STEVE WEISSMAN HERBERT KROSNEY12 The Kindly Dr. Khan Dr. Also Quiser Khan th most maze mla oy ‘Boe ins Pus Alan Non iy ok lr ert the " he Oe, Decent Hewes an amusing person For iaanes he ws ays fering toate and sete tothe sersares eae i et 8 ould tes ae tty, Gathaie University of cue Plutonium is the easiest way to nuclear weapons, That is what the Amaicans sel i the bomb they dropped on Nagaeai, and what the Pakistanis were hoping to ge rom their reprocessing plant at Chashma, But there i a econ ‘way—highlyentiched uranium. That was the nuclear explosive in the bomb that devastated Hiroshima, And that was what the Pakistanis saw as ther neat best choice, For even a they argued with France over the fate of Chashmas they were secretly geting their hands on that latest, top-secret Euopea technology and quietly buying the finest industrial components to build thei ‘own supersophisticated enrichment plant in the tiny village of Kahuts, nest Islamabad, This was something that none ofthe developed nations had expected. The enrichment process had been a costly, complex technology to master, eve within the most advanced Wester countries. Only a few of the mst industrialized nations had ever built their own enrichment plants, and both the technology and the constraction had proceeded under the sricest secrecy, How could poor, backward Pakistan ever hope to do it? Yet they were doing i, largely by slipping in between the West's cael stnuctured set of muclear regulations. The major components of «wit entichment plant were elasfed, and subject to export regulations in mos the counties concemed, But the individual pats were not casified, and he Pakistanis went about buying their enrichment plant by proceeding $= tematically ffom county to country, buying the essential tems—patt part—fro rations kita Either w several n become @ were pars Asi anc the inter what the he st Ansterta expatriate three nati casted Qader K A aye magazine: Blend of) sects of iho stole Fuchs ane ‘We do prea fim. Like bright you West and (Homeland That is “Palamen of 1980, ¢ | hich one Bom in F fo the Tec EB Cerman © egineein = and 1967, Catholic ( One oft atLewen, Dr, Babe12 sale gy eto s Osea "na ote vy oteing isa ef Leen | American | tani were sa second the bomb their nea Chasing, European build thei Inula, near ected. The | aster, even the major 1 and both te stictest acl “inmost ai ad the ceding 9 opt by Di. Brabets recalled Khan as “a competent si The Kindly Dr. Khan 1%5 part—from dozens of companies in atleast five different Western European hations. Pakistan was going both ways: plutonium and highly entiched wanium, Kither would give the Pakistanis enough nuclear explosive matral for several nuclear weapons, IF both succeeded, the Pakistanis would soon | become a serious nuclear rival to both the Indians and the Ialis. And they ‘were pursuing the uranium enrichment rote ona clandestine basis nd with a sill and daring that left the ill-prepared Westem intelligence agenses and the international agencies alvays a step behind—even when they noticed what the Pakistanis were doing, whieh as not until 1973, ‘The story of Kahuta and its uraniumenrichment plant begins in Amsterdam in the early 19705, and it is largely the story of one nanan tepattiate Pakistan who ran circles around the lackluster security schemes of three nations and walked away with the secrets of one ofthe mos: highly clasified nuclear proceses in ll of Western Europe. His name is D. Abdul Qadcer Khan, ‘A myth in a dozen languages, Khan has emerged in newspapers and ‘magazines throughout Europe as'a man of immense mystery—an bslamic blend of James Bond and Dr. No, using the magi ofthe Bast to teal the sores ofthe West, Khan i superspook: “The spy of the century.” “The spy who stole the bomb for Islam.” “The mos sucessal nuclear spy since Klaus Fuchs and Alan Nunn May took their secret to the Kremlin,” We do not see him that way. In our view, the now legendary D. Khan fppeats more a scholar than a spook, a family man without much mystery to him. Like so many others stil in simiany sensitive situations, he was just a bright young man from the Thied Worl, one who had been educatel inthe West and who found himself ina position to do what he thought bes for his homeland, ‘That is also the picture that comes from a close reading of the Duteh Parliamentary report on the subsequent secuity sandal issued in the spring of 1980, and from a series of inteviews by the BBC Panorama teem—ot ‘hich one of us was a member—with people who knew Khan in Europe, * Born in 1936 in Bhopal, in what was then Brish India, Khan came to Europe to complete his studies in the early 1960s. He went ft to Germany, to the Technische Universitit in West Berlin, where he became fient in Geman, Then to Holland, where he took a degree in. metalurgical engineering atthe prestigious Technical University of Delft between 1963, and 1967. And finally to Belgium, where he finished his Ph.D. at the Gatholie University of Leuven in 1972, One of those who knew him best during thee student days was his mentor at Leuven, Professor M. J. Brabers. Interviewed therein the spring cf 1980, a" though “not relly @ * Srl inerviws aot thst ws contd by he BEC TV Panorama team's ‘i Tica al Clas Olga and se qed with Cs.176 PAKISTAN genius.” But what Brabers remembered best about the young Pakistani was his ability to make friends Khan was outgoing, charming, and highly likable, Unlike many Pakistanis, whom Brabers found quite class conscious, Khan could gt slong with anyone, from the people who cleaned the workshop to the most respected scientists ‘dont know how, but he managed to make frend all over the word,” recalled. Brabers, If Khan admired a scientist, or if he needed come information, he would sit down and jot off a note. His enthusiasm and willingness to ak questions won him access that few other graduate students could get. "At one point, Dr. Brabers worked with Khan in editing a book on physical metallurgy a festschrf for an older professor atthe Technical Universty of Delf. What amazed Brabers was how the young Khan made contact with top scientists around the world, and how he succeeded in getting then t contribute articles tothe book Brabers aso recalled that Khan, as a Muslim, would not eat potkor drink alcohol. But he was by no means a fanatic, “He was proud of his country," Brabers remember. “He also had thesame atitude as everbody ele in Pakistan that they were not wel treated by other ‘countries, particularly the Western countries. But Khan was “not national tie, notin the old sense, He had an international ming, He could live fy any county, I think, and thats what he tried todo for his firs job.” "This was in 1972, and the job was in Amsterdam, at a specialized ceawicetng ft, The Physieal Dynamics Research Laboratory, or FDO, ‘The post had not een advertised. former fellow sident from Delft headed DOs metallurgical section and wat familiar with Khan's talent. He jumped at the chance to put Khan on his elite team. "A subsidiary of the major Dutch frm Verenigde Machine-Fabricken, FDO worked closely with one of the key nuclear projects in Europe. This was Urenco, a joint venture of the governments of Great Britain, West ‘Germany, and the Netherlands, No longer willing to depend on the tnited States for nuclear fuel the thre nations had created Urenco in 1570 to ‘guatantee a steady supply of enriched uranium to fuel their nuclear powet plans. They were building a jointly owned uranium-enrichment plant it Holland, tthe town of Almelo. “The plant was to use anew and highly clasified technology—the ultacentifuge. Made of Finely machined, high-strength steel alloys, thou ‘ands ofthese ullrcentrifuges would spina gas of uranium hexafluoride at incredible speeds, as fst as 100,000 revolutions a minute, This would pysially separate the two diferent isotopes found in natural uraniur—the heaves, garden variety uranium 238 from the marginally lighter, far art and vetyfisionable uranium 235. The plant would then bring the searatt Streams of uranium gas back together, but with a higher proportion of the ‘uranium 235 The pt between t very smal thousand requite 25. May cenviched FDO, uitracent stengthes se of x cantifuge secret use Becaus nations it tor, FDO the expa Khan hac in Holla ‘The D ceutsory € BVD qui later cha Khan's British pe TheD have lear would ne only com Once « "He w van