United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 433 F.3d 165, 1st Cir. (2005)

433 F.
3d 165
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.
Jos Guillermo RODRGUEZ-GONZLEZ, Defendant,
Appellant.
No. 04-2333.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard December 7, 2005.
Decided December 30, 2005.
Rachel Brill, for appellant.

Nelson Prez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Senior Appellate
Attorney, with whom H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, was on brief
for appellee.
Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and HOWARD, Circuit
Judges.
BOUDIN, Chief Judge.
Jose Guillermo Rodriguez-Gonzalez ("Rodriguez") was indicted by a federal

grand jury for conspiring to commit credit card fraud, for aiding and abetting
bank fraud and for money laundering. 18 U.S.C. 371, 1344, 1956(a)(1)(h)
(2000). In substance, the indictment charged Rodriguez with participating in a
ring to obtain and improperly exploit credit card numbers; his role was
described as that of a "runner" who assisted other co-conspirators in the illegal
acquisition of merchandise, in recruiting new conspirators and in arranging for
the transfer of devices to glean account information from credit cards.
Each count of the indictment specified that Rodriguez had conspired with
others "[f]rom in or about December of 2002, and continuing through in or
about November of 2003." The indictment charged Rodriguez with having
committed an overt act in furtherance of the credit-card and bank-fraud
offenses "[o]n or about August 18, 2003 through on or about August 20, 2003,"
namely, by recruiting an unnamed individual to join the conspiracy and making
arrangements to transfer to him the device for gleaning information from credit
cards.
3
Rodriguez thereafter entered into a plea agreement with the government to

plead guilty to the credit-card and bank-fraud violations. The plea agreement
described the indictment's countsto which Rodriguez was pleadingas
charging Rodriguez with participating from December 2002 through November
2003, leaving the impression that he was accepting that premise. In exchange,
the government said in the agreement that it would dismiss the money
laundering count and would recommend that Rodriguez be sentenced at the
lower end of the applicable guideline range.
Rodriguez and the government also expressly agreed to specific guideline

enhancements, based on the implicit assumption that he was responsible for
conduct throughout the conspiracy-a loss of over $400,000, U.S.S.G.
2B1.1(b)(1)(G), and between 10 and 50 victims, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(A). A
separate stipulation of facts attached to the plea agreement referred to the 11month duration of the conspiracy and the $400,000 loss but did not expressly
link Rodriguez' participation to any specific time period apart from noting the
dates of his overt act (August 18-20, 2003).
At the change of plea hearing, the judge was explaining the nature of the
charges to Rodriguez when his then-counsel conveyed to the judge Rodriguez'
assertion that he "did not participate in the whole scheme of time on the
conspiracy." The judge replied: "[E]ven if you didn't start at the beginning, you
are to be held accountable just as if you had been there since the beginning and
you would be responsible for the conduct of the co-conspirators, ever since the
conspiracy started." Defense counsel did not disagree, and Rodriguez proceeded
with his guilty plea.
Thereafter, a presentence report was prepared setting forth the guideline

calculation to which the parties had agreed in the plea agreement. The report
described the full duration of the conspiracy, the amount of the loss, and the
number of victims without saying anything about when Rodriguez had joined.
By then Rodriguez had acquired new counsel (who also represents him on
appeal) who objected that the enhancements for loss and the number of victims
should be reduced or eliminated because, according to counsel, Rodriguez'
participation had not been shown to extend beyond the two days of his one
overt act in August 2003.
At sentencing, defense counsel pressed this same objection; the district judge
rejected it. The judge had (as already noted) expressed at the plea hearing the
view that Rodriguez was legally responsible for the actions of his coconspirators from the start of the conspiracy; and the judge made clear that he
believed that Rodriguez was seeking to escape from stipulations made in the
plea agreement. Rodriguez was then sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment at
the bottom of the 46 to 57 months range.
8
In the course of the sentencing, the government, seeking to refute defense

counsel's suggestion that Rodriguez had joined the conspiracy only in midAugust 2003, said that it had evidence to the contrary. Although the proffer was
not developed, it appears that the government may have had tape recordings
indicating that Rodriguez was, at the very least, aware of the contours of the
conspiracy and its key players well before August 2003. In any event, the
district judge made no independent findings as to the date of Rodriguez'
joinder, apparently relying instead on the plea agreement stipulations and the
judge's own view that the precise date did not matter under existing law as to
late-joining conspirators.
Rodriguez then appealed to this court to contest the inclusion in the guideline
calculation of the $400,000 and 10 to 50 victim enhancements. Viewing the
plea agreement stipulation as clear, this court entered a judgment, whose
mandate has not yet issued, summarily affirming the sentence. Then, on defense
counsel's petition for rehearing, the court agreed to reexamine the matter and
held an expedited oral argument. Although it is a close call, we now conclude
that a remand is appropriate and supplant our earlier judgment with this
decision.
10
There is nothing surprising in the district judge's belief, when confronted with
defense counsel's objections to the enhancements, that Rodriguez was trying to
back-pedal from stipulations that he had made in the plea agreement.
Ordinarily, a defendant can be held to such stipulations. United States v. Teeter,
257 F.3d 14, 28 (1st Cir.2001). Further, a special problem exists where, as here,
a defendant seems to disavow his stipulations without seeking to set aside the
plea agreement, as the government has ordinarily paid a price for the agreement
(although in this case defense counsel thinks that Rodriguez got little from the
agreement).1
11
Over and above the stipulation as to the enhancements, the plea agreement's
description of the conspiracy charge as extending for 11 months and its
assertion that Rodriguez was pleading guilty to the two counts based on the
indictment certainly invited a reasonable reader to understand that Rodriguez
was agreeing that in fact he had participated for the full period charged. The
attached stipulation of facts, although it did not say when he entered the
conspiracy, said nothing that negated the agreement which indicated that he
had participated throughout.
12
If this were the sum total of events, we would join with the district judge in
thinking that the stipulation and Rodriguez' unqualified guilty plea established
that Rodriguez had participated in the full conspiracy. The difficulty is that
before the judge accepted the guilty plea, Rodriguez specifically told the judge
that he (Rodriguez) had not been in the conspiracy from the outset. And when
one looks back at the plea agreement, it becomes clearat least in light of
Rodriguez' disavowalthat it is not an airtight factual admission that
Rodriguez participated from the beginning. Had he thought it relevant,
doubtless the district judge would have sought to clear up the arguable
inconsistency before accepting the plea.
13
The district judge did not do so because, at least in part, he relied on the
generalization that a late-joining conspirator takes the conspiracy as he finds it
and is responsible for what happened prior to his joinder. This is true in one
context: co-conspirator statements, made even before the defendant joined the
conspiracy, are admissible against him as admissions by a co-conspirator.
United States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1022-23 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting
United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 997 (1st Cir.1987)).
14
Events in a conspiracy prior to a defendant's joinder may be relevant in various

