FIRST DIVISION

SPS. ALBERTO and JOCELYN G.R. No. 157593

AZANA,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
CRISTOPHER LUMBO and
ELIZABETH LUMBO-JIMENEZ,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March 22, 2007
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DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari, spouses Alberto and Jocelyn Azana assail the
decision[1] dated September 17, 2002 and resolution[2] dated March 12, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60973. After a re-evaluation of the
evidence on record, the appellate court held that the trial courts factual findings
were contrary to the evidence presented and, on that basis, reversed the latters
ruling.

Originally, respondents filed an action for quieting of title [3] in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan. The subject matter of the action was a piece of real
property located in the island of Boracay, a prime tourist destination. It was
designated as Lot 64 during the national reservation survey of Boracay on April 14,
1976.
Respondents alleged that they were the owners of Lot 64. They claimed that,
in a deed of absolute sale dated December 1, 1996, the spouses Emilio and Estela
Gregorio sold Lot 64 to petitioners. This cast a cloud over their title.
To support their claim of ownership, respondents stated that Lot 64 was
originally part of the 8.0488-hectare land bought in a public auction by their
parents, which they inherited entirely; that such sale in the public auction was
evidenced by a final bill of sale dated September 18, 1939; that Lot 64 was
separately designated during the national reservation survey only because it was
also being claimed by the spouses Gregorio; and that, if Lots 63 and 64 were
combined, the boundaries of the resulting lot coincided with the boundaries of the
lot purchased under the final bill of sale.
For their part, petitioners claim that they purchased Lot 64 from the spouses
Gregorio in good faith; that the spouses Gregorio became the lawful owners of Lot

64 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale dated March 25, 1976 executed by Ignacio
Bandiola in favor of Estela Gregorio whereby Bandiola transferred to Gregorio a
parcel of land with an area of 3.4768 hectares; and that Lot 64 was part of this
3.4768-hectare land.
According to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, respondents failed to establish the identity
of the lot sold under the final bill of sale. Consequently, their claim of title over Lot
64 also had to fail. In the words of the court a quo:
Assaying the evidence presented by the parties in relation to their
respective submissions, the Court noted that the land acquired by
[respondents] parents at the public auction is not solely bounded on the
North and East by [the] Visayan Sea, but also by Anunciacion Gelito and
Guillermo Sualog, respectively. Indeed, [respondents] own survey plan
discloses that Lots 63 and 64 [are] bounded by Lot 62 and seashore.
Hence, it is not clear that the land acquired by [respondents] parents at
an auction sale includes Lot 64. The Court could probably sustain
[respondents] theory if the said land is solely bounded on the North and
East by [the] Visayan Sea or seashore. There would be no space for any
intervening lot.[4] (citations omitted)

Finding equiponderance of evidence[5], the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners

and upheld the validity of the sale of Lot 64 to them.
On review, the CA arrived at a different conclusion. It declared respondents as
owners of Lot 64 and nullified the sale by the spouses Gregorio to petitioners. The

appellate court agreed with respondents that Lot 64 was part of the 8.0488-hectare
property described in the final bill of sale. As opposed to the findings of the trial
court, the appellate court was satisfied that the boundaries of the lot resulting from
the merger of Lots 63 and 64 coincided with the boundaries of the 8.0488 hectare
property. Moreover, the CA noted that the areas of Lots 63 and 64 were 7.0300
hectares and 1.2012 hectares respectively, meaning that the area resulting from the
combination of the two lots was equivalent to 8.0000 hectares, more or less, which
[was] the total area being claimed by the [respondents].[6]
Aggrieved, the spouses Gregorio and the spouses Azana filed in this Court separate
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitions
were separately docketed as G.R. No. 157617 [7] and G.R. No. 157593, respectively.
The Court instantly denied both petitions for essentially raising questions of fact
which are generally beyond our review.
Thereafter, both the Gregorios and petitioners filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. The Court denied the MR[8] of the spouses Gregorio, in effect
denying G.R. No. 157617 with finality.

Meanwhile, the MR of the spouses Azana was granted. As a general rule, it

is not the Supreme Courts function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the

probative value of the evidence presented.[9] The factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts are binding on this Court and are given great weight and respect.
[10]

