Aff Consultation CP
Aff Consultation CP
Aff Consultation CP
Michigan 2011
Index
***DISADS to Consultation
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 3/182 out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's unipolar power. Warm feelings are a distant third. After the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism at home, and this was under an American administration that was obsessively multilateralist and accommodating. Yet today, under the most unilateralist American administration in memory, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not the result of a sudden attack of Yemeni goodwill, or of a quick re-reading of the Federalist Papers. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of recalcitrant states on the price of non-cooperation. Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand; they are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What even pragmatic realists fail to understand is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. It was when the first President Bush said that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would not stand, and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that he created the Gulf War coalition. Extinction Khalilzad, Rand Corporation 95 (Zalmay Khalilzad, Spring 1995. RAND Corporation. Losing the Moment? The Washington Quarterly 18.2, Lexis.) Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 5/182 Americans still hold their fate in their hands, and there is no real reason to bet against us. We will once again confirm Churchill's observation that "you can always count on the Americans to do the right thingafter they've tried everything else." Here is more evidence that giving a veto will wreck U.S. leadership Krauthammer, 4 (Charles, Washington Post columnist, A President of Consequence, Hoover Digest, no. 3, http://www.hooverdigest.org/043/krauthammer.html) But the larger issue is that the Democrats simply have nothing positive to offer in the war on terror or the situation in Iraq. Yes, they offer a critique of Iraq. But when you ask them what they would do otherwise, they have nothing to say. They say internationalize as if that is a panacea. Of course we would like the French and the Germans to be in Iraqwe could use their helpbut there is no formula. There are governments who opposed our policy on principle and would not support us then and will not support us now. The idea that somehow we have rejected the United Nations is absurd. The wonderful Portuguese U.N. civil servant Sergio Vieira de Mello was running an extremely successful program in Baghdad, but, when its compound was attacked by a bomb in August 2003, the United Nations ran away. Now you can defend or attack the U.N. decision, but it had nothing to do with American unilateralism. We wanted U.N. support, but it would not stay in an insecure situation. We are now getting some U.N. support again, and I think it is going to help us. But internationalizing the war on terror means nothing, or it means acquiescing to the United Nations and allowing our policy to be driven by the veto of the French or the Russians or the Chinese or others. That is not a policy. And it will never sell with Americans, who do not like the idea of American foreign policy, particularly the defense of our country in the war on terror, being handed over to the cynics at the Quai dOrsay. Consultation fails and leads to war- 3,000 years of realism prove Thornton, 10 PhD (4/21, Bruce, Hoover Institute, Covenants without Swords? http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/5303, mat) President Obama has been fulfilling his campaign promise to restore diplomacy, including engagement with our enemies, to American foreign policy. His overtures to Cuba, Venezuela, and particularly Iran, along with his well-received meetings with our allies in Europe and his outreach to Russia, reflect his aim to reinvigorate Americas position in the world by returning to the multilateralism, reliance on transnational institutions such as the United Nations, and diplomatic discussion and negotiation presumably neglected by his predecessor, whose unilateralist penchant for using force entangled the United States in a brutal war, alienated our allies, and tarnished our global reputation. This belief in the power of diplomatic engagement to defuse crises and resolve conflicts without the use of force reflects Western ideals that since the Enlightenment have shaped notions about interstate relations. These ideals assume that human nature and civilization are progressing away from the violence and disorder fostered by irrational superstitions, such as ethnic, religious, or nationalist loyalties, to a world in which the essential rationality of human nature will be liberated and thus able to create a more stable and just universal social and political order. This ideal further assumes that there is a global harmony of interests because all peoples desire the same ends as Westerners: peace, prosperity, and political freedom. Once alerted to these true interests, all peoples will realize that these goods can be best obtained not by force and the pursuit of parochial national interests but by networks of interstate agreements that adjudicate disputes rationally and subject the behavior of nations to clearly defined international rules and protocols enforced by transnational organizations, thus creating the order in which peace and prosperity flourish. Then war will give way to diplomacy: rational discussion, negotiation, respect and tolerance for the other sides demands, and a mutual desire to adjudicate grievances without the destruction and suffering that attend the use of force. A belief in the power of diplomatic engagement to defuse crises and resolve conflicts without force reflects Enlightenment ideals that have long shaped notions about interstate relations. Ever since Immanuel Kants influential 1795 essay Perpetual Peace, the years have seen numerous attempts to realize these ideals, whether through international agreements such as the Geneva and Hague Conventions or institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Insofar as it has a foreign policy, the European Union embraces this Kantian ideal predicated on supranational constraints on unilateral policies and the progressive development of community norms, as Oxford Universitys Kalypso Nicolaidis describes it. The goal is to create a security
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 6/182 community that favors civilian forms of influence and action over the use of force and whose guiding principles will be integration, prevention, mediation, and persuasion. For the past several U.S. presidential elections, this has also been the philosophy of the Democratic Party, one being put into practice by Obama, which explains in part why European leaders have welcomed him so warmly. This idealistic internationalism could be tested empirically by examining the historical record of the past hundred years or the achievements of institutions such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, and various other intergovernmental agencies. By this test, these ideals have been a failure, given that in the twentieth century 200 million people were killed by war, genocide, civil war, gulags, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, and various other forms of state violence and interstate conflict. The League of Nations and later the United Nations were able to prevent none of those deaths and in some instancesKosovo and Rwanda, for exampleinadvertently facilitated them. More important, however, is a critique of the underlying philosophy on which this ideal, which we can call utopian internationalism, is based. HISTORY TAKES A HARDER VIEW First, the Enlightenment view of human nature as rational and peace lovingonce it is liberated from unjust social, economic, and political ordersis hard to support from history, which, as Edward Gibbon said, is little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind. On this point, the Greek historian Thucydides was closer to the actual behavior of people and states. In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides highlighted the perennial power of the irrational in human behavior, the force of appetite, passion, fear, pleasure, violence, and the desire for honor that drives human action, particularly at those times of disorder and danger when human nature, always rebelling against the law and now its master, gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice, and the enemy of all superiority, writing of the many revolutions that erupted in the Greek city-states during the war. In this view, which we can call tragic realism, human reason not only will not control the imperious necessities, as Thucydides called them, but instead will be used to achieve those irrational and destructive aims. The sources of conflict, then, will be found in an irrational human nature, constant over time and space, rather than in environmental or other material causes, which will merely supply the occasion for the human passions and appetites to be manifested. In a speech to the Corinthians and Spartans right before the outbreak of the war, the Athenian ambassador identifies these causes of war: fear, honor, and interest, all three reflecting the irrational springs of human behavior. It follows, the Athenian ambassador says, that it was not a very remarkable action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. In the past century, 200 million people were killed by war, genocide, civil war, gulags, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, and various other forms of state violence and interstate conflict. Neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations could prevent this. Of course, various idealistic pretexts such as peace or justice will frequently be brought forward as motives for actions, but these will often be camouflage or rationalizations for advancing a states interests, to be abandoned once such ideals will not serve that purpose. Moreover, because interests will necessarily collide and the goods that states desire will differ, ultimately force or the credible threat of force will be the only way to settle these conflicts. Thus, as Platos Cleinias puts it in the Laws, peace is only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other. Thucydides analysis of the origins of conflict in the eternal verities of human nature, and in state behavior motivated by fear, conflicting interests, or ideologies like honor, suggests that the rational argument and negotiation of diplomacy, based on an assumed harmony of interests, are unlikely alone to resolve or deter conflict and often will provide either pretexts by which interests are advanced and aggression pursued or the excuses for inaction for those not disposed, whether through fear or interest, to resist the aggressor. For example, an aggressor for his own ends can manipulate this process of negotiation, meetings, summits, and so on to buy time or camouflage his true intent. History is filled with examples of this manipulation of diplomacy, the most notorious being Adolf Hitlers negotiations at Munich in September 1938, when the French and British betrayed Czechoslovakia on the pretext that Hitler was concerned with the plight of the Sudeten Germans and that negotiating a settlement to that problem would defuse the crisis, a goal they assumed Hitler shared. Of course, Hitlers true aim was dismantling the Versailles Treatys eastern settlement by destroying Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. More recently, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has for several decades been the subject of numerous summits, meetings, agreements, special envoys, road maps, and other diplomatic devices meant to resolve that conflict, all on the assumption that a critical mass of Palestinian Arabs desire a national homeland in which they can live in peace, and that they will negotiate in good faith to achieve that end. More evidence exists, however, that the destruction of Israel for religious and revanchist motives is the real aim, one that force has three times failed to achieve. Thus diplomacy becomes a
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 7/182 tactic for buying time and camouflaging this motive until changing circumstances allow for the destruction of Israel to be pursued openly. As Platos Cleinias puts it, peace is only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other. Likewise, Saddam Hussein spent twelve years manipulating the UN inspection regime, hoping that in time the public relations nightmare of the sanctions, the loss of American political will, and France and Russias desire to do business with him would end both the sanctions and the inspections, an outcome prevented only by the U.S. invasion. And, for almost two decades, North Korea played the diplomatic game with the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency until it acquired nuclear weapons, reaping along the way billions in aid from the West. Finally, history shows that a state faced with an aggressor but unwilling to confront him, whether because of fear, internal political constraints, or its own national interests, will use diplomacy to create the impression that something is being done, substituting words for deeds. This is particularly important in democratic states, where transient public opinion puts enormous pressure on elected officials. A multinational organization such as the United Nations, then, serves as the photogenic locus of debate, inquiry, resolutions, and other verbal camouflage for the inability or unwillingness to act, becoming what Winston Churchill warned against in 1946: a cockpit in the Tower of Babel. DIPLOMACY AS CAMOUFLAGE If Thucydides is correct about human nature and state behavior as at some level expressions of powerful irrational desires or national interests, then diplomacy will be a tool for states to achieve those interests when they lack the hard power of force or are unwilling to use it. This explains, as Robert Kagan suggests, the European praise of soft power such as diplomacy, given that their militaries are puny and find it difficult to project force beyond their own borders. The European delight with Obamas return to diplomacy, then, partly reflects the perception that he will subordinate Americas interests to those of the imagined world community. But in the end, the threat of force has to exist somewhere in the world community to punish or pressure those states that are pursuing interests counter to the interests of other states. A state faced with an aggressor, but unwilling to confront him, will use diplomacy to create the impression that something is being done. Irans pursuit of nuclear weapons is likely to be the most important test of Obamas foreign policy philosophy. A nuclear-armed Iran would significantly reorder the balance of power in the Middle East, most likely touching off more proliferation as states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt strive to keep up with Iran. So far, under both the Bush and the Obama administrations, multilateral diplomacy has attempted to deter Irans ambitions or at least through sanctions coerce it into allowing inspectors to determine the extent of its nuclear program. These attempts have failed, despite Obamas willingness to talk directly with Iran to negotiate a settlement. And the reason for that failure confirms Thucydides analysis: it simply is not in Russias or Chinas economic and geopolitical interests to impose on Iran sanctions tough enough to induce the regime to change its behavior. And with force pretty clearly off the tableexcept for a veiled threat of an attack from Israelit is hard to see what the West can offer Iran that would offset the enormous gain in power and prestige that nuclear weapons would confer. In the future, we are likely to see a face-saving settlement negotiated in which Iran possesses nuclear latency, the ability to create a bomb when it needs to, while the West can assert that it has kept the bomb out of Irans hands. Obviously, such a settlement merely kicks down the road all the problems of nuclear capability in the hands of an autocratic, religiously fanatic regime whose president has expressed his desire to wipe Israel off the map. In the end, such a settlement would resemble the Munich agreement, which merely postponed Hitlers aggression and world war for a year. In the end, the threat of force has to exist somewhere in the world community to punish or pressure those states that are pursuing interests counter to the interests of other states. Thucydides insights on human nature suggest that Obamas claims to resolve conflicts through diplomatic negotiations, absent a credible threat of force, are dubious at best. Interest, fear, passionately held ideas such as honor or religious faith will trump any rational calculation or appeals to abstract standards of justice or equity, which will then become, like the process of negotiation and deliberation, mere pretexts or camouflage for the pursuit of aggression. As Thomas Hobbes, the first translator of Thucydides into English, has written, For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all. Consult kills hege, which is key to solve global wars Rabkin 2007 (Jeremy, Heritage Formation, JEREMY RABKIN is a Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law. Before joining the faculty in June 2007, he was a Professor of Government at Cornell University for 27 years. Professor Rabkin is a renowned scholar in international law and was recently
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 8/182 confirmed by the U.S. Senate as a member of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace. He holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Government at Harvard University and graduated Summa Cum Laude with a B.A. from Cornell University, The Meaning of Sovereignty: What Our Founding Fathers Could Tell UsAbout Current Events, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/05/the-meaning-of-sovereigntywhat-our-founding-fathers-could-tell-us-about-current-events, Hemanth) Sovereignty Before Our Eyes Many questions about our experience in Iraq will be disputed for years to come. Some will even deserve to be. No close study is required to affirm some basic lessons, however. The most important lessons are visible right on the surface of events. Three, in particular, deserve emphasis. First, people around the world think there are rules that govern the relations of one nation with another-but disagree about what they are or about when and how they apply. This was the obvious lesson from the months of debate that preceded the American-led invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003. The U.N. Security Council was prepared to agree that Saddam's government had failed in its obligation to cooperate with international inspectors and account for weapons of mass destruction. The council was prepared to agree that sanctions should be maintained, limiting Iraq's ability to convert oil revenue into new weapons programs. The council was not able to agree that the proper next step was a military invasion. Still, some three dozen nations, including Britain, Australia, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and others, did ultimately contribute to the U.S.-led coalition that toppled Saddam's government. The debate which started then has continued, and in some ways has intensified, in the years since. We have learned-or have been reminded-that many people around the world look at the United States with fear, suspicion, or resentment and readily attribute the darkest motives to American actions; but we have also seen much indignation among peoples who, before the war, were not so inclined to anti-American feeling. Meanwhile, for all the indignation expressed in so many countries in Europe and elsewhere, we did not see any serious movement toward a gathering of disapproving governments and peoples into an ongoing anti-American coalition. Nor did countries previously allied with the U.S., such as NATO partners in Europe, show any disposition to build up their own military capabilities as a counter to American power. Many people are angry about the American effort in Iraq, not because they regard America as a relentless and remorseless aggressor in the world, but precisely because they do think the United States has committed itself to live by established rules and then violated those rules in Iraq. Nobody seriously expected that the United States would follow up its invasion of Iraq with an invasion of Canada, but much of the worldperhaps most of the world-was not satisfied that war against Saddam was justified in the spring of 2003. I do not want to rehash the contending arguments but simply to emphasize the underlying lesson of the debate. Most people think it is wrong to invade and overthrow another government except under very unique and special circumstances. Most Americans, even most American government officials, hold the same view. There are supposed to be limits, but we disagree about what they are or where they apply. Even in Europe, most people do not imagine that these limits can be settled by a majority vote of all nations, large and small, advanced and backward: one nation, one vote. Even in Europe, most people do not hold seriously to the idea that the U.N. Security Council must decide every disputed case. So, for example, the NATO war against Serbia in the late 1990s was not rejected in European opinion even though it was not authorized by the Security Council. It matters that most people think there are limits on what one nation may do to impose its will on another, even the most powerful in dealing with the weakest. It matters because it shows that most people do not think international politics is simply a jungle of predators with no serious possibility for cooperation or the opportunity to differ in peace. And people are right to reject this vision because much experience goes against it. We do see that most countries live at peace with most others, most of the time. War is exceptional, while cooperation-in trade, in travel, in cultural and scientific exchange-is pervasive. So most of the world thinks there are limits on when and how even powerful states can impose their will on others. But at the margin, when it comes to hard cases like Saddam's, there are differences, and there is no accepted international method for resolving these differences. Hence, in the extreme situations, which may be rare but still carry enduring consequences, nations must decide for themselves. In other words, the fundamental fact about international affairs is the sovereignty of nations. Sovereignty is not in opposition to rules or norms in international affairs. To the contrary, to claim sovereignty is to claim a recognized status among nations, whose rightful prerogatives are more or less defined by existing rules of international conduct. Sovereign states are bound by rules in their mutual dealing. That is what makes it possible for distinct sovereignties to coexist rather than have all fall under the sway of one or two great empires. But nations may disagree about particular applications of the general rules and insist on their right to act on their own views. They may insist, that is, on their sovereign rights. We have learned a closely related lesson from more recent experience:The community of nations is not
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 9/182 a very strong or reliable community. We can see this point much more clearly from what happened after the war against Saddam. In the summer of 2004, all members of the Security Council put aside their previous disagreements about the appropriateness of the initial invasion. With Saddam gone, with Iraqis working to establish a new government, all agreed that the new government deserved international assistance. The council called on all U.N. member states to provide what help they could to the struggling new government. Despite this call from the Security Council, however, few nations offered much assistance, apart from those already contributing to the original coalition. Germany's offer was so grudging and qualified-it would train Iraqi police but not in Iraq, nor even in the Middle East-that it was rejected out of hand by Iraq's new government. The paucity of international assistance is all the more striking because no government in the world openly embraced the shadowy terrorist groups already starting up a very nasty insurgency against the new government in Iraq. Certainly no Western government wanted terrorists to prevail in Iraq. Not even Russia and China can have wished success to the insurgency, since they faced their own long-term threats from Islamist terrorist groups who would likely be energized by terrorist victories in Iraq. But deepening crisis in Iraq did not prompt governments outside the initial coalition to step forward with offers of significant assistance, let alone with additional troops. Governments around the world looked on the war as controversial because the initial decision to intervene remained controversial. It might be a bad thing for Iraq to fall into chaos, but few governments were prepared to take serious action to avert this bad result. It was easier to leave the burden of defending the new Iraqi government to the United States and its original allies. A resolution of the Security Council could not, by itself, mobilize commitments to act in a serious way. In other words, international machinery for consultation and coordination-which is what the U.N., at its best, can afford-is no substitute for actual powers to legislate and enforce new laws, to raise revenue by taxation, to raise and deploy armies. International machinery is no substitute for sovereignty. So violence escalated in Iraq. It continued to escalate even as Iraqis voted for an interim government, voted in larger numbers to ratify a new constitution, voted in still larger numbers for parliamentary parties which then negotiated a broad coalition government. This experience shouts the final lesson: Sovereignty is not merely a legal construction, conferred by legal resolution and recast to suit outside preferences. Sovereignty means effective governing capacity and is crucial for decent life in the modern world. So it was one thing for the Security Council or the United States to affirm the "sovereignty" of the new government in Iraq. It was something else again for all Iraqis to accept the new government's authority. If the new government could not protect its people, it could not demand their obedience to its laws or their cooperation with its policies. Iraqis sought safety in the tribe, the sect, the local strongman, or the charismatic chieftain. In retrospect, we should not be surprised that a government which lacked effective military and police forces was not able to command respect and that people gravitated to loyalties or hopes that seemed more substantial or reliable. The historic purpose of national sovereignty was to put a check on such impulses, to tame the force of local, ethnic, or sectarian loyalties. When there is not an effective sovereign authority, these latent loyalties reassert their claims, as in the violent past. Without the restraining force of established sovereignty, the result is wretchedness. International endorsements are no substitute for sovereignty. Democratic elections are no substitute for sovereignty. A free press-which Iraq has indeed developed-is no substitute for sovereignty. Nor are formal guarantees of religious freedom, which the new Iraq also has. All of these are fine things, as are free exchange of goods and services and openness to trade and exchange with the outside world, which Iraqi law now also permits. The law does not mean much because the government lacks power to enforce it or ensure protection for those who obey it. Without a secure sovereignty, the benefits of freedom-the free practice of religion, of commerce, of inquiry and debate-cannot be enjoyed. It is all so very obvious. Why don't critics see this? What critics emphasize, instead, is the failure of "unilateralism"-that is, the futility of sovereignty. Multilateral Blinders Opposition to the American-led effort in Iraq traces back, of course, to the way the war began. Critics, especially in Europe, rallied to the claim that war against Saddam's government could be lawful and legitimate only if authorized by the Security Council and that, since war was not explicitly authorized, it was indeed unlawful. Lacking the endorsement of all major powers, the war was, in essence, "unilateral"-at least as critics depicted it. "Unilateral" efforts, as they are morally questionable, do not deserve to succeed. Subsequent developments in Iraq, in all their tragedy and misery, should have been expected, say critics. It is surely not hard to resist such claims if one has a mind to do so. They do not express a serious argument so much as an amorphous climate of opinion. Was the war against the Serb government of Milosevic in the late 1990s bound to fail because it was not authorized by the Security Council? Were the entirely unilateral American interventions in Panama in the early 1990s and Grenada in the late 1980s bound to fail because they were so entirely unilateral? What magic is there in U.N. endorsements, anyway? The war in Afghanistan had full U.N. approval from the outset, but the
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 10/182 Taliban continues to recover strength because very few countries have been prepared to offer actual fighting forces to shore up the new Afghani government. The Security Council insists that Iran must not continue its nuclear program without international safeguards and inspections. There is no indication that the government in Tehran is in any way impressed by the force of these impeccably multilateral admonitions. People who insist that "unilateral" ventures are bound to fail must suppose that the world has been transformed in some way at least since the time when wars, even major wars, could be won without full international endorsement for one side in the conflict. Those who insist that the age of sovereignty is behind us can say-as they have, quite insistently, since the early 1990s-that international politics is no longer restricted to sovereign states. True, we now have intergovernmental organizations, starting with the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the European Union and NAFTA, and a whole catalog of smaller or more specialized organizations. We have an even larger stock of nongovernmental organizations which are internationally active, including major churches and religious organizations, relief organizations like Doctors Without Borders or the International Red Cross, and advocacy groups like Amnesty International. And of course there are transnational corporations-oil companies, manufacturing firms, transportation and communication companies, etc. The more sober economic historians caution that our era is not, by many measures, more "global" in its trade and investment patterns than the era before the First World War.[2] Influential "nongovernmental organizations" are not a novelty of our times, either, as the history of religion will confirm.[3] But we can stipulate that international communication, among nongovernmental entities as well as governments, is wider and deeper than ever before. That stipulation will still not bring us within range of the conclusion that critics of "sovereignty" embrace. The world is richer than ever before, and more people have more time for political and even international engagement than ever before. What follows? Do they all agree? Do transnational oil companies agree with international environmental advocacy organizations just because they both operate in many countries? Does al-Qaeda agree much with the Roman Catholic Church just because both are international and nongovernmental? When they disagree, who decides what law is binding in what territory? It simply does not follow that because international civil society is deeper, national sovereignty is less relevant. Even if many differences are worn away by increasing international contacts, new ones appear. Within the United States, Americans have more opportunity to communicate with each other than ever before, with cell phones that can transmit pictures and Internet technology that can make video segments available at all hours to everyone. Is the country more united than it was 60 years ago? To imagine that increasing international contact will lead to increasing consensus, you have to embrace an additional premise: that fundamental differences are illusory, or at least that they are on their way to disappearing. You must assume that we can talk our way through all conflicts or evolve our way past them. You must assume that with patience and goodwill, we can continue talking and negotiating until we will finally recognize that our conflicts were rooted in misunderstanding, so conflict can give way to a new and broader consensus. Sovereignty is a way of constraining conflict. It presupposes the ongoing potential for conflict. That is not necessarily a tragic thought: Conflict need not result in actual war; actual wars may be relatively brief; longer and harder wars may still be won. Still, to insist on sovereignty is to insist on the continuing relevance of security concerns, since providing security is the core purpose of sovereignty. At home, a sovereign state tries to reduce conflict by offering protection to citizens of varied views. Abroad, a sovereign state may hope to secure peace by demonstrating its willingness and capacity to use force to redress injury or forestall threats. But both at home and abroad, it is the potential for conflict which makes sovereignty seem necessary. The modern world is filled with dreamers who envision a world in which even the possibility of conflict has vanished. Not all of these dreams are sentimental. Jihadist terrorist networks also look to a future of universal peace and harmony-under a single religious authority in an Islamicized world. At some level, the vision is not all that different from that which inspired Communists through much of the 20th century. And many Communist formations were also nongovernmental and transnational. It should not surprise us that heirs to the Communist or extreme left vision of globalism now make common cause with Islamist transnationalism on many issues and in many forums. They have many of the same hatreds-for example, of commerce, of freedom, of differing faiths, and the constitutional democracies in which these are all protected. The soft vision of peaceful evolution toward global consensus certainly differs from such brutal dreams of world unity by world conquest. Yet these visions share, at least, a common premise: that differences will be overcome in the course of history or that the movement of history is already, in some way, assured. Those who see the world moving toward peaceful consensus ought to be strongly opposed to those who advocate unification by violence. Yet, in practice, countries that are the most insistent about respecting the authority of the United Nations have been notably reluctant to see U.N. authority invoked against terrorist violence or jihadism. So, years after the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. has still been unable to
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 11/182 agree on a definition of "terrorism," in part because too many governments fear to insist on a definition which would force them to take sides in ongoing controversies. The government of Iran, one of the leading sponsors of terrorism, has defied international controls on nuclear weapons technology, but the Security Council cannot agree on meaningful sanctions because governments in Europe, as in Russia and China, are engaged in direct confrontation with Tehran. During the Cold War, as well, advocates of "peace" were reluctant to denounce Communist arms buildups or "wars of national liberation" because "peace" might be threatened by emphatic opposition to aggression. The difficulty of organizing the world against security threats ought to be seen as a clear argument for sovereignty. If the world can't organize itself to provide security, doesn't that show that individual countries must organize to defend themselves? But apart from hypocrisy and posturing, many people seem beguiled by the hope that somehow the effort at self-defense won't be necessary-or they despair that it won't be availing. Looked at in this way, national sovereignty appears as the alternative to faith in, or resignation to, inevitable trends in the world. Sovereignty confers the legal right for nations to resist the prevailing tide, but it is not easy to exercise sovereign rights when people have lost confidence in their capacities and think adverse tides can only be accommodated or accepted. Perhaps we ought to think again about the moral foundations of sovereignty.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 13/182 was prepared to adopt a different tone with Muslims, the basic structure of American policy in the region would not be different. Why Obama Believed in a Reset Button In both the European and Muslim case, the same question must be asked: Why did Obama believe that he was changing relations when in fact his policies were not significantly different from Bushs policies? The answer is that Obama seemed to believe the essential U.S. problem with the world was rhetorical. The United States had not carefully explained itself, and in not explaining itself, the United States appeared arrogant. Obama seemed to believe that the policies did not matter as much as the sensibility that surrounded the policies. It was not so much that he believed he could be charming although he seemed to believe that with reason but rather that foreign policy is personal, built around trust and familiarity rather than around interests. The idea that nations werent designed to trust or like one another, but rather pursued their interests with impersonal force, was alien to him. And so he thought he could explain the United States to the Muslims without changing U.S. policy and win the day. U.S. policies in the Middle East remain intact, Guantanamo is still open, and most of the policies Obama opposed in his campaign are still there, offending the world much as they did under Bush. Moreover, the U.S. relationship with China has worsened, and while the U.S. relationship with Russia has appeared to improve, this is mostly atmospherics. This is not to criticize Obama, as these are reasonable policies for an American to pursue. Still, the substantial change in Americas place in the world that Europeans and his supporters entertained has not materialized. That it couldnt may be true, but the gulf between what Obama said and what has happened is so deep that it shapes global perceptions. Global Expectations and Obamas Challenge Having traveled a great deal in the last year and met a number of leaders and individuals with insight into the predominant thinking in their country, I can say with some confidence that the global perception of Obama today is as a leader given to rhetoric that doesnt live up to its promise. It is not that anyone expected his rhetoric to live up to its promise, since no politician can pull that off, but that they see Obama as someone who thought rhetoric would change things. In that sense, he is seen as naive and, worse, as indecisive and unimaginative. No one expected him to turn rhetoric into reality. But they did expect some significant shifts in foreign policy and a forceful presence in the world. Whatever the criticisms leveled against the United States, the expectation remains that the United States will remain at the center of events, acting decisively. This may be a contradiction in the global view of things, but it is the reality. A foreign minister of a small but not insignificant country put it this way to me: Obama doesnt seem to be there. By that he meant that Obama does not seem to occupy the American presidency and that the United States he governs does not seem like a force to be reckoned with. Decisions that other leaders wait for the United States to make dont get made, the authority of U.S. emissaries is uncertain, the U.S. defense and state departments say different things, and serious issues are left unaddressed. While it may seem an odd thing to say, it is true: The American president also presides over the world. U.S. power is such that there is an expectation that the president will attend to matters around the globe not out of charity, but because of American interest. The questions I have heard most often on many different issues are simple: What is the American position, what is the American interest, what will the Americans do? (As an American, I frequently find my hosts appointing me to be the representative of the United States.) I have answered that the United States is off balance trying to place the U.S.-jihadist war in context, that it must be understood that the president is preoccupied but will attend to their region shortly. That is not a bad answer, since it is true. But the issue now is simple: Obama has spent two years on the trajectory in place when he was elected, having made few if any significant shifts. Inertia is not a bad thing in policy, as change for its own sake is dangerous. Yet a range of issues must be attended to, including China, Russia and the countries that border each of them. Obama comes out of this election severely weakened domestically. If he continues his trajectory, the rest of the world will perceive him as a crippled president, something he neednt be in foreign policy matters. Obama can no longer control Congress, but he still controls foreign policy. He could emerge from this defeat as a powerful foreign policy president, acting decisively in Afghanistan and beyond. Its not a question of what he should do, but whether he will choose to act in a significant way at all.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 14/182 This is Obamas great test. Reagan accelerated his presence in the world after his defeat in 1982. It is an option, and the most important question is whether he takes it. We will know in a few months. If he doesnt, global events will begin unfolding without recourse to the United States, and issues held in check will no longer remain quiet.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 16/182 Wattenburg 2001 (Ben, Washington Times, Heritage Foundation, An Unacknowledged Doctrine, http://www.aei.org/article/12943, Hemanth) It was not President Reagan who coined the phrase "the Reagan Doctrine," connoting America's 1980s assertive foreign policy; it was columnist Charles Krauthammer. Now, in a major article in the Weekly Standard, doctrine-maker Krauthammer is at it again, announcing the advent of "the Bush Doctrine." The article is subtitled "ABM, Kyoto and the New American Unilateralism." The key word is "unilateralism." Oooh, it's a bad word. It plays right into the European charge that the United States is seeking to "go it alone." Even Robert Kagan of the Carnegie Endowment, who's just as hawkish as Mr. Krauthammer, is critical of the terrible U-word. Somewhat more importantly, Mr. Bush flatly denies he is a unilateralist. Is it just the "Krauthammer Doctrine" that Mr. Krauthammer is preaching? I think not. Mr. Krauthammer offers two major examples of "the Bush Doctrine." First is the Bush administration's push for a national missile defense system, which requires the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. Second is the out-of-hand rejection of the Kyoto Treaty on greenhouse gases. Each of these positions, by my lights, is correct. Surely, neither would have taken place in a Gore administration. And each of these actions can be described as "unilateral." Perhaps the best way to see what's going on is by looking at what the parties to this debate agree about. Most everyone everywhere agrees for good or ill that the United States is the "sole surviving superpower," or, as the French would have it, the "hyper-power," or, as the Chinese say, "the hegemon." Even the sometimes-mushy Clinton administration kept pronouncing that the United States was the one "indispensable" nation. Yes, the Cold War is over; we won it, and at least for now, there ain't no one left in the big leagues. We are No. 1 in a way that no nation in history has ever been before: militarily, geopolitically, scientifically, linguistically, demographically, educationally, culturally--globally. In many parts of the world, even where we are criticized, our geopolitical presence is requested, required and demanded. The nations on the Chinese rim, including Japan, make up one such area. Europe is another. That given, what should we do about it? I believe that, if asked, Americans would reflexively and appropriately say our primary goal should be to stay first. Why? Because it's good for us and it's good for the world. Most Americans believe that we stand for something special--liberty. If that idea becomes ever more global, we are ever more secure, and our existence is more meaningful. Just as important, democratic nations may bicker, bicker, bicker, but unlike dictatorships, they almost invariably stop well short of shooting. Hegemons pay a price. Try as hard as we can to stay away, we get involved in a lot of places. Some examples, big and small: Taiwan, Israel, Bosnia, Cuba, China, Russia. But hegemons also get a bonus. We can try to make the rules, not just play by them. We don't have to cede sovereignty to international organizations if we don't think their proposed actions are in our best interest. The overblown and misunderstood power of "international public opinion" need not hold much sway for the United States. After all, the United States is a nation that could, if it wanted to, which it doesn't, "go it alone." So Mr. Bush can withdraw from the Kyoto Treaty, which was a fool's errand in any event. The United States catches some flak for it. But no other nation will say, "Therefore, we won't trade with you." Mr. Bush can maintain that the missile defense of America is an American matter and will be dealt with by Americans, hopefully in cordial consultation with our allies, but at the end of the day, by Americans. And no one will put us on a list of "rogue nations." A nation with an ideology seeking to stay No. 1 should promote its cause. This is done every day by our private sector, in business, universities, entertainment and science. But the U.S. government is not doing its job in this field. In a craven act of picayune budgetary manipulation, the Clinton administration eliminated the U.S. Information Agency just when the world wanted plenty of information about the United States. The function, and perhaps the name, of the USIA ought to be restored. So, is there a Bush Doctrine? Apparently there is. But Mr. Bush denies it, if it involves the U-word. That's all right. Truth be told, sometimes doctrine-purveyors are the last to know. Over a period of years, Ronald Reagan went on the offensive in Angola, Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Only then did the shape of "The "Reagan Doctrine" become doctrinal.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 18/182 The old pre-American world was as unstable and dangerous as would be a new post-American update. But both retrenchments were choices that an unsure and depressed United States made - not symptoms, then or now, of inherent weakness or inevitable decline.