Vivarium

Volume

12
1974

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
FOR THE
LIFE OF THE
INTELLECTUAL
PHILOSOPHY AND
MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XII 1974

w
E. J. BRILL - LEIDEN

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VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNALFOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE
AGES AND RENAISSANCE

editors

advisory
committee
publishers
published

vivariumis devotedin particular

to the profane side of
and theintellectual
mediaevalphilosophy
lifeoftheMiddle
Ages and Renaissance.
- L. M. de Rijk,(Leyden)- J.Engels,
C. J.de Vogel,(Utrecht)
(Utrecht)- H. A. G. Braakhuis,(Nijmegen)- F. F. Blok,
- J. IJsewijn,(Leuven).
(Amsterdam)
oftheEditorialBoard: Prof.L. M. de Rijk.
Secretary
All communications,
exceptof a businessnature,shouldbe
addressedto C. H. Kneepkens,InstituutvoorLaat Latijn,
Maliestraat7, Utrecht,The Netherlands.
- Tullio Gregory,
Marie-Therse
d'Alverny,(Paris-Poitiers)
Paul
Oskar
Kristeller,
(NewYork) - JanPinborg,
(Rome)
- AlbertZimmermann,
(Cologne).
(Copenhagen)
E. J. Brill,Leiden,The Netherlands.
Twiceyearly,
MayandNovember;ca 160pagesyearly.
submittedto vivarium should be written
Contributions
in English,Frenchor German.The manuscripts
preferably
and doublespaced,exceptforlong
shouldbe typewritten
Adequatemargins(ijinch) should
quotationsand footnotes.
be left at each edge of the sheet. Footnotesshould be
each article.Theymay
numberedcontinuously
throughout
be placedeitherat thefootofthepage or at theend ofthe
text.
receive25 off-prints
free.
Contributors

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CONTENTS

OF VOLUME XII (1974)

EDITORIAL
j. engels
Utrecht
james SHIEL
Brighton,Sussex

Les commentairesd'Ovide au XVIe sicle

Boethiusand Eudemus

I
3
14

richard f. WASHELL Aristotle's Syllogistic: A Medieval View

East Liverpool,Ohio

18

roberto Giacono
Cambridge,Mass.

Masters, Books and Library at Chartres

Accordingto theCartulariesof Notre-Dame
and Saint-Pre
30

Joseph Kupfer
Iowa State Univ.

The Father of Empiricism: Roger not

Francis

52

paul v. spade
Ockham's Rule of Supposition: Two ConIndiana
Bloomington,
flicts in His Theory

63

ELEONOREstump
Cornell Univ.

Boethius's Workson the Topics

L. M. de rij
Leiden

Some Thirteenth
CenturyTractson theGame

j. engels
Utrecht

Thomas Cantimpratensisredivivus....

RPDp. orbn
Utrecht

Anonymi Teutonici commentumin Theodoli eclogam e codice Utrecht,U.B. 292

editum(2)
133

E. j. ASHWORTH
Waterloo,Ontario

"For Riding is Required a Horse": A

Problemof Meaning and Referencein Late
Fifteenthand Early SixteenthCenturyLogic 146

77

94

of Obligation

review

124

173

BOOKS RECEIVED

74, I74

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Editorial

has now been appearing fora littlemore than a decade

and the Editorial Board has taken this opportunityto consider
VIVARIUM
what has been accomplished so far and to make plans for the
future.The intentionexpressed in the editorial to the firstvolume was
that this periodical should illustrate the relationshipof philosophy to
the whole of mediaeval thought and learning- as well, of course, as
the vast fieldof the liberal arts. The past eleven years have shown that
it is almost impossible to avoid including the renaissance in our
investigations,and we have thereforedecided to enlarge the editorial
board and to broaden the scope of Vivarium,changing its subtitle to
'An International Journal for the Philosophy and Intellectual Life
of the Middle Ages and Renaissance'. We are confident that these
changes will increase the value of Vivarium and also make it useful
to those interestedin a wider variety of subjects.
The Editorial Board and the Publisher also felt that closer contact
with scholars outside the Benelux was desirable and we are pleased
to be able to announce that the followinghave agreed to become
members of the International Advisory Committee: Prof. MarieTherse d'Alverny (Paris-Poitiers), Prof. Tullio Gregory (Rome),
Prof. Paul Oskar Kristeller (New York), Prof. Jan Pinborg (Copenhagen) and Prof. Albert Zimmermann (Cologne).
The publisher of the first eleven volumes, Van Gorcum in Assen,
will unfortunatelyno longer be able to print and distribute our
periodical. This and futurevolumes will appear under the imprintof
E. J. Brill of Leyden.
L. M. de Rij,

Secretaryof the EditorialBoard

Universitiesof Leyden and of Utrecht
F. F. Blok,
ofAmsterdam
University
H. A. G. Braakhuis,University
ofNijmegen
ofUtrechtand ofBrussels
Universities
J. Engels,
C. J. de Vogel,
ofUtrecht
University
ofLouvain
J. IJsewijn,
University
. H. Kneepkens, EditorialAssistant
I

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Vivarium
, XII, i (1974)
Les commentaires d'Ovide au XVIe

sicle *

J. ENGELS

XVIe sicle, les commentaires allgoriss des Mtamorphoses

Ovide ont t apprcis par des auteurs d'inspiration fort

Au
diverse: Erasme, Rabelais, les Dunkelmnner, Luther, et par
les responsables de l'Index. Malgr cette diversit toutefois, leur
apprciation va dans le mme sens : celui de la condamnation. Aussi
bien deux problmesse posent: Quelles sont les moralisationsvises ?
Qu'est-ce qui a amen cette cascade de condamnations ?
Le plus pratique sera d'aller rebours de l'ordre chronologique.
En 1559, 1' Index autorum et librorum1- promulgu Rome par
le pape Paul IV, la foisen son propre nom et en celui de l'Inquisition
- inscritsous la lettre parmi les Certorum2 auctorumlibri prohibiti,
l'item que voici3: In Ovidii Metamorphoseoslibros commentariasive
enarrationesallegoricae vl tropologicae4. Cet item sera reproduit tel
quel dans YIndex librorumprohibitorumlabor par la commissionad
hoc du Concile de Trente et dict par Pie IV en 1564 5. Puis, il passera
dans l'Index dict par Sixte V en 1590 6 et dans celui dict par
* Une premirebauchede cet articlea t lue au 2d Congrsinternational
des tudesno-latines,
aot 1973.
Amsterdam,
1 Pourlesrfrences,
aux deuxouvragesde Fr. HeinrichReusch,
onse reportera
des sechzehnten
1) son dition:Die Indiceslibrorum
prohibitorum
Jahrhunderts,
Tbingen,1886 (repr.Nieuwkoop,1961; 1970)citeici Indices; 2) son comBcher.Ein Beitragzur Kirchen
mentairehistorique:Der Indexderverbotenen
undLiteraturgeschichte
vol. I, 1883; vol. II, 1885,citici Beitrag.
,
Bonn,
2 L *Auetorcertustanten l'espceOvide,non son commentateur.
3 Indices,p. 199; BeitragI, pp. 258-300.
4 Pour les notionsd'allgorieet de tropologie
et leursrapports,se rappelerla
: Quidestallegoria,
nisi tropusubi
phrasede saintAugustindans le De Trinitate
ex alio aliud intelligitur
(citepar M. Hoornaertdans l'articleAllgoriedans
le Diet. de spiritualit,
I, 1937,cl- 310)-Voir aussi BerylSmalley,The study
oftheBiblein theMiddleAges2,Oxford,1952,pp. 28 svv. et passim;C. Spicq,
de l'exgselatineau MoyenAge,Paris,1944 (consulter
Esquissed'unehistoire
la Table dessujetstraits,
s.v.).
6 Indicesp. 275; BeitragI, pp. 312-46.
6 Indices,p. 508; BeitragI, pp. 501-32.De l, l'itema pass dans l'Index pour
3

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ClmentVIII en 1596 7. L'item ne devait tre liminque dans l'Index

promulgu en 1758 par Benot XIV 8. La condamnation a donc eu
force de loi pendant deux sicles.
Le libell de l'item est assez vague, et ne permet pas d'identifier
d'emble les ouvrages condamns. Du moins, peut-on procder
quelques liminations.
Depuis Trithemius9, en 1494, la plupart de ses bio-bibliographies
attribuent au frre augusti Denis de Borgo San Sepolcro (prs
d'Arezzo), l'ami de Ptrarque et de Boccace 10,un commentairesur les
Mtamorphoses.Cette assertion sera rpte aussi, en 1608, par Possevinus11, lequel observera ensuite: Sed memoriamreuocandum est,
quod Index librorumprohibitorumClementeVIII Pont. Max. emissus
habet: Nimirum in Ouidij Metamorphoseonlibros Commentariasine
enarrationesAllegoricas, vel Tropologicas omnesprohiben. Se rfrant
cette phrase, Fabricius 12 affirmeraen 1734 que l'Index avait vis
le commentaire de Borgo San Sepolcro. Tiraboschi 13, sans doute
choqu de cette singularisation de son compatriote, objectera que
Possevin avait simplement rappel la condamnation gnrale des
commentairestropologiques.
Mais, ce commentaire des Mtamorphosesde Borgo San Sepolcro,
est-ce qu'il a jamais exist ? J'avoue que, tout en ayant eu l'il au
guet depuis plusieurs annes, je n'ai nulle part trouv trace d'aucun
manuscrit. Sans doute, il y a le tmoignage d'Ambroise de Cora 14,
l'Espagne dressen 1583 par le Grand InquisiteurQuiroga,Indices,p. 424;
BeitragI, pp. 490-8.
7 Indices, p. 537,note1; BeitragI, pp. 532-80.
8 BeitragI, p. 285,II, pp. 38-41.
9 Joh.Trithemius,
Ble, 1494,
ecclesiasticorum,
Catalogussiveliberscriptorum
f. I02v.
10morten 1342. Bibliographie
rcente:R. Weiss,Noteson Dionigida Borgo
San Sepolcrodans: Italian Studies
, X = 1955,pp. 40-2;
, An annualreview
und Kirche
Lexikonfr Theologie
a, III, 1959,coli. 405-6.
31Ant. Possevinus,Apparatussacer. . . , Cologne,1608,I, p. 475.
12 Jo. A. Fabricius,Bibliotheca
latinamediaeetinfimaeaetatis
, II, Hambourg,
1734,pp. 94-5; dans l'ditionMansi,Florence,1858 (repr.Graz, 1962),II, p.
del
e nelleimmaginazioni
447. Il sera rptpar A Graf,Roma nellamemoria
medioevo, II, Turin,1883,p. 306; par GastonParis,Hist. litt,de la Fr., XXIX,
par Y. F.-A. Giraud,La Fable de Daphn,Droz,
1885,p. 524; toutrcemment
Genve,1969,p. 124.- Cf. aussi W. Stechow,Apollound Daphne,Leipzig/
DarmzumNeudruck,
und Nachtrgen
Berlin,1932; repr.miteinemNachwort
stadt,1965,p. 67.
13GirolamoTiraboschi,Storiadella letteratura
itahana.. . , V, Modene,1775,
p. iii.
14Le tmoignageest le plus souventreproduitd aprs Jean bchiphower,
4

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du XVe sicle, selon lequel Dionysius fabulas omnead tam praecellentem Tropologicumsensum reduxit, ut in admonendis populis nihil
vehementius,nihil jucundius, nihil denique utilius possit adferri:
"Denis savait rduiretous les mythes un sens tropologique si lev
que, pour instruirele peuple des fidles, on ne pourrait trouver rien
de plus saisissant, rien de plus amusant, enfin rien de plus utile".
Seulement, cette phrase partout cite ne doit pas se rapporter un
livre de Denis, mais sa prdication. On sait, grce notamment aux
sermons conservs d'un autre frre augusti, prdicateur du roi
Charles VI, Jacques Legrand, qu'il aimait les tofferau moyen des
Mtamorphoses15. Par consquent, jusqu' plus ample inform,on
doit considrerle commentairede Denis de Borgo San Sepolcro comme
hypothtique.Mais, mme s'il devait mergerun jour, il n'a certainement pas retenusuffisammentl'attention au XVIe sicle pour motiver
sa mise l'Index.
Reusch ie, notamment, supposait 17 que l'item de l'Index concernait le clbre incunable, en franais, imprim Bruges en
1484: Cy commence Ouide . . . son Hure jntitule M ethamorphose,
Content .XV. Hures particuliers moralisie par maistre Thomas
waleys . . . Translate & Compile par Colard mansion. Grce aux
18
Hellinga notamment, les problmes concernant l'impression de ce
livre et les circonstancesparticuliresqui l'ont accompagne et suivie,
sont maintenant peu prs rsolus. Malheureusement,le contenu de
cette compilationreste l'objet de confusions,malgrl'tude de Holger
19
N0rgaard qui avait lucid la question. Mais cet article,tant rdig
en danois 20, n'a pas eu toute l'influence qu'il mritait. Ne pouvant
auteurdu Chronicon
archi-comitum
Oldenburgensium
(publien 1688 Helmstedt
II, p. 164),mais
par H. Meibomiusjr dans les Rerumgermanicarum
scriptores,
Perini(Bibi.august.,II, p. 28) a vrifique leditchroniqueur
l'avait transcrit
telquel de la Chronicaordinis,imprime
Romeen 1481,d'Ambroisede Cora.
15E. Beltrn,JacquesLegrand
dans: Analectaaugustiniana
prdicateur
XXX = 1967,pp. 148-209;VivariumIX = 1971,pp. 23-4.
ie BeitragI, p. 285 et note.
17Interprtant
une noticedans G. W. Panzer,Annalestypographici.
. . , V,
Nuremberg,
1797,p. 339.
18VoirWytze & Lotte Hellinga,ColardMansion: An originalleaffromthe
Ovidemoralis
Print1963;id.,TheFifteenth-Century
Bruges1484,Amsterdam,
, 2 vol.,Amsterdam,
1966,1,pp. 53-4;II, Planche
ingTypesofTheLowCountries
60; p. 395.
19HolgerN0rgaard,SanktOvid,Tekstligt
Metamorfosernes
og billedmaessigt
dans Fund og Forskningi det KongeligeBiblioteksSamlinger,
forvandling,
X = 1963,pp. 7-26.
Copenhague,
20Je dois au Drs. G. Kuipers (Institutde littraturecompared'Utrecht)
de mel'avoirrenduaccessibleen le traduisant
en nerlandais.
5

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insister pour le moment, je dirai simplementceci: Il n'y a aucune

indication que les rdacteurs de l'Index de Paul IV se soient souvenus
de ces textes vernaculaires21. Nous pouvons donc les liminer galement de notre enqute.
Passons maintenant Martin Luther. Entre 1535 et 1545 a
rdig en latin ue srie de Vorlesungensur le premierlivre de Mose,
c'est--diresur la Gense.Ainsi, les pages 22traitantdes versets 9 11
du chapitre30: "Quand Lia vit qu'elle avait cess d'avoir des enfants,
elle prit Zilpha, sa servante, et la donna pour femme Jacob", etc.
D'abord, sur le plan thologique, Luther explique que, dans ce cas,
il ne s'agit point d'un adultre sordide, mais bien au contraire d'un
lgitime dsir de procration. Malheureusement,les Manichens et
les Papistes sont impuissants saisir le sens littral, c'est--dire
historique,de ce rcit biblique. Par suite, Gerson,saint Bonaventure,
Hugues de Saint-Victor,Origne et saint Jrmes'en sont tous scandaliss. C'est pour se tirer de cet embarras qu'ils ont eu recours
l'explication allgorique. Un genre que Luther a en horreur.Suit un
23
passage violent, cit dj en 1711 par Salomon Glassius , avec le
coup de griffecontre les stupides moines oisifs qui ont invent les
allgories. Lesquels sont mme alls jusqu' transposer en allgories
les Mtamorphosesd'Ovide, o le Laurier est devenu la Vierge Marie,
et Apollon le Christ: Mariam feceruntLaurum, ApoUinemChristum24.
Passons ensuite Franois Rabelais. On connat la phrase du prologue de Gargantua o, entre 1533 et 1535 Rabelais ridiculise les
25
allgories :
. mon opinion, qui decrete icelies [les allgories] aussi peu
avoir est songez d'Homere que d'Ovide en ses Metamorphoses
les sacremensde l'Evangile, lesquelz un Frere Lubin, vray croquelar21La listedressepar RobertH. Lucas,dansSpeculumXLV = 1970,pp. 242-4,
trervise.
demanderait
22D. Mariin LuthersWerke,kritischeGesamtausgabe,43. Band, Weimar,
1912,pp. 665-70.
23 SalomonGlassius,Philologiaesacrae,qua totiussacrosanctae
Veteris& Novi
tumsensus & genuinaeintertumstylus& Literatura,
Testamenti
Scripturae,
libriquinqu.. . , Amsterdam,
1711, pp. 200-1.
pretationsratioexpenditur,
24C'est tortque W. Stechow(op. cit.,p. 51) affirme
que LutherauraitemOvidii(voirl'ditionde F. Ghisalberti,
pruntcettecitationaux Integumenta
a aussi t examinedans le chapitre
citation
La
43).
1933,
Messine/Milan, p.
TheMightyPan, Miltons
de Helga Spevack-Husmann,
MythosundChristentum
, Mnster,1963, p. 60.
Vergleiche
mythologische
25 Je cite d'aprsl'ditionM. A. Screech,TextesLittraires
Franais,GeneveParis,1970,pp. 15-6,et la note95.
6

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don, s'est efforcdemonstrar,si d'adventure il rencontroitgens

aussi folz que luy. .
Dans Pantagruel, Rabelais a insr deux allusions ce Frre
Lubin qui manquaient encore dans l'dition de 1532 26: 1) Au chapitre
VII, dans le catalogue de la Bibliothque de Saint-Victor, il intercale
"ReverendiPatris Fratris Lubini, Provincialis Bavardie, de croquendis
lardonibuslibri tres"27.Au chapitre XI (XV), il intercale: "(que met)
Frater Lubinus, libro De compotationibusmendicantium"28.
Antrieurement Gargantua et Pantagruel, dans la ballade D'ung
qu'on appeloit Frere Lubin compose par Clment Marot avant 1527
et publie dans L'AdolescenceClmentine de 1532 29, le personnage
tait dj reprsentatifdu religieux peu scrupuleux, hypocrite et
bon vivant 30. Mais jusque-l, on ne lui attribuait pas une allgorisation des Mtamorphoses.Les rabelaisants se sont naturellementdemand quel ouvrage tait fait allusion dans Gargantua. La plupart
ont song au MetamorphosisOuidiana Moraliter . . . explanata du
pseudo-Thomas Waleys imprim pour la premire fois, en 1509, par
Josse Bade. C'est M. A. Screech,je crois,qui s'est avis le premierqu'un
livre signal par P. S. Allen 81feraitmieux l'affaire: les Metamorphoseos
libri moralizaticum . . . tropologicanonnullarumfabularum enarratione
d au dominicain Petrus Lavinius ou Pierre Lavin, et dont la premire dition, Lyon, date de 1510. En effet,une transpositionde
"Frre Lavin" en "Frre Lubin" est bien dans la manire de Rabelais.
Ces Mtamorphosesmoralisesont connu un succs norme. Le British
Museum possde des rditions de 1513, 1517, 1518, 1519, 1524,
28 Jecited'aprsl'ditionV. L. Saulnier(T.L.F.), Genve,1965.
27Ed. Saulnier,p. 38 (ligne74 et var.); p. 197.
28 Ed. Saulnier,p. 84 (ligne72 et var.).
28 ClmentMarot,uvres diverses
. . . , dition critiquepar C. A. Mayer,
Londres,1966,pp. 142-3.
80Ce sensn'estpas attestdans le Dictionnairede la languefranaisedu seizimesicled'E. Huguet,t. V, Paris,1961,p. 55. Les attestations
dans les dictionnaires
du siclesuivant(Cotgraveet Oudin)peuventremonter Marotet
Rabelais.L'tymologie
saintLubin (proposepar le FEW , V, 1950,p. 427) est
maismanquede documentation.
En effet,au VIe sicle,il y a eu
ingnieuse,
Chartresun saint vque nommLeobinou Lubin,Mais Marotle savait-il?
31Opusepistolarum
. . , III, 1517-1519,Oxford,1913,
Des. ErasmiRoterodami.
p. 328,notead 596: "Ouidianasfabulas]Thomasde Walleys(xivc.),an English
Dominican,had composeda 'moralization'of the Metamorphoses
, firstprinted
in Paris,J. Badius,15 July1509; to whichanotherDominican,PeterLavinius
of Langres,added a 'tropological
enarration'in an edition,Lyons,C. Davost,
1510".
7

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32
1527 ; le Catalogue gnral des livres imprims de la Bibliothque
nationale mentionne une rdition de 1540 Venise m.
Avant Allen, l'ouvrage avait t signal, ds 1555, par Josias
Simler dans son Epitome bibliothecaeConradi Gesneri34; puis, en
35
1721, par Qutifet Echard dans les ScriptoresorUnis praedicatorum ;
en 1735 par Jo. A. Fabricius dans sa Bbliothecalatina mediaeetinfimae
aetatisZi; en 1737 par J. H. Zedier dans son Grosses vollstndiges
Universal-Lexicon37; en 1889, par G. Duplessis dans l'Essai biblioditionsdes uvresd'Ovide ornesde planches
graphiquesur les diffrentes
au
et
XVIe
sicles
XVe
38, et notamment entre 1895-99, par
publies
Baudrier dans sa Bibliographie lyonnaise, Recherchessur les imprimeurs,libraires,relieursetfondeursde lettresde Lyon au XVIe sicle 39.
Depuis Allen, le livre a t dcrit, en 1930, par Robert Brun dans
Le livre iUustren France au XVIe sicle40 et cit, en 1959, par A.
Cioranesco dans sa Bibliographie de la littrature
franaise du seizime
sicle41.
Les deux titres, celui du Metamorphosis Ouidiana Moraliter a
Magistro Thoma Walleys . . . explanata imprim par Josse Bade,
et celui du Metamorphoseoslibri moralizati imprim Lyon, se ressemblent beaucoup. Cette similarit de leurs titres amne que les
deux ouvrages sont facilement confondus. Ainsi, Francis Griffin
32BritishMuseum. Generalcatalogueofprintedbooks
edition
, Photolithographic
toJ955,volume131,Londres,1962,col. 748.
83Auteurs
, tomeXC, Paris,1927,col. 922.
34 Zurich,1555, p. 147 (PetrusLauinius, scripsittropoligicam
enarrationem
Ouidij, impressamLugduni).
fabularualiquot Metamorphoseos
s* II, p. 23; pp. 336-7.
38IV, Hambourg,1735,pp. 726-7;ed. Mansi,Florence,1858(repr.Graz,1962),
IV, p. 531.
37Halle/Leipzig,
1737 (repr.Graz, 1961),XVI, col. 1056.
38 Paris, 1889,p. ii, n 25 (ditionde 1510); p. 12, n 27 (ditionde 1512);
amenepar le n
p. 15,n 37: 1518. Venisesans douteune fauted'impression,
36, pourLyon1518; pp. 15-6,n 38 (ditionde 1518).
39 Lyon, 1895-99(repr.Paris, 1964), pp. 222-5; PP- 288-9. Baudrierdcrit,
du titre,d'abordl'ditionde Lyon,avril1510,parClaudeDavost
avec fac-simil
de troisdes quinzevignettesdessines
pour EtienneGueynard.Reproduction
du titre,de l'ditionde
avec fac-simil
par GuillaumeLeroy.Puis, description,
Lyon,janvier1512par J.SacconpourJac.Huguetan.Baudrierajoute"Edition
revisepar PierreLa Vigne": serait-ceunetranscription
pourPetrusLavinius?
40 Paris,1930,p. 274 et, plus succinctement,
dans la rditionsous le titreLe
dela Renaissance,Etudesuiviedu Cataloguedesprincipaux
livrefranaisillustr
de
livres figuresdu XVIe sicle, Paris, 1969,p. 262; p. 70. Il est intressant
comparerl'apprciationdes vignetteschez Baudrieret chez Brun.
41 Paris,1959,p. 413.
8

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Stokes42 a affirmque le second serait une simple rimpressiondu

premier,avec seulement le texte des Mtamorphosesen plus. Dans sa
brivet, la notice prcite de P. S. Allen43 peut aussi facilement
induire en erreur,le terme added suggrant que Pierre Lavin aurait
fait des additions au Waleys de Josse Bade. En fait, ce sont deux
ouvrages tout fait diffrents.Pour tre clair et bref,je parlerai ici
du Badius et du Lavinius.
D'abord le Badius. L'imprim de juillet 1509 44et celui de 1511 45se
trouventmaintenant dcrits avec toute prcision souhaitable dans le
nouveau Renouard 4e. Ce rpertoirerappelle en outre que, ds 1883,
B. Haurau avait identifile texte comme tant l'tat isol YOvidius
moralizatus,c'est--dire le quinzime des seize livres qui constituent
l'encyclopdielatine de Pierre BersuireintituleReductoriummorale47.
Puis, ce rpertoirerpte mais tort, d'aprs F. Ghisalberti,que le
Badius serait un remaniementde YOvidius moralizatus,tandis qu'en
ralit il s'agit de la premireversion rdige par l'auteur Avignon
vers 1340. Josse Bade nous informe,dans sa prface48,qu'il avait reu
le manuscrit, qui sera seulement retouch pour l'orthographe, du
prieur de Clairvaux, Jean de Voivre 49. L'attribution errone au
dominicain anglais Thomas Waleys 50 se lisait sans doute dj dans
ce manuscrit. Quant au caractre du texte, c'est essentiellement
un commentairedes Mtamorphoses,l'auteur rsumantd'abord chaque
42Epistolaeobscurorum
virorum.
. . , Chatto & Windus,Londres,1925,p. 74,
note38.
43Supra, p. 31, note7.
44Rditionronotype,
dans Werkmateriaal
avec rsolutiondes abrviations,
Utrecht
doorhetInstituutvoorLaat Latijn derRijksuniversiteit
,
1-2,uitgegeven
1960-2.
45Pourla rditionde 1515 par F. Regnaultet cellede 1521par Laisn,voir
le Cataloguegnraldes livresimprimsde la Bibliothque
nationale
, Auteurs,
tomeCXXVIII, Paris,1934,coll. 683-4.
46Imprimeurs<&Librairesparisiensdu XVIe sicle, Ouvragepublid'aprs
les manuscrits
. . . , II, Paris,1969,n 107,pp. 62-3et n
de PhilippeRenouard
174,p. 87.
47L'ditioncritiquede YOvidiusmoralizatus
est attendueversla finde I974 ma Noticebibliographique
Pourla bibliographie
du sujet,on pourrase reporter
surPierreBersuiredans VivariumII = 1964,pp. 62-124; IX = 1971,pp.
19-24.
48 Rimprime
etdes uvres
des impressions
dans Ph. Renouard,Bibliographie
de JosseBadius Ascensius.. . , III, Paris, 1908 (repr.New York, 1963), pp.
116-8.
49 Werkmateriaal-3,
collectioncite,Utrecht,1966,Introduction,
pp. VIII-IX.
50BerylSmalleya misen lumierel'activitde ThomasWaleys,Englishfriars
and antiquity
in theearlyXIVth century
, Oxford,i960.
9

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00:01:45 AM

mythe- mais sans le reproduire- pour en donner ensuite une explication, rarement littrale, le plus souvent allgorique et moralisante.
En revanche, le Lavinius est une de ces nombreuses ditions du
texte des Mtamorphosesimprimes la findu XVe sicle et au XVIe,
munies en manchette d'une luculentissimaexplanatio de composition
variable. Dans ce cas-ci, les gloses ont t runiespar un certain Jean
Thodoricde Beauvais. Il faut observerque les moralisationsne sontpas
de PierreLavin, mais de l'humanisteitalien Raphael Regius Volaterranus 51,dontla prface- date Venise 1493- adresse au prince de Mantoue, Franois de Gonzague, est reproduiteen entier.Lavin a seulement
contribu- outre une prfacedate Vienne (prs de Lyon) mars 1510des pigrammeset, rien que pour le premierlivre des Mtamorphoses
,
. Le temps du carme lui avait permis
des enarrationestropologicae
d'arriverjusque l, dclare-t-ilen prenantcong de ses lecteurs52,mais
les ftes de Pques ne lui ont plus laiss les loisirs pour continuer.
Il ne parat gure douteux que les responsables de l'Index de Paul
IV, dans leur item, visaient aussi ces enarrationestropologicaede
Pierre Lavin, sinon en mme temps les allgories et moralisations de
Raphael Regius. La terminologie est identique et ils connaissaient
Rabelesiusydont ils condamneront tous les livres ou autres crits une
page plus loin 53.
Quant Erasme, en juillet 1509 M, rdigeant YEloge de la folie, il
avait dnonc les interprtationsallgoriques, tropologiques et anagogiques des "fables" empruntes au Speculum historalede Vincent
de Beauvais ou aux Gesta Romanorumanonymes,par lesquelles, la
fin du moyen ge, les prdicateurs terminaientvolontiers leurs sermons. Ces fables taient donc de pieuses lgendes plutt que des
55
mythes antiques. C'est seulement dans sa lettre du 7 mai 1518
Martin Lipsius qu'il s'exprimera,en passant, sur les allgorisationsdes
. A l'adresse de ceux qui critiquaient le latin de ses
Mtamorphoses
crits bibliques, visant le Badius il lance: "Et dire que personne
n'lve la voix contre l'ouvrage insipide d'un certain dominicain qui
51Sur cet auteur,voirle chapitreDas Fortwirken
Moralisation
derchristlichen
in RenaissanceundBarockdans: ManfredBeller,PhilemonundBaucis in der
undAnalyse,Heidelberg,
1967,pp. 48 svv.
Literatur,
Stoffgeschichte
europischen
52 Fol. XXXIr.
53Reusch,Indices,p. 201.
54Quandle Badius sortaitde presse.
55Opus epistolarum
. . , III, 1517-9,ed. P. S. Allen,
Des. ErasmiRoterodami.
Oxford,1913,pp. 312-30.
10

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adapte au Christ,au besoin en les dtournant de leur sens, toutes les

fablesd'Ovide" : Neque quisquam clamatin opus cuiusdamPraedicatoris
insulsissimum, quoi ornnesOvidianas fabulas ad Christumaccomodai,
imo detorquet
5e.
Voil donc qu'au cours de trenteans, Erasme, Rabelais et Luther- tous les trois ridiculisentles alldans des contextes fortdiffrents
gorisations d'un seul et mme pote classique, Ovide, telles qu'elles
se lisent dans un crit par un religieux. On pourrait y voir une concidence. Mais, d'autre part, l'Index de Paul IV qui en 1559 condamne
les critsde ces trois auteurs 57,condamne aussi les allgoriesd'Ovide.
On doit ds lors se demander pourquoi. Les rdacteurs de l'Index ne
se seront tout de mme pas laiss convaincre par les arguments de
ces auteurs considrs subversifs!Du reste, l'inverse de Luther, ils
ne pouvaient pas condamner globalement toutes les allgories partir d'Origne et saint Jrme jusqu' Gerson. Pourquoi ont-ils alors
retenu nommmentles seules allgorisations d'Ovide, dont la porte
thologique n'est pourtant pas considrable ?
A mon avis, le lien entre ces faits apparemment contradictoires
est fournipar la lettre 28 des Epistolae obscurorumvirorum58, qui a
sensibilis les esprits. Prtendument adresse par Frater Conradus
Dollenkopffius MagisterOrtvinusGratius,cette lettreest entirement
consacre, soi-disant un loge, mais en fait une critique acerbe
du commentairedes Mtamorphosesque Josse Bade venait d'diter,
en 1509 et 1511, sous le nom de Thomas Waleys. Tout naturellement,
cette lettre a eu sa part du retentissement travers l'Europe qu'a
connu le recueil entier des Dunkelmnnerds sa publication la fin
de 1515. Accueillies d'abord on theirface value, notamment par les
dominicains et les franciscains59,les Epistolae seront condamnes par
la bulle de Lon X du 15 mars 1517 eo.
w Ibid,p. 328. C'est cettephraseque se rapportela notede P. S. Allenque
nous avons reproduiteplus haut.
57PourErasme,voirReusch,Indices, p. 185 et p. 183:". . . etiamsi nilpenitus
contrareligionem
vel de religione
contineant.";BeitragI, pp. 347-55.
58 La meilleureditionreste toujourscelle d'E. Bcking,Ubichi Hutteni
virorum
cuminlustrantibus
equitisoperum supplementum.
Epistolaeobscurorum
adversariisque
scriptis,
Leipzig,I (1864),II, i (1869),II, ii (1870).- Pourla lettre
28, voirBckingI, pp. 41-3; II, ii, pp. 580-5;pp. 489-9.
59 Voirles lettresd'Erasmedu 5 avril1518et du 5 septembre1528,Opusepied. cit.,III (1913),pp. 262-3et VII (1928),p. 479.
stolarum,
60BckingII, i, p. 142. Curieusement,
elles ne serontmises l'Index qu'en
1590 (Reusch,Indices, p. 478; BeitragI, p. 64).
II

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00:01:45 AM

C'est la lettre de Dollenkopffius qui a attir l'attention sur le

Badius, lequel sans cela aurait facilementpass inaperu. Dans le cas
d'Erasme, il y a des indications trs prcises. L 'Eloge de la Folie- rdig avant qu'il ait pu avoir le Badius entreles mains- certescritique
les allgories, mais pas encore celles des Mtamorphoses.C'est seulement aprs avoir pris connaissance -du Dollenkopffius qu'Erasme,
dans sa lettre Martin Lipsius, citant plusieurs autres Thomas,
fait sa sortie contre l'opus insulsissimumdu dominicain qui allgorise
tous les mythes ovidiens. Quant Luther, impossible de supposer
qu'il ne se serait pas souvenu des Dunkelmnner.Et l'on doit se demander si Rabelais, mme si son "frre Lubin" fait allusion au Lavinius plutt qu'au Badius, aurait insr ce passage sans la notorit
que ce dernieravait obtenue grce la lettre de Dollenkopffius.
L'attitude des rdacteurs de l'Index de Paul IV s'explique galement partirde cette lettre.La mthodeallgorique ou tropologique,
admise partout ailleurs, ils n'entendaient pas tellementla condamner
lorsqu'elle tait applique aux Mtamorphoses.Leur motiftait autre.
On se rappelle que dix ans auparavant, le 17 novembre 1548, le parlement de Paris avait sur son territoireinterditla reprsentationdes
Mystressacrs ei, qui scandalisaient les mes religieuses. C'est pour
une raison analogue que l'Index condamna les allgorisationsd'Ovide :
pour rduirele scandale que la lettre de Dollenkopffiussur le Badius
avait cr 2.
Ce scandale peut rendre compte aussi de trois faits d'histoire
littraire pour lesquels, jusqu'ici, aucune explication satisfaisante
n'a t avance:
La premireimpression63du Reductoriummoralede Pierre Bersuire
41L. Petitde Julleville,
Les Mystres,
I, Paris, 1880,pp. 428 sw.
a Est-cequ'il y a aussi un lien,plus ou moinslche,avec ce dcretdu synode
la main la plumepourtraiteren posie
de 1578: "Ceux qui mettent
protestant
l'histoirede l'EscritureSainte,sontavertisde n'y meslerles fablespotiques

Dieu le nomdes fauxdieuxet de n'ajouterou diminuer

et de n'attribuer
l'EscritureSainte,maisde se tenir peu prs ses termes",citpar Marc-Ren
franaisedu XVIe sicle.. . , Droz, Genve,
Jung,H erode dans la littrature
und christlicher
Geistin
1966, p. 122, d'aprs H. Sckommodau,Heidnischer
Romanische
LIV =
derfranzsischen
Forschungen,
Lyrikdes 16. Jahrhunderts,
1940,pp. 400-11.
8 Unelisteimposantedes imprims
de BersuirechezCh.SamaranetJ.Monfrin,
PierreBersuire,Prieur de Saint-loide Paris (i2go?-i32), dans Histoire
littraire
6le la France,XXXIX = 1962, pp. 444-6.
Ajouter,p. 444,sous Operaomnia: "3 bis. Venise,apud GasparemBindonum,
- Supertotam
Bibliam
1589.Reductorium
(LivresI-XIV). In-40,caract.romains.
voirplus loin,p. 446 (n 8).".
(Livre XVI).- Repertorium,
12

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ja paru Paris en 1521 chez Claude Chevallon M, libraire de l'Universit.Mais il manque deux livres: le quinzime, contenant Ovidius
moralizatus,et le seizime, contenant les moralisations de la Bible.
Chevallon s'en explique dans son Ad lector
em 65: Il entend seulement
publier les quatorze premierslivres, encore indits, rests cachs dans
les fonds de manuscrits.Non les deux derniers,le seizime livre ayant
dj t imprimsous le nom de l'auteur 66,le quinzime (le Badius)
par le plagiaire Thomas Waleys 67. Mais comme l'impression tait
munie du visa de la Facult de Thologie, on peut prsumer que le
remous caus par la lettre de Dollenkopffiusde 1515 tait la raison
profonde de la suppression.
Dans les impressions suivantes du Reductorium
, partir de la
seconde en 1575 Venise jusqu' la dernire en 1730-31 Cologne,
seul le livre XV avec YOvidius moralizatusmanque, le livre XVI tant
devenu un volume part. L, sans aucun doute, il faut voir l'effetdes
Index, de Paul IV en 1559 jusqu' Benot XIV en 1758.
En 1556, loa. Gryphius publie Venise une dition pourvue de
, avec luculentissimaexplanatio en manplanches des Mtamorphoses
chette, comportant des allgories empruntes YOvidius moralizatus
de Bersuire, sans doute moyennant le Badius 68. Pourtant, l'dition
69
que Gryphius publiera en 1565 les supprimera. Comment ne pas
voir, ici galement, un effetde l'Index promulgu en 1559 ?
Utrecht
InstituutvoorLaat Latijn
*4PourClaudeChevallon,en attendantle prochainvolumede Ph. Renouard,
Imprimeurs& Librairesparisiensdu XVIe sicle (supra,p. 9, n. 46) voir
de la Bibliothque
nationale
, Auteurs
, tome
Catalogue
gnraldeslivresimprims
XI, Paris, 1925,coll. ii 19-20.
86"Habes hic lectorcandidequattuordecim
librosReductoriiMoralisFratris
PetriBerchorii.Nam cum sexdecimsint eius operislibri: nos eos duwtaxat
situsobduxerat.Tertiuw-(sic !)
curauimus:quos hactenusincognitos
imprimi
decimumveroqui est de poetarumfabulis: ThomasquidamWaleys plagiaries
suppressoauthorisnominesibi vendicauit:mutatispauculisquibusdam:vti
soientqui equumaut aliudquoduisawiwalabegerint
: aut caudamaut auriculas
praecidere:vt diuersumanimalvideatur.Sextusdecimus
porroliber: qui est
de Bibliorumfiguris& expositionibus
: suo authori adhuc remanetinteger:
& preclarum:olim iam impressum."
opus multiforme
ee En fait,dix foisentre1474et 1520(Samaranet Monfrin,
p. 445).
67A Paris,en 1509,1511,1515et 1521 (Samaranet Monfrin,
pp. 444-5).
68 Voir T. Engels,Etudessur l'Ovidemoralis,
Groningue,
1943/45,
PP- 29 svv.
Ces deux ditionsde Gryphiusn'ont pas t signalesdans G. Duplessis,
Essai bibliographique
ditionsd'Ovide ornesde planches
sur les diffrentes
publiesaux XVe et XVIe sicles,Paris, 1889.
13

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00:01:45 AM

Vivarium
, XII, i (1974)
Boethius and Eudemus

JAMES SHIEL

1
writinghis explanation of Porphyry's'tree' Boethius inevitably
In encountered a subdivision of 'substance' where Porphyry had
divided 'rational animate substance' into 'mortal' and 'immortal'.
An immortal animate could only be a god, and, since 'animate' had
already been classed under 'corporeal', this would be a corporeal
god as described by the ancients who identifiedthe world and the
heavens with Zeus. Boethius does not quarrel with this doctrine.Only
by abruptly detaching the referenceto the ancients can Pierre Courcelle 2 see in it a Christian reservation voiced by Boethius himself.
Since similar philosophic referenceto the ancient beliefis to be found
in Greek 8 I believe that Boethius translated it fromGreek. And the
Greek he translated fromwas not the extant commentaryof Ammonias 4 on Porphyry.
deum.
hominem
namsi rationalimortalesubieceris
constitues;si immortale
deumverodicocorporeum
; huncenimmundumveteresdeumvocabantet
Iovis eum appellatone dignatisunt,deumquesolemceteraquecoelestia
corpora,quae animata esse cum Plato tum plurimusdoctorumchorus
arbitratus
est.
Later on , in explaining how 'a dialectical question is one that expects as answer the admission of one of two contradictorypropositions', Boethius classifies various sorts of question. A question is
eitherdialectical or non-dialectical.The non-dialecticalis of two types:
either it is about accidents, asking what is the subject of a given ac1 Boeth.,in Isagogen208.22Brandt(PL 4.).
a P. Courcelle,La Consolation
littraire
de Bocedans la tradition
(1967) 341.
His suggestionand footnotesare appropriatedby . J. de Vogel, Vivarium
9(i97i) 59.
3 Elias, in Isagogen69.21 Busse.
theGreekintouncialtypedesigned
As homageto BoethiusI havetranscribed
by myfriend,
TimothyHolloway,ofSt. John'sCollege,Oxford.This I entrust
to theelegantpages of Vivarium:... in bibliothecam
posui.
4 cf.Ammonius,
in Isagogen81.10Busse.
6 Boeth.,in lib. de Interp.(20 b 22) 361 Meiser(PL 64.572c).
14

189.235.178.250

00:01:50 AM

o zeyc
Kai
oti aittoc
TOIC 011 O M6N 6IC T(DN Tpi(DN (DC
OTAN 61 6NAAIOC ZGyC X0ON1OC
t(dn TpicuN
ZGyc Aieefioc zeyc
OTAN 61 ANAftDN 6
eetN
HMOY
AITTON GINAI <>ACIN Ol 1
GptTHCGCDC GIAOC MGN
AG KAAOyMGNHC
161
'HN TO MGN NAI KAI
nyCMATIKHC
TO Oy XUJpANOyK GXOyCI AGXGCDC AG
GNIOTG AG KAI nAGIONOC
AGI T(DI GfCTCMGNCI
THN AnOKpiCIN
AIAAX6HNAI Tl 1 TINOC ROyAOMG
N(ON GCTIN 'H nyCMATIKH GpUTHCIC OION
nOTG HA0GC
XMMCDNIOY
OyTG OyN npOTACIC 1
'H 161 OyTG GptTHCIC
GCTI GIAH
npOTACIC 161
61 Gp(DTHCG(DC Oy MONON
GptDTHCIC ACGN riNGTAI
GyAHMOC GN TOIC 1 AGZGDC AIHipHKGN
Ol GpU)TU)NTGC H nGpi CyMRGRHKOTOC
GpCDTCDCIN H npOOGNTGC TI KAI OpiCAN
TGC nyNANONTAI TO TOyTDI CyMRGRH
(DC Ol 6p(DT(DNTGC TIC TOy 'H
KATA <1>yCIN KINHCIC H Tl CDKpATGI CyMRG
RHKGN H GMriAAIN TO MGN CyMRGRHKOC
OpiZOyCI TG KAI AAMRANOyCIN GN THI
Gp(DTHCGI (DI AG TOyTO CyMRGRHKGN
KAI TOyTO MGN "GN
AZlOyCI MA0GIN
GIAOC Gp(THCG(DC
AG 1 OyCIAC
OTAN npOGNGrKAMGNOl TI 6 GCTI
TOyTO AIA Gp(DTHCG(C GXGT AZMGN
XXeXXNA-fOY
15

189.235.178.250

00:01:50 AM

cident, or what is the accident of a given subject; or it is about substantives, asking what a given word means, or to what word a given
meaning applies.
autemsecundumPeripatticos
duplexspeciesest,aut cum
Interrogationis
dialcticainterrogatio
est,aut cum non dialctica.Non dialecticaeautem
duaespeciessunt(sicutaudivimusdocet),una quidemquaninterrogationis
cui illud accidat, ut cum videmus
do sumentesaccidensinterrogamus
domumCiceronissi interrogemus
quis illicmaneat,vel quandosubjectum
ut si
quidemipsumet remsumimusquid autemilli accidatinterrogamus,
quo divertat.Et haec una spequis videatet interroget
ipsumCiceronem
Altera
ciesest eorumquae secundumaccidensnondialecticeinterrogemus.
aut genusaut differennomenquidsitquaerimus,
veroquandoproponentes
ut si quis interroget
tiamaut definitionem
quid sitanimal,vel
requirentes,
dictorum
et quaerimus
sumimus
aut
definitionem
superbis
aliquid
quando
cuius illa sint, ut si quis quaerat 'animal rationalemortale*cuius sit
definitio.
That introductoryphrase sicut audivimus docetpuzzled medieval
scribes. It is omitted fromsome manuscriptsand fromMigne. Instead
of the obviously corrupt audivimus Meiser in his edition proposed
Eudemus. But M. Courcelle 6, on the strength of the corresponding
Greek passage 7, has suggested Ammonius, and feels confidentthat,
as evidence forBoethius' dependence on AmmoniusofAlexandria,the
piece "would furnishconclusive certaintyif it were not corruptedin
the manuscripts."
Now one cannot help noticingthat Boethius has a somewhat more
complex classification than Ammonius. The latter includes no distinction for the two kinds of non-dialectical question. Besides, in
place of 'non-dialectical' Ammonius has a more positive term, 'investigative' (pysmatike), which is not translated in Boethius. And
where Ammonius says "according to the ancients" Boethius has the
more precise "according to the Peripatetics." All this should make
one cautious of asserting that Ammonius is the exact source of
Boethius.
What is more, Eudemus turns out to be the right man. This is
perfectly clear from a passage of Alexander's commentary on the
8
Topics where the Boethian classification is given with an explicit
e P. Courcelle,Les lettres
. Engl,
grecquesen Occidentde M aerobe Cassiodore
trans.(1969) 294. (The enlargedbibliography
studiouslyfailsto mentionany
and editedofBoethius'
ofthegenuinetextsthathave recentlybeenidentified
of directHellenisationto
effort
the mostnoteworthy
Aristotelian
translation,
occurin theWestbetweenMacrobiusand Cassiodorus).
7 Ammonius,
. 199.19-20;200.5-8Busse. See note3.
in lib. de Interp
8 Alexand.,in Top. (104 a 8) 69.13-19,22-23Wallies.See note 3.
16

189.235.178.250

00:01:50 AM

ascriptionto Eudemus. Boethius however does not seem to be translating Eudemus directly,forthe Latin scheme is slightly more elaborate, especially as regards substantial definition.And of course it is
only part of the larger classification"according to the Peripatetics."
And so I come back to the general conviction I have written about
elsewhere,that Boethius translated his explanations fromsome Greek
book later than Porphyry but anterior to Ammonius, and that in
numerouscases one could visualise the exact Greek words he copied
from. In the present case, as in that previous gloss on Porphyry's
'tree', a briefmarginal scheme in Boethius' uncial Greek manuscript
would have given him all the material he needed forhis Latin.
It is rather a pity, then, that this Ammonius text does not work
as evidence that Boethius received his education in the school of
Ammonius at Alexandria. Nor does any similar text that I have so
far been able to examine.
Universityof Sussex
School of European Studies

17

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00:01:50 AM

Vivarium,
XII, i (1974)
Aristotle's Syllogistic : A Medieval View

RICHARD F. WASHELL

recent years, a number of logicians have contended that ArisIn totle's procedure in presentinghis syllogisticin the Prior Analytics (Bk. I, chs. 1-7) is non-demonstrative.Jan Lukasiewicz, for
example, holds that Aristotle's theoryof the syllogismis "an axiomatized deductive system" and not a demonstrativescience. 1 Following
his lead, I. M. Bochenski claims that in presentinghis theory of the
syllogism,Aristotle set forththe "first known axiomatic system, or
more preciselythe firstclass of such systems." 2 And while rejecting
both Lukasiewicz's and Bochenski's interpretation of Aristotle's
syllogistic,Martha Kneale agrees with themin thinkingthat Aristotle's
procedure is not demonstrative.8
The issue concerning the demonstrative or non-demonstrative
character of the Prior Analytics, as well as the other works collected
in the Organon, was an important one during the Middle Ages. This
was the case because at that time logic was generally held to be a
science in its own right as well as an instrumentof science.4 Since
only a demonstrative procedure was thought to be productive of
1 Jan Lukasiewicz,Aristotle*
s Syllogistic
, 2nd ed., (Oxford,1957),P- 44*
2 I. M. Bochenski,A HistoryofFormalLogic, trans,by Ivo Thomas,(Notre
Dame, i960), p. 75.
3 W. and M. Kneale,The Development
ofLogic,(Oxford,1962),pp. 67-81.
4 ErnestA. Moody,Truthand Consequence
in MediaevalLogic, (Amsterdam,
1953), pp. 13-14.Also see, forexample,Avicenna,AvicennaOpera, (Venice,
ed.
1508),Logicae,Prima pars, fol. 2rb-2vb;Johnof Salisbury,Metalogicon,
ClementC. J. Webb,(Oxford,1929),Lib. II, c. V, p. 67; and ThomasAquinas,
etPosteriorum
ed. Raymundi
LibrosPeriHermeneias
In Aristotelis
Analyticorum,
that metalogical
M. Spiazzi,(Torino,1955),pp. 5 and p. 147. It is noteworthy
attentionin theworksof two very
concernsof thissortreceivedconsiderable
influential
viz.,JohnPoinsotand JacobZabarella.
logiciansofthe16thcentury,
of the
Poinsotmaintainedthat logic is both a scienceand the instrument
of the
sciences,whereasZabarella contendedthat it is onlythe instrument
sciences.On thispoint,see JohnJ. Glanville,"Zabarellaand Poinsoton the
Objectand NatureofLogic",Readingsin Logic,ed. RolandHoude,(Dubuque,
1958), pp. 204-226.
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science, it would seem to follow that the procedure employed in the