der and sve fay.” Khan's Pere ren Tite vit With | Khan me Schipol« about the own to Thestalong, fe most world,” d some sm and students physical ceri of with top them to or dink thesame by other atonal: vein any recialized oF FDO, headed ents, He ‘abrcken, ope, This tin, West ae United +1970 to feat power t plant in ogy the oy, how Borie at his would siumm—the 2 separated tion ofthe The Kindly Dr. Khan ti The process called for the finest precision. The difference mn weight between the isotopes is minuscule, and the natural uranium contains only a very small propottion of the prized uranium 235, about seven parts in a thousand, or 0.7 percent. For fuel, the standard lightrater power reactors require that the mixture be “enriched” to some 3 percent ofthe uranium 235. Many research reactors—and also nuclear weapons—require highly enriched uranium, which is enriched to ax much at 93 percent of the uranium 235 FDO, and now Dr. Khan, served as subcontractors and consulta on the ultracentrifuge process. For Khan, this was a unique opportunity, He could strengthen his knowledge and experience in his field of specialization, the use of exotic metals to withstand the strains caused by the immense speed of centifuges. And he would gain knowledge snd experience in the new top. secret use of ultracentrifuge inthe enrichment of uranium, Because of the seerecy sunounding the ultacentifuge process, the three tions in Urenco had agreed on tough secuiy, and as a major subcontrac- tor, FDO was required t get security cleatances frit employees, including the expatriate Khan. FDO recommended Khan strongly to the Urenco ‘management and praised his talent as a metallugist The firm also noted that Khan had been in the West fr eleven years and planned to settle, preferably in Holland, and that he was marred “to 2 Dutch wife.” ‘The Dutch security sersice—the BVD—took the information and ran cursory check on Dr. Khan. The check found nothing suspicious, and the BVD quickly approved a limited clearance, “secret inclusive.” Mich to its later chagrin, the BVD missed a number of details, such asthe fct that Khan's wife was not Dutehatall, bt a Dutch-speaking South African with a British passport ‘The Dutch Ministry of Economic Afar gave its approval. From what we have leamed, they were under the impresion thatthe Pakistani metallurgist would not work directly on the ultacentifige projec, and that 1¢ would only come into contact with low-security data, (Once cleared and at work, however, the likable Dr. Khan ft ight in, “He was an amusing person,” another of his old friends, Dr, Georges van der Perre, recalled. "For instance, he was always offering cookies and sweeties to the seretaries because in his idea a gil should be a litle fay.” Khan's command of Dutch was adequate, even good, But, as Dt. van der Perre remembers, Khan had his own Pakistani accent that “sounded funny a lie bit” ‘With his Dutch-speaking wile, Henny, and their two young diughtes, Khan moved into the tidy subueb of Zavanenbng, not far from Amsterdam's Schipol Airport. The family blended easily into the community. Everything shout their home at 71 Amstelle Street was normal and instantly frgetable, down tothe lace curtains and potted plants inthe windows, ‘The Khans were good neighbors and good fiends, They were alse atypical178 PAKISTAN youre family, taking ips othe sae, to the Ardennes, and sometires io Hold vey t Leven, ‘On eration, there wee nighborhocd volleyball guns, and Khan till remembered for hs "special ele” "Te wa smhing fom al pt cf the tours” ove of the neghbon sclatol Tt way of paying ar thes tnconentoa, but five Beane is nas were dangeoun” "A wotk and py, this seemed fo be the mos menacing thing anyone remembers about the chaming Pain. Bat voll nas not the oly fame thet Khan would come play. DO, his nef, ber, essing sapere, and ha soon ha th un af the place. In thi he was no diferent fom anyone ee No one at FDO seems fo have taken ecly a serous mate, an is ivy epee the door fr Khan to eter the Ureno plant il Accring he fil Dutch ert on he "Khan," his revit tothe factory at Almelo was on May 8 and9, 1972, only abou wesk afer fe sated work FDO wanted him to faite himself wit te gene procedures at Une, tome knowledgeable about the operation, a ao 1 lok int an important spect of hi pedal, the stenghening cf he tcl sed inthe centages Tos all aml enough, Bu twa alo breach of secuy. Khan and his employes had vlated—pethape umitingly—the supposedly vd secu regulations agreed on by tence Uteeo nan, and ll thikexen Fete Kh could sete downto is nr ine Inthe following months aod yea, Khan vas oficial engaged in only limited metallorgeal rescach for he ultacenfage poet Bat wl he Tay in ening the curt rey, he append Alle pea tay and als ad cso Uren foraton wht having ogo te la 2 ‘One of his jobs was to translate technical documents, which Khan repeatedly took home with him, all withthe pemision of FDO. He had ‘very opportunity to see Almcs complte design plans, which wee Svat another section of FDO pret company. An, nay Inst impo, he guned an ine knowlege of the fins p6 Component forth racers Inspec iti bios ta the Pakistan was ina pret poston po avay the sre ofthe ultacentfge. Bat there no evidence to suze that Khan tok the ob to py, tat he Paistuis ad purposely lied him in FDO to infitate res, Instead, peat that Khan gan working forthe Fakisa Government nly te ar 1974, psy afte dan nla etn May, Neigibon teembe tht ea wth ipo plates om Begum and rane een Showing up inthe lat pt of the yay and hat th vistors fen aed tl the ry hous of the morning “The migors noticed thee, but har gave them a cod thought “Tey simpy asuned tat Khon, lie any fel pessoal, ha SO fiends in until some ‘Whethe known. B of interest should he Inany 1974, wh wanted hi Dutch, "There, cone with: went bac! rushing te the metic seoret hac mentally. pat of th Oficial worked at He worke sensitive ‘The sec Mem vas supe and offer And alli Those oficial D at FDO, tnginces the strict FDO, ws The br themain and coffe Khan both the Sppeatst slearance om eign language id thttimes to van is stil rt of the as rather ‘ganyone the only and Khan yone else. and this = Bist vist week afer ve general and alo ing ofthe Khan and cally sigid Uihis even din only t with the slo repeat goto the sich Khan >. He had hich were many ways supplying ition to pry to suggest aly planted ovement Neighbors ance began fen stayed vd thought had cose The Kindly Dr. Khan 179 fiends in his county’ various embassies, At least that is how they saw it until some five years later, when all the pieces began to come together, ‘Whether Khan sought out the Pakistanis, or they recruited him, i still not Jnown. But one might expect a first-rate expatriate sient to bring matters of interest to his government’ attention, if only to guarantee a good job should he ever decide to return home. Inany case, Khan was almost certainly working fr Islamabad by the fill of| 1974, when he made his most important vist to the Almelo plant Urenco wanted him to translate part ofa top-secret technical report fom German to Dutch “The report concerned a major breakthrough in centrifuge technology, and ‘one with 2 faseinatng history Tis was the vertical centsifge method, and it went back to research during World War Il, when Navi scien were rushing to forge the ultimate weapon for Hitler, The Russians lteraerfcted the method with the help of some ofthe same Nazi scientists, and now the secret had returned to Germany, where scientists had developed it experi- mentally. Urenco hoped to incorporate the new method, and the report was pat of the effort Officially seconded to Urenco to help withthe technical translation, Khan worked at Almelo for some sixteen days over a period of three or four wees He worked inside the eomplex itself and was given a desk in one ofthe mest sensitive sections, where the final planning and design work were executed, ‘The section was apy called the "brainbox. ‘A temporary building set apart from the centifuge facility, the brainbox ‘was supposed to keep the tightest security. Regulations required thatall desks and offices remain locked, All work was to be srcly compartmentlized, ‘And al information was tobe testrited to those with “the need to know Those were the vles. The practice was something eke. Accondig to the ‘ficial Dutch report, the brainbox ha a decidedly “fee atmosphere." Just as at