SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO.

156

Hazards XXII

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FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS WITH THERMAL FLUID SYSTEMS

Alison McKay, PROjEN plc, UK
Richard Franklin, Heat Transfer Systems Ltd, UK
Incidents relating to thermal fluid systems are unfortunately more common than we might realise,
and can be extremely serious. The fire and explosion hazards with thermal fluid systems have been
re-emphasised by recent incidents. These incidents have a direct bearing on the estimated 4,000 UK
companies that operate thermal fluid systems.
Water or steam can be used as heat transfer fluids, but when high temperatures are needed
organic fluids, which are capable of forming explosive atmospheres, are often used. Although
fire and explosion hazards of low flash point flammable liquids are generally recognised, similar
hazards with high flash point materials, such as thermal fluids, are often missed. These heat transfer
fluids are often handled at temperatures above their flash point.
The Health and Safety Executive recently issued a prohibition notice to a UK company following
a major thermal fluid incident and significantly, following that incident, has identified thermal fluid
systems as a fire and explosion hazard. There have been other serious incidents this year. Although
not under HSE jurisdiction, there was a recent thermal fluid-related explosion and fire at a German
panel products plant which tragically caused three fatalities.
Most companies will be aware that any system that operates above the flash point of the thermal
fluid falls under the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere Regulations 2002
(DSEAR). However, many people are unaware that heat transfer fluids based on mineral oils
degrade over time. This degradation can cause the fluids flash point to decrease dramatically, so
that thermal fluids which were not flammable at the operating temperature when they were initially
installed may, over time, become flammable at the operating conditions. Also, high flash point
materials (such as thermal fluids), can form explosive mist atmospheres when handled under
pressure, even at temperatures below the flash point.
The DSEAR regulations require that the risk from dangerous substances (flammable materials) is
assessed and eliminated or reduced. Systems need to be put in place to reduce the risk and manage
the residual risk. The ATEX directives require the hazardous areas to be identified.
Regular thermal fluid testing and the results obtained will indicate the physical condition of the
fluid and the degree of risk in the event of a fluid release. However, flash point testing alone is not
enough to comply with DSEAR. Procedures are also needed to change out the thermal fluid, or
remove the lower flash point components from the thermal fluid. Many companies operating
thermal fluid systems may not be aware of this.
This paper discusses recent incidents of fires and explosions which have occurred in thermal fluid
systems, and makes practical recommendations for how such incidents can be avoided. These
include carrying out Area Classification on thermal fluid systems, methods to avoid or limit mist
formation, avoiding ignition sources and installing proprietary equipment which removes the
lower flash point components from the thermal fluid.

100a or ATEX 95 Directive, concerning equipment

and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres).
The key requirements in DSEAR are that risks from
dangerous substances are assessed and eliminated or
reduced. Employers are required to:

INTRODUCTION
The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres
Regulations 2002 (DSEAR) are concerned with protection
against risks from fire, explosion and similar events
arising from dangerous substances used or present in the
workplace. They set minimum requirements for the protection of workers from fire and explosion risks related to
dangerous substance and potentially explosive atmospheres.
The Regulations implement two European Directives:
the safety aspects of the Chemical Agents Directive 98/24/
EC (CAD) [EC 1998] and the Explosive Atmospheres
Directive 99/92/EC (ATEX 137) [EC 2000] which requires
similar legislation throughout the European Union (EU) on
work involving hazardous chemical agents and explosive
atmospheres. (There is also an ATEX Product Directive
94/9/EC [EC 1994], more often known as the ATEX

1)
2)
3)
4)

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Prevent the formation of an explosive atmosphere,

avoid its ignition, and/or mitigate the effects.
Assess the risk to employees from the dangerous substances (gases, liquids or dusts).
Identify where an explosive atmosphere may occur by
carrying out hazardous area classification.
Select equipment and protective systems suitable for
use in explosive atmospheres, on the basis of the
requirements set out in the Equipment and Protective

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5)

Hazards XXII

the pipework. These mists can result in explosive atmospheres being formed outside the pipework where ignition
sources such as motors, pumps and electrical equipment
may be present.
Therefore, explosive atmospheres may be present
both inside and outside thermal fluid systems, which can
be ignited, resulting in a fire or explosion.

Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive

Atmospheres Regulations 1996(a).
Draft a document (equivalent to an Explosion Protection Document) which contains the risk assessment,
hazardous area classification and measures taken
(organisational or technical) to reduce the risk.

APPLICATION OF THE DSEAR REGULATIONS

Dangerous substance means any material classified as explosive, oxidising or flammable, or any dust which can form an
explosive atmosphere with air. Normally this means any
flammable gases or dusts, or liquids being handled above
their flash point. However, it also applies to materials being
handled below their flash point but under pressure, such
that a flammable spray or mist is formed which can form
an explosive atmosphere. Heat transfer fluids can form explosive atmospheres either by operating at temperatures above
their flash point, or due to mist formation.
PROjEN has carried out hazardous area classification
exercises and DSEAR risk assessments of the fire and
explosion hazards associated with operations involving a
variety of materials which are flammable at the handling
temperature, and explosive mist atmospheres. But how
reliable are the flash points of the materials being handled?

INCIDENTS OF FIRES & EXPLOSIONS IN

THERMAL FLUID SYSTEMS
Recent instances of explosions in thermal fluid systems
include the following examples:
1) A polystyrene manufacturing facility in Greater
Manchester was operating with 22,000 litres of Essotherm
500 (Mineral Oil) at 2858C. Although the plant had
defined hazardous areas the thermal oil system was operated
as a utility with no formal risk assessment. No formal training had been undertaken with the maintenance personnel
having little knowledge of the risks associated with high
temperature oil systems.
The thermal oil system was a closed loop system with
no deaeration facility, which meant that as the fluid
degraded the gaseous VOCs generated could not be
removed easily from the fluid stream. The result was that
the system lack of circulation warning would regularly
trip causing production disturbance. Without understanding
the significance of the lack of circulation trip, an engineer
wired out the switch to prevent the recurrence of the alarm.
Recurring differential pressure alarms is an indication
of rapidly dropping flash points and increasing vapour
pressure. In this instance the switch also acts as back up
to the low level switch in the expansion tank.
On this site, following routine maintenance, some
fluid was lost from the system and as the low level switch
indicated that there was oil in the expansion tank, the
system was started up as normal.
Unfortunately, the low level switch had failed and air
was being drawn into the system on the suction side of the circulation pump. This condition would normally have been
detected by the differential pressure switch. However, as
the switch had been disconnected the system ran as normal.
The air introduced into the system caused cavitation
of the pumps and oil vapour was released back into the
expansion tank where it condensed. The cavitation caused
rapid degradation of the fluid eventually resulting in an
explosion which tore the expansion tank apart, spraying
hot oil over the plant.
When samples of the fluid were taken from the expansion tank after the event, the fluid had a flash point of 428C
with an auto ignition temperature of just 1408C. For new
fluid the flash point would be 2108C and the auto ignition
temperature in excess of 3508C. These measurements indicate that the fluid had degraded dramatically.
2) A frozen food company manufacturing Yorkshire
puddings based in Leeds were operating two serpentine
ovens, using thermal oil in plattens to provide the heat
inside the ovens. The operation was dedicated to producing

FLASH POINT VARIATION

Flash points vary depending on the constituents of the
material being tested. However, many people are unaware
that heat transfer fluids thermally degrade over time, especially if they are handled near to or above their recommended
maximum temperature. This degradation results in the generation of light (low flash point) materials with lower flash
points than the heat transfer fluid itself. Therefore, this
causes the flash point of the heat transfer material overall
to reduce. The degradation of the heat transfer fluid can
cause the fluids flash point to decrease dramatically, so
that thermal fluids which were not flammable at the operating
temperature when they were initially installed may, over
time, become flammable at the operating conditions.
Experience of handling heat transfer fluids has shown
many instances of flash point reduction over time. Some of
the reported examples include:
.
.

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In the UK, a decrease in the flash point of a thermal fluid

from 1608C to 328C.
In Switzerland, within one year of service the heat transfer fluid flash point had decreased from 1208C to 608C.

