Weiner
Weiner
Weiner
In 1645, Miyomota Musashi was contem- of the Redwood National Park for their sorry state. Tim
plating the causes of his past success as a war- Skaggs, the union business agent, shrugged. 'You could
spend a lifetime fixing blame,' he said. (Martinez, 1982,
rior. In A Book of Five Rings he mused,
Pt. 5, p. 1)
When I reached thirty I looked back on my past. The previous victories were not due to my having mastered strategy.
Perhaps it was natural ability, or the order of heaven, or
that other schools' strategy was inferior. (1645/1974, p. 35)
was a success, then there is likely to be an attempt to reinstate the prior causal network.
On the other hand, if the prior outcome or
event was undesiredsuch as exam failure,
social rejection, political loss, or economic declinethen there is a strong possibility that
there will be an attempt to alter the causes to
produce a different (more positive) effect.
Desire for mastery and functional search,
two of the generators of causal exploration, do
not seem to specifically characterize one geographical area or one period of human history.
The Japanese warrior in the Middle Ages and
today's union representative are engaged in the
same endeavor: attempting to assign causality.
Indeed, one might argue that adaptation is not
possible without causal analysis. The warrior
needs to know why he is winning battles so he
can survive the next one, just as the union representative needs to explain why the industry
is doing poorly in order to urge wiser actions
in the future. Because of the apparent pancultural, timeless aspect of causal search and
exploration, and because of the evident adaptive significance of this activity, causal ascriptions are proposed to provide the building
blocks for the construction of a theory of motivation and emotion.
This article advances an attributional theory
of motivation and emotion, with achievement
strivings as the theoretical focus. Initially, the
most salient causes of success and failure in
achievement-related contexts are identified.
The basic properties of these causes, or the
structure of causal thinking, is then determined from both a dialectic and an empirical
perspective. Three causal dimensions are discovered: locus, stability, and controllability.
The structure of causal thinking is next related
to emotion and motivation. Thus, this article
progresses from a description of causal perceptions to causal structure, and then from
causal structure to an examination of the dynamics of action. It is documented that causal
stability influences changes in goal anticipations, while the three causal dimensions determine the emotional experiences of anger,
gratitude, guilt, hopelessness, pity, pride, and
shame. Guided by Expectancy X Value theory,
I presume that expectancy and affect direct
motivated behavior. Examples of research on
the disparate topics of parole decisions, smoking cessation, and helping behavior suggest the
549
550
BERNARD WEINER
Table 1
Investigations of the Perceived Causes of Success and Failure
Experiment
Subjects
Perspective
Frieze (1976)
College students
Self and
other
Hypothetical school
and game
performance
College students
Self
Anagrams
1 st-5th graders
Other
Hypothetical
academic test, art
project, sports, and
game
Teachers
Other
School performance of
students
Teachers
Other
School performance of
students
Anderson (1983a)
College students
Other
Variety of hypothetical
situations
Behavioral preparation,
experience and skill, effort
level, and general knowledge
Self
School exam
Self
School exam
Advantaged
students
Self
Academic test
Disadvantaged
students
Self
Academic test
College students
Task
Dominant attributions
7th graders
Test preparation, effort for
study, concentration during
study, and teacher's ability
Test preparation, concentration
during study, effort for study,
and self-confidence
551
It is now realized that there are many shortcomings of this classification (see Weiner,
1983). Ability may be perceived as unstable if
learning is possible; effort often is perceived as
a stable trait, captured with the labels of lazy
and industrious; tasks can be changed to be
more or less difficult; and luck may be thought
of as a property of a person (lucky or unlucky).
Thus, the causes within the four cells did not
truly represent the classification system (i.e.,
they did not conform to the phenomenology
of the naive attributor). Less ambiguous entries
might have been aptitude, temporary exertion,
objective task characteristics, and chance (see
Weiner, 1983). Hindsight, however, is better
than foresight, and the problems so evident
now were not fully recognized in 1971.