FDO, no one put any special emphasis on seeuity, ‘Technicians and ‘engineers spoke freely. Anyone inthe brainbox was assumed to have passed the strictest security check And Dr. Khan, the nice Pakistani chap from FDO, was just one ofthe boys ‘The brainbox was a separate building, but the lax security spillel over to the main plant. That is where the centrifuges were, It is alo where the tilts ‘were, and the canteen, where the boys from the brainbox gathered for snacks and coffee. Khan could hardly have done better. For sixteen days he had access to both the brainbox and the centrifuges. It was a rare opportunity, and it spats that Dr, Khan mae the mt of, ee with ited secu ‘On one oceasion, a colleague noticed that Khan was making notes in a foreign script. The man assumed that Khan was writing in his native language, and asked what he was writing, The friendly Pakistani stiled and said that he had been waiting a letter to his family back home.180 PAKISTAN Another taf member repestodly saw Khan touring the entifge fit, notebook in hand. ‘The #aff member thought nothing of i and only Teported what he had sen afte the scandal broke Ise the brainbox, Khan shared an office with a technician who wat also working on the same German centifuge project. ‘The technician was not alway this desk, and it ikl that Khan saw the document the man as working on Kan finshed his sixteen day secondment st Almelo without arousing suspicion, and returned to his normal routine at FDO, where he conned to have 2eces to information on the ullacentfuges But during the following yese, Khan gre careless, and several incidents brought him tothe attention of the Dutch authorities. In one of the more Blatant heared an FDO colleague to come home with him to photograph some ultacentifuge drawing that he happened to have “The authorities didnot seem ovely concerned. Then in Oetober 1975, the Ministry of Economic Ais asked FDO to shift Khan toa new pst where he would no longer have anything to do with the uleacentifoge project. FDO agreed, and Khan's wsefulnes in Amsterdam came oan end, least fr his Pakistan fend, Tt was time fr Khan to come in fo the cold The testi detail, Two months ltr, on December 15, Khan and hit wife, Henny, and their wo daughters lf on a ti. According to. neighbor, helt departure was sudden Henny then wrote 10 several fends and neighbor. The Khans were in Pakistan taking a vacation. Her husbard had fallen ill wih yellow fever, and they would be staying for another eight wwe, Shortly afterward, Khan wrote fo FDO. He had decided nt to ira to Helland, ad was submiting his resignation, to take fc frm March 1 1916, "FDO was sorry to lose such a good metallugst. The Dutch authors took litle notice. And the neighbors were not especially surprised. Theit cnly concern vas that Henny might find it difficult ito Pabst society “We also knew that hi family, the family clan, let sy, was urging hrm and putting pressure on him to come home to Pakistan,” one of Khas Dutch frends explained, “It wart so stange, We said ‘Otay, the Sm has won the boy back.” Tevething seemed so natural, Henny retuned to Holland fra shot ine to wexp up te far’ afi, and continued to send Christmas ards the neighbors. Khan aio stayed in touch, and let his finds know that Fe had taken anew jb in his own county. A litle hush-bush, perhaps, But clear a big ob “I was happy that he got the job in Pakistan,” one of is closet Suteh colleagues recalled. °T had insisted slready for several years that he should Tetum to Pakistan because T sw his future more in Pakitan thn it Holland” Ievase Dr. Khan From Ali Multan in Islamic be Candu te itvas wid But Mt far more onsidere the Paris about, wh "The Pe Acordin, Bhutto's would ts Taser and reprocess At this somethin were sho eich ultcent the com ‘The f ‘The Pak about Alectroni Pakistan Fest fou Once seienis tlracen! Islamabe they wo tlacen Both feproces nuclea, In te | alterat to, ancre hail, ‘and only & arousing continued luring the him tothe e asked a centage ober 1975, "new post veentrifuge toanend, 1 from the wn and his ‘neighbor, ‘ends and ssband had other eight >to return 1 March 1, authorities sed. Theit 2 Pakistani crging hi ‘of Khan's the family ‘short time ards to the hat he had But clearly vaest Dutch the should vn than in The Kindly Dr. Khan 181 Iwas only ater that Khan’s fends would come to leatn what the kindly Dr, Khan was cally doing From Ali Bhutto's first meeting with his top scientists under the tent at Multan in 1972, the Pakistanis had seen plutonium as their eases way to the Ilamie bomb. ‘They had a stock of plutonium in the spent fuel fom their Candi reactor at Karachi, andthe reprocessing technology needed to extract itwas widely understood, easly available, and relatively cheap, But Mr. Bhutio and hs scientists had also shown an early interest in the far more dificult and tightly guarded processes of enrichment. "We considered it asa possibility,” recalls Mr. K., the Pakistani official active in the Paris meetings with Libya in 1973. “We wanted to find out what about, what it would mean for us to understand this kind of progr. ‘The Pakistanis pursued their intrest quite openly, especially in France. According to one of the secret aides-mémoires now in our prsesion, Bhutto's scientists asked the French Atomic Energy Commission in 1974 i it would tain some Pakistanis in enrichment know-how, including the new laser and ultracentrifuge technologies. ‘This was atthe time the Pakistanis ‘were concluding their final negotiations with SGN for the Chashma reprocessing plant, and the French refused, Reprocessing, maybe. Enrich ‘At this point, the Bhutto government saw entichment technology as only something to think about. By the summer of 1975, however, the Pakistanis ‘were showing signs of a major new commitment-—to go for ulsacentrifuge entichment as well as reprocessing. And sinee no one was going te build an ultracentrifuge plant for them, they set about building it themselves, buying the components they would need piece by piece "The fret clue came in Angie! 1975, while De, Khao wa silat FDO. ‘The Pakistani Embassy in Brussels wrote to a frm in Holland inquiring about high-fequeney transformers, or inverters. These are sophisticated electronic devices needed to control the spinning of the centifges, and Pakistan's continuing pursuit of them would leave a tal from Holland to at Teast four other counties over the course ofthe next five yeas. ‘Once Dr. Khan returned to Pakistan inthe fall of 1975, Bhutto and his scientists set out on a crash program. They would start with a small ‘ultracentrifuge pilot plant in the town of Sila, «fw miles south and eat of Islamabad. Then, » bi farther down the road atthe litle ilage o® Kahuta, they would build 2 massive industrial plant, with ax many a= 10,000 leacentrifage units Both Sihala and Kahuta ae vstually in the backyard of Pinsteck, with ite reprocessing pilot plant, all of which gives the Islamabad area a fcridable “nuclear atk.” In retrospect, the new scheme was amazingly audacious. I: was an alternative incase the French pulled out of Chashma, as they later tried to do, and a way to get nuclear explosive material unhamperee by any182 PAKISTAN international agreements. None of the IAEA safeguards would apply tothe Sihala or Kahuta projets, since the Pakistanis have never declared the tristence ofthe faites to the IAEA, and thus none of the enrichment ‘equipment could be subject to international controls The Pakistanis called their new initiative Project 706, and as with the reprocessing program, it was under the overall supervision of the Pakistan ‘Atomic Energy Commission and its chief, Munir Ahmed Khan. Butta alo brought in the military's Special Works Organization to oversee the construction at Kahuta and to help withthe purchases. Fresh for the fel De. Abdul Qadeer Khan took charge of the new Engineering Research Laboratory, where he worked on the design ofthe new ultracentrifuge and also put together a shopping list ofthe components needed to build them, For Dr. Khan, no relation to his new boss, Munir Khan, this was a dream come true, He had already shown that he was quick and resourceful, Now he ‘would prove that he could handle one ofthe Third World's most ambitious cngineering projects, building lite Almelo in Pakistan, “He had a good setup, a good organization,” explained his old mentor, Profesior