ways beyond the admissibility of co-conspirator statements. But there is no
need to explore the ways in which such pre-joinder events might or might not
be relevant to, say, the statute of limitations or the characterization of the
conspiracy or Pinkerton liability. For when it comes to sentencing, the
guidelines say that a defendant is responsible only for losses that occurred and
victims who were injured after he joined and, then, only to the extent that they
were foreseeable by him.
15
In the words of the Sentencing Commission, "A defendant's relevant conduct

does not include the conduct of members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant
joining the conspiracy, even if the defendant knows of that conduct...."
U.S.S.G. 1B1.3, comment. (n.2). Rather, for sentencing purposes, the court
"is required to make an individualized finding as to [the conduct] attributable to,
or foreseeable by, that defendant." United States v. Colon-Solis, 354 F.3d 101,
103 (1st Cir.2004); see also U.S.S.G. 1B1.3. Thus, in our case, the factual
question of when Rodriguez joined the conspiracy is not made irrelevant by any
legal principle imposing on him liability for sentencing purposes of prior acts
of the conspiracy.
16
Yet this leaves Rodriguez' stipulation that he was subject to the enhancements.
Defense counsel says that the sentencing judge is supposed to impose the
correct sentence based on the evidence regardless of the parties' stipulation, but
this is too loose a statement: Teeter makes clear that a trial judge, although not
required to follow a stipulation (outside Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)), may
normally rely on the defendant's stipulation in determining what is the correct
sentence.
17
There are qualifications on such reliancefor example, a mistaken stipulation

on a matter of lawbut the precise timing of Rodriguez' entry into the
conspiracy is not of that kind. Indeed, there is still no affirmative evidence of
record, beyond the defendant's summary say-so at the plea hearing, that the
stipulation was factually mistaken. Certainly a summary and unilateral
disavowal by the defendant does not itself negate a stipulation.
18
Thus, our original summary affirmance of the sentence was supportable.

Nevertheless, we now think that given the defendant's caveat at the plea
hearing, the district judge would likely have insisted on clarifying the
stipulation at the plea hearing, had it not been for the court's seeming
misunderstanding as to the law governing pre-joinder conduct of coconspirators. After all, the contradiction between what the plea agreement
suggested and the defendant's own protest was stark.
19
Under these peculiar circumstances, we think the just course is to remand the
matter to the district court for resentencing at which the court is free to
reconsider afresh what weight, if any, to give to the possibly suspect
stipulation. If the court determines to give the stipulation less than ordinary
weight, it will presumably warn the government so that the government can
muster its own evidence of the extent of Rodriguez' involvement in the
conspiracy.
20
The case does afford lessons all around: the need for care in the drafting of plea
stipulations; the distinctions to be drawn in the rules applying in different
contexts to late-joining conspirators; the benefit of persistence by able defense
counsel; and the ability of the iterative judicial process to remedy mistakes,
whether in the trial court or on appeal.
21
The petition for rehearing is granted and this court's judgment of July 20, 2005
is vacated. The sentence is vacated and the matter remanded to the district
court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
22
It is so ordered.
Notes:
1
Defense counsel did move to set aside the agreement on the ground that the
enhancements were not consistent withBlakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); but that claim has not been pursued
on this appeal, and counsel never sought to withdraw the plea based on
misunderstanding or mistaken advice given to Rodriguez as to the
enhancements.

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433 F.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Rachel Brill, for appellant.

Jose Guillermo Rodriguez-Gonzalez ("Rodriguez") was indicted by a federal

Rodriguez thereafter entered into a plea agreement with the government to

Rodriguez and the government also expressly agreed to specific guideline

Thereafter, a presentence report was prepared setting forth the guideline

In the course of the sentencing, the government, seeking to refute defense

Events in a conspiracy prior to a defendant's joinder may be relevant in various

In the words of the Sentencing Commission, "A defendant's relevant conduct

There are qualifications on such reliancefor example, a mistaken stipulation

Thus, our original summary affirmance of the sentence was supportable.

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