Prior Analytics(Bk. I, chs. 1-7) was demonstrative.One finds,however,
that Albert the Great, (1193-1280), an important logician of this
period and one who emphatically held logic to be a science, is in
agreement with Lukasiewicz and others on the non-demonstrative
character of the Prior Analytics (Bk. I, chs. 1-7).6 But, unlike the
aforementionedauthors, Albert, as I intend to show, seems to have
conceived of Aristotle'sapproach to the syllogisticas somethinglike
a decision procedure. I also intend to show that such a view is not
necessarily incompatible with the belief that the Prior Analytics
itselfcounts as a workin science. To do this, firstof all it will be useful
to have a sketchofAlbert's notionof demonstrationand demonstrative
science.
I
Albert delimits the concept of demonstrationin his paraphrase of
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, a work which he judged to be demonstrativeon two counts: (a) it teaches one how to demonstrate,
i.e., it sets forththe principles of demonstration; and (b) in doing
so, it exemplifies demonstrations, i.e., it contains demonstrations
and thus counts as a demonstrative science.6 Insofar as it concerns
the teaching of demonstration,it has as its subject the demonstrative
syllogism: "... est autem haec scientia ut de subjecto de syllogismo
demonstrativo:de hoc enim inquirit differentiaset passiones et modos
5 Albertexplicitlytakes up the questionconcerning
the scientificcharacter
oflogicin De praedicabilibus,
to the firsttractofthe
tr. I, c. 1. All references
De praedicabilibus
are based on the editionof JosephBlarerentitled"De Antecedentibus
Ad Logicam",TeoresiRivistadi culturafilosofica,
Vol. 9, 1954,
to theworksofAlbertare to the Borgnetedipp. 177-242;all otherreferences
character
tion,OperaOmnia, (Paris,1890).He indicateshisviewofthescientific
ofthePriorAnalytics
in thefollowing
text:"Sed ad hocdicendumquod scientia
Posteriorum
libroPriorm,quam e converso:cumsubjecmagissubalternatur
tum hujus sit sub subjectoillius. Quod enim artifexlibriPriormmodm
sed a demonstratione
non est a libroPosteriorum,
accipitdemonstrandi,
quae
est per experimentm
et per viam sensus,a quo orituromnisscientia:et de
tali mododemonstrandi
non est scientiaPosteriorumIn I post,anal., tr. I,
c. 2, p. 7b.
When speakingof the modusemployedin the PosteriorAnalytics,Albert
states: "Resolutoriaenimest haec scientia:quia resolvit et resolveredoet
conclusiones
in principia,
quae suntcausae essentialeset propriaesive convertibilesimmediate."In I post,anal., tr. I, c. 1, p. 3b. This textindicatesthat
Albertdiscerned
whatmightbe termeda "showand tell" aspectofAristotle's
work.
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7
quibus fiat." And insofar as it exemplifiesdemonstrations,it contains demonstrationsthat have as their subject the demonstrative
syllogism.8No attempt is made to prove that there really is such an
entity as the demonstrativesyllogism. Albert simply identifiesit as
the subject of the science set out in the PosteriorAnalytics and then
indicates its definition.Logic, for him, concerns the instrumentsfor
moving fromthe known to a knowledgeof the unknown.9Demonstration is one of these instrumentsand, like any other,it has a particular
functionor end. Albert specifiesits end and definesit in termsof such :
demonstratioest syllogismusfaciens scire.10The term syllogismusconstitutes the generic element of this definition,and while its meaning
has already been determinedin the Prior Analytics, the meaning of
scire must be specifiedin the PosteriorAnalyticspriorto its use as an
element in the definitionof demonstration.Albert does this and also
mentions another reason forindicatingits meaning here:
Intendimusenim ex quibus et qualibus est demonstratio:
possunt
ad finemipsum,et utrumque
sciriquae suntad finem,nisiex proportione
et sic scientiafinisdirigitintentionem
illorumreferatur:
omniumaliorum
est determinatio
quae ad finemordinantur:et hoc rationepraemittenda
finis omnibus aliis.11
Scire thus serves as a principle from which the conditions for its
'production' are derived.
On the basis of this, Albert calls attention to what he considers
to be a demonstrationin which the conditions of demonstrationare
concluded by means of the aforementioneddefinitionofdemonstration:
that are true,
Every syllogismproductiveof scireis frompropositions
immediate,betterknownthan,priorto, and causes of the conprimary,
clusion.
is a syllogismproductiveof scire.
Every demonstration
is
frompropositions
thatare true,primary,
demonstration
etc.
Every
7 Ibid.,p. 2b.
8 This means that there are demonstrations
about demonstrations
in the
serve as examplesof dePosteriorAnalyticsand that these demonstrations
Thereare also presentedin thisworkinstancesof demonstration
monstration.
thathave a different
in sciences
subjectand serveas examplesofdemonstration
otherthanlogic.See, forexample,In II post,anal.,tr.II, c. ii, p. 192b.
On Albert'sconceptionof logic,see my "Logic, Language,and Albertthe
Great",Journalof theHistoryof Ideas, XXXIV, 3 (July-Sept.,1973), pp.
445-450.
10 In I post,anal., tr. II, c. 1.
11Ibid.,p. 21a
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Concerning the conclusion of this argument, he thus states: "conclusio est diffinitio materialis demonstrationis demonstrata per
diffinitionem
ejus quod est scire. Et hoc quidem est verum secundum
intellectumAristotelis,et tunc praepositio quae proponiturcum dicitur, ex veris et primis,nott circumstantiascausae materialis." 12We
thereforehave in the above, at least in Albert's mind,an instance of an
argumentin which the principlesof demonstrationare both set forth
and exemplified.Accordingly,we have in the above some idea of what
Alberttakes to be the principlesof demonstrationas well as an example of what he takes to be a demonstrationand thus a demonstrative
science. Given thispictureof demonstrationand demonstrativescience,
let us now turn to Albert's paraphrase of the Prior Analytics (Bk. I,
chs. 1-7).
II
Albert devotes two full tracts of his paraphrase to a discussion of
Aristotle'sdoctrineof the assertoriesyllogism.The firstdeals primarily
with the definitionof the syllogism,its division into perfectand imperfect, and the principles of the perfect and the imperfectsyllogism.13The second, entitled De GenerationeSyllogistnorumin Figura,
concerns the differentfiguresand modes of the syllogism.14
Unlike Lukasiewicz and others, the syllogism for Albert is a rule
of inferenceand not a conditional proposition,i.e., it is a certain kind
12Ibid., . 2, pp. 24b-25a.In the fourteenth
century,Ockhamquestionedthe
demonstrative
characterof this argument,and contendedthat it was not
On this point,see
but a certainnotification
properlyspeakinga demonstratio
DamasceneWebering,Theoryof Demonstration
to WilliamOckham,
according
he based his viewon the claimthatthe
(New York,1953),p. 19. Apparently
definition
or
syllogismus
faciensscire,whichis statedin termsof thefunction
finalcause of demonstration
and used as a middletermin this argument,
Ibid., p. 3 and p. 19. Also
onlyexpressesthe quid nominisof demonstration.
see ErnestA Moody,The Logicof WilliamofOckham,(New York, 1935),PP274-279.Walter Burley,however,anotherinfluentiallogicianof the same
At any rate,he states
period,seemsto have regardedit as a demonstration.
that the conclusionderivedin the above argumentis the firstin the science
expoundedin the Posterior
Analytics,and uses thewordprobaturto describe
themannerofits derivation.
AristoSee his Scriptum
superLibrosPosteriorum
telis.. . , (Venice,1514), i. I, c. 2, fol. 40vb. Burley'spredecessor,Robert
in which,he contends,themaGrosseteste,
clearlyviewsit as a demonstration
terialdefinition
of demonstration
Like
is concludedfromits formaldefinition.
Burley,he indicatesthat it is the firstconclusionof Aristotle'swork.See his
In I post,anal., (Venice,1514),c. 2, fol. .
13In I pr. anal., tr.I, pp. 459a-48sb.
14Ibid.,tr.II, pp. 486a-5i5b.
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of modus.15AU syllogisms are said to be syllogisms because they

consist of three terms arranged in such a way that they necessarily
entail a consequent- Albert calls this the necessitasconsequentiaein
contradistinctionto the necessitas consequents- but in some cases
the fact that a given syllogism necessarily entails a consequent requires no proof and in others it does.1Of the formertype of syllogism, Albert holds that it is apparent that it necessarily entails a
consequent and hence it is said to be perfect." Regarding the latter
type, he contends that it is not apparent that it necessarilyentails
a consequent and thus it is said to be imperfect.18
For Albert, the principles of the perfect syllogism are two: the
dici de omni and the dici de nullo.19The principle of the imperfect
syllogism,he claims, is conversion.20As set forthby Albert, the dici
de omni and the dici de nullo are neither axioms of a system nor
summary statements of the firstfour modes of the firstfigure syllogisms.21He calls them 'principles' and it seems that what he means
here is that syllogistic argumentation somehow proceeds from or
depends upon one or the other of them. 'To be predicated or said of
all' means that the predicate of a universal affirmativepropositionis
asserted of any and all of the parts of its subject; while 'to be predicated or said of none' means that the predicate of a universal negative
15The wordmodushas manymeanings.See A. Ernoutand A. Meillet,Dictionde la languelatine, 4th ed., rey.(Paris,i960), pp. 408-409.
nairetymologique
ofmodusas it pertainsto logic,see JamesA. Weisheipl,O. P.,
For a treatment
"The Evolutionof ScientificMethod,"The LogicofScience, ed. V. E. Smith,
, one
(New York, 1964),pp. 59-86. Amongthe meaningsof the wordmodus
can discerntwodistinctbut notunrelatedsenses.In one ofits usages,it means
the measure,norm,or way accordingto whichone proceeds,forexample,in
in a thingrean inquiry.In anotherofits usages,it meansthedetermination
sultingfromits subjectionto an objectivemeasure,normor way. Obviously
he is using
withthesyllogism,
when Albertusesthetermmodusin connection
manner.
it in theformer
16In I pr. anal., tr. I, c. 5, p. 466b.
17Ibid., . 6, p. 467a.
18 Ibid., pp. 47-47.Firstfiguresyllogisms
are called 'perfect'and second
are called'imperfect'.
It appearsthatAlbertthinks
and thirdfiguresyllogisms
evident
termsis intuitively
that the relationof transitivity
amongsyllogistic
in firstfiguresyllogismsonly.
19 In I pr. anal.,tr. I, c. 7, pp. 468a-468b.
20 "conversiopropositionum
in termmiseisdemfactaest pnncipiumper quod
Ibid., . 8, p. 469a. Althoughthis is the
imperfectus."
syllogismus
perficitur
it is not the only one. See
syllogisms,
primaryprincipleused in perfecting
ibid.,p. 469b.
21On Aristotle's
oftheseprinciples,
see,forexample,Bochenski,
understanding
op. cit.,p. 79.
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propositionis denied of any and all of the parts of its subject.22 By

'parts' in the above context, Albert clearly means subjective and not
integralor physical parts.23Accordingly,if the dici de omni is understood in this way, the proposition 'every man is an animal' does not
assert that every integral part of man, such as his arm, leg, heart,
etc., is an animal, ratherit asserts that every instance of man as such
is an animal. The same holds true mutatismutandisof the dici lenullo.
Accordingly, syllogistic argumentation resulting in an affirmative
conclusion depends on the dici de omni in the sense that it requires
of a term the capacity to be predicated of all of the subjective parts
of anotherterm; whilesyllogisticargumentationresultingin a negative
conclusion depends on the dici de nullo in the sense that it requires
of a term the capacity to be predicated of none of the subjective
parts of another term. If there were no such capacity, then syllogistic
argumentationwould be impossible, for argumentation of this sort
presupposesthat a predicate term can be said of or denied of whatever
its subject term is said of. This, it would seem, is why Albert states:
"Et iterumdicendumest quid est quod dicimus de omni vel de nullo:
sine his enim non potest esse discursus syllogisticus."24
Albert describes the principle of the imperfectsyllogisms in the
followingway: "Est autem conversio propositionisin terminissicut
terminorumtranspositio,ut subjectum fiat praedicatum,et e converso
de praedicato fiat subjectum." 25 As distinguished from the dici de
omni and the dici de nullo, its purpose consists in effectingthe reduction of imperfectsyllogismsto perfectsyllogisms,i.e., it is a principle
of proof.2"
Four differentforms of proposition are recognized as syllogistica
by Albert: the universal affirmative,the universal negative, the particular affirmative,and the particular negative (hencefortheach will
be representedby the letters A, E, I and respectively). Of these
forms,only the firstthree are said to admit of conversion:27
" In I r. anal., tr.I, c. 6.
23Albertindicatesthatthisis the case in the following
text: "Quando autem
dicitur,quando nihilest sumeresub subjecto,non stat nisipro partibussubjectivis: quia illae solae sumuntursub subjecto sicut communi:integrales
autemnonsumuntur
sub subjecto,quia totumsubjectumnon praedicaturde
ipsis." Ibid., . 7, p. 468b.
14Ibid.,. 2, p. 460b.
25Ibid.,. 8, p. 469b.
s* On thispoint,see,forexample,ibid.,tr.II, c. 8, p. 498b.
47Ibid., tr.I, c. 9, p. 473b.
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(a) xAy convertsto ylx

(b) xEy converts to yEx
(c) xly converts to ylx
As can be seen fromthe above, the conversionof the latter two forms
simplyinvolves a change in the position of theirrespectivesubject and
predicate terms,whereas the conversionof the firstinvolves a change
in its quantity as well. In each case, however, the quality of a given
proposition remains unchanged.
sio per conIn his discussion of conversion, Albert speaks of convey
, but rules it out as a principleforreducingsyllogisms.28
trapositionem
He also mentionstwo other ways of 'perfecting'imperfectsyllogisms,
viz., deductio ad impossibile and expositio, yet neither procedure is
explained prior to his consideration of the assertorie syllogism as
such.29
For Albert, the various syllogistic figuresresult from the relation
of termsto one another: "Ad generationemautem syllogismirequiritur
ordo terminorumin propositionibus syllogismipositorum, ex ordine
30
generantur syllogismorumdiversae figurae." As was common in
his day, he admits only three figures.31The reason forthis is given in
the followingpassage:
Si autemquaeratur,quare tantumtressuntfiguraeet qualiterordinantur
enimmediiduorum
ad invicem,
satispatetsolutioperante dicta: dispositio
scilicetut aut sitinterextrema,
mediorum
variarinonpotestnisitripliciter,
vel extraipsa. Si autemest interextrema,nonpotestesse nisisubjectum
in primaet praedicatumin secunda:quia aliteraccideretquod nihilconcluderete,sicutin ante habitisdictumest. Adhucautemex quo est inter
extremaquae sunt majus et minus secundumlineae praedicamentalis
ordinem,oportetquod subjectumprimisit praedicatumsecundi.Si vero
non potestesse nisi ante
mediumest extraet extremihabet positionem,
vel post. Et ante quidemfacitfiguramsecundam:post autemesse facit
tertiam.32
figuram
The basis for the distinctionbetween syllogisticfiguresthereforelies
in the position of the middle term: it is either between the extremes
or outside of the extremes. If it is between the extremes, the first
figureresults. If it is outside of the extremes,i.e., when the middle
term is predicate of both propositions or subject of both, either the
88 Ibid.,tr. I, c. 8, p. 469a.
29 Ibid.,p. 469b.
30Ibid.,tr.II, c. I, pp. 486a-486b.
31 See Bochenski,op. cit.,p. 216.
82In I pr. anal.,tr. II, c. 14,pp. 5i5a-5i5b.
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second or thirdfigureresults.There is no possibilityof a fourthfigure

because when the middle term is between both extremes,it must be
subjected to what is called the 'major extreme' and predicated of
what is called the 'minor extreme*.For, as Albert contends in the De
praedicabilibus, that which is between two extremes must be the
logical inferiorof one, viz., the major, and the logical superior of the
other, viz., the minor.33
Of the three figures,the first, according to Albert, is somehow
objectively superior to the second and third since in it the "medium
vere mediumest, et extremitatessunt vere extremitates.In aliis autem
medium et extrema non habent perfectammedii et extremorumrationem: et ideo in Ulis figurisnon perfectefit syllogismusextremitatum." 34 Using a combinatorial procedure, Albert determines all of
the possible syllogisticmodes (the mode of a syllogism results from
the quality and quantity of the propositions out of which it is composed), and then determineswhich of these are valid, i.e., utile.35Of
all possible modes, he acknowledges only the validity of four in the
firstfigure,four in the second, and six in the third:
i.i xAy
zAx
zAy
2.1 yEx
zAx
zEy
3.1 xAy
xAz
zly

1.2 xEy
zAx
zEy

FigureI
1.4 xEy
1.3 xAy
zlx
zlx
zly
zOy

2.2 yAx
zEx
zEy

FigureII
2.3
2.4 yAx
zlx
zOx
zOy
zOy

3.2 xEy
xAz
zOy

FigureIII
3.3 xly
3.4 xAy
xAz
xlz
zly
zly

3.5 xOy
xAz
zOy

3.6 xEy
xlz
zOy

Concerningthe four valid modes of the firstfigure,Albert claims

that all are confirmed(<oonfirmantur
) by the principlesdici de omni and
dici de nullo; 1.1 and 1.3 are confirmedby the dici de omni whereas
33De praedicabilibus
, tr.IV, . , . 6.
34In I pr. anal,,tr.II, c. 2, p. 489a.
35Albert'scombinatorial
procedurewas probablyderivedfromMoslemlogicians.See Bochenski,op. cit.,p. 219.
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1.2 and 1.4 are confirmedby the dici de nullo.36Althoughit is difficult

to see what Albert means by this, it seems that he regardstheseprinciples as somehow justifying or explaining the differentinferences
exhibited in these four modes. In any case, his remarkson the use of
these principlesin confirmingcertain syllogisticmodes would indicate
this. For example, when discussing 1.3, he states: "Et confirmaturper
dici de omni,a quo fitdiscursussyllogisticus: quia ex quo A inest omni
universaliter,tunc oportet quod insit omni parti ejus quod est
: autem aliquod est aliqua partium , oportet igitur quod Uli
insit A." 87
Of the four valid modes of the second figure,none are confirmed
by the above principles; all are said to be proven,however, by means
of conversion, conversion and the transposition of propositions,or
reductioad impossibile.88The firstand thirdmode onlyrequireconversion of the major proposition:
2.1 yEx convertsto xEy thusforming1.2 xEy
zAx
zAx
zEy
zEy
2.3 yEx convertsto xEy thusforming1.4 xEy
zlx
zly
zOy
zOy
The second mode requires both conversion of the minor proposition
and transposition:
2.2 yAx convertsto xEz, which,in turn,becomes1.2 xEy
zAx
in
zEx themajorproposition
zEy
zEy
The fourthmode cannot be proven by eitherof the above procedures,
but, as Albert states, it is proven by reductioad impossibile.39 This
involves taking the contradictoryof the conclusion of 2.4 along with
its major proposition and thus forming1.1. Since the conclusion of
1.1 is inconsistentwith the remainingpropositionin 2.4, the acceptance
of both propositions of 2.4 and the denial of its conclusion would
constitutean inconsistency.
Like the valid modes of the second figure,it is also necessary to
34In I pr. anal.,tr.II, c. 2, p. 489b and c. 4, p. 491b.
" Ibid.,. 4, p. 491b.
se Ibid.,. 14,p. 513a.
* Ibid.,. 8, p. 498b.
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prove the validity of those of the third by means of conversion,conversion and transposition,or reductioad impossibile.Four of the six
valid modes require conversion of the minor proposition only, viz.,
3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6; one requires conversion and transposition,viz.,
3.3; and one requiresreductioad impossibile,viz., 3.5.
Albert concludes his treatment of Aristotle's assertorie syllogism
with the followingremarkson the order of the firstto the second and
third figures,and of the second to the third figure:
et metrmet
sicutprincipium
Ordo autemest,quod primapraemittitur
: primaquidemratione,
perectioaliarum.Secundaautemest ante tertium
quia ejus mediumest primmpositione,tertiaeautemfiguraemediumest
ultimumpositione.Secunda autem ratione,quia duplex concluditproblema,universalescilicetet particulare:cum tertianon concludatnisi
particulare.Tertiaetiamratione,quia secundafiguradescendita prima
figuraperconversionem
majorissecundimodiprimaefigurae:tertiavero
minorisejusdemmodi.40
figuradescendita primaper conversionem
The firstfigureis priorto the othersinsofaras it is the principleof the
second and the third,i.e., the second figureresultsfromthe conversion
of the major proposition of the first figure,while the third results
from the conversion of the minor proposition of the first figure.41
It. is also the measure of the other figuresin the sense that the second
and third figuresyllogisms are validated by being in some manner
transformedinto the firstfigure.42
The second figure is prior to the third on three counts: (a) the
middle termin the second figurefunctionsas a predicate,whereas the
middle term in the third figure functions as a subject only:43 (b)
universal and particular conclusions can be derived in the second
figure,whereas only particularconclusions can be derivedin the third;
and (c) the second figureis derived fromthe firstby means of conversion of the major proposition of the second mode of the firstfigure,
while the third figureis derived from the conversion of the minor
proposition of the same mode of the firstfigure.In connection with
this last point, it should be noted that only the second and third
figurescan be derived from the firstin this manner; Albert is not
40 Ibid.,c. 14,p. 515b.
41This was already
Categorico,
pointedout by Boethius.See De Syllogismo
ed. J-P. Migne,PatrologiaeLatinae,Vol. 64, i860, 812D-813B.
42It seemsthatit is the
in the
of secondand thirdfiguresyllogisms
perfectio
sameway.
43Albertclaimsthat
predicatesare priorto subjectsin the predicamental
line. See, forexample,De praedicabilibus,
tr. 4, c. 3, p. 63b.
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saying that every valid mode of each of these figurescan be derived

by means of conversion,nor could he correctlysay this.44
Ill
Given the preceding exposition, it should be clear why Albert does
not regard Aristotle's procedure in the first seven chapters of the
Prior Analytics as demonstrative.First, given Albert's understanding
of Aristotle's theory of demonstration,only that which can be expressed by means of a categoricalpropositionadmits of demonstration.
Albert, however, regards the syllogism as an inference scheme.
Second, demonstration is made possible through a certain kind of
syllogism; yet, the procedure used in validating second and third
figuresyllogismsis not itselfsyllogistic.Lastly, Albert contends that
the subject of a science does not itselfadmit of demonstration.45But
the syllogismsimpliciterconstitutesthe subject of syllogisticascientia,
and its various modes and figuresin differentways exhibit this subject.4
While not regarding Aristotle's method as set forth in the first
seven chapters of the Prior Analytics as demonstrative,it seems that
Albertconceived of it as being a decision procedure.He recognizesonly
certain firstfiguresyllogismsas evidently valid and confirmedto be
such by the dici de omni and dici de nullo. Syllogismsformedin either
the second or third figuresare judged to be valid only if they can be
transformedinto firstfiguresyllogismsby means of conversion,transposition, or reductioad impossibile.Those syllogismswhich cannot be
transformedinto firstfiguresyllogisms are regarded as invalid. For
Albert then, reductiois a method used in determiningthe scope of the
subject of syllogisticascientia. Unlike demonstration,reductiois not
productive of scientificknowledge and since it is not productive of
such knowledge, one may wonder why Albert refers to the Prior
Analytics as if it were a work in science. Indeed, why does he claim
that logic itselfis a science, if a very importantpart of logic does not

satisfy the conditions of science ?

Although Albert is not too clear on this point, there are several
reasons for thinkingthat he considered only certain sections of the
Prior Analytics to be non-demonstrativeand others demonstrative.
First of all, he indicates that the inherenceof proper passions in the
44 2.4, forexample,could not be derivedin thismanner.
45In I post,anal., tr. Ill, c. 1, p. 68b.
46In I pr. anal., tr. I, c. 1, p. 459a.
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syllogismas such is knownin a demonstrativeway: "sic enim acceptus

syllogismussimplex proprias habet passiones quae de ipso per propria
47
principiasunt probandae, ut fiatde ipso scientia specialis." Secondly,
shortly after his exposition of Aristotle's modal syllogistic, Albert
claims that the passion 'to have only three terms' is proven {probatur)
to belong to the syllogismas such and it seems that here he is using
the term probatur as a synonym for demonstrator
.48 Finally, the
assumptionthat Albert did not view all sections of the Prior Analytics
as being non-demonstrativeor demonstrative could explain why he
claims in his paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics that the mode
followedin its companion work is not demonstrative.For, given this
assumption,one can take Albert's remarksin this work to be directed
to the non-demonstrativesections of the Prior Analytics and, in particular, to Bk. I, chs. 1-7. His remarks to the effectthat the Prior
Analytics counts as a work in science can be taken to referto other
sections of this work. What is of interest in all this, however, is the
degree of reflectionthat Albert manifests regarding questions concerningthe epistemicstatus of both the Prior and PosteriorAnalytics.
East Liverpool, Ohio
Kent State University

47Ibid.,p. 459b.
48 Ibid., tr. , c. 6, p. 617a. It shouldbe notedthat certainlogiciansof the
14thcenturycontendedthat 'to have threeterms'countsas a passionthatis
to belongto syllogism.See, forexample,Richardof
properlydemonstrated
ed. Edward A.
Campsall,QuestionesSuper LibrumPriormAnaleticorum,
Synan,TheWorksofRichardofCampsall,Vol. I, (Toronto,1968),1.35 and 1.36.
29

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00:01:57 AM

Vivarium
, XII, i (1974)
Masters , Books and Library ai Chartres
According to the Cartularies of Notre-Dame and Saint-Pre*

ROBERTO GIACONE

once more about Chartres,its schools and its masters,

after the previous works writtenat the end of the last century
Speaking
1
by R. L. Poole and A. Clerval 2, and the many studies that
have since followed8, may appear absurd or at best pretentious.
Furthermore,attemptingto extract informationand inferconclusions
fromthe cartularies alone of Notre-Dame and Saint-Pre 4, now that
* I shouldlike to thankhereProfessor
GilesConstableforhis helpand many
and Mr. WarrenLeon for havingread my paper. This
usefulsuggestions,
researchhas beenmadepossibleby a grantawardedby the Instituteof InternationalEducationat New York.
1 The Schoolsof Chartres,
in Illustrations
,
of theHistoryof MedievalThought
London 1884,p. 109-35(quotedhereas Illustrations
, fromthesecondedition,
London1920,p. 95-115).
2 Les colesde Chartres
au moyenge,Paris 1895.
3 Foran exhaustivebibliography
on thissubject,seethestudiesof. Jeauneau,
deBernarddeChartres
humerisinsidentes:essaid'interprtation
Nani gigantm
,
in "Vivarium"V (1967), p. 79-99; and NotesurVcolede Chartres,in "Studi
Medievali" 3rd ser. V (1964), p. 821-65.Cf. too, R. L. Poole, The Masters
s time,in "The English
in JohnofSalisbury*
oftheSchoolsat Paris and Chartres
in Studiesin ChronHistoricalReview"XXXV (1920), p. 321-42,republished
ologyandHistory,Oxford1934,P-223-47(citedfromnowonwardsas Studies);
H. Liebeschtz,MedievalHumanismin theLifeand Writings
ofJohnofSalisdi
bury,London 1950; T. Gregory,Anima mundi: la filosofiadi Guglielmo
Florence1955; L. C. Mac Kinney,BishopFulbert
di Chartres,
e la scinola
Conches
South Bend 1957. Some indications
and Educationat theSchoolof Chartres,
can also be drawnfromtherecentbooksof B. Stock,Mythand Sciencein the
Princeton1972 (especiallythe
Century.A studyofBernardSilvester,
Twelfth
Platonism
andPoetryin theTwelfth
lastpart,p. 227-83); and of W. Wetherbee,
Princeton1972.In both
Theliterary
oftheSchoolofChartres,
influence
Century.
schoolexistedor not
bookshowever,thequestionwhetheran institutionalized
dealtwith.
is notspecifically
in Chartres
4 Cartulaire
de l'Abbayede Saint-Prede Chartres
, ed. M. Gurard,Paris 1840,
de Chartres,
ed. E. De Lpinoisand L.
2 vol.; and Cartulairede Notre-Dame
Merlet,Chartres1862-65,3 vol. For theobituarycontainedin thethirdvolume
to these othersources:
of the lattercartulary,we can also make reference
du XI e sicle,Chartres1893;
chartrain
R. Merletand A. Clerval,Un manuscrit
de la Provincede Sens,in "Recueildes
A. Molinierand A. Longnon,Obituaires
et BellesLettres"
de la Francepubliparl'Acadmiedes Inscriptions
historiens

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

studies about Chartres in general are so advanced, may again seem

paradoxical.
But there are plausible reasons for doing so. First of all, for far
too long primarysources have been put to one side, and relyingon
ClervaTs book- a superstructurein itself- , other scaffoldingshave
been raised, so that more and more we have been assessing the artificial frameworkas the true building, taking for granted the assumptions of Clerval without thoroughlychecking the sources themselves.
Second, this classical work, whence began not a few of the ideas
on which definitionsof the twelfthcenturyRenaissance are founded5,
is based primarilyon the cartularies of Notre-Dame and Saint-Pre,
and thereforeit incites us to do the same.
Third, a recent essay of R. W. Southern 6, which definesthe school
of Chartresas a legend 7 and raises many doubts about the system of
education and the mutual relationships among the masters of Chartrain Humanism, has crudely recalled us from dream to reality.
It has revived discussion of some points in Clerval's theory which
seem to be due to unwarranted enthusiasm, and has taken the cat. II, Paris 1906 (Fromnow on citedas: Saint-Pre,Notre-Dame
; A. Clerval,
and dates concerning
Manuscrit
; A. Longnon,Obituaires).For identification
see L. and R. Merlet,Dignithepersonageappearingin Chartres'cartularies,
in "Archives
Listeschronologiques,
de Chartres.
tairesde l'glisede Notre-Dame
du diocsede Chartres"t. V, Chartres1900.
5 On thisconcept,see Ch. H. Haskins,The RenaissanceoftheTwelfth
Century,
Cambridge(Mass.) 1927; G. Par,A. Brunet,P. Tremblay,La Renaissancedu
Paris-Ottawa1933; P- Renucci,L'avenXlle sicle.Les colesetl'enseignement,
turede l'Humanismeeuropenau Moyen ge (IV -XIV e sicle),Clermontsurla Renaissance
Ferrand1953,p. 54-62and 68-79;and thevolumeEntretiens
du XI le sicle,ed. M. De Gandillacand . Jeauneau,Paris-TheHague 1968.
About this discussedtopic, cf. W. A. Nitze, The so-calledTwelfth
Century
Renaissance,in "Speculum"XXIII (1948),p. 464-71; E. MatthewsSanford,
The TwelfthCentury:Renaissanceor Proto-Renaissance
?, in "Speculum"
XXVI (1951), p. 635-42; U. T. Holmes Jr., The Idea of a Twelfth
Century
in "Speculum"XXVI (1951),p. 643-51; and M. D. Chenu,DRenaissance,
au XI le sicle,
l'coledeChartres
de l'homme
couverte
dela natureetphilosophie
in "Cahiersd'HistoireMondiale" II (1954), p. 313-25.
Humanismand the School of Chartres,in MedievalHumanismand other
studies,Oxford1970,p. 61-85.Cf.,however,someSouthern'spointscontested
in "Anuariode estudios
totheschoolofChartres,
by P. Dronke,Newapproaches
aboutl'tatde la question
medievales"VI (1969), p. 117-40;and theremarks
by
di Studio,
in XIX Settimana
Les colesdeChartres
etdeSaint-Victor,
J.Chtillon,
Spoleto1972,II, p. 795-804.
7 Ibid.,p. 83.Cf.,too,p. 66: . .whatdo weknowabouttheschoolofChartres?
The answerto thisis: remarkably
little;muchlessthanis generally
supposed.".
31

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

thedral-schoolof Notre-Dame down fromits pedestal. As a result of

Southern's findings,we do not know now whether to regretthe absence of a "classical" Clerval work for other similar schools, or complain about the unintentionallymisleading influences such a work
has brought about. It is more than justified then, to go back to the
sources again, trying to select which records we can use and what
conclusions we can draw from them.
I
Notre-Dame the cathedral, in the center of the ancient town, and
Saint-Pre the monastery,not very far fromits walls 8 stand as two
opposite poles in the topographical planimetryof Chartres. The two
buildings, distant less than a mile from one another, were destined
nevertheless to play a different(even though equally important)
role in the cultural evolution of the town. The cathedral, rising to
new life at the beginningof the eleventh century9, assumed its final
settlement- we can still admire today 10- a centurylater. The abbey,
founded around the middle of the seventh centuryn, populated at
once by many monks, was very soon to become a shining center of
every virtue ia. Here are the two symbols of the cultural glory of
Chartres,a material pod and a somehow diaphanous tegumentof an
alleged deep and intellectual movement.
The monk Patii of Saint-Pre, editing the cartulary of his abbey
in the second half of the eleventh century,talked about Chartresat
the epoch of the Norman siege [858] as the most rich and populous
town of Neustria, famous forthe greatness of its walls, the beauty of
its buildings and the study of the liberal arts 1S. He was probably
8 Saint-Pre
locus,nonlongea menibusCarnotine
, I, p. 4: "I taque memoratus
Around1185,veryprobably,it was enclosedintra
situs..
urbisnormaliter
murosof Chartres,withmostof the Saint-Presuburb:cf. Saint-Pre
, I, Introd., p. ccxlv.
Notre-Dame
, I, p. 14.
10 For thehistoryofthemanylossesand themostimportant
firesthataffected
, I, Introd.,
the cathedral,cf. A. Clerval,Manuscrit
, p. 47-91and Notre-Dame
Notre-Dame
in
some
find
can
We
cxxxvii-cxl.
,
I,
records,
too,
252, and
p.
p.
III, p. 200.
11Saint-Pre,I, Introd
., p. ccxxxiv.
12Ibid., I, p. 4:
. .non modicomonachorumcoetu resplendebat,qui, in
; et beatoPetroapostolo
Christiamore,carnisviciamortificando
comprimebant
famulans,velut Lucifertunc omnibusvirtutumluce radiabat.".
13Ibid., I, p. 4-5: "Urbs . . . populosa admodumatque opulentissima
inter
edificiorum
Neustriaeurbes, murorummagnitudine,
quoque pulchritudine,
vel artiumliberaliumstudiis,habebaturfamossisima".
32

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

projectinginto the past featuresproper to his own time; but to apply

to a formerperiod categories of one's own historicalcontext, has been
a typical proceeding of every period. We evidently need to define
the past, be aware of it, to defineourselves and to find a raison d'tre
in our existence and in our present time of life. The phrase of Paul,
therefore,appears to us perfectlyconsistent- if seen and considered
in a metahistoricalor ahistorical context- , and can somehow project
its rays of light on the period we are about to consider, namely the
eleventh and the twelfth centuries. Anyhow, this idea expressed
by the monk Paul, was the starting point for the firstworks about
the schools at Chartres, on whose judgement we are still deeply
indebted and too much influenced14.
Were these analyses true ? Or were they vitiated by a triumphalistic
and too enthusiastic means of conceiving History ? And above all:
is it possible to form any idea about the school of Chartres making
use of our cartularies ? Let us see. School, at that time as in our day,
was firstof all synonymous with teachers and books. Starting with
the study of records concerningthem, it is perhaps possible to draw
some conclusions about the school, the type of learning,the subjects
of interest: at least we can become acquainted with a couple of important entities- the first"teaching", the second "taught".
Masters in Chartresseem to have been numerous,but only fromthe
twelfthcentury onwards. We must caution at once that the single
word magister
, if found isolated among the records of our cartularies,
does not representmuch, is in some way very ambiguous, and can lead
to dangerous conclusions 15. Certainly the term magister associated
14The firstattentionto Chartres,
indeed,was paid by the Histoirelittraire
de la France, XIII, Paris 1814,p. 376-81;and thenby . Haurau,Histoirede
la philosophie
de
, Paris 1872,vol. I, p. 390-419;Bernardet Thierry
scholastique
Chartres
et Belles-Lettres.
des
, in "Acadmiedes Inscriptions
Comptes-rendus
sancesde Tanne1872" 3rdser.I, Paris 1873,p. 75-84; Mmoiresurquelques
du XI le sicle, occasiond'uneproselatinepubliepar M. Th. Wright,
matres
in "Mmoiresde l'Acadmie des Inscriptionset Belles-Lettres",
XXVIII,
de l'glise de
2, Paris 1876,p. 223-38; and Mmoiresur quelqueschanceliers
Chartres,
ibid.,XXXI, 2, Paris 1884,p. 77-86.Then,forthe following
works,
seeabove,n. 1-2-3-6.
16See P. Rich,Recherches
des lacs du IXe au XI le sicle,
sur l'instruction
in "Cahiersde CivilisationMdivale",V (1962),p. 179. In factwe have some
wherea magister
examplesin ourcharters,
Radulphuscarpentarius
(Notre-Dame,
III, p. 14), a pincernarum
, I, p. 68), and somemaistros
magister
(Saint-Pre
, III, p. 62) are testified:all thesepersonageshave little
fabrice(Notre-Dame
to share with the schoolmasters.
. .1
33

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

with the word schola could be more significantie. But this kind of
binomial unfortunately,is very rare in our charters17. When these
terms are found, there is probably a furtherdistinction to make
- the formerseems to represent
betweenmagisterscholaeand scholarum
latter
the
head of a school18- . The
the regular schoolteacher; the
testimonyof Saint-Pre cartulary, where Gausbertus after a gap of
time is named in two differentcharters as magisterscole and then
scolarumcan prove this assumption ie, even though this record alone
does not demonstrate anything for certain.
But we can perhaps infermore fromour sources. The name magister
recurs in Saint-Pre charters only six times referringto fivepersons;
while in Notre-Dame cartulary this term is present by the scores.
Besides, of the five masters mentioned in Saint-Pre records no one
can be definitelyidentifiedas a monk and teacher of this abbey; surely
neither the canons Garius and Radulph 20, nor the clerk Fulgo 21.
Anothermaster,Hugh, signinga charterin Orleans, was veryprobably
living in that town 22.Still Gausbertus remains,the only one that may
have ben teaching at Saint-Pre: but it would be a mistake to assert
that without furtherproofs23. Of course no important conclusion
can be drawn by these negative statements,even if it is really possible
that we are here in the presence of a testimonyinvolving the ecclesiastical teaching from the end of the eleventh century onwards,
emphasizing a more and more sharp cloisonnementbetween the
monastic and the episcopal schools. The formeris in unchecked decline
in every part of Europe; the latter represents the novelty of the
twelfthcentury,the firstreal impulse towards more general and open
learning and ultimately the warning sign of the rise of the Universities M. This can be explained, too, as a reflectionof the antithesis
16Even if P. Rich,Recherches
, p. 179, says that scholacan simplysignifya
groupof persons:but we thinkthisis neverthe case withourcontext.
17It recursthreetimesin Saint-Pre(I, p. 215; II, p. 432; II, p. 561),and only
once in Notre-Dame(III, p. 194).
18 Cf.G. Par,Renaissance
, p. 69.
19 Saint-Pre
, I, p. 215: "Gausbertus,magisterscole" [before1080]; ibid., II,
p. 561: "Gausbertus,magisterscolarum"[before1103].
20 Ibid., II, p. 619 and 642.
21Ibid., II, p. 304: "Fulgo clericus,magistervicecomitis".
22Ibid., II, p. 32.
23For Gausbertus,see above, . 17 and 19.
24Thereis a thirdtypeofschool,besidesthemonasticand thechapter-school,
in Twelfth-Cen
thatofthelay courts:see R. Klibansky,TheSchoolofChartres,
turyEurope and theFoundationof ModernSociety,ed. M. ClagettG. Post
R. Reynolds,Madison1961,p. 4. Howeverlaypeopleseemverylittlecultivated
34

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

between two very differenttypes of persons, swarming around and

inside the monasteryand the cathedral. The cathedral is the symbol
ofofficialcharacter,wheremostlydeeds and legacies requireimportant
witnesses;whereasthe monasteryis a place topographicallyvery close
to the town,but psychologically,in the mind of the people, a country
28
place, more close to their simple feelings
To come back to our term magister,I repeat, we must be very
careful. The fact that in the Saint-Pre cartulary the word magister
and magisterscoleis so infrequent,could only show that the teachers
did not take part as witnesses to the signature of deeds. Moreover
nothingproves that the magistimentioned in Notre-Dame charters
could not have any relationship with the monastery of Saint-Pre.
The patternsof this entente,however,are not evident in anyone of our
cartularies.On the other hand, if we have beforepointed out the lack
of records about the name magisterin the Saint-Pre cartulary, the
statementsconcerningteaching and education are not better testified
for the cathedral. For instance, only once, reading throughout the
three volumes edited by Lpinois and Merlet, could I find the term
magisterscoie: it was forHildegar, subdean and master of Our Lady 2e,
a very close friendof bishop Fulbert 27.Otherwisethe echoes of what
seems to have been one of the most famous cathedral-schoolsin the
twelfthcenturyRenaissance remain silent in the records of our charters.
On the threshold of the eleventh century nevertheless, we have
the mentionof two grammarians,Aregard 28and Ebrard 29.The latter
is perhaps to be identifiedwith a deacon and chancellor whose name
recurs in the Obituary 30, and not with the Ebrard monk, abbot of
in thisperiod:cf.P. Rich, De ducationantique Vducationchevaleresque
,
Paris 1968,p. 70.
26Beyondthenamesstatedin common(mostlyecclesiastical,
theseonesrecur
in Notre-Dame
: rex,dux, comes
, comitissa,medicus,scutaria,miles,magister,
. vicedominus,
domna
, matrona',
aurifaber,princeps,vir nobilis, monetarius
whereasin Saint-Prewe can find: carpentarius,
, fur, cordubanarius
fabrus
narius,carnifex,macellarius,cementarius,
pellifex, famulus,porcarius,bolen
tanator,
feltrerius,
gerius,asinarius,cocus,sartor,avenarius,molendinarius,
carronus.
lorimerarius,
fossarius,
26Notre-Dame,
III, p. 194: "Obiit Hildegarus,subdecanuset magisterscole
huiusecclesie".
27Cf.L. . Mac Kinney,Fulbert,p. 18-20.
28Notre-Dame,
III, p. 136.
29 Saint-Pre,
II, p. 401.
30Notre-Dame,
III, p. 4: "Obiit Ebrardus,levita,subdecanusac cancellarius,
litteriserudituset facundoeloquio". The circumlocution
employedmakesus
35

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

Breteuil, keeper of the relics, chancellor as well, and contemporaryof

the formerEbrard 31.This is really a useless argument,but I do wish
to raise it here, in order to show how difficultmay be the identification of every personage, and consequently a consistent analysis
of the outstanding characteristics and features of the Chartrian
school. It is true that Clerval warns us indirectlynot to be so pessimistic simply because we find infrequentlythe word magisterscole,
affirmingthat throughoutall the eleventh until the beginningof the
twelfth century it is the bishop himself who gives instruction at
Chartres. But in his demonstration, only the example of Fulbert
stands out. It is true that Clerval says that the chancellor can cooperate in teaching with him, and only with the arrival on the scene
of Bernard will the position of the magisterscole be created32: here
again however, records are very scanty. Very often then, the speech
revolves around the same names, and we do not know how far it is
right to generalize from these examples.
There are some convincingexamples whichtestifyto the relationship
intercurrentamong the officeof schoolmasterand that of chancellor,
but unfortunatelythe personages called to support this thesis are the
The officeof the magister
same as before: Hildegar 33 and Ebrard
scole seems to have been the step previous to reachingthe chancellorship- perhaps the most importantrank under the bishop-, as some
records about master Bernard show 35.It is very interestingto notice
L. C. Mac Kinney,Fulbert,
thinkthatthisone was theEbrardusgrammaticus.
p. 22, following
probablyA. Clerval,coles, p. 47-48,does not seemto know
the above-mentioned
record.
31Notre-Dame
, III, p. 105: "Obiit Eubrardus,primodevotusmatrisDei canonicusac studiosuscancellarius,
postverototiusobedienciemonacuset abbas
assidueevangelizansomnibus".See also Saint-Pre
, I, p. no, 117 and 120.
32 See R. L. Poole, Studies,p. 228-29;and R. Klibansky,SchoolofChartres,
P. 4-533That Hildegarmay have also been chancelloris howevera simplesupposition: cf.L. C. Mac Kinney,Fulbert,
p. 19.
34 Even ifmyinference
on Ebrardwereinexact(see above n. 29 and 30), this
is alwaysvalid,becausethe otherEbrard,too, had been chancellor
reference
recordin Notre-Dame,
II, p. 146:
(see above n. 31). Thereis anotherinteresting
ecclesiecarnotensis"
: butdoesit mean
"magisterPetrusde Taaris,cancellarius
ormagister
is onlyan honorific
thathe reallytaughtat Chartres,
titlesometimes
given to the chancellor?
36Cf. L. Merlet,Manuscrit
. . Bernardus
, p. 196: "Vulgrinuscancellarius.
scolemagister"[around1121].In a charterof 1124Bernardis alreadyattested
as chancellor(Saint-Pre,II, p. 469: "Bernardocancellarlo. . . Gisleberto
to observethe ecclesiasticalpromotions
canonico"). It is very interesting
throughourcharters.In fact,onlytwoyearslater,in 1126,we meetGilbertas
36

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

that, if we exclude the obituary, the chartersof the cathedral report

the word magistervery late. The first record of a master signing
as a witness36 recurs under bishop Peter of Celle [1181-83], and
around the same years the word will become more and more familiar
in Notre-Dame cartulary37, until the inflation (if we can apply a
modern and up to date category of judgement) of the thirteenth
century where in one charter alone, for instance, the term magister
is testifiedfor six differentpersons38. That often "master" may be
synonymouswith "schoolmaster", or can at least indicate a learned
person when applied to the clerks or canons of Chartres39, we are
pretty sure, because many times it is associated with a name or a
formula40 which cannot leave us in doubt about the activity of these
persons41.
But all these records, decisive according to Clerval, neither completely prove his assumptions, nor permitto infermany conclusions.
There were many masters in Chartres, mostly among the canons
of the cathedral. From the twelfthcentury onwards, some of them
were definitelyregular teachers; but some others were difficultto
cancellarius
II, p. 267), officehe held until1137whenGuidowas
(Saint-Pre,
nominatedat his place (Saint-Pre,II, p. 385). Thereis howeveran unsolved
questionabout Gilbert.Why in the same day [27 nov. 1126] did he signtwo
as canon and the latteras chancellor(Saint-Pre
, II, p.
barters,the former
267 and 307) ? See aboutthisproblemN. M. Haring,Epitaphsand necrologies
du
et littraire
doctrinale
II ofPoitiers,in "Archivesd'histoire
onbishopGilbert
as AHDLMA). Vulmoyen-ge"XXXVI (1969),p. 72-74(quotedhenceforth
, I, p. 103) through
grinuswas chancellorfromaround1099 (cf. Notre-Dame
1121.His deathis howeverput later,becauseafterhavingheldthechancellorValle (see Notre-Dame,
III, p.
ship,he was stillcanonicusat Saint-Jean-en118).
3e In reality,thereare in thisveryfirstdocumentthreemasterswho signed:
see Notre-Dame,I, p. 207.
37Ibid,,I, pp. 211,217, 218 and 239.
88 Ibid., II, p. 146.
39 It "isstriking
and canonicusare linked
how manytimesthe wordsmagister
almostall therecordsreferto a periodfollowing
and thatfurthermore
together,
? It is imthetwelfth
century:did all the mastersteachin thechapter-school
II, p. 146; III, pp. 5, 12, 13, 22, 23, 25, 35,
possibleto say. Cf.Notre-Dame,
38, 42, 45, 50, 69, 93, 95, 99, 105, 112, 117, 118, 119, 128, 158, 165, 176, 178,
forthetwelfth
,
188,203,210,214,219.Two mentions
centuryare in Saint-Pre
II, pp. 526 and 619.
40 Notre-Dame,
III, pp. 12, 69, 109,162.
41.Lesne,Les colesde la fin du Ville sicle la findu XI le, in Histoire de
la proprit
en France,vol. V, Lille 1940,pp. 453-64,treatsthe
ecclsiastique
wholequestionofthetermand theidea of"master"; he tendsalmostalwaysto
themagister
witha pedagogue,currently
teachingor previously
having
identify
taught.
37

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

, succentoresor
define, and then many of them were simple cantores
es*2, namely heads of the cathedral choir. We would be
precentor
sceptical to insert this kind of magistias an integratingpart of a
cultural leaven which many scholars have deemed to be classified
as a Proto-Renaissance or a Renaissance tout-court
, balancing it
against the correspondingItalian movement of the fifteenthcentury.
Moreover, the recent propositions expressed by Southern, have
produced a psychologicalshock among the supportersof the greatness
of Chartres' school, and a sort of cultural earthquake to Clerval's
theories.43All is put back into dispute. To cite only a few examples
concerning the subjects I have treated so far, Southern maintains
for instance that the relationship between magisterand cancellarius
is by no means so obvious as Clerval claimed, that a master signing a
charter at Chartresas a witness cannot be automatically enrolled in
the formation (by now more and more scanty. . .) of the cathedral
teachers 44 Thus, according to Southern,Thierry- the famous author
of the Heptateuchonand one of the pillars of Chartres'school in Cler- was surely chancellor from 1141 to 1151, but
val's demonstration
nothingproves that he was also a teacher at the same time 45.
If Clerval proceeded in his inferenceswith a party zeal to raise
Chartres' school ber alles, and thereforesolicited his sources too
markedly, Southern on the contraryfounds his proofs "challenging"
the sources and causing a violent impact on the reader. The outcome is
not less seductive than the quiet and apologetical demonstrationof
Clerval. The hypotheses (or theses ?) of Southern would fit very well
with our doubts and cautions, and I would like to subscribe to them.
But unfortunatelynot all his reasoningis carriedon withoutblemishes.
For instance we have a record published twenty years ago by Dom
Jean Leclercq, that impugns Southern's argumentations about
Thierry and the alleged non-interconnectionbetween the terms
magisterand cancellarius. In fact he found in a Vatican manuscript
(Vat. Reg. Lat . 278 , fol. 72-73) a list of masters,presentat the council
of Reims in 1148 : Thierryof Chartresis clearlystated here as a master
42Cf.Notre-Dame,
III, pp. 38,42, 93, 214; and A. Longnon,Obituaires,
p. 157h.
43See for instancethe reviewof Southern'sbook by F. Oakley, in "The
AmericanHistoricalReview" 77,5 (i972)> P- I42444Cf. R. W. Southern,Humanism,pp. 66-7. Aboutthe relationship
between
see also above,nn. 33 and 34; and thepointraisedby
and cancellarius,
magister
Gilbertof La Porre.
P. Dronke,Approaches,
pp. 119-21,concerning
45 R. W. Southern,Humanism,p. 70: "Nor is thereany evidencethat he
[Thierry]taughtat Chartreswhilehe was chancellor".
38

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00:02:04 AM

of school, with many other known personages 46. In this year [1148]
he had already been chancellor for seven years: thus it becomes impossible to claim that thereare no proofsof Thierry'steachingbetween
1141 and 1151.
His presence at Reims moreover, can also prove an identification
denied by Southern47 and already supported by Clerval, Poole and
Lesne without any proof48: that the Terriensquidam scholarummagisterattendingthe council of Soisson in 1121, is to be identifiedwith
the author of the Heptateuchon.
In fact, almost in the same context, Thierryspeaks about the same
argument,namely the Unity and Trinity of God, and on both occasions a quotation of Athanasius recurs49. If thereforeClerval was
effectivelywrong, inventing two quotations on Thierry as schoolmaster50,his conclusions were "inexactly" right.
Furthermore,foundinghimselfon ClervaTs assumptions, Southern
claims that "thereis not the slightestevidence of a connectionbetween
Thierryand Chartres,until he became chancellor in 1141" 51.But we
possess the cartulary of Notre-Dame of Josaphat, unpublished at
ClervaTs time, in which the three attestations of a Teodericus archidiaconus, around the years 1127-1139, could very probably referto
our master52. We perfectlyagree on the other hand with Southern
when he says that a chancellor signing a deed in our cartularies does
not mean accordinglythe presence of a furthermasterin the cathedralschool, as the name of a famous master present in a charter does not
4e See J.Leclercq,TextessurSaint-Bernard
dela Porre,in "Mediaeval
etGilbert
Studies" XIV (1952), p. 109: "MAGISTI SCOLARUM: . . . Petruslumb[ardus].Theodericus
carnot[ensis].Robertusde bosco. Adam de paruo ponte
et alii multi".
47 R. W. Southern,Humanism
Les coles,
, p. 70, n. i. See also J. Chtillon,
p. 799,. 12.
48 See A. Clerval,coles,p. 169-70; R. L. Poole, Illustrations
, p. 100, and
Studies,p. 242; . Lesne, coles,p. 162.
49 See Abelard,Historiacalamitatum
Paris 1959,p. 88, lines
, ed. J. Monfrin,
877-882(PL 178, col. 150B); and J. Leclercq,Textes,p. 108-9.Moreover:
is it necessary
that Thierrydeals withthisproblem,namelythe
to remember
Cf. the editionof N. M. Haring,
Unityof the Divinity,in his Hexaemeron?
to Thierryof Chartres
and
The Creationand theCreatorof theworldaccording
Clarenbaldus
ofArras,in "AHDLMA" XXII (1955),p. 184-200.
50 Cf.A. Clerval,coles,p. 160; and R. W. Southern,
Humanism,p. 70, n. 1.
61Ibid.,p. 70.
See Cartulaire
de Josaphat,ed. Ch. Mtais,2 vol., Chartres
de Notre-Dame
of. Jeau1911-12,vol. I, p. 34, 126,138.This also seemsto be theconclusion
neau,Note,p. 822.
39

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00:02:04 AM

prove he was teaching at Chartres. And we are perfectlyaware that

Southern is right when he hints that, even if these two previous assumptions had to be shown wrong, nothing would still be proved
about the real level of instructionand the size of the school at Chartres53: propositions that a simple obituary cannot however verify.
That is why we do not accept the enthusiasticconclusions of Clerval,
which were established using our cartularies as sources M.
Another master, as well as Thierry, still draws our attention:
Bernard of Chartres, his supposed brother. Scholars have made a
torrent of ink run on this argument. Perhaps never two brothers,
- have been so harassed, with the
in history- or pseudo-history
result that no "serious" analysis on the school of Chartres can leave
this question out of consideration: "Was Thierry brother of Bernard ?". Nor can I, unfortunately,evade the problem, true and
modernfurcae Caudinae in the studies on Chartres' school. From the
positive assertions of Clerval, to the sensible doubts raised by Southern 55,there are at present few things to add: that they were brothers is still an assumption,and no finalanswer can be found so far. It
remains, at least, that he was surely a master of that school- the
one famous pedagogue that definitelywas teaching at Chartres- from
around to II22 66: among so many uncertainties,at last a certitude!
On the other hand there are at this turningpoint of the Middle
Ages many persons that- mastersor not- could certainlyhave played
some role in the cultural environment at Chartres from Fulbert's
period [1007-1029] to John of Salisbury's time [1176-1180]: bishops
such as Adrald [1969-1075] or Ivo [1090-1115] for instance 57, or
53R. W. Southern,
Humanism,p. 66-67.We have,however,a record,testified
by Ratiusto EverardofYpres: "Cui [seil.Gilbert]Carnotiquartusin lectionem,
assedi" (Cf.N. M. Haring,A Latin
Parisiusin aula episcopiferetercentesimus
in "MediaevalStudies"XV (1953),
ofPoitiers,
DialogueontheDoctrineofGilbert
p. 252.
54See A. Clerval,Ecoles,p. 272: "En rsum,l'colede Chartres,pendantla
des
premiremoitidu Xlle sicle, futle foyerd'une renaissanceuniverselle
ses potes,
etse passionnapoursescrivains,
tudes.Elle aimal'antiquitprofane
la philosophie,
les
ses philosophes. . . Elle sut menerde frontla littrature,
trsnuanc.. .
sciences,le droit,les arts.Elle porteun cachetd'idalisme
56See A. Clerval,Ecoles,p. 159-63; R. W. Southern,
Humanism,
p. 69.
56See Cartulairede Saint-Jean-enVallede Chartres,
ed. R. Merlet,m Collectionde CartulairesChartrains"t. I, Chartres1906,p. 8, 14; and L. Merlet,
Manuscrits,p. 196. See also above, . 35.
67Notre-Dame,
ofthelattertextin A.
I, p. 16 and III, p. 39. See theintegration
III, p. 225.
p. 7a. For Ivo, see Notre-Dame,
Longnon,Obituaires,
40

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

simple deacons as Edoald and Radulph of Curville58, or chancellors

as Robert, acquainted with theological disciplines as well as in the
encyclopaedical curriculum of the liberal arts 59, which celebrates
its triumphexactly in the twelfthcentury Renaissance, after having
been "one of the key-conceptsin European culture and education" 60
throughoutall the Middle Ages el. The septenarycanon of the trivium
and quadrivium,constitutingthe studia liberali a, was the constant care
and interest- at least on a programmaticlevel- of the teachers at
Chartres. From the attestation of the monk Paul62, through the
shining personality of bishop Fulbert , or the teaching of Bernard
and the Heptateuchonof Thierry, to end with Robert chancellor64,
the study of the artesliberalesdoes forma Leitmotivin the programof
the school of Chartres65. It is difficultto show how deeply applied
in reality,to how many pupils taught and with how much continuity;
but this programis to be reckonedamong the importantachievements
in the educational context of the Middle Ages 66.