Brabers, who visited Khan in Pakistan. “He could choose the people he realy wanted, He knew who the good people were. He gave them good salaries 20 they would nat want to lave the job. “Also in buying equipment, he knew all the companies; he knew so many people abroad in many countries,” Brabers continued. “Why, he knew so many languages, and he is so charming [that] he managed to buy many things that ther Pakistanis would not manage to buy ‘Mach of the buying itself el toa network headed by a superb man in the field, Mr. S. A. Butt. One of the participants at the orginal meeting in Malian, Butt had caught Ali Bhutto's eye when he jumped up and shouted that the bomb could be built in thee years. He was obviously wrong but his enthusiasm won favor, and in July 1975, he was posted to the Pabistani [Embassy in Brussels, in charge of science and technology. Tn Brusels, and ltr in Pais, But spent much of his time working onthe reprocessing side with Belgonucléaire and SGN. At the same time he abo became the chief purchasing agent in Europe forthe items on Dr, Khan's shopping list, and was almost certainly the man responsible forthe inuiry about inverters in Holland in August 1975, ar froma super secret band of smugglers, But and his colleagues pursued theie purchases in a surprisingly open way, at east at the start of thee buying campaign, Butt and some of the others were accredited diplomats. They swotked out ofthe Pakistani Erbasis or offices linked to them. ‘They told many of the suppliers what they were buying the components for, They ‘made no secret of thie requests. But in so doing they acted with a blatant dstegard for the various national and international agencies that were supposed to be stopping the spread of dangerous nuclear technologies, The buying campaign began in eamest in 1976, following the itil inguiies the year Before, and the Pakistanis made one ofthis fist tps i Switzerlan during ext “The bu of Haag 0: Technik, valves, Vi The Pa high-vacu VAT frst with | answered inchading London ¢ exported 1 not. High centage ‘The va London € ot “nue Rules valves, The p ws. “The, Well p Switzera they foun sisificat ents entrifug ‘The P wanted it thd not | problem “Wen regulation on the 1 Festition Me Wply tothe ated the srichment with the = Pakistan hutto abso versee the “the fed, Reseatch ifages and 1W them, ssa dream, AL Nowhe ambitious 4 mentor, hase the fave them, ws0 many ve knew 20 buy many san in the neeting in ad shouted srg bt hi e Pakistani king onthe ime he aso Dr. Khan's he inguiry ses pursued heir buying nats. They ‘They told for, They hha blatant that were otis. ‘the intial inst stops in The Kindly Dr. Khan Switzerland. Their reception could not have been warmer, as we learned during extensive investigations in 1980. ‘The buyers—three sill unnamed Pakistanis—went fst tothe litle town ‘of Haag on the border with Liechtenstein, to afr called Vakuum Apparat ‘Technik, or VAT. A widely known manufacturer of highly specialized salves, VAT exports to nuclear and other industries all over the wold ‘The Pakistanis were astonishingly ank Would VAT supply them with bigh-vacwum valves fora centifuge enrichment plant? 'VAT was happy to oblige. As a good Swiss frm, however, they checked first withthe government in Berne to see ifsuch a sale was permited. Berne answered by the book. ‘The bureaucrats sent VAT a list ofthe regulations, inching the “tiger lst” lid down by the nuclest exporting naticns inthe London Club. Complete centrifuge units were listed, and could only be ‘aported to safeguarded facilities, which the Pakitan enrichment plant was fot. High-vacuum valves were not listed, even if expresly intend for a centifuge enrichment unit ‘The valves might be necessary to the centfuge, But, inthe logic ofthe London Club list, they were not pat ofthe centifige tit ite. They were not “nuclear sensitiv,” and did not diretly separate the two diferent uranium isotopes, uranium 235 and uranium 238, Rules are rules, especialy to the Swiss, and VAT sold the Pakistanis the salves “The parts for Pakistan were not eruial components,” a VAT oficial told vs, “They were not parts for isotope-separation equipment.” ‘Well pleased with the robust and businesslike attitude toward fre trade in ‘Switzerland, the Pakistanis went next tothe picturesque Chur Valley, where they found a new firm called CORA Engineering. This time the Pakistanis vere not talking about minor pants They wanted major compunent—a ‘psilication and solidification unit o feed uranium hexafluoride gi into the Centrifuges, and then to transform it back into @ solid at the end of the centrifuge proces ‘The Pakistanis told CORA exactly what they wanted, and what they wanted it for, and CORA checked with Bere. Once agtin the London Chub had not listed the item as nuclear sensitive, and once agin Beme sw no problem in the sale “We made sure we were not violating any existing agreements and existing tegulations,” CORA's Rudolf Walt told us, in an interview later broadcast fon the BBC. “We were told this [sale would not touch any of these testrctons. Infact, that it wouldn't even need an export permit.” Mr, Walti knew, as did officials in Berne, that the Pakistanis needed the CORA unit for the centrifuges to enrich uranium, Without it, the ‘eitfuges would not work. But Walti vas not troubled, "We ate not producing revolves or cannons, and we ate not producing bots,” he argued. “We ae not involved in nucleat weapons in any respec, because we wouldn't even know how ta make a nuclear weapon.”184 PAKISTAN M. Poincet, at SGN in France, had said almost the same ting in defending the sale ofthe eprocesing plant to Pakistan, Only Mr, Walt at CORA, was even more emphatic. “There comes really a question 9f nuts and bolts,” he insisted. "What can lead to a nuclear weapon? That i the ‘question, of course. Nuts and bolts ean lead to a nuclear weapon, So where do you draw the line?” For Mr. Walti and his firm, the answer was easy, ad inthe suramer of 1978, CORA Engineering completed the “nuts and bolt,” Elboratly esighed and carefully engineered, the gasifation and soidfcaien unit was one of the largest single components that the Pakistanis ordered in Europe, and it took thee specially chartered Hercules C130 transport planes to ly the completed plant to Pakistan, ‘The Pakistani buying campaign also showed up big and brazen in Holland, where Dr. Khan knew many of the supplies: personally. As in Switzedland, the purchases appear to have stated seriously in 1976, following the inital inquiry on inverters the year before, and most of the 1own orders were for specialized tubes and steel ‘The obvious stating point was Khan's old employers FDO, though their ‘exact ole remains a mystery, We know that a member of the FDO staf went to Pakistan on an unspecified mission in September 1976. The follwing June, two of Khan’s Pakistani colleagues returned the vst, They trough with'them a letter from Khan asking for spate parts and certain data om the ultracentifuge process. On Khan’s behalf the two Pakistanis supgetad that they could arrange a tip to Pakistan for one of the FDO staf, and possibly rake it worth his while financially. ‘The Pakistanis also suggested that another of Khan's excolleagues might come along, In the event, FDO apparently discouraged the ides, andthe two Dutchmen declined the kind offer, The Pakistanis got a much better response from a second compan, Van Domne Transmissie, and in 1976, the placed an initial order fr tabes of specially hardened steel. Ds. Kham himself showed up at Van Doone the following year, and raised the order to 6,500 of the special tubes. This was 2 staggering amount and worker at the company began to eal it "the Pakistan Pipeline. ‘The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs got wind of the order, and one of its officials came tothe plant. He was tld that the tubes were for we in a Pakistan ultracentrifuge process and unlike the Swis, the Dutch authorities fold Van Doome to stop. But the government could nat invoke any specific export regulation against the tubes, and Van Doorne went ahead with the bulk ofthe order, shiping out the last consignment in September 1972, The ‘otder was just too big to turn down, even atthe risk of government het. ‘The Pakistanis aso placed orders with other Dutch firms for aluminum tubes, and in the spring of 1977, at a meeting of