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 20/182 Of course, it is impossible for foreign/international law to play a significant role in U.S. constitutional interpretation unless the judges make themselves supreme over the Constitution because nothing in the Constitution's text or our American and classical English traditions allow for foreign/international law to influence the meaning and application our fundamental law. Millennia of America's foundations are erased with this one judicial act by six Supreme Court Justices who occupy their seats for, at the most, thirty to forty years. The foreign/international law cited by the U.S. Supremes is squarely opposed to out Constitution's text and constitutional/jurisprudential traditions. This is clear in the comment quoted above from Lawrence. The "history of Western civilization and Judeo-Christian and moral and ethical standards" point "in an opposite direction" from current foreign/international law, some of which legalizes sodomy. Our American system and the classical British system are founded squarely on a Judeo-Christian foundation. Current foreign/international laws are infused with Humanistic worldview arguments, upholding homosexual rights. These two legal systems are polemic and irreconcilable. The Court's assertion that inserting foreign/international law into American jurisprudence is based on "certain fundamental rights" held by other nations which are central to "our own heritage." What rights? The Court just told us in Lawrence that our Judeo-Christian and Western traditions are "opposite" the current positions of much of the rest of the world on homosexual conduct. When two legal systems disagree on an issue as basic as the nature of man and human sexuality, one wonders how "the rest of the world" and America can agree on much of anything in our system of fundamental constitutional principles. The impossibility of finding fundamental agreements on basic principles between America and "the rest of the world" becomes clearer when we view the list of foreign nations and international agencies that the Court cites as sources for its interpreting our Constitution. This list includes India, Zimbabwe, Jamaica, the European Court of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, Canadian courts, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the European Union, etc. Even the United Kingdom can no longer be cited (although the Court does so) as a legitimate source for understanding the U.S. Constitution. As Justice Scalia points out in his Roper dissent (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas), ". . . with increasing speed, the United Kingdom [has submitted] to the jurisprudence of European courts dominated by continental jurists a legal, political, and social culture quite different from our own." If the U.S. Constitution's standards regarding sodomy and use of capital punishment are to be shaped at least partially by foreign/international laws, shall we then adopt non-American legal standards in other areas where there is current disagreement? These current "discrepancies" between American and non-American law include law related to America's exclusionary rule, separation of church and state, and abortion. Scalia's Roper dissent highlights some of the irreconcilable conflicts between current American and non-American law. For example, "The Court-pronounced exclusionary rule, . . . is distinctively American." Since this rule is considered to work generally to the advantage of the Humanistic worldview's tenets, would Reconstructionists support the elimination of this rule because it is not common to "foreign and international law"? Similarly, "most other countries including those committed to religious neutrality do not insist on the degree of separation between church and state that this Court requires." But American Reconstructionists' insist on radical "separation of church and state" in total opposition to foreign/international law in general. Are the Americans willing and eager to therefore abandon their insistence on "separation of church and state" in the U.S. in order to conform to foreign/international law? Looking further in differentiating between American and foreign/international law, we encounter an issue we cannot ignore of abortion. Unbelievably to some of us, the U.S. Court's abortion law is extraordinarly proabortion "makes us one of only six countries that allow abortion on demand until the point of viability." As with separation of church and state jurisprudence, the American Court's Reconstructionist-created law is out of line with foreign/international law. Are the U.S. Reconstructionists eager to toughen constitutional protections for the unborn child in order to bring American law more in line with foreign/international law? Our Supremes' invocation of foreign/international law in interpreting our matchless Constitution destroys "law" as a basic concept. As Scalia observed in his Roper dissent, "the concept of 'Law' ordinarily signifies that particular words have a fixed meaning." But an even cursory view of the law of other nations reveals that they include or are even based on concepts and values nonexistent in American law. American constitutional concepts of "life, liberty, and due process of law" are not found in many legal systems, or bear quite different meanings from ours if such concepts do exist. There is no fixed list of basic principles among the world's legal systems, and no universal fixity in the priority or meaning assigned by various nations to the legal phrases they do use in common with one another.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 21/182 As for "international law," there is no such thing. "Law" requires an agency with sufficient authority and ability to enact and enforce its mandates on the entire jurisdiction it purports to cover. There is simply no such authoritative agency existing in today's world. Furthermore, there is no genuine "world community" over which an international government could rule. Therefore, "international law" is an oxymoron. The conclusion of the matter is that Justice Scalia was absolutely right in arguing in Roper that "To invoke alien law when it agrees with one's own thinking [i.e., the thinking of a tiny group of Justices on our Supreme Court], and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but sophistry." So long as our Supremes persist in invoking even some foreign/international law, our legal system and culture cannot rely on America's courts to provide certainty, consistency, and continuity. Yet these qualities are what British scholar H.L.A. Hart asserted are necessary if any legal system is to be healthy and mature. To argue otherwise (i.e., in favor of foreign/international law) is to severely threaten our Constitution and our entire culture. The judge must act to uphold the constitution Carter, 87 (Brigham Young University Law Review No. 3, p. 751-2) The problem with this use of our burgeoning public policy science, an inevitable one in an area of theory driven by instrumental rationality, is that the law itself is stripped of the aura of uniqueness which is assigned to it in liberal theory. The law becomes all too mutable, and is left as no more than one of the means that must be tested against its efficacy in achieving the desired end. The Constitution, which is after all a species of law, is thus quite naturally viewed as a potential impediment to policy, a barrier that must be adjusted, through interpretation or amendment, more often than preservation of government under that constitution is viewed as a desirable policy in itself. In this the modern student of policy is like the modern moral philosopher and like a good number of constitutional theorists as well in denigrating the value of preserving any particular process and exalting the desirable result. But constitutionalism assigns enormous importance to process, and consequently assigns costs, albeit perhaps intangible ones, to violating the constitutional process. For the constitutionalist, as for classical liberal democratic theory, the autonomy of the people themselves, not the achievement of some well-intentioned government policy is the ultimate end of which the government exists. As a consequence, no violation of the means the people have approved for pursuit of policy here, the means embodied in the structural provisions of the Constitution can be justified through reference to the policy itself as the end.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 23/182 Senators should press Sotomayor to explain her stance on the use of foreign law -- and pay close attention to her answers. Putting international and foreign law first overrides US legitimacy and rule of law Bolton 11. (John R., senior fellow at AEI. John Bolton on Law, International Law, and American Sovereignty January 11, 2011, http://www.aei.org/article/102995) To President Obama, the concept of international law is palpable, as his September 2009 speech to the U.N. Security Council emphasized: "[W]e must demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise, and that treaties will be enforced." Many in his administration are doing their utmost to subvert America's welldeserved reputation as an adherent of the rule of law by subordinating it to the dangerous concept that international law, as defined by its high priests, overrides our domestic law, including in the judiciary. What is or is not legally binding about international law, particularly customary international law, is wide open to dispute. Customary international law used to refer to "state practice" in international affairs, a generally sensible way of deciding such questions as navigation protocols, reflecting what seafaring states have done over the centuries. In recent decades, however, the academic Left has seized on customary law as a fertile field for imposing its own ideological standards internationally and binding countries to "laws" they never explicitly approved. Because democratic debates in constitutional systems like ours are so unsatisfying and often so unproductive for America's statists, they have, in essence, launched an international power play to move outside of our legal systems. They find much greater prospects for success in international forums like the United Nations than in the U.S. Congress. Hence, the role and limits of international law, determining what is legally binding for our international conduct and domestic policy, will be a critical area of debate in the coming years. President Obama should adjust his antiterrorism policy in America to reflect the war paradigm in central Asia. The most visible, immediate impact of President Obama's fascination with international law appears in the global war against terrorism, a term he tries to avoid. Instead, he adopted the view widely held in Europe and among legal theorists that terrorist threats and attacks should be treated under the criminal law enforcement paradigm, rather than as attacks on America subject to the law of war. The question is whether we treat terrorists simply as bank robbers on steroids or as national security threats to which we should respond in legitimate self-defense. The Obama administration strongly supports the criminal law paradigm, which most Americans emphatically reject. Closing Gitmo is not just good policy but "norms" America Thus, reflecting the law-enforcement approach, Obama rapidly ordered the closure of the Guantanamo Bay terrorist detention facility and either the release of those still detained or their transfer to the United States. He also pushed to abandon "enhanced interrogation" techniques and insisted upon trying as many terrorists as possible in civilian courts, under ordinary criminal law procedures rather than in military tribunals. This mindset's strong ideological roots reflect the administration's fundamental acceptance of leftist conventional wisdom on international law. Under this view, for Obama, closing Gitmo is not just good policy but, more importantly, "norms" America with international opinion on handling terrorists. Why we should defer to international norms on terrorism is, to say the least, unclear. The U.N. has repeatedly tried and failed to reach a comprehensive definition of terrorism. Its continuing inability to agree on something so fundamental helps explain why the U.N., particularly the Security Council, has been AWOL in the war on terrorism, and why international norms should not dissuade us even slightly from legitimate self-defense efforts. Unfortunately, mishandling the war against terrorism doesn't end with distorting the correct legal and political paradigms to combat it. The Obama administration has broader ambitions as well, including an ill-concealed desire to join the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although billed as a successor to the Nuremberg tribunals, the ICC, in fact, amounts to a giant opportunity to second-guess the United States and the actions we take in self-defense. The ICC's enormous potential prosecutorial power awaits only the opportunity to expand almost without limit. "Universal jurisdiction," permits countries utterly unrelated to an event to initiate criminal prosecutions The Clinton administration initially signed the ICC's founding document, the Rome Statute, in June 1998, but there was no prospect that the Senate would ratify it. The Bush administration unsigned the treaty and entered into more than 100 bilateral agreements with countries to prevent our citizens from being delivered into the ICC's custody. To date, the ICC has proceeded slowly, partly in the hope of enticing the United States to
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 24/182 cooperate with it, and the Bush administration succumbed to it in its final years. The ICC's friends under President Obama want to go even further. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in 2009, for example, that it was "a great regret but it is a fact we are not yet a signatory" to the Rome Statute, signaling unmistakably what she hopes to do. The Obama administration's willingness to submit U.S. conduct to international judicial review also extends to the concept of "universal jurisdiction," which permits even countries utterly unrelated to an event to initiate criminal prosecutions regarding it. The administration has yet to say, for example, that it will oppose potential European efforts to prosecute those responsible for enhanced interrogation techniques. This devotion to international norms is designed to intimidate U.S. decision makers, military forces, and intelligence agents, and violates basic democratic precepts that we are responsible for and fully capable of holding our government to its responsibilities under our Constitution. Limiting America's military options is a high priority for the Obama administration. In fact, limiting America's military options and capabilities through international agreements and organizations is a high priority for the Obama administration. It has been hard at work since Inauguration Day negotiating with Russia to significantly reduce both America's nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The administration appears open to imposing new constraints on our missile defense programs. These were previously eliminated in 2001 by the Bush administration's withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which barred us from building national missile defenses. President Obama has already abandoned missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic that were intended to protect the continental United States. Any missile defense budget cuts will cause enormous damage, no matter what is agreed with Moscow. Moreover, the president's aspiration, articulated in his 2009 Prague speech, to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is well on track, whether or not other nuclear nations (and proliferators) follow suit. Obama has committed to a multitude of multilateral arms-control treaties and negotiations, such as again pressing for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (previously defeated by a Senate vote of 5148 on October 13, 1999). Undoubtedly, the Landmines Convention, another Clinton administration legacy (adopted in Ottawa in December 1997) will also reappear on the administration's agenda. In addition, the president wants to negotiate treaties to stop new production of fissile material, to prevent an outer space "arms race," and to regulate trade in conventional weapons that will have potentially enormous implications for our domestic debate over the Second Amendment and firearms control. In addition, many senior administration officials have demonstrated their sympathy for using international "human rights" norms on the conduct of war to constrain the United States. Of course, no one advocates uncivilized or inhumane behavior, but the critical point is who defines such behavior and who holds those who violate the accepted standards accountable. Under our Constitution, we are fully capable of deciding how and when to use military force, how our warriors should conduct themselves, and how to deal with those who violate our standards. We do not need international human rights experts, prosecutors, or courts to satisfy our own high standards for American behavior. Having failed to win within our political system, they retreat into international organizations. This is not the view, however, of those who want to constrain our sovereignty. After all, if we decided what is right and wrong, they couldn't second-guess us and bend us to their views. Having failed to win this point within our political system, however, they simply retreat into international organizations, hoping they and their international leftist allies can win there what they failed to win at home. Israel is often a preferred target because it is small and even less popular in the elite circles of international law and norming than the United States. Thus, the U.N.'s recent Goldstone report on Israel's 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in the Gaza Strip criticized Israel for violations of the law of war, such as the "disproportionate use of force," in ways that severely undermine Israel's inherent right of self-defense. If such conclusions become widely accepted, they will obviously have direct and substantial effects on our ability to undertake our own self-defense, which is, of course, exactly what the globalists have in mind. The U.N. Human Rights Council, established in 2006, has proven to be even worse than its completely discredited predecessor, spending most of its time examining Israel's defects rather than the world's worst human-rights violators. Nonetheless, based on its post-American ideology, the Obama administration rejoined the council. Unsurprisingly, U.S. membership has had no effect on council decisions, but our return has given it a legitimacy utterly lacking in our absence. President Obama has used military force to protect America, but almost apologetically and with undisguised longing to do exactly the opposite. Thus, even when announcing a substantial increase in U.S. forces in
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 25/182 Afghanistan to combat the Taliban, he avowed simultaneously his hope to begin withdrawing those forces in mid-2011. Such a clear signal of weakness only encourages the Taliban and al Qaeda to hold on until that point, when Obama could begin bringing troops home, perhaps even proclaiming "mission accomplished." Ironically, of course, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan employ armed drone aircraft to target and kill terrorist leaders and supporters, although, needless to say, the targets don't get Miranda rights read to them. The administration seems unwilling to reconcile these strikes with how it handles terrorists captured in the United States. Already, there are international complaints that the drone attacks are precisely the kinds of "targeted" or "extra-judicial" killings complained about for years when undertaken by Israel. But what conclusion will terrorists draw if they realize that, as with the Christmas Day 2009 bomber, you are likely to be safer if you attack the United States in its homeland rather than in the "Af-Pak" mountains? President Obama should adjust his antiterrorism policy in America to reflect the war paradigm in central Asia. Commitment to the rule of law is vital in preventing global nuclear conflict Rhyne 58 (Charles, fmr president @ American Bar Association, "Law Day Speech for Voice of America," 5/1/1958, http://www.abanet.org/publiced/lawday/rhyne58.html) The tremendous yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving international disputes . We in our country sincerely believe that mankind's best hope for preventing the tragic consequences of nuclear-satellite-missile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire world to submit all disputes to tribunals of justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of America would like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so appealing that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Man's relation to man is the most neglected field of study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world. Men must either live together in peace or in modern war we will surely die together. History teaches that the rule of law has enabled mankind to live together peacefully within nations and it is clear that this same rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism to achieve and maintain peace between nations. --card has been gender-edited
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
***PERMUTATION
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 29/182 familiar illustration of that is the desire to have property itself widely distributed in the community. We say the person has a stake in the community. He cannot want to preserve that which he has without at the same time willing that others should preserve what they have. So the conservative who wants to keep the present order is anxious for a relatively wide distribution of property so that everyone, having a definite stake in the preservation of that order, will also want to preserve it. The interests of such a community must be universal in their character, which means that they shall be of such a form that when a person wills something for himself he is willing the same for others. But, of course, the difficulty is in stating that specifically. It can be stated, as we have seen, in relation to property and also with reference to truth by the spreading of enlightenment. Truth is valuable only in a community where it has universal acceptance. If a thing is not recognized as true, then it does not function as true in the community. People have to recognize it if they are going to act on it. For example, we expect a person to be familiar with the laws of the community Lying inevitable The Independent 2010 (News Website, The science of lying: Why the truth really can hurt, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/the-science-of-lying-why-the-truth-really-can-hurt2018293.html, Hemanth) With deception so significant a part of the natural world, it's little wonder we resort to it almost reflexively. Indeed, who's not to say that lying isn't an in-built part of human nature? On this point Feldman is hesitant, not quite believing that we lie instinctively. Still, once we do develop deceptive skills there's no shortage of stimuli. Much of our environment is conditioned by falsehoods. "To advertisers, it has become acceptable to make claims that aren't entirely accurate," points out Feldman. "We'll talk about integrity and its importance, but a lot of business decisions are based on deception. We've just seen it: mortgages being inflated; the creation of a climate in which it's easier to justify certain actions." Curiously, for all their ubiquity, we appear to be largely unaware of the mass of untruths that surrounds us even when they spring from our own mouths. The bulk of Feldman's studies involve secretly filming volunteers as they engage in some form of interaction. "Afterwards, people are surprised to find out that they haven't been entirely honest. I'll ask them if they were being accurate and they'll say they were, but when we show them the footage they can identify all kinds of deception." The irony of this method is its own dishonesty: the camera is hidden and volunteers are rarely told of the nature of the study, so as not to set them on guard. So Feldman lies to his guinea pigs in order to catch them lying. "One of the most common things used to be to do diary studies, where people are responsible for recording how many lies they tell," he explains. "But we faced two big problems: firstly that people may not remember exactly what they have said each day; and, secondly, that they know the study is for honesty, so they may be on their best behaviour." Despite his methods, Feldman is part of a growing school which argues against our culture of dishonesty not just the deliberate, targeted, dishonesty of conmen and criminals, but the day-to-day white lies that ease our social existence. The New Statesman recently carried a piece by Australian psychologist Dorothy Rowe warning of the "network of unforeseen consequences" that we create for ourselves. It isn't just a moral, philosophical standpoint: scientific evidence increasingly backs up their views. Feldman refers to studies identifying a psychological "twinge of distress" suffered by the tellers of lies. "In the end, it makes our relationships less real. People have been found to express regret for pulling something over on another person even when they think they are doing it to make something better." Quite how we might pursue a more honest society is unclear. Attempts have been made to live entirely without lies so-called 'Radical Honesty' but this may, for anyone who has ever been asked if they like their best friend's unflattering new haircut, sound like a step too far. Certainly, for the time being the task looks like something of an uphill struggle. Feldman's next study will focus on our behaviour on the internet. Early research indicates that our online existence only enhances dishonesty. Anyone who has spent time polishing their Facebook profile, or who has assumed an alias to comment via a newspaper website,
Michigan 2011
AT: Leaks
U.S. Intelligence is Protected After Leaks Lake 10 works on the geopolitics desk at the Washington Times (10/6/10, Eli, The Washington Times, U.S. rethinks intelligence sharing after leaks anger Obama, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/6/intelligence-leaks-anger-obama-sharing-rethought/? page=1) Obama is angry over recent public disclosures of classified information in Washington, and the intelligence community is re-evaluating the post-Sept. 11 push for greater intelligence-sharing, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said Wednesday. We are working on information-sharing initiatives across the board, Mr. Clapper said in a speech. But the classic dilemma of need to share versus need to know is still with us. And I would observe that the Wikileaks episode represents what I would consider a big yellow flag. I think it is going to have a very chilling effect on the need to share. The remarks at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington came in sharp contrast to his predecessors who called for increased information among the 16 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community. Indeed, the need for greater interagency intelligence-sharing was a key feature of not only the Sept. 11 commissions final report, but later reviews of U.S. government lapses in attacks like the Fort Hood massacre and the near bombing of a Northwest Airlines jet on Dec. 25. Wikileaks, a website that gathers and releases internal documents, made public in July thousands of U.S. military field reports from Afghanistan that included sensitive information, such as the identities of Afghan nationals who spied for the United States. The disclosures prompted the Taliban militia to announce a campaign to find and kill so-called collaborators. Mr. Clapper said the leaks are upsetting Mr. Obama. I was at a meeting yesterday with the president, he said. I was ashamed to have to sit there and listen to the president express his great angst about the leaking that is going on here in this town. The intelligence chief continued, chastising anonymous senior intelligence officials who, for whatever reason, get their jollies from blabbing to the media. Mr. Clapper added that the president remarked, the irony here is people engaged in intelligence can turn around and talk about it publicly. In voicing criticism of leaks to Mr. Clapper, Mr. Obama joins a long list of presidents frustrated by the publication of sensitive government information in the press. President Nixon set up a counterleak squad known as the plumbers after Daniel Ellsberg, a military analyst, gave the New York Times a secret history of the Vietnam War known as the Pentagon Papers. Mr. Clapper, who was sworn in as the fourth director of national intelligence on Aug. 9, said he has sought to emphasize counterintelligence the identification and countering of foreign spies, work that requires compartmentation, or tightly controlling intelligence data. There is always this dilemma between compartmentation and sharing and collaboration and all that sort of thing, he said. In this day and age with the hemorrhage of leaks in this town, I think compartmentation, appropriate, reasonable compartmentation, is the right thing to do. Earlier directors of intelligence voiced different concerns following the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, or the Sept. 11 commission, that criticized intelligence agencies for failing to connect the dots despite having pieces of intelligence that might have averted the attacks. The final report recommended that information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge. New U.S. Security Measures Avoid Leaks Reuters 10 (12/29/10, Reuters News, Pentagon revamps security in wake of Wikileaks, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/clapper-obama-intelligence-leaks/2010/10/06/id/372805) There are 2.2 million people in the United States with access to one or more levels (confidential, secret, and top secret) of classified information; there are 854,000 people with top secret clearances -- of which 265,000 are contractors; the 9/11 Commission recommended more sharing of information among agencies -- but critics say that too much sharing is as risky as too little sharing
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 31/182 The two massive Wikileak releases in June and November of 2010, as well as threats from the organization to force a major bank executive to resign, shows that Wikileaks is far from relenting. This news has brought the U.S. federal governments safeguards and method of data sharing modeled after the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, into question. Homeland Security NewsWire spoke with representatives from the Department of Defense regarding the next steps the federal government will be taking to prevent further breaches of security protocols. LtGen Ronald L. Burgess Jr., director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), spoke at the U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Symposium (GEOINT) on 4 November, described finding the proper balance between the restricting and sharing of information: We have to build safeguards into our intelligence systems to prevent this from happening again, Burgess said. But how do we do that without rolling back the progress in information sharing? How do we properly react without overreacting? Where do we draw the line? How do we keep pushing the incredible power of [geospatial intelligence] and other intelligence to our customers, especially to the lowest levels where it makes a real difference, without opening ourselves up to WikiLeaks 2, 3 and 4? Data shared between the fourteen intelligence services in the United States uses three levels of security access: confidential, secret, and top secret. The Washington Post investigation, titled Top Secret America, estimated that out of 854,000 people with top secret clearances, 265,000 are contractors. The Department of Defense does not have data regarding the number of intelligence community personnel outside of its department holding clearances, but it currently has approximately 2.2 million personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) with access to classified information. DoD does not anticipate changing this number of personnel in the foreseeable future, Major Chris Perrine from OSD Public Affairs told the NewsWire. The Department of Defense has taken steps to increase security since documents were first disclosed by Wikileaks. They conducted an internal 60-day review of security procedures with recommendations sent to the secretary of defense. Some combatant commanders have taken individual measures for their commands. Removable storage media have been restricted or disabled as well as the capability to write or burn removable media on DoD classified computers. This is a temporary technical solution to mitigate future risks of personnel moving classified data to unclassified systems. An example of this was the expanded coverage of softwarecontrolling USB port use to CD/DVD drives by Central Command (CENTCOM). (O-6 or GS-15). Asides from undertaking vulnerability assessments and improving awareness and compliance with information protection procedures, CENTCOM has also increased insider threat training focusing on awareness of associated activity, initiated multi-discipline training between traditional security, law enforcement, and information assurance at all echelons, established Insider Threat Working Groups to address the Wikileaks incident and prevent reoccurrences, restricted access to the Wikileaks site to prevent further dissemination, and informed all personnel of restrictions on downloading to government systems. Lt. Col. OSD PA, April D. Cunningham told the NewsWire, Our focus is on monitoring the way our information is accessed and on controlling the use of external media through a suite of security capabilities that DoD has already fielded on our unclassified networks and is rapidly fielding on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR). DoD organizations were directed to limit number of systems authorized to move data from classified to unclassified systems (similar to a KIOSK concept, where it is necessary to meet at a central, supervised location to conduct this activity). There are also two-person handling rules for moving data from classified to unclassified systems to ensure proper oversight and reduce chances of unauthorized release of classified material. Procedures to monitor and detect suspicious, unusual, or anomalous user behavior (similar to procedures now being implemented by credit card companies to detect and monitor fraud) have also been developed. Sixty percent of DoDs SIPR-net is now equipped with HBSS (Host-Based Security System) an automated way of controlling the computer system with, a capability of monitoring unusual data access or usage. DoD is accelerating HBSS deployment to its SIPR-net systems. When asked why news outlets such as the U.K.s Guardian have persisted in labeling Bradley Manning, former U.S. intelligence analyst, as the suspected leaker of diplomatic cables, Major Perrine responded: PFC Bradley Manning is considered a person of interest regarding the leaked diplomatic cables. He is in pre-trial confinement for charges stemming from previously leaked documents. He was charged on July 5 with four specifications under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for violating Army Regulation 25-2 (Information Assurance Policy), and eight specifications under Article 134 for violating federal statutes related to the receipt of classified information (18 U.S.C. 793) and wrongful access of a government computer (18 U.S.C. 1030).
Michigan 2011
***POLITICS
Michigan 2011
Consultation is Unpopular
Obamas willingness to cede authority over things like the CP to foreign countries allows republicans to spin him as weak in the upcoming elections. Montopoli 11. (Brian, senior political analyst at CBSnews.com. Emerging GOP line: Obama has made America a follower. 3/21/11. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20045617-503544.html) President Obama's handling of the Libya crisis is prompting Republican criticism that he is turning America from the world's leader into a mere follower - a country all too ready and willing to take orders from even the French. "When we have [French] President [Nicolas] Sarkozy dictating the pace and terms and conditions for security initiatives in the world, we know that we've entered a new era in terms of America's place and leadership and vision for security around the world, and that concerns me greatly," former Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty, who just announced a presidential exploratory committee, said Monday. Speaking from Chile Monday afternoon, Mr. Obama again stressed that America is working "with our international partners" on the offensive against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, stating the action has been solely "in support of an international mandate from the Security Council." Longtime Republican strategist Ed Rollins says that sort of rhetoric presents an opportunity to critics like Pawlenty, who can point to it as evidence that Mr. Obama doesn't see America as the preeminent nation in the world. "To a Republican audience, it's what they want to believe," said Rollins. "They want to believe the president is weak and hasn't been decisive." That perception may have been reinforced over the weekend with a spate of stories like this one in the New York Times, which suggested that a trio of women - Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Senior National Security Council aide Samantha Power and ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice - pushed Mr. Obama to take a harder line with Libya. The White House tried Monday to rebut that narrative, with a senior administration official maintaining that Mr. Obama has led the debate and telling Politico that Clinton and Power weren't present in the meeting where he made his decision. It has good reason to push back: No president wants to be seen, particularly in an era of lingering sexism and anti-French sentiment, as being told what to do by a coalition of women and a country populated by what some conservative commentators are prone to call "cheese eating surrender monkeys." Mr. Obama has cast the Libya offensive as an international effort in part to keep it from further ginning up anti-American sentiment in a region where American military intervention has already generated significant anger. In the run-up to the attacks, he repeatedly stressed the Arab league's call for a no-fly zone as well as the consensus represented by the Security Council vote to take action if Qaddafi did not change his ways. Following the anti-Bush doctrine rhetoric from his campaign, he cast the Libya effort as reflecting the world acting together to stop a humanitarian crisis - not the latest example of America getting involved in a part of the world where it does not belong. That's part of the reason that it French airplanes conducted the initial flights into Libya. The subsequent attacks have come largely in the form of American missiles, but the French flights helped push the argument that America is merely a participant in what, this time around, really is a coalition of the willing. Fitting with this line of reasoning, the White House said Monday that it will hand responsibility for coordinating the offensive over to coalition partners within days. Mr. Obama, meanwhile, argued that his course of action has allowed the United States to keep from having to shoulder the burden of the military intervention alone. "Our military's already very stretched and carries large burdens all around the world," he said. "And whenever possible, for us to get international cooperation, not just in terms of word but also in terms of planes and resources and pilots, that's something that we should actively seek and embrace because it relieves the burden on our military and it relieves the burden on U.S. taxpayers to fulfill what is an international mission and not simply a U.S. mission." Yet according to Rollins, Mr. Obama's handling of the situation - which has included continuing a trip to Latin America despite the crisis, and authorizing military action from foreign soil - has fueled perceptions that he "doesn't look like he's in charge, or wants to be in charge." His decision to cast America's actions as part of a larger effort, pragmatic though it may be, has provided fodder for potential general election
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 34/182 opponents like Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich, who have shown themselves eager to cast Mr. Obama as a leader who sees America as less than exceptional. Romney pointedly titled his most recent book "No Apology: The Case For American Greatness," arguing inside that Mr. Obama has been overly apologetic about America's role in the world and has presided over a "misguided and bankrupt" shift away from American exceptionalism. Gingrich, meanwhile, said last August that "to deny American exceptionalism is in essence to deny the heart and soul of this nation." Ultimately, the political impact of the president's handling of the Libya crisis won't become clear until the situation plays out, and it will depend in large part on whether Qaddafi is able to hang onto power. But for his critics, Mr. Obama's posture that America is an equal in the fight -- not a leader -- is further evidence that the country needs someone new in charge come 2012.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 37/182 collective defense alliance, but also as a political alliance and an alliance of values. Unless the transatlantic community has decided that neither security nor values matter, there can be no rationale for downgrading NATO.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 40/182 No impact to NATO collapse alliances fail inevitably Haass 6 17 11 president of the Council on Foreign Relations and former director of policy and planning at the State Department (Richard B, Why Europe no longer matters, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-europe-no-longermatters/2011/06/15/AG7eCCZH_story.html) Finally, the very nature of international relations has also undergone a transformation. Alliances, whether NATO during the Cold War or the U.S.-South Korean partnership now, do best in settings that are highly inflexible and predictable, where foes and friends are easily identified, potential battlefields are obvious, and contingencies can be anticipated. Almost none of this is true in our current historical moment. Threats are many and diffuse. Relationships seem situational, increasingly dependent on evolving and unpredictable circumstances. Countries can be friends, foes or both, depending on the day of the week just look at the United States and Pakistan. Alliances tend to require shared assessments and explicit obligations; they are much more difficult to operate when worldviews diverge and commitments are discretionary. But as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya all demonstrate, this is precisely the world we inhabit. For the United States, the conclusions are simple. First, no amount of harping on what European governments are failing to do will push them toward what some in Washington want them to do. They have changed. We have changed. The world has changed. Second, NATO as a whole will count for much less. Instead, the United States will need to maintain or build bilateral relations with those few countries in Europe willing and able to act in the world, including with military force. Third, other allies are likely to become more relevant partners in the regions that present the greatest potential challenges. In Asia, this might mean Australia, India, South Korea, Japan and Vietnam, especially if U.S.-China relations were to deteriorate; in the greater Middle East, it could again be India in addition to Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others. None of this justifies a call for NATOs abolition. The alliance still includes members whose forces help police parts of Europe and who could contribute to stability in the Middle East. But it is no less true that the era in which Europe and transatlantic relations dominated U.S. foreign policy is over. The answer for Americans is not to browbeat Europeans for this, but to accept it and adjust to it.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consult = Delay
NATO confers with multiple agencies, countries and external councils delays any decision Finnegan 2009 member of the National Bereau of Asain Research and the Center for US-Korea Policy (Michael, February 2009, Benchmarking Americas Military Alliances: NATO, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/FinneganBenchmarkingFeb09.pdf) What has been described here is a very institutionalized structure by which the allies political objectives are operationalized (See Figure 1). There is of course a complementary set of norms and processes by which the alliance operates. Chief among these norms is consensusa NATO decision is by definition a consensus decision, an expression of the collective will of all sovereign member states. 18 This consensus building takes place within the very structured and intense workings of the NAC and MC, which meet weekly in regular session at the Permanent Representative/Senior Military Representative-level. The process is supplemented by additional consultations with partner countries such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATORussia Permanent Joint Council, as well as other consultative mechanisms. Both the structure and processes of NATO are highly institutionalized and formal, resembling in some ways an international conglomerate more than a military organization
Michigan 2011
Say No Militarization
NATO will say no against militarization JAPCC 2009 Join Air Power Competence Centre (NATO Space Operations Assessment, https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/NATOSpaceO/file/_WFS/NATO%20Space%20Ops%20Assessment %20Jan%2009.pdf) While many nations have demonstrated the capability to conduct offensive SC activities, NATO must determine if there is the political will for the Alliance to engage in such activities. Despite the existing threats of satellite jamming and piracy, and of the demonstrated Chinese ASAT capability in 2007, the JAPCC assesses that the NATO Alliance is not willing to adopt a stance that would endorse the conduct of offensive or aggressive SC operations. However, NATO must ensure free access to and freedom of action in Space for all peaceful purposes. Cooperation between Nations to share data, enforce responsible Space practices and provide SSA is needed. NATO say no disagreements about militarization Bodtke 2006 Major of the Air Command and Staff College Air University (Michael E, NATOS SPACE SUPPORT CAPABILITY, https://docs.google.com/viewer? a=v&q=cache:QzXKhzVBE8MJ:https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_49eb8da5-7ef1-4e5f-8d23-9ee125ac9362/display.aspx%3Frs %3Dpublishedsearch+NATO %E2%80%99S+SPACE+SUPPORT+CAPABILITY&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShwuqhk4oCNuH9W _624gLj64Yznl0VdTDyg6ANBTPSFoOG6wSg8h_OZ0qxIbmTPRWSrJ3XFSKL36X7U4RPwCd2zp8DBxX287WXeBI0_TyaiXSvJhUvgJoMymI-XlUGrzemcR4F&sig=AHIEtbTSXFtjnx3LoCdq-kiPnq1-IbPW-g) The first priority for discussion is the issue of self-defense in space. Normally accepted as an inherent right, this concept runs counter to the desire to keep space demilitarized. NATO has the forces and capabilities necessary to provide policymakers with a range of terrestrially-centered options for retaliating in the event of an attack against a NATO member nations space assets. However, NATO has not articulated a policy that recognizes its own dependency and the dependency of its member states on space capabilities constitutes a center of gravity that must be defended. Until then, a policy on retaliation will likely be rejected as too aggressive. Division within NATO member nations exists over the issue of militarization of space to such a degree that it is uncertain whether NATO could reach consensus on retaliation even if its space capabilities were attacked. If NATO had the space expertise needed within the planning staffs to draft contingency plans for approval at the highest level of NATO, the NATO Advisory Council, it would focus the debate and hopefully garner a resolution before a contingency arises.
Michigan 2011
On Friday his father addressed the nation via telephone, demanding NATO halt its attack or risk seeing Libyan fighters descend on Europe "like a swarm of locusts or bees." Libya's Prime Minister echoed al-Islam's belief that Gaddafi would not leave his post under any circumstances. He told Al Arabiya television that NATO was infringing on Libya's sovereignty. LIBYAN PRIME MINISTER, DR. AL BAGHDADI AL MAHMOUDI "We consider any non-political interference in Libyan affairs as a direct attempt to interfere with Libyan authority. At the same time it makes the situation worse and so what's currently happening, including the NATO raids, is a direct threat to Libya and it inflates the situation and makes it worse. We can't be working on solving the issues in this environment and under constant raids. What France did is in clear violation of the UN mandate." Libyan instability collapses the economy, destabilizes Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, and leads to terrorism and human rights abuses Pack 3/18/11 researcher of Libya at Oxford University's St. Antony's College. He has worked in both Tripoli and Washington, D.C., on strengthening U.S.-Libya relations (Jason, is a, Libya Is Too Big to Fail, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/18/libya_is_too_big_to_fail?page=0,0,) What makes Libya so important? Any real estate agent could tell you: location, location, location. Control of the country has always been a remarkably effective way to project power into Egypt, the Mediterranean, and beyond. Similarly, denying a hostile power (be it the Soviet Union, Muammar al-Qaddafi, or terrorists) the ability to destabilize surrounding countries from Libyan territory has been a consistent thread in U.S. policy since the end of World War II. Seventy years ago, the Axis powers used Libya to launch daring tank offensives aimed at the Suez Canal. With the British victory at El Alamein in late 1942 and the ensuing conquest of northern Libya, British strategic planners decided that Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) was the only part of conquered Italian colonial territory that was essential for Britain's strategic position in the Middle East. In 1945, the Soviet Union's foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, pushed for a Soviet trusteeship over Tripolitania (northwest Libya). The Soviet bid backfired. It forced American statesmen to put aside their distaste for extending the British Empire as they realized that denying the Soviets a naval base on the Mediterranean was a core U.S. interest. France and Italy, as pretenders to world-power status and interested parties in North Africa, also wanted to have their spheres of influence in Libya. Because the "Libya question" was so rancorously contested by all parties, it was deemed unsolvable by traditional great-power diplomacy. In 1948, it was passed onto the nascent United Nations. By the late 1940s, U.S. President Harry Truman and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin concluded that Libyan airfields were essential for Cold War defense. After Libyan independence in 1951, U.S. and British payments for basing rights formed the single-largest element of Libyan GDP until oil exports began in 1961. Even with the decline in importance of the fighterbomber as a nuclear delivery vehicle, and thus the need for the bases, Libya's strategic importance did not wane. Accordingly, U.S. and British diplomats attempted to court Colonel Qaddafi's favor when he came to power in 1969. They acquiesced to his demand to abandon their air bases, supposing that eager compliance
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 45/182 would encourage Libya's new leadership from drifting into the anti-Western camp. They were wrong. As Libya intensified its support for militant revolutionary causes -- ranging from the Irish Republican Army to Ugandan dictator Idi Amin to various unsavory terrorist groups -- throughout the 1970s, Western policymakers avoided reprisals against Libyan interests. Amazingly, from 1972 to 1977, U.S. imports of Libyan oil increased tenfold, and U.S. exports to Libya trebled. Qaddafi gratefully used the influx of dollars to undermine American interests in Africa and the Middle East. The 1970s U.S. policy of bartering with a sworn enemy was abandoned under President Ronald Reagan. Convinced that Libya's anti-Western orientation and geostrategic position made regime change a core U.S. interest, Reagan famously declared Qaddafi to be the "mad dog of the Middle East." However, unilateral U.S. sanctions in 1982 and then airstrikes in 1986 -- as a response to the Berlin disco bombing -- failed to produce the desired results. By the 1990s, it was clear that the United States could not unseat Qaddafi by itself. Libya's threat to a stable post-Cold War world order was deemed significant enough that U.S. policymakers devised a way to enlist Europe in shutting Libya out of the international system. On flimsy evidence, Libya was found guilty of the devastating 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Europe was finally on board for comprehensive U.N. sanctions of Libya, which endured from 1992 to 1999. In 1999, feeling the pinch caused by his decaying oil infrastructure and declining revenues, Qaddafi turned over the two suspected Lockerbie bombers for trial in the Netherlands (only one, Abdelbasset Ali alMegrahi, was later convicted). This action caused U.N. sanctions to be suspended. As more countries began trading with Libya, the U.S. policy dating back to Reagan of actively containing Qaddafi and hoping for his ouster was no longer feasible. In the new millennium, U.S. and British negotiators intensified their covert dealings with Libyan diplomats, and in 2003, Qaddafi made his first payment of compensation to the Lockerbie victims' families. At the same time, the colonel declared his desire to voluntarily give up his weapons of mass destruction program. The rogue was seemingly rehabilitated and multilateral action vindicated. Libya was tentatively permitted to rejoin the world community. From 2004 to 2010, U.S. diplomats and businessman embarked on the long and hard road of normalization. Erratic Libyan behavior and electorally motivated grandstanding by U.S. congressmen -- generally on third-tier issues like Qaddafi's desire to pitch a tent in Central Park or Megrahi's release from a Scottish prison for health reasons -- frequently derailed progress. In 2008, I changed my career as an academic of Syria to become instead a professional engaged in the American and European efforts to bring Qaddafi in from the cold and forward the agenda of pro-market economic reform and Western investment in Libya. My logic then was the same as it is now: Libya is too important in the world system to have Western strategic priorities in Libya unfulfilled and U.S. businesses shut out. This logic is grounded in history and is also best for the aspirations of the Libyan people. Over the last six decades, successive U.S. and British administrations have consistently concluded that the "Libya question" merited great economic and diplomatic sacrifices. It still does. Today we face a familiar dilemma. Libya sits atop the strategic intersection of the Mediterranean, African, and Arab worlds, and its ability and track record in destabilizing those three areas is well documented. It is laudable that the international community has combined humanitarian and geostrategic rationales to unite under a banner of multilateral airborne intervention. This intervention must balance two equally important aims: to unseat Qaddafi and to ensure that the Libyan people have agency over their lives and political system. Hopefully, the West will play a supportive, yet decisive role in the ongoing conflict. Were Qaddafi to remain in power he world needs Libya, but Qaddafi has become an expert at thumbing his nose at world opinion. Much as we might pretend otherwise, oil is unquestionably part of the equation here. In the words of Armand Hammer, the late founder of Occidental Petroleum, Libya's oil is "the world's only irreplaceable oil." What makes Libyan oil irreplaceable is its proximity to Europe, the ease of its extraction, and the sweetness of its crude. Because many refineries in Italy and elsewhere are built to deal with sweet Libyan crude, they cannot easily process the heavier Saudi crude that would inevitably replace a Libyan production shortfall. Since dtente with Libya began in 2003, Western companies in the form of Repsol, Wintershall, Total, Eni, OMV, Shell, the Oasis Group, Chevron, Marathon, ExxonMobil, and BP have either rushed into Libya or intensified their existing operations. Those with political connections to the Libyan regime that predate sanctions have tended to fare better than others. All have an enormous stake in not losing their vast investments and being replaced by the Chinese, Indians, and Russians, were Libya to become a pariah state. Most crucially, though Europe would be hit hardest if Libyan production were to vastly diminish due to ongoing unrest or stagnate due to a lack of future investment, low production totals would have sustained negative effects on both the fragile world economy and the Libyan people. For European countries, illegal immigration is another major concern. Starting in the 1990s, in an attempt to combat his international isolation, Qaddafi allowed all Africans visa-free access to Libya. After the Libyan populace rioted against the newcomers and no jobs were created for
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 46/182 them, many attempted illegal crossings to Europe. The 2008 Italian-Libyan "Friendship Treaty" largely closed the spigot of illegal migration to a trickle. Any intensification of the human calamity, especially if combined with the closing of the Tunisian border, could open it to a flood. In the past, Qaddafi has frequently increased the flow of migrants when seeking to gain political concessions from Italy. Were Libya to become a failed/pariah state, there is no doubt that Qaddafi or those who would come after him could use the same tactic to pressure Europe. Relative to the amount of oil wealth it possesses, Libya is a terribly underdeveloped country -- the unhappy legacy of Qaddafi's economic experiments of the 1980s and the U.N. sanctions in the 1990s. Despite having the highest per capita income in Africa, Libyan education levels and living conditions outside its big cities are on par with those of some of its sub-Saharan African neighbors. Only in the last 10 years has the Qaddafi family finally committed itself to real infrastructure development. In the last two years -global recession notwithstanding -- the Libyan government spent $60 billion, with $160 billion more promised over the next five years. With global aggregate demand (especially in the construction sector) far below 2007 levels, Libya's increase in post-2007 demand promised much-needed relief for U.S. and British firms, especially in the construction management and architectural-design sectors. If Libya becomes a failed state, Western firms will likely be excluded from future infrastructure projects. In that scenario, only countries like China and Turkey-- with their greater tolerance for corruption and human rights abuses -- will benefit from Libya's billions. Terrorism is a real concern. Although Qaddafi's rhetoric that the rebels consist of "jihadists on drugs" is funny enough to be a big hit on YouTube, Cyrenaica has long been a productive recruiting ground for global jihadi causes. If the West abandons the Cyrenaican rebels, it will not be a surprise to see more Cyrenaican fighters returning to Iraq by 2012. In fact, Libyans formed the third-largest fighting contingent in Iraq until U.S. counterterrorism cooperation with Qaddafi began to stem the flow in 2006. Similarly, during his dtente with the West from 2003 until 2010, Qaddafi proved himself a reliable ally against the trans-Saharan networks of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Were the retro-rogue Qaddafi to remain in power post-2011 or should Libya become a failed state where nonstate actors could find easy cash and safe havens, the grave consequences would resonate from North Africa to the African Sahel region and the larger Islamic world. The United States and especially Europe cannot afford a protracted Libyan civil war, a Libya ruled by a spurned Qaddafi, or a return to the 1990s situation in which multilateral sanctions largely removed Libya from the world economy, making it a breeding ground for dysfunctional governance and Islamic extremism. Libya is simply too big to be allowed to fail.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
EU Credibility DA
The consultation destroys EU credibility it is zero-sum with NATO Schmidt 07 the senior analyst for Europe in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State and former director of the NATO office at the State Department and as director for NATO affairs at the National Security Council, (John R., Last Alliance Standing? NATO after 9/11 Washington Quarterly PROVOCATIONS; Vol. 30, No. 1; Pg. 93. Lexis) If these trend lines are clear, the prospects for the future are not. U.S. ambitions for NATO clearly conflict with French ambitions for the EU. Furthermore, even though most EU NATO members find themselves caught in the middle, the current zero-sum nature of NATO-EU relations seems to portend continuing turmoil on the road ahead, to the detriment of both organizations and of transatlantic relations more generally. At the end of the day, the answer to how far Washington can take the alliance may depend as much on U.S. preferences as it does on how far the French and other NATO allies are prepared to have it go. Similarly, for the EU, the availability of resources, not just ambition, will have a profound effect on what kind of security and defense role the EU can play in the future. EU credibility stops Iran proliferation EIU Views Wire 06 (March 16, EU/Iran politics: Soft Power and a Nuclear Iran Proquest) In October 2003 the EU took its first major step in resolving a security problem outside Europe, with the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the UK travelling to Tehran. It was a promising start. Iran agreed to halt its production of enriched uranium - material which is needed to create a nuclear weapon - and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty additional protocol which allows for more intrusive inspections. Soft power - the ability to persuade without cohesion - appeared to be working. Building on that, the Paris agreement of November 2004 ensured Iran would "extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities". For the EU the Paris agreement was a step back from the logic of escalation inherent in the UN system and laid the foundations for a comprehensive deal which would hold for at least a decade. In August 2005 this agreement was eventually presented to the Iranian authorities, offering a way of rapidly improving trade and political relations with the West in return for Iran giving up its uranium enrichment activities indefinitely. It was summarily rejected by Tehran. "They did not even read it," one EU diplomat remarked at the time. Uranium enrichment activities resumed .Since then, despite more EU-Iran negotiations and a Russian offer to enrich uranium and then transport it to Iran, the issue has steadily moved to the United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency and on to the Security Council, where Iran now faces the threat of sanctions. The limits of the EU's ability to entice and of its soft power appear to have been shown. Iranian proliferation poses multiple scenarios for nuclear war The Daily Texan, 2004 (September 8, http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2004/09/08/Opinion/IranNuclear.Program.Should.Not.Be.Ignored712197.html) A nuclear Iran would be a geopolitical disaster for the United States. It would pose a direct nuclear threat to Israel making the prospect of nuclear exchange between the two greatest powers in the region an ever-present fear. It would put pressure on other nations in the area, fearful of Iranian aggression, to develop their own nuclear programs. Regional faith in the American security guarantee would wane as local leaders questioned America's willingness to become involved in a nuclear exchange far from its borders. We would be left with the most unstable region in the world simultaneously becoming the most nuclear. This is in addition to the obvious danger that Iran would always be able to covertly supply a terrorist group with a small nuclear device that could one day be detonated in America.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
No Impact to EU Collapse
No impact to NATO/EU collapse China Daily 6 20 11 (Why Europe no longer matters, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/201106/20/content_12737673.htm) With Europe's influence waning sharply in the next decades, the transatlantic alliance will play a far diminished role, and it is in regions like Asia that the 21st century will be most likely molded and defined, predicts Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in an op-ed piece published by the Washington Post on June 18. Haass, who also served as the director of policy and planning at the State Department from 2001 to 2003, gave his pessimistic assessment after the outgoing US Secretary of State Robert Gates berated NATO and America's European allies in his final policy speech, warning of "the real possibility for a dim if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance." "Certainly, one reason for NATO's increasing marginalization stems from the behavior of its European members," says Haass. These failings include a lack of coordination, an inclination to make critical decisions nationally and the stalled process of genuinely formulating a common defense policy, which were all exposed in the intervention in Libya. More important, since the end of Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the political willingness for European nations to provide adequate public funds to the military has been declining steadily. Ironically, Haass notes, it is precisely "Europe's own notable successes" - the building of an integrated Europe over the past half-century and the freedom and stability it enjoys - that transatlantic ties will matter less in the future. Moreover, political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also "ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence," according to the article, as grappling with mounting economic problems and an ageing population takes precedence. "The conclusions are simple" for the US, says Haass. It should first accept and adapt to the change. Then the US should also maintain or develop bilateral relations with "those few countries in Europe willing and able to act in the world. Finally, other allies - South Korea and Japan in Asia or Israel and Saudi Arabia in Middle East - are likely to become more relevant partners in these regions that present the greatest potential challenges. No impact to EU collapse diminished influence and shift in geopolitical competition to Asia Haass 6 17 11 president of the Council on Foreign Relations and former director of policy and planning at the State Department, (Richard B, Why Europe no longer matters, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-europe-no-longermatters/2011/06/15/AG7eCCZH_story.html) Ironically, Europes own notable successes are an important reason that transatlantic ties will matter less in the future. The current euro zone financial crisis should not obscure the historic accomplishment that was the building of an integrated Europe over the past half-century. The continent is largely whole and free and stable. Europe, the principal arena of much 20th-century geopolitical competition, will be spared such a role in the new century and this is a good thing. The contrast with Asia could hardly be more dramatic. Asia is increasingly the center of gravity of the world economy; the historic question is whether this dynamism can be managed peacefully. The major powers of Europe Germany, France and Great Britain have reconciled, and the regional arrangements there are broad and deep. In Asia, however, China, Japan, India, Vietnam, the two Koreas, Indonesia and others eye one another warily. Regional pacts and arrangements, especially in the political and security realms, are thin. Political and economic competition is unavoidable; military conflict cannot be ruled out. Europeans will play a modest role, at best, in influencing these developments. If Asia, with its dynamism and power struggles, in some ways resembles the Europe of 100 years ago, the Middle East is more reminiscent of the Europe of several centuries before: a patchwork of top-heavy monarchies, internal turbulence, unresolved conflicts, and nationalities that cross and contest boundaries. Europes ability to influence the course of this region, too, will be sharply limited.
Michigan 2011
Alt Causes
U.S.-EU relations will inevitably decline --- demographic and political differences Haass 6 17 11 president of the Council on Foreign Relations and former director of policy and planning at the State Department (Richard B, Why Europe no longer matters, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-europe-no-longermatters/2011/06/15/AG7eCCZH_story.html) Political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes precedence. No doubt, Europes security challenges are geographically, politically and psychologically less immediate to the population than its economic ones. Mounting financial problems and the imperative to cut deficits are sure to limit what Europeans can do militarily beyond their continent. Moreover, intimate ties across the Atlantic were forged at a time when American political and economic power was largely in the hands of Northeastern elites, many of whom traced their ancestry to Europe and who were most interested in developments there. Todays United States featuring the rise of the South and the West, along with an increasing percentage of Americans who trace their roots to Africa, Latin America or Asia could hardly be more different. American and European preferences will increasingly diverge as a result. Alt causes to lack of cooperation with Europe Ra 6 22 11 specialist in International Affairs of the Paris Institute of Political Sciences, current journalist for the Washington times (Benjamin, The current state of Atlantic Relations: Part II of II, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/word-national-interest/2011/jun/22/current-stateatlantic-relations-part-ii-ii/) Obama had a golden opportunity to take the Alliance to another level, but nothing happened. Deauville was the result. The French who cannot rely on a relationship with Washington are hoping to gain a head start in a race to Moscow. The Germans are, as yet, conservative, but if there is any country which can derail the process of European unity singlehandedly and still profit from it, that country is not France but Germany. The French are thus straddling between Moscow, Washington, and London with whom they recently signed a military agreement. The old politics of the 19th century have reappeared albeit in gentler form. Wars are impossible, but if present conditions persist, so too is the unity of Europe. The intent of this article is not to criticize the current Administration. With its responsibilities in the Middle East and Asia, it is understandable that the President would turn his gaze to Europe and decide that a policy for such an uneventful region is not worth the time. But there are consequences for such a lack of policy; for there is a country which, unlike the United States, has a very clear idea of what it wishes to achieve in Europe. Alt causes to EU collapse relations and lack of cooperation Levy 6 10 11 (Phil, Foreign policy shrapnel, when Europe blows, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/10/foreign_policy_shrapnel_when_europe_blows) 1. Relations between European countries could dramatically worsen. The tensions that union was meant to bury are apparently not as deep as one might have thought. A year ago, when the first Greek bailout was under discussion, some German parliamentarians suggested that the profligate Greeks should just sell off some islands. "We give you cash, you give us Corfu," one paper offered. Greeks responded with recollections of Nazi plunder and atrocities. Meanwhile, countries like Spain, with strikingly high unemployment, are being told to launch austerity programs, under the tutelage of the Germans and the French. Any potential for resentment there? 2. Broken promises and unbearable burdens can spur resurgent nationalism. When Germans gave up their beloved Deutsche Mark, they were assured that the strength of the Euro would be paramount and bailouts would be verboten. Now Europe's leaders have clarified that there would be no bailouts, except in case of emergency (but presumably still ruling out non-emergency bailouts, should that issue ever arise). The more prosperous nations of Europe are racking up significant liabilities through their handling of the crisis, often in opaque ways. This has already led to the rise of parties like the True Finns. It is not hard to imagine less-benign movements who point to the threat of inflation and painful budget cuts and claim that their leaders have
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 56/182 betrayed their nation to serve foreign interests. There is some precedent (see Weimar Germany). And how long will comity hold among political parties in the troubled countries at Europe's periphery (Ireland, Portugal, Spain)? As austerity bites and unemployment rises, we can only hope that the policy objections come from politicians channeling the critiques of non-European economists, as opposed to demagogues peddling more pernicious prescriptions. 3. This raises core issues for the G-20. The prestige of the new, premiere forum for handling international issues is at stake with efforts to push global rebalancing. One of the major obstacles to progress in Seoul last fall was Germany's objection to proposals to have objective criteria for when countries' imbalances are excessive. The G-20 was left with a long, tedious process of trying to come up with euphemisms for "excessive current account imbalance." Nor is the G-20 the only institutTion of global economic governance that is implicated. The IMF is a direct participant in the European bailouts, a fact which is coloring discussions over a new Managing Director. 4. This severely undercuts a more multilateral approach to foreign policy. The Obama administration has tried to distinguish itself from its predecessor by stressing the need to enlist more partners in cooperative endeavors (though, as Josh Rogin has reported, this has not always played out as advertised). The number of major potential partners in global undertakings is relatively limited. If Europe's time, money, and focus are consumed by internal crises, then it will be less willing and able to join the United States in leading multilateral efforts elsewhere in the world. Decades of European stability have been a wonderful boon. It is hard to see how that stability survives the continent's current economic crisis. If Europe falters, the ramifications will not be limited to the world of finance.
Michigan 2011
EU Collapse Inevitable
EU collapse is inevitable no momentum, financial crisis, nationalism Gati 7 1 11 , Senior Adjunct Professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies and Foreign Policy Institute Fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies (Charles, This is a revised version of the outline prepared for a keynote address at the conference A Strong Europe in a Globalized World, organized by CEPA in conjunction with the Center for Transatlantic Relations, the International Center for Democratic Transitions in Budapest and the Polish Institute for International Affairs, Lost Momentum: The European Union in 2011, http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=311) Ill mention six of the main components of this systemic crisis: 1. The memory of what Europe had done to itself before Jean Monnet began to dream of European Unity is fading among new generations. Who recalls who is even familiar with the centuries of war since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648? Who knows that there was a time when Germany and France had fought more wars against each other than any other two countries in Europe? That Europe is no longer the fire hazard it used to be and that France and Germany are close allies and friends, are the almost-forgotten huge achievements of European integration. (An exception to my generalization worth mentioning is Poland, where history under the current government has been used for constructive ends.) 2. The momentum to build an integrated Europe is no more. Few remember the touching poetry of Central Europes intellectuals longing to belong once again to Europe. How many such odes have we seen lately? Now there isnt much of that even in countries that seek EU membership, let alone in those that are already member states. It may be that after all these decades of existence, poetry has to give way to the day-today tasks performed by faceless bureaucrats in Brussels. Yet, without such longing, without some momentum, without a vision that contains both a strategic imperative and an emotional commitment, the European Idea may dissipate. 3. The prospects for either deepening or widening are now poor, at best. After Croatia, its hard to see which country will enter the EU next probably none for years, perhaps decades, to come. As it is, theres a widespread resentment among old members that once a new member is admitted, it forgets its promises and neglects its commitments. How many old member states would now vote to let in all 10 new applicants from Central and Eastern Europe? As for deepening, the trend is in the opposite direction. Today, politicians everywhere talk not about opening borders, but closing them. If Denmark, of all countries a model of tolerance and rationality can entertain a plan to get around Schengen, then something is rotten not only in the state of Denmark but in the EU as well. 4. The crisis of 2011 is also fueled by the growing uncertainties of Europes political and economic elites. In the past, for many decades, the European Idea was carried on by the elites, not by the people. Lets face it: Huge minorities, at times even small majorities, of the people never cared very much for integration. Today, integration lacks decisive support not only from the average European (as in the past), but increasingly from the elites. (An exception, once again, is Poland where excluding the PiS, the right-wing Kaczyski party the elites keep voicing their deep commitment to genuine integration.) 5. Coincidentally, a nationalist surge haunts Europe. In most places, it is against immigrants. Hatred toward Muslims and Roma is widespread. In some countries, there is a broader sentiment against all foreigners. Look at Finland or Sweden. It is once again fashionable to blame someone abroad the IMF, George Soros, capitalism, the Jews for every problem ranging from poverty to corruption. Consider the frightening paradox: Much of Europe has no physical borders, but this nationalist surge is hard at work building mental borders of xenophobia and conspiracy theories about foreigners. 6. Leaving to the end the obvious and certainly most important component of todays crisis: 2011 is the year when economic and financial calamities are tearing Europe apart. Without going into details, it is at least possible, if not probable, to predict that the austerity measures needed in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and elsewhere could destabilize not only those countries but the EU itself. Theres a good chance that eventually, Greece will have to leave the Euro-zone. Today, many countries that once dreamed of adopting the Euro soon, have changed their minds; that dream, it seems, has turned into a nightmare. My conclusion is that the European Idea that was born after World War II has peaked. The European Union is backsliding. Its creative edge is pass. Increasingly, it reminds me of a fire-brigade running from one fire to another without having the time, the energy and the leadership to consider its long-term objectives. It seems to me that Europe needs to recapture the spirit of its founders and reset its priorities. Collapse of the EU inevitable financial crisis
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 58/182 The Economic Collapse 2010 (12 23 10, Has the Financial Collapse of Europe Now Become Inevitable?, http://www.infowars.com/has-the-financial-collapse-of-europe-now-become-inevitable/) What in the world is happening over in Europe? Well, it is actually quite simple. We are witnessing the slow motion collapse of the euro and of the European financial system. At this point, many analysts are convinced that a full-blown financial implosion in Europe has become inevitable. Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, France and Belgium are all drowning in an ocean of unsustainable debt. Meanwhile, Germany and the few other healthy members of the EU continue to try to keep all of the balls in the air by bailing everyone out. But can Germany keep bailing the rest of the EU out indefinitely? Are the German people going to continue to be willing to hand out gigantic sacks of cash to fix the problems of other EU nations? The Irish were just bailed out, but their problems are far from over. There are rumors that Greece will soon need another bailout. Spain, Portugal, Italy and France have all entered crisis territory. At the same time, there are a whole host of nations in eastern Europe that are also on the verge of financial collapse. So is there any hope that a major sovereign debt crisis can be averted at this point? One would like to think that there is always hope, but each month things just seem to keep getting worse. Confidence in European government debt continues to plummet. The yield on 10-year Irish bonds is up to 8.97%. The yield on 10-year Greek bonds is up to an astounding 12.01%. The cost of insuring French debt hit a new record high on December 20th. Bond ratings all over Europe are being slashed or are being threatened with being slashed. For example, Moodys Investors Service recently cut Irelands bond rating by five levels. Now there is talk that Spain, Belgium and even France could soon all have their debt significantly downgraded as well. But if the borrowing costs for these troubled nations keep going up, that is just going to add to their financial problems and swell their budget deficits. In turn, larger budget deficits will cause investors to lose even more confidence. So how far are we away from a major crisis point? Professor Willem Buiter, the chief economist at Citibank, is warning that quite a few EU nations could financially collapse in the next few months if they are not quickly bailed out. The market is not going to wait until March for the EU authorities to get their act together. We could have several sovereign states and banks going under. They are being far too casual.
Michigan 2011
Say No
EU will say no disagreements between leading countries about space Johnson 2006 Policy Department of the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (Dr Rebecca E, June, Europe's Space Policies and their relevance to ESD, http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/PE381369EN.pdf) Europes engagement in space currently occurs on two levels: collective endeavours coordinated through the 17-member European Space Agency (ESA) 5 ; and the national programmes of a few key states, notably France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK (and to a lesser extent Belgium and the Netherlands) 6 . These states tend to take the lead in determining Europes attitudes towards space, but there are tensions between those, like France, which seeks a more autonomous industrial and military role for Europe, and Britain, which would like to integrate more closely with US programmes. Some EU Members interpretation of their commitments to NATO, where US space policy objectives predominate, have contributed to the difficulties over agreeing a progressive, coherent European Space Policy. EU will say no US space policy perceived as over-militaristic without benefiting Europe as a whole Johnson 2006 Policy Department of the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (Dr Rebecca E, June, Europe's Space Policies and their relevance to ESD, http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/PE381369EN.pdf) Under the auspices of the Commission, several studies have been conducted in recent years, culminating in three meetings of the Ministerial-level European Space Council. Though it is widely accepted that to support the ESDP and Petersberg tasks and enhance the competitiveness of Europes space-related industries, the EU needs to needs to have greater independence and coherence in its space policy and programmes, the European Space Council has been struggling to identify the objectives and elements of a European space policy. This paper aims to inform Parliamentarians of the current state of play and identify some of the major elements that will need to be carefully considered in order that a space policy is adopted that truly contributes to European peace, security and foreign policy, and to equip policymakers to avoid the pitfalls that the overmilitarisation of US space policy has become trapped in.
Michigan 2011
Leadership DA Link
A strong EU would be isolationist and kill the alliance Bolton, 9 JD, senior fellow at AEI (11/25, John R., American Enterprise Institute, Less Than Sum of Its Parts http://www.aei.org/article/101352, mat) The European Union, fortified by the Treaty of Lisbon, last week selected a full-time president and foreign minister. Tony Blair, a candidate for the presidency, was rejected in favor of Belgium's little-known prime minister, Herman Van Rompuy, through a process so opaque that selecting a new pope in the College of Cardinals looks transparent. The EU's first foreign minister has no foreign policy experience. How will the Lisbon Treaty and its new bureaucratic leadership affect EU relations with Washington? Most likely, contrary to the treaty's advocates, there will be no effect at all. The EU has accomplished the seemingly impossible, taking a major step forward and then almost simultaneously reversing it. One form of EU gridlock has simply been replaced by another, all created by Europeans for Europeans. Over the years, advocates of a stronger EU argued closer integration would make the EU better able to stand up to the United States. These same advocates then turned around and argued to Americans that a stronger EU would be a better global partner for the United States. The plain truth is that the EU is less than the sum of its parts, and has been for quite some time. Maybe they thought we weren't paying attention. In any event, we still don't know which half of their internally contradictory argument, if either, is correct. Despite endless negotiations, innumerable treaties and communiques, and endless prattle by pro-Brussels commentators, the EU remains weak and ineffective internationally. Critically, a "strong EU" is manifestly not the same as a strong Europe, and not the kind of partner Washington needs. Drafters and proponents of the Lisbon Treaty once proudly called it an EU "constitution," but this label was disappeared for more anodyne nomenclature after a few essentially cosmetic changes to its text. Many, whether for or against ratification, downplayed the name change as mere spin, which it was to an extent. But more importantly, when "the European project" either can't tell the truth to Europe's people or can't decide what the truth actually is, it is in deep trouble. So today, the EU has a potentially strong, new treaty but weak, new leadership. Until the peoples within the EU decide what they really want--and there is ample to reason to believe they do not want a "stronger EU"--no amount of treaty tinkering or intricate personnel selection will change the underlying absence of agreement on the way forward. Indeed, obscuring that basic disagreement, a well-honed EU skill, long term only makes the problem worse. Even if Europeans could create a "strong EU," it would not be a close U.S. ally. Europe is already so internally focused that a "strong EU" is ironically even more likely to be inward looking and isolationist than it is today, precisely the opposite of America's preference. Moreover the visceral anti-Americanism permeating much of Europe's politics, fading only when presented with a palpably post-American president like Barack Obama, will surely be even more influential in a "strong EU." The plain truth is that the EU is less than the sum of its parts, and has been for quite some time. From the U.S. perspective, this is bad news indeed, because responding to a challenging world, filled with threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, requires a strong Europe to work with the United States. What would most benefit America and Europe is a group of confident, independent European nation-states capable of deciding democratically they want to defend their interests, their values and their allies around the world. We once had that in NATO, but no longer. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the demands of EU "communitaire" behavior have weakened both NATO and its individual European members. When Canada complains, justifiably, that Europe is not pulling its weight in Afghanistan, Europeans should realize the trouble they're in. Given the EU's indecisiveness last week, it is only a matter of time before advocates of greater European integration call for yet another treaty. This has been the consistent pattern, and there is no reason to think it will not reassert itself. When it does, that is the tangible opportunity to call into question the entire integrationist effort. Have the debate then, while advocates of yet another sub silentio constitutional effort are just getting organized, rather than waiting until a document has emerged, ready to be rammed through by parliamentary majorities insulated from popular opinion.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 61/182 Individual European nations, led by strong leaders, will not invariably be U.S. "poodles," the malicious and fanciful charge leveled against Mr. Blair by opponents of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Strong leaders should and likely will advocate their countries' interests to Washington, where issues can be identified and hopefully resolved. What such a re-emergence of strong European nations will avoid, however, is EU decisionmaking, a rare human process that repeatedly makes molehills out of mountains, as it just did in selecting its new leadership.
Michigan 2011
Say No Militarization
China says no to militarization AFP 05 (China Says It Opposes Militarization Of Outer Space, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace05za.html, Hemanth) China Thursday said it is opposed to the militarization of space, and supports international legal documents ensuring its peaceful use. "Space is our shared treasure and we have consistently maintained the need for the peaceful use of space so as to benefit all of mankind," foreign ministry spokesman Kong Quan told a regular briefing. "We are opposed to the militarization of outer space. We support preventive measures, including the adoption of international legal documents to guarantee the peaceful use of outer space," he said. Kong's remarks came a day after the White House said it was updating its space policy while denying a report that the changes under consideration could lead to the fielding of offensive and defensive weapons in space.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 65/182 new defence secretary to replace Robert Gates, Xinhua said. The announcement of Mullen's visit comes after the United States and the Philippines launched 11 days of joint naval exercises on Tuesday amid a simmering maritime row over territorial claims in the South China Sea. Manila and Washington emphasised the exercises were aimed at deepening defence ties, and not linked to the rising concern about China's allegedly aggressive actions in the strategic and potentially resource-rich waters. As tensions in the South China Sea have mounted, China-US military exchanges have also quickened pace with Gates meeting Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie in Singapore in early June, following a January visit to Beijing. New cooperation efforts solve relations Xinhua 6/27/11 (Commentary: Seeking China-U.S. cooperation in Asian-Pacific via new channel, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-06/27/c_13951047.htm) BEIJING, June 26 (Xinhua) -- China and the United States rounded off their first round of consultations on Asian-Pacific affairs in the U.S. state of Hawaii on Saturday, thus opening a new channel of bilateral communications on issues concerning the world's most populous and economically dynamic region. The Hawaii consultations, part of their efforts to materialize consensus reached by the two sides upon in their latest round of strategic and economic talks this May, were initiated to promote cooperation and understanding between the world's top two economies in the Asia-Pacific region where they both have vital interests in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity. The two sides exchanged views on the general situation of the Asia-Pacific region, policies on the region as well as other regional issues of common concern. Japans's Nihon Keizai Shimbun or Nikkei commented that the consultation would facilitate bilateral communication and coordination on key regional issues in a more convenient and timely manner. In fact, the birth of this consultation mechanism has resulted from Washington's strategic emphasis on the Asian-Pacific region and China's growing global influence. Since it came into office in early 2009, the Obama administration has repeatedly reaffirmed U.S. identity as a Pacific country as well as a strong desire to play an active role in the region. Meanwhile, Washington is trying to reinforce its engagement with many organizations in the region, for instance, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). U.S. President Barack Obama also declared he would attend the East Asia summit in Jakarta, capital of Indonesia late this year. For China, a peaceful and stable Asian-Pacific region is definitely a prerequisite to sustain its fast and steady economic growth and social development. Facing increasing U.S. presence in the region, China said it welcomes the United States to the region as long as it could play a constructive role for the region's peace and development. Chinese President Hu Jintao once said the Asia-Pacific region is where China and the United States have the most overlapping interests. Cooperation between the two countries is crucial to the region as well as the growth of China-U.S. relations. Needless to say, the two countries have differences in the region as they intensify their interactions. The consultation mechanism could help them narrow or bridge these divergences. To make the talks more effective, it is imperative for both sides to respect each other's core interests and major concerns and follow generally accepted norms of international relations in a join effort to effectively tackle the hot-spot issues in the region and face their differences in an objective and sober manner. At present, the Asia-Pacific region is noted for social stability and sustained and dynamic economic growth. And countries in the region have become even more interdependent. It is in the best strategic interest of both China and the United States to have a stable Asia-Pacific region and the world at large to boost common development. As long as they are committed to such a consensus, cooperation between China and the United States will surely bring them greater benefits. Cooperation high now and solves Gang 6/24/11 (Ding, China Daily, China, US launch new win-win cooperation platform, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-06/24/content_12771662.htm) The first round of consultations between China and the United States on Asia-Pacific affairs will be held in Hawaii on June 25. Compared to the existing 60-plus consultation mechanisms between the two countries, the Asia-Pacific affairs consultation mechanism appears a little "late." However, it was actually launched at the right time, given the development of China-U.S. relations and the current situation in the region. China and the United States are two world powers facing each other across the Pacific Ocean. They have conducted fruitful cooperation in handling Asia-Pacific affairs and made great contributions to regional peace, stability, and prosperity. During Chinese President Hu Jintao's state visit to the United States this past January, the heads of state of the two countries vowed to follow the trend of the times, and to work together toward a
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 66/182 cooperative partnership based on mutual respect and mutual benefit, ensuring that the two countries' cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region will move in the right direction. The United States has long dominated the political, economic, and security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region, while China, as an emerging great power in the region, is bound to play a major role in transforming the landscape. The interests of the two countries in the region overlap to some extent, which has caused friction. The two countries are both located in the Asia-Pacific region, so it is understandable that they have overlapping interests. Proper handling of their overlapping interests will create a significant and positive impact on the regional peace, development and prosperity. The Asia-Pacific region is currently searching for a deep economic integration and is in a period of transforming to a new security pattern. The China-U.S. consultation is the inevitable product of this transitory stage. There are many hot issues in the Asia-Pacific region and regional diversity and complexity is very prominent. China and the United States have common interests and common responsibility in the Asia-Pacific region. This has decided that the two countries can only work together in this region. The China-U.S. consultation on Asia-Pacific affairs is not aimed at "setting the tone" or "setting the direction" for various AsiaPacific affairs, but rather planning and promoting bilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region through the exchange of views to properly handle related conflicts and differences and form an interaction pattern with rules. China and the United States strengthening mutual trust is the reliable guarantee of the stable development of the Asia-Pacific region. China will strengthen contact with Asia-Pacific countries in various fields along with its rapid economic development and growing strength in order to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. However, China will remain a developing country for a long period of time, and China's development will not constitute a challenge to other countries because China does not have such a strategic will. The peaceful development of the Asia-Pacific region requires a new political, economic and security pattern and the creation of more space for the development of emerging markets, such as China. China and the United States strengthening consultation is conducive to ensure a peaceful interest distribution method of the Asia-Pacific region in the transitory stage and will also help both sides adapt to their exchanges in the new pattern of the future. Some countries in the Asia-Pacific region are concerned about the rise of China. Some traditional allies of the United States still expect it to counterbalance China and their mindsets are understandable. The countries seeking to counterbalance China simply aim to use such a balance to maintain regional peace and stability and maximize interests for their development. The more results the China-U.S. cooperation produces, the more benefits they will receive. None of the countries are willing to face a situation in which they will have to choose which side they will be on, China or the United States. The confrontation between China and the United States is harmful to both sides, because it will not only increase the development costs of both sides, but also lead to the loss of security in the region. As for the entire Asia Pacific region, the peaceful coexistence between China and the United States is beneficial to both sides and all of the parties involved. Therefore, the China-U.S. consultation on Asia-Pacific affairs to be held in Hawaii is of considerable symbolic significance. The island is located in the middle ground between Beijing and Washington D.C. and is around 8,000 kilometers away from both of the two capitals. What a huge area it will be when drawing a circle with Hawaii in the center and with its radius covering both capitals.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 70/182 films and other products -- from luxury goods to industrial machinery. The International Intellectual Property Alliance, which represents U.S. copyright industry groups, has estimated U.S. trade losses in China due to piracy at $3.5 billion in 2009. Meanwhile, U.S. customs officials say 80 percent of the fake tennis shoes, clothing, luxury bags and other goods they seize each year at the border come from China. China says it is making progress against intellectual property piracy and launched many enforcement campaigns to stamp out bootlegged books, music, DVDs and software. Still, all are still openly available in Chinese shops and street stalls. China remains on the U.S. "priority watch list" of countries deemed to have serious copyright and trademark theft. Microsoft (MSFT.O) and other members of the Business Software Alliance in the United States complain nearly 80 percent of the software installed on personal computers in China is pirated. They have called for a "results-based" deal to boost U.S. software sales and exports to China by 50 percent in two years. China has said it is making progress in its campaign to ensure government offices do not use pirated software. Two-fifths of central government offices were using legal software and another two fifths were buying it, an official from China's National Copyright Administration said. INDIGENOUS INNOVATION, STATEOWNED ENTERPRISES Big U.S. companies like General Electric (GE.N) are worried that China's industrysupporting "indigenous innovation" policies could make it more difficult for them to compete in China. The "indigenous innovation" regulations are intended to promote innovation within China and reduce its dependence on foreign technology and companies. U.S. industry fears China is using discriminatory policies in areas from government procurement to technical standards and tax policy to promote its state-owned enterprises at the expense of foreign firms. U.S. companies are also worried that under indigenous innovation, they may be forced to transfer development and ownership of intellectual property to China to participate in the country's huge government procurement market. President Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders have indicated goods produced by Chinese affiliates of U.S. and other foreign firms would be considered indigenous innovation products. But the Obama administration and U.S. businesses have said they want stronger followup from Beijing to ensure that commitment is kept. U.S. companies also complain that state-owned enterprises receive many other unfair advantages from the Chinese government. U.S. officials have said they would push in various forums for rules to establish a "competitively neutral environment" for state-owned enterprises. RARE EARTHS China, which controls 97 percent of available global rare earth supplies, has alarmed its trading partners by restricting exports of the minerals which are used in a variety of clean energy and high-industry technologies. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has pressed the United States to secure a commitment from China to remove rare earth export taxes and quotas, and the United Steelworkers union also raised concern about the issue in a petition to the U.S. Trade Representative. China has defended its restrictions as measures to manage supplies and control pollution associated with rare earth production. USTR officials have said they are looking at what action they can take, and note they have challenged other Chinese export restrictions at the World Trade Organization. U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS Beijing complains that Washington, while pushing for greater access for U.S. firms in the Chinese market, imposes unwarranted restrictions on Chinese investment in the United States, often citing national security concerns. China says it wants a level playing field for its investment into the United States, saying that its intentions are benign and will benefit the U.S. economy and create jobs. A new report this week estimates that China's outward investment in new greenfield projects or mergers and acquisitions could increase sharply by 2020 to an estimated $1 trillion to $2 trillion. The United States says it is open to Chinese investment in all but a few cases, but accuses China of blocking investment completely in some industries or imposing onerous conditions on foreign companies. China says it would also buy more from the United States if not for overly restrictive U.S. controls on high-technology goods. The United States says China's argument is overstated, but it is in the process of reforming its export control system, which could lead to increased sales of some lesssensitive items. Experts say better Chinese protection of U.S. intellectual property is a prerequisite for any major easing of export controls. Without that, say analysts, U.S. tech exports will taper off as Chinese firms copy the products. Trade disputes spill over to political tensions NYT 09 (China-U.S. Trade Dispute Has Broad Implications, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/business/global/15trade.html, Hemanth) HONG KONG An increasingly acrimonious trade dispute between China and the United States over the past three days is officially about tires, chickens and cars, but is really much broader. Enlarge This Image John Loomis for The New York Times China may move against new U.S. tariffs on tires with duties on chickens and
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 71/182 car parts. Above, a chicken farm in Arkansas. Both governments face domestic pressure to take a tougher stand against the other on economic issues. But the trade frictions are increasing political tensions between the two nations even as they try to work together to revive the global economy and combat mutual security threats, like the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. On Friday evening in Washington, President Barack Obama announced that the United States would levy tariffs of up to 35 percent on tires from China. Chinas commerce ministry issued a formulaic criticism of the American action on Saturday, but after a frenzy of anti-American rhetoric on Chinese Web sites, the ministry unexpectedly announced on Sunday night that it would take the first steps toward imposing tariffs on American exports of automotive products and chicken meat. Late Monday, the ministry said in a statement that it was demanding talks with the United States on the tire tariffs. Carol J. Guthrie, a spokeswoman for the office of the United States trade representative, said earlier in the day that the United States wanted to avoid disputes with China and continue talks, but would look at any Chinese trade decisions for whether they comply with World Trade Organization rules. Eswar Prasad, a former China division chief at the International Monetary Fund, said rising trade tensions between the United States and China could become hard to control. They could cloud the Group of 20 meeting of leaders of industrialized and fast-growing emerging nations in Pittsburgh on Sept. 24 and 25, and perhaps affect Mr. Obamas visit to Beijing in November. This spat about tires and chickens could turn ugly very quickly, Mr. Prasad said. The Chinese governments strong countermove on Sunday night followed a weekend of nationalistic vitriol on Chinese Web sites. The U.S. is shameless! said one posting, while another called on the Chinese government to sell all of its huge holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds. But rising nationalism in China is making it harder for Chinese officials to gloss over American criticism. All kinds of policymaking, not just trade policy, is increasingly reactive to Internet opinion, said Victor Shih, a Northwestern University specialist in economic policy formulation. Mr. Obamas decision to impose a tariffs on Chinese tires is a signal that he plans to deliver on his promise to labor unions that he would more strictly enforce trade laws, especially against China, which has become the worlds factory while the United States has lost millions of manufacturing jobs. The trade deficit with China was a record $268 billion in 2008. China exported $1.3 billion in tires to the United States in the first seven months of 2009, while the United States shipped about $800 million in automotive products and $376 million in chicken meat to China, according to data from Global Trade Information Services in Columbia, South Carolina. For many years, American politicians have been able to take credit domestically for standing up to China by enacting largely symbolic measures against Chinese exports in narrowly defined categories. In the last five years, the U.S. Commerce Department has restricted Chinese imports of goods as diverse as bras and oil well equipment. For the most part, Chinese officials have grumbled but done little, preferring to preserve a lopsided trade relationship in which the United States buys $4.46 worth of Chinese goods for every $1 worth of American goods sold to China. Now, the delicate equilibrium is being disturbed. Chinas commerce ministry announced Sunday that it would investigate certain imported automotive products and certain imported chicken meat products originating from the United States to determine if they were being subsidized or dumped below cost in the Chinese market. A finding of subsidies or dumping would allow China to impose tariffs on these imports. The ministry did not mention the tire dispute in its announcement, portraying the investigations as based on the laws of our country and on World Trade Organization rules. But the timing of the announcement on a weekend and just after the tire decision in Washington sent an unmistakable message of retaliation. The official Xinhua news agency Web site prominently linked its reports on the tire dispute and the Chinese investigations. The commerce ministry statement, posted on its Web site, also hinted obliquely at the harm that a trade war could do while Western nations and Japan struggle to emerge from a severe economic downturn. China is willing to continue efforts with various countries to make sure that the world economy recovers as quickly as possible, the statement said. The Chinese government sometimes organizes blog postings to defend its own policies. But some postings on the tire decision have been implicitly critical of the Chinese government, making it unlikely that they are part of an orchestrated effort. Why did our government purchase so much U.S. government debt? said one posting signed by a Group of Angry Youths. It continued, We should get rid of all such U.S. investments. China has accumulated $2 trillion in foreign reserves, mostly in Treasury bonds and other dollar-denominated assets. It has done so by printing yuan on a massive scale and selling them to buy dollars. This has held down the value of yuan in currency markets and kept Chinese goods quite inexpensive in foreign markets. Chinas exports have soared -- China surpassed Germany in the first half of this year as the worlds largest exporter while Chinas imports have lagged, except for commodities like iron ore and oil that China lacks. Worries that China might sell Treasury bonds or even slow down its purchases of them have been a concern for the Bush and Obama administrations as they have tried to figure out how to address Chinas trade
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 72/182 and currency policies. But China now finances a much smaller portion of American borrowing than a year ago. The savings rate in the United States has climbed during the recession and many private investors around the world have been seeking the safety of Treasuries. At the same time, the Chinese economy relies heavily on exports to the United States, while the American economy is much less dependent on exports in the other direction. Exports to the United States, at 6 percent of Chinas entire economic output, account for 13 times as large a share of the Chinese economy as exports to China represent for the United States economy. The American Chamber of Commerce in China said in a statement on Monday afternoon, We respect the rights of governments to take W.T.O.-compliant trade actions, but caution both the U.S. and China against an escalation of restrictive trade measures that could undermine economic recovery in both nations. Products involved in trade disputes between the United States and China together make up only a minuscule sliver of the two countries trade relationship. The bigger risk for China, economists and corporate executives have periodically warned, is that trade frictions could cause multinationals to rethink their heavy reliance on Chinese factories in their supply chains. The Chinese targeting of autos and chickens affects two industries that may have the political muscle in the United States to dissuade the Obama administration from aggressively challenging Chinas policies. General Motors sees much of its growth coming from its China subsidiary, the second-largest auto company in China after Volkswagen. The farm lobby in the United States has long pressed for maximum access to a market of 1.3 billion mouths, and agriculture is one of the very few trade categories in which the United States runs a trade surplus with China. Chickens are a longstanding issue in Sino-American trade relations. The United States only allows the import of chicken meat from countries that meet food safety inspection requirements that are certified by the United States Department of Agriculture as equivalent to American standards. But Congress, worried about low-cost Chinese chickens at a time of international worries about food safety in China, has banned the Agriculture Department for the last several years from spending any money to certify Chinas procedures as equivalent. The Senate budget bill, expected to come up for a vote next week, would remove the ban. So Chinas latest move could represent an attempt to influence that vote. But spotlighting automotive trade may be risky for China. G.M. and Ford both rely mostly on local production to supply the Chinese market, because of steep Chinese tariffs on imported cars and car parts. But China has rapidly increased its share of the auto parts market in the United States over the past three years, at a time of rising unemployment in the Upper Midwest, where the manufacture of auto parts has long employed more people than the final assembly of cars.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 74/182 issues in economics and trade as well as security issues, such as the nuclear issues of the Korean Peninsula and Iran. Alt causeTaiwan recognition Crotty 09 (Bob, writer for Salon, a leading politics blog, U.S. Seeks to Recognize Taiwan, http://open.salon.com/blog/robcrotty/2009/08/11/us_seeks_to_recognize_taiwan, Hemanth) It's a little blip in today's Federal Register but the measurement by the Federal government is seeking a huge policy change in the Pacific: recognizing Taiwan. Taiwan has remained a flash point for potential violence in the Pacific since the 1940s and China's communist revolution, when the former Chinese regime was exiled to the small island nations. Few countries in the world continue to recognize the Taiwanese government as the legitimate Chinese government; in fact, Taiwan is technically referred to as the Republic of China. While Taiwan would settle for taking over China once again, it's fine working toward independence these days. Under Bush's reign, China threatened war if the U.S. recognized Taiwanese independence. It will be interesting to see what it's reaction is to this quiet mention in today's Register.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 82/182 Rublee, 9 lecturer at the University of Auckland and a former intelligence officer in the Defense Intelligence Agency (April 09, Maria Rost Rublee, Ph.D., Strategic Insights, The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/rubleeApr09.asp#author, JMP) International Determinants Because most domestic factors work to keep Japan non-nuclear, it is likely that any change in Japanese nuclear policy will be due to international forces. A number of external factors have the potential of dramatically changing the security dialogue within Japan. U.S. Withdrawal. Should the United States withdraw from the U.S-Japan Security Treaty or otherwise retract the nuclear umbrella, Japan will take the nuclear option much more seriously. One Japanese defense expert noted that the most important thing the United States can do to keep Japan from going nuclear is to maintain and strengthen the U.S.-Japan security relationship.[42] A U.S. withdrawal does not, however, guarantee that Japan would take the nuclear option. A number of Japanese defense analysts noted that a very strong conventional defense could take the place of a military nuclear capability. Others mentioned that because developing a second-strike capability would take years to develop, a nuclear force was less attractive especially considering how vulnerable the small island country is to any nuclear strike. Thus, the Japanese response to U.S. disengagement would not necessarily be a nuclear one, but the potential for a nuclear Japan certainly increases. U.S. Abandonment of Japan for China. Japans long-term concern is not North Korea; it is China. With Chinas aggressive, nontransparent military build-up, the Japanese are concerned about their ability to balance the potential superpower. With the United States on its side, the concern is greatly lessened. However, if Washington makes a strategic decision to align with China, the Japanese concern will spike. In such a scenario, the nuclear umbrella could technically remain in place, but its credibility would be greatly diminished. One expert noted that additional Japan passing could cause a gradual rethinking in Tokyo about the best ways to maintain its security.[43] Another expert was more blunt: Dont abandon us for China.[44] A nuclear response would not be immediate, nor likely (as in the case of a formal U.S. withdrawal), but its likelihood does increase. This is due in part to the fact that a strengthened U.S.-China relationship could cause resurgence in Japanese militarism and could tip the balance domestically for a stronger military, including a potential nuclear option. Growing ties between the U.S. and China could motivate Japan to nuclearize Choong, 10 Senior Writer (1/26/10, William, Straits Times, US-Japan security pact not as solid as it seems, Factiva, JMP) In the long-term, workshop participants sketched out several scenarios that could imperil the alliance: Reunification of the two Koreas, leading to calls for US troops to be withdrawn from South Korea as well as Japan; different perspectives emerging between Tokyo and Washington during another crisis in the Taiwan Strait; an emerging desire in Japan for an independent nuclear capability; and differing stances between Japan and the US on the emergence of China. The last two are the most pertinent. There are two interconnected dynamics here: Japanese fears of a 'Group of 2', or G-2, between Beijing and Washington, might compel it to abandon its 'three noes' nuclear position and adopt an independent nuclear deterrent. For now, at least, there is nothing to suggest that Japan would do so. But calls for it to go nuclear will grow as China and the US become increasingly tied in what one former US State Department official has called a 'mutual death grip' of shared interests. Japan's problem can be boiled down to two words: extended deterrence. For decades, Japan has depended on Washington's extended deterrence posture - a sophisticated term for saying that the country's security is guaranteed by America's nuclear umbrella. The doubt is simple: In a nuclear confrontation with a nuclear-armed state such as China, for example, would the US risk Los Angeles in order to save Tokyo? If at some point Tokyo feels that the US guarantee is no longer ironclad, it might decide to mull over other alternatives. Boosting U.S.-China relations will magnify Japanese security fears Murdock, et. al, 9 senior adviser at CSIS (Nov 09, Clark A. Project Director, Jessica Yeats, Contributing Authors Include Linton F. Brooks, M. Elaine Bunn, Franklin C. Miller and James L. Schoff, Exploring the
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 83/182 Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance Workshop Proceeding and Key Takeaways, http://csis.org/files/publication/091218_nuclear_posture.pdf, JMP) Closer U.S.-China Relations. Apart from Chinas military programs, closer U.S.-China ties raise serious questions about the U.S. tolerance for escalation. As LintonBrooks explains, a closer U.S. relationship with China will lead to a gap between U.S. and Japans security perspectives, weakening the U.S. commitment. Japan is closely watching the Obama administrations newly minted strategic reassurance policy toward China, which entails the U.S. government taking steps to convince China that it is not out to contain the emerging Asian power. 105 Assuming this policy remains, it shifts the burden toward improving the Japan-China relationship because the quality of the US-China relationship [is] limited by the quality of Japan-China relations.106 The perception that the U.S. is moving to develop closer ties with China at the expense of Japan will trigger nuclearization Campbell & Sunohara, 4 senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** visiting fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS (Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, 9. Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable, ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP) Conversely, the Japanese also worry that in the future the United States might develop closer ties with China the emerging economic and military leader of East Asiathan with Japan.62 Anxiety over Japan passing has become a regular feature in Tokyos preoccupations over a rising China, along with worries that China is beginning to replace Japan in American regional diplomatic priorities. Some Japanese fear that if these trends continue, a crisis in confidence could ensue. While it is today difficult to imagine a scenario that could lead to such a profound alienation between the United States and Japan, in the future such a development might prompt the Japanese to seek the independent means of defense that nuclear weapons would provide.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 86/182 prioritization of almost everything else. This even includes the volatile issue of Taiwan, which will elect a new president in March. Beijing regards the island as a disrespectful, wayward son that must--someday--be returned to the family fold. Yet "the disincentives for the Chinese to invade are high," Swaine reasons. "They will only do it if they have no choice." Taiwan doesn't want war with China either. It could not hold out alone for long, so Taiwan's survival would ultimately require intervention by U.S. forces, a scenario the U.S. military would much rather avoid. Swaine believes, however, that the United States will create serious problems for itself with Beijing, now and in decades to come, if it moves into a closer strategic relationship with Taiwan. "It's not that we shouldn't get closer to Taiwan simply because Beijing doesn't like it," he explains. Instead, we should avoid strategic intimacy because, "in the cost-benefit analysis, we gain more by not doing too much than if we do." Transforming the U.S.-Taiwan relationship into an outright, explicit, formal alliance, as some in Congress actually want, would not enhance the island's security but rather undermine it. That's because it would uproot Beijing's stake in improving its relationship with Washington, a Beijing priority that keeps its Taiwan ambitions in check. "Please understand what the Taiwanese authorities are doing when they request more high-profile arms than they can possibly use anyway," Swaine warns. "It's a mistake to make them look like a formal ally, like South Korea or Japan. Besides, they're not." That both Taiwan and the United States are electing presidents this year could trigger major debates and policy reviews. We need to convey a consistent and clear message that the American people want to get along with the Chinese people, but at the same time the American people don't want to see Taiwan kicked around. Yes, the new Taiwan president needs to protect the interests of his people, who on the whole want no part of the Beijing regime. That must be achieved without goading Beijing into a course of action that will lead to tragedy for everyone involved. A China-Taiwan conflict will escalate and cause extinction Cheong, 2000 East Asia Correspondent (Ching Cheong, The Straits Times, No one gains in war over Taiwan, 6-25-2000, Lexis-Nexis Universe) A cross-strait conflict, even at the lowest end of the intensity scale, will suffice to truncate, if not to reverse, the steep GNP growth trends of the past few years. Other than the quantifiable losses from disrupted trade flows, there is also the longer-term damage to consider. For example, it took Taiwan almost three decades to establish itself as the third largest producer of information technology (IT) products in the world. It is now the island's single largest foreign exchange earner. The Sept 21 earthquake last year demonstrated the risk involved in Taiwan's dependence on the IT industry. A few days of power blackouts disrupted chip-manufacturing operations on the island, which in turn sent prices of these components soaring worldwide. Not surprisingly, a scramble followed for alternative sources of supply. A blockade lasting three months will devastate the industry in Taiwan. Similarly, it has taken China more than two decades to establish itself as the second largest recipient of private direct investment. In recent years, such investment has amounted to more than 20 per cent of China's total capital formation. A capital outflow will follow if there is trouble across the strait. Other than China and Taiwan, Japan's economy is likely to be hurt too if the blockade disrupts its "life-line" -the sea lane through which flows its supplies of oil and other commodities. Though no physical loss will be incurred, the blockade will force up prices across the board as Japan is so dependent on this sea lane. The Asean region stands to gain in the short run. Those with strong IT industries, like Singapore and Malaysia, will carve a big slice from what was previously Taiwan's share. Similarly, as investment flees China, the Asean countries might be able to intercept this flow and benefit thereby. Politically, the blockade is likely to provoke Sino-phobia in the region. Japan's rightwing forces will seize this golden opportunity to demand a revision of the post-war Constitution prohibiting its rearmament. Asean countries having territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea will beef up their defence budgets. Ethnic Chinese population in these countries may have to contend with increased suspicion or worse as Sinophobia rises.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 87/182 The US stands to gain. So long as its stays on the sidelines, it does not lose the Chinese market. At the same time its defence industry gains as countries in the region start stocking up on arms in anticipation of trouble. DESTROYING THE TAIWAN MILITARY THE medium intensity scenario postulates a situation in which Beijing wages a war against Taiwan. The objective here is to obliterate its military capability which is seen as underpinning its independence movement. The outcome: Taiwan is brought to its knees but only after widespread death and destruction have been inflicted on the island and the coastal provinces of China. In this scenario, the US while feeling obliged to support Taiwan militarily is not party to a full-scale war with China. Washington's primary concern would be to keep it to a "limited war" to prevent hostilities from spinning out of control. Limited though it may be, the war will set back the economies of China and Taiwan by at least two to three decades. All the short-term gains enjoyed by the Asean countries in the low-intensity scenario will be nullified as the conflict intensifies. In this medium-intensity scenario, no one gains. Politically, all countries are forced to take sides. This decision is particularly hard to make in those countries having a sizeable ethnic-Chinese population. THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 90/182 chartered US China Security & Economic Review Commission, Sustaining Deterrence on the Taiwan Strait[1], http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.228/pub_detail.asp, Hemanth) While seasoned observers are identifying what may be a second freeze on arms sales to Taiwan,[2] the 66 F16C fighters the Obama Administration has not yet approved for sale to Taiwan may only constitute the very beginning of a new phase of arms sales that will be required to sustain deterrence on the Taiwan Strait through this decade. While Taiwan, especially under the flexible diplomacy of President Ma Ying Jeou has sought to expand economic and political relations with China, there should be no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains committed to achieving unification under their terms, a condition will continue until the CCP is removed from power in China. Until such a turn of history Taiwans survival as a democracy will depend on economic and political engagement with China that minimizes risks and the maintenance of a military capability that deters the CCP leadership from considering that it can secure military victory. However, Taipeis principal arms source and guarantor, the United States, will face greater pressure from China to end arms sales to Taiwan as Beijing meets with greater success in convincing Washington that Chinese cooperation is necessary to advance U.S. goals and interests. Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have tended to view Taiwan as a problem to be managed, not a valuable ally with strategic implications for the future of China. The danger is that by bullying Washington from selling sufficient arms to Taiwan, China will accelerate its achievement of decisive military superiority over Taiwan. A key symbol of both the Bush and Obama Administrations reluctance to favor Taiwans defense over its equities with China has been their reluctance to sell Taiwan decisive new weapons systems like the Lockheed-Martin F-16 Block 52, even though consideration of a 5th generation fighter is justified. Sale of another decisive system, submarines, is mentioned less and less. Yes, the U.S. has sold some very useful systems like the Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopter and the Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 missile interceptor, but these fall under the U.S. State Departments restrictive definition of defensive weapons, a limitation designed to promote stability on the Taiwan Strait, but which is in fact encourages greater Chinese pressure on Washington, especially as its military power increases over Taiwan and against U.S. forces in Asia. Taiwans prospects would appear bleak absent a concerted effort by Taiwan and the U.S. to equip Taiwan with 5th generation capabilities and new offensive capabilities that preserve a Taiwanese ability to deter and ever more capable China. By the 2020s PLA missile aimed at Taiwan could exceed 2,000 or 3,000, with close to 1,000 4th generation fighters, plus more capable and larger invasion forces and significantly larger nuclear forces. It would be preferred that Washington dispense with its denial of far more capable weapon system that could defend or deter with greater offensive capabilities. Washington could increase the prospects for stability by moving to help Taiwans assemblage of a new level of asymmetrically targeted offensive military capabilities that greatly increase Taiwans independent capacity to deflate PLA military offensives, reducing the likelihood of their happening. However, Taiwan is not without options for developing indigenous asymmetrically targeted offensive military capabilities, and the remainder of this paper explores some of them. A China-Taiwan conflict will escalate and cause extinction Cheong, 2000 East Asia Correspondent (Ching Cheong, The Straits Times, No one gains in war over Taiwan, 6-25-2000, Lexis-Nexis Universe) A cross-strait conflict, even at the lowest end of the intensity scale, will suffice to truncate, if not to reverse, the steep GNP growth trends of the past few years. Other than the quantifiable losses from disrupted trade flows, there is also the longer-term damage to consider. For example, it took Taiwan almost three decades to establish itself as the third largest producer of information technology (IT) products in the world. It is now the island's single largest foreign exchange earner. The Sept 21 earthquake last year demonstrated the risk involved in Taiwan's dependence on the IT industry. A few days of power blackouts disrupted chip-manufacturing operations on the island, which in turn sent prices of these components soaring worldwide. Not surprisingly, a scramble followed for alternative sources of supply. A blockade lasting three months will devastate the industry in Taiwan. Similarly, it has taken China more than two decades to establish itself as the second largest recipient of private direct investment. In recent years, such investment has amounted to more than 20 per cent of China's total capital formation. A capital outflow will follow if there is trouble across the strait.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 91/182 Other than China and Taiwan, Japan's economy is likely to be hurt too if the blockade disrupts its "life-line" -the sea lane through which flows its supplies of oil and other commodities. Though no physical loss will be incurred, the blockade will force up prices across the board as Japan is so dependent on this sea lane. The Asean region stands to gain in the short run. Those with strong IT industries, like Singapore and Malaysia, will carve a big slice from what was previously Taiwan's share. Similarly, as investment flees China, the Asean countries might be able to intercept this flow and benefit thereby. Politically, the blockade is likely to provoke Sino-phobia in the region. Japan's rightwing forces will seize this golden opportunity to demand a revision of the post-war Constitution prohibiting its rearmament. Asean countries having territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea will beef up their defence budgets. Ethnic Chinese population in these countries may have to contend with increased suspicion or worse as Sinophobia rises. The US stands to gain. So long as its stays on the sidelines, it does not lose the Chinese market. At the same time its defence industry gains as countries in the region start stocking up on arms in anticipation of trouble. DESTROYING THE TAIWAN MILITARY THE medium intensity scenario postulates a situation in which Beijing wages a war against Taiwan. The objective here is to obliterate its military capability which is seen as underpinning its independence movement. The outcome: Taiwan is brought to its knees but only after widespread death and destruction have been inflicted on the island and the coastal provinces of China. In this scenario, the US while feeling obliged to support Taiwan militarily is not party to a full-scale war with China. Washington's primary concern would be to keep it to a "limited war" to prevent hostilities from spinning out of control. Limited though it may be, the war will set back the economies of China and Taiwan by at least two to three decades. All the short-term gains enjoyed by the Asean countries in the low-intensity scenario will be nullified as the conflict intensifies. In this medium-intensity scenario, no one gains. Politically, all countries are forced to take sides. This decision is particularly hard to make in those countries having a sizeable ethnic-Chinese population. THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 92/182 In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 94/182 times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 97/182 C) Cultural and education ties Japan Times 2010 (Takashi Kitazume, Staff writer, Japan Times, 9/24/2k10, New vision of Japan-U.S. ties needed at key turning point, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100924d1.html) Calder added that Japan and the U.S. need to move beyond the military-security dimensions and broaden their scope of cooperation to other areas including energy, environment, mass transportation and the medical field. He stressed the importance of cultural and educational ties between the two countries. "The alliance is something much broader than simply political-military dimensions, even if they are at the core. And these can be things that help us to create a win-win environment, rather than just a narrow focus on Futenma, where there is always a sort of scoreboard on who is winning and who is losing. I think we need to broaden our relationship beyond that," he said D) Earthquake Assistance Stimson Center 5/9/2k11 (Henry L. Stimson Center, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security, 5/9/2k11, The US-Japan Alliance After 3/11, http://www.stimson.org/essays/the-us-japan-alliance-after-311/) The day opened with introductory remarks by Ambassador Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Stimson's Chairman of the Board. Ambassador Bloomfield proposed that while the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake continues to present both the Japanese government and its people a formidable challenge, the tragedy was also an opportunity to demonstrate the strength of the US-Japan alliance. Ambassador Bloomfield shared his confidence that the United States, as Japan's ally, will work closely with Japan as it tackles the formidable challenges of recovery and reconstruction in the years to come.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 99/182 had trouble coming to and implementing the agreement on Futenma," he said. William Brooks, an adjunct professor at SAIS who had earlier monitored Japan-U.S. relations at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo for 15 years, observed how Futenma which was put on the political agenda in the mid-1990s as a key part of the plan to reorganize U.S. military bases in Japan "is still unresolved and is still a thorn in our side." Futenmas the litmus test of relations relations will be low until an alternative option is found Klinger 2k10 Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (Bruce, The Heritage Foundation, 4/21/2k10, Futenma Cast Shadow Over US Japan Alliance, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2010/04/futenma-cast-shadow-over-us-japan-alliance) Impact on the Alliance. Futenma has had a corrosive effect on the alliance and paralyzed Washingtons ability to engage with Japan. This corrosive environment has fueled suspicion. U.S. officials comment that Washington should be able to understand, predict, and rely on the views of an ally. But this is not the case with the DPJ. While the Hatoyama administration issues platitudes about the importance of the alliance, its actions call its commitment into question. In January, Prime Minister Hatoyama characterized solving the Futenma issue is a litmus test for developing the U.S.Japan security arrangement. If Hatoyama fails to accept the Guam Agreement or provide a viable alternative by the end of May, it will be hard to keep the alliance from taking on serious water. While it is unclear what dynamics are set into motion, it is easy to see things unfolding. The Obama Administration must remain resolute on the need to implement the force realignment agreement but do a better job publicly explaining the importance of U.S. military forces for the defense of Japan and other security contingencies. U.S. Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable component of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis. For its part, Tokyo should realize that allowing the Futenma wound to continue to fester distracts both nations from more important issues and strains important bilateral military ties. It is important that both countries understand that Japanese and U.S. national interests are best served by maintaining and strengthening the alliance. U.S. forward deployed forces in Japan and South Korea provide a tangible sign of Washingtons commitment to defending its allies as well as the values that these countries share.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Kan faced angry Okinawa leaders Thursday, following this weeks decision by his government and the United States to push ahead with the unpopular relocation of Marine Corps forces on the island. Kan came to Okinawa to mark the end of the World War II battle for the island, but his visit was overshadowed by a vow Tuesday by top
ministers and their counterparts, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates, to relocate the Futenma air station on the island.
Okinawa leaders decried the decision during the Kans visit and demanded the air station be closed immediately. It was the most recent expression of anger over the U.S. military presence here -- and has become an immovable roadblock of opposition for the two countries military plans. I fully understand the desire of Okinawa to move the operations out of Okinawa and out of Japan, Kan told reporters following the memorial ceremony. We have reviewed
it from every angle, however, and the current situation would not allow it. The prime minister attended the memorial, in which about 5,000 island residents and some local lawmakers took part, before he met in private with Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima, a staunch opponent of the Futenma plan. The relocation of the air station to a less populated area of Henoko is a key piece of a larger bilateral agreement to shift U.S. military forces in the region, including the transfer of about 8,600 Okinawa Marines to Guam. The realignment plan has caused deep political fissures in Japan for years because of the Okinawa opposition, which pressured Kans predecessor to resign from office last year. The U.S.-Japan security summit on Tuesday approved new runway plans for the air station relocation the first sign of concrete progress in years and attempted to tamp down political problems, which now include growing criticism from U.S. lawmakers, who say the Futenma relocation and military realignment are too expensive. Gov.
Nakaima told reporters Thursday that the decision to follow through with the relocation plan was beyond his understanding. I have trouble understanding why they are so rigid in thinking, and stick to the idea, he told reporters following the meeting with Kan. If they had more flexible minds and thoughts, a better idea would come up that satisfies all three sides. Zenshin Takamine, speaker of the Okinawa prefectural assembly, took a harder stance in a speech he delivered before Kan and those at the war memorial ceremony. A plan by both governments to move the operations to Henoko in Nago is absolutely unacceptable, he said. I demand a decision from the U.S. and Japanese governments to remove the threat and reduce the burden from the shoulders of the people of Okinawa by moving Futenma operations outside of Okinawa.
Futenmas key to deter Korean War, Senkaku Crisis, China conflict, and other regional threats that escalate
Klinger 6/14 Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies at The Heritage Foundation (Bruce, Heritage Foundation, 6/14/2k11, Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-whythe-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific) Top 10 Reasons for Keeping U.S. Marines on Okinawa The United States Marines stationed on Okinawa operate as one element of an integrated, comprehensive U.S. security strategy that uses individual service capabilities based on a specific contingency or operation. Removing Marine Corps assets from Okinawa would leave the United States with a twolegged security stool in a region where steadiness and support are essential. It is therefore essential that all parties recognize the following 10 reasons for maintaining the U.S. Marine presence on Okinawa. Reason #1: The U.S. Marine presence is a tangible sign of Americas commitment to defend Asia. U.S. forward-deployed forces in Asia are indisputable signals of Washingtons
commitment to the obligations of its 1960 security treaty with Japan to defend its allies and maintain peace and stability in Asia. The U.S. Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable component of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis. The Marine
presence is also a clear rebuttal to perceptions of waning United States resolve in the face of a rising and assertive China. Withdrawing the U.S. Marines from Okinawa would only affirm that perception and lead Asian nations to accommodate themselves to Chinese pressure. As a senior U.S. military officer commented, U.S. dominance is not a given. You have to be on the court to be in the game. Finally, an important question remains: What impact would the removal of U.S. ground forces have on President Obamas much-hyped claim that the U.S. is now back in Asia? Reason #2: The U.S. Marine presence deters aggression. U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos has explained that the fundamental role of U.S. military forces in Japan is to make those who would consider the use of force in this region understand that option is off the table. The forward deployment of U.S. forces puts us in a position to react immediately to emerging threats.[7] The December
2010 Japanese National Defense Program Guidelines underscored Rooss comments by noting that the presence of U.S. armed forces in Japan gives countries in the Asia Pacific region a strong sense of security by functioning as deterrence against and response to contingencies in this region.[8] Foreign Minister Okada affirmed that the
presence of U.S. Marines on Okinawa is necessary for Japans national security [since they] are a powerful deterrent against possible enemy attacks and should be stationed in Japan.[9] History has repeatedly shown that ground troops are
necessary to influence an opponent. Removing combat elements of the only rapidly deployable U.S. ground force between Hawaii and India would degrade U.S. deterrence capacity and limit response options. Reason
#3: The U.S. Marine presence enables the conduct of full-spectrum combat operations. The Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) on Okinawa is a flexible, scalable, tailored, self-
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 102/182 contained, rapidly deployable, powerful military force that can fulfill any contingency that might arise throughout the region. A combined arms force that operates under the Marine Corps doctrine of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the III MEF is comprised of organic ground, air, and logistics components under a single commander. A MAGTF requires collocation of its ground, air, and logistics components to enable coordinated training of integrated units. Ambassador Roos explained that the Marine helicopters on Okinawa enable the U.S. to: Rapidly move our ground combat and support units on Okinawa across the island chain that links Northeast and Southeast Asia to wherever they would be required. For heavier and longer-range operations, the
Marines would be supported by our naval fleet in Sasebo, just a few days sailing time away, which could project both Marine ground and air power anywhere in the region. The
Marines on Okinawa would arrive first on the scene to secure critical facilities, conduct civilian evacuations, and provide forward land and air strike power.[10] Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, former commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, echoed
disaster relief location.[11] Reason
Rooss comments, noting that Okinawa Marines are trained to respond to dozens of different emergencies and contingencies: When the 31st MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] is aboard ship in Okinawa, there is a 100 percent chance they are about a days transit time to either a U.S. defense treaty ally, a threat to regional stability, or a perennial
#4: The U.S. Marine presence helps America meet its commitment to defend Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. The United States has pledged the lives of its sons and daughters to defend Japan. As
Lieutenant General Stalder succinctly explained, all of my Marines on Okinawa are willing to die if it is necessary for the security of Japan. [12] Indeed, as Prime Minister Kan commented, Including the Marines in Okinawa, all U.S. troops stationed in Japan play a major role in contributing to our nations safety and the regions stability.[13] Kan stated: [W]e must never forget that in the context of the JapanU.S. alliance, members of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Marines, perhaps youth not even twenty years of age, have a mission to be prepared to shed their own blood [for the defense of Japan] should a contingency arise. In response to Chinese provocations, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reassured Foreign Minister Maehara in November 2010 that the United States considered the Senkaku Islands to be Japanese territory under the bilateral security treaty. The U.S. statement was a stronger affirmation than previous vague diplomatic comments on the sovereignty of the islands. In addition to the Senkaku Islands, U.S.
Marines are also critical to securing Japanese interests in Okinawa. For example, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa opposed moving U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam because, as he noted, these troops a very important role in deterring against Chinese adventurism near Okinawaif all the Marines in Okinawa were transferred to Guam, we cannot defend those islands. [14] Further highlighting the Marines role in the Pacific, in February 2011, Admiral Robert Willard, commander of Pacific Command, announced that the Marine Corps had been integrated into the new U.S. AirSeaBattle Concept battle plan, commenting that their capabilities will be an enhancement to our joint force. A U.S. defense official added that the revised strategy could use the Marines to retake islands in the East China or South
China seas after a Chinese attack. The official commented that the Japanese and South China Sea states dont have Marine Corps-type capabilities to stop a Chinese occupation of islands.[15] Reason
#5: The U.S. Marine presence would help to defeat a North Korean invasion of South Korea. The U.S. Marines on Okinawa play a critical role in Operations Plan 5027, the joint U.S. South Korean war plan for responding to a North Korean invasion. Marine forces are capable of conducting a full range of combat operations in Korea. Even the threat of an amphibious invasion would force North Korea to divert ground forces from the front line. General Burwell Bell, former commander of U.S. Forces Korea, affirmed that: [The Marines on Okinawa] have a critical role in any Korean contingency. They were my deep operational ground maneuver unit. Without them, it would be WWI all over again. When the North Koreans consider the potential for the United States Marines to interdict their logistics sites and fragile supply lines deep in their rear areas, the likelihood of the North seriously considering a sustained ground offensive drops drastically.[16] Representative Park Jin, then chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the South Korean National Assembly, declared that: [T]he U.S. military bases located in Okinawa play a significant role in keeping the Korean peninsula peaceful and safe. The U.S. Marines in Okinawa are obliged to defend Korea. Thus,
the relocation of U.S. military bases in Japan would affect not only the U.S.Japan relations but also security on the Korean peninsula. [17] In seeking to justify removing U.S. Marine forces from Okinawa, some analysts have asserted that a Korean War would be over quickly and that South Korean forces would be sufficient to handle the North Korean forces. Both premises are dangerously wrong. U.S.
war simulations reveal that, even a week after a North Korean invasion, the situation would remain precarious. Moreover, an invasion would result in horrific casualties in the hundreds of thousands as well as trillions of dollars worth of damage.[18] A U.S. defense official commented: [E]ven if South Korea could do it without U.S. Marines, it would be with far greater casualties and destruction. Why would you do that? Reason #6: The U.S. Marine presence helps the U.S. respond to Korea crisis contingencies other than war. The U.S. and South Korea have also developed Concept Plan 5029 to respond to crisis contingencies short of war. MAGTF forces can conduct
Why would you send the military into a dangerous situation with fewer capabilities than necessary? Besides, you need those [South Korean] troops for the post-war collapse of North Korea.[19] Indeed, the North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 illustrated the critical role Marines would play in rebuffing an attack by Pyongyang. As a result, Seoul augmented its own 27,000-member Marine Corps by 2,000, thereby bolstering its ability to defend the five islands in the West Sea.[20]
several military operations in support of those plans, including limited amphibious raids and full-scale amphibious assaults, airfield and port seizure operations, maritime interdiction operations, amphibious advanced force operations, stability operations, and tactical air support.[21] Major General Mark Brilakis, commanding general of the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa, affirmed that in all U.S. contingency plans for Korea, the 3rd MEF plays a major role. In case of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, Brilakis stated, overnight, I go from being the smallest division in the Marine Corps to being the largest.[22] According to Japanese media reports, Lieutenant General Stalder commented during a private meeting with Japanese officials that during a Korean crisis, the Marines in Okinawa would be charged with seizing North Korean nuclear weapons.[23] Such an operation would be consistent with the responsibilities of Military Expeditionary UnitSpecial Operations Capable (MEUSOC) units that conduct operations behind enemy lines, such as special reconnaissance and direct action against designated strategic targets. Reason
#7: The U.S. Marine presence enables non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Marines, through NEOS, provide physical protection
and evacuate U.S. citizens from Taiwan or other Asian nations during a deteriorating security situation or natural disaster. NEOs usually involve swift insertions of a force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.[24] NEOs have typically been a specialty of Marine Expeditionary Units, which have participated in several NEOs worldwide. Implementing an NEO may require forming a joint task force. However, the organic combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of a Marine Corps forward-deployed amphibious expeditionary strike group (special operations capable) are trained and certified to conduct NEOs.[25] The 31st MEU on Okinawa routinely trains for NEOs. Moving U.S. Marines away from Okinawa would hinder protection and evacuation operations, directly increasing the threat to U.S. lives, as well as the lives of Americas allies. Reason
#8: The U.S. Marine presence helps the U.S. to conduct humanitarian operations. The Okinawa Marines have routinely been the primary responders to major natural disasters in Asia, such as the 2004 Asian tsunami, mudslides in the Philippines, and the typhoon in Taiwan. The Marines have led or participated in 12 significant humanitarian assistancedisaster relief (HADR) missions during the past five years alone, helping to save hundreds of thousands of lives in the region.[26] For example,
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 103/182 in response to the March 2011 natural disasters in Japan, U.S. military forces in Asia responded quickly and worked seamlessly with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Operation Tomodachi (friendship) highlighted the versatility of U.S. forces deployed on Okinawa.