As a result of such instances some suppliers of heat transfer

fluids recommend regular evaluation of the heat transfer
fluid, it is suggested annually. [UK CRHF]
MIST FORMATION
In many thermal fluid systems the heat transfer fluid is
handled under sufficient pressure so that a mist or spray
can be formed, particularly around leak points such as
flanged joints, around valves and at connection points in

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needs to be recognised. The explosive atmospheres may be

present around leak points due to flammable mist formation,
or because the thermal fluid flash point has decreased over
time and it is being handled above its flash point. If the
explosive atmospheres cannot be avoided, the location and
extent of the hazardous areas need to be identified by carrying out a Hazardous Area Classification Exercise.
Once the hazardous area extents have been identified,
an inventory of any equipment in these areas needs to be
carried out, to ascertain whether there is any equipment in
the area which could constitute an ignition source. Although
this is standard practice within the chemical industry, it is
not always recognised as being necessary with thermal
fluids. In many cases thermal fluid systems have been supplied to companies with standard (i.e. not ATEX-rated)
motors. This is despite the fact that the connection point
for the motor into the thermal fluid pipework is a leak
source around which an explosive atmosphere may be
formed. Therefore, the pump, motor and any other electrical
equipment in the hazardous area needs to be suitable for use
in an explosive atmosphere.

the highest possible output from the ovens. This resulted

in the thermal fluid being operated to the maximum operating limit.
The thermal oil, Gulftherm 32, is a mineral oil which
states in the technical data sheet that the fluid can be operated to 3168C in closed, indirect heating systems (up to
1808C in open heating systems). As a result the company
set their thermal oil circuits to 3158C in the belief that this
would be both reasonable and acceptable.
The rapid degradation at these temperatures resulted
in lowering flash and fire points, reduced viscosity and
increased vapour pressure, and subsequently, an explosion.
The cause of the explosion is still being investigated
though it is enough to say that the fluid had a flash point
of below 308C, and was operating at 3158C! (The flash
point of Gulftherm 32 is quoted as 2308C).
3) Three workers were killed in the explosion of a
thermal oil boiler at a plant in North Rhine-Westphalia in
Germany in February 2010. The plant produces timber,
chipboard and laminate flooring, and the accident occurred
in the biomass heating plant. A replacement boiler,
approved by a certified company, had been installed in
place of the normal boiler. The explosion, in which the
three workers died, was followed by a fire, which 47 firefighters were able to extinguish within 90 minutes. The
cause of the explosion is currently under investigation.

REGULARLY REPLACE THE THERMAL FLUID

To prevent the degradation of the thermal fluid over time,
(which will result in the reduction of the flash point), the
thermal fluid should be regularly replaced. Suppliers of
thermal fluid systems recommend that the thermal fluid is
replaced annually, to prevent the dramatic reduction in
flash point (see Figure 1).
However, although replacing the thermal fluid will
avoid the formation of explosive atmospheres when handling the fluid at atmospheric pressure, the formation of a
flammable mist atmosphere is still possible if the fluid is
handled under pressure.

LAGGING FIRES
Fires in thermal oil systems often occur in insulation. Fluid
leaking from a valve, flange or instrument port into open
types of insulation materials, such as glass fibre or mineral
wool, migrates from the source of the leak and disperses
within the insulation. If the insulation is removed or punctured, spontaneous ignition of the thermal oil can occur due to
an increase in the oxygen available. Spontaneous ignition
can also be caused by an abrupt increase in operating temperature. [Oetinger 2002]

REGULAR MONITORING OF THE THERMAL

FLUID FLASH POINT
To prevent the reduction of the flash point over time via
degradation, the thermal fluid needs to be sampled regularly,
and the flash point of the sample determined. If the flash
point has reduced considerably, then the thermal fluid will
need to be replaced.
However, as stated above, although replacing the
thermal fluid will avoid the formation of explosive atmospheres when handling the fluid at atmospheric pressure,
the formation of a flammable mist atmosphere is still possible if the fluid is handled under pressure.
It is important to emphasise that flash point testing
alone is NOT sufficient to comply with DSEAR. Some companies are offering to test the flash point of a customers
thermal fluid, giving them the impression that if this is
done, the customer will be compliant with the DSEAR regulations. This is not the case.

METHODS OF AVOIDING FIRES & EXPLOSIONS

IN THERMAL FLUID SYSTEMS
There are several different ways in which fire and explosion
hazards in thermal fluid systems can be avoided:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

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Hazardous Area Classification and correct Equipment

Selection.
Regularly replace the thermal fluid.
Monitor the flash point of the thermal fluid regularly.
Install fluid conditioning equipment in the thermal fluid
system.
Reduce the extent of mist formation by fitting mist
guards.
Avoiding lagging fires.

HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION AND

CORRECT EQUIPMENT SELECTION
The potential for explosive atmospheres (hazardous areas)
inside and around leak points on thermal fluid systems

INSTALL FLUID CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT

If the flash point has reduced to an unacceptably low level,
an alternative to replacing all the thermal fluid is to remove

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Figure 1. Typical thermal fluid installation (reproduced by permission of Heat Transfer Systems Ltd)

only the light end materials which are responsible for reducing the overall flash point. This can be done by installing
proprietary fluid conditioning equipment, designed to
remove the VOCs, as part of the thermal fluid system (see
Figure 2). Fitting fluid conditioning equipment has the
potential to extend fluid life considerably, which can
result in significant savings compared with fluid replacement.
AVOID/LIMIT MIST FORMATION
Although explosive mist atmospheres may be formed where
the thermal fluid is handled under pressure, the extent of the
hazardous area created by the mist can be limited by fitting
mist guards around any leak points, such as flanges. These
guards will limit the extent of the hazardous area to
within the area inside the mist guard, which should be
away from any sources of ignition.
However, it is important that if the fitting of mist
guards is used to reduce the hazardous area extent, then procedures must be in place to ensure that the mist guards are
replaced after any maintenance work.
AVOIDING LAGGING FIRES
Lagging fires can be avoided by a variety of methods. First,
only use high temperature, closed-cell glass insulation in
leak-prone areas, e.g. near valves, flanges and instrument
ports. Alternatively, remove the insulation from these
areas completely.
When installing the thermal oil system, pay attention
to the following areas:
i)

ii)

System cleanliness ensure equipment is clean and

dry. Contamination can result in low flow, which can
cause overheating and thermal fluid degradation.
Component orientation ensure valves are mounted
stem-downward so leakage cannot enter nearby
porous insulation.

Figure 2. Fluid conditioning equipment for VOC removal

(reproduced by permission of Heat Transfer Systems Ltd)

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iv)

Hazards XXII

System tightness to avoid leakages.

Allow for thermal expansion and contraction by
installing expansion joints and expansion loops in
the piping. Avoid threaded fittings as these may
result in leaks.

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approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning

equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres, from Official Journal of the
European Communities L100.
EC 1998, Council Directive 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998 on the
protection of the health and safety of workers from the risks
related to chemical agents at work (fourteenth individual
Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive
89/391/EEC), from Official Journal of the European Communities L131.
EC 2000, Council Directive 1999/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999
on minimum requirements for improving the safety
and health protection of workers potentially at risk
from explosive atmospheres (15th individual Directive
within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/
391/EEC), from Official Journal of the European
Communities L23.
Fuhr, J.C., 1992, Prevent fires in thermal oil heat-transfer
systems, Chem. Eng. Progress, 88(5), 4244 (May 1992).
Oetinger, J., 2002, Prevent fires in thermal fluid systems, Chem.
Eng. Progress, Jan. 2002, 46 48.
S.I. 2002 No. 2276, The Dangerous Substances and Explosive
Atmospheres Regulations 2002, HMSO.
UK CRHF (Chemical Reaction Hazards Forum),
incident no. 89 from http://www.crhf.org.uk/incident89.
html#top.

[Fuhr 1992]
CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides case studies where explosions have
occurred in thermal fluid systems, and the flash point of
the thermal fluid was found to have decreased below the
operating temperature.
The paper emphasises the need to consider thermal
fluid systems under the DSEAR regulations, including
assessing the fire and explosion risks and identifying
where explosive atmospheres may occur. It also highlights
the fact that where thermal oils are handled under pressure,
explosive mist atmospheres may be formed at temperatures
below the flash point.
A variety of methods for avoiding fire and explosions
in thermal fluid systems is also presented.
REFERENCES
EC 1994, Council Directive 94/9/EC of the European
Parliament and the Council of 23 March 1994 on the

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