the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 2 Dutch engineer reportedly. showed some amazed Indian scientists a photocopy of an enormous Pakistani over for almost tipo te worth in it Inany the prob’ power, 1 neither | Theb the Pakis the cour niles fe secrete January Organi: in Bonn One Leybold technol for gas 5 license Spiegel 1 A see reported some IC plans su cleat “Mis Der Spi thatthe the job without believed turned centichm The f Comin Butt, iy ‘explain The | ‘guivale been ne Hem and het Te neething Wal, at on of nuts That isthe So where summer of Elabortely cation unit otdered. in 0 transport brazen in ally. Asin in 1976, rot ofthe ough theie Dtalf went « following vey brought data onthe ‘ested that ind possibly gested that went, FDO ved the kind pany, Van for tubes of Doone the This was a he Pakistani and one of for use ina Ihauthortes | any specific sad with the 21979, The ent hostility rr aluminum ‘nal Atomic howed. some snk onder for ‘The Kindly Dr. Khan 185 martensitic ste, an alloy so hard and strong and expensive that itis used limes exclusively for jet plane engines and gas centrifuges. It was an obvious tip-off to Pakistani plans, but no one—not even the Indiane—thought it north informing the authorities or asking for an official investigaticn to stop it In any case, to whom would they have been able to turn? That was one of the problems. The international agencies such as the IAEA had no policing power, And selling the martensitic stel was not in and of ise! llega, ‘either internationally nor in any ofthe individual Western natiors “The buying campaign in West Germany was even more shadow, though the Pakistanis thought it impostant enough to havea special buying office in the country. This was ina smal village called Watchberg-Pech, some twenty miles from the Pakistani Embassy in Bonn, and it was headed by an sccredited Pakistani diplomat called Ika ul-Haq Khan, who set ua shop in January 1977, This Mr, Khan was from the militay’s Special. Works (Organization, and worked closely with « Minister a the Pakistani Embassy in Bonn, Mr. Abdul Waheed ‘One of the few known supplies in Germany was a firm in Hanay, Leybold Heraeus. One of the world’s foremost manufactures of vacuum technology, the company sold the Pakistanis vacuum pumps and equipment for is purification, ata cost of 6 million deutschmarks. No special export license was required, and the firm later told the German magazine Der Spiegel that the equipment “could be bought anywhere.” ‘second company—Aluminium Walzwerke of Singen—supplicd a reported 40 million deutschmarks of material, inching rolled rods and some 10,000 small aluminum pars specially welded according te detailed plans supplied by the Pakistanis. None of it was on any “banned” list of huelesr equipment "Mie af thee arts cannot he [prevent "« company seaman tod Der Spiegel. “Export busines i not equipped to do that.” He pented out thatthe pals could be used ina variety of nonnuclear items, and vas not the job of his company to investigate the Final use of standard items sold without restriction throughout the world. Several other German firms are believed to have supplied the Pakitani centrifuge projec, but at lest one tured them down. ‘This was a firm that also acted at an agent for tntichment services fiom the Soviet Union, RobstofBinfuh, ‘The finn's president, Alfred Hempel, said that the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission intially contacted him by telex dicey from Islamabad, Mr Butt, in Paris, then followed up with thtee ot four telephone call, ‘explaining that he was acing on the Atomic Energy Commission’ behalf ‘The Pakistanis wanted ten to fieen tons of uranium yellow-cake, of an equivalent amount in the form of uranium hexafluoride, which weuld have been ned only for the enrichment plant Hempel knew where to find the yellaw-cake, That was in South Aca, and he teleed his contacts thereto sce what was available, At the same time, The needed to get permission to sell the uranium and got in touch with186 PAKISTAN German governmental authorities in Bonn to se ifthe deal was al ight It was “no” all the way around. Bonn forbade the delivery because Pakistan ad never signed the Nonproliferation Treaty and Germany's interational agreements required that uranium yellow-cake—unlile the individual parts of the centfage technology—must be subject to IAEA, monitoring, Sonth Afi trleve hack an ace who the customer was, and ‘when Hempel said Pakistan, the South Aftcan Government refused, “Butt called," Hempel confided, “And he pressed us and asked fer out decision.” The decision had to be no. Mr. Butt would have to find some other way to meet his urgent need for uranium. “The Pakistanis also ran their buying campaign in France, where Mr Bult moved from Belgium in February 1977. As far as is known, most ofthe purchases in France itself were for reprocessing, and only a few fer the ‘enrichment projet (One is especially interesting. The Pakistanis had approached a well-known firm in northem France and arranged to buy as many as 10,000 bellows for the ultracentrifuges. French Customs officials forbade the sale, and accord- ing to one diplomatic source, who cannot be named, the company managed to send part ofthe onde through a frm in Belgium, along with the es to ‘enable the Pakistanis to make the rest themselves But the best-known purchases were in Britain, whete the Pakistanis laced at least three orders, two of them fr those telltale high-frequency inverters ‘These wete the same inverters that the Pakistani Embassy in Brussels had been pursuing in Holland in 1975, and the orders ended up creating sach a for that the press and television from a number of counties came to cover the story ‘The Pakistanis gave th job of buying the inverter to a British subject of Indian Muslim origin called Abdus Salam. This isnot the Abdus Salam who won the Nobel Prize in physics, but a small businessman living comfortably in north London. A British official we checked with told us this Salar w also an old fiend of Ds. Abul Oadeet Khan, Stating at the end of 197, Salam set up a series of new companies, among them Weargate Le, The companics were never much more names, and in at Teast four of them, Salam had the same British partner, a engineer fom South Wales called Peter Griffin Salam and Griffin fist showed up on the Pakistani circuit with an order for thity inverter, "This was in 1977, and the order went to.a Bitsh subsidiary ofthe giant American frm Emerson Electric, which shippcd the inverters tothe Pakistan Army’ Special Works Organization in Rawalpindi in August 1978. The invoice went to Weargate in Britain For reasons that are fill not clear, the Pakistanis placed the order through commission agent in Leonberg, West Germany—Team_Industies According to'Team’s Mr. Pf, he had been contacted by the Pakistanis in Paris, alos certainly Mr, Butt, who had tld him that Pakistan needed the inverters for the kind of centrifigs used in textile pant The Pal conde with inverter. Sates, the ss confirm The Ame interventic Aid accept ‘forme ciehmes convinced sophisica! cases unt fist ship Tong lst c this mean went dow Stil, the thi when a dan "Was supped contig ‘What export be Alla the tease “Thes those or Petha ‘lun 1 ‘mention labor a same fr have lea Inaw and he Ms, Te ‘One The ex shipped the CoSerra’ calike the to TARA vas, and od sd for our Find some = Mr, Butt vost of the ov for the sell-known bellows for nnd accord managed the dies to anis placed Y inverters russel had ting such a re to cover a subject of Salam who comfortably Salam was companies, more than patter, an ith an order toa British shipped the «Rawal der through 1 Industries. Pakistanis in ss needed the The Kindly Dr. Khan 187 ‘The Pakstanis—through Team and. Weargate—placed two additonal orders wth Emerson in Britain, including one for about sixty high-Fequency inverters. The Pakistanis also approached an Emerson plant in the United Slates, the company’s Industrial Contols Division in Santa Ana, California, 48 confirmed to us by a company spokesman during the summer of 1981 ‘The American division refused to accept the onder, posubly at the intervention of the American Government. But Britain's Emerson Electric id accept, Did they know what the inverters were for? ‘A founer engineer al the Bits anti Swindon tld ws that anyone who was anyone in the firm would assume that the inverters were for uranium cnvichment. But they were not overly concemed because they were convinced that the Pakistanis would never know how to aperte such sophisticated equipment, and that the inverters would all itin thet packing cases until they rusted away. This was the atitde wil afew days after the fist shipment reached Pakistan, when Emerson received a telex requesting a long lst of extremely complex modifications. As the enginecr destibed this meant another Anglo-Saxon prejudice about Pakistani “incompetence” went down the drain, Stl, the Emerson plant filled the fist two orders, and would have filled the third except for an unexpected intervention. This came in July 1978, when a leading Labor Party Member of Parliament, Mr. Fran Allaun, raised an embarassing question in the House of Commons. “Was the Brith Gavernment aware that the frm Emeron Electric had supplied Pakistan with a quantity of special inverters for diving ultra cenfrifages in a uranium-enrichment plan” he asked. ‘What were the inverters to be used for? he wanted to know. And had the export been approved by British Customs? Allaun late told the ZDF-Magazin program on German television one of the reasons he was so troubled by the sale “These converter are of the same kind, and have the same frequency, as those ordered by the British Atomic Energy Authority,” he explainel. “They are unsuitable asa contol system in a testi factory.” Perhaps the most interesting, and least known, part of the story is how Allaun learned ofthe Emerson orders. Allaun will not say. But some reports ‘mentioned that a worker fom the Emerson plant approached him duting & labor dispute, while the London Observer suggested thatthe infermation came from the Israels, though no one has suggested how the Israels would have learned about it. In any case, Allaun has along history of interest in nuclear disarmament, and he pressed the issue with the like-minded Minster of Energy athe time, Mr. Tony Benn, who instigated a full-scale investigation One of the fits things the investigation found was especially diturbing. ‘The export of the inverters was completely legal, and Emmerson actually shipped the first of them tothe Pakistanis after Allaun raised the question in the Commons. The three months the Government took to exarine the188 PAKISTAN problem enabled the shipment to be made, The British then added high Frequency inverters to the export contiol list, which effectively stopped Emerson fiom supplying Pakistan with any more of them, "In the end we used the trading powers under the embargo procedure that we had in onder to stop this apparently quite innocent sae of inverters which were clay intended forthe purpose of building the Pekan nub,” Benn later explained to the Canadian Broadeasting Corporation’ Fifth Estate ‘We aced in a way that was right and proper,” Benn concluded. “But Ihave sot of feclng it wasn't effective, and that what President Bhutto begs and President Zia continued is going tobe, iit in already, a muclear weagon in Pakistan,” Benn’s pessimism is easly understood. ‘The new regulation was enly ‘one-shot remedy. The Pakistanis continued to shop in Britain for other, non- prohibited tems for their centifge project, and the British were forced to expand their export regulations twice in the opening months of 1979—fast to stop the export of inverter parts and sub-assemblis, and then to prohibit the sale of any pats or equipment specially designed forthe centifige process. ‘The clever Pakistanis were staying a step ahead ofthe game by buying the individual parts and assembling more and more ofthe equipment themuelves in Pakistan ite Fora the difficulties, Allauns question in the Commons stated the ball rolling. ‘Tony Benn’s investigation uncovered much of what the Pakistani network was trying to buy in Britain. The British talked to ther partners in Urenco and the London Club, who began their own investigation. ‘The ‘media followed after. In time, the new interest would pose the fist significant challenge tothe Pakistani enrichment project. ‘The ease ofthe Emerson inverters signaled the fist public recognition that the Pakistanis were pursuing enrichment as well as reprocessing asa way to rnuclear weapons. Yet the Pakistanis had been openly inquiring about centrifuge equipment since 1975, nearly three yeas before, and various government agencies in Western Europe had done litle to stop them ort spread the word about what they were doing. In short, security was appalling, and the intemational guidelines ef the London Club woefully inadequate. Here was one of the most dangerous nuclear technologies, and the Pakistanis were buying it onthe open market barely bothering to mask what they wete doing. Thei tail was everywhere no one had shown any interest in following it The bigest scandal was in Holland, where the new publicity in ealy 1979 Finally opened up the story of Dr. Khan. What sectets had the Pakistan taken? And how had he gotten away so easily? There was plenty of blame to go around, Urenco blamed FDO for biting Khan, FDO blamed the Ministry of Economie Asis, which had approved Khan's security clearance. ‘The Ministry blamed. Urenco for not informing the intemal security service about Khan's repeated visits to the Almelo lant And the Dutch internal security service blamed the Dutch overseas intlligen intention “The { responsib ioumalist passing is Interior.” “The by oficial C The lang clear eno ‘tho Bngincer tllracent report re regulatio to Pakist ho prose Ta the Beitr owe wh 1975, w others Pakistan Israel Begin s Dutch p tw tal from Be formal 8 Begin received atiudes Only erptus invited Urenco themsel Reproce But came fr took the Asin the exp exporeMed high. 'y stopped cedure that, ters which nb,” Benn ft Betae, ‘But Ihave began and weapon in was only 4 ather, non: e foreed to 79—fist to rohit the ge proces, buying the themselves ted the ball Pakistani partners in tions. ‘The ce the ft ion that asa way 10 iting about ind various them oF lines of the dangerous yen market, sverywhere »eatly 1979, ve Pakistani for hiring Hd approved informing snelo plant hy overseas The Kindly Dr. Khan 189) intelligence service for not making «proper astessment of Pakistan's intentions from the beginning "The fact is that in the Hague every responsible authority is shoveling responsibilty for this onto someone else,” recalled one ofthe frst Dutch journalists on the story, An Salomonson of NRC Handelsblad, The buck- passing is particularly bad between the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Tnterio.” ‘The buck passing continued, and the Dutch Parliament finally set up an ‘ficial Commission of Inquiry, which issued its report in the spring of 1980 The language was careful tothe point of tedium. But the conclasion was cleat enough. “Although no absolute proof is forthcoming, i is accepted .. that Engineer Dr. Khan has been able to assist Pakitan in acquiring esental ulkracentifage know-how,” said the Commission. Rather predcably, the report recommended a tightening up of security, tightening up of export regulations, and the possible prosecution of Dutch firs that have exported to Pakistan’ So far there have been some changes in export regulations, but no prosecutions. In the meantime, Hollands fiends and allies were reacting sharply. Britain and West Germany—the other partners in Urenco—anted to know why Holland had not bought the Khan aff other attention back in 1975, when suspicions ist arose. Or in 1976 and 1977, when FDO and thers told Dutch authorities about Khan's centrifuge project back in Pakistan, Israel was even angrier. In January 1979, Prime Minister Menachem Begin sent his Dutch counterpart a strongly worded letter. Why had the Dutch permitted the nuclear sales to Pakistan? And what steps would they now take to stop them? The Dutch promised to investigate. Under presure from Begin and the other nations’ queries and protests, they isued their formal study in the spring of 1980, as noted eal. Begin also raised a specter that later proved real—that the Pakitanis had received funds for their nuclear project fom Libya's Colonel Qude, whore attitudes toward the Jewish state and the West need no elaboration, Only the French seemed secrety delighted at Holland's plight. The Perpetual odd man out in the Western nuclear word, they had not been invited to join Urenco, and were now happy to see the Dutch and theie Urenco partners carry the can for giving Pakistan the bomb. Tre French themselves had just taken the heat for their role in the Chashma Reprocessing Plant. Theit attitude now was, "Don't blame us. Blame them,” But the stongest response to both the Emerson ease and the Khan Asc came from the United States, where the Carter Adminstration once again took the lead in trying to stop the nuclear spread As in Britain, the fist problem Washingln faced was to ty to tghten up the export regulations, which was not as easy as it might seem. American exporters do not like restrictions or added paperwork any more than do theit190 PAKISTAN European competitors, and the Department of Commerce and other busines-minded bureaueras dragged their fet before adding any new items to the control list, specially where the pats or equipment had both conventional and nuclear applications In theory, the solution was easy: Define the items requiring special export licenses in the tightest terms posible. ls yratce tat exeated new probes By specifying a special variation of an otherwise standard industal pret, the Americans would be telling a wouldcbe nuclear nation exactly what it ‘might need to get the bomb ‘ALS. State Department official explained to us that the international consultations requited to establish permissible and nonpermissbl items in itself created delays, 9 that i is likely that some essential equipment di get ‘hough to Pakistan, including some ofthe high-frequency inverters, ‘Toying to put their own house inorder, the Americans also tried te find ‘out just what the Pakistanis had bought and where This wasn pat a je for the Cental Intelligence Agency, a well as for intelligence and security services throughout Wester Europe, The picture thatthe spooks Finally put together from all the bits and pieces Roored even the most experienced analysts. While Washington had been pressuring Pars over French help fot the reprocessing plant at Chashma, the Pakistanis had been buying an ‘enormous variety of parts and equipment for the ultracentrifuge plait at Kahita. According to one Washington insider, Mr, Butt and his network thad managed to get at least one of almost everything they would need, hile buck in Pakistan the kindly Dr. Khan was rapidly developing the eapability to reproduce what could no longer be bought Pakistan's purchases challenged everything Washington had been trying to do through the London Club, especially as some governments were using the London Club guidelines as an exeuse to sel tothe Pakistanis. fa partieular Piece of equipment was not listed, these governments would permit eit companies to expot it, even ifthe bureaucrats and businessmen both Inew that it was going to Kahuta, Quite naturally, the Americans expected everyone else to follow the spirit of the guideline, even if the Americans themselves obeyed only the letter ofthe la, In American eyes, the worst offenders were the Swiss, and in easly 1979, Washington sent a strong diplomatic note to Bee. The Americans were most concemed about two shipments—the high- vactum valves from VAT and the gasification and solidification unit fom CORA Engineering, Both firms were keping resident engineers in Pakistan, advising and providing postsale servicing, and Washington feared that CORA would sell the Pakistanis a second gasification and solidification unit, which they still needed for Kahuta. The An ther firms, including one, Sulzer Bros., that was supplying limited technology tothe reprocessing side ofthe Pakistan program. In line with the general approach in Washington, the note to Bene caried with it the implied threat that the Americans might cut of shipments rican not also menticned of envich send any “The ne Ina play found th periphery Te wae “special the gray ‘They ha unit was diferent Zanga promptly rear bae cexprese: Washing they eon The / Pakistan The Ru Afghani govern the Paki ‘Ava Patistan aay fc Novem aictong, Aiplom: The! the we oven thatthe and the The Pakistan Warrer conseqrand other new items had both cial export problem, A product, Ay what it ternational Te items in cent did et ied to find atta job for ad security finally put sxperienced ctr help for buying an se plant at nis netork eed, while spability to en trying to reusing the a particular vetmit thet both knew as expected ‘Americans cay 1979, the high unit from in Pakistan, feared that mentioned “ing Timited ste to Beme shipments The Kindly Dr. Khan 191 of enriched uranium to Switzerland, oF delay permission forthe Swiss to send any spent reactor fuel of American origin for reprocessing. ‘The note created great resentment in Berne, as did the thee. The Swiss Jnad played by the rues, and now the Americans were tying to pillory them, ‘We got the story straight from the man now in charge, Dr. Claude Zangget, the Deputy Director of the Federal Energy Office and. the chairman ofthe international committee that had drawn up the fst “trigger Tis” even before the London Club, “nthe spring of 1979 we made an inquiry,” Dr. Zangger tld us. “We found that what was being imported was not on the list. It was on the periphery. There was no legal basi for us to deny a license to export.” Ie was the old problem. The Swiss exports were not on the lit, and not “specially designed forthe cenufuge enrichment proces. "VA" is outside the gray area ofthe nuclear lis,” Zangger told us, "VAT produces valves ‘They have a catalogue, and the ready-made parts come off the shelf. CORA's Uunit was alo “a conventional process. They are making this for many Afferent uses. I's not part ofthe nuclear sensitive proces, Zangger disclosed that Berne sent this clarification to. Washington promptly. He believed that Washington “accepted” it, because he did not hear back from Washinglon immediately om hie reply. Americar diploma expressed to us their surprise that Zangger would draw a conclusion that Washington was “satisfied” with the Swiss response, and the Arericans sy they continued to press the Swis for clarifications ‘The Americans alo pressured the Pakistanis diectly, At this juncture, Pakitan was gaining fresh importance in Washington's strategie thinking ‘The Russians appeared to be winning new influence in neighboring Aighanistan, where a coup in April 1978 had brought = Communist government to power, and with the weakening and fall ofthe Shahin Ian, the Pakistanis looked lke the only available bastion in South Asi, Asa resul, there was great pressure in Washington not to confont the Pakistanis too openly on their nuclear program, but rather to wean them vay from it with offers of aid. In October 1978, Washington resumed the economic aid that it had cut off the year before because of Chashma, In November, the Americans offered fifty Northrop F-5 fighter, equipped with sirto-ground missiles, And there wee also offers of eivlan mule aid and diplomatic support for Islamabed in its dealings with In The theory was thatthe Pakistanis were going nuclear primarily because of the weakness of Westem guarantees to help defend them gains the overwhelming military power ofthe Indians. But by 1979 the Palistais felt that they hed already put extensive groundsvork into their nuclear program, and the Americans were offering fr too litle to matke them give it up ‘The Americans showy changed their mind, deciding to presare the Pakistanis by cutting ff aid. In easly March 1979, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Islamabad to wa the Pakistais of the consequences of continuing their nuclear quest. The fllowing month, on192. PAKISTAN April 6, Washinglon announced that it had eut off further economic subsidies to Pakistan, ‘This amounted to a cut of nearly $40 million in the current year, and another $45 millon in the nex. “U.S. laws tequite countries importing armaments components for aomic installations not subject to international security contols to be deprived of development funds,” Stato Department zpolesman Tom Reston anriownce in a formal statement, “Our information is that Pakistan is developing a centrifuge for the enrichment of uranium. In the long tern this might give Pakistan a nuclear weapon capabily, This would pose a difficult problem, and make fora grave situation, According to our laws, we have decged to cut back significantly on development ad to Pakistan.” ‘The timing could hardly have been more dramatic. The Pakistani cous had predictably found former