During Operation Tomodachi, the proximity of Futenma MCAS to Marine ground and logistics units was critical to the rapid deployment of supplies and personnel. Marine assets on Okinawa began flying to Japan within four hours of being tasked. Helicopter
and fixed-wing C-130 aircraft from Futenma were involved in humanitarian operations, as were members of the 31st MEU, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, and 1st Marine Air Wing, all based in Okinawa. U.S. disaster relief operations generated considerable goodwill in Japan, including on Okinawa. Okinawans now realize
what the Marines were training for when conducting HADR operations elsewhere in Asia. Yet Okinawan media refused to publish articles or photos of U.S. Marines from Okinawa conducting humanitarian assistance operations in Japan. In fact, some Japanese media outlets went so far as to criticize the Marines relief work. For example, the Ryukyu Shinpo criticized the U.S. Marine humanitarian assistance as a tool for political manipulation [and an attempt] to gain the support of the Japanese people to keep the FRF within Okinawa. The Shinpo editorialized that the U.S. statements highlighting the benefits of having the Marines available to assist Japan was very discomforting and tricks. The Okinawan Times chimed in as well, posturing that the U.S. was using the disaster as a political tool [to] manipulate our political decision-making. [I]t is something we cannot allow.[27] Reason
#9: The U.S. Marine presence is vital to the Theater Security Cooperation program. The Marines influence the regional security environment on a daily basis through the Theater Security Cooperation program, which, with 70 joint exercises per year, enables partners and reassures allies. Reason #10: Japan lacks the necessary defensive capacity. Japan lacks any Marine forces of its own, has ground forces that are less capable than their U.S. counterparts, and has poor combined arms operation
capabilities. Nor is there any existing Asian architecture that guarantees the rights or interests of Asian nations. The continued presence of U.S. Marines ensures that Japans security limitations do not become liabilities. The Japanese Ministry of Defense responded to growing concerns over Chinas increasingly assertive foreign policy by advocating the creation of Japanese ground forces modeled after the U.S. Marine Corps to strengthen the defense of remote islands in southwestern Japan. The ministry recommended doubling the 2,000 GSDF troops on Okinawa and developing ground forces capable of conducting amphibious operations to retake islands held by hostile forces. Yet Japanese forces amphibious operations capabilities remain in their infancy, and Tokyo does not intend to assume the regional responsibilities of the U.S. Marines on Okinawa.
A China-Taiwan conflict will escalate and cause extinction Cheong, 2000 East Asia Correspondent (Ching Cheong, The Straits Times, No one gains in war over Taiwan, 6-25-2000, Lexis-Nexis Universe) A cross-strait conflict, even at the lowest end of the intensity scale, will suffice to truncate, if not to reverse, the steep GNP growth trends of the past few years. Other than the quantifiable losses from disrupted trade flows, there is also the longer-term damage to consider. For example, it took Taiwan almost three decades to establish itself as the third largest producer of information technology (IT) products in the world. It is now the island's single largest foreign exchange earner. The Sept 21 earthquake last year demonstrated the risk involved in Taiwan's dependence on the IT industry. A few days of power blackouts disrupted chip-manufacturing operations on the island, which in turn sent prices of these components soaring worldwide. Not surprisingly, a scramble followed for alternative sources of supply. A blockade lasting three months will devastate the industry in Taiwan. Similarly, it has taken China more than two decades to establish itself as the second largest recipient of private direct investment. In recent years, such investment has amounted to more than 20 per cent of China's total capital formation. A capital outflow will follow if there is trouble across the strait. Other than China and Taiwan, Japan's economy is likely to be hurt too if the blockade disrupts its "life-line" -the sea lane through which flows its supplies of oil and other commodities. Though no physical loss will be incurred, the blockade will force up prices across the board as Japan is so dependent on this sea lane. The Asean region stands to gain in the short run. Those with strong IT industries, like Singapore and Malaysia, will carve a big slice from what was previously Taiwan's share. Similarly, as investment flees China, the Asean countries might be able to intercept this flow and benefit thereby. Politically, the blockade is likely to provoke Sino-phobia in the region. Japan's rightwing forces will seize this golden opportunity to demand a revision of the post-war Constitution prohibiting its rearmament. Asean countries having territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea will beef up their defence budgets. Ethnic Chinese population in these countries may have to contend with increased suspicion or worse as Sinophobia rises. The US stands to gain. So long as its stays on the sidelines, it does not lose the Chinese market. At the same time its defence industry gains as countries in the region start stocking up on arms in anticipation of trouble. DESTROYING THE TAIWAN MILITARY THE medium intensity scenario postulates a situation in which Beijing wages a war against Taiwan.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 104/182 The objective here is to obliterate its military capability which is seen as underpinning its independence movement. The outcome: Taiwan is brought to its knees but only after widespread death and destruction have been inflicted on the island and the coastal provinces of China. In this scenario, the US while feeling obliged to support Taiwan militarily is not party to a full-scale war with China. Washington's primary concern would be to keep it to a "limited war" to prevent hostilities from spinning out of control. Limited though it may be, the war will set back the economies of China and Taiwan by at least two to three decades. All the short-term gains enjoyed by the Asean countries in the low-intensity scenario will be nullified as the conflict intensifies. In this medium-intensity scenario, no one gains. Politically, all countries are forced to take sides. This decision is particularly hard to make in those countries having a sizeable ethnic-Chinese population. THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
Michigan 2011
is that Japan has taken important measures over the past two decades to assume a larger role. It expanded its role with the 1997
revision of the Japan-US Defense Guidelines and the 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law. Then, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Diet passed the groundbreaking Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to allow the dispatch of Japanese Self Defense Forces outside of the region, and this was eventually used to enable them to be deployed to Iraq and to permit refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. Japan has been moving in the right direction, although there is more it should do.
it is important to recognize that the burden of maintaining the US-Japan security alliance has been disproportionately shouldered by local citizens in a few areas in Japan, especially in Okinawa. In todays world, it is natural for people in a place like Okinawa, which hosts 75 per cent of the US military facilities for the entire country of Japan, to be bothered by the presence of foreign bases and another countrys soldiers, with all the disruption they inevitably bring. If local relations cannot be managed skillfully, the entire US-Japan security alliance can be put at risk. The Japanese and US governments
On the other hand, established the SACO [Special Action Committee on Okinawa] process in 1995 to work to reduce the US military footprint, but unfortunately they have not yet put in place a precise implementation plan for the reversion of the Marine Corps base, Futenma Air Station, which is in a heavily populated area and has become a prominent issue in bilateral relations. The relocation of the base to new facilities in Okinawa simply cannot be implemented without eventually gaining the acquiescence of local communities. Given all of the time and energy that has gone into pushing forward the current agreement, it is entirely understandable for the US government to claim that there is no alternative to the existing relocation agreement. Nevertheless, we
cannot deny the fact that there has been a sea change in Japan. The Democratic Party of Japan came to power on the strength of a campaign that, in part, opposed the current agreement, and the local community of Nago voted on January 24 to repudiate the base move to their city in a mayoral election that was widely perceived as a referendum on the relocation plan. Democratic governments have to find some way to respond to the voices of their people, and the Japanese government cannot simply disregard these pressures.
Michigan 2011
senior DPJ politicians reversed course and publicly admitted that the Marines are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to a crisis in Asia. For example: Although Prime Minister Hatoyama campaigned on a promise to remove the Marine air unit from Okinawa, he later admitted that, As I learned more about the [security situation in Asia], Ive come to realize that [the Marines] are all linked up as a package to maintain deterrence.[3] He added that the U.S. Marines on Okinawa have a major role to play, and itll be inappropriate to relocate the Marines too far away from Okinawa.[4] Foreign Minister Okada reversed his earlier opposition to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) by declaring that the presence of U.S. Marines on Okinawa is necessary for Japans national security [since they] are a powerful deterrent against possible enemy attacks and should be stationed in Japan.[5] U.S. diplomatic cables reveal that then-Land Minister and State Minister for Okinawa Seiji Maehara told U.S. diplomats in
December 2009 that if the U.S. does not agree to an alternative to the existing FRF plan, the DPJ would be prepared to go ahead with the current plan. In January 2011, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yorihisa Matsuno told the U.S. embassy that the DPJ would consider for forms sake Futenma options outside of Okinawa, but the only realistic options are to move Futenma to Camp Schwab or another existing facility.[6] It is important to acknowledge that the DPJ has made the rightalbeit belated decision with regard to U.S. Marines in Okinawa, but the real issueone that is perhaps not well understood in either America or Japanis why U.S. Marines must remain in Okinawa.
Michigan 2011
Agreement addresses the concerns raised by the Okinawans, including the need to reduce U.S. flight operations in a congested area, decrease the U.S. military presence on Okinawa, and return land to local authorities. [28] Yet, despite meeting each of these issues, the Guam Agreement faces continued opposition from Okinawa. For example, the Guam Agreement does exactly what the Okinawans have demanded: It reduces the U.S. military
presence on the island. The FRF would be one-third the size of the Futenma air base. The planned redeployment of 8,000 Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam would constitute a nearly 50 percent reduction of the Marine Corps forward presence in Japan. That redeployment
would enable the return of 70 percent of the U.S. bases south of the Kadena Air Base. Tokyo hoped to allay Okinawan concerns by altering the construction method at the planned relocation site to address environmental concerns. Protesters have complained that the replacement facility would harm the habitat of the dugong (manatee) and that building on coral would destroy a pristine bay. These complaints are groundless. Local Okinawans say they have not seen a dugongwhich is a migratory animalin
Henoko Bay for three generations. Nor is the bay as unique or irreplaceable as depicted; Okinawan civilian construction firms continue to build extensively on offshore coral locations throughout Okinawa.[29] Unsurprisingly, these
proposed alterations have done little to allay Okinawan objections, however, as the purported environmental issues are simply another means of combating the U.S. redeployment plan. Japan has also sought to decrease Okinawan resistance to the Guam Agreement by reducing the burden of the U.S. military presence. Washington and Tokyo agreed that F-15 fighter training flights would move from Okinawas Kadena base to Guam. Up to 20 days of training by two F-15 squadrons stationed at Kadena would be relocated, with a maximum
of 20 out of a total of 50 fighters participating each day.[30] Japan subsequently announced that U.S. flights out of Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture and the MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture would also be moved to Guam. The Kan administration emphasized that the training agreement constituted a tangible reduction of the U.S. military burden on Okinawa and hoped it would facilitate implementation of the long-stalled FRF agreement. However, the
agreement has had no impact on Okinawan demands. Indeed, Governor Nakaima continues to downplay the significance of the flight training movement, arguing, Thats the only part of the
military presence that has been reduced, and often those flights moved out are just replaced with new aircraft coming in. I wont know the true outcome until the move has been completed.[31] Neither
reductions in flight operations nor mitigation of the environmental impact of relocation will satisfy those who are seeking the withdrawal of USMC flight operations, let alone the entire U.S. military presence. Short of turning over bases to Okinawan control, attempts at reducing the burden that the Marines place on the island is unlikely to appease opponents of the relocation plan. The Okinawan priority is not alliance requirements and geostrategic factors but localized concerns of reduced military footprint, land givebacks, and removal of noisy military units. For Okinawan politicians, the preferred option has always been
to defer making a decision, both to avoid having to implement an unpopular option and to garner additional benefits from Tokyo and Washington.
Michigan 2011
has good reason to fear that as Chinas influence in Asia grows, it will use that influence to marginalise and eventually try to dominate Japan. As long as Japan depends on the US for its security, its only defence against Chinas growing power is to rely on, and encourage, the US to contest and contain Chinas growing influence. Behind the diplomacy, that is what we have been seeing in recent years. The problem for all of us, including Japan, is that a peaceful future in Asia is going to depend on the US and China getting on well. That will mean, among other things, as Chinas power grows the US will have to accord China a greater place in Asias power structure in other words, it will have to treat China as an equal. So Japan faces a really tough dilemma. As long as it relies on the US for its security, Japan will understandably feel threatened if the US accords more weight to China. But if the US does not do this, USChina relations will deteriorate, which would likewise be a disaster for Japan, as well as for the rest of us. The only way out seems to be for Japan to cease to rely on the US for its security, and to become itself an equal partner in a concert of great powers in Asia. Only in such a structure can Japan feel comfortable with a closer US-China relationship in which the US concedes strategic space to Chinas growing power. And only if
that happens can we look forward to a peaceful future in Asia. The heart of Japans strategic dependence on the US is its reliance on US extended deterrence against nuclear threats. And
for the Japanese, nuclear threats are not hypothetical: they have three nuclear-armed close neighbours. So for Japan to establish the kind of strategic independence of the US which seems to be required to build a stable order in Asia in coming decades, it needs to ease its dependence on US extended deterrence. Unfortunately there is no easy or incremental way to do that: either Japan is a nuclear power or it is not. Hence we may find that a nuclear-armed Japan is a necessary condition for a stable and sustainable US-China relationship, and hence for a stable Asian region. Of course an essential element of this argument is a judgement that Japan can be trusted with nuclear weapons. Some will argue that its conduct before 1945 permanently disqualifies it from being able to exercise independent strategic power on that scale. I do not agree. I think that after sixty years of highly responsible behaviour Japan deserves to be trusted again as a normal power. And I would ask, how attractive are the alternatives? Likewise the argument depends on the judgement that the US cannot resist a significant measure of accommodation to Chinas growing power without threatening the peace of Asia. That is itself a key question, but one for another
time. Suffice to say here that if China keeps growing, the US would be faced with the challenge of sustaining strategic and political primacy while it has lost economic primacy. That is, at best, a long shot. Of course the position I am exploring here remains counter-intuitive. There are very powerful and compelling arguments that a nuclear-armed Japan would be bad for regional stability. I understand and accept many of those arguments. But they need to be set against the depth and danger of the dilemma I have outlined above. Those counter-argument.
who dismiss the idea of a Japanese nuclear capability out of hand need to explain either why the dilemma I have identified is illusory, or how it can be resolved in some other way. I would be delighted to hear a persuasive
Michigan 2011
Gates and National Defense Minister Kim Tae-young participated in the 42nd Security Consultative Meeting, after which they told reporters that the U.S.-South Korea military alliance has never been stronger. The news that ailing North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il has anointed his son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor has the alliance preparing to defend against all possible North Korean threats. When Kim Jong-ils health may deteriorate or if there is a movement of public opinion in North Korea, we cannot eliminate the possibility that there will be an instability situation in North Korea, Kim said through an interpreter. The men also discussed the threats facing the alliance, the condition of the forces today, and the continued transformation of the alliance, Gates said. The
two leaders confirmed that the U.S.-South Korea strategic partnership remains vital to the interests of both our nations, Gates said. Both ministers noted that this year marks the 60th year since the start of the Korean War and how that conflict has cemented the alliance. Those bonds form the foundation of an enduring, resolute, and capable defense of South Korea, Gates said. North Korea remains the greatest threat to peace in Northeast Asia
and is the focal point of the defense posture on the peninsula. North Korea is believed to have at least 1.5 million military members, and has nuclear capabilities. In March, North Korea torpedoed and sank the South Korean navy ship Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. We are committed to providing extended deterrence using the full range of American military might: from our nuclear umbrella to conventional strike and ballistic missile defense, Gates said. In the wake of the Cheonan incident, the close cooperation across the whole of our two governments sends a clear message to North Korea that its provocation and aggression will not be tolerated. Both men called on North Korea to end provocative actions like the Cheonan attack. We once again called for North Korea to take responsible actions in regards to the attack against the Republic of Korea ship Cheonan, Kim said. We also reconfirmed the resolute desire of [South Korea] and the U.S. to jointly respond to North Korean military provocations. In recent weeks North Korea has tried to open talks with South Korea, Kim said. North Korea has taken more of a stance towards appeasement and there have been North Korean attempts at dialogue, he said. However, it is the basic position of the Republic of Korea government that we need a recognition of North Koreas role in the Cheonan incident, and we need an apology from North Korea and a punishment of those responsible. And North Korea must also take clear measures that will prevent any further provocations of this sort. If the North fulfills these conditions, the South will reopen dialogue, the South Korean defense minister said. Kim also addressed the agreement on Strategic Alliance 2015, a comprehensive implementation plan for transfers of operational control of forces on the peninsula to South Korea by 2015. We have also achieved significantly meaningful accomplishments, he said, such as the development of the defense cooperation guidelines that will realize the future vision of the alliance and the agreement to systemize the extended deterrence policy committee, a cooperative mechanism in the area of extended deterrence. South
Korea has been a strong ally to the United States, having provided thousands of troops during the Vietnam War, and having sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. South Korea also is a valuable presence in humanitarian relief operations in places such as in Haiti.
B) North Korea and military exercises Space Daily 2010 (Space Daily, 12/4/2k10, Obama: US-S.Korean alliance stronger than ever, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Obama_US-SKorean_alliance_stronger_than_ever_999.html)
The US-South Korean alliance is "stronger than ever," President Barack Obama said Saturday in the wake a deadly North Korean assault on its southern neighbor. "At a time in which there are increasing tensions on the Korean peninsula following the North's unprovoked attack on the South Korean people,
today we are showing that the defense alliance and partnership of the United States and South Korea is stronger than ever," Obama said. His remarks were part of a statement welcoming a landmark US-South Korea free trade agreement reached after three years of
honor. Earlier
deadlock. Incoming South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-Jin said earlier that Seoul would "swiftly and strongly respond with force" until North Korea surrenders if the communist state launches another assault. In his inauguration speech after President Lee Myung-Bak officially appointed the retired four-star general as the new defence chief, Kim said the sinking of a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea in March and the shelling on Yeonpyeong island left "indelible wounds" on the South's pride and
this week, South Korea's military announced just days after it wrapped Yellow Sea maneuvers with the US navy that it was planning more joint naval drills with the United States this month. C) OPCON delay
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 110/182 Klinger 2010 senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage foundations Asian Studies Center (Bruce, The Heritage Foundation,
7/8/2k10, OPCON Transfer: Timing Isnt Everything, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2010/07/opcon-transfer-timing-isnteverything)
On the sidelines of last month's G-20 summit, the United
States acquiesced to Seoul's request for a three-year delay to the planned 2012 reversion of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United Nations Command to the Republic of Korea. The U.S. decision alleviates South Korean concerns that a premature OPCON transfer would dangerously undermine the country's defense. It also signals strong U.S. support for its critical ally at a time of heightened tensions brought on by North Korea's heinous attack on a South Korean naval ship. The Lee Myung-bak administration requested the delay, characterizing the demand for OPCON by his predecessor Roh Moo-hyun as a naive, ideologically-driven political decision that ignored military realities. Moreover, the Cheonan sinking exposed dangerous deficiencies in South Korean military capabilities that might not be remedied by the planned 2012 transfer date. While both assertions are correct, they oversimplify a complex issue by neglecting several critical factors. The decision to delay
does not address the underlying deficiencies of the plan. The deferment also alleviates pressure on Seoul to redress security shortfalls, including years of underfunded defense requirements. Far more important than when OPCON transfer occurs is how it is done. Unfortunately, the heated debate over timing has caused insufficient attention being paid to the more important manner of OPCON transfer. The accompanying dissolution of Combined Forces Command (CFC) is dangerously ill-advised because it violates the key military precept of unity of command during hostilities. The ability of a single commander to direct multi-service forces from two countries is irreplaceable in ensuring unity of mission and achievement of objectives. Replacing a single integrated command with two parallel commands risks seriously degrading U.S. and ROK deterrent and war-fighting capabilities. A bifurcated command also increases the danger of friendly fire casualties. The current plan does not so much transfer OPCON as it divides it. Such a command structure is the equivalent of having two quarterbacks on the football field sending conflicting orders to the team. Despite public assurances by the Pentagon and U.S. Forces Korea, serious concerns remain that the new command structure has greater potential for confusion or even tragedy during the fog of war. The U.S. Congress and South Korean National Assembly should both hold public hearings to ensure that the alliance would retain sufficient ability to deter, defend and defeat any North Korean aggression. Moreover, the delay in OPCON transfer shouldn't be used by Seoul as an excuse to continue underfunding its requirements. Seoul has committed itself to Defense Reform Plan (DRP) 2020, an ambitious military modernization strategy to compensate for planned manpower reductions by upgrading to a smaller, high-technology defense force with improved command and control systems and more capable weapons. However, years of defense funding shortfalls have undermined the program. The plan prepared in 2005 identified the need for a cumulative 15-year budget of 621 trillion won (approximately $505 billion) and stipulated a 9.9 percent annual military budget increase for 2006 through 2010. Instead, the average increase has been only 7.2 percent. There is now a projected 80 to 110 trillion won aggregate DRP 15-year budget shortfall. The head of the Ministry of Defense Reform Bureau stated in 2008 that as a result of underfunding defense requirements, South Korea "can't even achieve the initial goals in the defense reform." The Ministry of National Defense has requested a 6.9 percent increase in the 2011 budget, three points below the original plan. Insufficient defense spending threatens the underlying premise of DRP 2020 which was that the increased quality of the residual military force would offset drastic cuts in the force structure. Bruce Bennett, renowned military expert at the RAND Corporation, has speculated that South Korea could even find itself with a less capable military in 2020 than existed in 2000. Just
as the OPCON transfer should be seen in the broader context of DRP 2020 that in turn should be part of a strategic review of the proposed U.S.-ROK "strategic alliance." Although the concept has been encapsulated in bilateral summit statements, actual progress on transforming the military relationship has been glacially slow. Washington and Seoul should develop a joint strategic vision of the future purpose, objectives, and roles of the broader alliance and how it furthers the two countries national interests. It will then be possible to identify the roles, missions, and required capabilities of the two militaries and then implement the broader alliance through procurement, deployment and training.
Although alliance managers have created a blueprint for Seoul assuming greater responsibility for the country's defense, identifying ROK regional and global security missions remain in the early stages, as reflected in protracted debate over Seoul's involvement in coalition operations in Afghanistan. A major impediment has been the failure of the Lee administration to suitably articulate South Korea's envisioned role on the world stage. President Lee advocates a "Global Korea" strategy commensurate with Seoul's political, economic, and military weight but has yet to define the country's international security responsibilities. Seoul should develop a detailed strategic blueprint, similar to the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, that delineates South Korea's national interests, strategic policy objectives, and how the instruments of national power, including the military, would be employed to fulfill them. Doing so would enable military planners to define security requirements and identify shortfalls even beyond those arising from the attack on the Cheonan. As
the recent 60th anniversary of the Korean War starkly reminded us, the U.S.-ROK alliance was forged in blood during the crucible of a brutal conflict. The enduring bilateral relationship has been indispensable for defending South Korea and maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Washington has demonstrated its support for a key ally by deferring the OPCON transfer. It is now Seoul's responsibility to use the
delay wisely by articulating a plan to redress shortfalls in its defense capabilities and its commitment to the alliance by fully funding its security defense requirements.
Relations resilient support on Iran proves Cha and Kim 2010 (Victor Cha, Seniro Advisor and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Ellen Kim, Research Associate at CSIS Korean Chair, 10/22/2k10, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), http://cogitasia.com/us-korea-relations-smoothsailing-in-the-wake-of-the-cheonan-part-i/)
There is general consensus among policymakers in Seoul and Washington that the current U.S.-ROK alliance is in the best shape it has been in recent years. The onset of the Cheonans sinking brought together two already close allies to become united against North Korea and stage a show of force. The first Two-plus-Two meeting held in Seoul between U.S. Secretaries Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates and ROK Ministers Yu Myung-hwan and Kim Tae-young exemplified an upgrade of the U.S.-ROK alliance from a traditional military alliance forged in the wake of the Cold War to a more comprehensive one. In a ministerial joint statement, Secretary Clinton acknowledged that the alliance has evolved into a strong, successful and enduring alliance and announced the ministers decision to complete Strategic Alliance 2015 by the next Security Consultative Meeting. The strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance was also put to the test as
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 111/182 South Korea came under U.S. pressure to join its global nonproliferation campaign against Iran and impose independent sanctions on the country. During his visit to Seoul with Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Daniel Glaser strongly urged the South Korean government to make a decision, calling the South Korean participation absolutely vital. Pressures mounted on Seoul particularly after Japan adopted sanctions on Iran. The situation presented a dilemma for Seoul as Iran is Koreas third-largest trading partner in the Middle East with the annual bilateral trade amounting to $10 billion. More importantly, Souths heavy reliance on Iran for oil concerned many Koreans of a potential backlash from Tehran. Internal splits within the ROK government delayed Seouls response to U.S. entreaties. While the foreign
ministry favored sanctioning Iran, the economic ministries were more cautious, in no small part because they remembered that sanctions by the ROK against Tehran during the George W. Bush administration resulted in immediate retaliation against South Korean businesses operating in the country.
Despite rumors that Seouls reluctance made Washington uncomfortable and even briefly strained their alliance, South Koreas later announcement of its sanctions on Iran reaffirmed the resilience of the U.S.-ROK alliance and eased the anxiety of alliance managers. The ROK government blacklisted 102 Iranian firms and 24 individuals and
suspended, albeit temporarily, the Seoul branch of Bank Mellat, which the U.S. accused of conducting financial transactions related to Irans nuclear development activities. The centrality of the U.S.-ROK alliance and cooperation, especially in the aftermath of the
Cheonan to coordinate their response to North Koreas provocative behavior, prevailed over Souths economic interests with Iran, experts say. We believe, however, that the core cause for Seouls agreement for the Iran sanctions stemmed from
proliferation concerns which overrode business interests. The ROK could not possibly have pressed for the international community to implement counterproliferation sanctions against the DPRK but then abstain from pursuing similar policy objectives regarding Iran
Michigan 2011
economic relationship is one of the world's most vibrant, with two-way goods trade reaching nearly $88 billion in 2010. Korea is our seventh largest trading partner, and the United States is South Korea's third largest trading partner. Our alliance with Korea has expanded from its military roots to develop into one of the most vibrant and dynamic full-spectrum strategic partnerships in modern history. Today's Korea stands shoulder-to-shoulder with us in
peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts in Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon. Recent events with North Korea have reminded us that the alliance is a vital linchpin of not only the security of Korea and the United States, but also for the Asia Pacific as a whole. Implementation of KORUS will signal to other Asia-Pacific nations our abiding presence in the region as a vital partner in its defense and development. It will underscore our commitment to prosperity and security in the Asia Pacific. KORUS
will re-establish U.S. leadership in shaping economic policy in the region and in crafting its emerging economic institutional architecture. Of course, commercial ties are not only important for the U.S.- Korea relationship, but for
America's prosperity. Now more than ever, America's ability to create jobs here at home depends on our ability to export goods and services to the world.
Trade not consultation is the linchpin of the relationship Tandon 4/19/2k11 Associated Foreign Press (Shaun, AFP, Keen to boost S.Korea, US prioritizes trade, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jygsva5DH6dBaJzq2LOEO9M8lvCA) WASHINGTON Eager to bolster South Korea and wary of initiatives on the North, the Obama administration is putting a new priority on ratification of a free trade agreement that has languished for years. On a weekend visit to Seoul, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton held talks about North Korea but barely said a word publicly about it. Instead, she spoke at length on the trade deal, vowing to push it through Congress this year. Clinton told business leaders Sunday that ratification would be "one of my top priorities" and that it would send "another powerful message that we are working together, of course for our own countries, but also in a strategic relationship that is beneficial to the region and the world."
The United States stations close to 30,000 troops in South Korea, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War, and incessant tensions with the communist North have long dominated the relationship between Seoul and Washington. But the dynamic has changed since President Lee Myung-Bak took over in South Korea in 2008 and US President Barack Obama a year later. Both have low tolerance for North Korea, which has defied the world by pursuing nuclear weapons. The Obama administration has set a policy of "strategic patience," refusing dialogue until North Korea recommits to denuclearization and makes amends for deadly incidents including the sinking of South Korea's Cheonan vessel last year. But Obama still wants to engage South Korea . He has come to view Lee as one of his closest foreign allies -- a sharp change from the often hostile rapport between the two leaders' predecessors, George W. Bush and Roh Moo-Hyun. On his first presidential tour of Asia in 2009, Obama was visibly elated by his warm reception in Seoul. Clinton hailed Lee for spearheading summits on the economy and nuclear security, saying that South Korea "has become, in many ways, a global power." A senior US official heaped praise on the "sophisticated" Lee, saying that -- in contrast to many Asian leaders -- he began talks with Clinton by discussing not bilateral concerns but instead Libya. The official told reporters traveling with Clinton that Asian leaders' top hope for the United States -- even more than security -- was economic engagement. "They
are viewing the Korea free trade agreement as basically the linchpin for the next 50 years in terms of US-Korean relations," the official said on condition of anonymity. Trade is key to relations Alden and Snyder 2010 Senior Fellow and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies (Edward and Scott A., Council on Foreign Relations, 12/6/2k10, Why U.S.-Korea Trade Deal Matters, http://www.cfr.org/trade/why-us-korea-trade-deal-matters/p23557)
The KORUS
FTA is an essential step toward the president's goal of doubling U.S. exports during the next five years. Passage of the FTA would also provide strategic reassurance to South Korean allies in the face of its growing economic dependence on China and lends credibility into U.S. efforts to expand trade liberalization through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. Following his mid-November visit to Seoul, President Obama received strong
criticism for his failure to close KORUS from critics who felt that the failure underscored the administration's weakness on the international stage following the Democratic loss of control of the House of Representatives in the November midterm elections. At that time, President
agreements just for the sake of trade agreements. I want to make sure that this deal is balanced." The revised agreement keeps U.S. tariff protection in place a bit longer; it exempts 25,000 U.S.-made cars each year -- four times the number in the 2007 version -- from Korean safety standards that have been used to block imports; and it provides extra safeguards in the event of a surge of Korea auto exports to the United States. The deal also gives U.S. carmakers extra time to adopt any new Korean regulations in the sector. In addition, the revised agreement delays tariff reductions on Korean autos by five years and on Korean trucks by seven years, and provides an additional ten-year safeguard against elimination of tariffs in the event that surges in Korean exports damage U.S. producers. These are positive amendments. But the United States paid a big
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 113/182 price for the wait. Korea is its seventh largest trading partner, making this the biggest bilateral trade deal since the 1993 North American Free Agreement with Mexico. Instead of locking up the Korea deal well ahead of its rivals, the new deal will now likely be
approved at roughly the same time as free trade agreements between Korea and the European Union and Korea and Canada, though Canada and Korea are still wrestling over both auto and beef trade. This has robbed U.S. producers of a jump-start they would otherwise have enjoyed.
Michigan 2011
A) South Korea Nationalism Campbell et al 9 (Kurt M. - co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, Victor D. Cha - Director of Asian Studies and the DS Song-Korea Foundation Chair at Georgetown University as well as a senior Fellow at the Pacific Council, Director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council and Deputy Head of the US Delegation to the Six Party Talks, Nirav Patel Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Randy Schriver Partner at Armitage International, president and cofounder of the Project 2049 Institute, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific under President George W. Bush, Vikram J. Singh Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Lindsey Ford Consultant at the Center for a New American Security, February 2009, Center for a New American Security, Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09.pdf) MAnAGI nG PoPU lIsM The second challenge for the alliance relates to managing populist fervor in Korea. Although it is a consolidated democracy by most metrics, the ROKs intense nationalism, very active nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and tightly interconnected society lead to occasional flare ups of populist anger and protest that can be very destructive to the alliances reservoir of goodwill. In the early spring of 2008, for example, the newly elected Lee government was paralyzed by dem-onstrations throughout the country. The streets of Seoul were blocked by candlelight vigils in the city center. The opposition party refused to attend the opening session of the National Assembly in which the newly elected president would tradi-tionally give a State of the Union speech. Joining the civil society NGOs in the protests were labor unions that undertook a work stoppage that cost the Korean government tens of millions of dollars in lost productivity. The ostensible reason for the demonstrations was Lees perceived rash decision to accede to the reopening of the Korean market to U.S. beef imports. Protestors saw this as a high handed decision by a CEO president who was out of touch with common Koreans concerns about the safety of American beef and who sought only to improve his relationship with Bush prior to his trip to Camp David (the first such trip by a Korean president to the Maryland retreat in the history of the alliance). These beef demonstrations demonstrated the unpredictable nature of populist movements in Korea. Just when things looked as though they were back on an even keel and the memories of the 2002 anti-American demonstrations in Korea had started to fade, these protests recalled all of the perennial difficulties in the alliance relationship. The beef demonstrations do represent a chal-lenge to the alliance for the new administration in Washington. Yet, these allparalyzing protests were not about American beef, which is safe by interna-tional standards. (Indeed, U.S. beef took some 39 percent of the Korean domestic market within one week of its return to grocery store shelves). Instead, they represent a fundamental new problem for Koreas populist democracy that is, the capacity of Koreas political left to operate effectively within established democratic institutions. With Lees election in December 2007, the pro-gressive left in Korean politics found itself out of power both in the executive and in the legislature branches of government for the first time in more than a decade, dating back to the presidencies of Kim Dae Jung and Roh, when the 3-8-6 Generation of former student dissidents held the reins of power. 11 This decade of rule came to an abrupt end when the conservative Lee won in 2007 by the widest margin of any Korean presi-dent since the establishment of democracy in 1987. Following Lees election, the April 2008 National Assembly elections put the conservative Grand National Party back into power with an almost two-thirds majority. In the history of Korean democracy, this was a novel situation: the political left that had fought for democratization took to the streets to voice oppo-sition to the new conservative government (using American beef as the entry point) rather than operating through the very democratic institu-tions they fought so hard to establish. Whether or not the decision to take the protests to the streets was merely an instinctive reaction from the left and civil society groups, what was most disturbing was opposition party legislators joining the street protests rather than trying to operate through the legislature. This was an undeniable failure of Korean democracy, hopefully only a momentary one sparked by the unprecedented nature of the political situation. Continued attempts from the streets to stymie the incumbent government in Seoul have real costs for the ROK and for the alli-ance. The nearly four months of protests in 2008 that paralyzed the government have been esti-mated to cost the economy $2.5 billion, according to a Korea Economic Research Institute study. 12 Rectifying this situation is outside the purview of the alliance. Nonetheless, how the Koreans are able to find ways for the political
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 115/182 opposition and ruling parties to work through their political differ-ences through established institutions rather than populist politics is an important variable in the alliances resiliency. B) Education System Campbell et al 9 (Kurt M. - co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, Victor D. Cha - Director of Asian Studies and the DS Song-Korea Foundation Chair at Georgetown University as well as a senior Fellow at the Pacific Council, Director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council and Deputy Head of the US Delegation to the Six Party Talks, Nirav Patel Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Randy Schriver Partner at Armitage International, president and cofounder of the Project 2049 Institute, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific under President George W. Bush, Vikram J. Singh Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Lindsey Ford Consultant at the Center for a New American Security, February 2009, Center for a New American Security, Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09.pdf) A third challenge and an important domestic determinant of the future relationship that receives scant attention in the policy studies community is the reform of the education system in Korea. The combination of a poor public school system and a strong leftist teachers union creates an ill informed jingoism among Korean youth that helps to fuel the runaway populism sometimes found in Korea. In the autumn of 2008, Lee, like his three predecessors, tried to address long-term education reform. He called for providing public school curricula in the English language, instituting school rankings and a teacher evaluation system, and seeking initiatives to reduce the financial burden of runaway spending on private tuition, among other measures. These efforts at education reform could have direct and long-term effects on the alliance. The secondary-school education system in Korea is broken. Parents pay billions of dollars to educate their children in high-priced hagwons (tutorials) that provide specialized training outside of regu-lar school hours. A Bank of Korea report found that household spending on education totaled an obscene $13.72 billion in the first half of 2008, representing a 9.1 percent increase over 2007. 13 Korean families spend an average $600 per month for private education, totaling some $30 billion or 4 percent of annual gross national product. The daily commute on buses to and from these educational institutions from 3pm to 11pm every evening is a standard part of the lives of Korean children. The result of this dynamic is that the actual school day is of little interest both to the students and to the teachers. Teachers, many of whom hail from the powerful (and leftist) teachers union, use their time to educate students about their days fighting American support of Korean mili-tary dictators, the 1980 Kwangju massacre, and Japanese colonialism, among other choice topics. These highly organized and politically powerful unions account for between 10 and 33 percent of the faculty in public schools. The aggregate effect is that successive generations of school children grow up with potentially very biased views of the United States from the 1970s and 1980s ingrained in them at a very impressionable age. This does not mean that anti-Americanism is increasing among younger generations, but that existing strands of it get perpetuated even as the U.S.-ROK relationship evolves far beyond that past. Liberal governments from 1997 to 2007 offered the best opportunity to contend with the powerful teachers union, but they were equally unsuccessful in gaining traction on the issue. This is an issue outside the purview of U.S. responsibilities, but it is important to the software of the alliance relationship and the sense of goodwill among younger generations. The visa waiver program and the Work, English Study, and Travel (WEST) program are two initiatives undertaken by the United States that should be promoted by the new administration. South Koreans longtime quest for accession to the U.S. visa waiver program became a presiden-tial initiative from the Bush-Roh 2005 Gyeongju Joint Declaration and was achieved in November 2008. In conjunction with the visa waiver, the new WEST program will soon allow 5,000 students to study and work for 18 months at a time in the United States. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the two governments in September 2008, the implementation of which will fall to the next U.S. government. Programs such as WEST and the visa waiver, in addition to the long-established Fulbright scholar-ships, cannot be overestimated in terms of the role they play in increasing people-to-people exchanges between Koreans and Americans. Younger people are more likely to take advantage of these programs and thereby gain firsthand knowledge of the United States, which should redound posi-tively for the alliance. In short, the average Korean students experience with the United States used to be a combination of hearing negative stories in public school about America, and for those who still sought to travel to the United
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 116/182 States, being forced to stand in a visa line for hours outside the American embassy. With options such as the visa waiver and WEST, the experiences of the next generation of Koreans will hopefully not be as negative, which can contribute to greater goodwill in the alliance. C) Abandonment fears Campbell et al 9 (Kurt M. - co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, Victor D. Cha - Director of Asian Studies and the DS Song-Korea Foundation Chair at Georgetown University as well as a senior Fellow at the Pacific Council, Director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council and Deputy Head of the US Delegation to the Six Party Talks, Nirav Patel Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Randy Schriver Partner at Armitage International, president and cofounder of the Project 2049 Institute, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific under President George W. Bush, Vikram J. Singh Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Lindsey Ford Consultant at the Center for a New American Security, February 2009, Center for a New American Security, Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09.pdf) Another significant domestic hurdle that the alli-ance will have to overcome is the fear of alliance abandonment in South Korea, particularly by conservative supporters of the current regime. The changing nature of the U.S. military engagement in South Korea, including drawdowns in troop levels, force relocations, and the goal of transfer-ring wartime OPCON of the Korean forces back to the ROK by 2012, has sparked deep fears of aban-donment in South Koreas Ministry of National Defense (MND). Many South Korean officers, as well as many members of the South Korean public, view the reduction in American forces from 38,000 troops in 2005 to 28,500 in 2008 as a precursor to the eventual withdrawal of all American forces from the ROK. 28 The U.S. push in 2006 for stra-tegic flexibility of USFK only increased concerns that more U.S. troops were likely to be withdrawn from the peninsula. Even though these fears are overstated, the pace and significance of the cur-rent changes in the U.S. military presence on the peninsula continue to stoke concerns. U.S. civil-ian and military leaders have worked diligently to dispel these fears. Such efforts will continue to be necessary for the next administration and should not be overlooked.