A third dimension of causality was then established with the same deductive reasoning
that led to the identification of the stability
dimension. Rosenbaum (1972) recognized that
mood, fatigue, and temporary effort, for example, all are internal and unstable causes.
Yet they are distinguishable in that effort is
subject to volitional controlan individual
can increase or decrease effort expenditure.
This is not typically true of mood or the onset
of fatigue, which under most circumstances
cannot be willed to change. The same distinction is found among the internal and stable
causes. Some so-called traits such as laziness,
slovenliness, or tolerance often are perceived
as under volitional or optional control, whereas
this is not characteristic of other internal and
stable causes such as math or artistic aptitude
and physical coordination.
The identification of this property, now
called controllability (Weiner, 1979), enlightened and solved some issues while creating
other difficulties. Among the illuminated topics
was the distinction by Rotter (1966) between
internal versus external perceptions of control
of reinforcement. Within the three-dimensional taxonomy, two of the proposed causal
properties are labeled locus and control. A
cause therefore might be internal yet uncontrollable, such as math aptitude. If failure is
ascribed to poor aptitude, then the performance is perceived as determined by skill and
ability. According to Rotter, this indicates that
the outcome is perceived as subject to internal
control. Yet a genetically determined aptitude
will not be perceived as controllable by a failing
552
BERNARD WEINER
ther control or intent (a possible distinction between these labels will be examined). In three
investigations other dimensions have emerged,
but they are not manifest in more than one
study.
The data therefore strongly support the
contention that there are three dimensions or
properties of perceived causality, which is consistent with the causal properties derived from
the logical analysis (although it must be recognized that even in the empirical studies the
dimensions require a subjective or experimenter labeling, and at times the empirical
methodologies have imposed constraints on
the causal perceptions of the subjects). The
empirical dimensions that have emerged are
reliable, general across situations, and meaningful. Other suggested dimensions are either
unreliable (perhaps intimating that they are
specific to a particular context) and/or are not
clearly meaningful, as the unnamed factor isolated by J. Meyer and Koelbl (1982).
It also seems to be the case that the structure
of causality is not merely a convenient classification system imposed by attribution theorists (see Schiitz, 1967, p. 59). The scaling and
the correlational procedures, as well as those
of factor analyses, yielded comparable dimensions corresponding to those that evolved from
the logical thinking of attribution theorists.
The dimensions, therefore, may be considered
part of lay psychology. Finally, there is a relative simplicity in the organization of causal
thinking, just as there is in the selection of specific causes.
Causal Comparisons
Recall that one of the purposes of creating
a causal taxonomy is to enable the investigator
to compare and contrast causes. Consider, for
example, low math aptitude and physical unattractiveness as respective causes of achievement failure and social rejection. Both appear
to be internal, stable, and uncontrollable
causes. Similar correspondence can be found
between other causes of achievement and social
failure such as "the school has hard requirements" versus "religious restrictions on dating" (both being external, stable, and uncontrollable). This demonstrates that the structural analysis is not limited to achievement
553
Table 2
Empirical Studies of Causal Dimensions
Dimensions
Domain
Locus
Stability
Control
(intent)
Factor analysis
Achievement
(hypothetical
exam of others)
Factor analysis
Achievement
(examination
performance)
Factor analysis
All
X'
Passer (1977)
Multidimensional Achievement
scaling
(hypothetical
exam
performance)
Failure
Success
Experiment
Procedure
Multidimensional
scaling
X?
X
X
Michela, Peplau,
& Weeks (1982)
Multidimensional
scaling
Loneliness
(hypothetical
other)
Stern (1983)
Correlation with
a priori
scheme
using
concept
formation
tasks
Free-sort
Sort-resort
Sequential sort
Graph
building
M ultidimensional
scaling
Achievement
(academic &
sports)
X
X?
Unnamed
X
X"
Marital conflict
(hypothetical
other)
Actor
Partner
* Unipolar.
b
Only internal causes.
'
Other
or X?
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Attitude toward
partner
Attitude toward
partner
554
BERNARD WEINER
555
some connection, some linkage, between attributional thinking and goal expectancy.
Two possibilities come to mind. On the one
hand, the influence of causal variables on the
absolute expectancy of goal attainment could
be ascertained. Heider (1958), for example,
reasoned that goal expectancies in achievement-related contexts are determined by perceived ability and planned effort expenditure,
relative to the perceived difficulty of the task.
This is an enticing analysis to follow, inasmuch
as attributional concepts already are introduced.
But other theorists have had completely different notions about the antecedents of goal
expectancy. Tolman (1925), for example, stipulated that expectancy is a function of the frequency, primacy, and recency of reinforcement. According to Rotter (1966), expectancies
are determined by the percentage of reinforcements of a particular response in a particular
setting, the percentage of reinforcements of this
response in similar situations, and individual
differences in the belief that reinforcements are
under personal control. And for Atkinson
(1964), expectancy is influenced by the number of individuals against whom one is competing, prior reinforcement history, and communications from others concerning the likelihood of success. It therefore is evident that
consensus does not exist about the antecedents
of goal expectancy, although all theorists would
agree that past reinforcement history does play
some important role.
A second possibility is initially to find relations between attributions and changes in
expectancy, and then use this information to
determine the relation between causal ascriptions and absolute expectancy of success. Inasmuch as attributional search is initiated following an outcomeso that change can be examinedthis seems to be a promising lead.
In addition, perhaps change in goal expectancy,
as opposed to absolute expectancy level, is
more amenable to a general law that transcends
the situational context.
Investigations of Expectancy Change
Three psychological literatures are directly
related to changes in goal expectancy, and
again the pertinent research has primarily been
conducted in achievement-related contexts.
556
BERNARD WEINER
557
558
BERNARD WEINER
Table 3
Subjects
Attribution
measurement
Task
Expectancy
measure
Correlational studies
Meyer, W. (1973)
German high
school students
Digit-symbol
substitution
Percentage rating
Probability of
future success
McMahan(1973)
American
grammar, high
school, &
college students
Anagrams
Paired comparison
Confidence of
future success
Weiner, Nierenberg,
& Goldstein
(1976)
American college
students
Block design
Within-dimension
scale rating
Anticipated performance
Inagi(1977)
Japanese college
students
Puzzle
Percentage rating
Probability of
future success
Kovenklioglu &
Green haus
(1978)
American college
students
Test performance
Paired comparison
Anticipated performance
American college
students
Unspecified
achievement
stories
Dimension scale
rating
Confidence in
outcome
repetition
American college
students
Unspecified "project"
(hypothetical)
Causes given in
description
Expected project
outcome
American college
students
School exam
(hypothetical)
Causes given in
description
Anticipated grade
Fontaine (1974)
Australian college
students
Unspecified "tasks"
Fictitious ascriptions
of others
Expected score
Valle(1974)
American college
students
Sales (hypothetical)
Causes given in
description
Anticipated performance
British college
students
Anagrams
Fictitious
information from
others
Performance
prediction
American college
students
Job performance
(hypothetical)
Causes given in
description
559
560
BERNARD WEINER
.General positive or negative emotions
Outcome
-Outcome evaluation
-Distinct emotions
561
562
BERNARD WEINER
Many others have reached a similar conclusion. For example, among the very first of the
pertinent investigations, Pastore (1952) demonstrated that aggression (and, by implication,
anger) is not merely the result of nonattainment of a desired goal, but rather follows when
a barrier imposed by others is arbitrary (e.g.,
"Your date phones at the last minute and
breaks an appointment without adequate explanation") rather than nonarbitrary (e.g.,
"Your date phones . . . and breaks an appointment because he (she) suddenly became.
ill)." To summarize, the attributional antecedent for anger is an ascription of a negative,
self-related outcome or event to factors controllable by others (see Weiner, 1980a, 1980b;
Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982).
Pity. In contrast to the linkage between
controllability and anger, it is hypothesized that
uncontrollable causes are associated with pity.
It is said that when Helen Keller began her
training, her teacher stated to Ms. Keller's
family: "We do not want your pity," thus conveying that a target of pity is associated with
an uncontrollable deficit. This analysis is similar to Hoffman's (1982) conception, for he
stated, "It is only when the cues indicate that
. . . the victim had no control that the . . .
partial transformation of empathic into sympathic distress may apply" (p. 296).
A number of research studies support this
contention. Another's loss of a loved one because of an accident, or difficulties because of
a physical handicap, are prototypical situations
that elicit pity (see Graham, Doubleday, &
controllable causes, but guilt is directed inward, whereas anger is typically (but not necessarily) directed outward. Thus, for example,
we tend to feel guilty when we have lied to
others, but angry when we have discovered that
someone has lied to us (see Weiner, Graham,
& Chandler, 1982). In a similar manner, lack
of effort toward an important goal tends to
elicit anger from others (such as teachers) and
also generates personal guilt.
Shame frequently is contrasted with guilt,
although both involve "negative self-evaluations that are painful, tense, agitating. . . depressing" (Wicker et al., 1983). Although there
appear to be different kinds of shame, it is believed that one antecedent is an attribution for
failure that is self-related and uncontrollable,
such as lack of ability. In studies testing uncontrollability-shame and controllability-guilt
associations, Brown and Weiner (1984), Covington and Omelich (1984), and Jagacinski and
Nicholls (1984) have reported that shame-related affects (disgrace, embarrassment, humiliation, and/or shame) are linked with failure due to low ability, whereas guilt-related
affects (guilt, regret, and/or remorse) are associated with failure due to lack of effort. It
also has been documented that shame-related
emotions give rise to withdrawal and motivational inhibition, whereas guilt-related emotions promote approach behavior, retribution,
and motivational activation (Hoffman, 1982;
Wicker et al., 1983). Hence, there are linkages
between low-ability-shame-inhibition and between lack-of-effort-guilt-augmentation. It
also is of interest to repeat that anger tends to
motivate aggression, so that three patterns of
behavior noted by Horney (going toward, going
away from, going against) are related to causal
controllability and the respective affects of.
guilt, shame, and anger.
Gratitude. There is relatively little research
concerned with gratitude, but the evidence
suggests that gratitude toward another is elicited if and only if the act of the benefactor was
under volitional control and was intended to
benefit the recipient. For example, Tesser,
Gatewood, and Driver (1968) presented subjects with scenarios that involved a benefactor
and asked the subjects how grateful they would
feel under the various circumstances that were
portrayed. They found that reported gratitude
was maximized when the gift was intended to
563
benefit only the receiver (as opposed to a situation in which the gift enhanced the reputation of the giver). In other supporting research it has been documented that reciprocity
is more likely when a gift is given deliberately
rather than accidentally (Greenberg & Frisch,
1972) and when help is voluntary rather than
compulsory (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966).
Hopelessness. It has been convincingly
documented that causal stability in part determines expectancies regarding future success
and failure. Thus, any emotion involving anticipations of goal attainment or nonattainment will likely be influenced by causal stability. One such affect has been labeled hopelessness. It has been found that hopelessness
and resignation are elicited given an attribution
for a negative outcome to stable causes (Weiner
et al., 1978, 1979). That is, if the future is anticipated to remain as bad as the past, then
hopelessness is experienced. In addition, affects
such as pity are exacerbated when the cause
of the negative state is stable rather than unstable (e.g., we tend to pity the blind more than
we pity those with temporary eye problems).
Similarly, we tend to be more angry at others
when perceived controllable behavior, such as
lack of effort, is stable (a trait) rather than an
unstable state (Weiner, Graham, & Chandler,
1982).
Summary and conclusions. Attributions
play a key role in affective life. Seven emotions
were briefly examined that relate to causal
structure: pride (self-esteem), anger, pity, guilt,
shame, gratitude, and hopelessness. These are
among the most frequently reported and written-about affective experiences (see Bottenberg, 1975; Davitz, 1969). Sociobiologists have
specified that four of these emotionsanger,
pity, guilt, and gratitudeare of special importance in promoting gene survival (see Trivers, 1971). These four emotions are related to
the causal dimension of controllability, which
is consistent with the sociobiological position
that emotions are used to aid in maintaining
the social order. Finally, although the bulk of
the supporting data have been generated in
achievement-related contexts, the relations
specified above do not seem to be confined to
a particular motivational domain. As previously suggested, aptitude as a cause of achievement success, and physical attractiveness as a
cause of social success, are conceptually similar
564
BERNARD WEINER
in that both are internal, stable, and uncontrollable. Thus, success or positive outcomes
due to these factors should enhance pride and
positive self-esteem, just as negative outcomes
because of their absence should lower esteem.
But nonattainment of a goal for these reasons
should provoke neither anger from others nor
personal guilt. Rather, failure given both these
specific ascriptions is likely to elicit pity from
others and produce feelings of shame and
hopelessness in the frustrated individual.
A word of caution, however, is needed about
the preceding discussion. Given a causal ascription, the linked emotion does not necessarily follow. For example, one may not have
put forth effort at something important, yet
still be free from guilt. Or one may attribute
success to help from others, yet not feel grateful. Furthermore, an emotion may be experienced in the absence of its linked antecedent.
For example, one may not be responsible for
an outcome, but will experience guilt (see
Hoffman, 1976). Hence, the position being espoused is that the dimension-affect relations
are not invariant, but are quite prevalent in
our culture, and perhaps in many others as
well. This position is similar to the argument
that there is a linkage between frustration and
aggression, although frustration elicits reactions other than aggression, and aggression has
other antecedents in addition to frustration.
The Complete Theory
It is now possible to present an attributional
theory of motivation and emotion based on
the prior discussion of the theoretical components. The theory is presented in Figure 2.
In contrast to other Expectancy X Value approaches, this conception is represented as a
historical or temporal sequence; motivation is
not conceived as an "ahistorical problem"
(Atkinson, 1964, p. 146). In addition, the theory to be proposed departs from prior Expectancy X Value conceptions by linking value to
the affect elicited following goal-directed activity. Other theories of motivation have been
remiss by virtually ignoring the emotions, save
for an acceptance of the general pleasure-pain
principle. The sequence depicted in Figure 2
will be used to discuss the following contrived
(but surely extant) scenario: "A Little League
baseball player performs very poorly during a
game. Instead of appearing for the next contest, the boy stays at home." Other scenarios,
such as the boy taking extra batting practice
following failure (rather than missing the game)
or taking extra batting practice after playing
well (success), could have readily been used to
portray how the theory shown in Figure 2 conceptualizes an achievement-related motivational episode. This is followed by an examination of achievement change programs, for
these therapeutic attempts illustrate both how
the theory has been used and document its
incomplete utilization. After these analyses, I
consider the generality of the theory beyond
the achievement domain.
Figure 2 reveals that a motivational sequence is initiated by an outcome that individuals interpret as positive (goal attainment)
or negative (nonattainment of the goal). Inasmuch as affects are directly linked with outcomes (the primary appraisal), Figure 2 includes a connection between outcome and the
reactions of happy (for success) and frustrated
or sad (if the outcome was interpreted as a
failure). These associations are designated with
a 1 in the figure. In the baseball scenario, the
boy performed poorly at the game and this
will elicit general negative reactions.
A causal search is then undertaken to determine why the outcome occurred (Linkage
2). Some of the conditions that particularly
promote this search, which were not discussed
in the present article (see Weiner, 1985), are
indicated in the figure. In our example, failure
at a subjectively important act should result
in the boy overtly or covertly wondering, "Why
did I perform so poorly?" A large number of
antecedents influence the causal explanation(s)
reached. This popular topic also was not discussed in the present article. Some of the
known attributional antecedents are included
in Figure 2, such as specific information (e.g.,
past personal history, performance of others;
see Kelley & Michela, 1980). The blanket etcetera at the bottom of the antecedents merely
conveys that there are many unlisted determinants of the selected attribution.
The causal decision is biased toward a relatively small number of causes such as ability
and effort in the achievement domain (see Table 1). Again Figure 2 is not complete, as denoted by the etcetera at the bottom of the
causal lists. In our example, assume that the
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ingly popular therapeutic treatment that induces participants to alter their attributions
for success and failure (see Foersterling, in
press). Often the participants in these programs were selected because they ascribe personal failure to low ability. The main empirical
finding in these studies is that persistence in
the face of failure is enhanced when attributions for failure are changed from low ability
to lack of effort (Andrews & Debus, 1978;
Chapin & Dyck, 1976; Dweck, 1975; Zoeller,
Mahoney, & Weiner, 1983), to poor strategy
(Anderson, 1983b; Anderson & Jennings,
1980), or to temporary external barriers (Wilson & Linville, 1982, 1985).
To alter attributions, in the treatment techniques the experimenter often directly communicates to the participants the attribution
that is desired to be induced (e.g., "You failed
because you did not try hard enough" or
"Success depends entirely on finding the right
strategy"). Following the logic of Figure 2, the
participants use this information to reach a
causal conclusion. Furthermore, they apparently accept the communicated ascription,
rather than attributing induced failure to low
ability. Attributions thus are altered from stable to unstable, which should (and does) result
in the maintenance of goal expectancy (see
Anderson, 1983b; Anderson & Jennings,
1980). This sequence is depicted in Linkages
3, 5, and 6 in the figure. The investigators all
reported increments in persistence of achievement strivings in the face of failure following
the treatment and assumed that the behavior
change was mediated, in part, by shifts in the
subjective expectancy of success, as indicated
in Linkage 11 (although Wilson & Linville,
1982, questioned the consciousness of this estimate, and Dweck, 1975, stressed the controllability rather than the stability of the induced causal ascription).
It is therefore evident that the researchers
have focused attention on expectancy of success. Although consistent with the theory, it
also is clear that the conceptualization is not
fully brought to bear on the phenomena, inasmuch as emotions are entirely neglected. As
previously revealed, ascriptions to ability, effort, strategy, and external barriers have disparate affective consequences. For example, a
program that induces effort rather than ability
ascriptions for failure theoretically is altering
567
568
BERNARD WEINER
is one without a previous history who impulsively committed the same crime. This is in
part because criminal history is a cue used to
determine the stability of the cause of the
crime; an extensive history results in the perception of the cause of the current crime as
stable and recidivism is therefore anticipated.
Parole board members do consider nonattributional factors in their decisions and, as opposed to college students simulating parole officials, base their decisions entirely on risk factors. However, the decisions made by judges
and by college students also take into account
beliefs regarding "deserved" punishment.
Crimes committed because of intentional and/
or controllable factors are believed to be more
deserving of punishment than are crimes
due to unintentional and/or noncontrollable
causes.
In this research, as in the work on achievement change programs, the full theory has not
been applied because of the neglect of emotions. This is not the fault of the researchers,
for the introduction of emotion into this theory
came well after their studies. Hence, a reasonable direction for these investigations is to incorporate feelings, particularly anger and pity,
into the determinants of sentence and parole
decisions.
Cessation of smoking. A great deal of attention has been devoted by psychologists to
an examination of why people do not give up
smoking, given the known negative consequences of this behavior. Eiser and Sutton
(1977) argued that the decision facing a wouldbe quitter is not whether to smoke or to quit,
but whether to smoke or to try to quit. This
shifts the theoretical focus from the determinants of quitting to the subjective expectancy
that an attempt at quitting will be successful.
In a large survey study, Eiser et al. (in press)
examined the attributions that smokers give
for the failure of others to give up smoking, as
well as the reasons for their own personal failure at cessation attempts. Path analyses revealed that the perceived stability of the cause
of prior failure attempts of both others and
oneself was related to personal confidence
about giving up smoking in the future. Confidence, in turn, was related to the behavioral
intention to try and quit, and intention was
associated with actual abstinence attempts.
Hence, the temporal sequence of cause, causal
569
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BERNARD WEINER
EMOTION
573