-percentage point to 8
percent when they meet on July 18, according to the median estimate of 20 analysts surveyed by Bloomberg.
Mexican inflation jumped in June to its fastest pace in over three years on higher food and energy
prices, increasing pressure on the central bank to raise borrowing costs despite a slowing economy. The
central bank said Wednesday that consumer prices rose 5.26 percent in the 12 months through June – the
highest inflation rate since November 2004. The May rate was 4.95 percent.
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Mexico's central bank will probably raise its benchmark interest rate for a second consecutive month
in a bid to curb the fastest inflation in 3 1/2 years. Banco de Mexico policy makers will increase the rate
at least a quarter percentage point to 8 percent on July 18, according to 12 of 16 economists surveyed by
Bloomberg. The four other analysts forecast no change.
Yields on the benchmark government bond fell for the first time in three days on speculation Banco de
Mexico may wait until at least next month to increase lending rates. Last month the bank raised its key
rate by a quarter-percentage point to 7.75 percent to slow the fastest inflation in 3 1/2 years.
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Kay and Quispe-Agnoli 2 (Stephen J., Myriam, Atlanta Fed’s Latin America Research Group, third quarter,
http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=1B0BDCE0-904D-43E4-BF7E42DC3F12D06F&method=display)
The United States depends on Latin America for a significant portion of its oil. In 2001 Mexico and
Venezuela were respectively the second- and fourth-largest suppliers of U.S. oil imports, and for the
month of May 2002, Mexico surpassed Saudi Arabia as the largest single supplier of crude oil to the United
States. Yet only a few Latin American countries — Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador and Colombia — are
large net oil exporters. Some countries, like Argentina, have become self-sufficient and have begun to
export oil while others, including Brazil, seek self-sufficiency in the coming decade. The rest of the region,
however, resembles the United States in its dependency on oil imports. The bottom line is that oil has a
significant effect on the economy of every Latin American country.
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Amiel 6 (Rafael, Global Insight, August 10, “Inflation Remains on Target Despite Political Uncertainty in
Mexico”)
The central bank of Mexico (Banxico) has succeeded in controlling inflation: the 12-month inflation
rate went down from 3.18% at the end of June to 3.06% at the end of July, i.e., practically on the
targeted rate. Banxico targets inflation at 3% plus/minus one percentage point. Annual inflation has been
within the targeted band since August 2005.
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Sarukhan and Lugar 8 (Ambassador Arturo, Sen. Dick, May 15, “Hands across the border” Politico.com)
At issue is an administration request for the first allocation of $500 million for Mexico's anti-drug
efforts as part of the upcoming supplemental spending bill. This represents the possibility for a sea change
in US-Mexico relations and the way both our nations fight organized crime. It was born from a
proposal formulated by Mexican President Felipe Calderon, who has changed Mexico's traditional
approach to bilateral cooperation by seeking deeper security ties with the United States. At a March
2007 meeting in Merida, Mexico, our two leaders agreed to take a decisive step toward significantly
enhanced cooperation. This commitment, known as the Merida Initiative, to jointly address the challenge
of drug trafficking includes a multiyear program to strengthen Mexico's capabilities to fight organized
crime with resources for training and equipment, information sharing, enhanced border security and
support for judicial reform, respect for human rights, and the fight against corruption.
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Rubin and Weisberg 3 (Roburt Rubin U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Jacob Weisberg American political
journalist, currently serving as editor of Slate magazine and a columnist for the Financial Times)
I told the President that the Mexican government faced an imminent threat of default and that, in the hope of
preventing it, we were recommending that he support a massive, potentially unpopular, and risky
intervention: providing billions of dollars to the Mexican government to avoid a collapse in its currency and
economy. Then I asked Larry to explain the situation in more detail. It took him ten minutes to spell out our
essential analysis and recommendation, which we'd finished formulating in a meeting with Fed chairman
Alan Greenspan hours earlier. If our government didn't step in to help, and help quickly, the immediate
and long-term consequences for Mexico could be severe. But the real reason for acting was that critical
American interests were at stake. The alternatives to the massive intervention we were recommending were
not promising. If Mexico defaulted on its foreign obligations, Larry and I went on to explain, the flow of
capital out of Mexico would probably accelerate and the peso would collapse, likely triggering severe
inflation, a deep and prolonged recession, and massive unemployment. And that would surely have a
substantial impact on the United States. Mexico was our third-largest trading partner, which meant
that many American companies and workers would be hurt. We presented estimates that a Mexican
default could increase illegal immigration by 30 percent, a half-million additional refugees a year. The
flow of illegal drugs could intensify as well. A crisis in Mexico might also hurt us indirectly, by affecting
other countries. Fears of a Mexican default were already producing wobbles in developing markets
throughout the hemisphere, a phenomenon that came to be known as the "Tequila Effect." Such a chain
reaction could lead investors to pull back from emerging markets around the world indiscriminately.
That, in turn, could affect economic conditions in the United States-since roughly 40 percent of our
exports went to developing countries. According to an estimate made by the Federal Reserve Board, a
Mexican default and the consequent "contagion" that was possible could, in a worst-case scenario, reduce
growth in the United States by 1/2 to 1 percent a year. We weren't proposing intervention for the sake of
Mexico, despite our special relationship, but to protect ourselves. That was our case for asking Congress
to provide billions of dollars in loan guarantees, as part of a package to be coordinated with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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***Mexico Answers***
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Weiner 90 (Lauren, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, August 8, WORLD; CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF; Pg.
A9)
But Mr. Pazos warned against a "wave of false optimism" of permanent gains in oil revenue, saying that
this was the mistake made by Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo during his spendthrift 1976-1982
administration. He said if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait and normal oil flows resume, then governments like
Venezuela and Mexico would be left out on a limb. A transitory oil boom could tempt these governments
to relax the austerity measures they have imposed to curb runaway inflation and pay their debts, thus
setting back economic reform, Mr. Pazos said.
Africa News 4 (July 12, Daily Champion, “Nigeria: Oil: Prize or Curse?”)
Venezuela has been in cyclic turmoil, with oil the trophy. Angola, rich in oil, diamonds, and gold, has just
ended a 30-year war, leaving physical devastation across the land. Its wealth in petrodollars has fanned
skyrocketing corruption, with some news agencies reporting upwards of $2 billion dollars missing from its
treasury over the past 10 years! Graft and corruption have also rocked Mexico's premier oil corporation
PREMEX for years. As for Russia's oil industry, it has become a case study for students of organized
crime!