Michigan 2011
Jong-il has put in place a nuclear game plan as a part of the plan's
military first policy to deal with nuclear rogue state America and its allies South Korea and Japan. (See Kim Jong-il shifts to plan B, Asia Times Online, May 21) The nuclear game plan is designed firstly to militarily prevent the US from throwing a monkey wrench into the plans of the Kim Jong-il administration for
Michigan 2011
economic prosperity by 2012 - the centenary of the birth of founding father Kim Il-sung - in a bid to complete its membership of the three elite clubs of nuclear, space and economic powers. Its second aim is to win the hearts and minds of the 70 million Korean people, North, South and abroad, and leave little doubt in their eyes that Kim Jong-il has what it takes to neutralize and phase out the American presence in Korea. This will hasten the divided parts of ancestral Korean land - bequeathed by Dankun 5,000 years ago and Jumon 2,000 years ago - coming together under a confederal umbrella as a reunified state. It is designed to impress upon the Korean population that Kim Jong-il is a Korean David heroically standing up to the American Goliath, that he can lead the epic effort to settle long-smoldering moral scores with the US over a more than 100-year-old grudge match that dates as far as the 1905 Taft-Katsura Agreement and the 1866 invasion of Korea by the USS General Sherman. Third, Kim
Jong-il has described the shift to plan B as a stern notice for the governments of the US and its junior allies that they cannot get away with their hostile behavior any longer, unless they are prepared to leave their booming economies consumed in a great conflagration of retaliatory thermonuclear attacks. The game plan assumes that the US is
unlikely to shake off its aggressive behavior until it is wiped off this planet. The Barack Obama administration has not taken much time to reveal its true colors, which are no different from the George W Bush administration. There have been four compelling signs: First, the March 9-20 Key Resolve (Team Spirit) joint war games between the US and South Korea. Second, the US-led United Nation Security Council's (UNSC) condemnation of an innocuous April 5 satellite launch. Third, the rehashing of counterfeit money charges that the US has failed to produce compelling evidence to support. As Newsweek wrote in its June 8 issue, "The Treasury Department couldn't find a single shred of hard evidence pointing to North Korean production of counterfeit money." Fourth, the presence of Bush holdovers in the Obama administration, such as Stuart Levy, the architect of Bush-era financial sanctions intended to criminalize the DPRK.
Michigan 2011
Korea under the 1979 agreement signed by the missile, South Korea missile range can not exceed 180 kilometers from Pyongyang because of the military demarcation line distance of 180 km. January 2001 lifting of the ROK-US agreement, South Korea officially joined in March the same year by the US-led "missile technology control mechanism." Under the agreement, South Korea missile range to 300 km, warhead weight is limited to 500 kilograms. a South Korean government source said the Korea-US negotiations began late last year to extend ballistic missile range of issues. For this problem, the basic consensus between the two countries. The source also pointed out that because the consultation has just begun, range and warhead weight can increase the number can not tell. However, it is necessary to extend the range to 1,000 km. In addition, the Korean National Defense Commission recently developed advanced technology to promote defense reform issues, including, in consultation with the United States, the missile range to expand from the current 300 km to 1000 km above the problem. South Korean military and some experts argue that South Korea should be more than 1,000 km range ballistic missile, so as to cover the coast from Nan Min to the range of North Korean territory. reported that the actual layout of the farthest North
Korea 3000-4000 km range of ballistic missiles, but the Han Jun is only 165-300 km range ballistic missiles.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 121/182 unacknowledged until the middle 2000s.21 In fact, Seouls military is better equipped and better trained; it rests upon a far stronger industrial and larger population base. Moreover, the South is capable of spending as much as is necessary to overmatch Pyongyang. The ROK doesnt do so because it doesnt have to, since it can rely upon American defense subsidies.22 Some analysts contend that Pyongyang has adjusted its military tactics to fit its force inferiority. For instance, the North might hope to seize Seoul, located just south of the DMZ, and then negotiate a ceasefire.23 No doubt South Korea should prepare for such a contingency. But, again, the responsibility for defending Seoul lies with the ROK, not the United States. The South should develop and deploy the forces and weapons necessary to thwart such an attempt. Obviously, it would be expensive for Seoul to replicate U.S. military capabilities. According to South Koreas Ministry of National Defense, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) enable South Koreans to reduce our defense spending, which contributes to our continued economic development. If we take into account all the equipment and materials that the USFK maintains in-country as well as the several billion dollars it spends on maintenance and operations, its opportunity cost is tremendous. If the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of additional defense expenditures to compensate for its absence.24 The argument that the South would need to undertake an astronomical increase in defense spending is, however, a self-serving exaggeration. Seoul does not need to replicate Americas military to defeat the Norths military. Notes Jae-Jung Suh of Johns Hopkins Universitys School of Advanced International Studies: while the U.S. military adds to the Souths capability, some of its contribution may be superfluous, especially given that Seoul is already enjoying military advantages over Pyongyang. The alliances supplementary effect, therefore, [is] smaller than it seems at first.25 The South requires well-trained and equipped armed forces that are better than those of the DPRK, and Seoul has those already. For the ROK to further upgrade its forces would take money and time, but presumably the South Korean people believe protecting their nation is worth substantial and sustained effort. If not, the American people are not responsible for filling any resulting gap. U.S. fiscal obligations start with a national debt exceeding $13 trillion and an annual deficit running up to almost $1.6 trillion.26 Americans are borrowing money to pay to defend the South so South Koreans can spend their money on other priorities. But South Koreans have long been capable of doing far more on their own behalf. Despite a growing economy, the military dictatorship of Chun Doo-hwan cut military outlays in the 1980s for economic reasons. Defense spending continued falling as a share of GDP under democratically elected Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Daejung. Although the leftish Roh Moo-hyun government reversed this trend, conservative President Lee Myung-bak has dialed back the recent modest growth in spending. Chung-in Moon and Sangkeun Lee, both professors at Yonsei University explain: Although the actual amount of defense spending rose slightly as part of a fiscal stimulus package to cope with the global financial crisis, the relative share of total government spending was radically reduced to 10.8 percent in 2009. The Lee government has also announced plans to cut the estimated budget for the Defense Reform The alliance is outdated, but in the shortterm the United States and South Korea are tied together militarily. Their responses to the sinking of the Cheonan have reflected that relationship, thus Secretary of State Hillary Clintons vague promise of consequences for North Korea in response to the Cheonan sinking. However, Washington should leave imposition of those consequences to Seoul. There are low-risk steps which the Obama administration could take, but almost all would be counterproductive. For instance, naming the North a terrorist state for sinking the Cheonan would demonstrate that the designation has little or nothing to do with terrorism.28 Sinking a military vessel may be an act of war, but it does not fit the definition of terrorism. Formally killing the Six-Party Talks might provide the ROK and the United States some satisfaction but it also would eliminate the only ongoing U.S.-North Korean dialogue and might make it harder to enlist Chinas assistance in dealing with the North.29 In fact, after the sinking the Obama administration supported restarting these negotiations. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley explained: I wouldnt necessarily link those directly. And we want to see North Korea come back to the six-party process.30 However, the administration has not pushed the issue since the Norths complicity became obvious. Finally, reinforcing Americas military posture on the peninsula represents a move in the wrong direction. Victor Cha of Georgetown University, who was the NSC director for Asian Affairs in the latter years of the Bush administration, advocates reestablishing deterrence on the peninsula.31 Exactly when and how deterrence disappeared he does not detail, but responsibility for any reestablishment should lie with Seoul. Similarly, Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation advocates enhancing U.S. naval forces in the Yellow Sea.32 However, South Korea already possesses larger, betterequipped, and more modern vessels than does the North. The sinking of the Cheonan should serve as a wake-up call to Seoul to focus its military build-up on its own defense rather than regional or global missions.33 Cha proposes delaying the planned 2012 transfer of operational control (OPCON) over the combined U.S. and South Korean forces in any
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 122/182 war to the ROK. Ralph Cossa of Pacific Forum CSIS similarly argues against dissolving the Combined Forces Command in favor of the South Korean military so that there should be no question left in Pyongyangs mind about the joint ROK-U.S. commitment to fight together.34 A number of South Koreans also want to postpone this move. However, the very modest step is long overdue. Gen. Walter Sharp, commander of U.S. Forces Korea and head of the CFC, notes the limited nature of the change: This is not the ROK military becoming responsible for the self-reliant forces [sic] to defend the Republic of Korea.35 It is simply taking over command of combined forces, most of which would be South Korean, from the United States. The ROK and U.S. militaries have worked together for more than 30 years as part of the CFC. Niksch writes: It is difficult to believe that the South Korean command has not achieved a high level of preparedness.36 Yet the proposed reform is a tepid measure that just marginally reduces South Koreas dependent mentality. It also creates the awkward and troubling outcome of putting American troops under foreign military command. A better means to increase deterrence would be for Seoul to increase its own defense expenditures and readiness. Affirming its willingness to act independent of the United States would be a good start. Both sides should use the Cheonan controversy to reconsider an alliance that has outlived its original justification. Once the current crisis passes, the Mutual Defense Treaty should be terminated and the U.S. forces should be withdrawn.37 There is much on which both nations should work together in the future, including military operations where both countries have interests at stake. But such cooperation does not require todays antiquated security relationship.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 125/182 may be best to quote directly from a posting dated April 26, 2011 from the official website of the US Mission to ASEAN: In a ceremony today at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, H.E. David Lee Carden, the United States first resident Ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, presented his credentials to ASEAN Secretary-General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan. Dr. Surin will transmit Ambassador Cardens credentials to ASEAN foreign ministers via the ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representatives in Jakarta. Clearly, America is committed to a strong ASEAN-American relationship as evidenced by the posting of an Ambassador. This development, in this bloggers opinion, is not without good reason as ASEANs future economic potential is, well, rather staggering. This is especially true when considering the possible refractive benefits which could accrue to ASEAN from the potentially massive growth in the economies of, in, and around India and China. Hopefully, strong ASEAN-American relations will result in political and economic benefits for all concerned. U.S.-ASEAN Relations Strong Meetings Prove Limaye 10- director at the East-West Center in Washington, DC (10/28/10, SATU LIMAYE, Boom Times in U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations, http://aseanmattersforamerica.org/boom-times-in-u-s-southeast-asiarelations/404) These are boom times in U.S.-Southeast Asia relations. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton represents the United States at the 17th ASEAN Summit this week in Hanoi the highlight of which is to be U.S. participation, for the first time ever, in the East Asia Summit (EAS). Secretary Clinton is also expected to travel to Cambodia and Malaysia, and possibly elsewhere in the region, after the ASEAN and EAS meetings. President Obama will himself travel to the area when he makes a much-anticipated trip to Indonesia during a swing through Asia to include visits to India, South Korea (for the G20 gathering), and Japan (for APEC). All of this upcoming attention to Southeast Asia caps a stunning two years of activity in the region, including the first-ever visit by a U.S. secretary of state to the ASEAN secretariat, the U.S. signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), appointment of a resident ASEAN ambassador (to be named),and the holding of two U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Summits (the second of which was held last month for the first time in the U.S.). Combined with an announced policy of engagement with Burma, the declaration of a Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), and a clear statement on U.S. interests in the South China Sea in July, it is fair to say that never has the U.S. been so peacefully, fully, and visibly active in the Southeast Asia region. These immediate developments are just a manifestation of deeper, more structural trends in evolving U.S.Southeast Asia relations; trends that nonetheless bear noting. First, the U.S. is now unambiguously supportive of ASEAN as an institution. Earlier debates about whether to sign the TAC, appoint an ambassador to ASEAN, or hold a meeting with the member-country leaders have been mostly overcome. Simultaneously, a number of activities among officials are taking place to put meat on the bones of U.S.-ASEAN interaction. There is already a huge mutual stake in relations between the U.S. and Southeast Asia. As the new East-West Center initiative ASEAN Matters for America demonstrates, the subregion has two U.S. treaty allies (Thailand and the Philippines) and one critical security partner (Singapore), and accounts for the largest total stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asia (and the fourth largest source of FDI into the U.S.). The region ranks among the United States top 10 trading partners; has among the fastest rates of U.S. exports growth; sends 40,000 students each year to the U.S. who generate nearly a $1 billion to the U.S. economy; accounts for about a third of all Americans born in Asia; and hosts some 60 sister-city and other local civic exchange relationships.
Michigan 2011
Consultation Now
Status Quo Solves Consultation ASEAN 09 (2009, Association for South Easter Nations, asean.org, ASEAN - United States, http://www.aseansec.org/11068.htm) An active pattern of ASEAN-US exchanges reflected the vitality of ASEAN-US Dialogue relations, ASEAN and the US made the full use of their forums for close consultations during the period under review. The Ninth ASEAN-US Dialogue was held in Bangkok on 1-2 September 1990. At an interval of 10 months, the strong momentum was picked up again as both sides met at the Tenth ASEAN-US Dialogue in Washington D.C. on 20-21 June 1991. ASEAN and the US also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on improving their economic relations on 21 September 1990 and agreed to establish the Trade and Investment Cooperation Committee (TICC). The Inaugural Meeting of TICC was held in Washington D.C. on 24-25 June 1991, immediately following the 10th Dialogue, thus expanding the bilateral exchange to another level of frank and constructive discussions. The consultative mechanism was reinforced with the regular meetings of the Economic Coordinating Committee to maintain linkage in between and to handle specific trade and economic issues at the detailed level. The ASEAN-US Dialogue primarily reviewed trade and economic relations between ASEAN and the US and noted the rapid expansion of ASEAN-US trade relations. The Dialogue Meeting also registered its views to the US that further strengthening in some areas of investment cooperation should be undertaken, especially a more focused and coherent industrial cooperation program could be adopted to provide further impetus to increase US involvement in ASEAN industrialization process. Both sides have agreed to strengthen and put to maximum efficiency the various levels of consultative mechanism established as forums for consultation to reduce trade barriers and resolve trade disputes, as well as to promote joint investment. Consultation on Other Issues Solves ASEAN.ORG 93 JOINT PRESS STATEMENT 11TH MEETING OF THE ASEAN-US DIALOGUE (5/16/93, ASEAN, JOINT PRESS STATEMENT 11TH MEETING OF THE ASEAN-US DIALOGUE, http://www.asean.org/2618.htm) Bilateral economic issues such as trade, commodities and investment were also discussed. The Meeting noted a remarkable growth of ASEAN-US trade which had more than doubled over the last decade. The US has indicated its willingness to cooperate with ASEAN on forestry. The US will continue to consult ASEAN on tin disposal by the Defense Logistics Agency. ASEAN expressed a number of concerns over US policies affecting ASEAN trade with the US. The US responded to the concerns and emphasized the importance of open markets.
Michigan 2011
Alt CauseBurma
Burma Kills U.S.-ASEAN Relations VOA 07 Voice of America News (11/19/07, Voice of America News, US Trade Representative Says Situation in Burma Undermining ASEAN's Credibility, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-200711-19-voa8-66802322.html) U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab says Southeast Asian nations cannot go on with business as usual as long as Burma fails to enact reforms. Her remarks came as she joined officials of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, in Singapore Monday at the grouping's annual summit. VOA's Luis Ramirez reports from Singapore. The issue of Burma's massive violent crackdown on unarmed demonstrators is not on the summit's official agenda, but has overshadowed meetings here. U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab had lunch with ministers from the ten nations of ASEAN and said she expressed U.S. concerns about the situation in Burma. Ambassador Schwab told VOA that ASEAN has, in her words, a special responsibility when it comes to Burma. "I think the key is business as usual just doesn't cut it," Schwab said. "The bottom line is that business as usual just isn't going to solve the problems that are faced and as I discussed with my ASEAN colleagues, the situation in Burma is really undermining the reputation and the credibility of ASEAN as an organization." ASEAN officials have rejected calls by the United States for tougher action by Burma's neighbors for reforms in the impoverished country, which has been under harsh military rule since 1962. In remarks this week, the organization's secretary-general rejected U.S. calls for ASEAN to threaten Burma with expulsion, indicating the decision on that should be left to nations in the region.
Michigan 2011
---XT: Burma
Burma Kills ASEAN Credibility AFP 10 American Free Press (7/19/10, American Free Press, ASEAN credibility rests on Burma vote, http://www.dvb.no/news/asean-credibility-%E2%80%98rests-on-burma-vote%E2%80%99/10801) ASEANs credibility is at stake unless it defends freedom of expression and other rights ahead of elections planned in its military-ruled member Burma, Amnesty International said Sunday. Burma has said it will hold its first election in two decades this year, but has not yet announced a date. Southeast Asian nations should press the Myanmar [Burmese] government to protect the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association throughout the elections period and beyond, the London-based watchdog said in a statement.
Michigan 2011
Alt CauseCambodia
Cambodia Kills ASEAN Credibility Sukma 11 Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (4/26/11, Rizal Sukma, The Jakarta Post, ASEANs credibility at stake, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/04/26/asean %E2%80%99s-credibility-stake.html) Despite the ongoing Indonesia-mediated peace process, Thailand and Cambodia once again engaged in bloody skirmishes along the disputed border between the two countries. For three days in a row from Friday to Sunday last week exchanges of gunfire between both sides have led to the deaths of four Thai soldiers and wounding 25. Six Cambodians were killed and 17 were wounded (The Jakarta Post, April 25, 2011). As both sides continue to blame each other for the incidents, the situation is indeed worrisome. It is depressing to watch that the use of force has become more frequent in the territorial dispute between the two members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). What happened last week was only another among a series of similar skirmishes that have sporadically occurred along the border areas of the two countries since 2008. The problem has become a serious source of tension between the two nations and has begun to undermine the credibility of ASEANs efforts to transform itself into a security community by 2015. Indeed, the latest skirmishes clearly erode the optimism for a peaceful resolution resulting from the peace talks initiated by Indonesia since the Jakarta meeting held on Feb. 22.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 131/182 come to realise the benefits inherent in regionalism, and has begun to take a role in strengthening regional and global organisations. As Chinas economy has grown, its leaders have also turned their focus onto international efforts to solve environmental problems such as global warming. The United States remains the leader in higher education and research, and acts as a centre for educating talented people from around the globe. Additionally, international institutions sometimes lack the capacity to respond to urgent crises. In this context, the United States remains the country with the greatest capacity to resolve security and environmental emergencies. The United States recognises the importance of the AsiaPacific and can be expected to take an active role in the region. The Southeast Asian countries that formed ASEAN have set the model for the soft regionalism that is the glue binding together nations on both sides of the Pacific in a cooperative framework, most notably via APEC. It has unique convening power for bringing together the big powers of the region in a neutral setting. As the largest country in South-East Asia, Indonesia inevitably plays a central role in ASEAN. South Korea and Australia both also have unique contributions to make. South Korea, along with Singapore, is the most cosmopolitan country in East Asia, and continues to send many students to countries throughout the world. Australia has played a special role, not only as the regions key supplier of many raw materials, but also as the one sizeable Caucasian country that is in effect in Asia. No country outside South Korea has trained a higher percentage of its population in Japanese language and culture. No country outside Indonesia has done more to study Indonesia. Accordingly, Australia continues to play a key role in maintaining security within the Asia-Pacific. The regional organisations in existence are already flexible enough to make good use of the capacities of the respective countries. But India and Russia should also be absorbed in these organisations. Together, these countries, through the regional associations, can address some of the critical issues facing the region. I will just briefly mention two of the most difficult of these issues that require our attention: historical disputes, and military balance of power issues. At the moment, issues as to Japanese interpretations of history are relatively submerged, as South Korea and China are making an effort to set aside this issue. This does not mean that the issue has been resolved. On the Japanese side, efforts must be made to engage in a thorough study of the tragedies caused by the occupation of Taiwan and Korea, and of the invasion of mainland China in World War II. Korea and China must also make an effort to communicate to their populations the fundamental changes that have occurred after World War II, as Japan has sought to maintain peace and avoid militarism. The security balance in Asia is the single biggest issue confronting regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. In the past several decades, stability in Asia has rested upon two pillars; the overwhelming military power of the United States and the cooperation of other countries, most prominently South Korea and Japan. Now, the Chinese military is growing in strength, and it is no secret that the US has an imbalanced budget that will constrain military expenses in decades ahead. If we are to maintain peace and stability in the Asia Pacific, we must have a solid understanding between the United States and China. It is in the interests of all countries in the region to deal with these issues, and regional organisations can make an important contribution. Thus whilst we do not need another regional organisation for East Asia, it is vital that all concerned nations continue to cooperate using the existing organisations.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 133/182 to technical cooperation, capacity building, and the removal of impediments to realizing our relationship's full economic potential. Building on the success of the first year of the Partnership, we will continue to strengthen our economic and financial partnership in order to realize the full economic and strategic potential of the US-India partnership to achieve maximum benefits for Americans and Indians." Indo-US relations high and strong now cooperating over similar interests Blake 6/17 (6/17/11. Robert O. Blake Jr. Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. U.S.India Business Links and Prospects for the Future. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1106/S00487/usindia-business-links-and-prospects-for-the-future.htm) A U.S.-India Partnership for the Future I have been privileged to help advance the US-India partnership since I first started working in India in 2003. I have seen first-hand how committed government leaders working hand-in-hand with the business community and buttressed by strong people-to-people ties can transform a bilateral relationship. Broad, bipartisan political support in both countries has driven our countries closer together over the last decade, and ensures that this relationship will continue to be a mainstay of American and Indian foreign policy, regardless of who is in power. Over the last decade, beginning with President Clintons landmark visit in 2000, to the civil nuclear deal negotiated by the Bush Administration, to the greatly expanded strategic partnership established by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh, we have fundamentally transformed the way the United States and India work together. President Obamas trip last November will be remembered as a watershed, when the U.S. and India embarked for the first time on concrete initiatives to work together globally. Reflecting the comprehensive nature of our bilateral engagement, the Presidents visit resulted in new milestones across virtually every field of human endeavor, from civil nuclear cooperation to regional consultations, from energy to food security. Indo-US cooperation over free trade Blake 6/17 (6/17/11. Robert O. Blake Jr. Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. U.S.India Business Links and Prospects for the Future. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1106/S00487/usindia-business-links-and-prospects-for-the-future.htm) The Indian economy of today is the second fastest-growing in the world expanding at a rate of over 8 percent annually. The Indian economy has produced some of the worlds leading multinational corporations, which create innovative goods and services, and present novel business models for the other countries. However, as the Indian government itself acknowledges, growth presents its own challenges. How to manage growth in a way that includes the most vulnerable in society has been a top focus of the Indian government. In the private sector, businesses would like to be able to move faster. India has embarked upon a major period of infrastructure upgrades, which, once completed will vastly lower the transaction and time costs of doing business. Other challenges mentioned by Indian and other companies include corruption and lack of transparency. Indeed, India ranks 134 out of 183 countries in the World Banks index of Ease of Doing Business. I am confident that Indian business and policymakers together will overcome these challenges to unleash even greater growth to benefit all. The future of Indias economy looks very brightand very young. For example, India will likely have the worlds third largest economy in the year 2030 and the largest by 2050. Indias population will become the largest by 2030 as well. At a time when much of the industrialized world is shrinking as well as aging, half of Indias population is under age 25. That large and youthful work force is a growing strategic advantage, provided these young people can get the 21st century education they will need to compete. According to one study, India will have 25 percent of the worlds workforce by 2025. The incredible growth of Indias economy has resulted in positive spillover effects for the United States. A quick look at the data reveals a trade relationship that is accelerating, mutually beneficial, and relatively balanced. Between 2002 and 2009, U.S. goods exports to India quadrupled, growing from $4.1 billion in 2002 to more than $16.4 billion in 2009, and U.S. services exports to India more than tripled, increasing from $3.2 billion in 2002 to more than $9.9 billion in 2009. U.S. exports to India have grown faster than exports to practically all other countries in the world. 2010 broke records for U.S.-India trade in goods with U.S. exports to India up 17% and U.S. imports from India up 40%. This surge of nearly 30% to a high of $48.8 billion in goods trade moved India up two notches to become our 12th largest goods trading partner. This positive trend continues, with two-way goods trade up 19% in the first quarter of 2011 over the same time period last year. Our trade with India is also
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 134/182 very much a two-way exchange with mutual benefits to both our countries. Robust two-way trade means citizens from Kolkata to Kansas will see the benefits of our trade engagement. India is also a growing source of foreign direct investment into the United States. The total stock of FDI from India to the United States stood at almost $5.5 billion at the end of 2009. It has grown at a compound annual growth rate of 35 percent during the 2004 to 2009 time period, making India the 7th fastest-growing source of investment in the United States. Indian companies invest heavily in many U.S. industries such as energy and information technology, and we expect their investments to increase. The character of our trade with India is also relatively balanced. In a global economy where Americas trade relations in some cases have a balance favoring the other nation, the fact that Indias exports to the U.S. are relatively equal to its imports is important to note. Our trade with India also encompasses a broad range of sectors. U.S. exports to India include aircraft, electrical machinery, chemicals, plastics, pharmaceuticals, vehicles, railway equipment, and steel. Services trade is also significant. In addition to the dynamic IT trade investment, tourism is a little known but growing service. Last year 650,000 Indians visited the U.S., an increase of 18%, making India the 10th ranking source of tourism to the U.S. So I urge you to do your part and visit the U.S.all of our 50 states will be happy to welcome you! We in government are absolutely committed to doing everything we can to open new opportunities for trade and investment. We have a variety of mechanisms for doing so. Finance Minister Mukherjee will visit Washington at the end of June to hold a round of the U.S.-India Economic and Financial Partnership with his counterpart Treasury Secretary Geithner. The High Technology Cooperation Group, which has enabled both governments to significantly reduce barriers to trade in sensitive, cutting-edge high technology, will meet in mid-July in New Delhi. Other ongoing forums include the U.S. Trade Representatives Trade Policy Forum, which encompasses a number of sector-specific dialogues; and the Department of Commerces Commercial Dialogue, which facilitates an open dialogue about trade. The Opportunity for U.S. Businesses Indias market offers tremendous opportunity to U.S. exporters of goods and services. India has a market of 1.2 billion of the worlds consumers. These consumers have growing aspirations, and the disposable income to act on their aspirations. This is a powerful combination. The limitless potential for e-commerce, social media, and endless other business ideas that will arise from enhanced connectivity is staggering. According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, the current internet penetration in India is in the range of only 80-100 million, less than 10 percent of the population. With the advent of 3G and the ability of more Indians to go online with their mobile phones, the world of internet access will be completely transformed. Imagine more than half a billionand growing people chatting, Tweeting, connecting and innovating from their phones!
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 136/182 finds it difficult to accede the request of the US companies exporting nuclear reactors to amend its Nuclear Liability law to suit exactly their business needs. So, is this the end of the road for US-India ties? Far from it. There is a broad consensus in favour of expanding and deepening ties with the US, as our country moves into a higher trajectory of growth and it has needs of high technology for the modernisation of its economy, its society and human resources and its military. Didnt India recently place one of its biggest orders for procurement of weapons from US - handing over a highly lucrative 4.1 billion dollar order to Boeing which is estimated to generate around 25000 jobs in the US and would allow a profit margin of around 2 billion dollars? Trade is flourishing. Only yesterday, Robert Blake, US assistant secretary of state, who came all the way to Kolkatta to mark Americas high expectations from CM Mamata Bannerjee and Finance Minister Amit Mitra said at a speech, A quick look at the data reveals a trade relationship that is accelerating, mutually beneficial and relatively balanced. Washington cannot complain. At a time when World Bank forecasts a meagre 2.6 percent growth for US economy through 2013, Indian market is becoming a veritable milch cow it cant do without. Blake said: 2010 broke records for US-India trade in goods with US exports to India up 17% [and] moved India up two notches to become our 12th largest trading partner. He was thrilled that Indian investment in US compounded rapidly to establish Indias position as the 7th fastest-growing source of investment in the US. He frankly admitted, Indias market offers tremendous opportunity to US exporters of goods and services. In sum, what is happening is a certain removal of the blinkers on the US-India relationship. From the Indian side, the policymaker almost completely sequestered himself from the needless excitement of the proAmerican lobby and sundry other fatcats who stand to gain out of the US-India tango, as well as the US own propaganda machinery, which incessantly churns out the spin about the relationship being a rare thing in contemporary global politics. From the US propaganda, it may appear the Indian policymaker is being passively led by the skillful American master who knows the ways of the poodles. But in reality, both Delhi and Washington know - as WikiLeaks cables reveal - that it is just not in Indias DNA (to borrow a memorable phrase from the Peoples Daily) to be a poodle. The rupture that threatens to break out next week could well throw the entire US-India nuclear deal into a spin, but it has also brought out into the open the real alchemy of the US-India relationship as a hard-nosed, selective partnership based on mutual advantage. It stands out in primary colours. Sans misleading euphoria, sans false pretensions, sans unrealistic expectations. India and the U.S. are cooperating on aid and security. Khanna and Mohan 6 (February/March 2006. Parag Khanna fellow at the New America Foundation and Raja Mohan strategic affairs editor of the Indian Express in New Dehli. Getting India Right. http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-710.pdf) Nonaligned no more ACCORDING TO THE latest report of the CIAs National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, by 2020 Indias GNP will have overtaken or be on the threshold of overtaking European economies, potentially making it the worlds third largest economy. As the report concludes, Barring an abrupt reversal of the process of globalization or any major upheavals, the rise of these new powers [China and India] is a virtual certainty. Yet how China and India exercise their growing power and whether they relate cooperatively or competitively to other powers in the international system are key uncertainties. India on its own has begun the journey from its self-perception as an anti-imperialist power to a great power in its own right and is already defying the axiom that large states tend to be conservative about foreign policy. Though not a systemically revisionist power, it has pursued an increasingly activist foreign policy agenda, seeking to become not only South Asias dominant power, but an eminent Asian power. 1 Many in the U.S. might want India to become a Britain or Japan, mainly following where Washington leads. Others, like Jean-Luc Racine of the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, believe India has basically a Gaullist vision of the world and want India to become a France to the United States. But there are good reasons to believe India will be none of the above. Indo-U.S. strategic engagement will have to be constructed on an entirely different basis. The perceived distinction between Indias nonaligned past and alliance-oriented future is a complex one. At one level, India continues to cling to a cherished Nehruvian ideal of autonomous action based on democratic right and self-defined interest. At the same time, India has shown increasing flexibility in engaging the major powers and has expanded cooperation with the United States even in areas of prime security concern to itself. All of this makes India what political scientist Stephen Krasner calls a modified structuralist state, seeking to
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 137/182 maximize its interests and power but also to opportunistically transcend individual calculations of national interest. In Indias case, this position is actually based as much on an ideology of nonalignment, interpreted as an independent foreign policy that seeks to maximize Indias weight in world affairs. As Manmohan Singh has stated, We should develop friendly relations with as many major powers as possible. This will help in securing wider international support when we need it most. While there is no guarantee that India will become more allied or aligned, there has been a continuous trajectory toward a diplomatic posture which is perhaps best described as neo-Curzonian, after the British imperial viceroy and player of the Great Game Lord George Curzon. Ironically, Indias neoCurzonian worldview is the logical heir to one of the nations strategic ur-texts, Kautilyas fourth-century B.C. Arthashastras, which locates India at the nucleus of concentric rings of potential friends and foes. A neo-Curzonian foreign policy is premised on the logic of Indian centrality, permitting multidirectional engagement or multi-alignment with all major powers and seeking access and leverage from East Africa to Pacific Asia. Such a forward foreign policy emphasizes the revival of commercial cooperation; building institutional, physical and political links with neighboring regions to circumvent buffer states; developing energy supplies and assets; and pursuing multistate defense agreements and contracts. Today, India has recovered this 360-degree vision, looking west to boost investment from Europe and the Persian Gulf, north to secure stable energy supplies from Central Asia (including Iran), and east for partnerships and free trade agreements with South Korea and Australia. It engages actively in regional fora such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) while not shying away from potential strategic competition with neighbors such as Pakistan and China. Furthermore, it has transitioned from demanding respect on the basis of its nuclear status to proving greatness on the basis of its political and economic accomplishments. Since injecting nationalism into its foreign policy and simultaneously making it more pragmatic, India has experienced a marked improvement in its global visibility. Interestingly, the traditional sympathies for the Third World in New Delhi are slowly being morphed into a search for markets and influence in such regions as Africa and East Asia. India is steadily expanding the scale and scope of its foreign assistance programs, which now have reached an annual level of nearly U.S. $350 million. 2 Indias aid program also has the features of great power aid policies of the past, such as support to domestic industry and penetration of foreign markets. India no longer reactively asks what others would like it to do, but rather takes the lead in defining its own goals.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 139/182 Trade key to U.S-India relations Bloomberg 6/28 (6/28/11 Geithner Says U.S.-India Relationship Has Vast Potential http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-28/geithner-says-u-s-india-relationship-has-vast-potential1-.html) Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner said the U.S.-India relationship has vast untapped potential even as American banks and insurers confront obstacles in Asias third-largest economy. U.S. companies still face barriers in sectors such as banking, insurance, manufacturing, multi-brand retail and infrastructure, Geithner said at a press conference today with Indias Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee after bilateral meetings in Washington. Still, the relationship presents both our countries with vast untapped potential for greater trade, investment and economic opportunity, Geithner said. Closer ties would help American companies expand sales to Indias 1.2 billion people. Indias government wants foreign investment in infrastructure to improve its congested transportation network and ease power shortages that are limiting economic progress. Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs government plans to double infrastructure spending to $1 trillion in the five years through March 2017 to expand highways, ports, airports and railways. About 50 percent of the funds are expected to come from the private sector, including overseas investors, Mukherjee said. There is a huge opportunity for American investors, he said. He was visiting Washington to participate in the second U.S.-India Economic and Financial Partnership meetings. Exports Grow Cooperation between the two countries, previously limited to mercantile exports, has expanded in recent years to areas including defense procurement, Mukherjee said. Thats why U.S. exports to India grew fourfold in the past decade, he said. The U.S. wants India to be one of its top 10 trading partners, Geithner said in a statement today. The South Asian nation moved up to 12th last year. The U.S. is looking for more access to industries such as financial services, education and legal services. Indias laws, aimed at protecting small-store owners, dont yet allow foreign investment in multi-brand retail, and have limited it only to single-brand retail or wholesale operations. Easing the barriers, which are limiting economic growth and job creation in both our countries, would be an important step toward integrating our economies, Geithner said. We understand that addressing these barriers can be politically challenging, but the long-term benefits clearly outweigh the short-term challenges for both our countries. Project Financing India on June 24 unveiled options it is considering to help investors set up infrastructure debt funds to finance road, port and power projects. The Indian government framework for debt financing will help encourage private investment, Geithner said. India is ranked 91 out of 139 countries for its infrastructure, according to the World Economic Forums Global Competitiveness Index. Indias deficiencies in logistics infrastructure cost the economy $45 billion, or 4.3 percent of gross domestic product, each year, according to McKinsey & Co. estimates. Combined foreign direct investment between the two nations rose by 165 percent from 2005 to 2009. More trade with India would also help President Barack Obamas goal of doubling U.S. exports globally in five years, Francisco Sanchez, undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, said in a speech at the U.S.India Business Council in Washington on June 23. India last year became the 17th largest export market for the U.S., up from 31st in 2000, Sanchez said. At a business forum in Washington yesterday, Geithner called for India to take more steps in opening up financial services.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 141/182 uncertain. For better or worse, it promises to hold great sway over the United States political relationship with India and, by extension, Indo-US military cooperation. Defence cooperation, past and present THE tortuous strategic relationship between the United States and India since 1947 is well documented. Despite frequently converging concerns (particularly regarding Communist China, and more recently Islamist terrorism) and similar ideals (democracy, liberalism and pluralism), the two countries never forged a serious security partnership. The first years of ties are perfectly captured in the title of Dennis Kuxs excellent history, Estranged Democracies. There was one brief period of sustained strategic cooperation between 1962 and 1965, following the SinoIndian border war, which exposed Indias military vulnerabilities. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru frantically wrote to President John F. Kennedy in November 1962, focusing on the two countries common values, in a last-ditch attempt to secure American support. In the years that followed, the United States provided India with both grant assistance and military sales. This support, along with assistance to Pakistan, ended abruptly with the 1965 India-Pakistan war. The United States normalisation of ties with China in the 1970s and its alliance with Pakistan in the 1980s soured the relationship to the point that India began to think of Washington, Beijing and Islamabad as its own axis of evil. Sustained cooperation between the United States and India began only in the early 1990s, when military-tomilitary interactions were renewed. The navies led the way, the Indian navy being the least bound of the three services to a strict defence of Indias territorial sovereignty. The two countries began the annual Malabar exercises in 1992 and, after a hiatus following Indias 1998 nuclear tests, resumed expanded naval cooperation in 2002. The exercises increased in sophistication, from basic passing and replenishment-at-sea in 2002 to full-blown war games with aircraft carriers and satellite communications by 2005. The armies and air forces followed. Beginning in 2003, the two armies began joint counterinsurgency exercises in Mizoram. And after engaging with the US Air Force in exercises in India, the IAF was invited to participate in the Red Flag exercises in Nevada in August 2008, along with the South Korean and French air forces. Such military-to-military interactions remain, at present, the only concrete result of the much ballyhooed USIndia defence relationship, which, as a whole, has been the slowest facet of the overall relationship to realise its potential. Military ties have been uneven at best, with considerable variation in cooperation between different services and in different sectors. Obama will have a difficult time topping his predecessor in substantively improving relations with India but, assuming his administration takes into account Indias wishes and sensitivities, defence collaboration offers one area to build upon Bushs breakthroughs. The greater obstacle, however, may be Indias incoherence in building and deploying a modern military. Exercisesthe one area of outright successallow both militaries to operate within their comfort zones and provide some benefits for each side. Unfortunately, attempts to take further steps have frequently been stymied. For example, Washington has made favourable offers to India of institutionalised military cooperation, including offers to join the Combined Task Force 150 based in Djibouti, and to assume a major role in post-invasion peacekeeping operations in Iraq. In both cases, India spurned American proposals for cooperation of a higher order. On the other hand, the United States rejected Indias bid to assume a greater role in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. Washington did not see how India could be of practical help, and did not want to alienate Pakistan, which was in the process of signing on to the American effort. These refusals by one side or the other stem largely from differences in how Washington and New Delhi perceive the future of the bilateral defence relationship. For the United States, the end goal of steady steps towards closer interoperability is Indian involvement in a cooperative defence alliance, along the lines of the American relationship with other friendly countries such as Australia. India would ideally purchase sophisticated American equipment off the shelf, and participate in military operations in the region and elsewhere under American leadership. However, India views the burgeoning relationship very differently. Any cooperation with the United States would have to be framed as a partnership of equals, conducted to satisfy immediate Indian security concerns, and designed to involve a transfer of American technology to India that would ultimately abet Indias defenceindustrial self-reliance. The Bush administration learned, sometimes after several missteps, that it would have to temper its expectations accordingly. Enthusiastic rhetoric concerning the natural alliance between the two countries building upon Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayees use of the termgave way gradually to more sober and grounded talk of a mutually beneficial partnership. This was not merely a minor semantic adjustment, but rather, a
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 142/182 conscious realisation that Indias democracy, its size and its sensitivity to its sovereignty inhibit the kind of relationship that the United States has been used to with other friendly countries. More problematic, from the perspective of expanded defence cooperation, is the incoherence of Indias effort to modernise its armed forces. This incoherence has deep roots, but two factors stand out. The first is the attitude of most Indian politicians and bureaucrats, who fail to see the need for reforms in the military sphere similar to those pursued in many economic and social sectors. The Indian army today has essentially the same structure as that created by Lord Clive in the 18th century. Second, Indias services themselves lack any sense of cooperation or common purpose; despite talk, there has been no evident move towards this. Military modernisation is frequently interpreted as enhancing equipment and technology, rather than training, doctrine and structure. The result is a huge, paralysed defence empire. To take the example of defence procurement, particularly critical for the navy and air force, decisions are so hard to come by that India repeatedly misses important opportunities. The default optionproducing equipment in Indias own state-owned factoriesfrequently yields poorly-built and obsolescent weapons that even the Indian services do not want. As far as cooperation is concerned, each service has its own strategic doctrine, none of which necessarily represents actual policy that will be followed by the Indian government. Americans and others who interact with the Indian defence sector are all too often dismayed and disappointed at its 19th century approach to 21st century problems. Looking ahead AT ONE level, Barack Obamas election may not have a major impact on the security dynamics between the two countries. Joint exercises are expected to continue apace and, following the conclusion of the nuclear agreement, are unlikely to be hampered by the dictates of non-proliferation as in years past. The retention of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defence (who purportedly has great enthusiasm for India), continuing reservations in the Pentagon about the rise of China, and the resurgent threats of piracy, narcotics and terrorism also point to broad continuity in bilateral defence relations. Regardless, four aspects of the Indo-US military relationship can be greatly improved upon by an incoming US administration bent on action, in conjunction with South Block. The first two of these have not yet been brought to fruition to Indias satisfaction, while the latter two have not met American expectations. The first is joint defence production, which India greatly desires as a mark of trust and as a source of technical know-how. Indian enthusiasm is implicit in its offset policies, but it is exactly those policies, as well as the United States strict oversight and end-use monitoring requirements, which make such cooperation difficult. American firms that have tried to work within the offset policy often find it cumbersome, and unlikely to generate significant technological or economic benefits. The second, collaborative research and development, holds slightly more promise, as Indias proficiency in software complements the United States cutting-edge hardware. That avenue, however, has yet to be pursued to its fullest, thwarted partly by Indias less than impressive indigenous defence R&D infrastructure. In addition, the United States strenuous oversight over defence technology could also prove an impediment. This may change markedly if the private sector is allowed more space in India, and the long-discussed possibility of technology transfer via private firms on both sides (suitably monitored by the respective governments), could come to fruition in the next few years. The third aspect is bilateral defence trade, which has so far proven unsatisfactory from the standpoint of American manufacturers. India recently bought C-130J aircraft for almost $1 billion and the USS Trenton, now renamed the INS Jalashwa. These agreements certainly pave the way for further commerce. But while several other marquee defence deals may be in the pipeline, and others appear on hold, American defence contractors at present look unlikely to unseat Russia, Israel and France as major providers of systems to India. Finally, joint operationsother than for humanitarian reliefremain improbable for the near future, despite several common strategic objectives. Both countries being unused to partnerships of equals, differences over command are likely to be a point of contention, as they were when they contemplated cooperation in Iraq in 2003. While India has not historically been averse to multilateral operationsparticularly if under a United Nations flagit is not likely to participate in US-led coalition efforts unless Indian security is directly compromised, a consequence of Indias defensively-oriented strategic culture, the conservativeness of its bureaucracies, and the dictates of its domestic politics. Despite the difficulties, the Obama administration can potentially build upon the developments of the last eight years and qualitatively improve the US-India defence partnership. Obama himself had reservations about the nuclear agreement, and supported it reluctantly. Many of his advisors, particularly on nuclear matters, were more overtly critical. Yet, none of them are opposed to India itself; they believe that a strong US-India strategic
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 143/182 relationship makes sense. While the first year of the next administration is likely to be mired in extinguishing immediate crises on the economic and foreign policy fronts, the next fouror eightyears will give Obama the opportunity to do more than consolidate the advances in defence cooperation achieved by the Bush administration. U.S. India relations low defense differences. Business Standard 6/28(6/28/11. Senate pushes Pentagon on US-India defence ties http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/senate-pushes-pentagonus-india-defence-ties/440718/) Wants 5-year plan, F-35 sales and joint development of trainer aircraft. The United States Congress has moved decisively to bridge a widening gulf between the defence establishments of India and America. In an unprecedented initiative, the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), which oversees the US Department of Defense, has ordered the Pentagon to submit a report by November 1 with a detailed assessment of the current state of US-India security cooperation; and a five-year plan for enhancing that cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. The SASC has also ordered a detailed assessment of the desirability and feasibility of the future sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to India, and a potential US partnership with India to co-develop one or more military weapon systems, including but not limited to the anticipated program to replace the US Air Force T-38 trainer jet. The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has indicated its unwillingness to procure the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a futuristic, fifth-generation fighter aircraft that is at an advanced stage of development by US aerospace major Lockheed Martin. The reason that New Delhi cites is an ongoing joint development programme with Russia to develop a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). But MoD sources indicate there will be keen interest in New Delhi in any joint development programme with the US, especially in the realm of aerospace. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is grappling with a severe crisis in the availability of basic trainer aircraft for its cadets. The MoD is evaluating bids in a global tender for buying basic trainers for the IAF. Meanwhile, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is launching an indigenous programme for developing and building a basic trainer that has been dubbed the Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40 (HTT-40). With the Indian requirement estimated at about 200 trainers, joint development with the US would achieve a three-fold purpose: Indigenously meeting the IAF requirement; leveraging the experience of the US aerospace industry to ensure that the HAL programme meets time and quality yardsticks; and, most attractive for New Delhi, establishing a framework for high-technology cooperation and joint development with the US. The SASC initiative was piloted last week by two influential members Senator John Cornyn (Republican from Texas) and Joe Lieberman (Democrat from Connecticut) as an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill (each allocation of the US defence budget is evaluated and passed by the SASC). The amendment notes, It is in the national interest of the United States to support Indias rise and build a strategic and military culture of cooperation and interoperability between our two countries, in particular with regard to the Indo-Pacific region. This new initiative from the US Congress illustrates how the US-India relationship is expanding from the strategic into the popular realm. The senators interest reflects pressure from electoral constituencies, especially the powerful American-Indian community, and from economic considerations like the jobs created by Indian military purchases. Senior US officials privately contrast the flowering of the broad US-India strategic relationship with deepening scepticism about the defence relationship. Declaring flatly that there was hesitation within the Indian MoD about working too closely with the US, a top American official recently lamented that Washingtons outreach evokes little more than wariness from South Block. Meanwhile, Indian officials complain that America is interested only in defence sales, talking partnership but implementing technology sanctions. Henceforth, the flagging Pentagon-South Block relationship will not be left merely to bureaucrats, guided as they are by procedure and precedent rather than by an overarching vision. The efforts of the administration will now be watched over by the US Congress. Says Manohar Thyagarajan, head of Paragon International, a strategic advisory firm that closely monitors the US-India security relationship, This signifies that the Senate is willing to take a leadership role in discussing key elements of the US-India relationship. Key constituencies such as industry and the Indian-American
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 144/182 community would likely welcome thought leadership by Congress, which can be useful at times of inertia in the Washington interagency process, especially in trenchant areas like technology transfer. Key to relations Business Standard 6/28(6/28/11. Senate pushes Pentagon on US-India defence ties http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/senate-pushes-pentagonus-india-defence-ties/440718/) Wants 5-year plan, F-35 sales and joint development of trainer aircraft. The United States Congress has moved decisively to bridge a widening gulf between the defence establishments of India and America. In an unprecedented initiative, the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), which oversees the US Department of Defense, has ordered the Pentagon to submit a report by November 1 with a detailed assessment of the current state of US-India security cooperation; and a five-year plan for enhancing that cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. The SASC has also ordered a detailed assessment of the desirability and feasibility of the future sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to India, and a potential US partnership with India to co-develop one or more military weapon systems, including but not limited to the anticipated program to replace the US Air Force T-38 trainer jet. The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has indicated its unwillingness to procure the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a futuristic, fifth-generation fighter aircraft that is at an advanced stage of development by US aerospace major Lockheed Martin. The reason that New Delhi cites is an ongoing joint development programme with Russia to develop a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). But MoD sources indicate there will be keen interest in New Delhi in any joint development programme with the US, especially in the realm of aerospace. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is grappling with a severe crisis in the availability of basic trainer aircraft for its cadets. The MoD is evaluating bids in a global tender for buying basic trainers for the IAF. Meanwhile, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is launching an indigenous programme for developing and building a basic trainer that has been dubbed the Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40 (HTT-40). With the Indian requirement estimated at about 200 trainers, joint development with the US would achieve a three-fold purpose: Indigenously meeting the IAF requirement; leveraging the experience of the US aerospace industry to ensure that the HAL programme meets time and quality yardsticks; and, most attractive for New Delhi, establishing a framework for high-technology cooperation and joint development with the US. The SASC initiative was piloted last week by two influential members Senator John Cornyn (Republican from Texas) and Joe Lieberman (Democrat from Connecticut) as an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill (each allocation of the US defence budget is evaluated and passed by the SASC). The amendment notes, It is in the national interest of the United States to support Indias rise and build a strategic and military culture of cooperation and interoperability between our two countries, in particular with regard to the Indo-Pacific region. This new initiative from the US Congress illustrates how the US-India relationship is expanding from the strategic into the popular realm. The senators interest reflects pressure from electoral constituencies, especially the powerful American-Indian community, and from economic considerations like the jobs created by Indian military purchases. Senior US officials privately contrast the flowering of the broad US-India strategic relationship with deepening scepticism about the defence relationship. Declaring flatly that there was hesitation within the Indian MoD about working too closely with the US, a top American official recently lamented that Washingtons outreach evokes little more than wariness from South Block. Meanwhile, Indian officials complain that America is interested only in defence sales, talking partnership but implementing technology sanctions. Henceforth, the flagging Pentagon-South Block relationship will not be left merely to bureaucrats, guided as they are by procedure and precedent rather than by an overarching vision. The efforts of the administration will now be watched over by the US Congress. Says Manohar Thyagarajan, head of Paragon International, a strategic advisory firm that closely monitors the US-India security relationship, This signifies that the Senate is willing to take a leadership role in discussing key elements of the US-India relationship. Key constituencies such as industry and the Indian-American community would likely welcome thought leadership by Congress, which can be useful at times of inertia in the Washington interagency process, especially in trenchant areas like technology transfer.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Space Mil DA
India will ask for the United States to reduce export controls this leads to space militarization. FPIF 10 (11/3/10. Foreign Policy in Focus. India: Militarizing Space with U.S. Help. Matthew Hoey and Joan Johnson-Freese. http://www.fpif.org/articles/india_militarizing_space_with_us_help) U.S. President Barack Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have a meeting scheduled in Delhi on November 8. Certain to be on the agenda is the removal of the last remaining export controls on U.S. dualuse technology and military hardware to India, including technology appropriate for development of space weapons. Since President Obama pledged in 2009 to seek a ban on space weapons, the United States should not be helping other countries develop these weapons, especially in dangerous regions that have nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. But with the final hurdles of export control removed, Washington could be doing just that for India, with so far little or no objection. The relationship between the United States and India has been extraordinarily close since 2001. The United States views India as a rising democracy and ally in the fight against radical Islamic fundamentalism. Ten days after 9/11, Washington began to lift sanctions in place against India since its 1998 nuclear tests. Subsequently in 2001 the number of Indian companies on the Commerce Departments Entity List was reduced to just two from 159. Additionally, the U.S. licensing policy with India for nuclear- and missile- related technology changed from policy of denial to case-by-case review. Since 2006, delegations from the U.S. defense industry, including large numbers of retired high-ranking military officers, have flocked to India to prospect the $32 billion that has been allocated for defense procurement in 2010-11, with $13 billion of that figure set aside for the acquisition of new weapons systems. These defense industry representatives and retired military officials have served as an informal lobbying firm that continues to actively encourage the U.S. government to drop remaining export restrictions on India organizations like the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). In July 2010, the investment firm Deloitte estimated that India will spend nearly US$80 billion over the next five years on defense related capital expenditure. India is using space development as a way to advance a stronger geostrategic position in the region and globally. The U.S. defense industry is facilitating this military expansion with its aggressive move in to South Asian markets to supplement reductions in their Pentagon contracts. The potential long-term ramifications of both moves have been neglected in favor of short-term, understandable, gains. Nevertheless, the U.S. arms control community, by failing to address this dangerous situation, is asleep at the wheel. Indias Peaceful Space Program India, not surprisingly, says that its space program is for peaceful purposes only. The parallels between Indias nuclear program development and its current space program development, however, suggest otherwise. Former Indian President Abdul Kalam was a key developer and explicator of Indias nuclear and missile programs, as well as its current space vision. His definition of peaceful provides India considerable latitude. Kalam once stated that, In the 3,000-year history of India, barring 600 years, the country has been ruled by others. If you need development, the country should witness peace, and peace is ensured by strength. Missiles were developed to strengthen the country. This philosophy of peace through strength also provides the rationale for developing a wide range of new and emerging space technologies with far-reaching military applications. India considered its nuclear program peaceful right up to and including its 1974 test. Now, India considers its expanding space program peaceful as well. Despite contrary indications, Washington is apparently also willing to do so. Indias space program dates back to the launching of its first sounding rocket in 1963. Recently, however, the character of the Indian program has changed dramatically from utilitarian to more far-reaching. India is developing capabilities, including human exploration of space and expanded utilization of many dual-use technologies, to enhance its geostrategic position. This dual-use space technology can be used not just for military force enhancement but potentially for space weapons as well. Though most Indian politicians profess that India is not pursuing space weapons, some blur the lines. In February 2007, for example, Indian Defense Minister A.K Antony stated that, It may be difficult to demarcate distinctly between peaceful and military uses. However, we have always advocated peaceful use of technology. Thus, we are of the view that weaponization of space must be discouraged.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 148/182 The Indian military is not so circumspect and in fact at times directly contradicts the politicians. An alarming 2000 report titled Military Dimensions in the Future of the Indian Presence in Space caused waves within official circles but drew little international attention, probably due to its lack of availability outside of India. Perhaps most controversial was its suggestion that India could deploy a directed-energy weapon, such as a particle beam weapon, in space by 2010. At the time of publication, the papers author, V. Siddhartha, was an officer on special duty in the secretariat of the scientific advisor to the defense minister. The paper is testament to, at the very least, a longstanding interest within the Indian military of deploying not only a space-based laser, but also a kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) system. Although India clearly has not deployed an ASAT system that utilizes directed energy technology to date, Siddharthas forecast of India having the potential to develop an ASAT system still appears officially supported. In January of 2010 Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) Director General V K Saraswat stated at the 97th Indian Science Congress that, "India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites. All the while Indian officials continue to heavily lobby the United States to remove export restrictions on DRDO and ISRO, with a continuingly favorable reaction from the United States. Perhaps most clearly and most recently, the Indian ministry of defense published a document that serves as a technological roadmap for the Indian militarys future to the year 2015. This Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap confirms the pursuit of a formal anti-satellite program, stating development of ASAT for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both LEO and GEO-synchronous orbits as a goal for 2015. Not only is the United States not speaking out against such Indian efforts, it has become more accommodating in providing the technology to accomplish them. Meanwhile, international attention continues to focus on Chinas military space activities and, given Chinas overt ASAT test in 2007, rightfully so. But shortly after Chinas satellite shoot-down, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin convened a joint press conference where Singh declared; Our position is similar in that we are not in favor of the weaponization of outer space. This was just one day after then-Indian Air Force (IAF) chief Shashi Tyagi had stated, As the reach of our air force is expanding, it has become extremely important that we exploit space, and for it you need space assets. Indias contradictory intentions concerning its space program are hard to miss, yet Washington seems intent on doing so. U.S. Aerospace Posturing Much to the U.S. aerospace industrys dismay, the Obama administration cancelled the rocket and spacecraft construction connected to NASAs Constellation program and cut back on the perpetually close-tooperationally-functional missile defense program. Aerospace firms stepped up their scouting efforts for new business, with a major focus on India. In January 2006 the U.S.-India Business Council arranged for the most influential and largest defenseoriented delegation to travel to India to continue brokering the strategic partnership between the two nations. Headed by General (Rtd) Paul H. Kern, who was at the time a senior counselor with former U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohens Cohen Group, the delegation also included four-star Admiral (Rtd) Walter Doran, the vice president of Navy Accounts for Business Development at Raytheon, and former NASA astronaut Andrew Allen, then vice-president of International Fixed Wing Aircraft at Honeywell Defense and Space. The 31-member delegation represented 22 of the leading defense manufacturers in the United States, including Raytheon, Honeywell, Boeing, Lockheed, General Electric, Northrop Grumman. In 2010 the president and chief executive of Boeing Defense, Space and Security (BDS) Dennis Muilenburg was referring to India as Boeings Jewel in the Crown. U.S. manufacturers, worried about their Pentagon contracts, are pushing hard to open the Indian market wider. Boeing is, for instance, offering the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) help with its manned space trip planned for 2016. Export restrictions on ISRO, however, remain in place though perhaps not so after the November meeting in Delhi. Although ISRO considers itself a NASA counterpart and not part of the military establishment, there too the lines between the two are increasingly blurred. Retired Vice-Admiral Raman Puri, who supervised the Integrated Defense Force and led the coordination of Indias long-range military plans and joint doctrines, has recommended that all future [space] payloads including civilian space payloads should try to be dual-use meaning including military missions. As such, the Indian military could increasingly use ISRO-developed-and-operated satellites. Indias Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) satellite launchers are not drawn from prior missile programs, as were early Russian, U.S., and Chinese launchers. But the Agni missile, first test-fired in 1989, is a two-stage missile with the first stage using the first-stage solid-fuel
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 149/182 booster motor of the civilian-developed SLV-3 launch vehicle. The overlap between civilian and military communities is undeniable. Lets Make a (Bad) Deal Indias geostrategic position as a U.S. ally against Islamic radicalism and a potential market for the U.S. defense industry has allowed it leeway not afforded to many other countries. Even now, India has enjoyed access to dual-use technology largely denied to countries with similar positions on proliferation, since India has not signed either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has not subscribed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Since 2002, India has continued to push the United States for concessions in way few other countries would dare. According to the Times of India, India has very firmly asked the U.S. to ease export controls and remove top Indian agencies like the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) from the banned list. In terms of U.S. foreign policy and exceptionalism, India is to South Asia as Israel is to the Middle East. The United States in the past has wanted India to sign onto the MTCR as quid pro quo for the U.S. dropping restrictions on ISRO. India, however, will likely offer some lesser concession for the removal of the last remaining hurdles to export control. The economic and political forces behind the prospective commerce law changes seem too strong to stop this fast moving train unless attitudes change very quickly. India and International Law If the upcoming meetings between Manmohan Singh and President Barak Obama are designed to assist India in its effort to enter into a new era of technological and military prosperity, the United States should require beforehand that India abide by the will of the international community. The international community for the most part has embraced a number of treaties that serve as the backbone of global disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. The United Nations has frequently called on India to embrace the Non-Proliferation Treaty; in fact this has become a perennial practice. Indias status as a non-signatory undermines the treaty as long as New Delhi places itself on paper - in the company of Tehran and Pyongyang. That said, Indias reasons for not conforming to the NPT are difficult to discern. While Indian officials say they support full disarmament, they seem unwilling to take even the initially required steps on route to that goal. Calls for India to subscribe to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which has 34 members, have been frequent. Although India claims voluntary partial adherence to MTCR guidelines, it is not a member. Even in areas of arms control relating to terrorism arguably the greatest security threat facing India India has declined to participate in globally supported initiatives. As of 2010, India even has yet to sign onto the Proliferation Security Initiative to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Given its nuclear history and its exceptional position on arms control and its desire for dual-use technology usually reserved for countries demonstrating adherence to global arms control norms India must now accept the responsibilities that come with a more pronounced position in global politics. The actions of all the players in this drama may well be rational in the short term. But in the long term, the U.S. position of helping India boost its space program is counterproductive. Indias record with dual-use nuclear technology suggests that it is comfortable blurring the line between civilian and military applications. Moreover, U.S. technology given or sold to other countries has sometimes been subsequently used against the United States. Consequently, at least slowing down technology transfer to India would be prudent. Before the November 8 meeting between Obama and Singh, the Obama administration should reevaluate its role of playing matchmaker between U.S. aerospace industries and the Indian military.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 151/182 China who has always been aiding Pakistan in terms of economic and military equipment for a long time is pleased that United States Administration has refused to aid Pakistan anymore, and thats what probably China had longed. Dr. Raj Baldev, Cosmo Theorist and GBA Lead Man further said, China seems to be happy over President Obama for having suspended military aid to Pakistan, thats what China wanted such a situation to bring Pakistan closer to it. The GBA Lead Man said, The Obama administration has already suspended the aid of around 800 million dollars in military assistance to Pakistan, since they were annoyed over its cutback on US trainers, limits on visas for US personnel and other rubs. Dr. Raj Baldev, Cosmo Theorist finally said, The international community and the peace loving countries all over the world, who were annoyed on Pakistan for having created terrorist hubs in their country to blackmail the whole world. This group of countries is now happy that US has finally realized the wrong tilt in their foreign policy towards aiding Pakistan, who has undoubtedly proved to be an unreliable friend despite billions of dollar aids it received on the pretext of decimating terrorism. GBA President further said: The incident of May 2 secret US military raid in Abbottabad, which killed AlQaeda leader Osama bin Laden, has added an exposure of Pakistan and the military aid was denied to it, which strongly suggests that the bilateral relations between US and Pakistan are deteriorating day by day.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 154/182 Eleven Republicans sided with Mr Obama's Democratic and Independent allies, ensuring that the accord would net the two-thirds majority needed for ratification, while five lawmakers were absent. Mr Obama has made the treaty a linchpin of his efforts to "reset" relations with Russia, looking to lock in Moscow's co-operation to confront Iran over its suspect nuclear programme and back the US-led war in Afghanistan. The agreement which had the support of virtually every living US foreign policy or national security heavyweight restricts each nation to a maximum of 1,550 deployed warheads, a cut of about 30 per cent from a limit set in 2002, and 800 launchers and bombers. Economic issues key to U.S.-Russian relations U.S.-Russia Business Council 09 (February 2009, Recommendations to the Obama Administration Regarding the U.S.-Russia Commercial Agenda, p. 2, https://www.usrbc.org/pics/File/government/USG/USRBC%20Transition%20Paper_FINAL.pdf) Closer and more fruitful bilateral trade and investment ties can serve as a stabilizing influence on the political relationship and lead to a more constructive partnership. It is clear that Russia matters, from issues such as strengthening the nonproliferation regime to supporting NATOs critical mission in Afghanistan. The political relationship will continue to be fraught with complex issues that require significant attention to achieve meaningful advances. The United States must construct a new partnership with Russia, and the bilateral economic relationship must be a key component. The commercial agenda offers a solid foundation for moving forward in this cooperative fashion: U.S. companies have been operating successfully in Russia for almost two decades, and are market leaders in many sectors. While bilateral trade is relatively small (growing from $19 billion in 2005 to over $35 billion in 2008), U.S. and Russian companies are eager for deeper contacts. Russias market potential has captured the interest of U.S. CEOs from a range of industries and services, and Russia has emerged as a key market, if not the leading one, in their corporate strategies. At the same time, until the advent of the global economic downturn, Russian companies had begun to invest significantly in the United States, creating and saving many highpaying U.S. jobs. The commercial environment provides an opportunity for natural collaboration.
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 157/182 domestic [U.S.] consumption, said one official Russian visitor to Washington last fall. Such American softness is one reason why Medvedev told the Financial Times on June 18, Let me tell you that no one wishes the reelection of Barack Obama as U.S. president as I do. Free from concern about a serious U.S. response, corruption and abuse of power in Russia continue to rise. In June, the Russian Justice Ministry denied registration to the Party of Peoples Freedom, a new party created by prominent opposition leaders, an early indication that Decembers parliamentary elections will be neither free nor fair. No internal link --- relations are inevitably cyclical and down now for several reasons the counterplan doesnt correct Fenenko 11 Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, Russian Academy of Sciences (6/21/11, Alexei, Ria Novosti, The cyclical nature of Russian-American relations, http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110621/164739508.html) The negotiations conducted over 8 - 9 June on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) issues as part of NATO-Russia Council can not be called successful. The parties involved did not come to a compromise about the format for Russias participation in the European missile defense project. This gave rise to a plethora of comments in the Russian and American media about the end of the reset policy. Russian-American dialogue, of course, will continue. But no one can deny that this is an alarming sign for Moscow-Washington relations. The June setback The reset policy crisis has been discussed in the Russian and U.S. media for nearly a year. Both the Kremlin and the White House reported progress: from START-III entering into force to expanded economic contacts. But after the Washington summit that brought presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev together on 24 June 2010, there has been an increasingly dominant sense that the reset process is, somehow, going very wrong. The U.S. refusal to compromise over its ABM system, ongoing tensions over Iran, Libya and Georgia, Washingtons support for Japan in its territorial disputes with Russia, the U.S. medias infatuation with the Khodorkovsky case -- all these are symptoms of a deeper problem. Now, the situation is different. The preamble to START-III focuses on the balance between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Both parties, however, interpret this differently: the USA views it as an aspiration for the future, whereas Russia sees in it the need to reach agreement on ABM. Over the past year, Moscow has offered the United States two options for a potential compromise: either signing a special protocol to STARTIII or implementing the European missile defense project. Washingtons refusal to compromise on missile defense casts doubt over the idea that START-III (the main achievement of the two-year reset policy) stands any real chance of being implemented. Moscow and Washington, of course, will try to reach a compromise on ABM. But the purpose of the reset policy, i.e. building new partnerships and reviving relations between Russia and the United States, seems to be fading. Russian-American relations appear to have reverted to the traditional type, with issues relating to arms control comprising 80% of their agenda. Over the past two years the parties have failed to bring them to a new level. Cycles of convergence and divergence There is nothing special or unusual about the current difficulties. Over the past twenty years, both Russia and the United States have experienced several cycles of convergence and divergence in their bilateral relations. It seems that Moscow and Washington are doomed to repeat these cycles time and again. Such changes in bilateral relations are no mere coincidence. Russia and the United States base their relations on mutual nuclear deterrence. The material and technical foundations for Russian-American relations differ little from those underpinning the Soviet-American relations of the 1980s. Thus, these cycles of RussianAmerican rapprochement are due to two factors. First comes the desire to consistently reduce aging nuclear systems so that during disarmament neither party risked destroying the military-strategic parity. Second, the reaction to a major military-political crisis after which the parties seek to reduce confrontation and update the rules of conduct in the military-political sphere. After confronting these tasks, Russia and the United States returned to a state of low intensity confrontation. The first rapprochement cycle was observed in the early 1990s. Yeltsins government needed U.S. support in recognizing Russia within the 1991 borders of the RSFSR. Boris Yeltsin also needed U.S. assistance in addressing the problem of the Soviet nuclear legacy and taking on the Supreme Council. The administrations
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 158/182 of George Bush Senior and Bill Clinton were willing to help the Kremlin solve these problems. However, the Americans demanded major strategic concessions from Russia in return, outlined in START-III: making the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles a priority. The parties reached an unofficial compromise: U.S. recognition of the Russian leadership in exchange for the rapid decrease in Russias strategic nuclear forces (SNF). However, the stronger Russian state institutions became, the weaker the impetus to the rapprochement. In autumn 1994, Russia refused to ratify the original version of START-II and declared NATOs eastward expansion unacceptable. The United States adopted the concept of mutually assured safety (January 1995) under which Russias democratic reforms qualified as inseparable from continued armament reduction. The Overview of U.S. nuclear policy in 1994 also confirmed that America deemed Russian strategic nuclear forces a priority threat. The crises that unfolded during the late 1990s in Iran and Yugoslavia were, like NATO expansion, the logical results of a restoration of the old approach to Soviet-American relations. It was actually the events of 1994, not 2000, that in fact predetermined the subsequent development of Russian-American relations. The second cycle of Russian-American rapprochement was also rooted in strategic considerations. In 2000 START-II and the ABM Treaty collapsed. Both Washington and Moscow were faced with the problem of their agreed decommissioning of nuclear systems dating back to the 1970s. These events pushed presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush to reach a strategic compromise at a meeting in Crawford (12 November 2001). The United States agreed to sign a new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), and Russia did not object to Washingtons withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Instead of the ABM Treaty, the parties signed the Moscow Declaration on May 24, 2002, under which the United States pledged to consult with Russia on all issues pertaining to missile defense deployment. However, after the compromise at Crawford, the agenda for Russian-American rapprochement was exhausted. The disputes between Moscow and Washington over Iraq, Iran, Georgia, Ukraine and Beslan, which had been gathering steam since 2003, necessitated a return to the traditional format for Russian-American relations. At the Bratislava meeting (February 24, 2005) President Vladimir Putin refused to accept George W. Bushs suggestion of including issues of fissile material safety in the agenda. Since then, the rapprochement between Russia and the U.S. has reached a dead end, including at the official level. The real objectives of the reset policy The third cycle was the reset policy proclaimed in February 2009. Predictably, it was also based on strategic concerns. First, during the five-day war in August 2008 Russia and the United States came dangerously close to direct military confrontation. Second, it was time for the agreed decommissioning of nuclear systems in the first half of the 1980s. In the next two years, the Kremlin and the White House coordinated the parameters for START-III and discussed the new rules for military activities in Europe under the framework of the EuroAtlantic security initiatives. The next period of Russian-American rapprochement peaked on April 8, 2010, when START-III was signed in Prague. The relationship went on to follow the traditional pattern. The parties still demonstrated convergence. But contradictions in the core (strategic) area became an increasingly regular occurrence. That is why now, in mid 2011 the reset is going through a difficult time. But this fact is no indicator of inefficiency of either Russian or American diplomacy. Put simply, the tasks assigned two years ago have been completed. The problem is that Moscow and Washington have failed to develop their relations beyond the strategic sphere, which is a cause for concern. The potential for new cycles At first glance, the cyclical character of U.S.-Russian relations seems encouraging. Even taking this negative scenario into consideration, Russia and the United States should enter a new rapprochement cycle in about 2016. That is when they will need to have agreed on the decommissioning of their aging nuclear systems and overcome this unnecessary hostility. However, the problem is that in the second half of the 2010s the potential for a rapprochement cycle may well have been exhausted for the following reasons. First, Russia and the United States have now reached critical ceilings in reducing strategic nuclear forces: up to 1,550 operational warheads deployed by each side. A further ceiling reduction may result in a possible strike to disarm the strategic forces of either party. With the development of missile defense systems and precision weapons accelerating, Moscow is unlikely to agree to develop a new, more fundamental, START-IV.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 159/182 Second, over the past twenty years, Russia and the United States have upgraded their strategic nuclear forces much more slowly than they did in the 1970s and 1980s. The potential to decommission these nuclear systems will be far less than it was pre-2009. If it is to maintain the current groupings of strategic nuclear forces, Russia will be forced to extend the operating life of its nuclear weapons. Presumably, the United States, in turn, will not agree to compromise on missile defense without substantial concessions from Moscow. Third, the parties are not ready to begin a dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) reduction. For Russia, this functions as compensation for NATOs superiority in conventional forces. For the United States it is a mechanism by which they preserve their nuclear presence in Europe, especially in Germany. Theoretically, Russia could exchange the partial reduction of tactical nuclear weapons for the involvement of Britain and France in the INF Treaty (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty) and thus get guarantees for the nondevelopment of Britains nuclear capability. But the experience of 2010 proved that Washington is unlikely to be able to convince London and Paris to join these Russian-American agreements. Fourth, Russia and the USA have ever fewer compromise opportunities on missile defense issues. Washington has allocated vast resources for this project, and American business gets big military orders. Americans do not yet know what major concessions Moscow should make in exchange for an agreement on limiting anti-missile systems. Russia, in turn, is not prepared to reduce the strategic potential for the sake of attractive promises about partnership on ABM issues. In this sense, the failure of Junes missile defense talks is a greater cause for anxiety than any of the previous obstacles encountered. Strategic relations between Russia and the United States are dwindling. In the sphere of arms control both Moscow and Washington will go through a really difficult period in the second half of the 2010s. Will it be possible to expand the agenda of the Russian-American dialogue before that starts? Misunderstandings Mean U.S.-Russia Relations Will Inevitably Collapse Cohen and Ericson 09- Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies AND Professor of economics and chair of the economics department at East Carolina University (11/2/09, Ariel and Richard, The Heritage Foundation, Russia's Economic Crisis and U.S.-Russia Relations: Troubled Times Ahead, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/11/russias-economic-crisis-and-us-russia-relations-troubledtimes-ahead) As the Obama Administration embarks on a major readjustment of U.S. policy toward Russia,[1] U.S. policymakers need to understand how the economic crisis is influencing Russia's foreign and domestic policies, and thereby affects U.S. interests. Much of Russia's assertiveness and adventurism in recent years floated on a bubble of expensive oil and natural gas exports. Today, however, the Russian elite appears to be divided between those who hope that natural resources will continue to finance Russia's assertive foreign policy, and those, like President Dmitry Medvedev, who are calling for a major reform to clean up corruption, strengthen the court system, and move away from the current resource-export model toward a knowledge-based economy that is integrated into the global economy. The Obama Administration's strategy of unilateral U.S. concessions may fail. Instead, the U.S. should pursue a strategy based on a realistic assessment of Russian economic power. The White House should deny Russia economic benefits if it pursues anti-American policies. Meanwhile, the U.S. should work with its European allies to diversify their natural gas supplies, to defeat Russian hopes of blackmailing Europe into further strategic concessions, to block Russian weapons and sales to Iran and Venezuela, and to oppose Russia's attempt to reestablish its hegemony in the "near abroad." Finally, the Administration should focus U.S.Russian strategic and economic cooperation on matters in which pursuit of mutual interests is possible.
Michigan 2011
Hegemony Link
U.S. can only improve relations if it is willing to sacrifice its leadership Motyl 09 professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark, Atlantic Council (6/11/09, Alexander J. Motyl, Why Obama Cant Reset Relations with Putin's Russia, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/whyobama-can%E2%80%99t-reset-relations-putins-russia) Were the worsening of U.S.-Russian relations due only to Bushs policies, President Obama could easily fix things. But if U.S. relations with Russia worsened because of Putins transformation of Russia into an aggressively fascistoid state, then Obama can improve relations only at the marginsunless, of course, hes willing to appease Moscow by sanctifying Russias neo-imperial hegemony over its non-Russian neighbors. Inasmuch as such a move would destabilize Russia and its neighborsand, thus, Europeby encouraging a hyperventilating Russian regime to engage in imperial overreach, no American President would willingly reset relations to the point of mutually assured debilitation. Putins Russia will have to experience its own Orange Revolution for a fundamental shift in relations to be possible.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 162/182 peoples with deep spiritual and democratic roots. This kinship transcends occasional policy differences and partisan politics. Indeed, the bipartisan nature of American support for Israel was recently reaffirmed in Congressional letters upholding Israels right to self-defense and recognizing its commitment to peace. These statements received overwhelming support from both sides of the aisle and reflect unwavering backing for Israel among the American public. The visit of an Israeli prime minister to Washington is always a source of popular interest. When Benjamin Netanyahu enters the White House on Tuesday, no doubt a great many cameras will follow him and commentators will parse his and President Obamas every word. Observers can be assured, however, that the interaction, whether in public or behind the scenes, will be characterized by cooperation, candid communication and respect. Those are the cornerstones of any alliance and especially one as multi-faceted and historic as that between the United States and Israel.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 164/182 Minister Barak, in addition to discussing these attacks, we discussed a range of important defense issues both in our bilateral relationship and across the region, including the dramatic political shifts taking place in the Middle East and the implications those changes hold for the future; Irans nuclear program; the security environment on Israels borders, including southern Lebanon and the Palestinian territories; and the ongoing military operation over Libya. Our bilateral relationship and this dialogue is so critical because, as Minister Barak once said, Israel lives at the focal point of some of the biggest security challenges facing the free world: violent extremism, the proliferation of nuclear technologies, and the dilemmas posed by adversarial and failed states. And I think it important, especially at a time of such dramatic change in the region, to reaffirm once more Americas unshakable commitment to Israels security. Indeed, I cannot recall a time during my public life when our two countries have had a closer defense relationship. The U.S. and Israel are cooperating closely in areas such as missile defense technology, the Joint Strike Fighter, and in training exercises such as Juniper Stallioncooperation and support that ensures that Israel will continue to maintain its qualitative military edge. And during an exchange with a reporter Gates said: President Obama is the eighth American president Ive worked for. And I dont believe that the security relationship between the United States and Israel has ever been stronger than it is right now. And the steps that we have taken in the last two years in terms of, just as one example, collaborating together on missile defense, I think are without precedent. I see no change in prospect for that relationship. Gates concluded his prepared remarks by affirming the U.S.Israel relationship: [E]very time I visit Israel, Im reminded of the extraordinary challenges the Jewish people have overcome throughout their history, the tremendous accomplishment that the state of Israel represents and the importance of our alliance to ensuring Israels security. Security ties outweigh other factors and sustain relations Washington Post 2010 (Despite diplomatic tensions, U.S.-Israeli security ties strengthen, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR2010071506268.html, Hemanth) Despite diplomatic tensions, U.S.-Israeli security ties strengthen This week, Israel successfully conducted a test of a new mobile missile-defense system designed to shield Israeli towns from small rockets launched from the Gaza Strip. When the "Iron Dome" system is fully deployed in the next year, about half the cost -- $205 million -- will be borne by U.S. taxpayers under a plan advanced by the Obama administration and broadly supported in Congress. While public attention has focused on the fierce diplomatic disputes between Israel and the United States over settlement expansion in Palestinian territories, security and military ties between the two nations have grown ever closer during the Obama administration. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who has worked decades in Washington, "believes we are cooperating on military-to-military relations in an unprecedented manner," Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said. Military relations were very close during the Bush administration, but "in many ways the cooperation has been extended and perhaps enhanced in different areas" during the Obama administration, a senior Israeli official acknowledged. Elliott Abrams, a former senior Bush administration official and a frequent critic of the Obama administration's policy toward Israel, gives the White House high marks for its handling of the security relationship, saying it is "very smart" to insulate it from the diplomatic turmoil. "It is the sounds of silence," he said. "I do not hear from Israeli officials and officers any griping, and that is in a context when there has been a lot of griping in the past year about everything else." Long-term investment U.S. officials portray the effort as a long-term investment designed to improve the prospects for peace and to make Israel feel less vulnerable to any threat posed by Iran. "A secure Israel is better able to make the tough decisions that will need to be made to make peace," said Andrew J. Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. High-level exchanges of senior military and defense officials take place almost weekly -- more than 75 at the deputy assistant secretary level or above in the past 15 months, according to a Pentagon accounting. That results in an exchange of military and intelligence expertise that U.S. officials say is unique in the world. The U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan draw on lessons learned and equipment developed by the Israelis in their conflicts -- and vice versa. Unmanned drones and the armoring of vehicles to protect against roadside bombs derive from Israeli technology, Israeli officials say. "We exchange information and discuss developments in the region, and under this administration our communication has taken on a more frequent and intimate nature," Shapiro said. "It is a mutually beneficial exchange." Solidifying those links, more than 1,000 U.S. soldiers last year participated in a joint missiledefense exercise in Israel last year known as "Juniper Cobra," the first such exercise involving boots on the ground between the two nations. Besides Iron Dome, the United States provides about $200 million a year to two other Israeli missile-defense systems, known as Arrow and David Sling. The costs are shared 50-50, with
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 165/182 the understanding that the United States will benefit from the Israeli experience. "We have been working really closely with the Israelis on every tier of their missile-defense architecture, all the way from [the Hamas] Kassam [rocket] at the lowest level to the [Iranian] Shahab [ballistic missile] at the highest level," said a senior U.S. defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the breadth of cooperation. Israeli Ambassador Michael B. Oren noted that the U.S.-Israel relationship is more than the sum of its military parts. "Security is more than financial support and cooperation on missile defense and joint maneuvers; security is also dialogue, and dialogue has been especially close and continuous with this administration," he said. Under an agreement signed toward the end of the Bush administration, annual U.S. military assistance to Israel has been boosted from $2.5 billion in 2009 to $3 billion in 2011, meaning that almost a quarter of Israel's actual defense expenditures comes from the United States, according to Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Obama's Iron Dome money would be on top of that largesse, already the most military assistance to any country. Unlike most other countries, which are required to use U.S. military assistance to buy U.S. weapons and technology, Israel is permitted to use 26 percent of the funds for the development and production of its own weapons. This arrangement gives Israel "five or six times the value per dollar as a country like Egypt or Jordan," Cordesman said. Stockpile for Israel The United States also maintains stockpiles of ammunition, spare parts, communication gear and other military items in Israel, which the Jewish state can draw on if it runs short during a war. Because Israel has attacked without warning nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria, experts inside and outside the Obama administration think that not halting Iran's nuclear program could prompt an Israeli military strike against that country. Such an attack could prompt reprisals against American interests in the region, and U.S. officials hope the investment in close coordination with Israel will make a sneak attack less likely. "Neither of us try to surprise each other but we try to coordinate on issues of mutual concern," President Obama told Israeli television this month. "I don't think there is any question that the kind of relationship we have and the kind of intensity of contacts we have certainly breeds confidence in each other," a senior administration official said. "We have a partner who understands our interests and who we count on to be that cooperative partner going forward." Values solve relations Sharp 10 (Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf, Hemanth) U.S.-Israeli Relations and the Role of Foreign Aid For decades, the United States and Israel have maintained strong bilateral relations based on a number of factors, including strong domestic U.S. support for Israel; shared strategic goals in the Middle East (concern over Iran, Syria, Islamic extremism); shared democratic values; and historic ties dating from U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. U.S. foreign aid has been a major component in cementing and reinforcing these ties. Although there have been occasional differences over Israels settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (prior to the 2005 disengagement) and Israeli arms sales to China, successive Administrations and many lawmakers have long considered Israel to be a reliable partner in the region, and U.S. aid packages for Israel have reflected this sentiment. U.S. military aid has helped transform Israels armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the world. U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israels qualitative military edge (QME) over neighboring militaries, since Israel must rely on better equipment and training to compensate for a manpower deficit in any potential regional conflict. U.S. military aid, a portion of which may be spent on procurement from Israeli defense companies, also has helped Israel build a domestic defense industry, which ranks as one of the top 10 suppliers of arms worldwide.
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 167/182 settlements to metropolitan areas. With an economy that is running well, and economic links burgeoning with countries outside the Middle East, things appear to be going rather well for many Israelis. A negotiated, twostate solution with the Palestinians might be a desirable long-term objective a majority of Israelis tell pollsters that they want this outcome but little urgency is attached to this desire. For the Obama administration, however, some tangible progress toward an agreement is important for U.S. strategic objectives. Leading U.S. officials, such as General David Petraeus, have testified to Congress that the lack of any serious movement on the Israeli-Palestinian front darkens Americas image in many parts of the Muslim world. Other senior administration officials, speaking on background to reporters, have hammered home the same point. The United States carries the can, fairly or otherwise, for this stalemate in many corners of the Muslim world, because the United States is deemed to be a protector that could, if it so desired, push the Israelis toward a deal. That the Israelis cant be pushed is obvious to objective observers, but not to those who think grave injustices have systematically been done to Palestinians, including building settlements in the West Bank and expanding them in contested parts of Jerusalem. Apparently, the Obama administration, exasperated by the lack of negotiations and angry at the obduracy of the Netanyahu government, is considered publishing its own blueprint for a peaceful settlement. Good luck. Blueprints have come and gone many times before.
Michigan 2011
***CONSULT UN Ans
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Michigan 2011
Alt Cause--Obama
Obama has screwed up just as much as Bush has Bolton 10 senior fellow of AEI (September 20, 2010, John R. Bolton, Obamas UN Record, http://www.aei.org/article/102544, DH) In matters most directly threatening to America and its allies--the nuclear-weapons programs of Iran and North Korea--the U.N. has performed no better than it did during the Bush administration. In matters most directly threatening to America and its allies--the nuclear-weapons programs of Iran and North Korea--the U.N. has performed no better than it did during the Bush administration. Indeed, Obama's U.N. strategy regarding Iran and North Korea has not been much different from Bush's in his last two years. Neither has been successful. Under Obama, Security Council sanctions against North Korea were ratcheted up marginally after Pyongyang's second nuclear test in 2009, but the Security Council has otherwise been invisible on this issue. After a two-year-plus hiatus on Iran, it imposed a fourth round of sanctions in June 2010, but there is no evidence that they have materially impeded Iran's ongoing weapons program. The main diplomatic fora dealing with the rogue states still lie outside the Security Council, in the "perm five plus one" for Iran and the "six-party talks" for North Korea. Thus, despite Obama's proclamation about where the United States will address its priorities, in the crunch cases the Security Council gets no more love from him than it did from Bush's unilateralist cowboys. To be sure, there is blind faith in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its capacity to preclude, say, spent nuclear fuel at Iran's Bushehr reactor from being diverted to weapons purposes, and thus greater risk to the United States. But the IAEA is not a central player, and despite Obama's evident joy at chairing a Security Council meeting, its famous chamber will be dark and empty when the truly important nonproliferation decisions are made. Obama's first mistake was announcing immediately after his inauguration that the United States would join preparations for the 2009 "World Conference against Racism," known as "Durban II" after the South African city that hosted its 2001 predecessor. Durban I denounced Israel as racist and was, just below the surface, profoundly anti-American. Then secretary of state Colin Powell, announcing the withdrawal of the U.S. delegation in protest, rightly stressed that Durban I was "a throwback to the days of 'Zionism equals racism'" that we would not dignify with our presence. In later years, the U.S. walkout was routinely cited as evidence of Bush-administration unilateralism. Durban II, coming just months after Bush left office, was therefore widely seen as an important signal of how his successor would treat multilateral affairs. Contradicting Powell, Mary Robinson, Durban II's secretary general (and former U.N. high commissioner for human rights), said Durban I's outcome was "remarkably good, including on the issues of the Middle East." Obama soon realized, however, with Canada withdrawing and several EU nations planning to do the same, that he had been too hasty: Durban II's planned endorsement of Durban I's anti-Israel rant wasn't going to change. Accordingly, with obvious regret, Obama cut his losses, announcing in February 2009 that he was pulling out. The reaction was predictable. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay said, "I am shocked and deeply disappointed by the United States' decision not to attend." U.S. congresswoman Barbara Lee, a California Democrat, said, "This decision is inconsistent with the administration's policy of engaging with those we agree with and those we disagree with."
Michigan 2011
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 176/182 We are well aware that Washingtons attention is focused elsewhere, said Neil Auerbach, Executive Committee member of U.S. PREF, and Co-Managing Partner, Hudson Clean Energy Partners. Although both sides of the aisle agree on the importance of renewable energy and understand the need for a long-term consistent policy, there is little hope for progress in the short-term due to the debate on deficit reduction. At Hudson, we believe the country, as well as the renewable energy industry, would be better off with a less generous policy framework, but one with long-term visibility, say for five or ten years. We can live with less if we get it right. On the line are thousands of jobs, gigawatts of clean energy capacity and billions of dollars in investment in the next five years. The stakes are high and we need to be able to get these projects to the finish line. Across the board, consensus from REFF-Wall Street speakers and attendees was overwhelminga consistent long-term policy on renewable energy will be critical to the sectors success. While some areas of the industry are on course toward cost parity with traditional fossil fuel sources, the instability inherent to an absence of policy is too great a risk. Given the astounding success of consistent policy decisions supporting the traditional energy industry, it is time for the federal government to apply the same parameters to renewable energy to ensure the attainment of its promise. The private sector likes consistency. North American Clean Energy 6/29 (6/29/11. Financial Experts Warn that Inconsistency in US Energy Policy will Dramatically Dampen Investment. http://www.nacleanenergy.com/?action=article&id=11360) At the Renewable Energy Finance Forum-Wall Street (REFF-Wall Street), hosted by the American Council On Renewable Energy (ACORE) and Euromoney Energy Events, top leaders from the financial industry and renewable energy sector identified the need for consistent long-term clean energy policies. Financiers and policy drivers discussed the anticipated landscape for renewable energy, while expressing concern about misconceptions regarding specific renewable energy programs and an impending gap in federal support for renewable energy projects. History has shown that consistent and rational policies can successfully assist the private sector in building critical industry sectors that are important to our economy and national security interests." said Dennis V. McGinn, President and CEO, American Council On Renewable Energy. Indeed, the domestic oil and gas industry is a prime example of how consistent policies can help build a robust industry that plays an important role in both our economy and our nation's security. It makes sense to take the same approach for renewable energy. We need long-term policy incentives to create that market certainty, allowing renewable energy to scale-up, stimulating the economy, creating new jobs, and reducing debt. Polls have consistently shown that the American people see the value of clean energy technology. There is a clear disconnect between this widelyheld view and many elected officials who are actively working to slow down or prevent the realization of clean energys benefits. Financial experts observed that the important focus on deficit reduction in Washington, DC has seemingly gridlocked development of a consistent long-term policy for renewable energy. Both deficit reduction and longterm renewable energy policy are critical objectives for U.S. economic and energy independence, and lack of progress is creating market uncertainty. Specifically, uncertainty abounds around the continuation of programs that have played a critical role in advancing renewable energy deployment, encouraging private sector investment and creating jobs, including the 1603 Grant in Lieu of Investment Tax Credit, the 1703 and 1705 Loan Guarantee Programs, Production Tax Credits (PTC) and Investment Tax Credits (ITC). "Many people dont realize that renewable energy incentives more than pay for themselves and provide many long-term benefits, said Kevin Walsh, managing director and leader of power and renewables at GE Energy Financial Services. For example, we estimate that wind projects completed in 2010, which used the U.S. Treasury grant or federal Production Tax Credit, had a net present value of roughly $100 million for the U.S. Treasury. While emphasizing the need for a consistent long-term renewable energy policy to create a stable investment climate, financial experts also agreed that certain renewable energy sectors could soon compete on their own without subsidiesciting accelerated predictions for solar energy to reach grid parity on a non-supported basis, and wind energy projects competing on price with natural gas or even coal-fired generation. Recent volatility of fossil fuel prices is an indicator of future energy instability, and will likely accelerate renewable energy competing directly on costs.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 177/182 The group also discussed the importance of proposed policies to support the investment environment in the longer term, including a national renewable energy standard, a Clean Energy Deployment Administration (CEDA or Green Bank) and pending climate and related energy legislation. A number of commercial renewable energy technologies are rapidly approaching the point where they are cost competitive with traditional energy sources, such as oil and gas, that have enjoyed long-term, consistent government support, said Patrick Eilers, Managing Director, Madison Dearborn Partners, who serves on the Board of Directors for U.S.-based wind energy company First Wind and on the Executive Committee of the United States Partnership for Renewable Energy Finance (U.S. PREF). It would be unfortunate for U.S. global competitiveness if we are not able to reach consensus and provide legislative certainty when we are close to grid parity for renewables. Legislation that created a stable investing environment through 2020 would provide the catalyst for the U.S. renewable market to finally reach full cost competitiveness. We are well aware that Washington's attention is focused elsewhere, said Neil Auerbach, Executive Committee member of U.S. PREF, and Co-Managing Partner, Hudson Clean Energy Partners. Although both sides of the aisle agree on the importance of renewable energy and understand the need for a long-term consistent policy, there is little hope for progress in the short-term due to the debate on deficit reduction. At Hudson, we believe the country, as well as the renewable energy industry, would be better off with a less generous policy framework, but one with long-term visibility, say for five or ten years. We can live with less if we get it right. On the line are thousands of jobs, gigawatts of clean energy capacity and billions of dollars in investment in the next five years. The stakes are high and we need to be able to get these projects to the finish line. Across the board, consensus from REFF-Wall Street speakers and attendees was overwhelminga consistent long-term policy on renewable energy will be critical to the sectors success. While some areas of the industry are on course toward cost parity with traditional fossil fuel sources, the instability inherent to an absence of policy is too great a risk. Given the astounding success of consistent policy decisions supporting the traditional energy industry, it is time for the federal government to apply the same parameters to renewable energy to ensure the attainment of its promise.
Michigan 2011
Say No
The private sector wants to be the first into space. MSNBC 10 (12/29/10. Leonard David. Private spaceflight ready to take off in 2011. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40840100/ns/technology_and_science-space/t/private-spaceflight-readytake/) updated 12/29/2010 11:02:21 AM ET Share Print Font: The private space industry has long been viewed as fledgling. But this once-pejorative term has taken on new meaning this year, as a roster of successes and fast-paced growth throughout 2010 suggests private spaceflight is ready to take off in 2011. This year saw the very first launch of commercial space company SpaceX's Falcon 9 booster, and later the first liftoff of the firm's Dragon spacecraft, which launched atop a Falcon 9 to Earth orbit and then was recovered from the Pacific Ocean. Another company, Virgin Galactic, achieved some major milestones, including the first glide test of its suborbital spaceliner, SpaceShipTwo. Multiple private-sector space firms are moving into full power, going well beyond PowerPoints and handwaving. Still, the coming year, according to experts and analysts contacted by Space.com, is likely to feature battles between "same old space" and the ascension of "new space." Commercial landscape "The space industry has never seen such a rich and varied commercial landscape," said Carissa Bryce Christensen, managing partner of consulting firm The Tauri Group in Alexandria, Va. "New markets are emerging and established ones are changing." Christensen said that entrepreneurs are testing new launch and on-orbit capabilities in the real world, trying to move beyond development and demonstration and into sustainable, profitable operation. Large firms are changing their game plans in response. "The successes and setbacks of 2011 are going to make it the most interesting year in the history of commercial space," Christensen predicted. Commercial space is finally coming into its own, and 2011 represents a year of enormous potential for this developing industry, said David Livingston, founder and host of the radio/Internet talk show "The Space Show." "The key will be to systematically move forward, building success upon success," Livingston said. "I believe the coming year will reward patience, achievable goals, business fundamentals, reasonable business risks and a safety mindset." In terms of trends for the space industry, Livingston foresees a move away from big government programs in favor of economically managed and leaner commercial space ventures and projects. "I believe this trend will continue through 2011 and beyond. That said, I do not think our space program should be one or the other, government or private," Livingston said. "I believe we can now, more than ever, effectively create public/private partnerships to guide us into space and our future." Squarely in the spotlight The scheduled retirement of NASA's three-orbiter space shuttle fleet next year will also likely affect the landscape. "I think the environment for 2011, although much improved from the religious war in 2010, will still see continued debate about the future direction of NASA with shuttle retirement," said Brett Alexander, president of the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, an industry group that includes commercial spaceflight developers, operators, spaceports, suppliers and service providers. Alexander said he thinks commercial space will be "squarely in the spotlight" with an expected ramp-up of both suborbital flight testing and multiple orbital launches and re-entries under NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) partnership agreements with U.S. industry. NASA's Commercial Crew and Cargo Program is investing financial and technical resources to stimulate efforts within the private sector to develop and demonstrate safe, reliable and cost-effective space transportation capabilities. "So, with steady progress on the technical front, it should help to solidify NASA's new direction to develop commercial capabilities," Alexander said. Battleground
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 179/182 "2010 was the year that war broke out between commercial and cost-plus space," observed Jim Muncy, president and founder of PoliSpace, an independent space policy consultancy based in Alexandria, Va. "A rational White House, which nobody can accuse of having an ideological bias in favor of commercial business and privatization, decided that the nation couldn't do much, let alone everything, the 'traditional' way," Muncy said. "To actually use the International Space Station and explore space, the private sector needed to play a greater role in both." Muncy said that as nasty and counterintuitive as the long debate of 2010 was, next year especially in the context of the new Congress, which has vowed to cut government spending will see "the rubber hit the road" in several fronts of this war. At least two companies that operate suborbital reusable launch vehicles will fly science payloads for NASA, and piloted vehicles will have their first flight tests. A SpaceX Dragon will carry a mammal to low Earth orbit and possibly to the International Space Station. The effort to build a commercial crew spacecraft will move forward, while overall budget pressure on NASA will slow down Florida Senator Bill Nelson's grand compromise (which, among other things, gave money to commercial companies and NASA to develop and build new rockets). The Commercial Space Launch Amendment Act's "informed consent" regime for Federal Aviation Administration regulation of commercial human spaceflight will clash with some politicians' desire to kill commercial crew efforts. The fight over human-rating of commercial crew will get heated, as will a scrap for control over this rating between NASA's Johnson Space Center and the agency's Kennedy Space Center. "Not a prediction but a hope," Muncy said, is that "Republicans will remember they like the private sector and stop mindlessly bashing commercial." Fiscal meltdown Rand Simberg, a space policy and technology consultant and a former aerospace engineer, isn't optimistic that Republicans will get fully behind commercial space. "Despite the growing confidence in the ability of the commercial sector to do human spaceflight, the incoming Republicans may continue to wage war on the new NASA direction, in opposition to their usual stated principles of free enterprise and competition, for no reason other than it came from a weakened Obama White House," Simberg said. Overall, next year "may be the year that business-as-usual collides with budgetary reality," he predicted. Simberg said that "even the most pork-devoted politicians will have to recognize that the only way for NASA to have a viable human spaceflight program going forward is to rely on fixed-price launch contracts from new, more cost-effective providers for the now-mundane task of simply getting astronauts to orbit and back." On the suborbital front, Simberg said that 2011 may be the year that regular flights of fully reusable vehicles both horizontal- and vertical-landing will take off. That being the case, Simberg added, such suborbital flights "will start to develop the experience in high-tempo launch operations that will inform the eventual development of cost-effective space transport all the way to orbit." Availability and schedule Likely to be a nexus of private sector space action is Spaceport America, now under construction near Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. Virgin Galactic will run commercial operations from Spaceport America, with billionaire founder Sir Richard Branson recently setting his sights beyond suborbital passenger takeoffs. "Virgin Galactic has shown in the past few years how private sector investment and innovation can lead to a rapid transformation of stagnant technologies," Branson said. "We are now very close to making the dream of suborbital space a reality for thousands of people at a cost and level of safety unimaginable even in the recent past. "We know that many of those same people, including myself, would also love to take an orbital space trip in the future," Branson added, "so we are putting our weight behind new technologies that could deliver that safely whilst driving down the enormous current costs of manned orbital flight by millions of dollars." Earlier this month, Branson revealed that Virgin Galactic will be supporting work done by Sierra Nevada Space Systems (SNC) and Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) on commercial space vehicles for NASA's Commercial Crew Development Program. Both SNC and OSC are pursuing vehicle designs featuring reusable lifting-wing bodies and runway landings, which Virgin Galactic sees as possibly revolutionizing orbital space flight.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 180/182 Rick Homans, executive director of the New Mexico Spaceport Authority, said that the pace of activity continues to pick up throughout the industry and Spaceport America is no exception. "In 2011, we expect to be in the midst of our pre-operations phase hiring contractors, developing policies and procedures and conducting all kinds of tests and drills to ensure we are ready to go operational in 2012," Homans said. Homans said that from the inquiries they have received, he anticipates Spaceport America's vertical launch area should be very busy in 2011. Other companies such as UP Aerospace, Armadillo and other operators have already inquired about availability and schedule, he added. "I see 2011 as the year to get ready for 2012, when I predict we will have our first commercial launches from Spaceport America," Homans said. Leonard David has been reporting on the space industry for more than five decades. He is past editor-in-chief of the National Space Society's Ad Astra and Space World magazines and has written for Space.com since 1999. The private sector will say no. they want to be the first in space. TIME 10 (12/17/10. Jeffery Kluger. Astronauts Inc.: The Private Sector Muscles Out NASA. http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2037089,00.html) NASA has never been an exclamation-point outfit. The folks who work there may do extraordinary things, but they tend to talk about them in the dry and uninflected tones of the engineers they are. So it was something of a departure last week when, after an unmanned version of what may well be the next spacecraft that will carry American astronauts into orbit took off from Cape Canaveral and returned home safely, the first official dispatch read simply: "SPLASHDOWN!!!" Unfamiliar too was how the announcement was made: it was a tweet. That tonal change was by no means the most important thing that made the launch of the fancifully named Falcon 9 booster and Dragon space capsule different from all the granddaddy Saturns and Titans that have gone before it. Far more significant was that this ship was privately designed and privately built, the brainchild of the California-based rocketry start-up SpaceX, owned and operated by engineer Elon Musk, who also created PayPal. "It's actually almost too good," the never reticent Musk said of his accomplishment at his postflight press conference. "There's a natural reaction that sort of blows my mind, and it's hard to be articulate with a blown mind." If old NASA hands winced at this kind of giddy talk, they kept it to themselves and wisely so. In the face of contracting federal budgets and an expanding private sector, the space agency of the golden years is being blown up and rethought transformed from a government operation into a public-private partnership that, so its advocates say, will replace the politics, stodginess and glacial pace of Washington with the speed, nimbleness and accountability of the marketplace. That door had been creaking open for a while, but the Obama Administration facing towering debts and a nation in no mood to spend big on an indulgence like space has kicked it wide, and Musk is not the only one rushing through. The Orbital Sciences Corporation of Dulles, Va., is vying with SpaceX for government recognition and government contracts. So too are traditional aerospace giants like Lockheed and Boeing, whose rockets are not currently intended to carry astronauts but, they insist, could be redesigned to be safe for humans in short order and at a reasonable price. Such competitive churn is exactly what the private sector likes to see. But detractors worry that it's exactly the wrong way to take people into orbit, much less to the moon and beyond. Manned spaceflight is a uniquely risky, uniquely pricey, uniquely time-consuming enterprise that does not respond well to the pressures of the business cycle. Go too fast and people die (think the Apollo 1 fire), but go too slow and investors gripe. Best to take your time, keep the investors out of the loop and avoid the periodic tableaus of the flag-draped coffins and grieving families. "Every time we f___ up," says Mike Griffin, NASA administrator from 2005 to 2009, "it's because something that we didn't think mattered turns out to matter. Who knew that a briefcase-size piece of foam could bring down an orbiter? The stuff that kills us isn't going to be the thing we think will hurt us." But even old-school rocketeers including Griffin himself recognize the current reality, which is that without the private sector, America may simply not have the wallet to put human beings into space for a very long time. Giving private companies skin in the game may be an inevitable step if we don't want to become an earthbound nation, but what worries detractors is whether it's a prudent one.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 181/182 The privatization of at least some of the manned space program has been inevitable for a while particularly since 2003, when the loss of the shuttle Columbia made it clear that the entire aging shuttle fleet was becoming too risky to fly. NASA had made only the sketchiest plans for a shuttle replacement, so in 2006, Griffin created an office called Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) within the agency to draw private companies into the business of helping to deliver cargo and crew to the International Space Station, even as NASA developed its own Earth-orbital rockets too. The Obama Administration turbo-charged things this year when it officially directed NASA to scrap its part of that work and concentrate exclusively on space science and eventual manned flights to asteroids or beyond. The private sector alone will tend to near-Earth orbit. SpaceX and Orbital Sciences had already made enough progress to secure conditional contracts with NASA to service the space station, but SpaceX was clearly the greater of those two equals, with successful orbital missions in 2008 and June 2010. Last week's mission blew those other two away because it included a working prototype and successful return of the Dragon space capsule, making SpaceX the first private company to achieve such a feat. "It's a historical truth that government goes into those areas in which there is no private-sector profit motive, and the private sector follows behind," says Phil McAlister, acting director of NASA's Commercial Space Flight Development team. "We think the time is right to transition that part to the private sector." Such transitions are usually slow, but Musk, a space newbie, sees no reason to wait. His press conference was equal parts Q&A and touchdown dance and that raised eyebrows. "People sometimes assume that to take a cargo spacecraft and put a crew into it requires this enormous amount of magical pixie dust or something," he said. "This is not the case. If there had been people sitting in the Dragon capsule today, they would have had a very nice ride." Well, no. For one thing, there are no seats. For another thing, the life-support system is not remotely humanrated yet. Those are more than details. Every bit of additional hardware adds weight and complexity and the possibility of a breakdown and if that breakdown occurs in the network of tubes and tanks and fuel cells that feed air and power and water to the crew, the mortal consequences can be immediate (think Apollo 13). Musk is right that it's not pixie dust that makes a spacecraft suitable for what the space community sometimes calls "payloads with a pulse"; it's rigorous testing and retesting of multiply redundant systems, until you've reduced the risk of failure to a statistical rounding error. When Musk spoke equally glibly about scrapping the Dragon's parachute-based re-entry system and instead using a motor and legs as the lunar landers did something no manned craft has ever achieved on Earth he caused more murmuring still. The established space companies are being no less flip in their belief that they can leap quickly into the manned-space pool. There is a lot that goes into human-rating a rocket that was built to launch only satellites, not the least being redesigning it so it can fly on a shallower trajectory that reduces the g-forces to a level a human body can tolerate and retrofitting the booster with both hardware and software to make an abort possible. Astronauts speak of so-called black zones during a powered ascent points at which speed or angle of flight rule out any safe abort, regardless of what onboard equipment you have. Unmanned ships have plenty of black zones since there's nothing on board that can die if the vehicle blows up. Astronauts want no black zones at all, and recent years have witnessed an unseemly tableau of manufacturers and astronauts sitting at conference tables haggling over just how long a black zone would be considered acceptable. Would you tolerate 10 seconds in which there'd be no saving you if something were to break down? How about a minute? How about two? "What you get is an alternative discussion led by people who stand to make a profit," says Griffin. "Lockheed and Boeing say NASA's goals are too strict. Well, that's fine up until the first accident, when people say, 'Where were NASA's standards?' " Among the leading companies, it's Orbital Sciences that, at the moment at least, seems to be threading the needle most carefully if least showily. With former shuttle astronaut Frank Culbertson heading up its human-spaceflight-activities group, it is concentrating on developing a cargo vehicle for the space station as well as a new launch site at NASA's Wallops Island facility in Virginia, with no talk at present of trying to fly crew. NASA, while ceding some of its turf to the private sector, is both immovable and believable when it says it won't let safety suffer. Any private craft approved to approach anywhere near the space station much less carry crew will be subjected to the same rigorous flight-readiness requirements the agency's own spacecraft are. In the meantime, U.S. cargo and astronauts can always get to and from orbit if seats are bought aboard Russian Soyuz ships. The Soyuz already makes regular runs to the space station and will become America's sole means of transport after the last space-shuttle mission is flown next year.
Consultation CP Answers - 7 Week Juniors Michigan 2011 182/182 The hope both inside and outside NASA is that we won't be thumbing rides for too long but that we'll suffer that indignity for as long as we have to and vet any new ship fully and well before we commit lives to it. Musk may have been right last week when he was asked about people who resist the inevitable move to privatization. "They'll be fighting on the wrong side of yesterday's war," he said. But as Musk himself knows, wars have casualties. There were 14 of them in the shuttle program and three in Apollo, and that was with some of the best safety protocols imaginable. NASA does things the old way, but until a new way proves itself which it eventually will it's still the best way we have.