58 Notre-Dame
, III, p. 24 and 175.
59Ibid.,III, p. 187: "Robertus,beateDei genitricis
Marielevitaet cancellarius,
tam divinarumscripturarum
quam liberaliumartiumdisciplinisad plenum
eruditus".
Cf. L. M. De Rijk, 'EyxxXto
IlaiSettx:a studyof its originalmeaning
,
in "Vivarium" III (1965), p. 24.
el J. Fontaine,Isidorede Svilleet la cultureclassiquedans VEspagnewisigo, 2 vol., Paris 1959,vol. I, p. 13 claimsthat "les sept arts . . . ont t
thique
au long d'un millnairel'instrument
fondamental
de toute formation
intellectuelle.. . Dans la culturemdivaleles cadresdu trivium
et du quadrivium
se
sonttransmis
intactsdes colesmonastiquesdu Haut Moyenge aux Facults
des Arts".
ea See above,. .
Cf. Notre-Dame,
et sapientissimus
tam in
III, p. 85: "vir eloquentissimus
divinisquam in omniumliberaliumartiumlibris".For the testimonies
of conhim,see the textsin L. C. Mac Kinney,Fulbert,p.
temporaries
concerning
49-60.
4 See above,n. 58.
e6 For theprogram
oftheliberalartsin Chartres,
cf.A. Clerval,L'enseignement
des artslibraux Chartres
et Paris dans la premire
moitidu XI le sicle
in "Congrsscientifique
interd'aprsl'Heptateuchonde Thierryde Chartres,
nationaldes Catholiquestenu Paris en 1888,Paris 1880,vol. II, p. 277-Q6.
ee Thisprogram,
seemsto havebeenan idealandtheoretical
however,
aspiration
morethana practicalresolution,
all overEurope: seeM. L. W. Laistner,Thought
and Lettersin Western
Europe: A.D. 500-900,2nd ed., London 1957,P- 41'
and T. Gregory,
La reductioartiumda Cassiodoroa San Bonaventura,
in B.
nelMedioevo
Nardi,Il pensieropedagogico
, Cittdi Castellos.d., p. 286.
41

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

II
Through these overly discussed records and statementson masters
at Chartres- the "teaching matter"- , the question of the books- the
67
taught matter- arises. We know fairlywell fromother sources the
patrimony of Chartres library and the epoch of the manuscripts,
survivinguntil thirtyyears ago, when they were partlydestroyedby a
firein the second World War e8. But now is not the momentto go back
to this kind of record,since they require a direct textual analysis. On
the contrary,it is better to dig throughthe sources of our cartularies,
so far not yet sounded enough, and try to see which are the echoes
of the Chartriancultural flourishingin these charters.
All the referencesto books which we meet throughoutNotre-Dame
cartulary,are included in the thirdvolume, namelyin the Obituary 9.
For Saint-Pre the problem is quickly workedout: thereis no mention
of books except foran interestingcharteron the very bad conditionof
the library in the middle of the twelfthcentury, to which we will
returnlater on 70. We can thus reckon thirty-five
giftsof books, subdivided in this way: five bequests duringthe eleventh century71; two
betweenthe eleventhand the twelfth72; nineteenthroughthe twelfth73;
67Cf.Catalogue
de la villede Chartres
de la Bibliothque
desmanuscrits
, Chartres
des manuscrits
1840; and the supplementto thislist in U. Robert,Inventaire
des Bibliothques
de France, Paris 1881, p. 248-50; Cataloguscodicumhagioin "Analecta BollancivitatisCarnotensis,
bibliothecae
latinorum
graphicorum
desBibliothques
diana" VIII, Bruxelles1889; Cataloguegnraldesmanuscrits
see somerecordsin L. C.
deFrance, t. XI, Paris 1890.For theeleventhcentury
to the books
Mac Kinney,Fulbert
, p. 59-60,thatalso examinesthereferences
quoted by Fulbertin his letters.The historyof theseMSS. can be foundin
rede Chartres:
Ch. V. Langlois,Les fondsd*tat de la Bibliothque
formation
Paris 1904.
stitution
etalinationd'aprsles papiersde la Bibliothque,
e8 For thehistoryof thelibraryuntilour days,see M. Jusselin,
Petitehistoire
de la Bibliothque
, Chartres1962. The MSS. destroyed
municipalede Chartres
or preservedin the WorldWar are enumeratedin the Cataloguegnraldes
manuscrits
desBibliothques
publiquesde France, t.LUI, ManuscritsdesBibliode 1940 1944,Paris 1962,p. 2-5; 11; 14-35.
sinistres
thques
e9 Except one whichwe findin the Chronique
, I, p. 19) and also
(Notre-Dame
in
the
III,
32).
p.
(Notre-Dame,
Obituary
repeated
70See Saint-Pre,
II, p. 393-94.It is howeverknownthatSaint-Peremonastery
had a library.For theeleventhcenturywe possessthelistof Saint-PreMSS.,
with102 titlesavailable,in G. Becker, Catalogibibliothecarum
antiqui,Bonn
ofthesameabbey,in 1367,reports221 codices
1885,p. 144-45.The inventory
(G. Becker,Catalogi,p. 146): thelibrarydid notgrowverymuchin threecenturies.
71Notre-Dame,
III, p. 90, 126, 133, 144, 162.
72Ibid., III, p. 81, 175.
73Ibid.,III, p. 17,32,40, 54, 58, 80,93, 123,124,131,154,159,191,199,201-2,
206, 211,223,225.
42

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00:02:04 AM

seven duringthe thirteenth74; one each forthe fourteenth75and the

fifteenthcenturies76. It is not easy to calculate exactly the content
of all legacies, because sometimes the referenceis very evasive, as
for bishop Thierry[1029-after1048] 77, or Ascelinus Britto [f before
78
1120], who both gave their church librorum copia ; or Adelard
[t around 1092], who presented the church with libris optimis79. On
the contrary,when we have knowledge of the number of books, we
are not always told which kind of texts are involved, as for deacon
Salomon, who left thirty volumes 80 or master Bernard, who gave
of them to the cathedral 81.He was defined"the greatest
twenty-four
font of literarylearning in Gaul" 82: very probably, we have to seek
in the codices of the legacy the fountainhead of this literary font.
Similarlywe would be curious to know which are the forty-fivetexts
83
given by masterThierry[f after1161] ; more curious than ever, now
we do know for sure that he was the introductorof the Aristotelian
Topica , Analytica and Sophistici Elenchi into the European culture
of the twelfth century84. Furthermore, is there any relationship
between thislegacy offorty-fivebooks and the fact that forty-five
are
the excerptaof previousworks appearing in Thierry'sHeptateuchon85 ?
He presumablyepitomized many books presentin his libraryin order
to include theircontents in his encyclopaedical volume.
On the other hand many books, whose characteristicsare better
specified,presentlittle interestfroma literarypoint of view, and can
at the utmost enlightenus about the preparation of the Holy Office
or the personal edificationof the clerks. Antiphonaries,missals, martyrologies, epistolaries, graduais, tropers, breviaries, books of peri74Ibid., III, p. 44, 45, 105-6,135, 161, 171-2,220.
76Ibid.,III, p. 175.
76Ibid.,III, p. 15.
77Ibid.,III, p. 90.
78 Ibid.,III, p. 81.
79 Ibid.,III, p. 162.
80 Ibid.,III. p. 159.
81Ibid.,III, p. 123.
82 JohnofSalisbury,
I, 24, ed. C. C. J. Webb,Oxford1929,p. 55
Metalogicon,
(PL 199, col. 854c).
83Notre-Dame,
III, p. 206.
84See A. Vernet,Une pitapheinditede Thierryde Chartres,
in Recueilde
travauxofferts
. Brunei,Paris 1955,vol. II, p. 660-70.We can be sureby now
thatthepersonmentioned
diligentis
by Johnof Salisburywiththeperiphrasis
withThierry(see Metalogicon,
III, 5,
ingenipulsantestudiois to be identified
ed. Webb, p. 149 (PL 199, col. 902c).
85 See thelistin A. Clerval,coles,p. 222-23;and . Lesne,coles,p. 163-64.
43

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

copes {ectionaria), homilies, sermons and collects are the types of

manuscriptsmore frequentlyfound in Notre-Dame cartulary; and the
text itselfsometimes specifies that these volumes are to be employed
cotidianis usibus et officiis8e. For double usage- in the Mass and in
teaching- can be considered the Holy Bible, the most common text
in every mediaeval libraryeither in its complete version 87or in some
extrapolated- but entire- texts, as the Gospels, Paul's letters,books
of Prophets, Psalms and Apocalypse 88.There is an interestingrecord
about giftsand legacies- even if not affectingthe period we are considering- offeredby Gilles of Cond, who bequeathed to the cathedral
a breviary bought from the testamentaryexecutors of bishop John
of Garlande [1298-1315] 8#.At firstinsignificant,this testimonycould
demonstratethat not always were the books (or part of them) given in
legacy to the church; and thus explain why some bequests of books
of famous personages are so unimportant. For instance, the small
set of four books given by bishop Ivo [1090-1115] ,as compared to
the forty-ninevolumes left by Thierry, speaking of our cartulary
alone 91.
Other books, fortheir characteristicsor contents,attract our attention more. Texts oflaw are bequeathed to the cathedralby fivepersons.
92
Ansgerius[XII c.] gives canons and decrees ; Thierry,author of the
93
Heptateuchon,the Institutiones,Novellae and Digestumof Justinian ;
8e Othersimilarcircumlocutions
or
are employed,like ad usum communem
ad cotidianum
usum. For all these patternssee Notre-Dame
, III, p. 17, 45,
105-6,131,220.
87The name employedforthe Scriptures
: cf. Notre-Dame,
is Bibliotheca
III,
thatJohnofSalisburygave a
p. 44, 80, 171-72and 202,whereis wellspecified
. For otherexamples,see A. Longnon,Obituaires,
bibliothecam
p. 216e
integram
id est sacrorum
and 231e; Mabillon,Annales, IV, p. 405: "Unam bibliothecam
bibliorumcodicemper partes divisam"; D'Achery,Spicilegium,II, p. 281:
"Bibliothecamoptimamcontinentemvetus et novum Testamentm";E.
MartneU. Durand,ThesaurusAnecdotorum
, I, p. 486a and 502ab. See also
G. H. Putnam,Books and theirmakersduringtheMiddle Ages, New YorkLondon1898,vol. I, p. 44; and Ch. H. Haskins,Renaissance,
p. 79.
88 This kindof textis veryimportant,
becauseit permitsus to forman idea
read booksoftheBiblein theMiddleAges: cf.J. S.
aboutthemostcommonly
andcontents
: theircatalogues
, Cambridge
Beddie,Librariesin thetwelfth
century
(Mass.) 1929,p. 10.
89 Notre-Dame,
III, p. 175.
90Ibid.,III, p. 225.
91Ibid., III, p. 206. But thereare moreimportant
legacies.We are told for
instancethata bishopofBayeuxleft113volumesto Bee in 1164: cf.G. Becker,
Catalogi,
p. 119-202.
92Notre-Dame,
III, p. 131.
93Ibid., III, p. 206.
44

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00:02:04 AM

William [1206-12] donates decrees 94; Constantine [f 1250] presents

decrees and the complete Corpus Juris 95; John of Boudier [f 1429]
bequeathes a speculumjuris cum repertorio96. The Fathers too, are
well documented in these legacies. The ContraJovinianum of Jerome
is attested in two gifts of deacon Serannus [| around 1130] 97,and
John of Salisbury, who bequeathes seven other texts of Jerome:
Super Mar cum, Super I saiam, Super Ezechielem, Super Danielem,
Super Epistolas Pauli, Super duodecim Prophetas, Super Psalmos.
Augustine is recordedin his most popular works forthe Middle Ages,
such as De CivitateDei, ContraJudeos,De octogintatribusquestionibus
,
De doctrina Christiana98. It is perhaps worth-whileto linger a bit
over the library of bishop John, "vir magne religionis, totiusque
scientie radiis illuminatus" ". He bequeathed to the cathedral thirtyfour codices, and in addition to Jerome and Augustine's works, we
find the names of Hrabanus Maurus, Origen, Lactantius, Lanfranc,
John of Tours (?), Isidoras, Sigebert,Vegetius, Cicero, Seneca, Eutropius and at last he gave his own Polycraticum10.Also Peter of Roissy,
chancellor at Chartres [f after 1205] owns some valuable volumes:
the Historie of Peter Comestor, the Sententieof Peter Lombard, the
Sermones of Saint Bernard, the letters of Gaius, Solius and Apollinaris, the De naturalibusquestionibusof Seneca 101.And Thierry of
Chartres, among his legacy of forty-ninebooks, offers his Heptateuchon,called in our cartularyBibliothecaseptemartiumliberalium102,
94Ibid., III, p. 135.
96Ibid.,III, p. 126.
96Ibid.,III, p. 15.
97Notre-Dame,
III, p. 93.
98 Proportionally,
the numberof his books in mediaevallibrariesis striking.
At Saint-Maurice
of Naumburg,forinstance,thereare 98 MSS of Augustine
ona totalof184: seeG. Becker,Catalogi,
pp. 269-73.
99Notre-Dame,
I, p. 20.
100For all the legacyof John,see Notre-Dame,
III, pp. 201-2.Threebooks
are listedwithoutthe author:a liberde ecclesiastica
sivecelestigerarchia
and a
and theotherofJohntheScot ?); and a
girarchia(oneofHughofSaint-Victor
liberde divinisofficiis(Alcuin,Rupert?). Of the 34 codicesgivenby John,
fourofthemstillwereexistingbeforethesecondWorldWar: cf.. . J.Webb,
Noteonbooksbequeathed
LibraryofChartres,
byJohnofSalisburytotheCathedral
in "Mediaevaland RenaissanceStudies"I (1941),1, pp. 128-9.
101Notre-Dame,
III, p. 171.
102Ibid.,III, p. 206.The namebibliotheca,
as faras we know,is notcommonly
employedin the MiddleAgesto meana "library"in the modernsenseof the
to theHolyBible(seeabove,n. 86) orto an encyclopaeword,butratherreferred
dical set of manydifferent
works(thelattercase is supposedlyunique). Dom
A. Mund,Bibliotheca.
duCarmed'aprsSaintBenot,in "Revue
Bibleetlecture
45

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

certainly imitating the title proposed by Thierryin the prologue of

his work, the only part of this big encyclopaedia published so far103.
In conclusion,many books were bequeathed to the cathedral- 209
plus an undeterminednumber from three legacies (two of librorum
copia and one of libri optimi104) . If we considerthatsometimesin the
Middle Ages therewas the habit of listingonly the firsttreatiseamong
those contained in a volumen105,the total amount of the books designated for the cathedral furtherincreases. But once again it is not
possible to infer much from these records. The books listed in the
Obituary, though numerous, are among the most common in every
mediaeval library. Nothing would justify a higher glorificationfor
Chartres than for Laon, Orleans or Tours.
Ill
We have just spoken about books; it would be absurd not to expend a few words on the library, the material framework for the
care of codices. "Claustrum sine armario, quasi Castrum sine arma'
mentario' we read in a letter concerningthe foundation of a cenobius loe. The armarium, a cupboard, represents the mediaeval library: kept in the cloister- a place not very favourable to the preservation of the books themselves- , only later on would it have been
placed in a proper room 107.Not all the books were kept in the bookcase, but only those needing more care and a supervised reading,
whereas the service-booksforcommon use were kept in a place where
they mightbe easily consulted 108.The care of books was given to the
Bndictine"LX (1950), pp. 65-92,discussedthis point for the Regula S.
barbare(VieBenedicti.Cf.,also, P. Rich,ducationet culturedans l'occident
s teachers
Ville sicles
), Paris1962,p. 161,n. 136; and H. Bloch,MonteCassino*
latinodell'alto
and library
in theHighMiddleAges, in "La scuolanell'occidente
Medio Evo" (XIX Settimanadi Studio),Spoleto1972,p. 564, n. 3.
103See . Jeauneau,Le prologusin Heptateuchon
in
de Thierryde Chartres,
"MediaevalStudies"XVI (1954),PP- I7I_5republishedin "Studi Medievali"
3rdser.,V (1964),pp. 853-5,appendixto his Note.
104See above,nn. 77 and 78.
106Cf.J. De Ghellinck,
au XI Ve sicle.RichardAugerville
Un vquebibliophile
et des bibliothques
l'histoirede la littrature
de Bury {134s). Contribution
mdivales
, in "Revue d'HistoireEcclsiastique"XVIII (1922), p. 278. For
our texts,see A. Longnon,Obituaires,
p. 255e.
loe See Geoffrey
of Beaugency,Epistola ad PetrmMangot,in E. Martene,
ThesaurusAnecdotorum,
I, p. 511 d.
107Cf.J.W. Clark,Librariesin theMedievalandRenaissance
Periods,Cambridge
1894,p. 14-24.
108See Antiquaeconsuetudmes
canonicorum
regulanumS. VidonsParisiensis,
ecclesiaeritibus,III, p. 263:
De
in
E.
XXI
Martne,
antiquis
cap.
(De armario),
46

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

armarius109.He was generally in very close relation to the librarius

or chief scribe, and decided with the abbot which codices had to be
copied. The loan of books to the brothersdepended on him and was
dispatched througha meticulous system of writtenregistrationof the
borrowerand counter-receiptof an equivalent value forthe book 110.
It seems very probable that the officeof the armariuswas held by the
most learned clerks or monks and that the librarian could have other
duties, such as thesaurarius, notarius,precentoror even cancellariusU1.
A very interestingcharter De armario exists in the cartulary of
Saint-Pre, where it is stated that the monks all togetherdecided to
start a self-taxation for the maintenance of the cupboard112. This
charter,drawn up in 1145 under the directionof abbot Udo, leaves us
perplexed. The condition of the press is disastrous. Every book, old
and badly shelved, is fallingto pieces; and not yet in consequence of
too long a usage, but owing to the corrosion of worms113.Moreover
Saint-Pre's pattern is not an isolated one. The same measures of
Udo weretaken by abbot Macharius for Fleury monastery114in 1146,
"Libricommunes,
idestqui quotidiead manumhabendisunt.. . in loco comessepossit.. .
petentiexponendisunt,ubi competensaccessusomniumfratrum
Ceterosautem.. . [armarius]numquamextra armariumexponeredebet vel
nisispecialiterab aliquo fratrum
relinquere,
requirantur".
109Thereare fourmentionsconcerning
himin Saint-Pre(II, p. 458,508,654,
For the officeof armariussee E. Martne,
658). No mentionin Notre-Dame.
Ritibus,III, p. 262: "Armariusomnesecclesiaelibrosin custodiasua debet
consuetudines
cluniacensismonasterii,
habere"; and Hudalric,Antiquiores
III,
X,PL 149,col. 748-51.
110Ibid.,III, p. 263: "Numquamarmariuslibrospraestaredebet,nisiab eo cui
praestatvadimonium
accipiat.. . et nomenilliuscui praestat,sive ignotussive
notussit,et nomenlibriquem praestatet vadimoniumquod accipittotumin
breviannotatoretineat".
111Cf.forinstancetheimprovements
effected
whenhe was chancelby Gilbert,
lorofthecathedralat Chartres,
inNotre-Dame
, III, p. 167-68: "ObiitGislebertus
ecclesie,posteacancellarius
litteratissimus,
[1154],primuscanonicushujus
postea
venerabilis
Pictavorum
emendatos
episcopus,qui. . . librosquearmariidiligenter
modispluribusmelioravit".
112Saint-Pre,II, p. 393-94: ". . .ego fraterUdo. . . redditumdeterminatum
armarioassignavi.. . Hoc omnes,tam obedientiarii
quam claustrales,unanimiterconcesserunt
et tenendumin perpetuumdecreverunt".
113Saint-Pre,II, p. 393: "Hoc autemfieripernecessarium
erat; paupertatis
enim extremeque armariumdeprimebattestes erant manifestissimi
corrosi
tineiset pene deletivetustatelibelli,sparsimper armariumhue illucqueprojecti, qui a fratre qui armariopreerat,pre paupertatenimia,non poterant
renovarinec etiam,quod minusest,religari;et satis eratinhonestum
et indehaberetarmarium
corum,ut nostrum
monasterium,
quod magneest nobilitatis,
tantepaupertatis".
S. Benei14Cf.G. Becker,Catalogi,p. 198: "Ego Machariusabbas monasterii
47

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00:02:04 AM

and by Robert abbot of Vendme, ten years later 115.Of course,we are
aware that every light needs darkness to shine; but it is however very
strangethat these thingscould happen in places claimed so important,
and in the middle of one of the most exalted centuriesin the historyof
culture.
But not all, fortunately,is so dark and something is growing up
throughout this discussed historical period, to become the novelty
of the following century: the study of Jurisprudence116.The fact
that the councils of Reims in 1131 117,Lateran II in 1139 118,Montpellierin 1162 and 1195 119,Tours in 1163,120have to forbidthe study
of law (and medicine) undertakenin orderto get money,is the warning
sign that jurisprudence is becoming increasingly studied121. The
final step will be the prohibition of Roman legal studies in Paris,
decreed by Pope Honorius III in 1219 122.The juristic texts thus become precious and dangerous at the same time. That is probably
whytheyhave to be kept in a saferplace than a common cupboard, as
was recommendedin an article 123of the Cistercian Statutes in 1188.
nostraecodicesvetustatenimiacariosos
dicti Floriacensisvidensbibliothecae
. constituiinquam,ne tam ego quam
et teredine tinearodentecorruptos.
obedientiashabent,ad hoc opus tam
prioresnostriet qui intramonasterium
omittamus".
. . taxam conferre
tam utile,tam honestum.
necessarium,
116See E. Martene,ThesaurusAnecdotorum,
I, p. 445-46: ... librorumordo
Unde
nec novi fiebant,nec, ut decebat,veterescorrigebantur.
negligebatur,
ut
auctoritateDei et sua domnusabbas Robertuspraecepitatque constituit,
...
ecclesiaepertinentium
ad jus Vindocinensis
omnesprioresobedentiarum
annuumcensumarmariopraebeant".
lie Cf.the synthesisof Ch. H. Haskins,Renaissance,
p. 193-223.
117Cf.MansiXXI, col. 459b (<Cone. Rem.,cap. VI).
118Ibid., col 528b (Cane.Later.,cap. IX).
119In thesetwo councils,as withthat of Tours,the phraselucricausa no
Cf. Mansi XXI, col.
longerappears; sign alreadyof a deepercondemnation.
iiod (Cone. Monsp., cap. XV): "Prohibuitpraetereasub omni severitate
aut alius
ecclesiasticaedisciplinae,ne quis monachusvel canonicusregularis,
ad saecularesleges vel physicamlegendasaccedat". Same text for
religiosus,
thecouncilof1195,in MansiXXII, col. 670c.
120MansiXXI, col. 1179c(Cone.Turon.,cap. VIII): ". . .statuimus,
ut nullus
omninopostvotumreligionis,
postfactamin aliquo religiosoloco professionem,
exire".
ad physicam,legesve mundanaslegendaspermittatur
121The same conclusionis drawnby R. M. Thomson,The Libraryof Bury
in "Speculum"XLVII
and twelfth
St. EdmundsAbbeyin theeleventh
Centuries,
(1972), p. 645.
122See Chartularium
Universitatis
farisiensis,ea. i. A. cnateiain,
ne
et districtiusinhibemus,
interdicimus
Paris 1889,vol. I, p. 92: "firmiter
Parisiusvel in civitatibusseu aliis locis vicinisquisquam docerevel audire
jus civileprsumt".
123Statutacapitulorum
ab anno1116 ad annum
ordinisCisterciensis
generalium
48

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00:02:04 AM

Anotherlong decree, drawn up by the abbot of Saint-Victor of Marseille in 1198, directs that all the legal codices brought away from
the monasteryby any predecessors,are to be returnedto the armarium
of the house according to the decision of the entire brotherhood124.
Why were these books out of the monastery ? What interestmay have
been hidden behind their removal ? In all likelihood, the same that
forced some scholars out of France (and Chartres in particular) to
Bologna forthe study of civil law 126.Presumably it is this, too, that
attracted Hameric of Feuillet to that famous University,since he died
there at the end of the XII century12e.This is furthersupported by
the fact that we findaround the same time another person of Feuillet,
127
Hugh, learned in legal studies .
We cannot subscribe to the statement of Clerval, when he claims
that Chartresantedated Bologna and Paris in the study of canon and
civil laws 128.We have no record to support such an idea unless we
want to attach some importance to a record of the eleventh century129.But this testimonyseems too scanty to inferany important
conclusion. It is true that the charter establishing the universityat
130in
Bologna was signedby FrederickBarbarossa
1158, but this docuiy86, ed. J. Canivez,I, p. 108, n. 7 (anno 1188): "Liber qui diciturCorpus
Canonum,et decretaGratianiapud eos qui habuerintsecretiuscustodiantur,
ut cum opus fuerit,proferantur;
in communiarmarionon resideant,propter
variosqui inde possuntprovenireerrores"(E. Martne,Thes.Anecdt.,IV, p.
dist.prima, XI, in: H. Sjalon,
12).See, also, Instit.capit.gener.cisterc.,
Nomasticon
Cisterciense
, Solesme1892,p. 289: "Libri juris civilisvel canonici
in armariocommuniminimeresideant".
124Cf. E. Martne,U. Durand, Veterum
. . . amplissimacollectio,
scriptorum
nostriarmarioipsiusecclesiae. . .
I, col. 1020-21:". . . quidampraedecessores
libroslegumqui ad ipsumarmarium
sicutalii librispectant. . . prosua volntateauferebant
et capiebant.. . Iustisigiturtotiusconventusbenignofaventes
assensupostulationibus,
libroslegum. . . sine aliqua contradictione
armario
monasterii
et fideliter
reddendosesse".
assignandos,
126See . Lesne,coles,p. 681 and A. Clerval,coles,p. 319. The latterdoes
not draw any conclusionfromthis fact.
128Notre-Dame,
de
III, p. 222: "ObiitaputBononiamoptimeindolisHamericus
Folietocanonicus".See also thecurriculum
of NicholasHaudri [Notre-Dame,
artiumParisius. . . rexitBononiepostea
III, p. 179): . .post magistratum
honorifice
in decretis".He, too,was a civiscarnotensis,
who migratedto other
townsin orderto studyand teach.
127Ibid., III, p. 185: "Et Hugo de Folieto,subdiaconuset canonicus
hujus
ecclesie,virgenerenobilis,scientiaclarus,in jure perituset facundus".
128Cf.A. Clerval,coles,p. 271: "En rsum,pourl'un et pourl'autreDroit,
l'colede Chartresa de beaucoupprcdcellesde Bologneet de Paris,mais
elle a t ensuitesurpasse".
129Saint-Pre,I, p. 118: "Radulfi,legis docti".
130See G. Post,RomanLaw and earlyrepresentation
Spain and Italy (115049

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00:02:04 AM

ment only representsthe final act, the recognitionof a formercultural

trend consolidated at the beginning of the twelfthcentury131when
Irnerius,the lucernajuris, started to teach jurisprudence132.However,
even if Bologna had not been important at this date, this would not
be an argument to prove the essor of Chartresas a law school in the
formerperiod.
By an irony of chance, the spectacular rise of the name magister
in the sources, fromthe end of the twelfthcentury onwards (be these
masters true, supposed, or false schoolteachers), corresponds to a
decrease of affluence in the chapter-school of Notre-Dame 13S.The
bishops, deans, chancellors or simple canons recordedin Notre-Dame
obituary, are no longer pupils in Chartres' school, but students of
law in the risingUniversityof Paris 134.This momentnot only testifies
to the irreversibledecline of the chapter-schoolof Chartres,but even
points to the death of its ideal ofpaideia. The programand the teaching of the Notre-Dame school, described by John of Salisbury in the
first book of his Metalogicon, is overwhelmed by the ideal of the
135
Cornificiani(to employ one of John's categories of expression) : the
artesliberales136and mostly the grammaticaare refusedas means and
end of all learning137. Thus differentmasters, such as Robert of
1250),in "Speculum"XVIII (1943),p. 224-28;and H. Rashdall,The UniversitiesofEuropein theMiddleAges, a new editionin threevolumeseditedby
F. M. Powickeand A. B. Emden,Oxford1936,vol. I, p. 144: "This charter.. .
and the
does constitutean importantindicationof the growingimportance
independent
positionof the doctorsoflaw".
131Cf. Ch. H. Haskins,Renaissance,p. 198.
132See Odofredus,
Jus civile, Digestsveteris.De iustitiaet iure,Lyon 1550,
dumdoceretin artibusin civitateista,
t. I, f. 7: "Sed DominusYr. [Yrnerius],
cum fueruntdeportatilibrilegales,cepit per se studerein librisnostris,et
studendocepitdocerein legibus,et ipse fuitmaximinominis;et fuitprimus
scientenostre;et quia primusfuitqui fecitglossasin librisnostris,
illuminator
vocamuseumlucernmiuris" (quotedby H. Rashdall,Universities
, vol. I, p.
Ill, n. 1).
133See A. Clerval,coles, p. 284-88;and . Lesne,coles, p. 173.
134A. Clerval,Ecoles, p. 32-51,discussing
thistopicdoesnot inferany conclusion.
136For somebibliographic
references
on thesubject,see F. Alessio,La filosofia
e le artesmechanicaenelsecoloXII , in "StudiMedievali",3rdser.,fase.1, VI
(1965),p. 102,n. 70 and p. 105,n. 79.
138Johnof Salisbury,Metalogicon,
I, 5, ed. Webb,p. 17 (PL 199,col. 832c),
fumusille cito
was completelywrongwhenhe was claiming:"Verumtamen
euanuit . . . redieruntartes".
137This was the ideal followedby masterBernard:cf.Johnof Salisbury,Metalogicon,I, 24, ed. Webb,p. 53-58(PL 199,col. 853C-856C).
50

189.235.178.250

00:02:04 AM

Coin-de-Mur138, Nicholas of Cannes 139, Stephen 140, Bartholomew

the chancellor, Philip of Meslay 142, Constantine143, Pierre of
Mincy144,Bartholomew of Mincy 145,bishop Alberic 146,bishop Hen148
ry 147,bishop Bartholomew of Poitiers
(just to quote the clearest
examples and to remain in the firsttwo thirds of the thirteenthcentury), all somehow bound to the church of Chartres,certifythat a
real "Copernican Revolution" is in action. The old scheme of the
school, the dispenser of training in the liberal arts alone, is over.
And the wane of a traditional type of learning, drags with it the
decline of a particular ideal: the prophecy of Meinerius, a pupil of
Abelard, has come true 149.The satiricalBataille des Sept Arts, written
in the vernacular by Henry of Andeli at the middle of the thirteenth
century,testifiesin a poetic way to this change of interestsand the
triumphof Paris as seat of renewed studia liberalia 150.Chartresand
its school are no longer present. Their shining light, whethertrue or
alleged, has been extinguished forever. But the liberal arts, "die
Fundamentalordnung des Geistes"151, survived in their symbol
152
sculpted on the Royal Portal of the cathedral : perpetual possession
of human art and irrefutablewitness of cultural flourishing,even if
it lasted the space of a short season.
Harvard University(Cambridge,Mass.)

Departmentof History
138Notre-Dame
, III, p. 29.
139Ibid.,III, p. 61.
140Ibid.,III, p. 51.
141Ibid.,III, p. 147.
142Ibid.,III, p. 137.
143Ibid.,III, p. 160
144Ibid.,III, p. 77.
145Ibid.,III, p. 222.
148Ibid.,I, p. 23; and III, p. 97.
147Ibid.,III, p. 216.
148Ibid.,III, p. 199.
149Cf.GiraldusCambrensis,
ed. J. S. Brewer,
SpeculumEcclesiae,proemium,
London1861-91,IV, p. 7, writingaround1220 remindsus of the phraseof
Meinerius:"Venientdies,vae illis,quibuslegesobliterabunt
scientiamliterarum".On Mainerius(or Meinerius),
see R. L. Poole,Studies,p. 246.
150See the text in L. J. Paetow,TheBattleoftheSevenArts,
Berkeley1914.
Also W. Wetherbee,
Platonismand Poetry,p. 256, talkingabout theBataille
warnsthat"the dechneofChartrian
idealismand literary
culture
philosophical
is of courseonlya symptomof deeperchanges".
151Cf. E. R. Curtius,EuropischeLiteratur
und Lateinisches
Bern
Mittelalter,
1948,p. 5162"Dependenceof human learningand divineinspiration"
: cf.L. D. EtttoR.
linger,Muses and LiberalArts,in Essays in theHistoryofArtpresented
London1967,I, p. 34.
Wittkower,
51

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Vivarium
, XII, i (1974)
The Father of Empiricism:

Roger not Francis

JOSEPH KUPFER

Roger Bacon's life spanned most of the Thirteenthcenhis

Although
tury,
philosophy of science carried his thought into what
has been loosely dubbed the "Modern period". And although
often credited with heralding this Modern period of philosophy
Francis Bacon's emphasis on experimentis itself anticipated by his
cousin's empiricism. Living three centuries earlier than his more
celebrated scion, Roger Bacon's view of the scientific method is
more fittinglyregarded as the harbinger of the empirical tradition.
Anticipating the Renaissance and Enlightenment interest in the
meliorationof the human conditionBacon awards utility,observation,
and "experience" the central place in his philosophy of science and
knowledge. Reacting against much of the scholastic emphasis on the
deductive method, he abandons the quest for deductive certaintyin
science. In so doing he avoids the Cartesian dilemma: certitudeabout
relations of ideas, as in mathematics,but skepticismin knowledge of
the empirical. Roger Bacon's partial but illuminating analysis of
scientificprocedure and theoryushers in the so-called Modern period
of philosophic and scientific speculation. It is from him and not
Francis that the Twentieth century derives the "scientific critical
attitude."
I. Idolatry
Early in the Opus Majus Bacon enumeratesfour"obstacles" to the
acquisition of truth: the submission to unwarranted authority; the
influenceof custom and the popular; and conceit or desire foresteem.
While respecting the authority of the church fathers and Aristotle,
Bacon rejects their judgments as conclusive. "The principles laid
down by such authorities must be tested by experiencebeforethey
can be finallyaccepted." 1 Thus does Roger anticipate Francis Bacon's
1 WilliamNewbold,The CipherofRogerBacon,page 10. London:Oxford
Press,1928.
University
52

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00:02:15 AM

warningabout the Idols of the Theatre. As astute a scholar as Lewis

White Beck stressesFrancis' articulation of this danger and neglects
Roger's:
thephilosophy
In thefirsthalfoftheseventeenth
scholasticism,
century,
oftheChurch,was challengedfromtwosides.[Francis]Bacon. . . objected
to its Idols oftheTheatre,to whathe regardedas its slavishacceptanceof
ideas based on authority,
and againstit he insistedupon the importance
of new observations
of natureand man. In thisrespect,[Francis]Bacon
and the emptylogic
was an empiricist,
objectingto the authoritarianism
scientific
bywhichmanyofhisopponentsbelievedtheycoulddemonstrate
.2
and philosophical
truths,a priori
What most who place Francis Bacon as the forerunnerof the empiricist
traditionfail to realize is that he is still actually fightingin the Seventeenth centurythe battle begun by Roger in the Thirteenthcentury.
The rejection of authorityopens the door to reliance upon evidence
and observation. New evidence can discredit old hypotheses. The
theoriesofthe authoritiesare subject to the test of experience.". . . elle
3
[authority]ne fait rien comprendre,elle fait seulement croire,..."
Authoritycan only provide belief in an idea, suggest an hypothesis,
but can not give the verification which experience confers. This
emphasis upon experience, in fact, yields a new notion of authority
and credibility.Because of our confidencein the scientificinquiry of
others, their reports, and the continued openness of hypotheses to
furthertesting, we can rely more upon the findings and claims of
other inquirers: "Things that do not belong in our part of the world
we know throughother scientistswho have had experience of them"
(my italics).4
While habitual ways of thinkingare more powerfulthan authority
in subvertingthe quest for knowledge,popular prejudice and custom
are the strongest of the three main forces. "For authority merely
entices, habit binds, popular opinion makes men obstinate and confirms them in their obstinacy." 5 Like Francis' Idols of the Cave,
customary beliefs serve Roger as a foil for the truth. Compare the
cousins on this head :
LewisWhiteBeck,PhilosophieInquiry,page 60. New Jersey:Prentice-Hall
Inc., 1952.
s Emile Charles,RogerBacon (sa vie, ses ouvrages,ses doctrines,d'aprsdes
textesindits),page 112. Paris: L. Hachettteet cie., 1861.
4 RogerBacon, Opus Majus, RobertBurketranslation,
page 585. London:
OxfordUniversity
Press,1928.
* Ibid.,page 10.
53

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Therefore
let not yourWisdom[Pope ClementIV] be surprised,
noryour
Authorityconsiderit improperif I labor againstpopularcustomand
commonprecedents.
For thisis theonlywayofarriving
at a consideration
of truthand perfection.*
Francis counsels us to do the same with our most cherishedbeliefs:
Let everystudentof naturetake thisas a rule,- thatwhatever
hismind
is to be heldin suspicion,
seizesand dwellsuponwithpeculiarsatisfaction
andthatso muchthemorecareis to be takenin dealingwithsuchquestions
to keep the understanding
even and clear.7
The consistency of popular or desirable belief in leading us astray,
then, serves as an optimum point of departure for both Bacons.
The fourth cause of error, that of concealing from ourselves our
own ignorance and error because of pride, must be corrected by
the scientificmethod because it
and the sourceof the othercauses of erroralready
... is the beginning
mentioned.
For owingto excessivezeal in regardto our own feelingand
ofweak
therearisesat oncethepresumption
theexcusingofourignorance
relyingon whichwe extol what is ours and censurewhat is
authority,
form
another's.Then sinceeveryman loves his own labors,we willingly
oursintohabit.8
Bacon's professional suspicion of man's psychological tendencies,
again fore-shadowing Francis' warnings about Idolatry, are the
reverberationsof his scientificallycritical attitude.
Roger pre-emptsFrancis Bacon's rejection of the deductive method
and the authority which advocated it as the means of discovering
scientific and philosophic truths. Roger stresses the importance of
studying language and mathematics, but opposes the scholastic tradition from which he is emergingby holding that experience is the
only means of verifyingthought. "This was opposed to the general
trend of thought in his day, which would that logic as the principal
door to knowledge." 9 "La mthode scolastique est mauvaise; il en
faudrait une autre; c'est la proccupation constantede Bacon; . . ." 10
Bacon believed logic to be given man by nature,the only part of which
that required learning was its terms. Thus, it is a natural tool or
Ibid.,page 19.
7 FrancisBacon, NovumOrganum
, Mathew
, Aphorism58. (Bacon Selections
ThompsonMcClure,ed., N. Y.: CharlesScribner'sSons,1928,page 297).
8 RogerBacon, page 20.
9 A. G. Little,RogerBacon (AnnualLectureon a MasterMmd,The British
Academy)page 14. London: H. Milford,1929.
10Charles,page 111.
54

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instrumentof thought,but not the means to gaining knowledge of the

empirical world.
For Newbold the Thirteenthcenturyover-emphasizedthe deductive
method- a defectin the Aristoteliantheoryof science. Newbold sees
logic as the means of classifyingexistingknowledge,but not sufficient
forthe acquisition of new knowledge. "And this is preciselythe point
in Aristotle's system against which [Roger] Bacon directs his most
tellingblows. He by no means rejects the deductive method; he acknowledgesits importance and employs it himself.But he does deny
its adequacy, and he places experience above it"11 "He said that
scholastic science was too greatly concerned with intellectual definitions. . . and neglectedthe accurate observationof these events." 12
The conclusions deduced from our axiomatic principles must be
warranted by experience before they can be accepted. Bacon rebels
against the scholastic dual reliance on the deductive method and
authority,advocating in their stead attention to sense experience:
"Ainsi, ces deux instrumentsde la science scolastique [reason and
authority],Bacon oppose l'exprience, et il est, je crois, le premier
qui ait caractris par leur methode les sciences de la nature, en les
13
appelant les sciences exprimentales."
II. Two Experiences
Bacon distinguishes between two sorts of "experience": inner
illuminationand sensed impressions. Both are necessary to scientific
inquiry and the formertemporally precedes the latter. The spiritual
experience is a necessary condition for the organization of the "ordinary" sense experience.
Il fautdoncle secoursd'une autrefacult,l'illumination
sorte
intrieure,
divine,par laquelle l'auteurveut dsignerla connaissance
d'inspiration
directede certainsprincipesque les sens ne peuventnous rvler.14
Thus do we come to grasp the firstprincipleswhich Aristotle maintains must be prehended in immediate intuition by "operating"
reason. Bacon posits the Intellectus Agens (God or Angels) which
illuminatesthe human intellect.
11Newbold,page 9.
12M. Muir,"RogerBacon" inRogerBaconEssays(ed.byA. G. Little)page306.
London: OxfordUniversityPress, 1914.
13Charles,page 112.
14Ibid.,page 114.
55

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The humanintellectis not merelypassive,but it is incapableof arriving

at realknowledge
untilitsresponsive
powersarecalledintoactionby some
stimulusfromabove . . . The responseof the humanintellectto the illuofthedivineIntellectus
mination
orinspiration
agensresultsin'experience'.15
Without this inspiration,the senses cannot yield us knowledge of the
"monde matriel."
An extensive criticism of Bacon's notion of illumination and how
it relates to his philosophy of the experimentalscience is offeredby
Carton. What exactly is the relation of this interior experience to
the external sense experiences ? Are the senses merely validating
eternal truths actually given by means of inspiration,fleshingout a
Divine relation,or does the revelatoryexperienceitselfpertaindirectly
to the senses ? Carton argues for the view that Bacon is in reality a
mystical thinker, his "inner experience" being "hermtique"- the
senses barely of secondary significance.Bacon's "two experiences",
however,reflecthis Augustinin frameof reference.The soul or mind
of man is unable to discover truthswithout the aid of a participating
God. Moreover, the external sensible world is not discrete or cut-off
fromthat of the spiritual. The two forma continuityof experience:
the "revealed" and the sensible are aspects of the one God-created
reality. We deduce theorems from our first immediately intuited
principles. Once such theorems have been confirmedby sense experience, the revelation or illumination need not come again to every
scientist. This hardly seems in conflictwith the way science does
indeed work. Once a law or theory has been offeredits inspirational
genesis is not a prerequisitefor other scientists.
The sense experience itself is the stuff of which Bacon's philosophy of science is made. "That Bacon was aware of the importance
of the experimental method is shown by his actual use of it, but it
does not appear that he had ever attempted to define it and distin16
guish it frommere observations." By this "second sort" of experience, then, Bacon is referringto that which occurs duringobservation
or experiment.A. G. Little sums up Bacon's view of the two types of
experience and their relation to Bacon's revolt against the a priori
method: "These two kinds of experience are alike in this, that they
17
proceed by immediate contact with reality, not by reasoning."
16Little,page 31.
ie Newbold,page 11.
17Little,page 30.
56

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III. The Experimental Science

. without experience nothing can be sufficientlyknown." 18
Bacon distinguishesreasoning from experience as a means of acquiring knowledge, but sees their mutual dependence.

For therearetwomodesofacquiringknowledge,
and
namelyby reasoning
experience.Reasoningdrawsa conclusionand makesus grantthe conclusion,but doesnotmaketheconclusioncertainnordoesit removedoubt
so thatthe mindmayreston the intuitionof truth,unlessthe minddis. . . 19
coversit by the path of experience;

Experience must provide the test of our deduced theorems,thereby

validating our immediate intuitions. Without observation via the
senses, the mind has no warranted beliefs about the external world:
". . . . Roger Bacon insists on the need of observation and experiment
for attaining to real knowledge of natural events." 20 Argument,
reasoning alone, is insufficientto yield us knowledge.
While Bacon oftenspeaks of the experimentalscience as a discipline,
as a science separate and distinctfromothersciences, he is manifestly
aware of its relation to these other sciences as a procedurewithout
which they cannot function. The experimental science has three
"dignities" or "prerogatives"; it "certifies" all other sciences by
observation; it supplements other sciences by "taking account of
facts which lie within their sphere but outside their actual cognizance;" 21and thirdly,experimentalscience itselfinvestigates the secrets
of nature. Bacon seems to indicate that experimental science has a
fieldor realm ofinquiryuniquely its own, but does not make this clear.
Bacon maintains that the scientific attitude is one of openness
to new hypothesis.The innerilluminationremarkedabove may indeed
be the preparationfor such openness. We cannot experimentwithout
hypothesis and once we experiment, reasoning about the date is
essential:
Hencein thefirstplace thereshouldbe a readinesstobelieve
, untilin the
so thatinthethirdreasoning
secondplaceexperiment
follows,
mayfunction
(myitalics).22
Following the testingof this hypothesis,(which may be one's own or
that of another scientist) the causes at work are to be analyzed. We
18RogerBacon,page 583.
18Ibid.,page 583.
20Muir,page 300.
21Little,page 32.
22RogerBacon,page 615.
57

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axe to use our observations, moreover, as the basis of these causal

explanations: "Bacon at least tried to look firstat external realities,
and to base his intellectualexplanation of materialchange on observed
facts." 23
Bacon sees the work of scientists as constitutingthe work of a professional community.One scientist adds to the warrant or verification
of a hypothesisor theory posited by another: "Therefore in the beginninghe must believe those who have made the experiment,or who
have reliable informationfromexperimenters,to which one adds the
24
findingof his own experiments." If we reject an authorityit is not
on the basis of our own preconceived theoryor mode of reasoning,but
on the grounds that his claims do not bear up under experimental
investigation.It is withinthis communityof scientiststhat hypotheses
are more or less accredited, more or less disproved.
Bacon approaches an articulation of the contemporaryconcept of
degrees of verificationwhen he says that ". . . . truths and virtues
are infinite,and there are innumberablegradations in each truth and
virtue; . . . additions can fitly be made to the statements of real
authorities,and correctlyapplied in many cases." 25 These additions
are to be made on the basis of experiment.The Enlightenmentand
Renaissance view of progress and revision is again hinted at when
Bacon remarksthat the "younger, that is those of a later age, in the
progressof time possess the labors of theirpredecessors."
Because experience, observation, is the final court for any theory,
Bacon's philosophyof science provides fora corpus of theorywhich is
self-correctingand ever open-ended. "... he saw clearly that when
theories are inconsistentwith known facts, the theoriesmustbe sacrificed and the facts saved." 26
While Bacon's "method" was not a very carefullyworked out one,
"L'observation n'est pas pour lui un accident, un hasard: c'est un
"27 On this
point Carton agrees: "Trs prsystme nouveau;
tude
a
notre
cisment,
pour objet de dgager les caractres et de
fixer l'allure de l'exprience des sens comme mthode, . . ." 28 The
method consists in studying the followingin their respective order:
23Muir,page 302.
24 Roerer
Bacon,oaere617.
25Ibid.,page 15.
2e Little,page 21.
27Charles,page 119.
28Raoul Carton,L'ExpriencephysiquechezR. Bacon (tudesde Philosophie
Medievale),page 10. Paris: J. Vrin,1924.
58

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the simpler things before the more complex; the general before the
particular; and the easier before the more difficult.29Believing
inanimate objects less complicated than animate ones, Bacon insists
on theirexaminationfirst.'The compoundingof substances,which are
generated from their elements, therefore,should precede the inves30
tigation of the generationof animate things."
These experimentswill not only reveal the wonders of nature but
will help shatter the Idols of the Cave and Theatre. The effortsof
the experimentalscience can loosen the hold ofauthorityand customarily held belief. That Bacon was, himself,caught up in the drama of
science can be seen fromthe following: "For after I saw this [experiment with the magnet], there has been nothing difficultfor my intellect to believe, provided it had a trustworthyauthority." 31 But
Bacon has a criterionforthe "trustworthiness"of authority- reliance
upon the scientificmethod- with which he begins the destructionof
faithin "bad" authority.Is this not preciselywhat we today base the
overwhelmingmajority of our beliefs upon- "trustworthyauthority"
of one sort or another- the basis of which lies in the strengthof the
method of verificationand our confidencein that method.
Bacon's empiricism has teleological elements: understanding an
object's purpose is crucial in graspingits causal relations. "The utility
of everythingmust be considered; forthis utilityis the end forwhich
the thing exists." 32 Thus, ascertaining a thing's "purpose" is part
of the scientificprocedure.
This scientificprocedure, beginning with the inner light (illumination or inspiration) culminates in the success of prediction. The
objects under investigation are ultimately rendered useful through
their inclusion in the hypothesis and its verification.A warranted
hypothesis is significantnot in itself, but because it is useful. It
enables us to relate objects of our experience in fruitfulways. "C'est
direque la mthodede certificationcomprenddeux momentsextrmes,
un dernier o nous rapportons les choses nos fins pour les utiliser
dans des uvresplus particulirementopratives ou de puissance...."33
Bacon prefiguresthe Renaissance concern for mankind's progress
and the American pragmatists such as Dewey and Lewis. Scientific
29Charles,page 112.
30Muir,page 310.
31RogerBacon,page 630.
32Muir,page 30
33Carton,page 167.
59

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reasoning is ultimately concerned with leading from one sensuous

experience, through observation and experiment, hypothesis and
verification,to other experiences. He may have been the first to
flirtwith a pragmatic notion of truth- as Carton puts the matter:
"Ds lors en effet que la vrit est essentiellement dispensatrice
d'intrt, elle est d'autant plus noble et possde d'autant plus de
34 More salient than this, however, is
prix qu'elle est plus utile, ..."
Bacon's pervasive belief that science will increase man's physical and
spiritual powers, leading to his increased happiness.
IV. Mathematics
Bacon offersseveral reasons for the claim that all sciences require
the use of mathematics. He argues that, firstly,all the other sciences
use mathematical examples, and since examples clarify the subject
matter of the particular science, ignorance of the examples implies
lack of fullcomprehensionof the subject. To this reason, Bacon adds,
"Secondly, because comprehensionof mathematical truths is innate,
as it were, in us," but then seems to back offjust a bit:
Wherefore
since this [mathematical]
knowledgeis almostinnate,and as
orat leastlessin needofthemthan
and learning,
itwereprecedesdiscovery
othersciences,it willbe firstamongsciencesand willprecedeothersdisposingus towardsthem; sincewhatis innateor almostso disposestoward
whatis acquired(myitalics).36
This presupposes that mathematical truthsapply to the external sensible world, and that what is innate and that which is acquired refer
to the same universe. Perhaps his awareness of this presupposition
is what promptedBacon to considermathematicaltruthsverifiableby
experience and quasi-innate.
An understandingof mathematics is essential to the other sciences
because of its primacy among the sciences (in the order of acquisition)
and because it is the easiest to acquire. It is not beyond anyone's
grasp, maintains Bacon, and the "natural road" for inquiry is from
the simplest to the more difficult.
Our capacity for an "intimate" and more thorough knowledge of
mathematicsthan the othersciences again marks it as a starting point
of inquiry. These other sciences, moreover,requirethe use of mathematics for their verification.
34Ibid.,page i68.
35 RogerBacon,page 121.
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thatothersciencesarenotto be knownbymeans
Thisamountsto showing
of dialecticaland sophisticalargumentas commonlyintroduced,but
demonstration
enteringinto the truthsand
by meansof mathematical
them. . . thissimplyamountsto
activitiesofothersciencesand regulating
definite
methodsofdealingwithall sciences,and by meansof
establishing
mathematics
all thingsnecessaryto the othersciences.3*
verifying
AlthoughBacon argues that mathematicsis the foundationand first
effortof the mind, he neverthelessapplies the experiential criterion
to it, also. It might seem a bit inconsistent- to subject near-innate
- but for Bacon the innate and
knowledgeto experientialverification
the externallyreceived experienceare part of an organicwhole and are
mutually dependent. As with the two sorts of experience,illumination
and sense-experience,so with the almost innate mathematical knowledge and acquired knowledgeoftheexternalworld.Experienceremains
crucial to knowledge. 'This is also evident in mathematics, where
proofis most convincing.But the mind of one who has the most convincing proof in regard to the equilateral triangle will never cleave
to the conclusion without experience; . . ." 37 He goes on to cite
Aristotle's claim that mathematical proof be accompanied by "its
appropriate experience."
Bacon's apparent inconsistencyof claiming of the one hand that
mathematicaltruthsare demonstrablewith certaintyby necessaryand
proper causes, and urgingon the other that even mathematical truths
require experiential verification is further dispelled by viewing
mathematics as the frameworkand method according to which our
empirical investigations are ordered. Experimental science must
proceed on the basis of mathematical notation, which by itself is
insufficientto yield truths about reality.
Like the "experimental method" proper, mathematics functions
as a dimension of the investigationrequired by the various particular
sciences. AlthoughBacon himselfspeaks of both experimentalscience
and mathematics as sui generissciences his characterizationof them
belies his labelling. The former represents the sensible-observable
component of the method of scientificinquiry, and the latter the
logico-exemplaryfeature of science. Note the significanceof "completing" in the followingstatement by tienne Gilson: "... it was to
a Frenchman that he [Roger Bacon] owed the feeling,so vivid in him,
of the necessityforexperiments.His real master on this point . . . was
Peter ot Maricourt . . . Peter proclaimed, in his Letteron the Magnet
36Ibid.,page 126.
37Ibid.,page 583.
6l

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the necessityof completingthe mathematical method by the scientific

method." 38
Mathematics, then, is a tool of the experimental scientist, who
always has his mathematical structurein mind: "Bacon ofteninsists
on the need of mathematicsin the investigationofphysicaloccurrences.
He tried to forma general science which should bring the actions of
38
bodies, and of natural agents, under the principlesof mathematics."
We do not verifythe conclusions of mathematics directlyso much as
we verifythe predictions reached through the application of those
conclusions. Newbold nicely state Bacon's conception of the relation
between mathematics and experiment: "... there is but one ultimate
test of knowledge, experience, and but one way of organizingsuch
knowledge into a science, namely, by showing its conformityto the
laws of mathematics" (my italics).40This suggeststhat Bacon was recommending the hypothetico-deductive model of Plato: in doing
analysis we work fromexperimenttowards our firstprinciples; then,
in synthesizing,or organizing, we demonstrate our experimental
findingsas followingfrom our firstprinciples.
Mathematics and deductive theorizing are necessary to organize
and complete the findingof our empirical observations. Bacon's insightlies not only in his rejection of the exclusive reliance upon the
deductive method of the schools, but in his acceptance of that method
as a facet of the scientificprocedure. The Medieval and Modern periods are thus bridged in Bacon's philosophy of science, and it is
thereforefromRoger Bacon that the Modern period gets its impetus.
U.S.A.
Iowa State University

88 EtienneGilson,Historyof Christi
an Philosophyin theMiddleAges,page
309. New York: RandomHouse, 1955.
38Muir,page 305.
40 Newbold,page 2.
62

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Vivarium
, XII, i (1974)
Ockham*s Rule of Supposition:
Two Conflicts in His Theory

PAUL VINCENT SPADE

I
his thirteenth-centuryIntroductions in logicam, William of
In Sherwood enunciates the following principle: "Subjects are of
such sorts as their predicates may have allowed." 1 That is, the
kind ofsupposition2or referencea termhas in a givensentencedepends
at least in part on what kind of a term the predicate is. This principle
I shall call the "rule of supposition". Thus, in 'A man is running'the
subject 'man' has personal supposition, while in 'Man is a species' it
has simple and in 'Man is a name' it has material.3
1 WilliamofSherwood*
toLogic, NormanKretzmann,
s Introduction
tr.,(Minneaof MinnesotaPress,1966),p. 113. The Latin is: "talia sunt
polis: University
ed.,Die Introduc
subiecta,qualiapermiserint
predicata."Cf.MartinGrabmann,
tionesin logicamdes Wilhelm
nach
vonShyreswood
(|
1267), (Mnchen:Verlag
der Bayerischen
Akademieder Wissenschaften,
1937),P- 78. I suspectit was
this doctrine,in particularas it was developedby laterauthors,whichwas
forE. A. Moody'spuzzlingremarksabout supposition'sbeinga
responsible
relationoftermto termratherthana semanticrelationoftermto
syntactical
in MediaevalLogic, (Amsterdam:
Norththing.Cf.his Truthand Consequence
havegenerated
Holland,1953),p. 22. But contrastibid.,p. 11.Moody'sremarks
notleastofwhichis the
morethana littleconfusion
in the modernliterature,
to themediaevalsofa "syntactic"notionoftruth.Cf.,e.g.,Alfonso
attribution
Studi
Maier,"Il problemadella veritnelleoperedi Guglielmo
Heytesbury,"
serieterza,7 (1966),pp. 40-74,especiallyp. 46.
medievali,
2 I am concerned
in thispaper onlywiththat portionof suppositiontheory
whichT. K. Scottcalls"thedoctrine
ofsupposition
proper",as opposedto "the
doctrineof modesof personalsupposition".Cf. the introduction
to his John
Buridan: Sophisms
onMeaningandTruth,
(NewYork:Appleton-Century-Crofts,
withat least thisportionof
1966),pp. 29-42.I assumea minimalfamiliarity
suppositiontheory.Discussionsmay also be foundin PhilotheusBoehner,
MedievalLogic: An OutlineofIts Development
from1250-c.1400,(Manchester:
Press,1952),pp. 27-51;Boehner,"Ockham'sTheoryofSupposition
University
and theNotionofTruth,"in hisCollected
onOckham,
Articles
(St. Bonaventure,
N.Y. : TheFranciscanInstitute,
:
ed., & tr.,Ockham
1958),pp. 232-267; Boehner,
Philosophical
Writings,
(London:Nelson,1957),section4; Williamand Martha
Press,1962),pp. 246-274;
Kneale,TheDevelopment
ofLogic(Oxford:Clarendon
E. A. Moody,op. cit.,pp. 23-29.
3 Kretzmann,
op. cit.,p. 107; Grabmann,
op. cit.,p. 75.
63

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There are two ways in whichthisrule is leftincompletein Sherwood's

discussion.First, is the supposition of the subject termunambiguously
fixedby the kind of termthe predicate is, or does the predicate merely
narrow down the kinds of supposition the subject may take ? Second,
what featuresof the predicate are relevant,and how ? William is silent
on both counts.
In Walter Burley's longer tract De puntate artis logicae (1325-28),4
the firstquestion had been resolved. Burley maintains that any term
in subject position may have personal supposition with respect to
any predicate whatsoever, but it can have material or simple supposition only when it is "matched" with an appropriatepredicate.6Hence,
forinstance,6
... ifit be said: 'A man runs',or 'A manis white',thisterm'man' deterBut ifit be said: 'Man is a species'or
minatelyhas personalsupposition.
the term'man' can supposeindifferently
either
'Man is a monosyllable',
or simplyor materially.. . . Hencethisis notmultiple
: 'A man
personally
runs',or 'A man is an animal',because in these the subject supposes
personally.Yet sentencesof this sort: 'Man is a species'and 'Man is a
4 PhilotheusBoehner,ed., WalterBurleigh
: De puritateartislogicaetractatus
N.Y. :
witha RevisedEditionoftheTractatus
brevior,
(St. Bonaventure,
longior,
will
The FranciscanInstitute,1955),p. viii.All quotationsfromtheDe puritate
tract1,part1.
be fromthetractatus
longior
5 Ibid., ca. 3, p. 9 line 34- p. 10 line 2: "Intelligendum
est, quod terminus
te sermonisrespectu
potens habere diversas suppositionespotest de virtu
personalem,
quia ilia estprimaria
cuiuscumque
praedicatihaberesuppositionem
tamenmaterialem
vel simplicem
acceptiovel suppositiotermini.
Suppositionem
sibi convenientis
secundumsuppositiononpotesthaberenisirespectutermini
vel materialem."
nemsimplicem
e Ibid., p. 10 lines2-7, 19-34: "... si dicatur:'Homo curri,vel: 'Homo est
habetsuppositionem
'homo'determinate
albus',isteterminus
personalem.Sed
si dicatur:'Homo est species',vel: 'Homo est disyllabum',
potestisteterminus
vel simpliciter
vel materialiter
'homo'indifferenter
supponerepersonaliter
Unde haec non est multiplex:'Homo curri,vel: 'Homo est animai',quia in
:
istis subiectumsupponitpersonaliter.Sed tamen huiusmodipropositiones
suntmultiplices
'Homo est species','Homo est disyllabum',
penes secundum
'homo'potesthaberesupposiex eo quod illeterminus
modumaequivocationis,
sta enimpropositio
vel simplicem
vel materialem.
: 'Homo
tionempersonalem
est species',est multiplex,ex eo quod iste terminus'homo' potest habere
Et ista: 'Homo est dissylabum',
est
personalemvel simplicem.
suppositionem
ex eo quod illeterminus
distinguenda
penessecundummodumaequivocationis,
'homo' potest habere suppositionem
personalemvel materialem,ita quod
terminus
potestetiamhaberesuppositionem
potenshabereistas suppositiones
sed suppositionem
vel materialem
simplicem
respectucuiuscumque,
personalem
sibi
alicuiconvenienti
nonnisiex adjuncto,videlicetex hoc quod comparatur
vel materialem."
All translasecundumsuppositionem
talem,scilicetsimplicem
tionsinthispaperaremine,exceptforthepassagesfromWilliamofSherwood.
64

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withthesecondmodeofequivocation,7
are multiples
monosyllable'
by the
factthattheterm'man'canhavepersonalorsimpleormaterialsupposition.
For the sentence'Man is a species'is multipleby the factthatthe term
'man' can have personalor simplesupposition.And this one 'Man is a
withthesecondmodeofequivocation,
is to be distinguished
monosyllable'
by thefactthattheterm'man' can havepersonalormaterialsupposition,
so that a termable to have thesesuppositionscan also have personal
but simpleor material
withrespectto anythingwhatsoever,
supposition
supposition
onlyfroman adjunct,namely,fromthefactthatit is matched
withsomething
it accordingto suchsupposition,
namely,simpleor
fitting
material.
For Burley, then, sentences with certain special kinds of predicates
are equivocal and must be "distinguished". Such predicates do not
unambiguouslyfix the kind of supposition their subjects have. But it
has not yet been made clear what these kinds of predicates are.
William of Ockham adopts a version of the rule of supposition that
agrees with Burley's but goes beyond it with an account of the
relevant featuresof predicates.8 He says: 9
7 On the threemodesof the fallacyof equivocation,cf. Aristotle,Sophistic
Refutations
4, 166a I4ff.The secondmodeis thatin whichwe takea word"by
custom"in morethan one sense.Aristotlegivesno example.The mediaevals
tookthismode to be equivocationby "transumption".
Williamof Sherwood
theSeine
givestheexample: 'whateverrunshas feet,the Seineruns; therefore
has feet'.Cf.Kretzmann,
op. cit.,p. 87. It is hardto
op. cit.,p. 136; Grabmann,
seehowBurleythinksthatthesentences
hementions
areequivocalinthismode.
A morelikelycandidateis the thirdmodeof equivocation,"whenwordsthat
have a simplesensetakenalonehave morethanone meaningin combination;
letters'.For eachword,both'knowing'and 'letters',possiblyhas
e.g.,'knowing
a singlemeaning:butbothtogether
havemorethanone- eitherthattheletters
themselves
have knowledgeor that someone else has it of them" (Aristotle,
loc.cit.,Oxfordtr.).WilliamofOckhamtakessuchsentences
to be equivocalin
thismode.Cf. PhilotheusBoehner,ed., WilliamOckham
: Summalogicae(St.
N.Y. : The FranciscanInstitute,
Bonaventure,
1951-54),I, ca. 65,line15.
8 Burley'slongertractDe puritate
appearsto have beenwrittenshortlyafter
Ockham'sSummalogicae.Cf. Boehner'sed. of Burley,p. viii. Thus, while
Ockham'sviewis themoredeveloped,histextat leastis chronologically
earlier
thanBurley's.On the relationsbetweenOckhamand Burley,cf. L. Baudry,
"Les rapportsde Guillaumed'Occamet de WalterBurleigh,"Archives
histoire
doctrinale
etlittraire
du moyenge,1934,PP- I55*I73and StephenF. Brown,
"WalterBurleigh'sTreatiseBe Suppositionibus
and Its Influenceon Williamof
Ockham,"FranciscanStudies32 (1972),pp. 15-64.
9 Ockham,Summalogicae
, I, 65, lines42-51: "Potest igiturista reguladari,
quod quando terminuspotens habere praedictamtriplicemsuppositionem
comparaturextremocommuniincomplexisvel complexis,sive prolatissive
materialem
vel personascriptis,
semperterminus
potesthaberesuppositionem
lem, et est talis propositiodistinguenda.
Quando vero comparaturextremo
intentionemanimae, est distinguenda,eo quod potest habere
significanti
extremo
suppositionem
Quando autemcomparatur
simplicemvel personalem.
eo quod potesthabere
communiomnibuspraedictis,tunc est distinguenda,
vel personalem."
materialem
simplicem,
suppositionem
65

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00:02:24 AM

can be given,that whena termable to have the

This rule,therefore,
is matchedwithan extreme
aforesaid
threekindsofsupposition
commonto
incomplexor complex <expressions>, whetherspokenor written,the
and sucha sentence
termcanalwayshavematerialorpersonalsupposition,
is to be distinguished.
But whenit is matchedwithan extremesignifying
an intentionof the soul, it is to be distinguished
insofaras it can have
simpleor personalsupposition.But whenit is matchedwithan extreme
thenit is to be distinguished
commonto all theaforesaid,
insofaras it can
have simple,materialorpersonalsupposition.
Ockham thus gives a complete version of the rule of supposition
which we first saw in rudimentaryform in William of Sherwood.
Nevertheless,I shall argue in sections II and III, below, that Ockham
does not really want the rule he gives. It conflictswith the main body
of his doctrine in two ways; there are pressuresfrom two directions
to revise his version of the rule. In section IV, I shall examine how
some later formulationsof the rule relieved these pressures.
II
The two conflictsjust mentionedcorrespondto the two deficiencies
noted above in Sherwood's discussion. The firstconflict arises from
Ockham's acceptingthe view that some sentencesmust be distinguished
according to the kinds of supposition their subject terms may have.
The second arises in addition fromOckham's own apparent contribution, namely, fromhis account of the relevant features of predicates.
The firstconflictmay be broughtout in the followingsteps:
1) The division of supposition into personal, material and simple
applies to termsin the mental language (concepts) as much as to
spoken or writtentermsin physical language.10
2) The kind or kinds of supposition a subject term may have is
determinedby the rule of supposition.
3) According to that rule, some sentences are equivocal and must
be distinguished.
4) Hence, some sentences in the mental language are equivocal and
must be distinguished.
5) But, on the contrary, there is no equivocation in the mental
language.
10Ibid., I, 64, lines 59-62: "Sicut autemtalis diversitassuppositionis
potest
termino
vocaliet scripto,ita etiampotestcompetere
termino
mentali,
competere
et prose ipsa,et provoce
quia intentio
potestsupponereproilioquod significat,
et scripto." On Ockham'smentallanguage,cf. JohnTrentman,"Ockhamon
Mental,"Mind79 (1970),pp. 586-590.
66

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Step 4 could of course be avoided by holding that Ockham's rule

applies only to spoken and written language, and that the kind of
suppositiona term(concept) has in the mental language is to be decided
in some other way. There is no evidence, however, that Ockham
himselfmeant his rule of supposition to be restrictedin this manner.
Moreover,later writersmet the above problem by revising the rule,
not by restrictingits applicability.
There remains the justificationof my claim in step 5 that Ockham
wants no equivocation in the mental language. With respect to equivocal terms
, he is explicit: 11
Nowit is to be knownfirstthatonlyan utterance,
orsomesigninstituted
is equivocalor univocal,and therefore
an intention
ofthe
by convention,
soulorconceptis notequivocalorunivocal,properly
speaking.
Rather the univocityor equivocity of a spoken termis to be accounted
for by the relation of "subordination" between spoken terms and
concepts.12A univocal spoken termis subordinated to a single concept,
while an equivocal one is subordinatedto several concepts at once.13
Mental language then is what accounts for equivocation in spoken
terms.There can be no equivocal terms(concepts) in mental language,
since mental terms are not subordinated to anything furtherwhich
could account forthe equivocation.
About equivocal sentencesOckham is not so explicit. What he does
say indicates a parallel doctrine.Each spoken sentence correspondsto
a sentencein the mental language.14A spoken sentence is true or false
accordingas the mental sentence correspondingto it is true or false.15
11Ockham,op. cit.,I, 13,lines6-9: "Est autemprimosciendum,
quod sola vox
vel aliquodsignumad placituminstitutum
est aequivocumvel univocum,et
ideo intentioanimaevel conceptusnon est aequivocusnec univocusproprie
loquendo."
12On subordination,
cf.ibid.,I, 3. Writtentermsare in turnsubordinated
to
spokenterms.Cf. ibid.,I, 3, lines25-46.Univocityand equivocationamong
written
termsare explainedby an obviousextensionofthedoctrine.
13Ibid.,I, 13,lines10-12: "Est autemvox ilia aequivoca,quae significans
plura
non est signumsubordinatum
uni conceptui,sed est signumunumpluribus
seu intentionibus
animae subordinatum."
Also, ibid.,lines 40i.:
conceptibus
" 'Univocum'autemdicituromne
uni conceptui,
illud,quod est subordinatum
sive significet
plurasive non."
14Ibid.,I, 3, lines86-91: "Sed quod oporteatponeretalia nominamentaliset
verbaet adverbiaet coniunctiones
et praepositiones,
ex hoc convincitur,
quod
omniorationivocali correspondeat
alia mentalisin mente; et ideo sicutillae
vocalis, quae sunt propternecessitatemsignifications
partes propositionis
mentaliscorrespondentes
impositae,sunt distinctae,sie partespropositionis
suntdistinctae."
16Cf.e.g.,WilliamofOckham,Quodlibetu
septem(Strasbourg,
1491),quodlibet
5,q. 8,passim.
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In some cases the correspondenceis subject to general rules, and then

the spoken sentence is said to be taken literally.16In other cases a
spoken sentence is not taken literally,and then we must look in each
case to the correspondingmental sentenceto discover what the speaker
meant, and how we are to evaluate his utterance.In this way are saved
many of the authoritative sayings of the ancients, which are false
literallybut true in the sense in which they were made.17
The thrustof this is clear. To take a sentencein one sense or another
is to correlate it (subordinate it) to one mental sentence or another.
Since there are no further,supramental sentences to which mental
sentences can be subordinated, no mental sentence can be equivocal.
The firstpressure on Ockham's rule of supposition, then, is that it
introducesequivocation into the mental language insofaras it requires
that certain sentences be "distinguished". This latter featureof Ockham's rule is also foundin Burley's, forwhom it presentedno problem.
Burley,and realist logicians in general,had no vested interestin mental
language.18 But when Ockham and his followersmoved the realists'
extramentaluniversais into the mind and turnedthem into concepts,19
the old Aristotelian notion of a mental language 20 took on a new
importance. It is only the nominalistfollowersof Ockham, then, who
feelthis firstpressureon his formulationof the rule of supposition.
18Ockham,Summalogicae,II, 19,lines41-4: "namtalessecundumproprietahocestsecundum
et locutionis,
temsermonis
perquas taleset
regulasgenerales,
consimilesiudicaridebent,concedipossun'. Cf. also Boehner,"Ockham's
TheoryofSupposition,"
pp. 248-253.
17 Cf.e.g., Ockham,Summalogicae
, I, 66, lines43-45: "Et ita est frequenter,
suntfalsaede virtutesermonis,
authenticaeet magistrales
quod propositiones
veraspropositiones
et veraein sensu,in quo fiunt,hoc est,illiintendebant
per
"
falsaede
eas."; ibid.,lines51-53: . . . et caeteraetalesmultaesuntsimpliciter
tamenillae propositiones,
virtutesermonis,
quas Philosophusintendebatper
istas,suntverae.";bid.,I, 77,lines10-18: "Et ideomultumestconsiderandum,
et quandosecunet propositioaccipiturde virtutesermonis,
quandoterminus
dum usumloquentiumvel secundumintentionem
auctorum,et hoc quia vix
invenituraliquod vocabulum,quin in diversislocis librorumphilosophorum,
sanctorumet auctorumaequivoce accipiatur,et hoc penes aliquemmodum
aequivocationis.Et ideo volentesacciperesempervocabulumunivoceet uno
auctorumet inquisitionem
errantcircaintentiones
veritatis,
modo,frequenter
cumfereomniavocabulaaequivoceaccipiantur."
18Burleydoes mentionit, however,in Burleisuperartemveterem
Porphiriiet
Aristotelis
(Venice:Otinus(de Luna) Papiensis,1497,no folionumbers)in his
on De interpretatione
1, 16a 4ff.,wherehe sideswithOckhamand
commentary
and in generalsignify
do not primarily
terms
that
Boethius,
saying
against
concepts.
19 Cf. Etienne Gilson,Historyof ChristianPhilosophyin theMiddle Ages,
L. K. Shook,tr.,(NewYork: RandomHouse,1955)PP-49*f20De interpretatione,
1, 16 a 4ff.
68

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III
The second pressureon Ockham's rule arises fromhis accepting the
view that some sentencesmust be distinguished,and also fromhis own
contribution,namely, from his specification of the features of the
predicate relevant to determiningthe kind of supposition the subject
has. The combination of these two, as we shall see, conflictswith his
own definitionsof the various kinds of supposition.
Ockhm divides supposition as follows.21First there is the division
into properand impropersupposition: 22"Now one ought to know that
just as there is proper supposition, when, namely, a term stands for
that which it properlysignifies,so thereis impropersuppositionwhen
a termis taken improperly."Propersuppositionis then subdivided into
personal, simple and material. Personal supposition is defined as
follows:23
Personalsupposition
in everycase is thathad whena termstandsforits
be a thingoutsidethesoul,or whether
thatsignifcate
whether
signifcate,
it be an inscription,
it be an utteranceor an intention
ofthesoul,whether
thesubjectorpredicateof
or anything
elseimaginable,
so thatwhensoever
a sentencestandsforits significate,
so that it is takensignificatively,
the
is alwayspersonal.
supposition
. . . But thisis the definition,
that suppositionis personalwhena term
standsforitssignificate,
and significatively.
On the other hand, "supposition is simple when a term stands for an
intentionof the soul but is not taken significatively",24
while "supposition is material when a term does not suppose significatively,but
stands for an utterance of for an inscription."25
Ockham's usage suggests that a termis "taken significatively"just
21Cf.above,n. 2.
22Ockham,Summalogicae,I, 77, lines1-3: "Oportetautemcognoscere,
quod
sicutest suppositiopropria,quando scilicetterminussupponitpro eo, quod
significatproprie,ita est suppositioimpropria,quando terminusaccipitur
improprie."
28Ibid., I, 64, lines 3-8, 24-26: "Suppositiopersonalisuniversaliter
est ilia,
sive illud significatum
sit res
quando terminussupponitpro suo significato,
sivequodcumextraanimam,sivesitvox siveintentio
animae,sivesitscriptum,
que aliud imaginabile,ita quod quandocumquesubiectumvel praedicatum
ita quod significative
tenetur,
propositionis
semper
supponitprosuo significato,
est suppositiopersonalis."And, "... sed ista est definitio,
quod suppositio
et significative."
est,quandoterminus
personalis
supponitprosuo significato
24Ibid., lines 27I : "Suppositiosimplexest quando terminussupponitpro
intentione
animae,sed nontenetursignificative."
26Ibid., lines39f.: "Suppositiomaterialisest, quando terminusnon supponit
sedsupponitvelprovocevelproscripto."
significative,
69

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00:02:24 AM

in case it stands for what it signifies.26But if this is so, then the

definitionof personal supposition quoted above is redundant, and
personal supposition occurs just whenever a term stands for what it
signifies. This seems to be confirmedby passages where Ockham
conveniently ignores the "taken significatively" proviso, as if it
added nothing to the definition.27We shall take this as Ockham's
doctrine.
On the basis of this doctrine,the subjects of the followingsentences
stand for what they signify, and hence must have only personal
28
supposition:
1) Concept is a species.
2) Noun has fourletters.
3) Being is a participle.
On the other hand, by Ockham's rule of supposition, the subject of
1) may have simple supposition, that of 2) material supposition, and
that of 3) either.The rule of supposition,then,conflictswith Ockham's
definitionsof the main divisions of supposition. This is the second
pressureon Ockham's rule.
IV
To the best of my knowledge,no mediaeval author ever mentioned
these conflictsand pressures. But some later mediaeval nominalistsin
fact adopted rules of suppositionthat lessened the pressuresor relieved
2e Cf.e.g.,hisexamplesibid.,lines28-31,40-42.Cf.also ibid., II, 22,lines15i.,
sentencesaboutthepast or about
whereaftersettingout a ruleforconverting
thefuture,
he says: "Et estistaregulaintelligenda,
quandosubiectum
supponit
hocestsignificative."
personaliter,
27 Cf.ibid.,I, 64, lines9-21.A somewhatmoreseriousproblemwithOckham's
is redundantin the definition
of
accountis that if "taken significatively"
coincideswiththedefinition
ofproper
thenthatdefinition
personalsupposition,
- unlesstheword'properly'
in thelatterdefinition,
quotedabove,is
supposition
construedverypeculiarlyindeed.Ockhamwouldhave done betterto define
as Burleydoes,op. cit.,ca. i, p. 2, lines18-20:"Suppositio
propersupposition
supponitpro aliquo,proquo de virtutesermonis
propriaest,quandoterminus
permittitur
supponere."
28 The lack of quotationmarkswillperhapsbotherthemodernreader.Recall
that the doctrineof suppositionwas designedin part to make the kindsof
we maketodaywithquotationmarks.Notealso thatLatin,lacking
distinction
comfortable
an indefinite
article,wouldbe perfectly
takingthesubjectsofthese
sentences.
sentencesin personalsupposition.
Theywouldthenbe "indefinite"
articlewithoutchangingthesense: '(A)
We couldin Englishadd an indefinite
treated
sentencesweretraditionally
conceptis a species',etc. Such indefinite
: 'Some conceptis a species',etc.
likeparticularsentences
70

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00:02:24 AM

them altogether.Richard Lavenham,29for instance, adopts what are

essentiallyOckham's definitionsof the main branches of supposition,30
and says : 31
But hereit is to be notedas a rulethatwhensoever
thesubjectofsome
and thepredicateof secondintention,
sentenceis a termoffirstintention
thenthesubjectstandssimplyand thepredicatepersonally.
...
. . . And it is to be notedas a rulethat whensoever
the subjectof some
and thepredicateofsecondimposition,
sentence
is a termoffirstimposition
thenthesubjectstandsmaterially
andthepredicatepersonally.
The explication of firstand second intentionand of firstand second
impositionneed not detain us, and is moreoverrather problematic in
Lavenham. It appears that the featuresof predicates that are important forLavenham's analysis are not altogetherthe same as those that
Ockham uses.32What concerns us here, however, is the fact that he
does notview sentencesof the kinds he mentionsas equivocal; they do
not have to be distinguished.What Lavenham does, in effect,is to
eliminateBurley's and Ockham's bias in favorof personal supposition;
terms can no longer have personal supposition in just any sentence.
The tendencyhere is to avoid distinguishingsentences in Burley's and
Ockham's fashion,and therebyto avoid the firstconflictin Ockham's
theory.
In Lavenham, however,this is as yet only a tendency.He gives only
a partial account, not mentioningthe cases in which both subject and
predicate are of second intentionor of second imposition,or in which
the predicateis of firstintentionor firstimposition.It is moreovernot
29 Died after1399.Cf.my"The TreatisesOn ModalPropositions
and On HypotheticalPropositions
by Richard Lavenham,"MediaevalStudies35 (1973),
there.
PP-49-59and references
30 Lavenham,Suppositiones,
paragraphs6-11, edited in my "Five Logical
in a Festschrift
TractsbyRichardLavenham,"forthcoming
forAntonC. Pegis,
to be publishedbythePontificalInstituteofMediaevalStudies.In fact,Lavenhamstreamlines
to theextentofmakingexplicittherole
Ockham'sdefinitions
of the phrase'taken significatively'
(par. 6), and cuttingit fromOckham's
definition
of proper
of personalsupposition(par. 11). Lavenham'sdefinition
as Ockham's.Cf.above,
has thesameshortcoming
(par.2), however,
supposition
n. 27,andmyintroduction
to "Five LogicalTracts".
31Suppositiones
, par. 7 : "Sed hic notandumestproregulaquod quandocumetpraedicaestterminus
que subjectum
primaeintentionis
alicujuspropositionis
tumsecundaeintentionis,
et praedicatum
tuncsubjectumsupponitsimpliciter
Ibid., par. 10: "... Et notandumest pro regulaquod quandopersonaliter."
et
est terminusprimaeimpositionis
cumquesubjectumalicujus propositionis
secundaeimpositionis,
tuncsubjectum<supponit> materialiter
praedicatum
et praedicatum
personaliter."
32Cf.thediscussion
to "Five LogicalTracts".
in myintroduction
71

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00:02:24 AM

clear whetherhe avoids Ockham's second problem,since it is not clear

just which featuresof predicates Lavenham takes to be relevant, and
how they work.
Paul of Prgula,33however,adopts an account that avoids completely both of Ockham's problems. He allows only two main branches of
supposition, personal and material,34distinguishedaccording as the
term stands for its "personal significate"or for its "material significate".35 Now: 34
forwhich,ora pronoun
thepersonalsignificate
is thatwhicha termsignifies
withouta materialsign,as :
affirmatively
pointingto it, it can be verified
is what a termsignifies
for
Socratesis a man. The materialsignificate
which,or a pronounpointingto it, it cannotbe verifiedaffirmatively
withouta materialsign,as : The termmanis lyman.
Terms which are trulypredicable of themselvesboth with and without
adding the particle 'ly' have only one significate;otherwisethey have
two. Those of the firstkind include: being,something,sign,term,noun
etc.87
Prgula then gives his version of the rule of supposition.38For our
purposes there are two thingsto note. First, Prgula nowhereallows a
sentence to be "distinguished" according to the kinds of supposition
33Died 1451. Cf. Mary AnthonyBrown,ed., Paul of Prgula: Logica and
et diviso,(St. Bonaventure,
N.Y. : The Franciscan
Tractatusde sensucomposito
Institute,1961),p. v.
34T. K. Scott,op. cit.,p. 31,n. 57,suggeststhatBuridanwas alonein rejecting
kind.Paul ofPrgulais a counterexample.
as a distinct
simplesupposition
85Paul ofPrgula,Logica,tract2 ("De suppositionibus")
, lines5-7: "Suppositionumpersonalisest acceptioterminiin propositione
prosuo personalisignifiin propositione
cato. Materialisest acceptiotermini
prosuo materialisignificato." Thetracthasbeentranslated
byIvan Boh,"Paul ofPrgulaon Suppositions
and Consequences,"
FranciscanStudies25 (1965),pp. 30-89.For the passages
cf.ibid.,pp. 36i.
relevantto thisdiscussion,
3e Paul ofPrgula,loc.cit.,lines8-13: "Significatum
personaleest quod aliquis
illud quod potest
terminussignificatpro quo vel pronominedemonstrante
affirmative
verif
icari sine signomaterialiut: Sortesest homo. Significatum
demonmaterialeest quod aliquisterminus
proquo vel de pronomine
significat
verificalisine signo materialiut: Iste
stranteillud non potest affirmative
terminus
homoestly homo."The particle'ly' is as closeas themediaevalscame
- it governsan
to our quotationmarks.Notice that its scope is ambiguous
it. Noticealsothatit is notusedeverywhere
amountofwhatfollows
unspecified
we shoulduse quotationmarks.See thelast examplein thequotation.
37 Ibid.,lines17-25.
38 Ibid.,lines26-60.The rulesare complete
- i.e., theycoverall possiblecases.
Notealso thatwhereasforBurleyand Ockham,and as faras can be determined
forLavenhamas well,thepredicateofa sentencealwayshas personalsupposition,thisis notso forPrgula.
72

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00:02:24 AM

its termsmay have. In one kind of case,39 he admits, no general rule

can be given. But in that case, he says, we must look to the common
idiom to determinethe supposition of the terms- no mentionis made
of equivocation or of any need to distinguish senses. Prgula thus
completesthe tendencywe observedin Lavenham, avoiding completely
the firstconflictin Ockham's theory.
The second noteworthyfeatureof Pergula's account concernsthose
terms which he says have only one significate.These seem to be just
the terms responsible for the second conflict in Ockham's theory.
Prgula treatsthem as a separate case, and says that they always have
personal supposition- even when the particle 'ly' is added to them.40
By singling out such cases for special treatment, Prgula avoids
Ockham's problem. The solution is in effecta revision of Ockham's
analysis of the role of the relevant featuresof predicates.
It appears thenthat at least some logiciansin theOckhamisttradition
eventuallymanaged to work themselvesout of the difficultiesOckham
brought upon himself by accepting the need for "distinguishing"
sentences, and by his own analysis of predicates. They did this by
rejectingthe bias in favorofpersonalsuppositionwhichwas responsible
for the need to distinguish,and by a somewhat revised account of
predicates. Although no one seems to have explicitly mentioned the
pressuresand conflictsin Ockham's theory,it is hard to believe that
the doctrine evolved in this way by coincidence. The pressure were
felt.
Bloomington,Indiana
Indiana University

39 Rule 6, ibid.,lines52-60,namely,wherebothsubjectand predicateare of

arewithouttheparticle'ly' and havetwosignificates.
secondintention,
40 Rule i, ibid.,lines26-28.
73

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00:02:24 AM

Books Received

Turnholti
, CorpusChristianorum,
J.-M. Clment,Initia PatrumLatinorum
(Brepols),1971.
: SpeculumReligiosorum
and SpeculumEcclesie
EdmundofAbingdon
, editedby
Helen P. Forshaw,S.H.C.J. (= AuctoresBritanniciMedii Aevi, III),
London (PublishedforTheBritishAcademyby OxfordUniversity
Press),
1973 ( 5- net).
nederlandicae
mediiaevi,WoorJ. W. Fuchs- Olga Weijers,Lexiconlatinitatis
fase.3,
denboek
van hetmiddeleeuws
Nederlanden,
Latijn van de noordelijke
Amstelodami
(A. M. Hakkert),1972; fase.4, 1973.
Auxerre. Il compendioanonimo
FerruccioGastaldelli,Ricerchesu Goffredo
ed edizionecritica(= Bibliotheca
Introduzione
del "SuperApocalypsim".
- Commentaria,
voi.
"VeterumSapientia",SeriesA, Textus- Documenta
XII), Romae, 1970 (L. 3.200).
ManfredRaupach,Die Reichenauer
Glossen,Teil II: Entstehungund Aufbau
Editionenund
Philologiedes Mittelalters,
(= Beitrgezur romanischen
Abhandlungen,hrsg. von Hans-WilhelmKlein, Band 1/2), Mnchen
(WilhelmFinkVerlag),1972.
von
Mittellateinisches
, hrsg.von Karl LangoschunterMitwirkung
Jahrbuch
HellfriedDahlmann,Cola Minis,Peter von Moos, Alf nnerfors,Josef
VIII = 1973 (A. HennVerlag,Ratingen).Contents:G. KlbSzvrffy,
"
"
"; W. Berschin,Zum Eingangdes*
linger, VersusPanos und "De rustico
Die "Ecbasiscuiusdamcaptivi'
L. Gompf,
"Waltharius"
-Widmungsgedichts]
- manuscrit
d'Hrode
und ihrPublikum
; SolangeCorbin,Un jeu liturgique
M azarineiy12 (1316); D. KuijperF. f.,De ludoHerodis
Paris,Bibliothque
; D. KuijperF.f.,Exegeticamediaevalia;ThereseLatzke,Abaelard,
liturgico
22 derRipollsammlung
Hilarius und das Gedicht
; D. Lohrmann,Der Tod
Literatur
Englands
KnigHeinrichsI. vonEnglandin dermittellateinischen
Die fnfRedendes Laurentiusvon
und derNormandie
; U. Kindermann,
vonderHochzeitMerkurs
Durham; P. Klopschu. E. Walter,Das Gedicht
zum
und derPhilologie(Walther
20338); H. Grossmann,Untersuchungen
des MagistersAndreasde Rode',F. Wagner,Zur Dicht"Filius*'-Gedicht
der Verfkunstdes Konradvon Haimburg;Besprechungen;Verzeichnis
vonHans Walther
, zsg.von Helga undP. G. Schmidt;Klner
fentlichungen
J. Stohlmann,Nachtrgezu Hans Walther,Initia
Forschungsarbeiten;
mediiaevi (II); (DM. 38.- ).
ac versuum
carminum
von
Mittellateinisches
hrsg.von Karl LangoschunterMitwirkung
Jahrbuch,
Fritz
HellfriedDahlmann,Cola Minis,Petervon Moos, JosefSzvrffy,
Wagner,IX = 1973 (A. Henn Verlag,Ratingen).Contents:W. Breuer,
des Oster
Zur Textgeschichte
", Brbel
hymnus"Ad cenamagni providi
E. Hegener,PolitikundHeilsgeschichte
:
,
Beutner,Der TraumdesAbraham
Das Verhltnis
derDialekUrsulaSchssler,
"Carmenad Robertm
regem"',
74

189.235.178.250

00:02:30 AM

tikPeterAbaelardszur modernen
Logik; RosemarieKatscher,"Waltharius"
"
- Dichtungund Dichter
Zur "Ecbasis cuiusdamcaptivi
; B. K. Braswell,
Peter
von
V. i; D. KuijperF.f., Ad Theobaldi" Physiologum"
Moos,
;
Thomas
Palatiniquaestioquasi peregrini
; P. G. Schmidt,Die Ermordung
Becketsim Spiegelzeitgenssischer
; H. W. Klein, Johannis
Dichtungen
Neue Handabbatis" Liberde VII viciiset VII virtutibus"
; E. J. Thiel,
von Ovids " Ars amatoria"
der mittellateinischen
Nachdichtungen
schriften
" u.
und
und " Remediaamoris
Nachtrge',
Besprechungen;
Selbstanzeigen
zu Hans Walter,Initia carminum
ac
Stohlmann,
Nachtrge
Nachtrge;J.
versuum
mediiaevi (III); (DM. 38.- ).

75

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00:02:30 AM

Vivarium
, XII, 2 (1974)
Boethius's Works on the Topics

ELEONORE STUMP

De topicis differentiis
appears to be the mature product of an
The excellentmind. It shows the same acumen, subtlety,and care as
Boethius's other logical treatises; and it seems to build on the
trainingand insightBoethius manifestedin his earlier treatises.1It is
a complete study of the discipline forfindingarguments,both dialectical and rhetorical.Boethius workshis diversematerial,fromdifferent
traditionsand fromdifferentdisciplines,into one coherentand elegant
system unequaled, as far as I know, in any of the material that has
come down to us fromantiquity and the early middle ages.2 Not only
does he attempt to expound and reconcile the differentdivisions of
Topics, but he also provides a theoreticalfoundationforthe whole discipline. His analysis of rhetoric,he claims, is original with him; and
the more one studies that analysis, the more one is inclined to believe
him.3 His treatment of the Topics themselves is radically different
fromanythingin Aristotle's Topics and contains much that is not in
Cicero's Topica . His treatise,then, seems to be an original and important logical work.And the natural, common-senseview one gains from
reading the De top. diff.and the companion piece In CiceronisTopica ,
with their many cross-references
to Boethius's other works on logic,is
that Boethius was a highlytrained scholar with admirable philosophical gifts,who wrotea numberofindependentand originallogical works
in addition to his translationsof Aristotle.
But a thesis which runs counter to the common-senseview has been
'
published; James Shiel in his article Boethius Commentarieson Aris1 TheDe top.diff.is oneofthelastworksBoethiusproduced.See L. M. De Rijk,
On theChronology
Workson LogicII, Vivarium2 (1964),153-154
ofBoethius*
and 157-161.
2 See theIntroduction
Ph.D. dissertation,
andChaptersI-III inmyunpublished
Boethius'sDe topicisdifferentiis,
CornellUniversity,
1975.
3 See thenotesto mytranslation
See also Michael
ofBk. IV in mydissertation.
: an AnalysisofDe diff.top.LiberIV, paperpreLeff,TheLogician'sRhetoric
at Kalamazoo,Michigan.
sentedat theninthannualmedievalconference
77

23:57:09 PM

totle4 has argued that Boethius's works on logic are not original compositions but are ratherhis translationsof Greek Neo-Platonic scholia
on Aristotle's Organon. His thesis seems to be gaining currency; two
eminentscholars in the field,Minio-Paluello 5 and De Rijk,6 accept or
supportit. In this article,afterconsideringverybrieflysome treatment
of Shiel's thesis in the literature,I want to discuss the thesis in detail
as it applies to Boethius's work on the Topics. My main concernis to
examine and discuss Shiel's evidence forhis counter-intuitivetheory;
if it does not stand up under scrutiny,we are free to return to the
common-senseview and to take Boethius's works on the Topics, at
least, to be just what they appear to be- his originalcompositions.
Scholars discussingShiel's work differabout just how extensive his
thesisis meant to be. C. J. De Vogel thinksShiel is arguingthat "every
line and every word of Boethius' commentariesand treatises was a
translation of Greek notes".7 L. Minio-Paluello seems to think Shiel's
claims are narrowerand do not cover anythingfromthe two treatises
on the Topics except the Themistian materialin Bk. II of De top. cliff.*
There are two main reasons fortaking Shiel's thesis as Minio-Paluello
does: first,the claim that these treatises are translations of Greek
scholia is especially implausible;9 and secondly, Shiel nowhere argues
such a claim explicitly. But I think a close reading of Shiel's article
supports something more nearly like De Vogel's view. The problem
Shiel sets himselfconcerns the status of all Boethius's works on logic.
At the beginningofhis article,Shiel says, "The presentarticletherefore
proposes to examine the other extant resultsof Boethius' promise,the
commentariesand treatises. Are they really original or are they too
translatedfromGreek?" (p. 217). As he begins to summarize,he speaks
of the conclusion he is about to draw as a general conclusion about all
the Boethian commentariesand treatiseshe has mentioned (and these
include the treatiseson the Topics) (p. 241) ; and the conclusionhe goes
on to draw is that Boethius's contributionto medieval philosophywas
nothingmore than that of a translatorand transmitter(pp. 243-244).
4 Mediaevaland RenaissanceStudies4 (1958),217-244.
5 Cf.L. Minio-Paluello,
etlescommentaires
Les traductions
aristotliciens
deBoce
in: StudiaPatristicaII, fifthseries,v. 9; 1957;pp. 358-365.
Cf. L. M. De Rijk, On theChronology
ofBoethius'Workson LogicI and II,
Vivarium2 (1964),1-49,125-162.
7 BoethianaI, Vivarium9 (1971),p. 58.
8 Cf.,e.g.,Les traductions,
p. 360.
BothIn Cic. Top. and De top.diff.dependon Latinrhetorical
and philosophical treatises,
; and it is extremely
namely,Cicero'sTopicaand/orDe inventione
on Cicero.
readingand commenting
strangeto thinkofGreekNeo-Platonists
78

23:57:09 PM

The impressionthat Shiel takes the treatises on the Topics, too, to be

translationsis strengthenedwhen we see that he thinks all the crossreferencesin Boethius's logical works (among which these treatises are
included) are translated fromscholia (cf. pp. 238 and 243). And Shiel
says nothingto indicate that eitherof the treatiseson the Topics is an
exception to his general conclusion or that in these treatises Boethius
made an originalcontributionto the medieval world.
So in this article I will direct my argument against the thesis that
all Boethius's logical works,including the two treatiseson the Topics,
are translationsof Greek scholia ratherthan his own compositions.My
main business, however, will be examining the points Shiel makes in
his discussions of the Boethian works on the Topics; so most of my
criticismswill be applicable to Shiel's article even if he means to assert
only a narrowerthesis. But if Shiel does intend only a narrowerhypothesis,ifhe does thinkthat Boethius's treatiseson the Topics are original work,then the conclusion to his article is too strong(pp. 243-244).
He concludes that Boethius's service to logic was basically the work of
a translator,nothingmore. If De top. diff.is original,however, then
Boethius made a significantoriginal contributionto medieval philosophy, because that treatise was very importantnot only in later medieval logic but in medieval rhetoricas well.10And so Boethius's service
to medieval thinkerswas that of a philosopherand scholar as well as
translatorand transmitter.
De Rijk in his two articles On theChronologyofBoethius1Works on
Logic gives the impressionthat, on the whole, he accepts Shiel's hypothesis, though it is not clear whether he takes that hypothesis in a
broad or a narrow sense (cf., e.g., pp. 4, 31, and 144). De Rijk never
explicitlyexamines Shiel's thesis or the evidence offeredforit ; and he
refersto Shiel's workmost oftenonly as providingevidence warranting
caution in the use of cross-referencesto establish the chronology of
Boethius's works. It is mostly on the question of the cross-references
that De Rijk feels Shiel's hypothesishas to be qualified. Shiel thinks
all the cross-references
are just translations fromthe scholia and not
Boethius's own (cf. Shiel pp. 238 and 243) ; but De Rijk shows that
some of the more exact referencesshould be taken as Boethius's and
10For theimportance
see JamesMurphy,
ofDe top.diff.in medievalrhetoric,
in theMiddleAges,University
of California
Rhetoric
Press,1974; ChapterII,
pp. 112-117.See alsoMichaelLeff,BoethiusandtheHistoryofMedievalRhetoric,
CentralStatesSpeechJournal24 (1974),pp. 137-138.
79

23:57:09 PM

can safelybe used in fixingthe relative dates of Boethius's works (see

e.g., De Rijk p. 158).
Minio-Paluello takes Shiel's thesis as applying to only some of Boethius's logical works,includingcertainparts ofDe top.cliff.
; and though
he does not examine it in detail, he agrees with it:
"Les analysesdtaillsde M. Shieldonnentdes preuvesassez persuasives
aux Catgories
et au De
que toutce que Ton trouvedans les commentaries
aussibienque danslescommentaries
VIsagogde Porphyre,
interpretation
dans les troisTraitssurles Syllogismes
du
, et dansla partiethmistienne
De differentiis
adaptations,
topicisse rduit destraductions,
amplifications
dansle texteet dans les marges
toutnaturellement
de ce qu'on trouverait
de provenance
d'unvolumescolairede l'Organon
athnienne
(de l'entourage
de Proclus)".11
De Vogel takes Shiel's thesis to be that all Boethius's works on logic
are simplytranslationsof Scholia, and in her articleBoethiana 1 12she
argues against it. She presents a general argumentand does not consider the particulars of Shiel's evidence. It is unnecessary to recount
her case against Shiel in detail here; I want instead simply to summarize the way in which she proceeds against him. First, she says that
Shiel's observations are on the whole correctbut that his explanation
of those observations is not the only one possible and is, in fact, the
more implausible of the alternatives. Shiel's hypothesisrequires that
Boethius translated in a mechanical sort of way whatever he found in
his scholia. For example, Shiel thinksthat Boethius's famous promise
to translate Plato and Aristotleand reconciletheirdoctrinesis not his
promise at all but simply a literal translationwithout any appropriate
change of voice to indicate that the promiseis not Boethius's own (see,
e.g., pp. 243-244). Because Boethius does seem to have been a trained
scholar (as the Consolatio,forexample, suggests),an equally good and
certainlymore plausible explanation of Shiel's data is that Boethius
took an independent attitude in dealing with his sources forlogic as he
did with his sources formusicology,accordingto De Vogel (p. 59). To
conclude on the basis of the evidence Shiel has presented that all
Boethius's works on logic are translationsof Greek marginalia is, she
says, "a mere guess" (p. 60). Secondly, she adduces certain Boethian
passages which it seems impossible to consideras translations of NeoPlatonic scholia (pp. 59-60) ; forinstance,in In Cic. Top. 1070 D, 11Les Traductions
A Latin Commentary
, p. 360. /. also Minio-Paluello,
(?
anditsGreekSources
Translated
, The Journal
byBoethius)onthePriorAnalytics
of HellenicStudiesLXXVII (1957),93-*2.
12Vivarium9 (1971),49-66.
80

23:57:09 PM

thius is skeptical about a theological doctrine he identifies as

Platonic.
I thinkDe Vogel's argumentsare generallysensibleand well-founded,
and it seems to me that one mightadd another argumentto each ofher
two groups of argumentsagainst Shiel, the general argumentsand the
counter-instances.As a general argument,it strains credulityto think
that the mind which produced the Consolation of Philosophy, a book
that captivated the European worldforwell over a millenium,occupied
itselfin an abundant libraryfornearly two decades beforeit composed
that masterpieceby doing nothingbut translatingand adapting scholia
fromthe margins of one book. And as a counter-instancewhich one
might add to the passages De Vogel gives, there is an example in De
top. diff.1199 B15-C4, in the very Book of the treatise Shiel thinks
most likelyto have come fromGreek scholia, which is a quotation from
a speech of Cicero's,In Catil. I.3. Marius Victorinusquotes the Ciceronian passage in his commentaryon De inventione;1*and since both De
inv. and Victorinusare importantsources for Boethius, he may have
taken the quotation fromVictorinusrather than directlyfromCicero.
Since the passage in 1199 B15-C4 is a quotation, it could come from
Greek scholia only if Greek Neo-Platonists were quoting Cicero in the
originalLatin. It seems safe to say, then, that Boethius "will not have
found that [quotation] in any Greek marginal notes originatingfrom
the Neoplatonist School of Athens".14
And finally,two of Boethius's sources forthe De top. diff. are works
which are still extant: Cicero's Topica and De inventione.Comparison
of the De top. diff.Books III and IV with those two Ciceronianbooks
tends to bear out De Vogel's hypothesisthat Boethius drew on certain
works as sources but maintained independence fromthem.15
Shiel discusses all three of Boethius's works on the Topics, the two
treatises and the lost commentaryon Aristotle's Topics. For the commentary on the Topics, Shiel gives an argument explicitlyconcluding
that the work was nothingbut a translation:
ofhisownon Aristotle's
"Boethiusalso refers
threetimesto a commentary
- eitherhe had transTopics.Hence- exactlyas in thecase oftheAnalytics
whichis nowlostor elsehe was thinking
latedfromscholiaa commentary
of scholiawhichhe was on the pointof translating"(p. 240).
13Rhetores
LatiniMinores,. Halm,Lipsiae,1863,p. 227.
14 As De Vogelsaysin connection
witha different
example,p. 59.
15Cf.,e.g.,1207B3 and 1209C9 and thenotesto mytranslation
ofthosepassagesin mydissertation.
8l

23:57:09 PM

If we lay out Shiel's argumenthere, it comes to this:

of his on the Topics.
(i) Boethiusrefersthreetimesto a commentary
Boethiushad translatedor was about to translatea com() Therefore,
fromGreekscholia.
mentary
The conclusion is, of course, completely unjustified.But perhaps the
parentheticalcommentabout the Analyticsis meant to imply that the
argumentis an argumentfromanalogy. We mightadd this premissto
his argumentthen:
on theTopicsis exactlythesameas the
(iA) The case ofthecommentary
on theAnalytics.
case ofthecommentary
Even with this premiss, the argument is, of course, still invalid; it
requires at least this additional premiss:
on theAnalytics
is a translation
ofscholiaand not
(iB) The commentary
Boethius'sownwork.
If we look at the section of Shiel's article in which he discusses the
commentaryon the Analytics,we findthat he says nothingmore than
this to support his claim about that commentary:
fromwhichhe hoped
"... apparentlyBoethius'texthad othermarginalia
on theAnalytics:
to composea completecommentary
nostris
calcatiusexprimemus"
82gd: ... si qua verodesintinAnalyticis
(P-239).
The quotation fromBoethius which Shiel gives here shows only that
Boethius meant to write a commentary,not that he had marginalia
fromwhich he could or meant to produce that commentary.So Shiel
offersno argument or evidence which supports his claim about the
commentaryon the Analytics; and premiss (iB), crucial to Shiel's case
here, has to stand in the argument as an unjustified assertion. But
suppose, forthe sake of argument,that (iB) is true, as it may in fact
be.16The argumentis an argumentfromanalogy ; it depends on showing that the case of the commentaryon the Topics is really just the
same as that of the commentaryon the Analytics in the respect relevant to the conclusion. But Shiel gives no argumentat all to show even
that the case of the two commentariesis in generalthe same. The statement that they are the same- premiss(iA) - is an unsupportedclaim;
16 Minio-Paluello
in a manuscript
ofthePrior
has foundsomeLatinmarginalia
and
of partsof Greekcommentaries;
Analyticswhichseemto be translations
on
he suggeststhattheseLatin marginaliamaybe the Boethiancommentary
A LatinCommentary,
theAnalytics.
op. cit.
82

23:57:09 PM

Shiel does not explain in what way they are the same or how the
sameness is one relevant to the conclusion he wants to draw.
Two of the importantpremissesof Shiel's argumentabout the commentaryon the Topics, then,are altogetherunsupported; and, "exactly
as in the case ofthe commentaryon the Analytics", thereis 110evidence
for the claim that the commentaryon the Topics is a translation of
scholia and not Boethius's own work. Shiel's conclusion amounts to no
more than- in De Vogel's words- a mere guess.
Shiel discusses Boethius's commentaryon Cicero's Topica only very
briefly,and he says four things about it (p. 240). First he says that
Boethius intendswith this work to complete Victorinus'scommentary
on the same Ciceroniantreatise.17Then he adduces a numberof passages to show that Boethius makes much of his access to the Greek text
of Aristotle's Topics. Next Shiel says that Boethius gives a quotation
fromthe Physics, which he says Boethius has taken fromGreek notes.
And, finally,Shiel says that this material fromthe Physics, found in
the Greek notes, seems to be the same material Boethius is relyingon
in a passage in his commentaryon De Int.
Shiel's firstpoint, that Boethius "undertook to complete Victorinus'
commentary"on Cicero's Topica , seems to be just a mistake. Boethius
says explicitlyin the very paragraph cited by Shiel that he is going to
write a commentaryon the whole Ciceronian treatise, including the
parts Victorinushas already commented on:
Nos veroet hancipsamparticulam,
attigit,diligenter
quam Victorinus
(ut
cum Topicorum
et longiusexpositioneprogressi
possumus)aggrediamur,
debemusfineconsistere.18
Boethius does begin his commentary from the very beginning of
Cicero's treatise. And it is clear that the beginningof Boethius's commentaryis not just a reproductionof Victorinus's, because Boethius
describesthe fourbooks of Victorinus'scommentary,and they do not
correspondto the material in the firstpart of Boethius's work. For instance, Boethius says that Victorinus's commentaryon Top. 2.8-4.23
containsmany examples fromVirgil and Terence; but the corresponding section in Boethius's commentarycertainlydoes not contain many
such examples and seems in fact devoid of them.
Secondly, of the seven referencesShiel gives to demonstrate that
17Victorinus's
on Cicero'sTopica is no longerextant.See Pierre
commentary
tudes Augustiniennes,
Paris,1971,pp. ii5ff.
Hadot,Marius Victorinus,
i18PL 1041D10-13.CiceronisOperaomnia,ed. I. C. Orelliusand G. Baiterus,
Turici,1833;vol. V, 1; p. 271. 15-17.
83

23:57:09 PM

"Boethius constantly shows off Ms possession of the Greek text of

Aristotle's Topics", three contain no mention of the Topics at all.
1051 refersto Aristotle's Analytics. In 1119 Boethius discusses
Aristotle's division of opposites, which occurs prominentlynot in the
Topics but in the Categories.And in 1145 D Boethius considers Aristotle's four causes, which do not figurein the Topics in an important
way but which do have a more prominentrole in, say, the Posterior
Analytics,among the logical works of Aristotle,though,of course, the
basic discussion of the causes occurs in the Physics.
Thirdly,Shiel says that Boethius has a quotation fromthe Physics,
but he does not identifythe passage which he thinks constitutesthe
quotation or the place in the Physics fromwhich he thinks it comes.
As far as I can tell, there is no such quotation; and the only passage
which Boethius himselfidentifiesas Aristotelian,in the precedingsection ofthe commentary(1150 B12-13), seems to be a summaryor statement of Aristotle'sposition rather than a quotation.19Shiel then cites
a passage fromBoethius to indicate that the supposed quotation from
the Physics came from Greek scholia- though Shiel does not suggest
what text they were scholia to, nor is there any suggestionI know of,
either in Boethius or in Shiel, to indicate that Boethius had some
Aristotelian text of the Organon at his elbow while he was writinga
commentaryon Cicero (and it is part of Shiel's thesis (p. 243) that all
the Greek scholia in question were scholia to the Organon). Shiel's
quotation of the Boethian passage is this:
vacuumfuerit,
seiethaec
nostrosinspicere
"1152C:sed si cui commentarios
volumineadvertisse."
secundoPhysicorum
nos ex Aristotelis
Shiel's 'seiet' here is either an erroror an unnoted emendation; both
the PL and the Orelli 20 editions have 'sciai'. The Orelli edition also
has the more correct 'vertisse'instead of 'advertisse'.But this whole
passage says nothing more than that if someone found it not worthwhile to consider Boethius's commentaries,he ought to know that
Boethius has observed "these things" in- or translated them fromBk. II of Aristotle's Physics. Whether one reads with the PL or the
Orelli edition, and whether or not one takes 'vertisse'or 'advertisse'in
the sense of 'translate', what in this passage serves as evidence that
Boethius took any of his Aristotelianmaterial here fromscholia ?
19Boethius'sdiscussionin this passage is about chanceand the Aristotelian
viewof it. For Aristotle'sdiscussionof chance,see PhysicsII, v-vi.
20Ciceronis
Opera, ed. Oremus;vol. V, i; p. 373.1-2.
84

23:57:09 PM

And, finally,Shiel says that Boethius seems to be referringhere to

the same material he uses in the commentaryon De Int. (ed. Meiser;
2a, I90.i2ff.). But the discussions in the two works are only superficially the same. In the passage from the commentary on Cicero,21
Boethius is discussingchance and comparingCicero's definition,which
Boethius thinksinadequate, to Aristotle's. The passage cited fromthe
commentaryon De Int., however, contains a discussion not of chance
but of contingent
, which Boethius says (190.1-5) is partly what chance
and
produces
partly not; and he goes on to consider examples of the
differentsenses of 'contingent.Both passages speak of a man leaving
his house in order to see a friend,but the image is used in radically
differentways in the two passages and is nor found in Physics II.v-vi
at all. Nowhere in the passage on contingensdoes he discuss the nature
of chance, whichis the subject of the passage in the othercommentary.
Each of Shiel's fourpoints about In Cic. Top., then, is impreciseor
mistaken.But it is importantto notice that even if all his points were
whollycorrect,as faras his general thesis about Boethius is concerned,
his pointshere supportnothingmore than the claim that Boethius took
one quotation in his commentaryon Cicero fromGreek scholia. There
is nothinghere that can count as evidence that the entiretreatiseis a
translation,and thereis no reason forgiven up the common-senseview
that this treatiseis, as it seems to be, Boethius's originalcomposition.22
The argumenton De top.diff.is morecomplex. Shiel makes a number
of points designed to establish that at least the Themistian part of De
top. diff.comes froma scholion to the Topics in Boethius's copy of the
Organon.Shiel says (p. 241) :
"All thedialecticae
rationes
usedin theDe diff.top.by Boethius,including
the longdiscussionof magis,minusetc., axe elaboratedfromthe simple
Themistian
to Cicero'sat 1202cd. Boethius'other
diagramgivenincontrast
references
to Themistius(1214a, 1215a) are obivouslybased also on that
on the Topics,
diagram.The diagramcamefromThemistius'commentary
nowlost.Andsinceit is precisely
forthisThemistian
materialthatBoethius
refers
to his owncommentary
on the Topics, I take it forcertainthatthe
diagramwas a scholionin hisGraecavoluminaofthe Topics."
I want to dispute not only the conclusion but each point leading up to
the conclusion as well.
The phrase " dialecticae rationes" is not Boethius's designation for
Topics; it occurs in a discussion not about Topics but ratherabout the
differencebetween rhetoricand dialectic (1216 D), and in the context
21Orellip. 371.38-374.5;PL 1151B8-1153C6.
22In thisconnection,
9 above.
cf.p. 2 and footnote
85

23:57:09 PM

it seems to mean somethinglike dialectical arguments. According to

Boethius, argumentsare rationes(1174 D1-2), but Topics are orationes
or the differentiaeof orationes (1174 C5-6 and 1185 A4-8). And the
phrase "dialecticae rationes" occurs in a sentence in which Boethius,
having showed how rhetoric and dialectic differ,says that Cicero's
Topica discusses how to produce rhetoricalargumentsbut Aristotle's
Topics discusses how to dispute about dialecticaerationes-23I am not
sure whetherShiel uses 'dialecticaerationes'to referto Topics in general
or only to dialectical Topics; but the latter possibility makes better
sense, and I take that as Shiel's meaning for the phrase.
If that is how Shiel means the phrase, then Bk. IV of De top. diff.
is no longer under suspicion of being only a translation.That Book is
devoted to rhetorical,not dialectical, Topics; and they are rhetorical
Topics taken fromCicero's De inventions.Book III does contain dialectical Topics, but they are not Topics which correspondto the Themistian diagram. They correspondto the Ciceroniandiagram given immediately below the Themistian one, and they come fromCicero's Topica.
From Shiel's argument here, then, Bk. Ill also cannot be considered
as derivingfrom Greek scholia. But even for Bk. II, which contains
dialectical Topics correspondingto the Themistian diagram,thereis no
evidence that the discussion of the Topics is an elaboration of the diagram. Given the complex and subtle treatmentof the Topics in Bk. II,
the much more natural view is that Boethius provides the diagram to
summarize his discussion, rather than the discussion to elaborate the
diagram; and Shiel offersno evidence or argumentto contradictthat
common-senseview. Furthermore,thereare two othersets of diagrams
in the treatise as well as a Ciceronian diagram which matches the
Themistian diagram in question. There is no indication that Boethius
did not construct these diagrams himself; and if he did, why should
he not also have constructedthe Themistian diagram ?
If Shiel were right,however, that Boethius's discussion of Topics,
even in Bk. II, is an elaboration of a diagram, then Boethius would
have greater claims to originalitythan had been thought even before
Shiel argued the opposite view. The discussionin Bk. II is complicated
and philosophicallyexcellent; the theoryof Topics given thereis radi23The use of'ratio'in 1216B6 and 'dialctica
ratio'in 1216B14 is probablythe
rationes'in 1216D3-4. In conjunction
sameas thatof 'dialecticae
withthepre, it seemsveryunlikelythat 'ratio'(in the first
cedingphrase'ut progrediatur'
couldreferto a Topic.And 'dialcticaratio'(in thesecond
passagementioned)
sentence,whichis not a
following
passage)seemsto referto the immediately
a Topic.
containing
Topicbut an argument
86

23:57:09 PM

fromthe theoryin Aristotleand a considerableimprovecally different

ment over anythingin Cicero. If Boethius wrote it as an elaboration
of a diagram, his is truly a formidableand original mind.24
Next, Shiel says that Boethius's other referencesto Themistius are
also obviously based on this diagram. Now, in fact, Themistius is
mentionedby name not only in the two places cited by Shiel (1214 a,
1215 a) but also in these: 1194B1-3; 1196 A15-B1; 1195 C7-10; 1200
C10-13, C14-D3, D6-10, D11-14; 1201 A15-B1; 1202 B2-6, B6-7; 1203
A1-3, A3-4, A6-8, A13-15, B7-9, B9-10, B11-12, B14-15; 1204 A1-3,
A3-5, B4-7, B7-9, B12-14, B14-C2; 1203 D1-3, D3-4, D6-1204 D3; 1204
D3-4, D5, D6-1205 Ai ; and another fifteentimes in 1205 A1-1206 A3.
Many of these referenceshave to do with some dialectical Topic summarized in the Themistian diagram or with some featureof the Themistian system; others, such as those in 1194 B1-3 or 1196 A15-B2,
contain not a discussion of Topics but some general comment about
Themistius. Those referencesdiscussing Themistian Topics may be
linked to the Themistian diagram simply because that diagram is a
list of the Themistian Topics. But there is no sign that any of these
many referencesis based on the diagram.
Thirdly,Shiel says that the Themistian diagram came fromThemistius's commentaryon the Topics. There is a footnoteto the sentence
containingthat claim, which one mightwell expect to be a reference
constitutingthe evidence forit. But that reference,whichis to Themistius's commentaryon PosteriorAnalytics(ed. Wallies; p. 18.25-27) cannot serve as evidence even that Themistius ever wrote a commentary
on the Topics. Themistiusin the passage cited is speaking of the Topics
and refersto them as "o sv toZSiaXexfixou;7rapsbX7)<pafxsv",
a phrase
which at most mightsuggest that Themistiuswrote about the Topics.
There is nothingwhatever in that passage to give evidence that the
diagramin question came fromThemistius'scommentary.Shiel's assertion that it does so is utterlyunsupported and misleading.
Fourthly,according to Shiel, Boethius refersto his commentaryon
the Topics for the Themistian material. Now, as Shiel points out (p.
240 n. 5), Boethius refersto his commentaryon the Topics threetimes:
1191 A, 1209 C, and 1216 D. But in none of those places is it "for . . .
Themistian material that Boethius refersto his own commentaryon
"
the Topics (Shiel, p. 241). Boethius's point in 1191 A13 is that there
are many morekinds of Topics frommagis and minus than the Themis24 See thenotesto mytranslation
ofBk. II and ChaptersI and II ofmydissertation.
87

23:57:09 PM

tian ones given,which will not be treatedin his treatisehere,but which

he has discussed in his commentaryon the Topics.26 In 1209 B14-C3
the Topics Boethius is discussing are not even dialectical, let alone
Themistian; Boethius in 1209 says that some of the finerdistinctions
among rhetoricalTopics are discussed in his commentaryon the Topics.
And in 1216 D3-6 Boethius says only that he discusses disputation of a
certain sort in his commentaryon the Topics', Topics are not involved
in this passage at all. So it seems to be simplymistaken to thinkthat
Boethius refersto his commentary on the Topics "precisely for this
Themistian material".
Next, in 1173 C11-14 Boethius says that one of his sources for De
top. diff. is Graeca volutnina,and Shiel here identifiesthese Graeca
voluminawith the Topics. The identificationis explained earlieron p.
240 of Shiel's article. He begins by quoting Boethius's claim that his
Differentiaeof Topics are taken from Greek "volumina" as well as
fromCicero's Topica. These Greek "volumina", Shiel says, "turn out
to be nothingmore than Aristotle's Topics"; and as evidence for the
identification,he quotes Boethius's claim, fromthe same PL section,
to have translated Aristotle's Topics. But the two Boethian statements
Shiel mentions are separated by about two-thirdsof a PL paragraph;
they are made in two differentcontexts,and thereis no suggestionthat
they are to be linked, that the one elucidates an opaque referencein
the other. There is, on the other hand, strongevidence against Shiel's
point here. The tradition which Boethius says he takes partly from
Greek "volumina" is, as he says explicitlyin that passage and as Shiel
acknowledges, a tradition about the Differentiaeof Topics. But it is
clear fromeven a firstreading ofAristotle'sTopics that thereis nothing
in them that in any way corresponds to the Differentiaof a Topic.
Boethius has translated Aristotle'sTopics', he cannot suppose that the
traditionof the Differentiaeof Topics comes fromthe Topics. And, in
fact, Boethius says explicitly in his In Cic. Top. that the difference
between Aristotle's treatmentof the Topics and Cicero's is that Aristotle discusses Topics but Cicero discusses the Differentiaeof Topics
(Orelli p. 282.44-283.4; PL 1051 B2-8). So there seems no evidence for
and good evidence against the claims that the Greek "volumina" mentioned by Boethius are Aristotle's Topics and that Boethius thinkshis
Differentiaederive fromthat Aristotelianwork.
Thus, all the points that Shiel adduces forhis conclusion here that
2t Aristotle
givesa numberofTopicsfrommagisand minusforeachofthefour
predicables;see Top. iijbtfii., .,i37bi4f.,I46ai3ff.,and i54a4f.
88

23:57:09 PM

the Themistiandiagramwas a scholionto the Topics in Boethius's copy

ofthe Organonturnout to be eitherunsupportedassertionsor mistaken
claims, and thereis no reason forsupposing that the Themistian diagram was such a scholion or that Boethius took his discussion of the
Themistian Topics fromsuch a scholion. A fortiori
, there is no reason
forthinkingthat the entiretreatisederivesfromscholia or forrejecting
the common-senseview that this treatise is Boethius's own and not
just a translation.
But, in addition, there is good evidence on the other side to suggest
that Boethius knew much more of Themistius's commentaryon the
Topics than the diagram which is supposed to have come fromthat
commentary.Averroeshas preservedportionsofThemistius's commentary in his own work on the Topics,26Afteran initial search through
the middle commentaryon the Topics, I count nineteen quotations or
summaries of Themistius.27Some of these are commentson a particular Aristotelian Topic; but where the Themistian passage is more
general,Themistius's point is mirroredin the De top. diff.The Renaissance editionshave parallel columnsoftwo different
Latin translations,
one attributedto Mantinus,the otherto Abram. For the sake of consistency,I am followingand quoting here Mantinus's translationof Averroes's commentary;but where Abram's differsin some radical way, I
will add it in double brackets in the appropriate place :
Averroes
Boethius
i. 28D ff.[In 27E ff.Averroes
has
i. 1185A9-13. [Boethiushas just
and Alexander's said that a Topic is, in one sense,a
givenTheophrastus's
definition
ofa Topicand understand- maximapropositio
].
in arguments.
Now
. . . sint aliae propositionesquae
ingofits function
he citesThemistius,
whoseviewsdiffer cum per se notae sint,tum nihilulfrom
theirs
inimportant
atways.]Themis- teriushabeantquo demonstrentur,
tius vero dicit, quod locus est pro- que hae maximaeet principales
vocenpositi universalis,
[[quae est in syllo- tur,sintquealiae quarumfidemprigismojquae est veriorcaeterispropo- mae maximaesupplantproposisitionibus
et dicit,quodilia tiones.. . .
syllogismi,
propositio,
1185B5-8. Sed hiusmodipropositio
quae ita se habet,quandoque ponituripsamet in syllogismo, [i.e., maxima propositio]aliquoties
et quidemintraambitmargumenti
conquandoquevero eius significatum,
vis eius.
tinetur,aliquotiesvero extra posita
viressuppletac perficit.
argumenti
28 As faras I know,Averroes'sshortand middlecommentaries
on Aristotle's
TopicsareextantintheoriginalArabicand also in Latin.Formypurposeshere,
I have usedonlytheLatin middlecommentary.
27 Averroes,Primi voluminispars III Aristotelis
stagiritaeTopicorum,
atque
Elenchorum
in eosmediaexpositione,
Venice1574.
libri,cumAverroisCordubensis
89

23:57:09 PM

2. 43M- (utdicitThemistius)
debentannectihuicipsa agentiaet fines,
atqueactiones: namres,quarumgeneratioestbona,ipsaequoquesuntbonae,
et si ipsaesuntbonaeearumgeneratio
est bona, ea vero quae sumuntura
corruptione
oppositomodose habent:
nam quorumcorruptio
est bona,ipsa
sunt mala, et quorumcorruptioest
mala, ipsa sunt bona, et eadem est
ratiode ipsiseffectivis,
namquae efficiuntbonum,sunt bona, et quorum
corruptivumest bonum: ipsa sunt
mala.

2. 1190A3-B3. ...ab effectibus

vero et corruptionibus
et usibushoc
modo; namsi bona estdomus,et constructsdomusbonaest,et econtrario,
si bona est constructio
domus,bona
estdomus.Rursussi destructio
domus
mala est,bona est domus,et si bona
estdomus,mala estdestructio
domus.
Et si bonumequitareest, bonus est
equus, et si bonusest equus,bonum
est equitare.Est autemprimmquidemexemplum
a generationibus,
quod
idem ab effectibus
vocaripotest; secunduma corruptionibus;
tertiumab
usibus: omniumautemmaximaprobona est,ipsum
positio:cuiuseffectio
; cuius
quoquebonumest,et econverso
mala est,ipsumquoque bocorruptio
num est, et econverso;et cuius usus
bonusest, ipsumquoque bonumest,
et econverso.

that
3. 45 ff.[Averroescomments
3. 1192A2-9. Ex transumptione
the twenty-fourth
in
Topic is the Topic hoc modofit,cum ex his terminis
fromsimilarand is oftwokinds,from quibusquaestioconstituta
est,ad aliud
similarin accidentand frompropor- quiddamnotiusdubitatiotransfertur,
tion; Themistius,
ea quae in quaeshowever,has added et ex eiusprobatione
a thirdkind].Themistiusautemfacit tionepositasuntconfirmantur,
ut Sotertium
locumipsiussimilis,
et est,qui cratescumquid possetin uno quoque
sumiturex permutatione,
et transla- iustitiaquaereret,omnemtractatum
tione: nam cum nos volumusattri- ad reipublicaetranstulitmagnitudibuerealiquidalicuirei,cuiusprobatio nem.. . .
tunctransper similesit probabilior,
ferimusillam probationem
ad ipsum
simile,quod probabiliusest: et ea re
sic probataper illud, tunc transferimusilludad aliud notius,ut usus est
in civitate
Plato,cumprobatiustitiam
ex iustitiainanima[[proutferunt
Aristoteleset Plato de civitatiset animae
iustitia]].
has fourcri4. 62E ff.[Themistius
4. 1178A6-10.Sed si taleest quod
teriaforgenus,two of whichare ex- in quaestioneproponitur,
ut subiecto
plicitlydiscussedin Boethius].. . . ele- sit maius, et de subiectisubstantia
mentaautemhorumlocorum(ut in- praedicetur,erit genus: omne enim
suntquatuor: . . . ter- genusest maiuseo de quo praedicatur
quitThemistius)
ut animai
tium,ut in sua praedicatione
superet, et de substantiaeiusdicitur,
hoc est, hominis.
ac excedatipsumsubiectum,
See 28A,43I, 45C,46C,49I, 50I, 58A,62, 67H, 69C,70A,72I, 73M,77C,79C,
iooH, ioiG, 106L, 113M.The exactsametextseemsto be in theVenice1562
editionreproducedby the MinervaPress,Frankfurt
am Main, 1962; but the
paragraphlettersare sometimes
put in wrongor carelesslyin thisedition.
90

23:57:09 PM

ut sit communius
eo, et non aequale
illi,sicutanimaiexceditsuperhominem: namsi essetaequaleei tuncesset
veldifferentia:
proprium,
quartumest,
ut praedicetur
de subiectoin eo quod
quid: quoniam,si nonessetineo quod:
quid,nonessetgenus.

1178A15-B2.Quod si aequale quidemsit,sed a rationesubstantiaeseiunctum,erit proprium:ut risibile

homini.
Cf.also 1197 10-12: Genusestquod
de pluribusspeciedifferentibus
in eo
quod quid praedicatur.28

These parallel passages, then suggest that Boethius knew and used
Themistius's commentaryon the Topics ; they certainlyshow that he
had more of Themistius than the supposed Themistian diagram available to him.29
Shiel's points about Boethius's two treatiseson the Topics, then,are
all impreciseor mistaken; and his argumentsabout Boethius's works
on the Topics do not stand up under analysis. If Shiel's radical thesis
is meant to apply to the two treatisesas well as to the lost commentary
on the Topics, his conclusions are as unwarrantedin the case of the
commentaryas they are in the case of the treatises.The evidence and
argumentswhich might support the view that Boethius's three works
on the Topics are merely translationsfail to hold up on examination;
and one may safelyreturnto the natural, common-senseview that the
commentaryand treatises are just what it appears that they areBoethius's own, original work. If, on the other hand, Shiel means his
hypothesisonly in a narrowersense and is willing to grant that the
two treatiseson the Topics are original,then, firstof all, some doubt
is cast on Shiel's claim that the remaininglogical works are onlytranslations. At the least, one might argue that the same training,acumen,
and inclinationwhich produced the works on the Topics might easily
have been responsiblefor other Boethian works on logic. In addition,
however,in the De top. diff.alone, Boethius cites as his own work a
treatise on categorical syllogisms (1183 B1-2), on hypothetical syllogisms (1176B7-9), and on division (1192 D7-8), among others. These
are all workswhich Shiel considersnot originalbut simply translations
(cf.pp. 237-239). But if the works on the Topics are original,then Shiel
in them are just cross-references
cannot claim that the cross-references
from
which Boethius translated
scholia; and the referencesmentioned
above constitutesome evidence that the treatiseson syllogismsand on
28Cf.also Porphyry,
in Aristotelem
Graeca;Berlin,1887;
Isagoge,Commentarla
vol. IV, pt. 1; p. 2.15-16.
29If Shielwereto suggestthattherelevantThemistian
passagesherewere,then,
in Boethius'scopyof the Topics, the appropriate
amongthemarginalia
reply,
I think,wouldbe thattheburdenofproofis on him;and I see no evidenceto
let aloneto demonstrate,
sucha contention.
suggest,
91

23:57:09 PM

division are not, as Shiel thinks, nothing but translations.30And,

secondly,Boethius's works on the Topics, especiallyDe top. Uff.,were
extremely influential in later medieval logic and rhetoric. If these
worksare Boethius's independent work, then his contributionto medieval philosophy is not just that of a translator,as Shiel concludes,
but that of an excellent philosopher as well.31
Cornell University(Ithaca, N.Y.)
Sage School of Philosophy

30I do notthinkit is opento Shielto replythatBoethius'slanguagein these

to translations.
The wordsBoethius
as referring
references
mightbe understood
thosetreatisesare theordinary
usesto referto his activityin puttingtogether
'
'
'
'
wordsforliterary
composition;conscriboand componoare commonexamples.
and treatisesfrom
commentaries
And Boethiusseemscarefulto distinguish
to otherBoethian
In theDe topdiff.,thereare twelvereferences
translations.
ofAristotle
and therestto
to translations
works,ofwhichthreeare references
to otherworks
and treatises.In In Cic. Top. I countsixreferences
commentaries
andfourto commentaries
and treaofAristotle
by Boethius,twoto translations
and he alwaysidenlocutionsfortranslation,
tises.Boethiushas unambiguous
to indicate
But hesaysnothing
ofAristotle
as translations.
tifieshistranslations
aretranslations;
and the
or treatiseshe mentions
thatanyofthecommentaries
different
he uses to referto composingtheseworksare altogether
expressions
Aristotle.
Boethiususessimilar
fromthelanguagehe usesto referto translating
ofotherauthors,and I include
to literarycomposition
vocabularyin referring
suchreferences
forcomparison;see the appendixat theend ofthisarticle.
31This paperhas benefited
and critigreatlyfromthemanyusefulcomments
cismsgivenme by NormanKretzmann;and I am indebtedalso to C. J.De
in an earlierdraft.I am gratefulto
Vogel,who pointedout some infelicities
on mybehalfmadethispaperpossible.
whoseefforts
JohnCrossett,
92

23:57:09 PM

Appendix
Author
andjorwork

Term(in basicform)

Boethius'stranslationsofAristotle

in Latinamvertimus 1173D9-10
orationem
transfero

Boethius

conscribo

De
Victorinus,
definitione
Cicero,Topica

conscribo
conscribo

Aristotle,
Topics
rhetoricians'
books
Boethius
Cicero,Topica

conscribo
conscribo
scribo
scribo

Anstotle,Cat.
Boethius

scribo
compono

Boethius

exponoorexpositio

Institutes

exponoorexpositio

Boethius
De def.
Victorinus,
Cicero,Topica

edo
edo
edo

Boethius

commentiis
...
disseruimus

De top.diff.

1185Ai
1216D5
7
1216D3
1216D5

1210 B15
1183B2
1191Ci
1x76B9
1192 D7-8
1173Du
1191A13-14

1216C13

In Cic. Top.

1051B3
1052B2
112gC7
1135D9
IOI4 B4
IOI4 B8
1044Ais-Bi
1166 D8
51 D2-3
j)IO
1166 D7
X114B15
1129Cio
1071B13-14
1095A13
II20 DlI
IIOO B8
1166D4
1166 D8

1209C3

93

23:57:09 PM

Vivarium
, XII, 2 (1974)
Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on The Game of Obligation

L. M. DE RIJ

I. Two Separate Tracts onfalsi positio and impossibilispositio

i - Introduction
doubt, Boehner's characterization of the Mediaeval tracts De
No
obligationibusas not a mere collection of rules forschool exercises in disputingbut rather "a nucleus of rules foran axiomatic
method, though in a rather crude form"1 is not tenable. In his thorough study on Sherwood's and Burley's tractsDe obligationibus,Father
Romuald Green 2 rightlydescribes the aim of these tracts as follows:
"The purposewas to inculcateknowledgeof logicalrulesby practice,to
- thebasisofanydisputasharpenthepupil'smindto avoid contradiction
tion
to a numberoffundamental
It was a generalintroduction
logical
notionsand theiruse in disputation".3
I give his succinct descriptionof the general plan of the obligatio:
is as follows.It is a distheplan of an exercisede obligationibus
"Briefly,
The opponens
an opponensand a respondem.
putationinvolving
proposesa
acstatement,
which,forexample,he wishesto be upheld.The respondens
4to thewishesoftheopponens
and bindshimself
,
ceptstheinitialstatement
- the
that is, in this case, to upholdit. This is the meaningof obligatio
to take on the obligation,forexample,of
opponensasks the respondens
has acceptedthe
upholdinga particularstatement.Once the respondens
theopponensproposesa numberofotherstatements
whichthe
obligation,
mustconcedeor deny- but alwaystherespondens
mustmainrespondens
taintheinitialstatement
to theobligation
according
accepted,and he must
ifthevariousstatements
observethelogicalrulesofinference,
proposedare
logicallyconnected,at all timesavoidinga contradiction.
Preciselyit is
- whichprovidesthekeyto theexercisesin
thislast point- contradiction
1 PhilotheusBoehner,MedievalLogic. An Outlineof Its Developmentfrom
1952,p. 14.
1250to c. 1400,Manchester
2 RomualdGreenO.F.M. An Introduction
to theLogicalTreatiseDe obligationibus, withcriticaltextsof Williamof Sherwood(
?) and WalterBurley.vol. I :
Introduction
; vol. II: CriticalTextsofWilliamofSherwood(
Burley.
?) and Walter
in 1963has notbeenpublishedyet.
thisLouvainthesiswritten
Unfortunately,
Greenseemstobe a bitover-anxious
it.
As to Sherwood's
indoubting
authorship,
3 Op. cit.,pp. 118-119.
4 se obligat.
94

23:57:21 PM

De obligationibus
. The aim of the opponensis to involvetherespondens
in
has to avoidi'5
and therespondens
contradiction,
Often the respondens
, in his effortto maintain the initial statement,
which he has accepted to uphold, is forced to deny true statements.
The opponenshas the task to make the respondensconcede impossible
statements which the respondensneed not concede propterpositum.
Mostlythe procedureis this: the respondensconcedes the initial statement, albeit false, and then the opponens, by a series of propositions,
tries to entice the respondensinto conceding either to the opposite of
the initialstatementor into concedingand denyinganother statement.
So the respondentfault is always contradiction.Green rightlystresses
that the accent is on formalconsistency: once the respondenshas admitted a statement,no contradictionmust followfromit. Truth does
not matter.What matters is formalconsistency.6Therefore,Professor
Hamblin seems to strikethe rightnote in labelling this procedure "the
game of Obligation".7
Green pays some attention 8 to the sources and historyof the tract
De obligationibus
. He is rightin pointing to the eighth Book of Aristotle's Topics as the most probable source of the obligatiopractice.9
In fact, some mediaeval authors referto this Aristotelianwork as the
source of the ars obligatoria.10
The practice of obligatiohas certainlyexisted in the thirteenthcentury. Its existence is evidenced at least for the second half of the
thirteenthcenturyby three authors.11Green refersto William of Sherwood's De obligationibusand to two anonymoustractsfoundin, respectively,Paris, B.N. Lat. 11.412 and Munich, CLM 14.458, which all belong to the thirteenthcentury.12ProfessorHamblin has rightlypoint5 Op. cit.,pp. 18-19.
6 See Green,op. cit.,ibid.
7 C. L. Hamblin,Fallacies,London(Methuen)1970,p. 125. For his description
ofthisgame,see op. cit.,pp. 125-133,and passim.
8 Op. cit.,pp. 24ff.
9 Cfr.Boehner,MedievalLogic,p. 4.
10Green,op. cit.,pp. 25-26mentions
ofFontaines(d. 1306),Quodlibeta
Godfrey
fmans,p. 295 and pointsto the openingwordsof
VII, p. 4 ed. De Wulf-Hof
wordsofTopicaVIII, 3.
coincidewiththeopening
Burley'stractwhichpractically
11Godfrey
ofFontaines,see above,n. 10; JohnDuns Scotus,OrdinatioI, d. 11,
q. i, nos27ff.(Operaomniaed. Balie V, iof.; RogerMarston(d. 1303?),Quaestionesdisputatae
de anima(probablyafter1284); seeFratrisRogeriMarstonQq.
Bibl. Franc,scholast.mediiaevi VII, Quaracchi1932,p. 453. Cfr.
disputatae,
Green,op. cit.,pp. 30-32;212.
12His reference
etrespondendi
to the wellknownTractatusde modoopponendi
is somewhatconfusing.
foundin Paris,B.N.Lat. 16.617and othermanuscripts
95

23:57:21 PM

ed 13to the occurrence of some obligationterminologyin some twelfth

centurylists of sophismata, which show that the obligation practice
had been in existence for about fiftyyears at least, before treatises
like Sherwood's. Indeed, in these sophisms examples oftenbegin with
such phrase as: Facta tali positioned
The aim of these articles will be to publish some tracts, found in
Munich and in some other libraries,which seem to date fromthe first
halfofthethirteenthcentury,ifnot,in part,fromthe end ofthe twelfth.
2- The Tracts found in Munich, CLM 14.458
The collectiveparchmentmanuscriptin the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich, CLM 14.458, which formelybelonged to the library
of the Sankt Emmeran Monastery (Em. E. 81) contains a number of
works on logic. It was writtenby differenthands in differentperiods.
The second part (ff.29-44) seems to have been written in a rather
irregularhandwritingdating from the middle of the thirteenthcentury.15The folios 29ra-40rbcontain a treatise on dialectic, consisting
of, at least, five parts:
(29ra-3ivb)
(a) De introductionibus
(b) De predicabilibus(3ivb-33ra)
(c) De disputatone
1. introduction(33ra-34va)
2. De locis dialeticis (34va-37rb)
3. De locis sophisticis,De fallaciis (37rb-39rb)
16
(d) De insolubilibus(9-40)
(e) De implicationibus(40ra"rb).17
butan interpolated
torso.
has shownthatthisversionis nothing
Recentresearch
to myeditionof theoriginalworkin the seriesBeitrgezur
See theEinleitung
desMittelalters
to be published
undTheologie
derPhilosophie
Geschichte
, Mnster,
in theverynearfuture.
13Op. cit., p. 130.
14 E.g. in theQuaestiones
Victorinae
(editedin myLog.Mod. II 2), p. 764 sqq.
I couldnot findthe closingformulacedattempusin thesesophismsHamblin
makesmentionof.
16 For a detaileddescription
see L. M. de Rijk,Logica
ofthewholemanuscript,
to theHistoryofEarlyTerminist
A Contribution
Modernorum.
Logic,II 1: The
Assen 1967,pp.
of The Theoryof Supposition,
Originand Early Development
handsto Professor
Bernard
about thedifferent
43-49.I owe someinformation
in a
whowas kindenoughto supplymewithhisvaluableinformation
Bischoff,
personalletter.
16 Discussedand editedby L. M. de Rijk,in Vivarium(4), 1966,pp. 98-99and
104-115.
17 Edited,ibid.,pp. 100-103.
96

23:57:21 PM

The composition of this treatise is rather loose. The third part (c)
seems to be a tract on its own; its introductorypart forms,as it were,
a new beginningwith the usual introductoryremarks.The fourthand
fifthparts (d) and (e) have a rather vague connection with the preceding parts, to the extent that earlier I was of the opinion that the
treatiseends rightafterthe tract De fttaciis,where the explicit Et hec
sufficiant(f. 39rb)is found.18However, it is definitelyone and the same
hand that wrote the preceding parts, alternativelyin a bigger and a
smallerhandwriting,and went on in copyingthe tractsDe insolubilibus
and De implicationibus.One gets the impressionthat the treatisefound
on ff.29ra up to 40rb was compiled frompreexistingtracts, the third
of which (De disputatione)is most likely to have been an independent
tract on the subject. The same can be said, with even more certainty
of the last two tracts,De insolubilibusand De implicationibus.Especially the latter deals with a special subject (impiicatio), which later
tracts have incorporatedin a broader discussion; implication as discussed in the Munichtract turnsout to be a special kind of restriction,
which, in its turn, turns out to be considered there a formof appellation ; however,restrictionand appellation are not dealt with as such
in the Munich tract.
The same hand copied the initial part of a discussion of necessario
and contingenter
on f. 40. Aftera lacuna of about 16 lines a tract on
impossibilispositio is found. It winds up with the word Expiiciunt,
which not only shows the completeness of the tract but also points
to the fact that it was part of a largerdiscussion comprisingtwo tracts,
at least. About 25 lines of f. 40vb are left blank.
The same handwriting,in a somewhat bigger size, again, continues
on f. 41rawith copyingtwo more logical tracts,viz. on suppositionand
appellation, which apparently formedpart of a more extensive discussion of what is called the proprietatessermonm(comprisingcopulatio,
appellatio, suppositio, et multa alia, as we are told in the prologue19).
The tract on supposition ends on f. 42 va with est de suppositionibus. The remainingpart of the column (17 lines) is left blank.
On ff.42rb"vbthe tract on appellation is found in the same small handwriting,windingup with the formula: et hec sufficiantde appdlationibus, immediatelyfollowedby a tract on what is called falsa (!) positio
va
(ff.42vb-43rb).On f. 43 a freshstart is made, in still the same handwriting,with a shortdiscussion of argumentatiocompiexionalis.For the
18Log. Mod. II i, p. 45.
18See Log. Mod. II 2, wherethe workis editedas TractXIV, pp. 703-730.

97

23:57:21 PM

remaining texts of this page, see Log. Mod. II i, pp. 46-47.

I confinemyselfnow to discussing and editingthe two small tracts
on obligationfoundon ff. 40v and 42v-43r,whichdeal with impossibilis
positio and falsi positio, respectively.Taking the loose composition of
the treatise found on ff.2gra-40rbinto considerationone could be inclined to link them up with the foregoingtreatise,especially with the
third part of jt, De disputatione.This much seems to be certain that
both tracts separately discuss two special kinds of obligatiowhich are
found in later tracts De obligationibustogetherwith the other types of
obligatio. For that matter,both tracts appear to contain discussions on
(these special formsof) obligatiowhich are priorto those found in the
well-knownthirteenthcentury tracts, such as William of Sherwood's.
20
3- The Munich tract on falsi positio
The tract opens als follows:
multismodishabetobliganin disputatione,
de illa
42vb: Cumrespondens
hie tractandumest. Unde
obligationeque falsa (!) positionuncupatur,
videndumestquid sitponereet quid positio.Sed priusnotandumest quod
omnisobligatioin duobusconsistit,scilicetin positioneopponentiset in
consensurespondentis.
Thus it is clear that the anonymous authorconfineshimselfto discussing a special kind of obligatioonly, which is called falsi positio. Our
author labels his tract De falsi positione, Sherwood heads the part of
his tract dealing withit simplyDe positione, althoughhe still does speak
in an introductorypassage offalsi positio; on the contrary,the phrase
falsi positio does no longer occur in Burley's tract. Both our anonymous author and Sherwood stress that true statementsneed not to be
, always concerns
posited, so that positio, as meant in De obligationibus
that
wonder
Burley drops the addition
falsi (or dubii) positio. Small
falsi in falsi positio. This seems to suggest that our tract is prior to
Sherwood's just as the lattes antedates that of Burley.
The Munich tract can be divided into threeparts, as may be understood fromthe author's own words, p. 1067-8:Viso quid sit positio et
qualiter habeat recipi, videndum est qualiter respondendum sit ad
positum. I have added some subdivisions:
I
II

QUID SIT POSITIO

QUALITERPOSITIOHABEATRECIPI
De quibusdamregulis
20The MS mostlyhas thewrongreadingfalsainsteadoftheusualfalsi.To my
the readingfalsa to falsi givenby someof
view,Greenis wrongin preferring
his manuscripts
ofSherwood'stext.
98

23:57:21 PM

III

SIT AD POSITUM
QUALITERRESPONDENDUM
De quibusdamregulis
Quedam sophismata
Solutionen
Continuatio
De quadam regula que soletdari
Obiectio
Continuatio
Sophisma
Solutio
Utrumhabeatsustineripositiofacta per relativum
Qualiterdebeatsustineri
De quodam dubio
Continuatio
Sophisma
Solutio
Continuatio.

Sherwood's Tractatus de obligationibusgives a discussion of positio

which is much more articulated:
I

DE POSITIONE
1. De positionepossibili
De quibusdam regulis
De diversisopinionibus
De modisfaciendi sophismata
De positione disiunctiva
De positione relativa
De positione cadenti
De positione dependenti
De positione vicaria
2. De positione impossibili

[li
III

DE DEPOSITIONE
DE DUBITATIONE].

For the sake of comparison I add the main headings of Burley's

tract, with a subdivision of his DE POSITIONE :
I DE INSTITUTIONE
II DE PETITIONE
III DE POSITIONE
99

23:57:21 PM

1 De positionepossibili
De quibusdam regulis
De modofaciendi sophismata
De positione coniunctiva
De positione indeterminata
De positione dependenti
De positione cadenti
De positione renascenti
De positione vicaria
2 De positione impossibili
IV DE DEPOSITIONE
V DE DUBITATIONE
VI DE 'SIT VERUM'.
In the followinglines I confinemyselfto comparingour anonymous
tract with that by William of Sherwood.21
The Munich tract definespositio as prefixioalicuius enuntiabilisad
sustinendumtamquamverum, ut videaturquid indesequatur(p. 16*17),
i.e. heading (or: prefixing)an enuntiabile (viz. by the term 'pono* or
'ponitur')in orderto uphold it (i.e. to make it upheld by the respondens)
as a true statement,to see what followsfromit. Sherwood gives substantiallythe same definition:est igiturpositio prefixioalicuius enuntiabilis ad sustinendumtamquam verum.22
Unlike Burley, both authors pay some attentionto the phrase falsi
positio:
Et notandumquod hec obligationondicitur
Munichtract
, p. 10318-23:
falsi
falsaponantur,
sedquiasepiuspona<n>hocquodtantummodo
positio
propter
et vera
turquam vera.Cumenimomnispositiofiatpropterconcessionem
proptersui veritatemhabeantconcedi,non indigentpositione.Sed cum
falsa non in se causam concessionis< habeant>, indigentpositioneut
concedantur
et videaturquid indeaccidat.
f.
Sherwood, 547: Et quia verumscitumhabet de se ut debeat concedi,
ipsumnonhabetponi sed vel falsumvel dubiumverum.Et cumdubium
habeat ad verumet ad falsum- tuncenimdubitaturquando
respectum
nesciturutrumsit verumvel falsum- ipsumdubiumsolumhabet poni
hocdiciturfalsi(falsa:
quemhabetad falsum.Et propter
propter
respectum
B.N.Lat. 16.617; falsi: ErfurtQ 259 and B.N.Lat. 16.130)esse positioet
nominatur
line)positio.
positio: falsi (see preceding
21I followthebest manuscript
Green,
op. cit.,I, p. 156),Paris,B.N. Lat.
(see
16.617,ff.54v-62v.
22So B.N.Lat. 16.617,f.54v.Greenis wrongin readingwiththeVenicemanualiquidtamquamverum.
script(San MarcoX 204 = Z.L. 302): ad sustinendum
notjust something.
The objectofsustinendum
is the enuntiabile
prefixed,
IOO

23:57:21 PM

A furthercomparisonof our anonymous tractwiththat by Sherwood

shows that many subjects which are explicitlydealt with in Sherwood,
are discussed in the Munich anonymous tract only implicitlyor are
even missing there. So the chapter on making sophisms is not found
in M (= Munich tract) and the positio cadens and positio vicaria are
not dealt with either.The positio disiunctivaand positio relativaare not
discussed as such in M , but they seem to be implicitlypresent in the
discussionof the general rules found under the heading Qualiterpositio
habeatrecipi. Sherwood's discussionofthepositiorelativais paralleledby
that whichin M goes underthe titles: Utrumhabeatsustineripositiofacta
perrelativumaxiQualiterdebeatsustineri.What is calledin Sherwood(and
Burley)thepositiodependensmightbe alluded to in M's remark{Notandum)that sometimesconcedingan impossiblestatementoccurssubforma
dependente(p. 1162 sqq.); however, the discussions do not runparallel.
Generallyspeaking,Sherwood's tractDe obligationibushas a farmore
elaborated form.Everythingseems to indicate the priorityofM to Sherwood, especiallythe former'sloose composition.The same groundsthat
make us put Burley's tractafterthatby Sherwood(apartfromtheexternal chronology,ofcourse), should adduce us to antedatingM to Sherwood.
4- The Munich tract on impossibilispositio
The tract opens as follows:
40vb:Quod impossibilis
positiohabeat sustinerisic probatur.Sicutienim
ut videaturquidindesequitur,
nosdicimusquodpossibileestconcedendum
utvidetur
estconcedendum
similiter
habemusab Aristotile
quodimpossibile
quid indeaccidat.
It has the followingsubdivisions (the titles are mine):
1 Quod impossibilispositio habeatsustineri
2 Quomodoimpossibilispositio habeatfieri
3 Obiectiones
4 Solutiones
5 Continuatio
6 De impossibilipositioneque fit per unionem
7 Questio
8 Continuatio
9 Dubitatio
10 Obiectio
11 Questio
12 Solutio
13 Questio.
101

23:57:21 PM

The School of the Adamiti is once mentioned.No doubt the epigones

of Adam of the Petit Pont in Paris, who are called Parvipontani elsewhere,23are referredto :
non
impossibili
quodinhacquestioneexobligatione
p. 118"-" : Et notandum
Adamitorum
non est concedendain
sequiturquidlibet.Undeconsequentia
hac questione,scilicetquod ex impossibili
sequiturquidlibet.
Alexander Neckham, who had been a pupil of the School of the Petit
Pont writesin his De naturisrerum,cap. 173, (p. 288 ed. Wright)that
he is surprisedto see that some people reject this thesis which, all the
same, may be supported with plenty of arguments(miroretiam quosdam damnare opinionem dicentium ex impossibiliper se quodcumque
sequi enuntiabile; quod cum plurimis astrui queat rationibus
etc.).2*That the Parvipontanian thesis still was in actual dispute at
the time our anonymous author wrote his tract, seems to point to the
firstdecades of the thirteenthcenturyas the latest possible date for
his work.
It should be furthernoticed that the impossibilispositio que fit per
unionemwhichis paid much attentionin our anonymous tract, is completely missingin Sherwood's and Burley's treatises.Apparently,this
procedurelost its interestlater on.
5- The probable date of compositionof the tracts
I am inclined to date both tracts in about the same period, since the
occurrencein the same part of the Munich manuscriptand theircommon dissimilaritiesto the later tracts (Sherwood,Burley) seem to afford
a reliable clue. For that matter, more certaintycan only be attained
by furtherinvestigations into all the available texts on this subject
matter.
If my surmise be right,both tracts should be dated not later than
about the i22o's, because of the mention of the Adamiti (see above,
p. 102). It may be remarked in this connectionthat in his chapter on
positio impossibilisBurley rejects the rules ex impossibilisequiturquodlibet and necessarium sequitur ad quodlibetwithout mentioningtheir
Parvipontanian origin.
Any referenceto the School of the Petit Pont would certainlypoint
to a Parisian origin of the tract. However, the very fact that Adam
of Balsham's adherents are named Adamiti, not Parvipontani, does
23Ars MelidunaIII, 35; see Log. Mod. II 1, p. 356: ... sic obicietParviponex quolibetenuntiabili
tanussustinensnecessarium
sequi.
24 See also Log.Mod. II 1, p. 290.
102

23:57:21 PM

certainlynot exclude an origin outside of Paris. As a matter of fact,

through such a master as William of Leicester (= Montanus) the
Parvipontanian influencewas broughtto England and it is quite possible that in Oxford or Lincoln, where any acquaintance with the local
situationof the School {PetitPont) was missing,the adherentsofAdam
were designated as Adamiti.25In order to avoid any confusionabout
the origin of the tracts I label them emmeranus after the earliest
known provenance of the Munich manuscript.
TRACTATUS

EMMERANUS

DE FALSI

POSITIONE

SIGLA
E = codexEmmeranus(= Monacensis14.458,s. XIII)
Ec = manusquae correxitE
42vb Cum respondensmultis modis habet obligari in disputatione, de illa 5
obligatione que falsi positio nuncupatur, hie tractandum est. Unde
videndum est quid sit ponere et quid positio. Sed prius notandum est
quod omnis obligatio in duobus consistit, scilicet in positione opponentiset in consensu respondentis.Non enim obligaturrespondensnisi

consentiat.
I

QUID SIT POSITIO

Et est ponere: prefigerealiquod enuntiabile in aliqua disputatione

'
4
per hoc verbum ponitur ad hoc ut sustineaturtamquam verum. Per
'
*
hoc verbum ponitur dico, quia quandoque fitobligatio per hoc verbum
'
'
15
peto ; et talis obligatio diciturpetitio.
Per hoc patet quod positio est prefixioalicuius enuntiabilisad sustinendum tamquam verum ut videatur quid inde sequatur.
Et notandum quod hec obligatio non dicitur falsi positio propter
hoc quod tantummodo falsa ponantur, sed quia sepius pona<n>tur
quam vera. Cum enim omnis positio fiat propterconcessionemet vera 20
propter sui veritatem habeant concedi, non indigent positione. Sed
cum falsa non in se causam concessionis < habeant >, indigent positione ut concedantur et videatur quid inde accidat.
i falsi]seep. 98, n. 20.
16 est]et E

19 ponantur]ponaturE
22 habeant]suppl.

25Williamof Leicester(d. 1213) has been a well-known

of the artes
professor
at the Mont Genevivein Paris, wherehe numberedGeraldof Wales and
AlexanderNeckhamamonghis pupils.See also Log. Mod. II 1, pp. 442-443.

23:57:21 PM

II

QUALITERPOSITIOHABEATRECIPI

Et notandum quod cum enuntiabilia habeant poni, sciendum est

quod sunt quedam enuntiabilia que possunt poni, illa scilicetde quorum
positione nulla sequitur contradictio; alia sunt que non possunt poni,
illa
scilicetde quorum positione sequitur contradictio.Qualia sunt hec :
5
'
'
'falsumponi' , dissimileveroponi', similefalso poni' et omnia convertibilia.26Dato enim quod hoc enuntiabile 'falsumponi' possit poni, inde
sequitur contradictio,si ponatur falsum poni , et postea dicatur lceiat
tempus'.21Et queratur. Positum aut fuit falsum aut fuit verum. Si
io verum ergo verum fuitfalsum poni . Ergo falsum ponebatur. Et nichil
nisi hoc. Ergo hoc fuit falsum. Et hoc fuitpositum. Ergo positum fuit
falsum. Si falsum,ergo falsum fuitfalsum poni. Ergo falsumnon ponebatur. Et ponebatur aliquid. Ergo verum. Sed nichil nisi hoc. Ergo fuit
verum. Et dictum <est> quod falsum. Propter hoc debet dici quod
15 hoc non potest poni cum ex eius positione sequatur contradictio.
De quibusdam regulis

20

Item. De enuntiabilibus que non possunt poni, tales dantur regule:

si enuntiabile
quod non potest poni copuletur vero
enuntiabili per disiunctivam coniunctionem,
illud totale bene potest poni.
'
Unde hoc bene potest poni : falsumponi vel Deum esse, quia dicto cedat
'
tempus potest sustineriquod sit verum ratione istius partis Deum esse,
nulla sequente contradictione.

25

<Item>:
si autem enuntiabile
falso enuntiabili

quod non potest poni copuletur

per disiunctivam coniunctionem,
illud totale non potest poni.

Unde hoc totale non potest poni falsum poni vel Sortemesse asinum,
'
'
quia dicto cedat tempus inde sequitur contradictio.
5 sequitur]Ec: nullasequiturE
14 est]suppl.:. E

22 quod sitverum]Ec: . E
24 Item]suppl.

28 sc. cumeis.
27Withthisphrasetheopponensclosesthedisputation
he thinks
themoments
or the latter has
the respondens
has involvedhimselfin a contradiction,
succeededin avoidingsucha trap.
apparently
104

23:57:21 PM

Item:
si enuntiabile
enuntiabili

quod non potest poni copuletur vero

coniunctionem,
per copulativam
illud totale non potest poni.

Unde hoc totale non potest poni : falsum poni et Deum esse, quia dato 5
quod poneretur,inde sequitur contradictio,dieto 'cedat tempus'.
Item:
si enuntiabile
quod non potest poni copuletur falso
enuntiabili per copulativam
coniunctionem,
illud totale bene potest poni,
Unde hoc totale bene potest poni : 'falsumponi et Sortemesse asinum9,
'
9
quoniam dicto cedattempus potest sustineriquod positum fuitfalsum,
non sequente contradictione.
Per hoc patet quod si ponatur 'falsum poni vel M arcum vocari Tullium' si ista nomina 'Marcus*, 'Tullius' sint nomina eiusdem, Marcum 15
vocari Tullium erit verum. Et ita hoc totum bene potest poni ratione
istius partis,non sequente contradictione.Si autem sint nomina diversorum,Marcum vocariTullium eritfalsum.Et ita illud non potest poni.
Item. Notandum quod
'
hoc etpositumesse similia9non potest poni cum aliquo falso
copulato.

20

Unde hoc nullomodo potest poni : ponitur'te esse episcopum9etpositum

esse similia. Dato enim quod hoc posset poni, inde sequitur contradictio
sic. Cedat tempus.Positum aut fuit verum aut falsum. Si verum, ergo
9
verum fuit 'te esse episcopum et positum esse similia. Sed te esse epi- 25
scopum fuit falsum. Ergo positum fuit falsum. Et dictum est quod
9
verum. Si falsum, ergo falsum fuit 'te esse episcopum et positum esse
9
similia. Ergo 'te esse episcopum et positum esse similia fuit falsum.
9
Ergo 'te esse episcopum et positum non fueruntsimilia. Et fuerunt
aliqualia. Ergo fueruntdissimilia. Sed te esse episcopum fuit falsum. 30
Ergo positum fuitverum. Propterhoc debet dici quod non potest poni.
Et de similibusidem iudicium.
Item. Notandum quod positio quandoque interimiturexpropositione
vel ex responsione.Unde cum dicitur: ponitur: 'positumetpropositum
enims. contrasic saepiusE
13 nonsequentecontradictione]
105

23:57:21 PM

esse similia', debet dici quod uno casu contingentepotest poni, alio
non. Si enim poniturverum,bene potest poni. Si falsum,non. Similiter
cum dicitur: ponitur: 'positumetpropositumesse dissimilici, debet dici
quod uno casu contingentepotest poni, alio non. Si enim proponitur
5 verum, non potest poni. Si autem falsum, bene potest poni.
SIT AD POSITUM
QUALITERRESPONDENDUM
Viso quid sit positio et qualiter habeat recipi,videndum est qualiter
respondendumsit ad positum.
III

io

De quibusdam regulis
Et de hoc tales dantur regule:
si respondens sciat sibi proponi positum, debet illud
concedere si possit concedi.

'Si respondenssciat sibi proponipositum' dico quoniam si poniturSortent

'
esse album et ponitur Marcus estalbus' , nisi respondenssciat quod hec
'
'
15 Sor est albus', significeturper illam, non debet illam concedere. Si
'
possit concedi dico quia sunt quedam enuntiabilia que licet possint
sicuti hoc 'falsum concedi'. Dato
poni, tarnen non possunt concedi,
'
enim quod hoc 'falsum concedi ponitur, non sequitur contradictio ex
positione. Et ita bene potest poni. Sed dato quod concedatur,sequitur
20 contradictio ex concessione. Unde hoc enuntiabile bene potest poni,
sed tarnennon potest concedi.
Item. Notandum quod
si respondens dubitet sibi proponi positum, non debet
illud simpliciter concedere vel negare, sed debet
dicere : 'probaW
25
'
'
Verbi gratia. Si poniturSortemesse album et Marcus sit nomen Sortis
vel Piatonis sed tu nescis utrum; si ponitur hec: 'Marcus est albus',
cum respondens dubitet utrum hoc nomen 'Marcus' sit nomen Sortis
vel Piatonis, debet respondere: 'probaV.
30 Item :
omne sequens sequens
possit concedi.

ex posito

est concedendum,

si

Unde si poniturSortemesse album et proponiturhec : 'Sor estcoloratus',

in positione debet concedi, quia sequitur ad positum. Bene enim
35 sequitur: 'si Sor est albus, Sor est coloratus'.
106

23:57:21 PM

Item :
omne repugnans

posito est negandum,

si possit negari.

*
'
Et notandum quod sequens ad positum diciturillud sine quo positum
non potest esse verum, idest si positum est verum, illud est verum.
Repugnans dicitur illud cuius contradictorieoppositum sequitur ad 5
positum.Unde si poniturSortentesse album et poniturhec in positione:
'
Sor non estcoloratus' debet negari,quia eius contradictorieoppositum
'
sequitur ad positum,scilicet hoc Sortentesse coloratum.Item. Si possit
'
concedivel negari ponitur in regulis predictis propter hoc quia sunt
quedam enuntiabilia que licet ponantur vel sequantur ex posito vel
repugnant posito, tamen non possunt concedi vel negari, sicut ista:
, 'falsum negari'. Dato enim quod hoc enuntiabile 'fal7 alsum concedi*
'
sum concedi possit concedi, inde sequitur contradictio, sicuti supra
'
dictum est. Similiternotandum quod 'falsumnegari nullomodo potest
negari. Unde licet ista enuntiabilia bene possint poni, tamen non pos- 15
sunt concedi vel negari.
Item. Notandum quod

omne sequens ex concesso vel ex concessis

est concedendum, si possit concedi.

Item :
omne repugnans concesso | vel concessis
(3ra
negandum, si possit negari.

cum posito
20

cum posito est

Item. Notandum quod in falsi positione non tantummodo dicuntur

'
ilia concessa ad que bene respondetur: verumes, sed etiam contradictorie opposita bene negatorum. Unde si negem Sortemesse album, 25
dicor concedere Sortemnon esse album. Similiterdicitur non tantum'
modo illud negatum ad quod respondetur: falsum es , sed etiam contradictorieoppositum eius quod conceditur.
Item. Regula est quod
aliquo falso possibili posito, aliquod falsum possibile
quando que est concedendum, non quocumque ordine
proponatur sed aliquo.
10 ponantur]
poniturE
13 repugnent]
rpugnt(!) E
E
18 cumposito]composito
sicsemper

24 falsi]falsaE
31 quocumque]quacumqueE
107

23:57:21 PM

30

Ut hic. Rei ventas 28 est quod Sor <est > niger. Ponitur lum esse
album. Postea proponatur hec: 'Sor est albus et tu non es episcopus'.
Hoc est quoddam falsum non sequens ex posito. Ergo est negandum.
Ergo eius contradictorieoppositum est concedendum,hec scilicet: 'non
Sor
estalbus ettunonesepiscopus'. Sed Sor estalbus ; hoc estpositum.Ergo
5
est concedendum. Ergo non tu non es episcopus. Ergo tu es episcopus.
Patet ergo quod hoc falsum est concedendum in hoc ordine, quia
sequitur ex posito et bene concessis cum posito. Si autem primo loco
proponatur,negandum esset, quia esset quoddam falsumnon sequens.
io
Et de similibus idem iudicium.

15

20

25

30

35

Quedam sophismata
Item. Contra predictas regulas sic obicitur. In rei veritate Sor est
albus necessario et Plato contingenterest niger. Postea dicatur: 'possibile est Platonem esse album', ponitur. Postea proponaturhec: 'Plato
est aliqualis'. Hoc est quoddam verum non repugnansposito. Ergo est
concedendum. Similiter proponatur hec: 'Sor non est talis'. Hoc est
quoddam verum non repugnans. Ergo est concedendum. Quod sit
verum non repugnanssic probatur. Ego volo sumereista duo adiectiva
'aliqualis', 'talis' ad copulandum pro albedine et nigredine. Sed hoc
adiectivum 'aliqualis' copulai pro colore Platonis. Sed talem colorem
non habet Sortes et Sortes est albus. Ergo Plato non est albus. Cedat
tempus. Tu concessisti contradictorieoppositum positi. Ergo male.
Item. In rei veritate Sor videt aliquem hominem necessario et impossibile est Sortem et Platonem videre eundem; tamen Plato bene
potest videre illud quod videt Sor. Postea dicatur: 'Sor videtaliquem
hominem',possibile est Platonem videre'. Ponitur: 'Sor videtaliquem hominem; Plato videt'. Si negetur,cedat tempus. Tu negasti
positum sub eadem formavocis retentum. Ergo male. Si respondeat:
'verumest', inferatur:'ergoSor et Plato videnteundem'.Cedat tempus.
Tu concessistiquoddam impossibileper se, possibilipositionetibi facta.
Ergo male.
Item. Demonstranturduo dieta contradictorieopposita contingentia.
'Alterumistorumest verum,reliquumpossibile est esse verum'ponitur.
Postea proponatur hec: 'alterumistorumest verum'.Hoc est quoddam
necessarium. Ergo est concedendum. Postea: 'reliquumest verum'. Si
i alterum
5 Sor est]tu es E
est]suppl.
8 sequitur]falsoE
5 Sor est]tu es E
28The phrases'reiVeritas
estquod'and 'estoquod'etc.
estquod', 'in rei veritate
referto a stateofaffairs
acceptedas beingthecase.
108

23:57:21 PM

negetur, cedat tempus. Tu negasti positum sub eadem forma vocis

'
propositum sub qua fuit positum. Ergo male. Si respondeat: verum
est9,inferatur: 'ergo utrumqueistorumest verum' Cedat tempus. Tu
concessisti quoddam impossibile per se, possibili positione tibi facta.
5
Ergo male.
Item. In rei veritate Sor et Plato sunt albi; possibile est tantum
'
alterumistorumesse album. Ponitur: alteristorumest albus' Hoc est
quoddam verum non repugnans. Ergo est concedendum. Postea pro'
ponatur hec: reliquusest albus'. Si concedatur, cedat tempus. Tu concessistiquoddam quod repugnabat posito. Ergo male respondisti.Bene io
enim sequitur: 'si tantumalteristorumest albus, reliquus non est albus'
'
Et tu concessistioppositum. Ergo male. Si negetur,contra. Reliquum
9
'
9
9
'
esse album aut est S ortemesse album aut Platonem . Sed utrumque
istorum est quoddam verum non repugnans. Et illud negasti. Ergo
male.
15
Solutiones
'
29
Ad primumsophisma solvunt quidam quod hec est neganda: Sor
non est talis9,quia rpugnt sub hac formavocis. Sed si proponeretur
'
sub hac: Sor non est niger9,concedenda esset, quia non repugnaret.
Alii dicunt quod hoc est quoddam falsum non sequens. Et ita est 20
negandum. Non enim sequitur quod si Plato est albus, Plato est aliqualis et Sor non est talis. Et ita est quoddam falsum non sequens,
9
ad copulandum pro albedine
quia hoc adiectivum'aliqualis restringitur
'
9
ab hoc adiectivo album posito in positione.
De secundo et tertiosophismate dicunt quidam quod recipiendesunt 25
positiones et concedende sunt propositiones,sed argumentationesque
fiunt,non valent, quia fit processus a disiunctisad coniunctam.
Alii dicunt quod relativum potest referreaccidens significatumcirca
'
substantiam. Unde cum dicitur: Sor videtaliquem hominem; possibile
4
estPlatonemvidereillum9, dicendum est: falsum est, immoest impossi- 30
bile9, quia is est sensus: possibile est Platonem videre illum quem videt
'
Sor. Similiter cum dicitur: alterum istorumest verum; possibile est
11 alter]alterumE
2 positum]propositum
E
7 alter .... albus] alterumisto- 27 disiunctisad coniunctam]dissutisad consutam(!) E
rum est albus Ec : alterumistorumessealbumE
30 illum]Ec : eundemE
E
8-9proponatur]
proponitur
29The examplesproposedin the tractsDe obligationibus
are usuallycalled
Theironlyaim is to clarifythe applicationof logicalrulesin the
sophismata.
case ofan obligatio.
109

23:57:21 PM

, dicendum est: 'falsum est, immoest impossibile*

reliquumesse verum*
is
est
sensus:
quia
possibile est reliquum a vero esse verum.
Illi qui sustinenthanc solutionem,de ultimo sophismatedicunt quod
'
hec est neganda: reliquusest albus*. Cum autem dicitur: 'reliquumesse
'
album*,aut est 'Sortemesse album*aut Platonemesse album*,dicendum
'
*
est quod falsum est, immo est Sortemalium ab albo esse album vel
'Platonem
alium ab albo esse album*. Sed utrum illorum significetur,
est quoddam falsum non sequens. Et ita est negandum.
Continuatio

io

15

2o

25

30

35

Item. Notandum quod cum falsipositio astringatquandoque respondentem ad concedendumaliquod falsum et ita respondenssit in aliqua
apparentia, solet dici quod hac questione debet celari rei Veritas et
tunc non est respondendumin falsi positione ad quid nec ad quare nec
ad quando nec ad aliquam disciplinalem questionem. Ut patet in hoc
*
'
exemplo. Ponitur quod hec vox mulier sit masculinigeneris.Et postea
'
'
4
proponiturhec: mulieralbus est*.Si respondeatur: verumest*t vel fal'
'
sum est*, vel probaV, contra. Tu respondes ad hanc: mulieralbus est*,
que est incongrua, si esset congrua. Et non sequitur quod sit con'
*
grua. Ergo male. Non enim sequitur quod si hec vox mulier est mas'
culini generis,quod hec sit congrua: homoalbus est*,quoniam hec vox
'
album*potest permutaresuum genus.
'
Per hoc patet quod ad hanc: mulier albus est*debet dici: 'nugaris*
vel ' nichil dicis*.Si autem dicatur quod voces coniunctealiquid significent et non est ibi dissonantia generis, numeri,nec casus, dicendum
'
est: verumest*.Si autem dicatur: 'nec aliquorumaliorumaccidentium*
,
'
4
dicendum est: falsum est*. Si autem queratur: quorum?' non est
respondendumpropter hoc quia debet celari rei Veritas in falsi positione.
Item. Notandum quod licet falsi positio restringatad aliquod falsum
concedendum, male respondere est meta in hac questione. Sed quandoque contingit quod quando celatur rei veritas, respondens debet
concedere se male respondere. Ut patet in hoc exemplo. Ponitur te
concedereSortemesse asinum. Postea proponiturhec: 'tu concedisSortem
esse asinum*. Hoc est positum sub eadem formavocis propositumsub
qua fuit positum. Ergo est concedendum. Si concedatur, contra.
10
12
13
18

falsi]falsaE
E
celari]scelari(!) sic semper
falsi]falsaE
ac] hac (!) E

27 falsi]falsaE
33 Sortemesse asinum]Ec: te male
E
respondere

110

23:57:21 PM

Tu concedis Sortem esse asinum. Sed Sortem esse asinum est impossibile. Ergo tu concessisti impossibile, possibili positione tibi facta.
Ergo male.
Patet ergoquod quandoque contingitrespondentemconcederese male
'
responderein positione,quia sequitur ex posito. Si autem dicitur: cedat 5
; ergo male respondisti9
, non
tempus; tu concessistite male respondere
'
.
bene
immo
respondiste
sequitur,
potius: ergo
Preterea. Eadem positione retenta sic potest obici. Tu concedis
Sortem esse asinum. Sed Sortem esse asinum est falsum. Ergo tu concedis falsum. Cedat tempus. Quando concessisti illud: te concedere 10
falsum, aut fuit verum aut fuit falsum. Si verum, ergo verum fuit te
concederefalsum. Ergo concessistifalsum. Et nichil nisi hoc. Ergo est
falsum. Et dictum est quod verum. Si falsum,ergo falsum fuitte concedere falsum.Ergo non concessistifalsum.Et concessistialiquid. Ergo
verum. Et nichil nisi hoc. Ergo hoc est verum. Et dictum est quod 15
falsum.
Propter hoc notandum quod quando duo actus determinanttransitionem huius verbi 'ponitur9
, non astringiturrespondens ad conceden'
dum alterum tantum, sed ambos simul. Unde cum dicitur: poniturte
concedereSortem esse asinum*, sic non restringorad concedendum 20
Sortem esse asinum tantum sed ad hoc totum insimul me concedere
Sortemesse asinum. Unde si proponiturhec: 'Sor est asinus9, neganda
'
Sortemesse asinum
est. Si autem dicitur: 'tu astringerisad concedendum
1
dicendumest : falsum est9.Non enim astringorad concedendum Sortem
esse asinum sed ad hoc: me concedereSortemesse asinum.
25
Si autem dicatur, eadem positione retenta: 'possibilis positio est tibi
facta*, hoc est verum non repugnans. Ergo est concedendum. Postea
*
proponiturhec: nulla alia obligatio est tibi facta; ergo tu non debes
concedereimpossibile; sed tu debes concedereSortem esse asinum; et
Sortemesse asinum est impossibile; ergotu concedisimpossibile' Cedat 30
tempus. Tu concessisti duo contradictorieopposita in eadem disputatane. Ergo male.
Ad hoc potest dici quod ad hanc: 'tu debes concedereSortem esse
9
4
asinum dicendum est: falsum est9, immo ad totum hoc 'me concedere
Sortemesse asinum9. Vel potest dici quod ad hanc: 'possibilis positio 35
est tibi facta9 dicendum est: 'verum est' Cum autem dicitur: 'nulla
9
autem alia obligatioest tibifacta f dicendum est: 'falsum est9, licet sit
quoddam verum, quia rpugnt. Bene enim sequitur quod si debes
Ec : concedisE
2 concessisti]
III

23:57:21 PM

concedereimpossibile,possibili positione tibi facta, aliqua alia obligatio

'
est tibi facta. Et ita hec rpugnt: nulla alia obligatioest tibifacta'
Item. Licet detur sic pro regula quod omne verum non repugnans
posito est concedendum, tarnen accidit quandoque quod verum non
5 repugnansposito est negandum,quia respondeturad ipsum pro instanti
in quo fuit falsum. Ut in hoc exemplo. Rei veritatis est quod Sor in
instanti positionis est niger et in instanti prime enuntiationis post
'
positum erit albus. Postea dicatur: poniturS ortemesse album' Postea
'
proponiturhec: Sor est albus et tu non es efiiscopus'.Hoc est quoddam
io verum non repugnans posito. Et fuit falsum in instanti positionis. Et
pro ilio debereturrespondere: ergotu debesillud negare. Quod concedi'
mus hac ratione. Et non valet hec argumentado: hoc est quoddam
verum non repugnans posito; et illud negasti; ergo male respondiste.
Deberet enim addi et non negastiillud pro instantiin quo fuitfalsum'
15 Hoc autem falsum est.
De quadam regula que soletdari
Item. Solet dari pro regula quod
quolibet

falso possibili

posito de instanti quod est,

negandum est illud esse.

20 Unde si A sit presensinstans et in rei veritate | Sor est nigeret ponitur 43rb
'
Sortem esse album, si proponitur hec: A es , neganda est, quoniam
inde sequitur Sortem esse album in A; quod est impossibile. Si autem
dicitur: 'A esse estquoddamverumnon repugnansposito) etillud negasti;
'
ergomale respondiste, dicendum est: non vale, quia licet non repugnet
25 proposito,tamen rpugntposito et habito pro vero. Bene enim sequitur quod si Sor est albus et non est albus in A, A non est, hoc autem
habendo pro vero Sortem non esse album in A.
Obiectio
'
Sed contra sic obicitur.Cum dicitur: poniturSortemesse album*, hoc
30 verbum 'esse*aut copulat albedinem respectu huius instantis discrete,
aut respectu instantiscommuniter,aut respectu instantis in quo Sor
erit albus. Si respectuhuius instantis discrete,sic poniturimpossibile;
et ita non est mirum si conceditur impossibile. Si pro instanti communiter, aut respiciturilla communitas respectu huius instantis aut
35 respectu alterius. Si respectu huius instantis, sic hoc est impossibile;
i

possibilipositione]possibilis
positioestE

3 sic]sitE

112

23:57:21 PM

'
si respectu alterius, hoc est possibile. Cum autem infertur: ergoSor
*
estalbus in A', hoc non sequitur, quoniam hoc verbum esse' non copulai albedinem respectuhuius instantis,sed respectu alterius. Unde hec
'
*
propositio: Sor est albus equipollet huic: 'Sor erit albus secundum
'
'
hoc. Si autem hoc verbum esse copulet albedinem respectu instantis 5
in quo Sor eritalbus, sit illud instansB. Inde poniturSortentesse album
in . Sed illud aut ponitur respectu huius instantis aut repectu illius
in quo Sor erit albus. Si respectu huius instantis,hoc est impossibile;
et ita non est mirumsi sequitur impossibile. Si respectu illius in quo
Sor erit albus, sic est possibile et non valet sequens argumentatio, 10
ratione supradicta.
Alii aliter solvunt.30Distinguunt enim inter impossibile per se et
impossibileper accidens. Impossibile per se est illud quod nullo modo
potest esse verum,quando scilicetformapredicatinaturaliterrpugnt
'
rei subiecti,sicut hoc 31 homoest asinus'. Et tale impossibilenon debet 15
concedi, possibili positione facta. Impossibile per accidens est illud
quod non est impossibileper se sed per aliud, hocest respectu alicuius
determinationis,quando scilicetformapredicati naturaliternon rpugnt rei subiecti; sicuti hoc: Sortemesse album; albedo enim naturaliter
non rpugnt Sorti sed respectu huius instantis. Et tale impossibile 20
bene potest concedi, possibili positione facta.
Continualo
Item. Notandum quod idem est ponere totale dictum copulative et
ponere utramque partem eius. Utrobique enim astringiturrespondens
ad concedendumutramque partem. Sed notandum quod non est idem 25
ponere totale dictum disiuncte et ponere alteram partem et nesciatur
que. Si enim ponitur totale dictum disiuncte ad partem primo propositam, debet responden secundum qualitatem ipsius; ad partem
secundo loco propositam,debet responden ' verumes - licet sit quoddam falsum- , quia sequitur ex posito et bene negatis cum posito. 30
Unde si poniturhoc totale dictum ' Sortemesse album vel Platonem esse
'
album et utrumque sit falsum, ad hanc ' Sor est albus9 si primo proponatur, debet responden 'falsum es , cum sit falsum non sequens ex
'
posito. Ad hanc autem: Plato est albus*, si postea proponatur, debet
'
responden verumest- licet sit quoddam falsum- , quia sequitur ex 35
ii ratione]Ec sicutE
Ec . E
32-33 si primoproponatur]
23 copulative]Ec disiuncteE
30viz. thedifficulty
fromtherulegiven.
31sc. impossibile. arising
"3

23:57:21 PM

posito et bene negatis cum posito. Bene enim sequitur quod si Sor vel
Plato est albus et non Sor est albus, Plato est albus. Si autem ponitur
altera pars et nesciatur que, ad utramque partem debet responden:
"proba", cum de utraque dubitetur quid sit positum.
5

Sophisma
Et per hoc patet solutio huius sophismatis: in rei veritate sor
est Niger. Et ponitur Sortemesse album vel te debereconcedereSortent
esse album. Et ponitur totale dictum disiuncte. Postea proponiturhec
'Sor est albus'. Hoc est quoddam falsum non sequens ex posito. Ergo
io est negandum. Postea proponiturhec: 'tu debes concedereSortemesse
album'. Hoc sequitur ex posito et bene negatis cum posito. Ergo est
concedendum.Bene enim sequitur ex 'Sor estalbus vel tu debesconcedere
Sortemesse album' et 'non Sor est albus', 'tu debesconcedereSortemesse
album'. Si concedatur,contra. 'Sortemesse album' non sequiturex posito
15 nec bene negato nec bene concessis cum posito nec ex aliquo obligto.
Et tu debes concedere illud. Ergo est verum. Cedat tempus. Tu concessisti duo contradictorieopposita. Ergo male respondisti.
Solutio
Solutio. Ad hanc primoloco propositam 'Sor estalbus' debet respoderi
20
'falsumest', cum sit falsum non sequens ex posito. Ad hanc autem
secundo loco propositam: 'te debereconcedereSortemesse album' debet
responden 'verumest' - licet sit quoddam falsum , quia sequiturex
posito et bene negatis cum posito, ut probatum est superius. Cum
autem dicitur: 'Sortemesse album' non sequiturex posito etc., si enume25 ret omnes causas concessionis, debet responded 'falsum est'. Si autem
enumeret quasdam et non omnes, dicendum est 'verumest' sed illa in
qua enumerabitillas causas, neganda est, licet sit vera, quia rpugnt
posito et bene concessis cum posito.
Utrumhabeatsustineripositiofacta per relativum
30

Sequitur videre quomodo habeat sustineripositiofactaperrelativum.

Sed quod talis positio non debeat sustinerisic probatur. Omnis concessio habet esse respectu alicuius certi. Unde cum positio habeat esse
respectu concessionis,omnis positio habet esse respectu alicuius certi.
Sed cum talis positio facta per relativumnon sit respectu alicuius certi,
12 ex] quod E
27 illas]ullasE

30 habeat]habetE
32 habeat]habetE

114

23:57:21 PM

videtur quod non debeat sustineri. Sed hec causa non est sufficiens.
Bene enim possum astringereme ad aliquid certe vel incerte.
Supposito ergo quod talis positio debeat sustineri, videndum est
qualiter debeat sustineri.
Qualiterdebeatsustineri

Notandum quod quando fit positio per relativum relatum <ad

terminm> distributive supponentem debent concedi omnes singu'
lares illius universalis. Unde cum dicitur: omnis homo est; ponitur
'
ilium currere
' debent concedi omnes iste: Sor curri, 'Plato curri et
'
sic de aliis. Similitercum dicitur: Sor est; poniturilium currere*
, debet 10
'
concedi hec singularis: Sor curri.
De quodam dubio
Quando vero fit positio per relativum relatum ad terminmdeterminate supponentem, dubium est iudicium. Quidam iudicant quod,
cum dicitur: 'homoest; poniturillum currere
' si tantummodo sint tres 15
homines,Sor, Plato, Cicero,si illi tres singularesproponantur,ad duas
non sim astrictus
primo propositas respondendumest : 'falsum est cum
'
ad illas' Ad ultimo vero propositam dicendum est verumest, non quia
astrictussim ad illam sed quia sum astrictusad aliquam'
Alii dicunt quod ad utramque respondendum est secundum quali- 20
tatem ipsius. Et non valet hec argumentatio: 'tu es astrictusad aliquam ;
et nullam concessisti; ergo male respondisti. Quod patet per exposi; et nullam concessi,
tionem; 'ad aliquam eram astrictus, indeterminate
'
determinate
; ergomale respondi ; non valet. Si autem ille proponerentur:
'homocurri, 'Ule curri, bene debent concedi.
25
Preterea potest dici quod sicuti est in natura quod si aliquis promittat aliquid figurareindeterminate <et figuravitdeterminate>,
iam satisfecitpromissioni.Similitersi astringorad aliquid concedendum indeterminateet concedam aliquid determinate,iam satisfecipromissioni.Unde si aliqua illarummichiproponereturet illam concedam, 30
iam absolutus sum a promissione.
1 susficiens
(!) E
2 certe]Ec certumE
3 ergo]enimE
6-7ad termininum]
suppl.. E
diffinitive
E
distributive]

18 ultimo]ultimanE
27 et .... . determinate]
suppl.
28 aliquid]E significare
(/) add E

115

23:57:21 PM

Continuatio
Item. Notandum quod sub forma dependente quandoque contingit
impossibile concedere, ut dicunt quidam. Sed illud impossibile conceditur pro possibili.
5

Sophisma
Ut in hoc exemplo. In rei veritate Sor est niger. Ponitur illum esse
'
album. Postea proponatur hec: color est in Sorte; ille est albedo' Si
respondeatfalsum est vel probol, sic probetur.Albedo est in Sorte. Et
ilia est color. Ergo color est in Sorte. Et ille est albedo. Si concedatur,
'
*
io contra. Tu concessistiillum esse albedinem. Sed illum esse albedinem
erat 'nigredinemesse albedinem' Sed hoc est impossibile. Ergo tu concessisti impossibile,possibili positione etc. Ergo male respondisti.
Solutio
Solutio. Dicunt quidam quod ultima argumentatio non valet, hec
'tu concessisti impossibile, possibili positione etc.; ergo
scilicet:
15
male respondisti
' quoniam illud impossibile concessi pro possibili.
Sed aliter potest solvi. Si tu sustineresSortemesse album, tu negares
Sortemesse nigrum, si scires Sortem esse album in rei veritate. Sed
'
si scires Sortem esse album in rei veritate,sub hac formavocis : illum
'
9
20 esse albedinem erat nigredinemesse albedinem' Sed hoc non est impossibile. Et ita tu non concessisti impossibile,cum tu astringerisad
respondendumhanc, si scires in rei veritate.
Continuatio
Item. Notandum quod sicuti hoc enuntiabilefalsum poni a nullo
25 potest poni, similiterhoc enuntiabilefalsum poni a Sorte non potest
poni a Sorte, sed ab aliis bene potest poni. Et de similibus idem
iudicium.
De Ulis enuntiabilibus ad que non contingitbene respondere,solet
dici quod bene possunt poni iuxta hanc regulam:
solummodo sunt imponibilia
illa enuntiabilia
rum positione statim sequitur contradictio

30

6 alterum
in]Ec: . E
Ec: albedinemE
ii nigredinem]
E: del.Ec
18 sortemessenigrum]
scires]suppl.: s. Ec: . E

ex quo-

20 nigredinem]
coll.11611albedinem
E
20 non]Ec: . E
26 a Sorte]s. E ab aliis]alii E

116

23:57:21 PM

Unde cum ex eorum positione statim non sequitur contradictio,bene

possunt poni.
Sed contra. Omne positum debet concedi ut videatur quid inde
accidat. Sed illud videre consistitin oppositione et responsione. Ergo
si non posset esse responsio, non potest esse positio cum fit gratia 5
illius. Ergo cum ad talia enuntiabilia non posset responden, talia
enuntiabilia non possunt poni.
Preterea. Omnis positio fit propter disputationem. Disputatio consistit in oppositione et responsione. Ergo si non posset esse responsio
circa illa,32 non potest esse positio. Sed circa illa non potest esse 10
responsio. Ergo non possunt poni.
Quod concedunt quidam hac ratione. Et secundum hoc non valet
hec argumntatio:'ex positionenon sequiturcontradictio
; ergopossunt33
enim
'et
Ulis
addi:
poni*. Sic enim insufficienti.Deberet
positis potest
esse disputatio et responsio et potest videri quid inde sequitur' Quod 15
autem falsum est.
Vel potest dici quod bene possunt poni. Et secundum hoc non valet
hec argumntatio: ' omnis positio fit propter responsionem; sed non
'
potest esse responsio; ergo non potest esse positio' Instantia: omnis
homoestad beatitudinem;sed Ule homonon estbeatus; ergononest homo' 20
Non valet.
Et hec sufficiantde falsi positione.
TRACTATUS

EMMERANUS

DE

IMPOSSIBILI

POSITIONE

SIGLA
E = codexEmmeranus(Monacensis14.458s. XIII)
Ec = manusquae correxit
E

25

Quod impossibilispositio habeat sustineri

40va Quod impossibilispositio habeat sustinerisic probatur. Sicuti enim
nos dicimus quod possibile est concedendum ut videatur quid inde
sequitur, similiterhabemus ab Aristotile quod impossibile est con- 30
cedendum ut videtur quid inde accidat.
Preterea. Nos dicimus Deum esse hominem, et bene dicimus. Sed
magis differtdeitas et humanitas quam humanitas et asinitas secundum naturam. Ergo sicuti nos possumus intelligereDeum esse hominem
3 sed]s. E
8 positio]Ec: disputatioE
32se. enuntiabilia.
33se. illa enuntiabilia.

14 insufficienti
(!) E
22 falsi]falsaE

117

23:57:21 PM

esse veram, sic possumus intelgereS<ortem > esse asinum esse veram.
Et ita cum possumus intelligere,possumus ponere, et ita concedere.
Et ita pater quod impossibilispositio est admittenda.
Preterea. Habemus ab Aristotilequod impossibile potest intellegi.
Dicit
enim quod piseis extrahatur ab aqua, ita quod nichil subintret
5
locum eius, - quod est impossibile- ; ita impossibile potest intelligi.
Ergo cum possumus ponere illud quod possimus intelligere,patet quod
impossibilispositio est recipienda et impossibile est concedendum.
Subposito ergo quod impossibilispositio debeat sustineri,procedatur
io secundum hoc.

15

20

25

30

Quomodoimpossibilispositio habeatfieri
Notandum ergo quod in hac questione duo contradictiorieopposita
non sunt concedenda. Hoc enim in qualibet disputatione vel questione
est meta. Unde nee in hac questione in alia sunt concedenda duo
contradictorieopposita. Unde notandum quod nulla obligatio est recipienda que cogit respondentemconcedere duo contradictorieopposita.
Preterea. Notandum quod eadem est ars falsi positionis et impossibilis positionis. Unde notandum quod sicuti in falsi positione omne
hoc quod sequitur ex positio, est concedendum, sic in impossibili
'
*
positione omne sequens ex posito est concedendum; sequens dicitur
secundum rectam consequentiam. Et est recta consequentia quando
scilicet intellectusconsequentis clauditur in intellectu antecedentis.
Et notandum quod in hac questione ex obligatione impossibilinon
sequitur quidlibet. Unde consequentia Adamitoram 34 non est concedenda in hac questione, scilicet quod ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet. Sed tantummodo ilia consequentia est concedenda in hac questione in qua intellectusconsequentisclaudatur in intellectuantecedentis. Unde cum tantum talis consequentia sit admittenda in hac questione,notandum quod consequentianon est admittendain hac questione
in qua negatio sequitur ex affirmatione.Unde talis consequentia non
est concedenda: ' si homoest,non estasinus' Quod patet, si homouniatur
asino omnmoda identitte.

Obiectiones
Sed contra. Ex natura humanitatisnon est quod compatiatur asini35 tatem secum in eodem subiecto. Ergo humanitas et asinitas non posex unioneE
32 identitte]
17 falsi]falsaE
22 clauditurex concluditur
E
34-35asininitatem
(/)E
34 Adamitiprobablyare the adherentsof Adam of the Petit Pont. Cfr.L. M.
de Rij, LogicaModernorum
II 1, pp. 290-291.
118

23:57:21 PM

sunt esse in eodem subiecto. Ergo naturaliter sequitur: 'si homo est
non est asinus'.
Preterea. Substantialis differentiafacit speciem et dividit ipsam ab
aliis. Ergo rationale, cum sit substantialis differentia,facit speciem
nullam nisi hominem. Ergo bene sequitur: 'si aliquid est homo, est 5
diversum ab aliis ' Ergo bene sequitur: 'si est homo,non est asinus'.
Solutiones
Solutio. Cum impossibilis positio non habeat fieri respectu nature
sed quantum ad intellectum,cum ille due forme non possint esse in
eodem subiecto naturaliter,bene sequitur quantum ad naturam: 'si 10
est homo, non est asinus '. Sed quia potest intelligiquod ille due forme
sint in subiecto, quantum ad intellectumnon sequitur. Unde cum impossibilis positio habeat quantum ad intellectum,patet quod in impossibili positione non debet concedi consequentia in qua negativa
15
sequitur ex affirmatione.
Ad aliud dicimus quod intentio substantialis forme proprie <et>
per se est facere speciem, per accidens vero dividit ipsam ab aliis,
scilicet per contrarietatemquam habet cum aliis. Et cum illa contrarietas non sit in re, sed in intellectu,patet quod quantum ad intellec20
tum non sequitur: 'si est homo, non est asinus '
Continuatio
Et notandum quod licet impossibile habeat poni, tarnen notandum
quod impossibilenon potest poni ex quo sequuntur duo contradictorie
'
'
opposita. Unde si fiat talis suppositio quod mortale sumatur in diffinitionem hominis, hoc impossibile,scilicet esse ex necessitate
, nullo modo 25
duo
inde
contradictorie
si
sequuntur
potest poni, quia
ponatur,
opposita, sic: 'si Sor est homo,Sor est animal rationale et mortale*,et 'si est
animal rationale mortale,potest mori', si est ex necessitate,non potest
mori' Ergo si potest mori, non potest mori. Per hoc patet quod tale
30
impossibilenullo modo potest poni.
Item. Notandum quod hoc impossibile: Sortemdesinerescirese nichil
desinerescire nullo modo potest poni, quia inde sequuntur duo contradictorie opposita, scilicet: Sor desinit scire se nichil desinere scire et
< 'si Sor desinitscire,nichil desinitscire', sic >. Si desinit scire se nichil
desinere scire, seit se nichil desinere scire. Et si seit se nichil desinere 35
scire, est verum, quia quidquid scitur est verum. Et si est verum se
8 nonhabeatfieri]
Ee habeat:susti- 13 in] Ee: . E
neriE
16 et] suppl.
HQ

23:57:21 PM

nichil desinere scire, Sortes nichil desinit scire. Et ita si Sor desmit
scire,nichildesinit scire. Et ita sequuntur duo contradictorieopposita.
Et ita nullomodo potest poni.
De impossibilipositione que fit per unionem
5

io

15

20

25

30

35

Et notandum quod impossibilis positio quandoque habet fieriper

unionem, quandoque sine unione. Et est unio unius ex duobus predicatto,secundum quod hie accipitur.
Et notandum quod quandoque habet fieri unio essentie tantum,
quandoque persone tantum, quandoque essentie et persone. Et licet
essentia et persona idem sint et unum non possit esse sine reliquo,
tamen unum bene potest intelligisine reliquo. Et quia potest intelligi,
bene potest poni, cum impossibilispositio fiat quantum ad intellectum.
Et est essentia | suppositum intellectumsine forma,et est persona sup- 40va
positum intellectumcum forma.Et notandum quod terminiessentiales
dicuntur illi qui predicantur ita de toto quod de qualibet eius parte;
ut 'corpus', 'lignum' et similia. Termini personales dicunturilli qui ita
predicanturde toto quod non de qualibet eius parte; ut iste terminus
'homo' est et iste terminus'animal'.
Preterea. Notandum quod adiectivum sumptum in neuto genere est
terminusessentialis.
Viso quid sit terminus essentialis et personalis et quid sit essentia
et quid persona et quid unio, videndum est .quomodo respondendum
sit ad positionem factam per unionem. Unde notandum quod quando
fit unio essentie tantum, si predicatio essentialis predicata de uno,
debet concedi de reliquo; si autem predicatio personalis predicetur
<de uno>, debet negari de reliquo. Unde si Sor uniatur Brunello
unione essentie tantum, hec est concedenda: 'Sor est idem quod Brunellus', hec autem neganda: 'Sor est Brunellus'. Si autem fiat unio
persone tantum, econverso accidit, quoniam si predicatio personalis
concedatur de uno, debet concedi de reliquo. Unde si Sor uniatur
Brunello unione personali tantum, hec debet concedi: 'Sor est Brunellus', hec autem negari: 'Sor estidem quod Brunellus'.
Per hoc patet quod in hac questione non valet argumentatio ab
adiectivo sumpto in neutro genere ad adiectivum sumptum in masculino vel femininogenere.
24 de uno]suppl.
26 brunelle
-f [unionepersonali]MS
27 idem]id E

29 accidit]accidatE
32 idem]id E

120

23:57:21 PM

Quesito
Sed potest queri quare adiectivum sumptum in neutrogenerepotius
sit essentialis terminusquam adiectivum sumptum in mascculino vel
femininogenere.
Ad hoc est respondendumquod masculinum et femininuminponun- 5
tur a forma rei et propter hoc dicunt<ur> terminiformales,et ita
personales; neutrumgenus non inponiturab aliqua formaque sit in re,
immo a pura privatione. Et ita intelligiturres sine forma,et ita terminus essentialis.
10

Continuatio

Item. Notandum quod sunt quedam formeque conveniuntessentie

'
'
'
et persone, ut albedo et nigredo'. Unde qualicumque facta unione:
si una concedatur de uno, debet concedi de reliquo. Unde si ita sit
quod Sortes sit albus et Plato sit niger et fiat qualiscumque unio, hec
'
'
est concedenda: albedo est in Sorte'; sequitur et hec: nigredoest in 15
Sorte'. Et non valet hec argumentatio: 'albedo est; non ergonigredoest'.
Unde notandumquod locus ab oppositis non tenet in hac questione.
Item. Notandum quod sunt quedam formeque conveniunt persone
tantum,sicutcrementumet decrementum.Unde si Sortescrescatet Brunellus decrescat et fiat unio essentietantuminterSortemet Brunellum, 20
'
hec est concedenda: Sor cresci; hec autem neganda: 'Brunelluscresci.
Et notandum quod sunt quedam forme que conveniunt essentie
tantum. Unde notandum quod si fiat unio persone tantum si predicatio
essentialisconcedatur de uno, debet negari de reliquo. Undo notandum
quod sunt quedam formeessentiales ille que inportanturper terminos 25
'
essentiales,sicuti 'carneitas' et corporeitas', et similiterilia formaque
'
inportaturper istum terminm aliquid9.
Dubitatio
'
Item. Solet dubitari. Si fiat unio ut uniatur 'iste homo' iste asinus',
'
'
'
iste due sunt vere: iste homoes, iste asinus' , iste asinus estistehomo'. 30
Sed iste homo resurget.Ergo iste asinus resurget.
Hanc argumentationem concedunt quidam. Sed melius est quod
dicatur quod sit ibi fallacia secundum accidens.
Obiectio
Item. Notandum quod sicuti in falsi positione celatur rei Veritas 35
et observaturordo propositionum,similiterin inpossibilipositione. Et
E
29 primmiste]Ec : isteterminus
32 quod]quam E

35 celatur]scelatur(/) sic semperE

121

23:57:21 PM

per hoc patet solutio huius obiectionis. In rei ventate Sor est gramaticus, Plato gramaticus et musicus et uniantur omnmoda unione.
4
Postea probatur hec: Sor est tantumgramaticus' Hoc est quoddam
'
verum non repugnans posito. Ergo est concedendum. Similiter Plato
5 estgramaticuset musicus' Hoc est quoddam verum non repugnansetc.
Si concedatur, contra. Sor estPlato. Sed Sor est tantum gramaticus.
Ergo Plato est tantum gramaticus. Cedat tempus. Tu concessisti duo
contradictorieopposita in eadem disputatione. Ergo male.
Instantia. Iste est dux. Iste est episcopus. Et iste episcopus clbrt,
io Ergo dux. Non valet.
Et notandum quod sicut fit unio in rebus animatis, similiterfit in
inanimatis et in enuntiabilibus.
Questio
Item. Queratur utrum ad unionem enuntiabiliumsequitur unio re'
15 rum. Quod sic probatur. Si ista duo enuntiabilia 'Deum esse esarem
*
esse uniantur,bene sequitur: 'si Cesarem esse est verum, Cesar est; sed
esarem esse est verum; ergoCesar est' Quod esarem esse est verum
sic probatur. Cesarem esse est idem quod Deum esse; sed Deum esse
est verum; ergo Cesarem esse est verum. Ergo Cesar est. Et ita ad
20 unionem enuntiabiliumsequitur unio rerum.
Solutio
Ad hoc dicitur quod unio potest fieridupliciter. Potest enim fieri
unio quantum ad res et quantum ad intellectum.Et secundum hoc ad
unionem enuntiabiliumsequitur unio rerum.
Item. Potest fieriunio quantum ad intellectumtantum. Et ita ad
25
unionem enuntiabiliumnon sequitur unio rerum.
'
Per hoc patet quod non valet hec argumentatio: Cesaremesse idem
estquod Deum esse; sed Deum esse estverum; ergoCesaremesse estverum*
,
'
esse*
hoc
est
idem
Deum
esse
dicitur:
Cesarem
cum
,
quod
quoniam,
30 intelligiturquantum ad intellectum.
'
Cum autem dicitur: Cesarem esse est verum*
, hoc nullomodo potest
intellectu.
re
et
sine
sine
intelligi
Questio
Item. Queritur utrum unio veritatis et falsitatis debeat sustineri.
35 Quod non sic probatur. Enuntiabile esse verumnichil aliud est quam
22 dupliciter]
duplexE

26 non]Ec : , E

122

23:57:21 PM

enuntiabilesignificareproutestin re. Enuntiabileessefalsum nichilaliud

est quam enuntiabilesignificareprout non est in re. Et ita in totali
unione inplicatur esse in re et non esse in re. Sed nulla obligatio debet
sustineriin qua inplicanturduo contradictorieopposita. Ergo cum in
hac inplicenturduo contradictorieopposita, non debet sustineri.Ex- 5
pliciunt.
Leyde
FilosofischInstituut
Witte Singel 71

123

23:57:21 PM

Vivarium,XII, 2 (1974)
Thomas Cantimpratensis redivivus

J. ENGELS

que Thomas de Cantimpr renat. Quelque sept sicles aprs

Voil sa mort, enfin,l'dition princeps * de son livre principal,le De
natura rerum,est publie par le Dr. Helmut Boese, actuellement
Stuttgart, et qui s'tait dj fait remarquer par son catalogue des
manuscrits de la collection Hamilton Berlin. Le texte du trait est
prcd d'une brve prface (six pages et demie). L'diteur y fait tat
de difficultsqui ont retard la publication de ce premiervolume et
nous avertit que de nouvelles tches et fonctions,entretempsassumes
par lui, interdisentde prvoirquand le second volume pourra paratre.
Celui-ci est destin recevoir1'apparatus criticus; l'tude de la transmission du texte, les sources, les particularitslinguistiques du latin
, p. ix).
propre au De natura rerum; et les Index ( Vorwort
En attendant, on doit se contenterde l'article de M. H. Boese : Zur
von Thomas Cantimpratensis'Liber de natura rerum
Textberlieferung
paru dans YArchivmfratrumpraeiicatorumXXXIX = 1969 (pp. 5368), o 44 manuscrits sont numrs. D'autre part, la bibliographie
concernantThomas de Cantimprruniedans VivariumV = 1967 (pp.
163-71) et VI = 1968 (pp. 48-61) doit encore servir. En revanche,
l'dition du ms. Utrecht, Bibi. univ. 710 (annonce vol. V, p. 146) a
fait long feu - le Dr. G. J. J. Walstra ayant t appel d'autres
responsabilits universitaires- et est entretempsdevenue superflue.
Le problme pour M. Boese, prparant son dition critique du De
natura rerum,rsidait d'abord dans le nombre considrable de manuscrits; mme en liminant le remaniement ultrieur,appel parfois
Thomas III et apparemment apocryphe,il a finalementd en retenir
55. Ensuite, dans le fait que ces manuscritsoffrentdes versions assez
divergentes,quoique toutes authentiques. Thomas de Cantimprluimme dj nous informequ'il a fait successivement deux rdactions
* Thomas Cantimpratensis,
o princepssecundum
Liber de naturarerum
, editi
codicesmanuscriptos,
Teil I: Text[ed. Dr. H. Boese],Walterde Gruyter,
Berlin/
New York,1973,xi + 431 PP-*rel-D.M. 138.- .
124

23:57:29 PM

du trait: une premire, comportant dix-neuf livres (qu'il appelle

editiones); une seconde, o il en a ajout un vingtime,non compil
par lui, mais emprunt peu prs tel quel un autre auteur. En outre
- comme M. Boese constat - entre ces deux extrmes,Thomas
n'a pas cess d'introduiredes modificationsdans son texte. C'est peuttre quoi il fait allusion dans l'addendum au Prologue, qu'il rptera
en termes presque identiques a^ant-e livre-XX (Viccsimum autem
post finem laboris nostri, non tanquam ex nostra compilatione
, sei tannecessarium
addidimus
.
.
, .) Addidimustarnen
quam
ipsi operiprecedenti
aliqua et quedam subtraximusatque nonnulla in eodemlibrocorreximus.
Quoi qu'il en soit, ces correctionscontinues appliques par un auteur
dans son manuscrit de travail, n'avaient rien d'insolite l'poque
antrieure l'imprimerieavec ses tirages. On l'a dmontr( Vivarium
IX, p. 21) pour un crivain du sicle suivant, Pierre Bersuire, lequel
utiliserale De natura rerum, bien que moins systmatiquementque le
De proprietatibusrerumde Barthlemy l'Anglais. Il dclare explicitement dans la rdaction finale de son prologue au Reductorium:Laboro
veronunc haec omnia corrigendo
, et semperaliquid utile in diversislocis
et materiisaggregando
. Evidemment, on n'en finiraitpas si, aprs chaque modification,ft-elle mineure, on voulait parler de version ou
rdactionnouvelle,plutt que de simple "tat intermdiaire".M. Boese
a reconnu un tel tat - intermdiaireentre la rdaction primitivedu
De natura rerum et sa rdaction dfinitive- consign dans le ms.
Harlien 3717 du Muse britannique et provenant de Louvain, o
Thomas de Cantimprtat entrau couvent des dominicainsvers 1232.
M. Boese a tenu nous montrerad oculos cette volution du trait
sous les mains de son auteurA cette fin,l'diteur a imagin ( Vorwort
,
p. ix) un jeu typographiqueingnieux. Il imprimesur toute la largeur
de la page le texte, lorsque celui-ci est commun toutes les versions;
ainsi la page 89. Dans les cas, rares d'ailleurs, o un passage de la
rdaction primitive a t limin dans la suite, cela est signal au
moyen de crochets ([ . . . J); ainsi la page 97, lignes 2-3 d'en bas. Par
contre,lorsqu'un passage manque seulement dans la rdaction primitive, cela est indiqu par des crochetsrenverss([*...]). Ainsi, en haut
de la mme page 97, le long alina commenant le livre III De monstruosishominibus
. (Dans la rdaction primitive,ce livre commenait,
curieusement,par De mulieribuspugnatricbusque dicunturAmazones;
Thomas a mnag une transitionen intercalant la question de savoir
si ces monstruosidescendent d'Adam, le premier homme.) Les additions suivantes, jusqu' celles du ms. Harlien inclusivement, sont
125

23:57:29 PM

signales au moyen d'une simple barre en retraitde la marge gauche.

Finalement, les additions de la dernirerdaction sont signales par
deux de ces barres, encore plus en retrait. Par exemple, les 20 hexamtres rimant deux deux et mnmoniques de la page 12. Parfois,
des modificationsconcurrentessont imprimesl'une ct de l'autre.
Ce procd typographique me parat parfaitementrussi et mriter
imitation dans des cas analogues.
La prsentation du texte ne m'inspire que quelques observations
d'une porte tant soit peu gnrale. Le recours des manuscritssinon des groupes de manuscrits- divers, pour tablir les "tats"

successifs du trait, rendait presque invitable une certaine uniformisation de l'orthographe. Cependant, il va de soi que M. Boese n'a pas
donn dans l'anachronisme du toilettage pseudo-classique. Les noms
propres sont munis d'une majuscule: Aristotiles,Augustinus. Alors,
dans une perspectivemdivale, ne doit-onpas plutt criredeus avec
majuscule, au lieu d'une minuscule, l o il s'agit manifestementdu
dieu de la bible, des chrtiens? Ainsi (p. 13): Unde Grecehomomicrocosmusquasi minormundus dicitur. Hune deus post ceterascreaturasdie
sexta plasmavit; et (p. 414): ut secundum laborem meum michi deus
mercedemrestitutin futurum; et encore (p. 86): deus homofactus est.
Par contre,quelques lignes plus loin cette mme page, dans: Spiritus
multis modis dicitur. Dicitur namque spiritus deus et aer iste et flatus
aeris, . . . deus est un nom commun, qui exige la minuscule. Pour ces
quatre phrases, le risque de confusionn'existe gure. Toutefois,il y a
des cas scabreux o seul le doigt de l'diteur, acquis par sa longue
mditation du texte, permet de saisir d'emble la significationexacte
d'un termedans le contexte donn. Ainsi, la page 5, dans l'alina des
lignes 91-96, il y a scriptis, scripturarumet scripturis.Le lecteur serait
sans doute content si une majuscule l'avertissait quand il s'agit, non
d'un crit en gnral, mais de la sainte criture.La situation est analogue pour la ponctuation des propositionssubordonnesrelatives. La
plupart des ditions mdiolatines placent indistinctementune virgule
aussi bien devant les dterminativesque les explicatives (ou extensives). A la page 3 de l'dition, lignes 3-5: ut ea, que invenirem, . . .
compilarem, la virgule devant quet si elle n'est pas indispensable, ne
cause pas de confusion.En revanche, la premireligne de la page 253 :
Non inveniunturova nisi in piscibus, qui coeunt,la virgule cre inutilement une ambiguit, car Thomas veut dire que seuls les poissons qui
copulent, ont des oeufs; non les autres. Dans cette veine, on pourrait
aller plus loin, et envisager de mettre une virgule devant quia et
126

23:57:29 PM

quand ils sont conjonctions causales, mais la supprimerdans

q%ioniamy
le cas de dico quia , dico quoniam. Pareilles diffrenciations
contribuent
faciliterla comprhensiondes textes mdiolatins.
La lecture du De natura rerumcomplet, en dition critique, mais
pour une fois sans l'habituel accompagnement confortable de notes
explicatives et de renvois bibliographiques, est une exprience rafrachissante en mme temps que salutaire, donnant lieu un examen de
conscience scientifique: Dans la masse compacte de citations qui constituentl'essentiel du trait, lesquelles identifie-t-onaussitt ou sans
trop de peine? lesquelles laissent pantois? On peut maintenant se
formerune ide plus adquate de l'ouvrage que ne le permettaientles
fragmentsisols imprims jusqu'ici. A ce sujet, M. Boese a formul
dans sa prfacedes remarques rapides mais percutantes. Je ne toucherai ici que quelques points.
Dans les manuscrits,le titre est libell alternativement(Liber) De
natura rerum et De naturis rerum. Devant trancher, dj pour tre
pratique, l'diteur a opt pour le singulier,qu'ont les meilleurset plus
anciens manuscrits,de mme que le trait postrieurDe apibus (Text. . ., p. 53, n. i). Toutefois, le raisonnementque c'est l
berlieferung
"die richtigeBezeichnung" du trait n'emportepas aussitt la conviction. La question se pose: S'agit-il d'un titreremontant l'auteur, ou
d'une rubrique provenant peut-tre d'un copiste? On sait que c'est
seulementl'imprimeriequi a impos la gnralisationdu titre,comme
de la feuillede titre,et mme pas tout de suite. Auparavant, l'auteur ou dfaut un copiste - se contentait d'ordinaire d'indiquer globalement le contenu du livre, au dbut ou l'explicit, prcisment au
moyen de De . . .. Cela tant, j'attacherais de l'importance au fait
que Thomas de Cantimprcommencele Prologue par les mots Naturas
rerum, et que le pluriel y revient aux lignes 3, 32, 35, 46, 71 et 75. (A
la ligne 71, au surplus, c'est une citation emprunte la traduction
par Michel Scot du De animalibus d'Aristote, laquelle prfregalement le pluriel.) Le singulierne se lit que trois fois dans le Prologue,
aux lignes 10, 41 et 60. J'attacherais ensuite de l'importance au fait
que l'Epilogue ne se sert que du pluriel (p. 414, ligne 9 : libroDe naturis
rerum intendimus; ligne 12; ligne 15). D'autre part, y a-t-il une
diffrencelexicologique entre natura rerumet le pluriel? On pourrait
arguer que le singulierest plus philosophique et plus abstrait, et que
le pluriel spcifie davantage, en ce que la "nature des choses" y est
divise en ses "proprits" ou caractristiques.A cette fin,on pourrait
invoquer dans le Prologue l'expression de naturiscreaturarumet earum
127

23:57:29 PM

proprietatibus(lignes 3-4), et dans celui du trait parallle de Barthlemy l'Anglais naturas rerum & proprieties. Par contre, je ne vois
aucune diffrencede sens entre naturas et moresanimalium (ligne 75)
et naturapecudum, volucrum(lignes 10-11). Dans la mesure o lavaria
lectio confirmetoutes ces leons, on doit admettre que pour Thomas
il n'y avait qu'une diffrencestylistiqueentrele singulieret le pluriel,
et que dans le titre ils taient interchangeables.
Vigoureusement,M. Boese (Vorwort,pp. v sw.), s'inscrit en faux
contre ceux qui sont d'avis que Thomas de Cantimpr,avec son De
natura rerum,a ralis une encyclopdie. D'aprs lui, le trait,en comparaison avec les "vraies encyclopdies" de l'poque, resteraitloin de
compte. D'ailleurs, telle n'aurait point t l'intentionde l'auteur. Ds
son adolescence fascin par la personnalit de Jacques de Vitry-

lequel savait mafflerses sermons d'exempla propres mouvoir les

foules- le jeune adepte aurait trs tt commenc rassemblerdans
le mme but des "Merkwrdigkeiten".Avec ces matriaux, de fil en
aiguille, il aurait t amen composer un manuel destin en majeure
partie (livres III, IV-IX et XIII) aux prdicateurs,pour le reste la

pastorale ("Seelsorge").
Est-ce que cette conception, brivementesquisse, ne forcepas un
peu les antinomies? Certes,on peut discuterlongtempsde ce que c'est
qu'une encyclopdie au XIIIe sicle. Pourtant, lorsque le regrett P.
Michaud-Quantin,dans les Cahiers d'histoiremondialeIX-3 (Neuchtel,
1966), cherchait groupersous un mme dnominateurcommun le De
naturis rerumde Neckm, celui de Cantimpr,le De proprietatibusrerum et le Compendiumphilosophiae, disposait-il d'un meilleur terme
- comme
pour caractriser,en tant que tels, ces traits,dans lesquels
"la connaissance de la nature et du monde au
dirait Ch.-V. Langlois
a
t
moyen ge"
systmatiquementexpose ?
Nous ignoreronsprobablement jamais les motivations profondes
et lointaines qui ont finalementconduit Thomas de Cantimpr composer le De natura rerum.Quant connatreses intentionsconcrteset
actuelles, interrogeonsde nouveau le Prologue et l'Epilogue, o les
auteurs du moyen ge aimaient les dvoiler.
L'Epilogue (d. pp. 413-4) est rest plac la fin du dix-neuvime
livre, mme aprs l'adjonction conscutive du vingtime, lequel n'a
plus t intgr dans l'ensemble. Le Prologue (pp. 3-5) tait compos
entirement- sauf les lignes 7 et 40, de mme que l'addendum in
fine - ds l'achvement de la premirerdaction. Du reste, de larges
tranches- et notammentla deuxime ligne- n'auraient pu tre rdi128

23:57:29 PM

ges beaucoup auparavant. De sorte qu'entre le Prologue et l'Epilogue,

qui se compltentl'un l'autre, en fait il n'y a pas les quatorze quinze
annes que Thomas de Cantimpr dit avoir travaill au De natura
rerum.
Ds l'entre en matire, Thomas de Cantimpr nous informe (P,
lignes 1-5): "Ayant trouv la nature des choses, dans les crits des
diffrentsauteurs, parpille travers le monde entier, il a oeuvr
pour rassemblerce que - sur la nature des choses cres et leurs proprits- il a lu de mmorable et de conforme leur manires d'tre
(congruamoribus).Et cela, le plus fortementabrg possible, dans un
petit volume, que voici". Dans l'Epilogue, Thomas y revient. "Il s'excuse auprs du lecteur qui n'a peut-tre pas rencontrdans le trait
tout ce qu'il esprait, et assure n'avoir pargn ni peines ni dpenses
afin de se procurerdes livres sur la nature des choses, aussi bien en
France et en Allemagne (les mieux nanties) qu'au Levant et en Angleterre. Mais le lecteur intelligentconsidrera qu'il est impossible pour
un seul homme de mettre la main sur tous les critsdes philosophes;
puis de lire, d'extraire et de rassembler en un volume ce qui pourrait
tre dcouvert et lu, dans le monde entier,par le grand nombre. Au
fond,est-cequ'on trouverafacilementmieux que le De natura rerum?".
Tout ce que dit Thomas de Cantimpr ici n'est que de bon sens.
Mais ce qui frappe,c'est qu'il insiste tel point sur la notion de "un
seul (petit) volume". Aprs le in uno volumine. . . parvo du Prologue
nous lisons dans les peine 17 lignes de l'Epilogue: in uno volumine,
in tam parvo volumine, in unum volumen.Pourquoi cette insistance?
L'explication me parat fourniepar la citation du De doctrinaChristiana (II, xxxix, 59) que Thomas avait longtempseue prsente l'esprit
(diu habentespre oculis, E, lignes 10-11) et l'interprtationqu'il en
donne. S. Augustin est le premierauteur nomm dans le Prologue; le
dernierdans l'Epilogue. Mme s'il n'est plus repris parmi les sources
numres la premirepage, cela n'empche qu'il soit omniprsent
dans le De naturarerum. Il fut un des matres penser de Thomas. En
quoi il n'y rien d'tonnant, vu que le futurdominicain a d'abord t
chanoine rgulier l'abbaye de Cantimpr, o il vivait sous la rgle
attribue l'vque d'Hippone.
Replaons la citation dans son contexte du De doctrinaChristiana
II. S. Augustin pose deux conditions pour bien comprendreles livres
bibliques, desquels il venait prcismentd'tablir le canon : 1) la connaissance des langues, notamment de l'hbreu et du grec; 2) la connaissance des realia. En effet,"l'ignorance des realia rend incompr129

23:57:29 PM

hensibles les expressions scripturaires" : Rerum autem ignorantiafacit

obscurasfiguratas,locutiones, cum ignoramusvel animantium,vel lpidum, vel herbar
um naturas (sic!) aliarumve rerum quae plerumque in
similitudinis
Scripturis
alicujus gratia ponuntur (II, xvi, 24). Cette
vient
en
tte
d'un
de ces longs excursus (24-58) dont l'vque
phrase
raffolaitet la fin duquel il reprend le sujet. "Certains connaisseurs,
dont Eusbe de Csare dans son Histoireecclsiastique
, on ttraduitles
termestrangers,hbreux ou autres, qui se lisent sans explication dans
les saintes critures.Ils l'ont faitpour que chaque chrtienindividuellement ne soit pas oblig de travailler beaucoup propos d'un dtail":
quoi ergohi feceruntde his rebus, ut non sit necessechristianoin multis
propterpauca laborare (59). Suit le passage touffuqui sera rsum par
Thomas dans l'Epilogue: sic videopossefieri,si quemeorumquipossunt,
, ut quoscumbenignamsane operamfraternaeutilitatidelectetimpendere
que terrarumlocos, quaeve animalia vel herbasatque arboressive lapides
vel metallaincognita, speciesque quaslibetScripturacommmort
, eageneratim digerens, sola expsita litterismandet.Je reproduis la traduction
mrementrflchiede la Bibliothque augustinienne:"A leur exemple,
me semble-t-il,si quelqu'un de ceux qui en sont capables se sentait le
got de consacrer gnreusementson activit l'utilit de ses frres,
il pourraitfortbien notertous les lieux gographiques,tous les animaux,
herbes, arbres, pierres, mtaux inconnus et tous les objets de toute
nature mentionnspar l'Ecriture, les classer par genres,les dcrireun
par un, et les consignerdans un critspar". Ne voil-t-ilpas bauch
ici dj, tout le canevas du De naturarerum? A l'exception toutefoisdes
"lieux gographiques", qui ne sont reprsentsque par les quatre pages
du livre XIII De fontibus (pp. 351-4). Quant aux hommes, animalia
du 59 reprend animantia du 24, et englobe tous les tres
anims.
Cette phrase de saint Augustin, que Thomas de Cantimpr avait
depuis longtempsadopte comme devise pour sa compilation,voici de
quelle manireil la rsumevers la finde l'Epilogue (lignes8-12) : (Anni
iam quatuordecimaut quindecim elapsi sunt, ex quo libro De naturis
rerumdiligenterintendimus),illud beatissimip airis Augustinidictumin
libro De doctrina Christiana diu habentespre oculis, ubi dicit utilissimum fore, si quis laborem assumerei quo in unum volumennaturas
rerumet maxime animalium congregaret.
Congregaviergo. . . Il semble
le
animalia
sens gnral de "tres anidonne

aussi
Thomas
lui
que
maxime
et le fait qu'il a rde
l'adverbe
donn
tant
ms",
l'emploi
serv les trois premiers livres l'homme. Ensuite - la question re130

23:57:29 PM

bondit - pourquoi a-t-il interprtsola expsita litterismandet"consigner dans un crit spar, une monographie" au sens restrictifde
"un seul, petit volume" ? Il est loisible de voir dans le parvo du Proloque (ligne 5) un lieu commun de modestie, mais non en celui de
l'Epilogue (ligne 6). Ici, on peut d'abord songer que, pour les prdicateurs des jeunes ordresmendiants,un mince manuscrittait commode
emporterdans leurs prgrinations,au mme titre que l'autel portatif. Peut-tre aussi y avait-il dj l'ide, suggre peu aprs par ses
suprieurset ses confrres un autre dominicain-encyclopdiste,Vincent de Beauvais, lequel a du reste largementmis contributionson
prdcesseur: Il n'est pas sant qu'un pareil ouvrage bibliothecaesacrae
mensuramexcederet"dpasserait les dimensionsd'une Bible". (Ce bout
de phrase du Speculum naturalene parat pas corrompupar le personnage qui, au XIVe sicle, a ajout le Speculum morale, apocryphe, et
partant a d remanierle chapitre xvi du Prologue gnral.)
Le Prologue expose aussi la raison pourquoi (63-74), et comment
(91-6), le trait peut tre minemmentutile aux prdicateurs qui la
sagesse divine aura donn de comprendrepleinementla pense d'Aristote exprimedans le De animalibus XI (= Depart . anim. I, v; Becker
645 a; cf. Arist. Lat . I, p. 80, n 64). Sans doute, "le De natura rerum
concerne bon nombre de cratures rputes viles ou ignobles. Pourtant, comme rien dans la cration n'est oiseux ou fortuit,elles possdent toutes quelque chose de noble et d'admirable. Il faut considrer
et tudierles formesqu'ont prises les diffrentescratures,et - voici
Boce de Dacie qui s'annonce - 'se dlecter dans l'artiste crateur',
in operatione.Le prdicateur
quoniam artificiumoperantis manifestatur
qui s'est adonn l'tude des critsrecueillisdans le De natura rerum,
saura y trouver suffisancede quoi fortifierla foi des fidles ou corriger leurs moeurs. Il saura, de temps autre (interdum, 92), abandonnerhabilementles saintes criturespour citer en tmoins les tres
de la cration. De la sorte,il rveilleral'attention mme de ces abrutis
auxquels le texte scripturairetrop rpt et inculqu, ne dit plus rien;
au moyen des choses nouvelles qu'il leur raconte". Enfin,l'auteur nous
dit avoir t trs avare des moralisationsque les naturaererumpeuvent
amener,parce qu'il voulait viter la prolixit.
Avec la citation de YAristoteleslatinus nous en revenonsaux sources,
quasiment innombrables,utilises par Thomas de Cantimpr.Bis dat
qui cito dat: Nous appelons de nos voeux la parution prochaine du
second volume, dans lequel M. Boese se propose de mettre notre
disposition toute la documentation runie par lui sur le De natura
131

23:57:29 PM

rerum.Elle permettraune seconde lecture,plus en profondeuret par

l plus pntrante,du texte.
Cependant,plusieursproblmestenaces que pose le De natura rerum,
lui sont communs avec d'autres encyclopdies de l'poque. Dans le
domaine des sources, je songe l'identificationdu Liber rerumet du
Jorach. Il va sans dire qu'avec ces problmes,une tude transversale
de plusieurstraits la fois, au lieu d'un seul, conduira plus srement
au rsultatescompt.* Pour savoir mener bonne fince genre d'tude,
il faut souvent tre un littrairedoubl d'un scientifique.Le Dr. Chr.
Hhnemrder,actuellement Hambourg, s'y est illustravec sa thse
sur l'histoireculturelledu faisan (Bonn, 1970) et, auparavant, avec ses
articles Hercyniae aves [Rhein. Museum, 1967), et Die Bedeutunguni
Arbeitsweisedes Thomas von Cantimprund seinBeitragzur Naturkunde
des Mittelalters(Medizinhist. Journ., 1968). (Puisse-t-ilcontinuerdans
cette voie!) Parfoisaussi, le concours d'un arabisant sera indispensable.
Enfin, la collaboration entre purs littraireset purs scientifiquesleur
sera mutuellementavantageux. Le professeurL. D. Brongersmavient
d'en administrerune preuve dans son livre sur les European Atlantic
Turtles (Brill, Leiden, 1972). Jusque-l, pas mal de littrairesavaient
lu, sans trop s'y arrter, un passage sur un monstre marin appel
Zytyron,qui chez Thomas de Cantimprou Albertle Grand; qui chez
Jacob van Maerlant; qui chez Vincent de Beauvais; qui chez Pierre
Bersuire. Le zoologiste a rvl tout l'intrt de ces tmoignages. La
descriptiondu monstre marin chez Thomas de Cantimprsuggreune
tortue de mer particulire,laquelle ne sera atteste que plus tard dans
les eaux britanniques( Turtles, pp. 221 sw.). Bersuireajoute la description d'un monstre,qui serait une autre espce de tortuemarine et dont
la prsenceserait alors atteste fortanciennement Boulogne-sur-Mer
(p. 2x7).
Utrecht
Instituut voor Laat Latijn

* Attendant
les preuves,je vois- dans la recension,
dense,que le professeur
H. Silvestrea faitede l'dition-Boese
69 = 1973,
(Revued'histoire
ecclsiastique
a
une
dansune
Thorndike
feu
exprim
analogue
opinion
pp. 850-1) que
Lynn
note MoreManuscripts
, De naturisrerum(Isis 54 =
of ThomasofCantimpr
1963,pp. 269-77).
132

23:57:29 PM

Vivarium,XII, 2 (1974)
Anonymi Teutonici commentum in Theodoli eclogam e codice
Utrecht, U.B. 22 editum ( 2 )

RPD P. ORBN

vero maxima fames descendit in terramhanc, quare Abraham transtulitse versus Egiptum, ubi bona fuerunttempora,
Postea
redpiens secum Saram uxorem suam et Loth nepotem suum. Qui
dum deberet intrare terram Egipti, rogavit Abraham uxorem suam
Saram quod utique dicereta in Egipto quod esset soror sua et non
ab Egipciacis, quia erat mulierpulcherrima,qua
uxor, ne interficeretur
non erat pulchriorin Egipto. Et consideravit Abraham quod si Egipciaci scirentipsum esse maritum,utique interficerent
um, ut ipsi possent ea uti. Dum autem Abraham Saray et Loth intrarentEgiptum,
omnes Egipciaci ammirati sunt valde super formositateipsius Saray
annunciantes Pharaoni regi eorum quod talis mulierregia et pulcherrima sue terreibidem venisset. Qui cum festinacionemisit pro istis et
vocans Abraham dixit quod esset in bono commodo et quesivit an Sara
esset uxor vel quid esset. Abraham autem respondit "Non, domine,
uxor sed sorormea est". Hoc audito Abraham bene receptusest et iam
sibi date sunt oves boves azini cameli servi et familia. Sed rex Pharao
suscepit uxorem Saray. Qui dum tenderei in lectum cum ea, ita per
ulcionem divinam plagatus est quod non potuit eam cognoscere. Et
tota domus similiterpiagata est, et revelatum fuit Pharaoni divinitis
quod Sara esset uxor Abrahe. Pharao ergo de mane vocavit Abraham
dicens TQuidnamfecisti? Quare non indicasti mihi quod esset uxor
tua ? Quamobrem dixisti eam sororem tuam, ut tolleremeam mihi in
uxorem? Nunc b igitur ecce coniunx tua, accipe eam et vade. 1 Et
retinuitAbraham omnia bona sua et factus est dives valde et, ut patet
vicsimo 20 capitulo,2 recessit ab Egipto cum Loth et uxore sua et
venit ad locum, ubi prius posuerat tabernaculum suum et altare, scilicet interBethel et Hay. Erat autem tanta pecudum habundancia quod
1 Gen.12, i8s.

2 Gen.13,3.

disceretcod.
b noncod.;nuncGen.12, 19 cod.MnchenSB clm5243,f.i68v.
133

23:57:37 PM

pastores Abrahe et ipsius Loth inceperunt rixari. Et concordabant

tandem Abraham et Loth quod vellentse dispergere.Et dixit Abraham
ipsi Loth "Eligas; si ad dexteram partem ieris, ego tenebo sinistram
et econverso".1 Loth autem eligit regionemcirca Iordanem precipue
in Sodoma, Abraham autem transtulitse iuxta convallem Mambrem
in Ebron et ibi edificavit altare quoddam Domino suo. Postea enim,
ut scribitur[f. i6v] vicsimo 2o capitulo,2magna bella oriebanturper
diversos reges contra ipsum Loth sic quod Loth captus erat. Quem
Abraham vindicavit et liberavit a vinculis,ut patet ibidem.3Preterea,
sicud scribiturvicsimo 30 capitulo, dixit Dominus ad Abraham ["Noli
timere,Abraham, ego protectortuus sum et mercestua magna nimisl.4
Et responditAbraham IDomine Deus, quid dabis mihi ? Vado et servus
meus erit heres meus.Cui respondit Deus Non erit hic heres tuus,
sed qui egrediturde utero tuo, ipsum habebis heredem.6Et tunc duxit
eum Deus foras dicens TSusspice celum et numera a stellas, si potes.
Sic erit semen tuuml,7 quasi diceret "sic multiplicabo semen tuum
super terram". Et credidit Abram Deo. Sara vero, ut scribiturGenesis
vicsimo quarto capitulo,8 habuit ancillam Egipciacam nomine Agar,
cum qua Abraham concubuit et genuit filiumnomine Hysmael. Hoc
facto fugitAgar a facie Saray in desertmiuxta quendam fontem,ubi
apparuit angelus Domini dicens Agar, ancla Saray, unde venis et
9
quo vadis?1 Que respondit facie Saray domine mee ego fugiol.9
Et dixit angelus TReverteread dominam tuam et humiliare sub manu
ipsius.10Tu concepisti et vocabis nomen fillitui Hismaell.11Et factum
est ita. Tunc ultra, sicud scribiturGenesis vicsimo quinto capitulo,
quia Abraham credidit in omnibus Deum, et dixit ad eum Deus TEgo
Et dixit ultra
Deus omnipotens,ambula coram me et esto perfectusl.12
multarum
eris
et
meum
tecum
[Pactum
gencium nec ultra
pater
pono
erit
nomen
vocaberis Abram, sed Abraham
tuum,quia pater multarum
gencium constituam te et faciam te crescerevehementissimeet ex te
13
regesegredientur et circumcideturex vobis omnemasculinuml,14videlicet infans octo dierum. fMasculus vero si est cuius prepucii caro
circumcisab non fuerit,debetur anima illa alteriet delebiturde populo
suo, quia pactum meum irritumfecit.15Et dixit Deus ultra ad Abra1 Cf.Gen. 13,9.
5 Gen.15,2s.
9 Gen.16,8.
13Gen.17,4SS.

2 Gen. 14, ss.

Gen. 15, 4.
10Gen.16, 9.
14Gen.17, 10.

3 Cf.Gen. 14, 16. 4 Gen15, i.

8 Gen. 16, ss.
7 Gen.15,5.
12Gen.17, I.
11Gen.16, ii.
15Gen.17, 14.

a numerascod.;numeraGen.15, 5 cod.Guelferb.
212 (185 Heimst.)
, f.147**
b circumscisa
cod.
134

23:57:37 PM

ham rSaray uxorem tuam amplius non vocabis Saray, sed Saram et
benedicam ei et ex illa dabo tibi filiumtuum, cui benedicturussum.1
Hoc audito risitAbraham in corde suo, et ayt Dominus fSara uxor tua
pariet tibi filiumet vocabis nomen eius Ysaac. Ecce ego benedicam ei,
augebo et multiplicabo eum valde. Duodecum duces generabit.2
Postea, ut scribitur vicsimo sexto capitulo,3 apparuit Dominus
Abrahe sedentiin hostio tabernaculisui in valle Mambre. Ubi Abraham
vidit tres iuvenes pulcherrimos,tres vidit et unum adoravit.4 Que est
una primarum figurarumtrium personarum in divinis et unius veri
Dei. Et cum festinacioneAbraham coxit vitulum et apposuit lac et
butirum, et commedentes isti tres iuvenes interrogaveruntpro Sara
uxore sua, quibus dixit Abraham quod esset adhuc in tabernculo.
Tunc dixit unus eorum TSara uxor tua pariet filium!.5Sara autem
stans retro ostium tabernaculi audiens hoc verbum risit valde, quia
vetula fuit et Abraham decrepitus, et dixit respondendo fEgo dabo
6
operam voluptati. Numquid paritura sum anusPl Et tunc Sara concepii filiumet vocatum est nomen eius Ysaac.
Notandum quod moraliter per istum Abraham intelligimusquemlibet magistrmvel doctorem [f. 17*], fpatrem multaram genciuml.7
Per Saram vero intelligimusanimam sterilemnon fructiferamin doctrinis. Qui Abraham vel pater dum incipit generare, procrt filium
tamquam novum hominem ex effusionescienciarum in animam iam
factam intellectivam. Et sic thesaurus doctrine non est absconsus in
agro,8ymo quamvis iacuit diu sub terris sicud generado Abrahe sub
terra, que ipse fuit et Sara, iam apertus est et deinde generaciones
super terram multiplcate sunt, ut patet per doctores, qui sanctam
matremecclesiam illuminaveruntdoctrinissuis, sicud antiqua lex illuminata fuitper generacionemAbrahe.
Item allegorice per Abraham intelligimus Deum omnipotentem
7
Tpatremlinquam multaram genciuml quia omnium,ut patet Ihoan nis primo capitulo. Per Saram intelligimussponsam suam virginem
Mariam. Sicud enim Sara fuitsteriliset contra cursumnature concepit
et peperit filium,sic gloriosa Virgo contra cursum nature concepit et
peperitfiliumautoritate Ysaye prophete virgoconcipietet pariet
filiumet vocabiturnomen eius Emanueli.9 Et sicud istud nomen Ysaac
1 Gen. 17, 15s.
2 Gen.17, 20.
3 Gen.18, i.
4 Cf. Petr. Com. Historiascholastica,
Lib. Gen.,cap. 51 (PL 198, col. 1098);
Walafr.Strab.Glossaordin.,Lib. Gen.,cap. 18, ss. (PL 113,col. 125).
5 Gen.18, 10.
7 Gen.17,5.
8 Cf.Mat. 13,44.
e Gen.18, I2S.
Is. 7, 14.
135

23:57:37 PM

ab angelo impositum,ita nomen Xpisti fuit impostomi ab angelo, ut

patet per Euvangelistam. Et sicud Sara risit et stupefacta est de
pariendo, sic edam virgo Maria stupefacta est, quando angelus dixit
ipsam parituram rfiliumAltissimi!.1Tunc enim dixit TQuomodo fiet
2
istud, quoniam virum non cognosco ?
volandodividit alis sc. pice
Ulecarpentarius i . aptisfactis fluidum
secata
101 Dedalus
aera pennis.
aptatis
liquidum
sc. caloresolis
sc. Ycarus sc. volando
hmida
Filius
liquetur - b
insequitur - fragilis sed cera
mare
suspiravit
difficultate maris
sub
fluctus.
Et cadit in
pondere
pelagus:
gemuit
Dedalus
lile sui

benepotens ad Boreales
brumales
compos

pertingit principlus
archos. c
attigit

Hic ponituralia Fabula et est sentencia talis quod Dedalus penetravit

aera cum pennis convenientibus et aptatis sibi. Sed filius suus
Ycharus secutus est eum et cera liquescente cecidit in mare et submersusest. Dedalus autem tenens medium transvolavitmare et venit
ad partes Boreales.
Notandum quod, sicud patet per Ovidium octavo Methamorfosios
,s
erat quidam rex Cretensisnomine Minos habens uxorem nomine Phasise.d enim mulier fuit maxime libidinis et appetitus carnalis, que
quadam vice requiescens in fenestra turns vidit inferiusad pratum
quendam pulcherrimumthaurum in pascuis transeunten.Que devicta
fuit tanto amore quod concupivit coire cum thauro. Quare secrete
peciit a quadam vetula expertissima qualiter ad coitum posset devenire cum thauro. Cui vetula consuluit quod faceret vaccam ligneam
[f. I7V] et vestirei illam pelle pulcherrima,quam intrare deberet. Et
factum est ita. Quo facto Facise concepii de thauro quoddam monstrum,quod vocatum est Minothaurus,a Minos, quod est nomen regis,
et thaurus,4 nam pro parte assimilabatur Mynoy regi et pro parte
thauro. Minos autem rex videns hoc monstrummirabiliterstupefactus
est et verecundia motus quesivit modum, per quem hoc monstrum
abscondi posset, ne ab hominibus videretur. Et percepit de quodam
1 Luc. i, 32.

2 Luc. i, 34.

3 Met.8, 132SS. 4 Cf.Isid.Et. ii, 3,38.

a CECAT
cod.
b LIQUATUROsternacher,
1902 OdoPicardus,f. 22.
c ARCTOSOsternacher,
1902 OdoPicardus,f. 22.
d Phasise= Pasiphae.
136

23:57:37 PM

maximo artifice,scilicet Dedalo, pro quo misit sine mora. Dedalus

autem veniens construxit quoddam subtilissimum edificium, quod
vocatum est laborinthus,quasi labor intus,1proptereius intricacionem
quia nimiumintricatumfuit. Unde postquam aliquis intraverat,non
potuit exire nisi cum maxima difficultate.Quo facto deposuit rex
Minothaurumab oculis suis faciens eum duci in cameram secreciorem
illius edificii,ne exiretin perpetuum. Hoc autem facto Dedalus peciit
licenciam a rege. Rex autem negavit ordinans quod Dedalus nec per
aquas nec per terras recedere posset ab eo. Quare cogitavit Dedalus
quod veliet subtiliterrecedere per aera, et fecit sibi et Ycharo filio
suo fieri alas de pennis pice et cera. Quibus factis dixit pater ad
FiLium "Ecce fili mi, necessarium est volare, quia nec per aquas nec
per terraspossumus evadere. Videas igitur quod nec nimis alte voles,
ne penne LiQUEscantper solem, nec voles nimis basse, ne te gravitas
aquarum subtrahat". Hoc facto precessit pater et SEQuebaTUR eum
filius. Qui dum ad AERem venit, incepit ascendere paulatim, quia
summe placuit sibi volatus, et tam diu ascendit quod sol tetigit materiam,cum qua PENNe coniuncte fuerant,et LiQUEfactaest sic quod
Ycharus cecidit in mare et submersusest. Pater autem tenens medium
transvolavitmare et ad partes Boreales devenit.
Notandum quod per istum Dedaluhi moraliterintelligimusquemlibet doctorem seu patrem subtilem, per Ycharum autem quemlibet
discipulum vel FiLium inobediencie. Unde sicud Ycharus fuit inobediens patri suo, sic quilibet rebellis discipulus magistro, super quo
loquitur Boecius in De disciplina scolarium FNon est dignus sciencia
qui sciencie insurgitpreceptoril.2Sic eciam quilibet malus filius inobediens est patri suo, quod est contra preceptum Dei patrem
et matreml3 etcetera. Et ita tales frequenter triant vitam sicud
Ycharus.
Item allegorice per Dedaluhi intelligimusomnipotentempatrem,
qui est subtilissimusartifex autoritate Euvangelistae "Dominus est
magister vester, qui fecit laborintum domum delectabilem", scilicet
celum vel Paradysum. Per Ycharum intelligiturfiliusinobediens,scilicet Lucifer vel Adam. Unde sicud Dedalus ornavit FiLium suum
pennis [f. i8r], ut sursum volaret per aera, sic Deus pater ornavit
1 Cf.Isid.Et. 15,2, 36.
2 Ps.-Boethius,
De disciplinaschol.,I, De subiectione
scholarium
E. Ducei,
" (ed.
Un saggiodi pedagogiamedievale.
Il "De disciplinascholarium
delloPseudoBoezio.Torino,1967,p. 97).
3 Exod.20, 12; Mat. 15,4; 19, 19; Marc.7, 10; 10, 19; Lue. 18, 20.

23:57:37 PM

Luciferam et Adam, ut sursumvel superius habitarent. Luciferautem

videns se subtilem in volatu voluit ascendere alcius, dicens 'Tonam
sedem meam in aquilonem et ero similis Altissimo".1 Quapropter
PENNeeius LiQUEfactesunt a sole, scilicet a patre luminum,et cecidit
in mare, i. in Infernum,et submersusest, quia ibi nulla est redempcio.
Et sic eciam Adam cecidit in mare, i. in terram miserie, et postea
cecidit in limbum Inferni.
sc. Ysaac
105 Heredis
Quin

compunctus se. Abraham

motus
patriarcha,
de celo
deorsum
emissa
vox
,nisi

pulchritudine
forma
non est

immolaret
mactaret

se. Ysaac
eum

precepisset
iussisset ; rapitur, qui cornibus heret
ex
Abraham obedit
inter vepres
verv
In
aries ;
dumis,
patrem
sequitur a sua
Parcere

Ysaac
proles.

Hic ponitur alia Historia et dicit quod Abraham patriarcha non est
motus propter FORMositatemfilii sui Ysaac, quin mactasset eum in
holocaustum,nisi angelus Domini interposuissetmanum intergladium
et puerum et nisi aries fuissetmonstratusin dumis. Et sic factus est
filiusobediens patr suo.
Notandum, sicud patet Genesis vicsimo quinto capitulo,2 quando
Abraham fuitcentum annorumet Sara uxor eius nonaginta,tunc natus
est filius Ysaac et octavo die circumcisus.bEt sicud patet Genesis
vicsimo nono capitulo,3 ex quo Abraham erat vir iustus et bonus,
voluit eum temptare Dominus dicens Abraham, tolle filium tuum
unigenitumquem diligis Ysaac et vade in terramVisionis atque offer
eum ibi in holocaustum super unum moncium, quem monstravero
tibi].4 Abraham autem de nocte consurgensstrvit azinum suum et
duxit secum duos iuvenes et filiumsuum Ysaac. Cum autem venisset
ad locum ilium, quem monstraverat sibi Deus, dixit ad illos duos
pueros "Exspectate hic cum azino in pede montis. Ego autem et puer
meus ascendemus montem et postquam adoravimus, revertemurad
vos".5 Hoc dieto imposuit scapulis pueri sui quedam ligna et ipsemet
Abraham portavit gladium et ignem in manibus suis. Cumque sic as1 Cf.Is. 14, 13s.
5 Cf.Gen.22, 5.

2 Gen.17, 17.

3 Gen.22, ss.

4 Gen. 22, is.

a patremsequitur OdoPicardus,f. 23v; sequitur patremOsternacher,

1902.
circumscisus
cod.
138

23:57:37 PM

cendissenthii duo, dixit filiusad patrem rPater mi, ecce igniset ligna:
ubi est victima holocausti ?"l1 Cui responditAbraham rDeus providebifl.2Perrexeruntutique pariter,ubi edificavitAbraham unum altare
Deo, super quod posuit ligna, et super ligna posuit filiumsuum Ysaac.
Quo facto evaginavit Abraham gladium suum et adhibuit, ut immolaret filiumsuum Ysaac. Et ecce angelus Dei de celo clamavit dicens
rAbraham,non extende manum tuam super puerum neque facies ei

a
quicquam. Nunc enim cognovi quod timeas Deum neque parceres
filio tuo unigenito propter Deuml.3 Levavit autem Abraham oculos
[f. i8v] et vidit post tergum ARiEtemcum cornibus HEREnTeminter
vepres, quem sumpsit et mactavt in holocaustum. Dixit autem angelus ad Abraham 2 rDominus dicit: quia fecistihanc rem et non pepercisti filio tuo unigenito, benedicam tibi et multiplicabo semen tuum
sicud stellas celi et velud arenam, que est in littoremaris. Possidebit
semen tuum portas inimicorumtuorum et benedicenturin semine tuo
omnes gentes terre,quia obedisti voci meei4 Tunc Abraham reversus
est cum puero ad illos duos iuvenes et ad azinum, et gavisi recesserunt.
Abraham autem vixit centum et septuaginta annis et sepultus est ab
Ysaac et Hysmaele filiis suis. Sara autem uxor eius vixit centum et
vigintiseptem annis et mortua est in civitate Arbee, que stat in Ebron.
Nota quod moraliter per Abraham intelligimusquemlibet patrem
seu doctorem,sed per Ysaac quemlibet filiumbonum seu discipulum.
Unde sicud Ysaac fuitobediens patri suo, sic quilibet bonus filiusdebet
obedire patri et discipulus doctori. Unde TYcharii nati memoresestote
parati /iussa paterna pati: medium tenuere beati"!.5
Allegorice per Abraham intelligiturDeus pater omnipotens verus
Per Saram vero intelligiturvirgo Maria
patriarcha PATRiARCHArum.
et per Ysaac Xpistus Iesus unigenitus. Unde sicud Ysaac genitus est
a Sara contra cursum nature, sic Xpistus Iesus genitus est contra communem cursum nature a gloriosa virgine Maria. Et sicud Ysaac portavit in scapulis suis ligna ad montem,per que fieretholocaustum, sic
Xpistus Iesus portavit in scapulis suis lignum crucis ad montem Caivarie et ibi factus est in victimam holocausti. Et sicud Ysaac evasit
et aries MACTATus
est, designaturnobis duplex natura, scilicet deitatis
3 Gen.22, us.
2 Gen.22, 8.
1 Gen.22, 7.
5 Cf. H. Walther,Proverbia
, II, 11344.

4 Gen.22, i6ss.

a noncod.', nuncGen.22, 12 cod.Guelferb.

212 (185 Heimst.),
f. I49r.
b facerescod.',pareiscod. Guelferb
. 212 (185 Heimst.),
f. i49r; pepercissescod.
MnchenSB clm5243,f. i6gv.
139

23:57:37 PM

et humanitatis. In Xpisto enim deitas evasit nec poterai ledi, humanitas vero mortificataest.
vieta
elati
magno talisviri
Demofontis
superbi
capta
gravi
dolorose
corticem
arboris loco corporis corticem
Mutat flebiliter rigidum
pro corpore sber.
reversato
ad iliumlocum arborem
lile reversus eo
troncum
rigat ore
supino;
se dclint
tamquam
senserit oscula, Phillis.
Occurrit
ceu a
foliis,
illa mulier
109 Phillis
amore

Hic est alia Fabula et dicit quod Phillis est devicta amore Demofontis et postea est in arborem, sed Demofon REVERtens
oscuLAtus est arborem et inclinatus est ad eum arbor si fuisset
Phillis.
Notandum secundum Ovidium,1 postquam civitas Troyana fuerat
destructa et Greci revers sunt quilibet ad regionemsuam, erat quidam pulcherrimusGrecus, qui venit ad hospicium Trassie regis, cuius
nomen erat Ligur. Qui rex habuit quandam filiam pulcherrimamnomine [f. ig'] Phillis, que videns DEMOFONTemmirabilitercapta est
amore sui. Quod percipiensDemofon tardavit ibidem per aliqua tempora et incepit eam diligere valde. Postea vero Demofon recessit ab
ea promittensse breviter infra certuni tempus rediturum.Postquam
autem venit tempus quod rediturusesset Demofon, ista Phillis frequenter visitavit ripam maris, ut videret velum Demofontis. Postquam ergo Phillis longies visitaverat ripam et non poterai videre
DEMOFONTempropter impedimenta que habuit in mari, retrogressa
est et mirabilitercontristata. Et inveniensarboremin via suspendit se
in ea, super quo loquitur Ovidius De remedioamorisrVixissetPhillis,
si me b foretusa magistro/et per quod novies sepius"!.2Et quia Phillis
se ipsam suspendit, ideo est in arborem permissionedivina.
Post hoc autem reversus est Demofon, qui percipiensista lacrimatus
est et oscuLAtus est arborem, in qua Phillis se suspendit, et arbor
illa videbatur sibi declinare ad dandum sibi oscuLum ac si fuisset
Phillis.
1 Heroid.2, ss.

2 Rem.am. 55s.

a SEUcod.
b si immecod.; si me Ov. Rem.am. 55 cod.MnchenSB elm5243/IJ0T.
140

23:57:37 PM

Notandum moraliterper DEMOFONXemintelligimusamorehi huius

mundi et per PHiLLidem intelligimusmentem amatricem rei a mundane. Nam sicud Phillis suspensa est et periit,postquam erraveritad
ripam propterDEMOFONTem,sic eciam mens cuiuslibet hominisamantis res huius mundi quanto plus amat, tanto plus errat et tandem ipsa
mens suspensa prit et moritur.
Item allegorice per PHiLLidem intelligimusXpistum et per DEMOFONTempresentemmundum vel creaturas. Nam sicud Phillis posuit
animam suam cum corpore pro Demofontc, sie eciam Xpistus posuit
corpus et animam pro isto mundo et creaturissuis. Unde Euvangelista
TMaiorem caritatem nemo habet, ut animam suam ponat quis pro
amicis suis"!.1
sc.perignem i. quinqucivitatesmutans Dei
solvens divina
Sodomas
113 Incinerem
sc. Abramhe
proponit
Hoc b pactum
cogitt uni.
patrui, Loth parcere

vindicta
potestas

mutatur
Servat eum Zeghor, sed perfida vertitur uxor
iliumlapidem
speciem
cautem.
animalia
In salis effigiem; lambunt
Hic ponitur alia Historia et dicit quod divina maiestas convertens
quinqu civitatesin cineres pepercitipsi Loth nepoti Abrahe propter
pactum, quem feceratDeus Abrahe, ne perderetsemen suum. [f. igv]
Loth autem exivit et intravitparvam urbem nomine Zeghor et uxor
eius mutata est in speciem salis, scilicet lapidem, qui habet modm
saporis salsi, quem lapidem frequenteradhuc animalia lambunt.
Notandum, sicud scribitur Genesis vicsimo sexto capitulo,2 quod
intercetera habita de Abraham semel dixit Deus ad Abraham rClamor
ZoDOMorumet Gomorre multiplicatus est et peccatum eorum aggravatum est nimis. Descendam et videbo utrum clamorem qui venit ad
me opere compleverintl3 Quo dicto Deus et Abraham panter intraveruntZoDOMAmet videns Abraham quod Deus destruereveliet ZodoMAmdixit "Numquid perderes impium cum iusto? Absit autem ut
hanc remfaciesnec est hoc tuum, qui idicas terram; si fuerint
quinquaginta iusti in civitate an peribunt?" Et respondit Deus "Si
3 Gen.18,20s.
2 Gen. 18, ss.
i Joh.15, 13.
a regicod.; reicod.Guelferb.
212 {185Heimst.),
f. i$or.
b ob OdoPicardus
, /. 2$r Osternacher,
igo2.
I4I

23:57:37 PM

invenero quinquaginta iustos, parcam isto loco propter eos". Tunc

dixit Abraham "Domine, si fuerintquinqu minus, destrues tunc locum ?" Cui Deus "Si inveneroquadraginta quinqu, non delebo locum".
Tunc respondit Abraham "Domine, si non fuerintnisi quadraginta,
quid facies?" Dixit Dominus "Non perdam locum, si quadraginta inveneroiustos". Tunc ayt Abraham "Domine, rogo quod non indigneris,
si adhuc loquar. Quid erit,si fuerinttriginta?" Respondit Deus "Non
faciam locum perire, si invenerim triginta". Tunc dixit Abraham
"Domine, si fuerintviginti?" Respondit Dominus "Non occidam propter viginti". Tunc dixit Abraham "Domine, deprecor quod non irascaris, si adhuc loquar semel. Si inventi fuerintibi decern?" Respondit
Deus "Non delebo locum propterdecern". Et cum illis verbis Dominus
recessit. Abraham autem temptavit pro decern, sed nequaquam invenire poterat. Quapropter, sicud patet vicsimo septimo capitulo,1
misitDominus duos angelos ZoDOMAm,qui inveneruntLoth sedentem
in foribuscivitatis. Quos dum vidit Loth, surrexitet occurriteis ducens ipsos secum in domum suam. Quibus sic existentibusin domo cum
Loth perceperuntviri civitatis quod duo iuvenes pulcherrimiessent
in domo ipsius Loth. Et venerunttam senes quam iuvenes et a circumvallarunt illam domum querentes ab ipso Loth ubi essent viri, qui
intraveruntdomum suam, et dixerunt sibi ut educeret eos, ut cognoscerentipsos. Loth autem exivit et clausit ostiumdicens eis "Nolite,
fratres,hoc malum facere. Habeo enim duas filias, que numquam
cognoverunt viros, educam vobis eas, ut abutamini ipsis et parcatis
istis viris". Isti autem feceruntmagnam violenciam ipsi Loth, et cum
iam prope esset quod frangerentianuas domus, feceruntangeli ut qui
erant foras,non poterant cecitate devicti ostium invenire.Tunc dixerunt angeli ad Loth rOmnes qui tui sunt, educ de urbe ista, quia
delebimuslocum istum eo quod increveritclamoreorumcoramDomino,
qui misit nos ut perdamus illos"!.2Loth autem exivit ad illos, qui erant
accepturi fillias suas, et dixit rSurgite,egredieminide loco isto, quia
delebit Dominus civitatemhancl3 [f. 20r]De mane vero dixeruntangeli
ad Loth rSurge et tolle uxoRem tuam et duas filias tuas, ne et tu
pereas pariterin scelere civitatis"!.4Hoc dicto angeli duxeruntLoth et
uxoRem suam cum filiabusextra civitatemsic dicentesrSalva animam
tuam, noli respicere post tergum,sed in monte salvum te faci.5 Quo
audito dixit Loth "Deprecor ut possim salvati in aliquo loco hic prope
3 Gen. ig, 14.
4 Gen.19, 15.
2 Gen. 19, I2S.
1 Gen. 19, ss.
6 Gen. 19, 17.
a ut cod.; et cod.Guelferb.
212 (185Heimst.),
f. i$ov.
142

23:57:37 PM

stante, scilicet in parva urbe nomine Zeghor". Tunc dixerunt angeli,

ut Loth cum suis Zeghor urbem intraret.Et factum est. Postea Deus
pluit super ZoDOMAm et Gomorram sulphur et ignem et destruxit
totam illam regionem quinqu civitatum cum cunctis viventibus in
eis. Sed uxor ipsius Loth forte audiens strepitumretrospexit,quod
tamen fuit ei inhibitum,et statim mutata est in statuam salis. Hoc
facto Loth ascendit de Zeghor urbe cum filiabus suis in quendam
montemet intravitunam speluncam montis.Hoc facto dixit filiamaior
ad minoremrPater noster senex est et nullus virorummansit in terra,
qui possit ingredi ad nos. Veni et inebriemus eum cum vino et dormiamus cum eo, ut servare possimus ex patre nostro semen"!.1Nocte
autem veniente dederunt sibi vinum et inebriatus est Loth sic quod
fecitconcubitumcum maiore filia. Altero vero die venit maior filia ad
minoremdicens dormivi cum patre meo, demus ei vinum bibere
ista nocte, ut tu dormies cum eo et servemus semen de patre nostro"!.2
Et factumest ita, sic quod filia minoreciam concepit de patre. Postea
autem maior filia peperit filium nomine Moab, minor vero peperit
filiumnomineAmon.
Notandum moraliter per istum Loth intelligimus quemlibet obedientem: Loth enim obediens fuit angelis et non retrospexit. Per
uxoRem vero quamlibet mulierem inobedientem: ipsa enim contra
preceptumangelorumretrospexit.
Item allegoiice per Loth intelligimusspiritum qui vult semper ad
montem, qui Xpistus est, et ad locum salvacionis sine retrospectu.
Per uxoRem vero carnem intelligimus,que contra precepta semper
vult retrospiceregemens et suspiranspro temporalibus.Unde Ihoannes
rQui de terra est, de terra loquitur!.3
turbasGrecorum pugnans
Venus
117 Argolicas contra bellans acies Cytharea
Tidei
sustinuerat grande
Titide de a manibus dea pertulerat grave b vulnus.
sodales
deflent
socii
commissa ducis furiosi.
Dplorant
rostros
Nam facti volucres acuunt pro dentibus ungues.
1 Gen. 19,31S.
2 Gen. 19, 34.
8 Joh.3, 31.

a de . OdoPicardus,f. 2 Osternacher,
io2.
DEAPERTULERAT
GRAVE
OdoPicardus,f. 2r'GRAVE
PERTULERAT
DEAOsternacher
, 1902.
143

23:57:37 PM

Hic est alia Fabula et est quod Venus una vice bellans propterEneam
filium suum contra Diomedem et alios Grecos GRAviterest ab eo
vuLNerata. Quapropter ascendit [f. 20v] celos ostendens amasio suo
Marti vuLNera sua. Qua videns Mars mutavit Diomedem et suos in
voLUCREm,quod adhuc dplorant socii Diomedis in aves mutati.
koNotandum quod, sicud patet per Ovidium decimo 30 M ethamorp
fiebant
bella
devicta
erat, plurima
stos,1 antequam Troya
specialia,
quibus Troyani interfeceruntGrecos et econverso, antequam tota
Grecia venit, que iacuit ante Troyam per decernannos, ubi omni die
aliquid novi fiebat. Accidit ergo semel quod Dyomedes filius Tidi
Grecus pugnaret contra quendam Troianum nomine Eneas filium
Veneris. Qui dum ad conflictumpariterconvenirent,accepit Dyomedes
unum lapidem, quem vix duodecim homines levassent de terra et
proiecit ilium in Eneam sic quod Eneas cecidit in terram,et maxime
lesus est. Quod videns Venus mater Enee mutavit se in nubem et
obscuravit oculos Dyomedis, ne filius suus interficeretur.
Dyomedes
autem sic obscuratus percussitcum gladio in nubem et tetigitVenerem
sic quod GRAvitervuLNeravitearn. Venus autem lesa ascendit celos ad
amasium suum Marternostendens sibi lesuram et vuLNera tam filiisui
quam sui ipsius. Mars autem videns ista cogitavit quomodo posset
istud vindicare. Quare mutavit Dyomedem et suos socios in voluCREm,ut loco DENCium haberent ungues.
Notandum quod moraliter per Dyomedem intelligimusquemlibet
scolaremprobumvel quemcumque alium probumet castum, qui videns
filiamVeneris,scilicetluxuriam,impugnaresibi cum maximo lapide, i.
labore, proicitfiliumVeneris,i. membrumluxurie,in terramet devincit ipsum secundum doctrinara Boecii in De disciplina scolarium
2 etcetera. Et
luxurie fervore"!
postquam talis probus et castus sic
tunc
venit ipsamet mater Venus, i. tempdevicerit sicud Dyomedes,
tacio carnalis, mutans se in nubem et vult adhuc temptare an quicquam habeat in tali probo et casto. Sed tunc ipse probus et castus cum
gladio repugnacionis resistit et ledit Venerem sic quod amplius non
rediit et propter hoc tandem Dyomedes, i. talis castus et probus,
mutatur in voLUCREm,i. in sublimitatemalte cognicionis.
Item allegorice per Dyomedem et suos possumus intelligereldeos,
per Eneam vero Xpistum, sed per Venerem virginemMariani et per
Marternpatrem omnipotentem,qui ante tempus Xpisti vocatus est per
1 Met. 13,68ss. Cf.Met. 14,477; 15, 768. 806.
2 Ps.-BoethiusDe disciplinaschol.,I, De vtiattone
luxurie(ed. E. Ducei,p. 97).
144

23:57:37 PM

Prophetam HDeus ulcionuiril,1sicud Mars fuitrdeus ulcionunfl,1quia

vindicavit lesuram Veneris et Enee. Sicud enim Dyomedes et sui opposueruntse Enee, sic Iudei opposueruntse Xpisto et tandem sic eum
flagellaveruntet percusseruntquod mortuusest et sepultus est in terra.
Sed tempore lesure venit Maria sicud Venus mutans se in nubem et
libenterdefendissetfiliumsuum currensin circuitu domus Cayphe et
sequens filiumsuum usque ad crucem ad locum Calvarie. Et propter
hoc Dyomedes, i. Iudei, miserunt [f. 2ir] manus suas in Mariani, ut
repellerenteam sicud Dyomedes Venerem. Quapropter vuLNera filii
sui tam per eam quam per filiumostensa fueruntMarti,i. patri omnipotenti. Quod videns Mars mutavit Dyomedem et suos, i. ldeos, in
VOLUCRES,quia dispersi sunt per universum orbem errantes hic inde
ad modum voLUCRumrectam viam non tenencium.
Utrecht
InstituutvoorLaat Latijn

Continubitur

1 Ps. 93, i.
145

23:57:37 PM

Vivarinm
XII, 2 (1974)
"For Riding is Required a Horse" : A Problem of Meaning and
Reference in Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth
*
Century Logic
E. J. ASHWORTH

of the most interestingfeatures of the work of the logicians

associated with the University of Paris in the late fifteenth
centuryand the firstpart of the sixteenthcenturyis their application of medieval logical doctrines to the discussion of actual
examples. In this paper I intend to present a detailed study of one
specific example, "For riding is required a horse" [Ad equitandum
requiriturequus]. I shall firstdiscuss each of the argumentsthat was
used, showingits place in the general body of logical doctrine; then I
shall presentthree typical texts, togetherwith an analysis of the pattern of argumentfound in each. One text will deal with the problem
in the context of contradiction,one in the context of conversion,and
one in the context of supposition theory.In this way I hope to deepen
our understandingboth ofthe theories and of the techniques of medieval and post-medievallogic.
One

Part One. Discussion

The proposition "For riding is required a horse" was seen as problematic both in itself and in relation to otherpropositions.1So far as
* I wouldlike to thankthe Canada Councilforthe grantswhichmade the
researchforthispaperpossible.
1 Dorp,Enzinas,Major,Pardo,Sbarroya(PrimusTractatus)
, and de Soto disofcontradictories
cussedthematterinthecontextoftheirdiscussion
; Caubraith,
Celaya,Coronel{PrimaPars), Dorp and de Soto discussedthe matterin the
of Cologne,
contextof theirdiscussionof conversion;and the commentators
ofSt. Mark,JohnofGlogovia,and Sbarroya(QuartusTracGreve,Hieronymus
theory.Coronel(Secunda
tatus)in thecontextoftheirdiscussionofsupposition
of St. Markand Tartaretusdiscussedit in the contextof
Pars), Hieronymus
it in his discussionof
theirdiscussionof descent;and Dorp also mentioned
appellation.It willbe notedthat some authorsdiscussedthe matterin more
at the end of the
thanone place. For detailsofthe texts,see thebibliography
of Cologne,Greve,Hieronymus
notes.Of the authorscited,the commentators
of St. Mark,Johnof Glogoviaand Sbarroyaare theonlyonesnot specifically
ofSt. Markand Sbarroyaareclearly
associatedwithParis,thoughHieronymus
influenced
by Parisianlogicians.
146

23:57:43 PM

the propositionitselfwas concerned,it was normallytaken to be true,

but difficulties
arose fromthe attemptto demonstrateits truth,particuwhen
this
larly
attempt was made by means of the standard theory
of personal supposition. In its relation to other sentences, difficulties
arose fromthe attempt to finda contradictorywhich did not share the
same truth-valueand to find a simple conversionwhich did share the
same truth-value.The most obvious candidate fora contradictorywas
"No horse is required for riding" [Nullus equus requiriturad equitandum], yet given the standard theoryof personal supposition, this sentence seemed to be true. It also seemed to imply the other candidate
for a contradictory,"It is not the case that for riding is required a
horse" [Non ad equitandumrequiriturequus], which would then also be
true, even though the original proposition, "For riding is required a
horse" was itselftrue. For conversion,the obvious candidate was "A
horse is required forriding" [Equus requiriturad equitandum], yet this
seemed to be false,especially in the light of the apparent truthof "No
horse is requiredforriding". If the obvious truthof "For ridingis required a horse" were to be demonstrated,and if the laws of contradiction and conversionwere to be maintained in their standard form,it
was obviously necessary to offeran analysis of the sentences in question which departed from the analysis provided by the theory of
personal supposition.
For a few logicians the problem did not pose itselfin terms of the
theoryof personal supposition at all, because they had never imagined
that the term 'horse' in such a context could be taken as referringjust
to individual horses. Instead, they said that 'horse' had a special kind
of simple supposition. A term was normallysaid to have simple suppositionwhen it referredto a universalor to a commonnature,whether
these existed togetherwith or apart fromindividual objects, but since
most of the importantlogicians of the post-medieval period were nominalistin inclination,they rejected common natures, and hence did
not use simple supposition. Some Thomists, however, such as the
commentatorsof Cologne and John of Giogovia, not only retained
simple supposition but introduced some new distinctionsconcerning
it. In some contexts, such as "Man is a species", terms have simple
, in that they referonly to a common nature, in
suppositionsimpliciter
this case humanity, and make no referenceto particulars at all. In
other contexts, such as "For ridingis required a horse", terms have
simple supposition secundumquid.2 That is, they referprincipallyto a
2 Johnof Glogovia,xviiif.;
Fora fuller
Cologne,xx,xxivof.; Greve,xi,xviiiV0.
147

23:57:43 PM

common nature, but they also have "an inclination toward and relationship to particulars" [cum inclinationetarnenet habitudinead supposita].3 In this way, logicians avoided both the problem of implying
that 'horse' refersto a particular individual [ceriumsuppositum] when
no such individual can be identified;4and the problem of suggesting
that one needed only the common nature, equinity,forriding,and not
individual horses.5At firstglance such a solution has much to recommend it, and it is a pity that it was not worked out in greater detail,
and that it was not discussed by other logicians of the period.
It could be claimed that although most post-medieval logicians
failed even to mentionsimple supposition,some of the same issues were
raised throughtheir discussion of appellation. The latter doctrine is
obscure in many respects, but one of the claims it involved was this.
Some verbs, such as 'know' and 'understand' cause the term following
them to "appellate its proper reason",or, in otherwords, to bringits
concept into play. Thus, if it is true that I know a man [cognosce
hominem],I must have a concept of humanityand I must know a man
by means of that concept, whereas if it is true that a man I know
I must be acquainted with somethingthat happens
[,hominemcognosco~'
to be a man, but I need not be able to pick him out by virtue of that
description,and I may not even possess the relevant concept. This
doctrine could conceivably have been applied to the case of "For
ridingis required a horse", but Dorp, the only person who mentioned
the possibility,mentioned it only to deny it.7 Appellation cannot be
involved, he said, since 'requiritur'does not denote an interioract of
mind.
The usual approach to the analysis of "For riding is required a
horse" was by means of the doctrine of personal supposition,8and it
was only when this had been shown to be inadequate that other apsee E. J.,Ashworth,
views of simplesupposition,
discussionof contemporary
Period(Dordrecht,
1974)84 ff.
Languageand Logicin thePost-Medieval
3 JohnofGlogovia,xviii.
4 JohnofGlogovia,
dicuntquodinpropositionibus
xviii."Logiciautemcommunes
confuse
modo
termino
tantum
confuse
termini
supponente
supponunt
predictis
Cf.Cologne,xx.
tantumnonoportetdarecertumsuppositum".
e Cologne,xxiv0.". . . naturaequi non requiritur
ad equitandum.non tamen
determinatum
suppositum".
* Buridan,Tract4, On Appellation.". . . terminus
sequensdictionemsignifiactumimrectusa tali dictioneet terminane
cantemactumanimeinteriorem
rationem".
appellaiprecisesuampropriam
portatumpertalemdictionem
7 Dorp,Tract4, On Appellation.
8 For a fullerdiscussionofthisdoctrine,
see Ashworth,
op. ext.,207ff.
148

23:57:43 PM

proaches were explored. In the proposition just quoted, 'horse' was

normallysaid to have merely confused supposition, one of the four
'
'
types of personal supposition, on the grounds that requiritur was a
special sign producingmerelyconfusedsuppositionin the termswhich
followedit.9 A sentence containing a term with merelyconfused supposition was said to be equivalent to another sentence in which that
term was replaced by a disjunction of singular terms. The process of
inferencefrom the first to the second was called 'descent' and the
reverseprocess was called 'ascent'. In the case in question, we should
descend to "For ridingis required horsei or horse2or ... or horen".10
However, the latter seems to be false of each individual horse. If we
point to Morellus,we find that "For riding is required Morellus" is
false, and if we point to Favellus, we findthat "For ridingis required
Favellus" is false, and so on for all the horses there are.11 Yet our
intuitiontells us that "For riding is required a horse" is an obvious
truth.
There were two main moves which could be made by logicians who
wishedto maintain that 'horse' had merelyconfusedsupposition without accepting the consequences of carryingout a descent. One move
was to claim that 'horse' in this context had merely confused but
immobile supposition. That is, no descent could properlybe carried
out. Pardo objected to this on the grounds that the disjunction "this
or this horse and so on for all the others" was convertible with the
term 'horse', so that one should be replaceable by the other whether
one accepted or rejected descent.12Another move was to claim that
the disjunction in this case need not be verifiedfor any disjunct.13
Pardo replied that it was impossible for one to conceive of a disjunction being true when none of the disjuncts were true, and that to
make such a claim opened the way for th acceptance of falsehoods.
9 E.g. Celaya; Hieronymus
of St. Mark,QuestionI, On Supposition;Pardo,
xxxi; de Soto,lv.
xxxiivo;Sbarroya,
QuartusTractatus,
10Post-medieval
logiciansused the4phrase'thishorse'insteadof 'horsei'(i = i
to n). Thus Pardowrote(xxxiiivo)'Ad equitandumrequiritur
istevel istevel
isteequus".
11Hieronymus
Cf. Pardo,xxxiiivo.
of St. Mark,Question12, On Supposition.
12Pardoxxxiiivo.
thatI knowof.to the
references
Thereare no contemporary
use of immobilesuppositionin thisparticularcontext,thoughit was used in
Paul of Prgulaand
othercontextsby Paul of Venice and by his followers
Javellus.
Chrysostom
13Coronel,SecundaPars, xxxiiivo."Nego propositionem
de disiunctoveram
verificanpro aliqua parte quando totumdisiunctumsupponitconfuseper
specialesignum".
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23:57:43 PM

For instance, one could maintain that "For (horse-)ridingis required

a man or a donkey" was true while agreeingthat neithera man nor a
donkey was required for this purpose.14
Let us now assume for the sake of argument that "For riding is
required a horse" has been shown to be true and that 'horse' does
indeed have merelyconfused supposition. What, given these assumptions, can now be said of the relationship of this proposition to two
other propositions,"A horse is required forriding" and "No horse is
required for riding"? Let us firstconsider "A horse is required for
riding" which was put forwardas the simple conversionof "For riding
is required a horse". In this proposition,'horse' is not preceded by any
sign, and so it has determinate supposition. That is, the proposition
containingit is equivalent to a disjunction of sentences each of which
contains a singular term in place of the term with determinate supposition. In this case we obtain "Horsei is requiredforridingor horse2
is required for riding or ... or horsen is required for riding". If the
first proposition is true, then the proposition obtained by descent
must also be true. However, the disjunction seems clearly false. Of
any horse one points to, it will be false to say that that particular
horse is required for riding, since horse-ridingcan always take place
without it.15In essence the situation is no differentthan it was with
respectto "For ridingis required a horse", since whetherone is dealing
with a disjunction of sentences or a disjoint predicate the conditions
forverificationwill be largely the same.16
Two objections to the claim that "A horse is required forriding" is
the simple conversion of "For riding is required a horse" are now
immediatelyapparent. The firstis that one propositionis false, while
the other is true: yet if they are trulyconvertiblethey must have the
same truth-value.The second is that the inferencein question is an
instance of the invalid inferencefroma propositionin which a term
has merely confused supposition to a propositionin which the same
term has determinatesupposition.17One could escape the second trap
14 Pardo,xxxiiivo.He is echoedby Hieronymus
of St. Mark,Question12, On
Supposition.
15 Caubraith,Iii; Coronel,Prima Pars; Celaya; Major,lviiivo. Coronelwrote
hec est falsa: iste equusrequiritur
ad equitan"quocunqueequo demonstrato
dumcumsineiliopossitfieriequitatio".
18 Pardo,xxxiiiv0."Ex quo patetquod disiunctum
icari
semperdenotaturverif
licetdiversimodo
prouna partesivesupponatconfusetantumsivedeterminate
denotaturtalisverif
icatiosicutpriusostensumest".
17 Dorp,Tract4, On Appellation.
ISO

23:57:43 PM

by claiming that "For ridingis required a horse" must be converted

to "a.horse is required for riding",18where 'a.' is a special sign producing merelyconfusedsuppositionin the termimmediatelyfollowing
it. One could also suggest that the inferencein question can be absolved fromthe generalrule because of some otherpropertyor properties
that it enjoys, but the argument that the inferenceis indeed valid
turns out to depend on a special kind of expansion of the original
sentencewhichwill be discussed below.19This expansion also provides
one means of evading the firstobjection, since it will show that "A
horse is required for riding" is indeed true.
The verysame argumentswhichwere used to demonstratethe falsity
of "A horse is required forriding" were used to demonstratethe truth
of "No horse is required for riding";20and the very same arguments
which were used to block the inferenceof "A horse is required for
riding" from"For ridingis required a horse" were used to block the
inferenceof "It is not the case that forridingis required a horse" from
"No horse is required for riding".21The firstpart is easily shown. If
it is false to say of each horse that that horse is required for riding,
then it followsat once that "No horse is required for riding" is true.
The second part is also easily shown,given the consequential rule that
"-P therefore-Q" is valid if and only if "Q thereforeP" is also valid.
In the negative proposition,"No horse is required forriding", 'horse'
has distributivesupposition,22but in the affirmativepropositionwhich
is opposed to that negative proposition,namely "A horse is required
forriding", 'horse' has determinatesupposition. In the negative proposition "It is not the case that forridingis required a horse", 'horse'
again has distributivesupposition, but in this case 'horse' has merely
confused rather than determinate supposition in the corresponding
affirmativeproposition, "For riding is required a horse". The argument, "No horse is required forriding,thereforeit is not the case that
for riding is required a horse" is valid if and only if "For riding is
18Caubraith,liiv0.De Soto,lxx, deniedthatthiswas a trueconversion,
since
'horse'is thesubjectin bothirrespective
ofitspositionin thesequenceofwords.
19Enzinas,xxiiii;Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus,
xxixv0f.
20Enzinas,xxiiii;Pardo,xxxii; Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus
, xxixvo;de Soto,
lv. De Soto used the example"Nullusoculusrequiritur
ad videndum".
21Coronel,SecundaPars,xxxiiiv0;Enzinas,xxiiii;Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus,
xxixv0.
22If a termhas distributive
thenthe sentencein whichthatterm
supposition,
of sentenceseach of whichcontainsa
appearsis equivalentto a conjunction
singularterm.Thuswe can obtain"Horse!is notrequiredforridingandhorse2
is not requiredforridingand . . . and horsenis not requiredforriding"
.
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23:57:43 PM

required a horse,thereforea horse is required forriding" is also valid.