Smith and Walter 95+ (Roy C. NYU Kenneth Langone Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance, Seymour
Milstein Professor of Finance, Ingo Corporate Governance and Ethics at the Stern School of Business, New York
University http://books.google.com/books?id=Js1vyvBTLlsC&pg=PA199&lpg=PA199&dq=%22tequila+effect%22,+mexico&source=web&ots=LxDKJg8R3F&sig=q7xbD0BIlT4
gZmHjJY3q6ZQmvA&hl=en&sa= X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA199,M1 )
The tequila effect was limited and did not last long, except in Mexico. The paper rightly points out that the
Mexico crisis resulted in an overhang, the tequila effect, in Mexico and many other emerging markets in the
first quarter of 1995. But there has been a substantial correction since then (Figure 1, data from the IFC’s
Emerging Markets Data Base). Stock markets in Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, for
example, soon recovered and were at the same level or higher at the end of 1995 compared with January
1994. Since then , equity markets have further recovered in many emerging markets.
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Oil is key
Rosser 7 (Andrew, political economist, worked for AusAID, consultant to the World Bank, the UK Department for
International Development, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Journal of Contemporary
Asia, Vol. 37)
In this context, Indonesia's rapid economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s seems remarkable. The
oil and gas sector accounted for as much as 80% of the country's total annual exports and 70% of the
central government's annual revenues during these decades (Rosser, 2002: 42-3). But, despite this
massive natural resource wealth, the country's economy grew strongly during the 1970s and 1980s. As Figure
1 shows, annual real economic growth was more or less consistently in the 6%-10% range each year
during the 1970s, except for a couple of years during the mid-1970s. During the 1980s, economic growth
was somewhat slower, due mainly to the contracting effects of the two-stage collapse of international oil
prices in 1981-82 and 1985-86, but was still strong overall. So strong was Indonesia's economic growth
during the 1970s and 1980s that by the early 1990s, the country had become widely regarded as one of
East Asia's so-called "miracle" economies (World Bank, 1993)
Ghoshal 4 (Baladas former Professor of Southeast Asia and South-West Pacific Studies and Chairman of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies at
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi “Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto Indonesia” )
Unless democratic processes and institutions quickly take root and deliver results, the pendulum may
swing back the other way. Without economic recovery, there will not be political stability, and some of
the provinces will become more restless. Without unity, the country will plunge into instability with
huge economic costs and this may reverse democratic reform. The challenge of democratic reform in Indonesia is not to
drift from one form of extremism to another, but to find the right balance for the coexistence of democracy with stability, devolution with unity, reform with
prosperity and freedom with peace. Indonesia
needs time to work out this delicate balance, but it is unwise for others
to push Indonesia too hard in this process.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE
1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html //.
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the
global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to
security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its
provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century
offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to
war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their
leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less
likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not
build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more
reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates
for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own
citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor
international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more
difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect
competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable
foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
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Indonesia DA – UQ – Econ Up
Indonesia economy growing by 6.2%
Mingxin 8 (Bi, China View [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/09/content_8517925.htm] Indonesian
economy forecast to grow by 6.2 % in 1st half /July 9, 2008)
Indonesian economy is predicted to growth by 6.2 percent in the first half of this year, the Finance
Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati said here Wednesday. Indonesia has trimmed its economic growth target in
2008 from 6.8 to 6.0 percents after the soaring global oil price. The National Statistic Bureau will announce
the economic growth at the first semester at the mid of August. "At the second quarter, we are optimistic
economy will grow by 6.1 percent. So if we combine with the 6.3 percent growth in the first quarter, the
economy will grow at 6.2 percent at the first semester," Mulyani told reporters at finance ministry office.
The minister said that the figure was driven by the growth at the household consumption by around 5 percent,
investment about 2 percent, export and import at the range of 11 and 12 percents.
Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati has estimated Indonesia`s economic growth in the second
quarter of 2008 at 6.1 percent so that the economic growth in the first semester of this year was estimated
at 6.2 percent. The minister told a press conference on Wednesday that the economic growth was fueled by
household consumption, government expenditure, investment, exports, high raw material and capital
good imports. "Household consumption grew 5.2-5.3 percent as spending for motor-vehicles and
electricity remained high," the minister said. She said investment grew 10.4-10.5 percent while in the same
period last year it was only 7-8 percent. "We will continue to boost investment so that it would reach a two-
digit growth at the end of the year," Mulyani said. Indonesia`s exports in the first semester of this year
also booked a growth of 11.9-12.0 percent while imports grew by 11.1-11.2 percent, the minister said.
"Imports of capital goods and raw materials were high while imports of consumption goods fell so that the
economic growth in quarter 3 and 4 possibly dropped," she said.
September’s sale of a 10 per cent stake in Bao Viet, Vietnam’s leading (and state-owned) insurance firm
marked not only the biggest M&A deal in the country’s history but is opening the floodgates to a tranche of
other work. A report released in May by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute noted that while Indonesia
has enjoyed impressive and sustained economic growth over the past several years, that growth is more
impressive in that it takes place against a backdrop of decreasing government debt and relatively
stable inflation.
The rolling blackouts in Jakarta are officially due to maintenance work that will interrupt gas supplies
to two state-owned generating stations in North Jakarta. Analysts have blamed the country's
crumbling infrastructure and warned electricity shortages could limit economic growth and
discourage investment in Southeast Asia's largest economy. Rising demand for electricity has led to
increasing numbers of blackouts across the country in the past few years despite Indonesia's vast resources of
oil, natural gas, coal and geothermal energy.
Indonesia: The consumer confidence index fell to a 32-month low in June on concern higher food and
fuel prices will erode incomes, a central bank survey showed. The measure dropped to 79.1 from 82.4 in
May, according to a Bank Indonesia survey released yesterday. A reading below 100 indicates pessimists
outnumber optimists. The yield on the 9 percent bond maturing in September 2018 was little changed at
12.465 percent, according to the Inter Dealer Market Association.
Indonesia's economic growth is estimated to have slowed to 6.1 percent in the second quarter, from 6.28
percent in the first quarter, partly due to slowing private consumption, the finance minister said on
Wednesday. Sri Mulyani Indrawati said growth is likely to have been supported by strong exports and
imports of capital goods. But private consumption is estimated to have grown at a slower pace. She did
not elaborate, but analysts said soaring inflation, boosted by high food and global oil prices, is likely to
have hurt consumption, the country's main driver of growth.