However, the rule is not absolute. In instances where there is divergence in the

findings and conclusions of the trial court, on one hand, and the appellate court, on
the other, the Court may give the petition due course and re-examine the evidence
on record.[11] Satisfied that the foregoing exception applies to this case, the Court
ordered the reinstatement of G.R. No. 157593 (this petition).
Respondents oppose the petition on the ground that it is already barred by prior
judgment. They argue that the dismissal of the Gregorios petition (G.R. No.
157617) was a final judgment constituting a bar to the institution of a similar
petition.
Respondents position is incorrect. Res judicata calls for the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) there is final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order is
on the merits and (4) there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.[12] Here, the first requisite is absent. The Courts
resolution denying the spouses Gregorios petition is not the final judgment
contemplated by the first requisite. Rather, final judgment entails a decision which

perpetually settles the controversy and lays to rest all questions raised. At that
point, there was no final judgment because the spouses Azanas appeal of the CA
decision was still pending before us. Stated differently, there was yet no final
judgment which could be entered and executed.
We now proceed to consider the documents relied upon by the parties.
To prove their claim, petitioners submitted a deed of absolute sale of real
property[13] dated March 25, 1976 to show that Ignacio Bandiola sold to Estela
Gregorio 3.4768 hectares of land located in Manoc-Manoc, Malay, Aklan. The
property was particularly described as follows:
THE PORTION SOLD CONSISTS of 3.4768 hectares, more or less,
located at the southern side of the whole parcel and with the following
pertinent boundaries: on the North by Visayan Sea and Ernesto Bandiola;
on the East by Visayan Sea; on the South by Felicitas Lumbo, D. Pelayo,
and D. Magapi; and on the West by Teodorica Bandiola. [14]

They also presented the corresponding tax declaration [15] which reiterated the same
property boundaries.
Petitioners point out that a portion of this property was separately declared
for realty tax purposes under ARP/TD No. 93-011-1020/1021 as Lot 64 with an

area of 1.48 hectares.[16] The tax declaration indicated that the boundaries of Lot 64
were:
North: Visayan Sea South: Lot 63
West: lot 99-pt East: Visayan Sea

In the hope of strengthening their case, petitioners narrated the supposed

origin of the disputed property. They claimed that the 3.4768-hectare property was
taken from the consolidated lots owned by Ignacio Bandiola, i.e., three contiguous
parcels of land with individual areas of 8.7766 hectares, 6550 square-meters and
4994 square-meters.[17]From this land mass, Ignacio Bandiola carved out 3.4768
hectares and sold the same to Estela Gregorio. Allegedly, this portion included Lot
64 which Estela Gregorio, in turn, sold to petitioners.
Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners preceding allegations are true, it
follows that Ignacio Bandiolas lots, if taken as one, must have extended to the
Visayan Sea in the east to have roped in Lot 64. It also follows that at least one of
the lots should have the Visayan Sea as its eastern boundary. However, this
conclusion is belied by the tax declarations petitioners themselves presented. Not
one of the tax declarations stated that any of Bandiolas lots was bound in the east
by the Visayan Sea. On the contrary, all the tax declarations stated that each of the
lots was bound in the east by a particular land mass:

Tax Declaration No. 3066

Land Area: 8.7766 hectares
Boundaries: North Visayan Sea
East Lorenzo Lumbo,
Vanancio Maming
West Conchita Tirol, Visayan Sea
South Moises Pelayo, Paula Gelito[18]
Tax Declaration No. 3087
Land Area: 0.6550 hectare
Boundaries: North Visayan Sea
East Felicitas Alag de Lumbo
West Felicitas Alag de Lumbo
South Quirica Lumbo[19]
Tax Declaration No. 3068
Land Area: 0.4994 hectare
Boundaries: North Ignacio Bandiola
East Anunciacion Gelito and
F.A. Lumbo
West Ignacio Bandiola
South Gertrudes Casimero &
Salvador Magapi[20]

Petitioners strained to explain the discrepancy by pointing out that Lot 64 was but
a mere portion of the three parcels of land covered by the [three] tax declarations.
xxx. It [was] therefore, quite unlikely that Lot 64 would have the exact same
boundaries as any or all of these [three] parcels.[21]

We find their explanation wanting. If, indeed, Lot 64 was part of Ignacio Bandiolas
mass of properties it would have been in its south-east corner, occupying part of its
southern and eastern perimeter. [22] Therefore, the parcels of land covered by the
three tax declarations must reflect southern and/or eastern boundaries similar to
those of Lot 64. But, as explained earlier, none of the lots was enclosed or partly
enclosed in the east by the sea. It is highly unlikely that the corner portion of the
mother property would not have similar boundaries as those of the latter on at least
two sides.
The Court is not inclined to pronounce which of the documents presented by
petitioners is true and correct. It is enough to say that the evidence they presented
cast doubt on the validity of their claim. Petitioners failed to establish, by
preponderance of evidence, the exact perimeters of the land which they claim as
their own.
On the other hand, respondents anchor their claim over Lot 64 on a final bill of
sale[23] dated September 18, 1939. Apparently, the document was executed in favor
of Lorenzo and Felicitas Lumbo who bought an 8.0488-hectare property in a public
auction. It stated:
That on September 30, 1937, the real property under Tax Declaration
No. 6523 was forfeited to the Government in the manner and form
prescribed by Act 3995 known as the Assessment Law, for non-payment

of land taxes corresponding to the years 1931 to 1937, inclusive, the

description of which follows:
A parcel of cocal land situated in the barrio of
Manocmanoc, municipality of Buruanga, province of
Capiz, Philippines, having an area of 80, 488 square meters
more or less. Bounded on the North by Visayan Sea; on the
East by the property of Guillermo Sualog and Visayan Sea;
on the South by the property of Moises Pelayo; and on the
West by the properties of Venancio Maming and Lucino
Gelito, and assessed at P1040.00. x x x.[24]