The latter argumentis invalid, because of the rule about merelyconfused and determinatesupposition; thus the formerargumentis also
invalid.
Some authors devoted furtherdiscussion to the kind of distribution
which the term 'horse' enjoyed in the two negative propositionsdiscussed in the previous paragraph, and a distinctionwas drawn between
A termwas said to have comcomplete and incomplete distribution.23
in
of
the
distribution
the
absence
if,
distributingsign it would
plete
have determinate supposition; but it was said to have incomplete
distributionif, in the absence of the distributingsign, it would have
merely confused supposition on account of some special sign such as
'requiritur'.24A rule was now introduced to the effectthat if there is
a propositionin which a termhas merelyconfusedsuppositionbecause
of a special sign, that term must have incomplete distributionin the
contradictoryof the firstproposition.25Given this criterion,"No horse
is required for riding" is not the contradictoryof "For riding is required a horse", because in it 'horse' has complete distribution.On
the otherhand, in "It is not the case that forridingis requireda horse",
'horse' does have incomplete distributionand is the genuine contradictoryof "For riding is required a horse". Furthermore,since it has
been shown not to follow from "No horse is required for riding" the
argumentforits truth has been destroyed,and the law of contradictories is preserved. Some furtherdetails were added about descent
fromincompletelydistributed terms. It was said that fromthe proposition in question, one could infer "For riding is not required this
horse and for riding is not required this horse and for riding is not
required this horse or this or this horse".2However, this mixtureof a
conjunction of sentenceswith a disjoint predicate,does not clarifythe
truth-conditionsof the propositionin question; nor does it add to our
understandingof the proper analysis of that proposition.
It was not in fact necessary to introduce the distinctionbetween
incomplete and complete distributionin order to settle the question
of contradictories.Dorp did the same job more simply by means of
the rule that if in some proposition a term was not distributedafter
23Hieronymus
of St. Mark,Questioni, On Supposition;Tartaterus,
lxxviiiv0;
Pardo,xxxiiv0.Cf.Major,lviiiv0.
84 'Omnis'and 'nullus'weretypicaldistributing
signs.Thatis, theycausedthe
to have distributive
termimmediately
supposition.
following
25 Pardo,xxxiiT0.
" Pardo,xxxiivo.Cf.Tartaretus,
lxxviii.
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23:57:43 PM

a special signproducingconfusedsupposition,thenin its contradictory

that same termshould be distributedafterthat same sign.27In other
words,the orderof termswas not to be altered in any way. As a result,
"No horse is required forriding" cannot be the contradictoryof "For
ridingis required a horse", since the position of the term 'horse' is
not the same in the two propositions.
Another method of using the doctrine of personal supposition in
argumentsabout the truth-value of "For riding is required a horse"
involved looking not at 'horse' but at the complex subject 'a being
requiredforriding'[ens requisitumad equitandum].28Since of no horse
is it true to say, "This is a being required forriding",given that riding
can always be done by means of some other horse, it turns out that
this complex does not referto anything.Thus, the originalsentence is
false,since any affirmativesentence with a subject or predicate which
did not referwas said to be false by logicians in the medieval tradition.
Domingo de Soto did not particularlylike the argument.29Not only
did he believe that the true subject of the sentencewas 'horse', a belief
which made no differenceto the truth-valueof the sentence in question,but he also thoughtthat 'required' should be treated as an adjec"
tive which agreed with 'horse'. That is, instead of Requisitum ad
equitandumest equus,fone should write tfRequisitusad equitandumest
equus". If this were so, the sentence could not be split neatly into two
parts, 'a being required for riding' and 'horse', but would have to be
analyzed in some otherway. Pardo and Hieronymusof St. Mark mentioned another objection, that since this argumentimplied the falsity
of "For riding is required a horse", it should be rejected because it
went against the common mode of speaking, wherebythe proposition
was said to be true.30In reply they pointed out that if logicians followed the common mode of speaking, they would also have to concede
the truth of "A horse is required for riding", a move which in their
view was obviously undesirable.
One very elaborate solution to the problem of showing that one is
27Dorp,Tracti, On Contradictories;
Major,lviii.De Soto,lvv0,thoughtthis
rulewas unnecessary.
Major attributedthe rule to bothDorp and Georgeof
in thelatter.
Brussels,but I have not discoveredany relevantreferences
28Caubraith,liiv0; Celaya; Coronel,Secunda Pars, xxxiii; Enzinas, xxv;
of St. Mark,Question12, On Supposition;Major,lviiiv0;Pardo,
Hieronymus
xxxiii*f.; de Soto,lvvo;Sbarroya,QuartusTractatus,
xxxi.
29De Soto.lvvo.De Soto mainlyused the example"Requisitumad videndum
est oculus",but he explicitlyappliedeverything
he said to horsesas well.
30Pardo,xxxiiii;Hieronymus
of St. Mark,Question12, On Supposition.
153

23:57:43 PM

speaking about individual horses withoutalso implyingthat the propositions "For riding is required a horse" and "A horse is required for
riding" are false, involved the postulation of a new class of referents,
namely individual acts of riding,which were in turn identifiedwith
individual horses. This solution was apparently firstintroduced by
Simon of Lendenaria, in his discussion of Heytesbury's Sophisms.21
He proposed that in order to show the truthof "For seeing some eye
is required" [Ad videndumaliquis oculus requiritur],one should first
argue that "For seeing by some particular act of seeing some eye is
] is
required" [Ad aliquam visionemvidendamaliquis oculus requiritur
true of a particular act of seeing of a particular eye, and then that it
implies the original proposition,which is thereforealso true. The argument was taken up by logicians in the early sixteenthcentury,and
used to show that "A horse is required forriding" is true,32though it
could also be used to show that both "For ridingis required a horse"
and "For riding is required Brunellus" are true.33Three forms of
wordingwere employed. The most elaborate was "Brunellus forriding
by some particular act of ridingis required" [Brunellusad equitandum
];34 and a related versionwas "Brunellus is
aliqua equitationerequiritur
for
some
particular act of riding" [Brunellus requiriturad
required
].35Either sentence could be verifiedby pointing
aliquam equitationem
to Brunellus being ridden, for the act of riding was identical to the
ridden-Brunellus[que equitatioestipsemetbrunellusequitatus],36at least
The third formof wording
according to nominalist interpretations.37
was "Brunellus forridingin some way is required" [Brunellusad aliquo
modoequitandumrequiritur
],38and the same method of verificationwas
employed. One could now inferfromall these formulationsboth that
"Some horse is required forriding" and that "Some horse is required
forridingwithout which it is possible to ride", since the act of riding
Favellus can take place without Brunellus.39Furthermore,it turns
31 SimonofLendenaria,177. Coronel,SecundaPars, xxxiii,said thatthiswas
it to Simonof Lenan argument
againstHeytesbury;and Celayaattributed
denaria.
32Celaya; Enzinas,xxiiii;Pardo,xxxiiii;Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus,
xxixv0.
33Caubraith,Iii; de Soto, lv; Pardo, xxxiin;Coronel,SecundaPars, ;
Major,lviiiv0.
34 Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus
, xxixv0.Cf.Celaya.
35 Pardo,xxxiiii.
36 Enzinas,xxiiii.Cf.Caubraith,
liiv0.
37 Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus,
xxixvo.
38 Caubraith,
liiv0;Coronel,SecundaPars, xxxiii;Major,lix.
39 Pardo,xxxiiii."ratio est quia si sine brunellopotestfieriequitatiofavelli
154

23:57:43 PM

out that "No horse is required for riding" would be true only if one
could say of an individual horse "There is no act of riding for which
this horse is required".40This will, of course, be false since horsei is
always required forthe act of ridinghorsei.
Nobody adopted the above as their final solution, although both
Enzinas and Pardo seemed to thinkthat it was valid.41Other logicians
offeredreasons forrejectingthe solution,the most common being that
itis simplynot consonantwithhumanmodes ofconceivingand reasoning
to claim, among otherthings,that a particular horse, Brunellus,is required for riding.42It was also denied that a gerund includes any
referenceto particular acts.43Celaya showed how this could be argued
by means of analogy. One could prove the falsehood "Socrates is every
man" by saying that it followsfrom"Socrates in some place is every
man" [Sortesin aliquo loco omnis homoes]. However, he said, modern
logicians reply to this kind of example by pointing out that the sentence to be expanded contains no term which implies a referenceto
place, whereas the sentence about horses does imply some referenceto
acts of riding.44De Soto rejected the very principleon which the solution was based by arguing that such phrases as 'ad equitandumrequi'
ritur were to be taken syncategorematicallyrather than categorematically.45
The distinctionbetween categorematicand syncategorematicterms
was usually drawn by means of a distinction between terms which
referto some thing or to some things,such as men and animals, and
terms such as 'all' and 'some' which do not refer,but performsome
'
'
logical functionwithina sentence.46The case of requiriturwas a little
different.It could still be taken as having some kind of referent,and
indeed one of the criteriafora special sign producingmerelyconfused
supposition was sometimes said to be that it signifiedsome thing or
tamennonrequiritur
nonrequiritur
ad suamequitaproptereaquod brunellus
tionem.ideoconcederetur
ad equitandum
sinequo
quod aliquisequusrequiritur
possibileest equitare".Cf.Coronel,SecundaPars, xxxiii;Major,.
40Coronel,SecundaPars,xxxiii;Celaya.Coronelwrote"opportebat
sicarguere
omnisequitatiopotestfierisine brunelloergo brunellusnon requiriturad
equitandumubi antecedensestfalsum".
41Enzinas,xxiiiiv0;Pardo,xxxiiii.
42Caubraith,
liiv0;Coronel,SecundaPars, xxxiii;de Soto,lv.
43Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus,
xxx. "Et ad eiusimprobationem
negaturquod
et per consequensnon permittitur
ille
ly equitandumincluditly equitationem
descensus".
44Celaya.See textin Part II.
45 De Soto,lv.
46 See E. J.Ashworth,
op. cit.,45 f.
155

23:57:43 PM

some things.47To deny that 'requiritur'was to be taken categorematically was to deny the possibility of any direct ascent or descent to
singular terms. For instance, one cannot argue "There is required a
horse forriding,thereforethis thing required for riding is a horse or
this thing required etc." [Requiritur equus ad equitandum ergo hoc
requisitumad equitandum est equus: vel hoc requisitumetc.] since the
antecedent does not imply the existence of particular things,whereas
the consequent does.48On the otherhand, if one begins with a sentence
in which 'thing required' is already quantified, as in "Everything required forridingis a horse" [Omnerequisitumad equitandumestequus],
then descent and ascent are perfectlylegitimate.49The positive part
of the claim that 'requiritur'is to be taken syncategorematicallyrather
than categorematically,was that it indicated the need forthe sentence
in which it appeared to be explicated in termsof another sentence. To
be taken syncategorematicallyis to be taken exponibiliter,said Domingo de Soto;50 and in most cases it is only when the sentence has
been expounded that descent to individual thingsrequired,individual
acts of riding,and individual horses, can take place.
One of the most popular analyses was in termsofa conditionalproposition, and "There is required a horse for riding" was said to be
immediately replaceable by "If an act of riding takes place, a horse
is ridden" [S* equitatiofit, equus equitatur]51 or some other suitable
form of words.62Such a conditional could be true even if no horse
existed, and thus the sense of the original was captured.53The order
of words in the sentence to be expounded had to be taken into account,
for it was agreed that if the word referringto the thing required,
namely a horse, preceded 'requiritur',then one should descend from
that termbeforethe conditional analysis took place. Thus, one would
firstsay "This horse is required forridingor this horse is required for
riding", and one would then say "If an act of riding takes place, this
horse is ridden". Caubraith said that the latter was false, and that
"No horse is required forriding" should be conceded on this analysis;54
47 Coronel,SecundaPars, xxxiii;Pardo,xxxiivo.
48 Sbarroya,QuartusTractatus,
xxxi.
49Sbarroya,QuartusTractatus
, xxxi; de Soto,lvv0.
60De Soto,lvv0.Cf.Caubraith,liiv0.
61Caubraith,
liivo.
52E.g. Celaya,"Si equitatiodebetfieri,medianteequo debetfieri";Enzinas,
and Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus
, xxx, "Si equitatiofit,equo fit".
xxiiiiv0,
63Coronel,SecundaPars, xxxiiiv0;Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus
, xxx.
54 Caubraith,
liivo.Cf.Coronel,SecundaPars, xxxiiivo.
156

23:57:43 PM

but Enzinas and Sbarroya both claimed that this analysis showed the
truth of "Some horse is required for riding" and the falsity of "No
horse is required for riding".55If it was the gerund that preceded
'
', Sbarroya said that one should firstdescend to individual
requiritur
acts of riding;56but de Soto claimed that such a descent was improper,
and that "Requiriturad videndumoculus" and "Ad videndumrequiritur
"
oculus were equivalent.57
The conditional analysis was thoughtby some to overlook the need
forthe thingrequired to be possible, and to open a way for claiming
that such sentences as "For chimera-ridingis required a chimera"
[Ad chimerizandumrequiriturchimera]were true,58even though they
were about an impossible creature. Instead of the conditional, a conjunction of modal propositions,"It is possible forridingto take place
by means of a horse and it is not possible for riding to take place
withouta horse" [Equitatio potestfieri cum equo et non potestfieri sine
equo] was oftenofferedas equivalent to the originalproposition,"For
ridingis required a horse".59 On this analysis, Enzinas said, the sentence about chimeras would have to be denied. Two other analyses
employingmodal terms were also to be found, the simple "It is impossible to ride without a horse" [Impossibile est equitare sine equo];60
and the more complex "This inferenceis valid and necessary: "Some"
one is riding,thereforehe is ridingwith a horse" [Hec consequentia
est bona et necessaria aliquis equitat. igitur cum equo equitai].ei Both
Pardo and, followinghim, Hieronymus of St. Mark offeredthis as
their final answer to the problem of in what sense "For riding is re'
9
quired a horse" could be conceded. The term requiritur seems to
imply some inferentialnecessity [aliquam necessitatemconsequentie],
said Pardo.
The claim that the gerund 'riding' implies a referenceto particular
acts of riding,which can in turn be identifiedwith individual horses,
solved the problem of "For ridingis required a horse" at the expense
of raisingfurtherphilosophical problemsabout both language and the
55 Enzinas,xxiiiivo;Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus,
xxx.
56 Sbarroya,
xxx.
PrimusTractatus,
57 De Soto,lv.
68 Enzinas,xxiiiiv0.
Cf.de Soto,lv.
69Enzinas,xxiiiivo.Cf.Caubraith,Iii; de Soto,lv; Coronel,PrimaPars.
60Dorp,Tracti, On Conversion.
of St. Mark,
Cf.Pardo,xxxiiii;Hieronymus
Question12,On Supposition;Celaya.
ei Pardo,xxxiiii;Hieronymus
of St. Mark,Question12, On Supposition.Cf.
Major,lix.
157

23:57:43 PM

world. However, the claim that the sentence should be regarded as

equivalent either to a simple conditional or to some kind of modal
proposition solved all the problems very neatly without, apparently,
raising new ones. In the light of such an analysis one could maintain
the truthof "For ridingis required a horse" without at the same time
having to argue that the sentence had the same truth-value as its
contradictoryor a differenttruth-value from its simple conversion,
since these related sentenceswould have undergonea similar analysis,
thus turningout to have the desired truth-values.Whicheversolution
one prefers,it seems to have been amply demonstratedthat the simpleminded approach in terms of personal supposition alone was inadequate. To speak of horses being required forridingis to do more than
to make reference,successful or otherwise,to individual horses or any
other identifiableobjects in the world.
Part Two. Texts and Analyses
A. Celaya. A Problemof Conversion
i. Text
Sexto [text: secundo] principaliterarguitur. Ista est indefinita ad
equitandum requiriturequus: et non potest convertisimpliciter:igitur
dicta nulla. Minor probatur. si posset in aliquam converti maxime
esset in istam equus requiriturad equitandum : sed ista est falsa: et
alia vera: igiturnon convertiturin ilia quod ista sit falsa patet quilibet
descendens est falsa sub ilio termino equus supponente determinate,
ergo ilia est falsa. Antecedens probatur. quocunque equo demonstrato
ista est falsa: iste equus requiriturad equitandum: et est sua descendens: igitur quelibet descendens est falsa. Maior probatur. nichil sine
quo potest fieriequitatio requiriturad equitandum iste equus est aliquid sine quo potest fieriequitatio. ergo iste equus non requiriturad
equitandum. consequentia tenet/in ferio:et antecedensestverum: ergo
et consequens: et consequens est contradictoriumillius descendentis:
ergo illa descendens est falsa. Iam probatur quod ilia sit vera, scilicet
ad equitandum requiriturequus ad equitandum requirituraliquid et
non nisi equus. ergo ad equitandum requiriturequus. Idem argumentum potest fieride ista ad delendum peccatum requiriturpenitentia.
Similiterde ista ad videndum requirituroculus.
Pro huius argumenti solutione est sciendum / quod Hentisber et
Paulus Venetus concedunt has propositionesad equitandum requiritur
equus / nullus equus requiriturad equitandum similiterhas ad delendum peccatum requiriturpenitentiapariformaad videndum requiritur
158

23:57:43 PM

oculus: et secundum istam opinionemilia consequentia non valeret ad

equitandum requiriturequus. ergo equus requiriturad equitandum:
nec est conversiosimplex: quia arguitura terminosupponente confuse
tantum a signo speciali confusivoad ipsum supponentem determinate.
Et si petas quid est signum speciale confusivum.
Ad hoc respondentaliqui quod signum speciale confusivumest terminus aliquid significanehabens precise vim confundendi/ ut sint ista
verba promitto/ requiritur: et sic de aliis.
Ex ista diffinitionesequitur quod istud signum omnis non est speciale signum confusivum. Sed ista diffinitionon videtur sufficiens:
nam sequereturquod ly immediatenon est speciale signumconfusivum
cum non significetaliquid. Propterea satius est diffinirealiter signum
speciale confusivum. Unde signum speciale confusivum est signum
faciens supponere terminmconfuse tantum taliter quod quacunque
distributioneseclusa talis confusa non reputatur determinata.
Contrahanc opinionemarguitSymon de lendenaria super ilio sophismate Hentisberi.Omnis homo est unus solus homo /et nittiturprobare
falsitatemhuius nullus equus requiriturad equitandum / et sic arguit.
Ista est concedenda: aliquis equus requiritur ad equitandum: ergo
altera est falsa: et neganda antecedens probatur. bene sequitur aliquis
equus ad aliquam equitationem requiriturad equitandum ergo aliquis
equus requiriturad equitandum et antecedens est verum, ergo et consequent. Veritas illius antecedentis probatur. demonstrando equitationemqui debet fierimediante equo sortis,ista est vera aliquis equus
ad istam equitationem requiriturad equitandum: et ista est una descendens illius. ergo ilia est vera. Maior probaturdemonstrandoequum
sortis, ista est vera ad istam equitationem iste equus requiriturad
equitandum / et est una descendens alterius. ergo altera est vera. Hoc
argumentumdimittitipse Symon insolutum: ut ingenium tuum aliqualiter exerceatur.
Secundo argiturcontra eandem opinionemprobando falsitatemillius
ad equitandum requiriturequus est una affirmativacuius unum extremam non supponit: ergo est falsa. Antecedens probatur unum extremumest ly ad equitandum requisitimi: et illud non supponit: ut
lucidum est. igitur unum extremumnon supponit.
Tertio arguitur/bene sequitur ad equitandum requiriturequus. ergo
ad equitandum oportet habere equum et ultra sequitur quod ad equitandum necesse est habere equum: et ex ilio ulterius elicitur/ quod
necesse est habere equum quod est manifestefalsum: et per consequens
et ista ad equitandum requiriturequus. Propterhoc argumentumtenet
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23:57:43 PM

Petrus Mantuanus has esse negandas ad equitandum requiriturequus

ad videndum requirituroculus et sic de aliis. sed istud argumentum
parvi aut nullius est valoris. Nam si negeturilla consequentia. scilicet
ad equitandum necesse est habere equum. ergo necesse est habere
equum argumentumomnino extinguitur.et sine dubio consequentia
illa nullam habet apparentiam: sed duo prima sunt acriora non tamen
sunt insolubilia. Nam ad primum negabitur illa consequentia. scilicet
aliquis equus ad aliquam equitationem requiriturad equitandum. ergo
aliquis equus requiriturad equitandum / et dicetur quod non oportet
illud gerundiumincludere fflamdeterminationemsicut nec ista valet
sortes in aliquo loco omnis homo est. ergo sortes omnis homo est.
Ad aliud dici potest quod illa capitur in sensu conditionali: utputa
in isto si equitatio debet fierimediante equo debet fieri,et propterea
non respiciendumest ad suppositionemextremorumvel dico quod illa
capitur loco huius nequit fieriequitatio sine equo et ista non est affirmativa quare non oportet extrema supponere.
His tamen non obstantibus alia est opinio ferme omnium modernorum tenentiumilla gerundia includere aliquas determinationes:ut
ista propositio ad equitandum requiriturequus facit istum sensum ad
equitandum aliqua equitatione requiriturequus secundum quam. Respondetur ad formamargumentinegando minoremet ad probationem
concedo quod convertiturin fflam.scilicet equus requiriturad equitandum /et nego falsitatemillius: et ad probationemnego quod quelibet descendens sit falsa sub ilio terminoequus: et ad probationemnego
quocunque equo demonstrato ilia sit falsa, iste equus requiriturad
equitandum. et ad probationemnego fflammaiorem: scilicetnichilsine
quo potest fieriequitatio requiriturad equitandum: sed si assumatur
ilia scilicet nihil sine quo omnis equitatio potest fieri requiriturad
equitandum concedo fflamet negabo minoremsi assumas sic iste equus
est aliquid sine quo omnis equitatio potest fieri: nam habet unam
descendentemfalsam sub ly equitatio demonstrandoequitationemque
potest fierimediante equo demonstrato: nam ilia non potest fierisine
ilio equo. Proportionabiliterest dicendum de aliis que assumunturin
calce argumenti.
Contra fflamsolutionem arguitur: sequeretur quod ista esset concedenda richardus est omnis homo fortisconsequens est manifestefalsum: igitur sequela probatur sensus illius est verus ergo ilia est vera.
Antecedens probatur. sensus illius est iste richardus in aliquo loco
omnis homo fortisest / et iste est verus. ergo sensus illius est verus.
Maior probatur non est maior ratio quod ilia propositio.scilicet equus
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requiriturad equitandum faciat sensum scilicet equus aliqua

equitatione requiriturad equitandum quam illa richardus est omnis
homo fortisfaciat sensum richardus in aliquo loco est omnis
homo fortis.
Ad hanc replicam respondetura modernisnegando sequelam: et ad
probationem negatur quod ille sit sensus illius: et ad probationem
negatur quod non sit maior ratio etc. et discrimenassignatur: quia in
ad equitandum requiriturequus poniturterminusimportans equitationem: et in alia nullus est terminusimportans locum.
Contra istam solutionem arguitur sequeretur ad minus istam esse
concedendam richardus est omnis homo albus: rebus ut nunc consequens est manifestefalsum: igitur sequela probatur. sensus illius est
iste richardusaliqua albedine est omnis homo albus: et ista est vera:
igitur altera est vera. Maior probatur ly album includit albedinem:
ergo ille est sensus illius.
Ad hanc replicamrespondeturnegando sequelam et ad probationem
nego / quod ille sit sensus illius. et ad probationem negatur consequentia: sed sensus illius est iste richardus est omnis homo / albus
aliqua albedine.
2. Analysis
I. Main Thesis: ArgumentA
Major A. "For ridingis required a horse" is an indefiniteproposition.
MinorA. It cannot be converted simply.
ConclusionA. The thesis about simple conversion does not hold.
II. Proof of Main Thesis
1. Argument : Proof of Minor A
Major B. "For ridingis required a horse" would be convertedsimply
to "A horse is required for riding", if it could be converted simply at
all.
Minor B. (a) "A horse is required for riding" is false and (b) "For
ridingis required a horse" is true.
Conclusion B. Since they do not have the same truth-value, they
are not convertible.
2. Argument : Proof of Minor (a )
Major C. In "A horse is required forriding" 'horse' has determinate
supposition.
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Minor . Every descendent from'horse' is false.

Conclusion C. The original propositionis false.
3. ArgumentD : Proof of Minor
Major D. Whatever horse you point to, "This horse is required for
riding" is false.
Minor D. "This horse is required for riding" is a descendent of the
originalproposition.
Conclusion D. Every descendent is false.
4. ArgumentE : Proof of Major D. Part One
Major E. Nothing without which riding can take place is required
forriding.
Minor E. This horse is something without which riding can take
place.
Conclusion E. This horse is not required forriding.
5. ArgumentF . Proof of Major D. Part Two
ArgumentE is a valid syllogismin Ferio.
Major E and Minor E are true.
ThereforeConclusion E is true.
Conclusion E is the contradictoryof "This horse is required for
riding".
Therefore"This horse is required forriding" is false.
6. ArgumentG. Proof of Minor (b)
For ridingis required something,and this thingcannot be anything
but a horse.
Therefore"For ridingis required a horse" is true.
III. A Proposed Solution
William Heytesbury and Paul of Venice claim that these propositions are true: "For riding us required a horse" and "No horse is
required forriding".
They say that "For riding is required a horse, thereforea horse is
required for riding" is invalid because it argues from a term with
merely confused supposition because of a special sign to a term with
determinatesupposition.
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23:57:43 PM

IV. Argumentsagainst theProposed Solution

1. Simon of Lendenaria
"No horse is required for riding" is false because "Some horse is
required forriding" is true.
"Some horse is required forriding" is true because "This horse for
some act of ridingis required forriding" is true, as can be shown by
pointingto an individual act of riding.
2. "For ridingis requireda horse" is false
It is false because it is an affirmativeproposition with an extreme
which has no supposition,i.e. 'forridingrequired'.
3. Peter of Mantua
One can argue "For riding is required a horse, thereforefor riding
one must have a horse, thereforefor riding it is necessary to have a
horse, thereforeit is necessary to have a horse". The last proposition
is manifestlyfalse, thereforethe firstproposition is also false.
V. Replies to Argumentsagainst theProposed Solution
X. Reply to IV. 3

This argumentis of little or no value.

If one denies "For riding it is necessary to have a horse, therefore
it is necessaryto have a horse" the whole argumentis destroyed.
2. Reply to IV. i
One cannot argue "Some horse forsome act of ridingis required for
riding,thereforesome horse is required forriding".
The gerund 'riding' does not contain a referenceto individual acts
of riding.
3. Reply to IV. 2
The argument about lack of supposition is irrelevant because the
propositionshould be taken in a conditional sense, as equivalent to
"If ridingis to take place, it should take place by means of a horse".
VI. Main Solution
X. Thesis
Most contemporarylogicians hold that the gerund 'riding' does indeed contain referenceto individual acts of riding; and the arguments
put forwardagainst this do not hold water [details omitted].
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23:57:43 PM

Hence, "For ridingis required a horse" means "For ridingby some

act of ridingis required a horse".
2. Reply to ArgumentA
Minor A is denied.
Major is conceded.
Minor (a) is denied.
Minor is denied.
Major D is denied.
Major E is denied.
Major E could only be conceded if it stated that nothingwithout
which everyact of riding could take place is required for riding.
B. Hieronymusof St. Mark. A Problemof Supposition62
i. Text
Tertio arguitur.Si sub quocunque terminocommuniterpersonaliter
supponente liceret descendere sequeretur quod multe propositiones
vere essent false, igitur conclusio nulla. Antecedens patet quoniam
omnes iste sunt vere sortes bis cantavit missam. parrhisiis et rome
venditurpiper, ad equitandum requiriturequus. promittotibi equum.
et similes, et tarnen descensus est falsus descendendo sub terminis
fflarumsupponentibusconfusetantum, igiturnon sub quocunque termino supponente communiterlicet fieridescensus. Consequentia stat
cum veritate maioris. Et minor probatur. nam in ista sortes bis cantavit missam. si sub ly missam deberet descendi, sic descenderetur.
sortes bis cantavit missam. ergo bis cantavit istam vel istam missam.
et sic de aliis modo ille descensus est falsus cum sit unum disiunctum
quod pro nulla sua parte verificatur.Et eodem modo posset argumentai! in aliis. Nam descensus est falsus descendendo sub ly piper, quod
supponit confusetantum,hoc modo, parrhisiiset rome venditurpiper,
ergo parrhisiis et rome venditur hoc vel hoc vel hoc piper, quod
disiunctumpro nulla parte verificatur.igitur.
Pro solutione quero primo de veritate istius propositionissortes bis
cantavit missam. . . .
Secundo quero an hec sit concedenda ad equitandum requiritur
equus. Ad hoc solet communiterresponderiquod est vera, quia sensus
est. quod ad equitandum requirituriste vel iste equus. Ex quo infrant
62Hieronymus
of St. Mark,Question12, On Supposition.Hieronymus
of St.
here.
MarkfollowsPardoveryclosely,butPardo'stextis too longto reproduce
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23:57:43 PM

quod ad equitandum requiriturequus. et tarnennullus equus requiritur

ad equitandum. Sed contra, quia est una propositio affirmativacuius
alteram extremorumpro nullo suppordt.ergo est falsa. Consequentia
est nota. Et antecedens probatur quia subiectum illius propositionis
est istud. ad equitandum requisitum. quia de nullo verum est dicere
quod sit ad equitandum requisitum. ergo ilia est falsa. Item posset
argui ut argutumest in argumentoprincipali,quia quando dicitur.ad
equitandum requirituriste vel iste equus illud disiunctumiste vel iste
equus pro nulla parte verificatur.igitur. Antecedens patet. quia non
pro murello quia sine eo possum equitare. puta cum favello et sic de
aliis. igitur. Si etiam dicas quod non requiriturverificatiopr aliqua
parte. Dabitur mihi modus sustinendi quod ista est vera ad equitandum requiriturhomo vel asinus. Nam si dicatur ad equitandum non
requiriturhomo concedam et ad equitandum non requiritur asinus.
concedam, tamen dicam quod ad equitandum requiritur homo vel
asinus. Ex quo patet quod intellectus non potest intelligereverificationem disiunctiet tamen pro nulla parte sive tale disiunctumsupponat confusetantum sive determinatequia si tale principiumnegetur.
datur occasio multa falsa sustinendi.
Sed dices communiterconcedimusillas propositiones.Nam secundum
nostrum modum concipiendi videtur quod iste sunt concedende ad
equitandum requiriturequus. ad deletionempeccati mortalispost baptismum commissi requiritur penitentia et sic de consimilibus ergo.
Respondeo quod si communem modum loquendi hominum insequi
volueris. ita concedere debes, quod equus requiriturad equitandum
sicut quod ad equitandum requiriturequus. Et sicut conceditur quod
ad remissionempeccati requiriturpenitentia. ita etiam concedendum
est quod ad remissionempeccati penitentia requiritur.et ideo hoc in
mediumnon est adducendum. Dico ergo breviturquod huiusmodi propositio ad equitandum requiriturequus est concedenda in isto sensu.
Scilicet impossibile est aliquem equitare sine equo. Vel ad istum sensum et melius,hec consequentia est bona et necessaria aliquis equitat
igitur cum equo equitat. Unde ille terminus (requiritur)videtur importarealiquam necessitatemconsequentie. Et similiterdicatur de ista
ad delendumpeccatum mortale requiriturpenitentia. quod ly requiritur dicit quamdam necessitatem consequentie ita quod sensus sit. hec
consequentia est bona et necessaria de lege posita deletur peccatum
mortalepost baptismum commissumergo deleturper penitentiam.Ex
rationibus superius dictis patet quod ista propositio etiam est falsa,
ad eundum ad ecclesiam snete marie necesse est transirper aliquod
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spatium. Et si dicas quod illa propositio debet concedi. Respondeo

quod in talibus propositionibusly necesse importtquamdam necessitatem consequentie. et ad ilium sensum tales propositionesconceduntur. et ideo sensus illius propositionis.ad eundum ad ecclesiam snete
Marie necesse est transirper aliquod spatium. est iste, hec consequentia est bona et necessaria, iste vadit ad ecclesiam snete marie, ergo
transitper aliquod spatium et in tali sensu similespropositionesdebent
concedi.
Tercio quero an ista sit concedenda promittotibi equum. . . .
2. Analysis
I. Main Thesis: ArgumentA
If one can always descend froma term with personal supposition,
then many true propositionswill turn out to be false.
Thereforethe thesis about descent does not hold.
II. Proof of ArgumentA
1. Argument
Major B. "For riding is required a horse" is true.
Minor B. Descent from 'horse' produces a false proposition.
Conclusion B. One cannot descend from every term which has
personal supposition.
2. Argument : Proof of Minor
Major C. 'Horse' has merelyconfused supposition,and descent is to

a disjoint predicate.
Minor C. The disjoint predicate is not verifiedfor any of its parts.
Conclusion C. The descent is false.
III. The Searchfor a Solution
a. Socratestwicesang mass
b. For ridingis requireda horse
I. ArgumentD : Ill.b. is true
It is true because it means "For ridingis required this horse or this
horse". From this one can inferthe truth of "For ridingis required a
horse", even though "No horse is required for riding" is also true.
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23:57:43 PM

2. ArgumentE : Ill.b. is false

If it is an affirmativepropositionone of whose extremeslacks supposition,then it is false.
The inferenceis valid.
The antecedentis true because the subject of the propositionis 'for
ridingrequired', and of nothingis it true to say "This is required for
riding".
It followsthat the propositionis false.
3. ArgumentF : Ill.b. is false
See argumentC.
Minor is proved by pointingto Murellus,Favellus and so on, and
arguingthat one can ride without them.
4. ArgumentG: Reply to ArgumentF
One need not demand verificationof the parts of a disjoint predicate.
5. ArgumentH : Reply to ArgumentG
If I accept this argumentI will be able to prove the falsehood "For
riding is required a man or a donkey", even though I agree that a
man is not required for riding,and that a donkey is not required.
The intellectcannot grasp how a disjunction or a disjoint predicate
can be verifiedwithout one of the parts being verified.
6. ArgumentI: Ill.b . is true
It is true because it is commonlyconceded to be true.
7. ArgumentJ: Reply to ArgumentI
If one is going to appeal to the common mode of speaking one must
also concede "A horse is required forriding".
8. ArgumentK: Solution
"For ridingis required a horse" is to be conceded as true in one of
the followingsenses:
a. It is impossible for someone to ride without a horse.
b. This is a valid and necessaryinference: "Someone is riding,thereforehe is ridingwith a horse".
c. I promiseyou a horse

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23:57:43 PM

i. Text

. Sbarroya. A ProblemofContradiction63

Decimo. Arguitursic. Iste contradicunt ad equitandum requiritur

equus et non ad equitandum requiriturequus. Tamen dabuntur ambe
verae: igiturbene probatur. Affirmativade se patet. Et negativa probatur. Bene valet : nullus equus ad equitandum requiriturergo non ad
equitandum requiriturequus / consequentia est bona. Et antecedens
est verum: ergo et consequens. Quod antecedens sit verum probo per
descensum.Bene valet : iste equus ad equitandum non requirituret iste
equus ad equitandumnonrequirituret sic de singulis: igiturnullusequus
etc. Et antecedensest verum,igituret consequens. Quod antecedens sit
verumprobo per unam descendentem: quia non est potior ratio de una
quam de qualibet alia. Ista est vera isteequus ad equitandum non requiritur. Brunello demonstrato.Quod probatur sic. Omne illud sine quo
potest fieriequitatio non requiriturad equitandum. Sed iste equus est
ens: sine quo potest fieriequitatio: ergo iste equus non requiriturad
equitandum.
Si forteneges consequentiam primam: dicendo ibi argui a distributiva distributioneopposita determinatead oppositam confuse.
Contra ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis:
ergo consequentia illa erat bona. Antecedens probo. Bene valet: ad
equitandum requiriturequus: ergo equus ad equitandum requiritur.
Quod bene valeat patet. Quia nunquam dabitur antecedens verum
et consequens falsum. Quod probo: quia si aliquando dari possit: nunc
posset dari. Cum ille propositiones non dicant existentiam. sed nunc
non potest: igitur nunquam. minorem probo. Quia nunc consequens
est verum. Quod probo. Bene valet / brunellusrequiriturad equitandum: ergo equus requiriturad equitandum. Et antecedens est verum:
ergo et consequens. Quod antecedens sit verum / patet: descendendo
sub ly equitatione incluso in ly equitandum. Sensus enim eius est:
Brunellus ad equitandum aliqua equitatione requiritur.Quia demonstrata equitatione facta mediante brunello. ilia est vera. Nam illa
equitatio : que fitbrunello: non potest fierifavello. Quod probant nominales dicentes equitationem esse ipsummet equum equitatum. Et sic
possent concedere: quod equus sit equo. Quia equitatio sit equo.
Ad hoc argumentum.Est duplex modus dicendi. Primus dicit duo.
Primum est quod propositio in qua ponitur ly requiritur equivalet

es Sbarroya,PrimusTractatus,
I have beenunableto comparemy
xxixv0-xxx.
whichis to be foundin theUniversity
withtheoriginal,
Library,
transcription
Seville.
168

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aliquo modo conditionali. Sensus enim istius propositions requiritur

ad equitandum equus est iste. Si equitatio fitequo fit.Quod est verum.
Dato quod nullus equus sit in mundo.
Secundo est quod sub terminisprecedentibusly requiriturdescendendum est / antequam exponatur per predictamconditionalem. Ideo
ista est vera ad equitandum requiriturbrunellus. Quia ly equitandum
supponit determinate.Et possumus descendere sicut supra descendebatur. Sed ista est falsa requiritur ad equitandum brunellus. Quia
debet reduci immediate ad hanc falsam. Si equitatio fit brunello fit.
Unde sequitur omnem talem propositionemaut esse necessariam aut
impossibilem.
Quibus notatis respondetur: predictae propositionesesse contradictorias: negando minorem. Et quando probas illam. Quia prima est
vera concedo. Et ad probationem secunde concedo consequentiam. Et
nego quod antecedens sit verum scilicet istud nullus equus ad equitandum requiritur.Immo est falsum. Quia sua contradictoriaest vera:
scilicet ista aliquis equus ad equitandum requiritur.Ut patet descendendo: ut dictum est. Dicuntque taliter opinantes terminmsupponentem confusepost tale signum minime probari debere per suppositionemextremorum.sed per reductionempredictam.
Alius est modus dicendi secundum quem concediturmaior et negato minor.Et ad probationemnegaturconsequentia. Et defectusassignatus interarguendumacceptatur. Et ad eius improbationemnegatur
quod ly equitandum includat ly equitationem et per consequens non
permittiturffle descensus. Et sic argumentum non concludit. Nec
respondendoprimo modo superfluit.
2. Analysis
I. Main Thesis: ArgumentA
Major A. These propositions are contradictories:"For riding is required a horse" and "It is not the case that for riding is required a
horse".
Minor A. Both the above propositionsare true.
ConclusionA. The law of contradictoriesdoes not hold.
II. Proof of ArgumentA
I. Argument : Proof of Minor A
a. It is obvious that the firstcontradictoryis true.
b. That the second contradictoryis true is shown below.
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23:57:43 PM

2. ArgumentC: Proof of Argument.

Antecedent . No horse forridingis required.
Consequent C. It is not the case that forridingis required a horse.
3. ArgumentD : Proof of Antecedent
From "This horse is not required for riding and this horse is not
required for riding" one can infer"No horse for riding is required".
Nothing is required for riding without which riding can be done.
One can ride without Brunellus, thereforethis horse, Brunellus, for
ridingis not required.
Thus, one can prove the antecedent of argument D and it follows
that no horse forridingis required.
4. ArgumentE : Disproof of Argument
In the antecedent of 'horse' is distributedand in its contradictory
'horse' has merelyconfusedsupposition. In the consequent of 'horse'
is again distributed,but in its contradictory'horse' has determinate
supposition. Let the antecedent be '-P' and the consequent be '-Q'.
"-P therefore-Q" is valid if and only if "Q thereforeP" is valid. But
in "Q thereforeP" one argues froma propositionin which a term has
merelyconfused supposition to a propositionin which the same term
has determinatesupposition. This is invalid.
5. ArgumentF : Disproof of ArgumentE
We can argue "For riding is required a horse, thereforea horse is
required for riding". That is, "Q thereforeP" is valid, and so is "-P
therefore-Q".
6. ArgumentG: Proof of ArgumentF
One can never have a true antecedent and a false consequent in the
argumentjust cited.
Major G: If it was ever possible, it would be possible now, since
these propositionsdo not imply existence.
Minor G. It is not possible now.
Conclusion G. It is never possible to have a true antecedent and a
false consequent.
7. ArgumentH : Proof of Minor G
This argumentis valid: "Brunellus is required forriding,therefore
a horse is required forriding". The antecedent is true, as is shown by
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23:57:43 PM

descent to particular acts of riding,and thus the consequent is true.

Since it is true, argument F does not have a true antecedent and a
false consequent.
III. Two Possible Re-pliesto theMain Thesis
A. First Reply
1. A propositioncontaining'required' is equivalent to a conditional.
Thus the sense of "There is required for riding a horse" is "If riding
takes place, it takes place by means of a horse".
2. One should descend fromthe terms which precede 'required' before the sentence is expounded as a conditional. Thus "For ridingis
requiredBrunellus" is trueand "There is required forridingBrunellus"
is false, since it reduces to "If riding takes place, it takes place by
means of Brunellus".
In the light of this reply one can respond to the main thesis:
Major A is true and the propositionsare contradictories.
Minor A is denied.
Argument is conceded.
Argument D is denied. That is, the antecedent of argument is
false, because its contradictory,"Some horse is required for riding",
is true.
B. Second Reply
Major A is true.
Minor A is denied.
Argument is denied because argument H is denied. That is, no
descent to particular acts of ridingis possible.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
dialctica.
Sumtnula
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Buridan,John.
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Dorp,John.See Buridan:thetextcitedcontainsDorp's lengthycommentary.
liberprimus.Lugduni,1520.
iLnzmas,Fernandode. Oppositionum
Greve,Henricus.Parva logicalia.[Leipzig,149-.]
ofSt. Mark.Compendium
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1507.No pagination.
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Petri
parvorum
logicalium
Johnof Glogovia.Exercitium
superomnestractatus
Hisbani. Argentine,
1517.
Maior.Tohn.Libriquosin artibus... in lucememisit.Lugduni,1516.
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Summularum
MagistiPetri
Sbarroya,Augustinus.Expositioprimitractatus
Hispani. Hispali,1533.
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Waterloo, Canada
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172

23:57:43 PM

Book Review

Molnax,Les Vaudoisau MoyenAge(Studistorici

JeanGonnet-Amedeo
), VII +
Turin,1974,9 res510pp., Claudianaeditrice,
dbordantde toutepartle domainede VivaCes tudesd'histoire
religieuse
rium
, nous devonsnous borner les signalerici brivement,
malgrtoute
du sujetet l'ampleuravec laquelleil a t trait.L'ampleurtient
l'importance
outrela documentation
ce que les deux auteursdominent,
publiedans les
celleen languesslaves.Cela grce
occidentales,
galement
langueseuropennes
et la facult
leursfonctions:
M. JeanGonnetenseigne Rome, l'universit
vaudoiseprotestante
maisen mmetempsil est Belgradedirecde thologie,
la facultde
teurde l'Istitutoitalianodi cultura.M. Moinarest professeur
thologie Prague,et aussi chargde cours la facultvaudoisede Rome.
international
desmdidansle Rpertoire
antrieures,
Quant leurspublications
sousle n 1685et le n
vistesde 1971on en trouveraunelisteimpressionnante
2965.Il est piquantde voirvoisinerles nomsde FriedrichEngelset celuidu
bndictin
belgePaul de Vooght,spcialistede JeanHus. L'conomiedu livre:
Un Avant-propos
des diteursde Claudiana,prsentantles auteurs.Puis les
; II. VaudsetlesPauvresdeLyon;III. Les Pauvres
chapitres:I. Les antcdents
V. L'internationale
VI.
IV. Deux siclesde clandestinit;
lombards;
valdo-hussite;
du XIVe sicle;VII. La littrature
vaudoise
Premierscontacts
avec la rforme
(o il fautsignalerle paragraphesurles versionsvaudoisesde la Bible); VIII.
vaudoisou d'intrt
La thologie
vaudoise
. Suivent3 Appendices:1) Manuscrits
etc. d'origine
vaudois;2) Compilations
, traductions
, imitations
catholique;
3) OuetdeuxIndex.L'Avant-propos
dedrivation
hussito-taborite;
Bibliographie
vrages
dans les annes venir"un
supposenonsans raisonque l'ouvragedemeurera
au MoyenAge
pointde reprepourtousceuxqui s'occupentde la vie religieuse
et de l'histoirevaudoiseen particulier".La jaquette,trs suggestive,
a t
un bas-relief
de l'anciennePorta
dessinpar UmbertoStagnaro,s'inspirant
Romanade Milan (XIIIe sicle),lequel reprsente
l'archevquechassantles
de la p.
de la ville.- Une vtille: l'expression
l'Europemoyengeuse
hrtiques
?
211 estsansdouteun lapsuspourmdivale
J.E.

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Books Received

AlbertiMagniOrdinisFratrumPraedicatorum
De naturaboni. Primmedidit
EphremFilthautO.P. SanctidoctorisecclesiaeAlbertiMagniordinisfratrumpraedicatorum
episcopiOperaOmniaad fidemcodicumedendaapindicibusinstruenda
curavitInstitutum
parata criticonotisprolegomenis
AlbertiMagniColonienseBernhardoGeyerpraeside.TomusXXV, pars I.
in aedibusAschendorff.
Westfalorum
I44 PP-*974Monasterii
- Quaestiones
BoethiiDaci Opera. Quaestionesde Generatione
et Corruptione
Nuncprimum
ediditGza Saj. Voluminis
V pars
superlibrosPhysicorum.
II Quaestiones
. CorpusPhilosophorum
superlibrosPhysicoruncontinens
DanicorumMediiAevi. Consilioet auspiciisSocietatisLinguae & LitterarumDanicarumab Alfredo
Otto & HenricoRoosfundatum
nuncedendum
curavitJoannesPinborg.(pp. 139-362).HauniaeMCMLXXIV,typisFr.
G.E.C.GAD.
Bagge,apud librarium
KurtFlash,Die Metaphysik
desEinenbeiNikolausvonKues. ProblemgeschichtlicheStellung
Studienzur Problemgeschichte
und systematische
Bedeutung.
derAntikenundMittelalterlichen
In Verbindung
mitB. LakePhilosophie.
von J.
brink,Professoran der UniversittFreiburg/Br.,
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Professoran der UniversittFrankfurt/M.
Hirschberger,
Seiten.1973,Leiden,E. J. Brill./80,- .
U H ystoreJob, An OldFrenchVerseAdaptation
in JobbyPeter
ofCompendium
- Vilof Blois,ed. J. Gildea,VolumeI Texts,Lige (Vaillant-Carmanne)
lanova,Penna. (St.-ThomasPress),1974,xxiv + 286pp. - Containsalso,
partlyin Appendix,an editionofthe"vulgateversion"oftheCompendium
in Jobestablished
fromtheMS. Vat., Reg.lat.53 and 11 otherMSS.
verhaaluit de XIe eeuw
Versusde unibove(Het lied van boerEenos), Muchtig
ed. Prof.dr.A. Welmetrische
teksteditie,
facsimile,
vertaling),
(inleiding,
ACCO,Leuven,1975. ^
kenhuysen,
Uitgeverij
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