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Indonesia DA – UQ – Oil Up
Indonesia has future supplies of oil
Reuters 8 ([http://uk.reuters.com/article/rbssEnergyNews/idUKJAK17079720080624] Pertamina, Talisman to
cooperate on Indonesia oil/ June 24, 2008)
Most of Pertamina's energy blocks in Indonesia are already mature and need further investment to recover
remaining oil reserves. Pertamina forecasts it will produce 160,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil in
2008, compared with 143,000 bpd last year. Indonesia has said it has 8.6 billion barrels of proven and
potential oil reserves and about 182 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves.
In 2007, Indonesia had 4.4 billion barrels in proven reserves, according to the CIA Factbook. That's
more than either Malaysia and Vietnam, its nearest regional rivals, and just below Ecuador. Reserves in
Saudi Arabia, the largest producer, are estimated at 264 billion barrels.
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NYT 5 (8-17)
Pessimists say the bureaucracy is holding up many of the foreign investment pledges being made. "All the
hoopla over F.D.I. coming to Indonesia hasn't come through," said Harry Su, head of research at BNP Paribas
in Jakarta, referring to foreign direct investment. New toll roads and other infrastructure projects, for
example, are being held up as bureaucrats and investors wrangle over terms, analysts say.
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Indonesia DA – UQ – Diversification Up
Indonesia expanding its steel and nickel industry
STL 8 (Sify Technologies Limited[http://sify.com/finance/fullstory.php?id=14705901] New seven wonders of the
stock market/July 2, 2008)
Jindal Stainless (JSL) is India's largest stainless steel manufacturer having manufacturing facilities at three
locations - Hisar, Vizag and Orissa.It is the flagship company of the USD 6 billion Jindal Group and
manufactures different ranges of flat steel products to serve the domestic and international markets. The
company recently signed a joint venture agreement with an Indonesian mining company - Antam to
develop a nickel smelting and stainless steel plant in Indonesia from early 2009. JSL already has a
stainless steel cold rolling complex in Indonesia and this project is a step towards becoming a global
industry leader.
Meanwhile confluence of factors, from continued liberalisation in Vietnam, which has in the very recent past
been the scene of a number of equitisation deals as the government in Hanoi seeks to divest itself of
centralised control and ownership pf the economy, to resource and manufacturing booms (complemented
by increasing political stability) in nations like Indonesia, have become attractive centres for
dealmaking firms from Europe, the UK and Australia.
.
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Indonesia DA – UQ – Inflation Up
Inflation high in Indonesia
Mingxin 8 (Bi, China View [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/09/content_8517925.htm] Indonesian
economy forecast to grow by 6.2 % in 1st half /July 9, 2008)
Mulyani said that the inflation rate at the first semester was about 11.03 percent, rupiah exchange
rates against one U.S. dollar was at 9,261 and the oil lifting counted from December 2007 to May2008 was
on average of 937, 000 barrel per day. Indonesian Central Bank increased its interest rate by 25 basis point to
8.75 percent last week to cope with the high inflation pressure. The soaring global oil and food prices,
which have started to rise since at the beginning of this year, has put pressure on inflation in Indonesia.
The biggest Southeast Asia economy, Indonesia, revised up inflation target from 6.6 percent to 9.5
percent this year. The government raised oil prices by an average of 27.8 percent in May.
Indonesia's inflation accelerated to a 21-month high after the government increased fuel prices, stoking
speculation the central bank will raise its benchmark interest rate for a third straight month. Consumer
prices rose 11.03 percent in June from a year earlier, after gaining 10.4 percent in May, the Central
Statistics Bureau said in Jakarta today. The agency changed its base year to 2007 from 2002 for calculating
June's inflation. The increase in prices was less than the median 12.6 percent forecast in a Bloomberg News
survey of 20 economists, who used 2002 as the base year.
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Indonesia: The central bank will use the exchange rate and interest rates to slow inflation that is
running at the fastest pace in 21 months, Governor Boediono said. ``We will use all instruments'' to control
price pressures, Boediono said at the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club yesterday. The yield on the 9
percent bond maturing in September 2018 slid 21 basis
"In recent times, input costs have gone up, interest rates have gone up and investment demand is expected
to plateau. That's the reason we are seeing growth moderating." The poll showed that central banks in
seven economies, including China, Indonesia, the Philippines, India and Thailand, would raise interest
rates this year to tackle inflation.
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Rosser 7 (Andrew, political economist, worked for AusAID, consultant to the World Bank, the UK Department for
International Development, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Journal of Contemporary
Asia, Vol. 37)
In this context, Indonesia's rapid economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s seems remarkable. The
oil and gas sector accounted for as much as 80% of the country's total annual exports and 70% of the
central government's annual revenues during these decades (Rosser, 2002: 42-3). But, despite this
massive natural resource wealth, the country's economy grew strongly during the 1970s and 1980s. As Figure
1 shows, annual real economic growth was more or less consistently in the 6%-10% range each year
during the 1970s, except for a couple of years during the mid-1970s. During the 1980s, economic growth
was somewhat slower, due mainly to the contracting effects of the two-stage collapse of international oil
prices in 1981-82 and 1985-86, but was still strong overall. So strong was Indonesia's economic growth
during the 1970s and 1980s that by the early 1990s, the country had become widely regarded as one of
East Asia's so-called "miracle" economies (World Bank, 1993)
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Rosser 7 (Andrew, political economist, worked for AusAID, consultant to the World Bank, the UK Department for
International Development, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Journal of Contemporary
Asia, Vol. 37)
A second group of scholars has focused on the link between natural resource wealth and state capacity. They
have pointed to the economic problems of so-called "rentier" states--that is, states that receive regular
and substantial amounts of "unearned" income in the form of, for instance, taxes on natural resource
exports or royalties on natural resource production (Mahdavy, 1970; First, 1974; Skocpol, 1982; Beblawi,
1987; Luciani, 1987; Tanrer, 1990; Chaudhry, 1994; Vandewalle, 1998). These states, it is argued, tend to
develop greater capacity in distributive functions such as social welfare, education, and health and
productive functions than in functions related to the regulation and supervision of the economy and
domestic taxation because of the state's domination of the economy (Garaibeh, 1987; Chaudhry, 1994).
This in turn, it is suggested, reduces the potential for economic policy-making geared towards private
sector development. In this perspective, resource abundant countries are only likely to achieve
sustained rapid economic growth when state formation occurs prior to natural resource domination of
the economy. In these cases, it is suggested that state capacity is likely to be less skewed across the
different functions mentioned above, in turn facilitating the promotion of private sector development
(Karl, 1997; Vandewalle, 1998). For example, Karl (1997) has explained Indonesia's economic success
compared to other "petro-states" such as Nigeria and Venezuela in these terms.
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ANTARA News 8 (ANTARA is now trusted to be the president of the Organization of Asia-Pacific News
Agency http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2008/6/25/indonesian-government-more-efficient-less-corrupt-world-bank/)
A reform push by leaders in Indonesia has substantially improved the performance of government and
cut into corruption in Southeast Asia's largest economy, the World Bank said Wednesday. The bank's
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) report found governance had improved significantly in
Indonesia in the 10 years of "reformasi" since the 1998 ouster of dictator Suharto, a statement said. "The
progress is a reflection of a country whose political leaders, policymakers, civil society and private
sector view good governance and corruption control as crucial for sustained and shared growth," report
co-author Daniel Kaufmann was quoted by AFP as saying in the statement. "A decade into the reform era,
Indonesia bears all the hallmarks of a thriving democracy -- freedom of expression, freedom of
association, freedom of the press, and now freedom of public information," he said.
More ev…
NYT 5 (8-17)
Analysts also say that one of Mr. Yudhoyono's biggest obstacles remains getting the country's lumbering
bureaucracy to enact his policies. Yesterday, he reiterated his pledge to eradicate corruption and shake up the
government machinery. In addition to filing 233 lawsuits charging corruption, he said he would seek changes in
government salaries, professionalism, productivity and "the increase of discipline and work ethos."
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The Trumpet 98 ( the Philadelphia Trumpet newsmagazine analysis of recent global geopolitical, economic
events and trends http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?page=help&q=about )
Indonesia is an oil-rich group of islands stretching across Southeast Asia and Oceania. Notice what the May
18 WSJ reported: “Global commodity markets gyrated last week at the prospect of a top producer of
resources such as coffee and tin shutting down; shaky Korean and Japanese banks trembled at the
thought of further delays in restructuring the massive debts owed them by Indonesian companies; the
Australian dollar sank to a 12-year low, and Thailand’s Finance Minister warned that the unrest in
Indonesia could spark a fresh wave of selling in markets across the region. On Friday [May 15],
Standard & Poor’s downgraded the credit rating on an Indonesian bond rating to triple C-plus, a rating that
implies a default [or failure of the government to pay] is possible, from a more stable single B-minus. “While
the Indonesian unrest rocked global commodities markets, sending prices for resources such as coffee,
tin, palm oil and gold sharply higher on worries that supply from Indonesia would be cut off…a bigger
worry is that the collapse of the nation’s economic infrastructure—and the exodus of the ethnic
Chinese who dominate Southeast Asia’s economies—could make shipment and financing more
difficult.” The May 11 WSJ shed more light on Indonesia’s importance to the world when it reported, “The
stakes are huge, not only for Indonesia, but also for global commodity supplies…. In 1997, Indonesia
was Asia’s largest producer of natural gas, the world’s second-largest producer of crude palm oil, and
among the top five producers of coffee. It is also a major exporter of gold, tin, copper, cocoa and vanilla,
with the world’s largest single copper and gold mine operating on the island of Irian Jaya.”
The Trumpet 98 (the Philadelphia Trumpet newsmagazine analysis of recent global geopolitical, economic
events and trends http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?page=help&q=about )
In a tense reality check for world powers, it cannot help but be noticed that the present unrest in Indonesia
is once again threatening the “life line” of Asian nations: their oil supply. Is it possible that this
seemingly insignificant regional unrest has the potential to turn into another globe-spanning conflict?
Indonesia is a major producer of oil, with an OPEC production quota of 1.456 million barrels per day, a
large percentage of which goes to Japan. If anarchy collapses Indonesia into total chaos, you can bet
that Indonesia’s flow of oil to the world will cease. Of more concern, however, is the potential
disruption of oil from the Middle East brought about by control of the Indonesian shipping lanes.
Admiral Joseph Prueher, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, said this before a U.S. Senate hearing in
May 1998: “In addition to having a geo-strategic location along the Malacca Straits—through which
about 400 ships a week pass to go up to north Asia—[Indonesia] is the linchpin of…the Southeast
Asian nations.” Bilveer Singh, senior lecturer at the National University of Singapore, said, “In the present
economic circumstances, there’s every temptation to interception [piracy] in the hope of making your
millions. Oil tankers are protectionless. And if there are rogue elements from the [Indonesian] military
involved, then it’s a whole different story.” Indonesian society is in danger of completely unraveling, and
that could potentially mean heavily armed “rogue elements” breaking off from the Indonesian military to
threaten international shipping in the world’s busiest waterway, lying between Malaysia and Indonesia. In
that event, a large portion of world trade is at risk. In fact, over half of all international shipping
travels through Indonesian waters. U.S. warships in the Pacific even needed permission to cross
Indonesian waters to get to the Persian Gulf. Add to that the fact that Indonesia is the world’s largest
Islamic country and the fourth most populated nation.
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Economic collapse in Indonesia causes a shift in power to radical Islam which escalates
globally
The Trumpet 98 (the Philadelphia Trumpet newsmagazine analysis of recent global geopolitical, economic
events and trends http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?page=help&q=about )
Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has had only one change in leadership: when Suharto wrested control from President Sukarno. That upheaval in
1965 and 1966 claimed as many as 500,000 lives. “The
question now,” the May 19 WSJ asks, “is whether the anti-
Suharto movement, sparked by the discontent caused by the country’s economic crisis, will trigger a
similar convulsion…. The stage is set for a sharp new political confrontation in Indonesia.” Time
magazine of May 25 soberly stated, “It is a sad testament to the nature of power in Indonesia that the country
must again be brought to the brink of disaster before leadership can be transferred.” Even after
Suharto’s resignation, enormous forces of anarchy, especially radical Islam, remain active in the streets of
Indonesia, only awaiting a spark to re-ignite them. As witnessed in the mid-1960s, Indonesian-style
violence can be devastatingly destructive when it occurs. If Islamic fundamentalists succeed in stirring
up more trouble in Indonesia, the present volatility may lead to a global conflagration. Social unrest of
the kind recently incited in Indonesia can quickly lead to a change-over in leadership. The unseating of Suharto
may well have been only the first step in eventually empowering a leader steeped in Islamic fundamentalism. Time will tell if, in the absence of Suharto, a
close relationship forms between Indonesian leaders and Islamic militants. If it does, the world could be in for real trouble! (see sidebar, “King of the
Indonesia is like a ripe plum, just waiting to be picked and added to the radical Islamic
South,” p.23).
camp. The economic problems and social unrest are the perfect vehicle to vault a new leader into power.
The same thing happened to Germany in the 1930s. Hitler came to power through promises of social and economic reform.
Germany of the 1930s and Indonesia of the 1990s have many parallels: high unemployment, a vastly devalued currency and violent social unrest aimed at
wealthy minorities, to name a few. In the case of the king of the south, oil and water do mix: meaning, in part, control of the Indonesian waterways through
which perhaps one-half of the world’s commerce flows, and especially meaning the flow of Middle East oil through those perilous waters! Surely,
Indonesia must have the cross-hairs of radical Islam aimed squarely at it!
Kern 5 (Soeren Senior Analyst for Transatlantic Relations at the Strategic Studies Group
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zon
as_in/Cooperation+Developpment/ARI+8-2005)
Indonesia is also a front-line state in the global war on terrorism. With about 90% of its 240 million
people followers of Islam, Indonesia has more Muslims than all the Middle Eastern Arab states
combined. The vast majority of Indonesia’s Muslims have historically been noted for their moderation, and it is one of the few Muslim-majority
nations in which Islam is not the state religion. But it is also the heartland of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist movement, an al-Qaeda affiliate responsible for
the October 2002 bombings in Bali, the August 2003 attack on the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta’s financial district and the September 2004 car bombing of
the Australian Embassy, also in Jakarta. The US and Australia believe Indonesia
has the potential to be a global beacon of
moderate Islam, democracy and growth. But the country faces major problems: a complicated transition from authoritarian
rule to democracy; complex and politically sensitive economic problems left from the 1997-98 financial crisis; ethnic and sectarian
violence resulting in thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons; a significant increase in violence by radical
Muslims; and continued armed rebellion in Aceh.
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Rabasa and Haseman 2 (Angel Senior Policy Analyst, an expert in Regional security Colombia Latin America
South East Asia Indonesia John served with the US Army in Vietnam as a Military Intelligence Officer and Advisor
“STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR INDONESIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS”)
The “muddling through” scenario presented in the previous section should be considered to be among the better-case scenarios. The fragile economy and a
breakdown of order could generate more negative scenarios. One such negative scenario would be a
return to authoritarian rule. There are some powerful factors that militate against this outcome, at least in
the short term, including the backlash against Suharto’s 32-year rule, the emergence of new political and
civil society forces, and the discredit suffered by the military and the security services as a result of their association with the Suharto regime. Nevertheless, continued
inability of the new democratic institutions to deliver stability, competent government, and economic
growth could generate a demand for the return of a strong ruler. Any return to authoritarian rule must
have the backing of the military, but the military would prefer to stay in the background. Only a
catastrophic political collapse would compel the military to assume effective control of the government.
If that were to happen, the most likely model would be a military-technocratic government, with economic
policymaking in the hands of nonpolitical technocrats and eventual return to formal civilian control. A
second negative scenario could be an alliance of the military with political sectors, such as one or more
of the Islamic parties. That was the Pakistani model before September 11, when there was considerable
infiltration of the Pakistani government and the military by militant Islamic forces. Some secular
Indonesians are concerned that the “creeping Islamization” that the country is undergoing (see Scenario
4 later in this chapter) over time could make the Islamic parties an acceptable partner for the military or
a military faction. This scenario could precipitate the secession from Indonesia of areas in which Christians
are a majority or a substantial minority, or could result in civil war. A third version of the scenario might
be one that follows the “Burmese model.” As the name of this scenario suggests, it would constitute a
very repressive form of military rule in which the leaders try to isolate the country from Western
influences. This government would try to bring the press, political parties, and independent sectors of
society under its control and repress groups it considers subversive. This model of authoritarian government could come about if the
military were convinced that its institutional integrity or the country’s survival was at stake.
Ghoshal 4 (Baladas former Professor of Southeast Asia and South-West Pacific Studies and Chairman of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies at
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi “Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto Indonesia” )
Unless democratic processes and institutions quickly take root and deliver results, the pendulum may
swing back the other way. Without economic recovery, there will not be political stability, and some of
the provinces will become more restless. Without unity, the country will plunge into instability with
huge economic costs and this may reverse democratic reform. The challenge of democratic reform in Indonesia is not to
drift from one form of extremism to another, but to find the right balance for the coexistence of democracy with stability, devolution with unity, reform with
prosperity and freedom with peace. Indonesia
needs time to work out this delicate balance, but it is unwise for others
to push Indonesia too hard in this process.
Ghoshal 4 (Baladas former Professor of Southeast Asia and South-West Pacific Studies and Chairman of the Centre for South and
Southeast Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi “Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto
Indonesia” )
Unless democratic processes and institutions quickly take root and deliver results, the pendulum may
swing back the other way. Without economic recovery, there will not be political stability, and some of
the provinces will become more restless. Without unity, the country will plunge into instability with
huge economic costs and this may reverse democratic reform. The challenge of democratic reform in
Indonesia is not to drift from one form of extremism to another, but to find the right balance for the
coexistence of democracy with stability, devolution with unity, reform with prosperity and freedom with
peace. Indonesia needs time to work out this delicate balance, but it is unwise for others to push Indonesia
too hard in this process.
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Forrester 99 (Geoff, Asia & Associates Pty Ltd (GFA) is an Australian-based company specialising in political and
economic analysis of Indonesia http://books.google.com/books?id=7gr9Mi4CUAYC&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=
%22if+indonesia's+economy%22&source=web&ots=9qncEUHIPe&sig=SHlJ69itvpPU11FOQZjq6F8IZEY&hl=en&sa=X&oi=b
ook_result&resnum=4&ct=result)
‘Indonesia instead of becoming a strong sovereign country, will for many years be a beggar among the
nations – a grotesque outcome against what the military once set out to achieve.’ And yet he is optimistic. He
asserts that there is no ‘natural law’, no inexorable Javanese cultural logic that Indonesia can not establish a
genuinely democratic system. He expects democracy to prevail, in part because there is such a strong
yearning for it at all levels of Indonesian society, and in part because ABRI has acknowledged its past errors
and is now behaving with appropriate humility. He also asserts that the period of parliamentary democracy in
the 1950’s was not as bad as predicted by either President Sukarno or President Soeharto’s New Order.
Magnis-Suseno’s optimistic outlook has one proviso. He believes the economy is the deciding factor. … the
next ten months will be decisive. The greatest challenge does not lie in the political field. It is economics.
If Indonesia’s economy really breaks down, the establishment of democracy may remain a short
summer nights dream.
Economic stability is critical to Indonesian political stability and civilian military oversight
Rabasa and Haseman 2 (Angel Senior Policy Analyst, an expert in Regional security Colombia Latin America
South East Asia Indonesia John served with the US Army in Vietnam as a Military Intelligence Officer and Advisor
“STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR INDONESIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS”)
In the best-case scenario, Indonesia continues to develop along a secular, democratic trajectory, makes progress
in resolving some of the critical problems in the economy, and satisfies demands for provincial
autonomy without losing central control of its macroeconomic policy. In the area of civil-military
relations, there is more effective civilian control of the military through better oversight of military
affairs by the minister of defense and the parliament. If economic growth resumed and the necessary
resources became available, a greater proportion of the Indonesian military’s expenditures could be
funded from the state budget, rather than from off-budget sources. In the short term, it would be unrealistic to expect the military to
withdraw from its economic activities, but there could be greater transparency in the operation of military businesses. There would also be some movement
away from the territorial structure, beginning in areas where that structure is no longer needed, such as the island of Java.
Rabasa and Haseman 2 (Angel Senior Policy Analyst, an expert in Regional security Colombia Latin America
South East Asia Indonesia John served with the US Army in Vietnam as a Military Intelligence Officer and Advisor
“STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR INDONESIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS”)
This second scenario builds on trends that are already evident. Indonesia continues on a democratic
path, but fails to make meaningful progress on economic, political, and military reform. The structural
problems in the Indonesian economy are not addressed. Military reform comes to a halt after the
initial impetus for reform, which had been generated by domestic and international public pressure after the
fall of Suharto, slows down. The military is formally under civilian authority, but retains a decisive voice in
national security decision making. In this scenario, the government is not successful in negotiating a
political solution to the problem of separatism in Aceh and Papua and continues to resort to a “security
approach.” Jakarta has the military power to prevent the separatists from seriously threatening its control of
these provinces, but is obliged to mount costly counterinsurgency campaigns that overextend the military’s
resources. The pressure on the military inevitably leads to overreaction and human rights violations
which, in turn, generate criticism by human rights advocates and strain Jakarta’s relationship with the United
States and other Western countries. This scenario reflects the current situation in Indonesia and is
therefore the most relevant to current policymakers.
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Indonesian democracy up
Rabasa and Haseman 2 (Angel Senior Policy Analyst, an expert in Regional security Colombia Latin America
South East Asia Indonesia John served with the US Army in Vietnam as a Military Intelligence Officer and Advisor
“STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR INDONESIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS”)
Indonesia’s painful progress toward democracy—and the military’ssupport in this process—has created
opportunities for a closer rela-tionship between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries. This increasedinteraction
provides the United States with a foundation to helpshape the Indonesian military’s capability to deal
constructively withthe challenge of rebuilding civil-military relations based on demo-cratic principles.
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If we are serious about getting at the roots of international terrorism, we must get serious about
fostering development that gives people hope and dignity and improves the quality of their lives. That
requires dramatic improvements in governance, and these will not come without increased international
incentives and assistance. In real terms, levels of U.S. development assistance have fallen dramatically since
the 1970s and especially since the end of the last Cold War. It will not work to just throw money at the
problem in some new "Marshall Plan." No infusion of economic resources, no matter how massive and
sustained, will in itself generate development because the problem (unlike in Europe after World War II) is
not simply a lack of resources or functioning infrastructure. The problem is a more fundamental shortage:
of the institutions and norms of democracy and good governance. Unless we help to develop states that
collect taxes, limit corruption, control crime, enforce laws, secure property rights, provide education,
attract investment and answer to their own people, countries will not develop and the rage against the
West will not subside. This is why we must not only substantially increase our foreign assistance budget, but
also devote a much larger portion of that budget to democracy and good-governance programs (while
deploying more career aid officials with expertise in these fields).
This twisted logic resonates emotionally among large numbers of the one billion Muslims who stretch from
Morocco to Indonesia–and even some who live or reside in Europe and the United States. With time, force,
vigilance and some luck, we may substantially destroy and disrupt the existing global infrastructure of
terrorism. But no amount of military force, law enforcement vigilance and operational genius can
contain an army of suicide bombers that stretches endlessly across borders and over time. We must
ultimately undermine their capacity to recruit and indoctrinate new true believers. That requires
getting at the root factors that generate breeding grounds for terrorism. And one of the principal
factors is chronically bad governance.
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The policy response by the United States and other Western democracies to this scenario would almost
certainly be a call for a return to democratic rule. U.S. and other Western policymakers would want to
develop a package of incentives and sanctions to bring about a rapid return to civilian rule, but they
would be confronted with a dilemma. While the Indonesian military will have a decisive voice in
determining the pace and timing of a return to democratic government, U.S. domestic and international
pressures will drive the U.S. administration in the direction of sanctions and curtailment of ties with
the TNI.
Maintaining Indonesian security is key to avert a shift to radical Islam and authoritarian
rule which crushes relations with the U.S.
As the world's largest Muslim-majority country, Indonesia is a model for other Muslim countries
undergoing the transition to democracy. The International Republican Institute (IRI) has been working
with the people of Indonesia to advance their country's democratization since the fall of the Haji
Mohammad Suharto regime in 1998. IRI has worked to support the change to popular representation,
strengthen the country's electoral system, and train political parties to address the concerns of voters.
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Sisodia and Naidu 5 (N. S. Sisodia, G. V. C. Naidu, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
http://books.google.com/books?id=jSgfLG3Ib9wC&pg=PA58&lpg=PA58&dq=%22indonesia+is+critical%22&sour
ce=web&ots=lsgjv6Ww7j&sig=vfsMAiw_XMmJaNLmZwE9Jb_nFlw&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=10
&ct=result)
Given South East Asia’s position- straddling the sea lanes through which pass so much of the world’s
trade- the US is increasingly concerned about Maritime security in the region. Seven of the worlds 25
megaports are in Southeast Asia; two-thirds of the worlds liquefied natural gas passes through Southeast
Asian Seas; 600 vessels navigate the Strait of Malacca daily, carrying 25 % of world commerce and half
the worlds oil. The US has developed a range of policies- including the proliferation security initiative (PSI),
the container security initiative (CSI), and the regional Maritime security initiative (RMSI)- to help secure
maritime transit in the region. Success ultimately depends on cooperation and coordination with other
countries in the region. So far, the record is mixed. Indonesia is of particular importance in the region.
For long the anchor of ASEAN, political instability and drift in Jakarta have taken a toll on Indonesia
and all of Southeast Asia. Given its geographic position and stretch, stability in Indonesia is critical to
that of the region as a whole. A corner may have been turned with the election of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono as president in 2004, but his plans may yet be frustrated by political inexperience and determined
opposition.
Kern 5 (Soeren Senior Analyst for Transatlantic Relations at the Strategic Studies Group
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zon
as_in/Cooperation+Developpment/ARI+8-2005)
Indonesia is the linchpin to stability in South-East Asia. As the world’s fourth most populous nation,
the third largest democracy and the only Asian member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), Indonesia exercises major influence in the region and occupies some of the most
strategic real estate on earth. It has vast natural resources and is strategically located astride major sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Half of the world’s merchant
fleet capacity passes through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok; the straits also enable the US
to send warships from its Pacific Fleet by the shortest routes to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
Australia, Japan and the US also view Indonesia as a bulwark against Chinese expansionism in South-
East Asia. For example, Indonesia creates a strategic northern shield for Australia; any attack on the
Australian mainland would have to be staged through the Indonesian archipelago. And in case of a Taiwan
crisis, Indonesia can cut off China’s access to oil from the Persian Gulf, since 80% of China’s imported
oil passes through the Strait of Malacca. Moreover, Indonesia is the anchor of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a key player in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the only organisation in
the Asia-Pacific region that brings the US together with China, Japan and others to discuss security
issues. Indonesia also constitutes Australia’s largest and most immediate regional neighbour. Indeed,
Australian Defence Minister Richard Campbell Smith said a stable Indonesia is a ‘top national priority’.
Rabasa and Haseman 2 (Angel Senior Policy Analyst, an expert in Regional security Colombia Latin America
South East Asia Indonesia John served with the US Army in Vietnam as a Military Intelligence Officer and Advisor
“STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR INDONESIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS”)
Indonesia has been described as the least known of the world’s most important countries. Its
importance derives from well-known geopolitical factors. It is the world’s fourth most populous
country and the largest Muslim-majority country, with a population and a land mass almost as large as
those of the rest of Southeast Asia combined, vast natural resources and economic potential, and a
strategic location straddling critical sea lanes and straits—all of which makes it the key to Southeast
Asia’s security. A stable, strong, and democratic Indonesia could resume its leadership role in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), further regional integration based on democratic
principles, contribute to maintaining regional stability, and deter potential Chinese adventurism.
Conversely, an unstable or disintegrating Indonesia would make the regional security environment
more unpredictable and dangerous, create opportunities for forces seeking to subvert the regional
status quo, and generate large-scale humanitarian demands on the international community. Beyond that,
the outcome of Indonesia’s democratic experiment could have a major impact in shaping the political
evolution of Asia and of the larger Muslim world. If Indonesia’s democratic transition holds, it will be the
world’s third-largest democracy as well as the largest secular democracy in the Muslim world. This
transition could have enormously important global consequences. The future of Islam, some argue, will
not be decided in its Arab heartland with its authoritarian and intolerant models of governance, but in
countries such as Indonesia, where Islam has not jelled into a fundamentalist mold and where democracy
remains an attainable prospect.1
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Ogura and Oh 97 (Toshimaru and Ingayu, Professors of Economics, Monthly Review, April)
North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these
countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess
one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region – nuclear
annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing
importance in the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a
global conflagration.
Michael May, Professor of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford, Summer 1997, The Washington Quarterly
The unpalatable facts, to Europeans and North Americans, are that Asia has about half of the world's people,
that it is growing faster than other parts of the world, and that, by mid-century, it will probably have more than
half the population of the developed world and more than half of its money. Energy consumption, economic
influence, and military power will be distributed in proportion. That is the rosy scenario. The dark scenario is
that of a war that would, in all likelihood -- because nuclear weapons can be procured and deployed by any
of these countries at a fraction of the cost of peaceful development --leave most of the civilized world
devastated.
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Brown 3 (Colin, Professor of Asian Studies and Languages A SHORT HISTORY OF INDONESIA: THE
UNLIKELY NATION? p. 246)
The future of Indonesia remains, of course, unknown. The unity of the state is under greater challenge than at
any time since the regional rebellions of the 1950s. The country is clearly not well served by its current
leaders. Yet despite economic and political crises, for most Indonesians life goes on, despite the
maneuverings of those in positions of political leadership. Ultimately the future of the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’
will be determined by whether ordinary Indonesians feel sufficiently committed to the principles these terms
represent to be prepared to work to ensure that they remain alive. For all its faults, Indonesia still offers the
majority of its citizens a better and more enlightened future than any of its potential successor states
could offer. The break-up of the state would not only be a strategic disaster for the country's neighbors
in Southeast Asia, including Australia but, more importantly, it would be a human rights disaster for
its citizens, for no such break-up is likely to occur peacefully. But to survive the nation must adjust and
making those adjustments is the challenge now facing the national leadership. The next few years will show
how successful they are in meeting that challenge.
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***Indonesia Answers***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 206
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Indonesia Answers- Internal Link Turn: Dutch Disease
Indonesia is oil dependant and vulnerable to price shocks
Rosser 7 (Andrew, political economist, worked for AusAID, consultant to the World Bank, the UK Department for International
Development, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 37)
In explaining economic outcomes in resource abundant countries, many scholars, particularly those
operating from neoclassical/public choice or behaviouralist perspectives, have focused on the extent to
which policy elites in these countries have been guided by economic rationality in their policy-making
decisions. Mitra (1994) and Krause (1995), for instance, have argued that one of the main reasons why
resource abundant countries have performed less well in economic terms than resource poor countries
is that resource booms have often caused policy elites in the former set of countries to become myopic,
slothful, and/or over-exuberant (Ross, 1999: 309). Other scholars have suggested that this difference in
economic performance has stemmed mainly from the effect of resource booms on policy elites'
propensity to engage in rent-seeking behaviour. Ross (2001), for instance, has argued that resource
booms in Indonesia and Malaysia during the 1970s created severe economic problems because they
encouraged political and bureaucratic elites to either directly seize the rents created by these booms or
try to gain control over the right to allocate them rather than invest them productively. Conversely, Prawiro
(1998) has explained Indonesia's success in overcoming the resource curse during the 1970s and early 1980s in terms of the strong influence of technocratic
ministers over economic policy, particularly macroeconomic and fiscal policy. As he puts it, this period saw the "relinquishing of the extreme, emotion-
charged focus on ideology [of the previous regime] for a more detached, analytical, and flexible approach based on pragmatism" (Prawiro, 1998: 87-8).
Corruption in Indonesia means the country does not benefit form oil revenues
NYT 5 (8-17)
Indonesia's oil troubles are coming home to roost, posing a growing challenge to President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono's ability to maintain economic stability.
A Pertamina oil exploration site in Indonesia. Turmoil and red tape have helped turn the country into a net oil
importer, despite its reserves. Indonesia is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries, and oil and natural gas are among the country's largest sources of export revenue. But red tape,
legal uncertainty and past political turmoil have turned Indonesia into a net oil importer, and companies have
shied away from investing in new oil wells or refineries. At $65 a barrel, oil has become as big a threat to
Indonesia's economic health as it is to that of the United States or Europe.
Analysts are increasingly divided as to whether Mr. Yudhoyono will be able to keep Indonesia on course or
whether oil prices will join the list of calamities buffeting the country, including terrorist attacks, the
December tsunami, bird flu, the reappearance of polio and spreading forest fires that have sent a pall of acrid
haze across Southeast Asia in the last two weeks.
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Koh and Wilcove 8 (Lian Pin Postdoctoral Research Fellow at ETH Zurich David S. Professor of Ecology and
Evolutionary Biology and Public Affairs Princeton University http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0520-palm_oil.html)
More than half of the oil palm expansion between 1990 and 2005 in Malaysia and Indonesia occurred at
expense of forests, reports a new analysis published in the journal Conservation Letters. The conversion
had a "detrimental" impact on regional biodiversity say the authors. Analyzing data from the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization, Lian Pin Koh and David S. Wilcove of Princeton University found that 55-59 percent of oil palm expansion in
Malaysia and at least 56 percent of that in Indonesia occurred at the expense of forests. Given that oil palm plantations are biologically
impoverished relative to primary and secondary forests, the researchers recommend restricting future expansion to pre-existing cropland
and degraded habitats. In recent years Malaysia and Indonesia have rapidly expanded the area of land devoted to oil
palm cultivation: between 1990 and 2005 the area of oil palm plantations in Malaysia more than doubled to
3.6 million ha; in Indonesia the area planted with palm expanded by more than 270 percent to 4.1 million
ha. At the same time Indonesia's forest cover declined by 28 million ha, while Malaysia lost some 1.5 million ha. Koh
and Wilcove calculate that at least 1.704 million ha of forest land in Indonesia and 1.04 million ha in Malaysia were converted for the
oilseed during the period. "Our analysis indicates that oil palm plantations in Malaysia and Indonesia have replaced
forests and, to a lesser extent, pre-existing cropland," the authors write. Using data on birds and butterflies showing that conversion of forest
to oil palm produces steep declines in species richness, Koh and Wilcove say the expansion of the oil palm estate in Malaysia
and Indonesia negatively affected regional biodiversity. Noting that demand for palm oil is expected to
increase dramatically in coming years, the authors suggest future oil palm expansion be limited to lands
that have already been converted for agriculture or are otherwise heavily degraded. Even logged forests — which support considerably higher levels of
biological diversity than plantations — should be off-limits to oil palm development, they conclude.
Rabasa and Haseman 2 (Angel Senior Policy Analyst, an expert in Regional security Colombia Latin America
South East Asia Indonesia John served with the US Army in Vietnam as a Military Intelligence Officer and Advisor
“STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR INDONESIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS”)
Although Indonesia’s future is highly uncertain, several conditions can be expected to hold for the next
several years: First, a sustained economic recovery is not on the horizon. Although the economy (i.e., the
GDP) grew at a rate of 3.5 percent in 2001, the underlying causes of the country’s economic weakness—
large private and public debt and the insolvency of much of the corporate and banking sectors—
remain unresolved. Second, the political system will remain under stress. The Megawati government has
been unable to make headway on economic reform or to show much administrative competency, but the
opposition parties have yet to develop any coherent strategies for governing the country. The
decentralization process, if not properly managed, has the potential to be greatly destabilizing. Third, the
issue of the role of Islam in politics—which, as already noted in this report, goes back to the fundamental
question of the nature of the Indonesian state—will continue to be a divisive issue and could have
significant impact on the 2004 and subsequent elections. Will Megawati, if she is reelected, continue to be
dependent on the Muslim political parties for her parliamentary majority? If the Golkar organization (the
political instrument of the New Order, which has been trying to recreate itself as a viable post-Suharto party)
collapses, will Islam form the basis for a new political bloc?
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Rabasa and Haseman 2 (Angel Senior Policy Analyst, an expert in Regional security Colombia Latin America
South East Asia Indonesia John served with the US Army in Vietnam as a Military Intelligence Officer and Advisor
“STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR INDONESIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS”)
The “muddling through” scenario presented in the previous section should be considered to be among the
better-case scenarios. The fragile economy and a breakdown of order could generate morenegative scenarios.
One such negative scenario would be a return to authoritarian rule. There are some powerful factors that
militate against this outcome, at least in the short term, including the back-lash against Suharto’s 32-
year rule, the emergence of new political and civil society forces, and the discredit suffered by the
military and the security services as a result of their association with the Suharto regime. Nevertheless,
continued inability of the new democratic in-stitutions to deliver stability, competent government, and
economic growth could generate a demand for the return of a strong ruler.
No radical take-over
Rabasa and Haseman 2 (Angel Senior Policy Analyst, an expert in Regional security Colombia Latin America
South East Asia Indonesia John served with the US Army in Vietnam as a Military Intelligence Officer and Advisor
“STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR INDONESIA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS”)
A radical Islamic takeover is possible, but should be considered a low-probability scenario at this stage. It
would be opposed by secularists in the political establishment and in the military and probably by most
Indonesian Muslims themselves, the vast majority of whom are moderate and do not support the radicals’
agenda. However, progressive Islamization—defined as increased influence of Islam in politics and more
overt manifestations of religiosity in public behavior—would be entirely possible.
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While threatening the integrity of universal values, the campaign to spread democracy will not succeed.
The 20th century demonstrated that states could not simply remake the world or abbreviate historical
transformations. Nor can they easily effect social change by transferring institutions across borders.
Even within the ranks of territorial nation-states, the conditions for effective democratic government are
rare: an existing state enjoying legitimacy, consent, and the ability to mediate conflicts between domestic
groups. Without such consensus, there is no single sovereign people and therefore no legitimacy for
arithmetical majorities. When this consensus – be it religious, ethnic, or both – is absent, democracy has
been suspended (as is the case with democratic institutions in Northern Ireland), the state has split (as in
Czechoslovakia), or society has descended into permanent civil war (as in Sri Lanka). "Spreading
democracy" aggravated ethnic conflict and produced the disintegration of states in multinational and
multicommunal regions after both 1918 and 1989, a bleak prospect.