Prime Minister Bhutto gully of eonspircy to ‘utd and in the face of appeals for clemency by nearly every wold leader fiom Jimmy Carter to Colonel Qaddafi, General Zia ulsHag had ordered Bhutto hanged on April 4, only two days before. ‘The father ofthe Islamic Bom, Bhutto died convinced that his overthrow hhad been engineered by the American Cental Intelligence Agency, and that the takeover by General Zia had brought about the stoppage ofthe Pista nuclear program. Pakistan, he thought, would henceforth be defenseless before the Indian nuclear threat. As he wrote in his lat politcal testament ftom prison, “What diference does my life make now when [ can imagine cighty million of my counteymen standing under the nuclear cloud of a defenseless sky?” ‘Bhutto's assessment of Zia was inaccurate. Zia was continuing the neclat bomb program. Only two days after Bhutto died largely for what he bel ved was the nuclear cause, the United States cut off aid to hie executioner for pursuing the same Islamic bomb that Bhutto believed had been stopped with his own overthro ‘A spokesman for the Pakistan Foreign Ministy claimed the Amescans had singled out Pakistan because they believed wrongly, he insisted—that the Pakistanis might develop nuclear dviees for the Muslim World to use against the Israeli ‘Over the following months, Washington continued the pressure, appoint ing a special task force to consider new options for stopping the Pakistani ‘nuclear program, or at least slowing it down, ‘The task force was headed by Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, and it suggested a series of eatrot-andtick ‘options that became public in midsummer. ‘One option was to try again to wean the Pakistanis away from nuclear ‘weapons by beefing up their conventional defenses, this time with the afr of the more advanced F-16 aircraft in plae ofthe old F-5 ‘A second option was to use the stick of strict economic. sanctons, ‘esricting private American investment in Pakistan and blocking, World Bank and other international loans, AA thitd option was the most surprising, and would have created great pesto paramiltn possibility 12, 1978, There is anything r Pakistanis the Amer installed F ithe the Probabl other key tension th Tn late} Ariving ae Tater insist mob srt Govern: ep their A few Sherwell suburb on and beat prosecute Tn the They di Thoug) thatthe « Khan's that have loth tothe We Stories of Yet sor reported been ork int ot his wi But # treatmen alieady ¢lion in the for atomic deprived of| announced sweloping a might give leprobiem, decided to stan courts snspiracy to vor leader ‘ad ordered s overthrow vy, and that te Pakistani defenseless 1 testament an imagine cloud of the muclat he believed stioner for ‘opped with Americans sisted thal ‘orld to use «6, appoint ve Pakistani ‘headed by otand-stick fom nuclear the offer of sanctions king’ Work ceated great The Kindly Dr. Khan 198 presure on the Pakitanis—the use of covert operations, induding 2 paramilitary attack to disable the Kahuta enrichment plant. When this ibility of covert action was published by The New York Times cn August 12, 1979, the Slate Department immediately denied that it had ever been considered ‘There is no evidence that Washington ever considered such an attack as anything more than an option, or that it was a all taken seriously. But the Pakistanis took the possiblity very seriously indeed, and formally ptested to the American Ambassador in Islamabad. At about this time they also installed French Crotale missiles at Kahuta to deer any sugical antikes by cither the Americans, the Indians, or the Israels Probably more tothe point, the Pakistanis also surrounded Kuta and ather key locations with plainelothes security men, and with the growing tension throughout the country, this led to a series of very nasty incidents In late July, the French Ambassador and one of hi First Secretaries were driving along the road to Kahuts—just to sce a nearby historical site, they later insisted, As they drove past the high walls ofthe entichment plant, ‘mob surrounded the car and severely beat both men. The Pakistan Government later apologized. But the message was clear: Foreigner should cep thei distance from any of the county’ muclear faites, ‘A few days later, in August, a young British jourmalst named Chis Sherwell tied to interview Abdul Qadeer Khan at his home in a garden suburb on the outskirts of Islamabad. A small group of men jumped Sherwell tnd beat him rather badly. ‘The Pakistani Government then threatened to prosecute the journalist, and he was forced to leave the county. Inthe words of an editor on Sherwell’s newspaper, the Financial Times, “They did very professional job on him,” ‘Though unteported, we learned from the British Embassy in blamabad thatthe son of a British diplomat was also attacked while passing in font of Khan's house on the way toa party, and thete are stories of similar incidents that have never received any publicity ln the meantime, Khan himself remained a man of mystery, unevailable to the Wester press that had suddenly discovered one of the great epionage stories of the nuclear age. He was always guarded tghty by Pakistani security Yet some of those who knew Khan best did manage to see him, en they reported that Dr, Khan remained the same genial person he hac alvays been, “Iles now dhe normal house father, recalled his old mentor, Hrotessor Brabers, who visited him in Islamabad, “He likes to do the cooking and to the garden. He has tomatoes and even peanut. He likes to tke care ‘of his wife and his two nice children,” But there were signs that Khan was beginning to grow bitter at his treatment in the hands of the Wester media, where majot stoves had slready appeared in Der Spiegel and the London weekly, 8 Days. A heroin194 PAKISTAN Pakistan, Dr, Khan had become an archvillin in Burope, and he ddd not Tike that at al “Wester joummalism takes pride in false and malicious repertng ‘specially when it coves the developing counties,” he wrote in a fascinating and wholly unexpected letter tothe German magizine Der Spiegel, as he tried to vindicate his ations to those who blackened his name unjustly, he claimed. “The intensity is enhanced when it deals with Muslim counts, T want to question the bloody holier-than-thow atitudes ofthe Americans and the British,” he continued. “These hastards are God-eppointed guard. ians ofthe world to stockpile hundreds of thousands of nuclear warheaes and have the God-given authority of earying out explosions every month. But if we start a modest program, we are the Satans, the devils, and all the journalists consider it a crusade to publish fabricated and malicious stries.”| Yet the facts are clear enough, ‘The Pakistanis Know thatthe goal of ‘Wester companies isto profit bythe sale of thee products. The marketplace does not ask them to analyze theit customers’ motives, Neither, in most ceases, do their governments We soon discovered, in the course of our investigation, exactly what the Pakistanis had seen previously. ‘The regulations and agreements that exit among Western countries to block the sale of "dangerous nuclear tech- nologies" can be easily cizcumvented. The sytem of safeguards and coutrols ishopetesly vulnerable, easly evaded, and badly defined—many ofthe pats for uranium-enrichment plants could be bought individually on the open market and the regulations would not apply at al Most important, the Pakistanis knew that the mouthines of the diglomats against nuclear peliferation were hollow, The regulations were inadequate, the lst of banned or monitored items incomplete, and there was no senous, ‘comprehensive policing effort to prevent violations ofthe nuclear regulations that did exis, ‘Whether inspired by Satan or Allah Himself, the Pakistanis’ “modest” nuclear program had advanced dramatically in the unexpected direction of tranium enrichment, andthe West had done lite to stop it. Parl, this was because of De. Khan's own skllfal endeavors in geting the plans and the supplir lists forthe needed parts. And partly, we concluded, it was because the community of nations simply did not have a system to prevent nuclear proliferation, It lacked the concerted will, the attention to detail, and the Power of enforcement that would make one work Somcho 1978, th tohelp! The dec policy, Yet'e Embass actually ocume supple suspect SGN Wet Washin ignore p