The trial court discredited the final bill of sale by highlighting the fact that the
property bought at the public auction was not solely bound on the north and east by
the Visayan Sea but also by the properties of Anuncion Gelito and Guillermo
Sualog, respectively. With this, the trial court deduced that there was an
intervening space which should not have been there if the lot referred to in the
document included Lot 64. Thus, the final bill of sale must pertain to a different
parcel of land.
We find the trial courts conclusion inaccurate. The Gelito and Sualog properties
were not located between the Visayan Sea and the disputed property. Otherwise,
the tax declarations and final bill of sale would have indicated that the Lumbo
property was solely bound in the north by the Gelito property and in the east by the
Sualog property. A cursory look at the survey map [25] reveals that the perimeter of
the Lumbo property ran along the Visayan Sea and Gelitos property in the north,

and the Visayan Sea and Sualogs property in the east. Naturally, the tax
declarations and final bill of sale included the two properties mentioned as part of
the boundaries of the Lumbo property.
Petitioners underscore the seeming irregularities in the description of the property
under the final bill of sale, a deed of sale dated May 20, 1939 and the tax
declarations for the years 1991 and 1993 in the names of respondents. They posit
that these irregularities negate respondents claim of legal or equitable title and
ultimately justify the resolution of the case in their favor.
A deed of absolute sale[26] was executed on May 20, 1939 between Pantaleon
Maming and the respondents parents, stipulating the sale to the Lumbos of an
approximate area of [five hectares], being a part of the land under Tax No. 6523 in
the name of Pantaleon Maming.[27] Petitioners emphasize the fact that the property
sold under the final bill of sale was the same lot under Tax Declaration No. 6523.
This discrepancy supposedly blurred the identification of the property claimed by
respondents.
We disagree.
The CA sufficiently reconciled the difference in the land areas in the two
deeds:

xxx. It may be asked why there were two deeds of sale covering the
same property. We find credence in [respondents] explanation. The
public auction was held on 13 September 1938 and therefore Pantaleon
Maming had up to 13 September 1939 to redeem the property. Before
the expiration of the period of redemption, Lorenzo Lumbo bought [five]
hectares of the [eight]-hectare property in an attempt, as [respondents]
put it, to persuade Maming not to redeem the property. This can be
inferred from the price of P500.00 he paid for the [five] hectares while in
the auction sale held, he bought the entire 8.0488 hectares for
only P56.78. xxx.[28]

Next, petitioners highlight the tax declarations filed by respondents for the years
1991[29] and 1993[30] covering Lot 63 only. In the absence of contrary evidence, tax
declarations, being official documents, enjoy a presumption of truth as to their
contents. Petitioners contend that, unlike them, respondents never actually declared
Lot 64 as theirs and cannot therefore claim ownership of the property.
Jurisprudence is consistent that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership of the properties stated therein.[31] A disclaimer is even printed on their
face that they are issued only in connection with real property taxation [and]
should not be considered as title to the property. At best, tax declarations are
an indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.[32] However, non-declaration of
a property for tax purposes does not necessarily negate ownership.[33]
From the foregoing, the fact that both tax declarations in the names of respondents
covered Lot 63 only did not necessarily mean they did not own Lot 64 as they were

in fact able to present a document evidencing ownership of both properties the

final bill of sale.
Clearly, respondents have been able to establish by preponderance of evidence that
they are the rightful owners of Lot 64.
When an owner of real property is disturbed in any way in his rights over the
property by the unfounded claim of others, he may bring an action for quieting of
title. The purpose of the action is to remove the cloud on his title created by any
instrument, record, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid and prejudicial to his title.[34]
Here, the deeds of sale executed in favor of petitioners and the spouses Gregorio
were prima

facie valid

and enforceable.

However, further

scrutiny

and

investigation established that petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Ignacio Bandiola,

could not have owned the disputed lot. Consequently, the subsequent conveyances
of Lot 64 to the spouses Gregorio and thereafter, to petitioners, were null and void.
Therefore, respondents, as the adjudged owners of Lot 64, are entitled to have the
aforementioned deeds of sale nullified to remove any doubt regarding their
ownership of the lot.

While the appellate court adequately explained its decision, it failed to

categorically declare the deeds of sale as null and void in its dispositive portion.
Since it is the dispositive portion of the decision which shall be carried out, it is
important that the status of the deeds of sale be clearly stated therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision dated
September 17, 2002 and resolution dated March 12, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that the deed of absolute sale dated
March 25, 1976, in so far as it covers Lot 64, and the deed of absolute sale dated
December 1, 1996 are hereby declared null and void.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice