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    Documents From The US Espionage Den Vol. 60

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    Irdial-Discs
    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Documents From The US Espionage Den Vol. 60

    Uploaded by

    Irdial-Discs
    161 views144 pages
    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

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    Documents from the US Espionage Den Vol. 60

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    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    161 views144 pages

    Documents From The US Espionage Den Vol. 60

    Uploaded by

    Irdial-Discs
    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

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    of 144

    .

    In the name of Allah

    the most .Compassionate and Mercif ull

    The Center for the Publi~8~oion the U S of .. Espionage Den's ~ o c u m e d s P 0. BOX: 15815 - 3489 .
    Tehran' lslamic Republic of Iran Tel : 824005

    THE MOST COMMPASSIONATE AND MERCIFUL TABLE OF CONTENTS ONE-SECURITY IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

    A REVIEW OF THE SECURITY SYSTEY OF IRAN

    ....................... 1 ..................... 2 I- IlJTRODUCTION ........................................... 2 II- BASIC SECURITY LEGISLATION ............................. 3 III- PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD SECURITY ....................... 5 IV- NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY ..................... 6 1- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ........................... 7
    2- NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE 3- J-2 4- G-2
    &

    SECURITY

    ...

    SECTION SUPREME COMMANDER'S STAFF SECTION OF GENERAL STAFF

    ............ 10 ...................... 11
    ..................... 12

    5 - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORP (CIC)


    67-

    IRANIAN NATIONAL POLICE

    ............................ 13
    ....................... 14 ........................ 15

    IMPERIAL IRANIAN GENDARMERIE

    8- SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

    V- INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION VI- SECURITY IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT VII-

    ............ 1 7 ..................... 19 PHYSICAL SECURITY ..................................... 20 1- CIVILIAN MINISTERIES ............................... 20


    2- ARMED FORCES

    VIII- CONTROL OF CLASSIFIED MATTERS IX- PERSONNEL SECURITY

    .......................................20 ......................... 21

    .................................... 23

    ................................... 26 .............................................. 27 XII- RECOMMENDATION ........................................ 29 XIII- CONCLUSION ............................................ 30


    X- INDUSTRIAL SECURITY XI- FINDINGS ANNEX A ANNEX B ANNEX C ANNEX D TWO- MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH COUNSUL,KHORRAMSHAHR 36

    ................................................. 36 ......................................... 36 PERSIAN GULF .............................................. 36 FRENCH OIL COMPANIES AND EQBAL ............................ 37
    KHUZESTAN DOMESTIC POLCTICS TREE- SEMI ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN
    1- SUMMARY
    2-

    38

    34567-

    ................................................ 39 THE SHAH ............................................... 40 THE ECONOMIC SITUATION ................................. 4 1 IRAN-U.S. RELATIONS .................................... 43 IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF .............................. 45 IRAN AND IRAQ: THE SHATT CONFORNTATION ................. 46 IRAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES ............................... 48

    ...............................50 ............. 53 10- DIR iENT AND INTERNAL SECURITY ......................... 55 FOUR- REFORM IN IRAN ................ ................ 58 SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION ....... .................. 59 1- LAND REFORM ............... .................... 6 1
    8- IRAN-COMMUNIST RELATIONS

    9- THE GOVERNMENT. PARLIAMENT AND THE PARTIES

    ...........

    .................................. 62 5- ELECTION LAW REFORM .................................... 63 6- LITERACY CORPS ......................................... 63 7- HEALTH CORPS ........................................... 64 8- EXTENSION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPS ........................ 65 9- HOUSE O F J U S T I C E AND ARBITRATION COUNCIL ............... 66 10- NATIONALIZATION O F WATER RESOURCES ..................... 67 11- RECONSTRUCTION O F THE COUNTRY .......................... 67 12- ADMINISTRATIVE AND EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTlON .............. 68 13- OTHER MEASURES ......................................... 69 COMMENT ................................................... 70 F I V E - YOUTH ..................................................... 72 S I X - REFORM PROGRAM ............................................ 75 SEVEN- IRAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY ......................... 78 GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS ................................... 81 CHANGE FROM THE T O P ....................................... 84 OBSTRCLE TO CHANGE .................................... 86 THE STRONG MAN TRADITION .............................. 88
    4- WORRER P R O F I T SHARING

    .......................... 90 .................................. 91 O I L AND WHAT E L S E ? .................................... 91 LOOKING WEST. E A S T AND TO THE MIDDLE E A S T ............. 93 A S THE SHAH GOES. S O GOES IRAN ........................ 94 CHRGNOLOGY ................................................ 96 AREA B R I E F ................................................ 98 EIGHT- B R I E F I N G FOR TDY PERSONNEL ............................... 100 INTRODUCTION ............................................. 100 U.S. I N T E R E S T S ........................................... 101 PHYSICAL CHAPACTERISTICS ................................. 104 PEOPLE. R E L I G I O N . CULTURE ................................ 107 SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ........................ 114 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ................................... 118 EXTERNAL THREAT .......................................... 120 IRAQ IS IRAN'S MOST ACTIVE ANTAGONIST .................... 121 STRATEGY ................................................. 124 DEFENSE ORGANIZATION ..................................... 125 ............................ 126 FORCE DISPOSITION/DEVELOPMENT GROUND FORCE ............................................. 126 AIR FORCE ................................................ 128 ORGANIZATION O F THE I M P E R I A L IRANIAN NAVY ................ 129 D I S P O S I T I O N O F FORCES .................................... 131 ......... 131 HISMRY OF MILITARY ASSI~TAIJCE: AND AMISH-MAAG ORGANIZATION O F APAISH-MAAG .............................. 132 ARSEC .................................................... 132 AFSEC .................................................... 133 NAVSEC ................................................... 133 ................................. 133 EUCOM SUPPORT ACTIVITIY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FIELD TEAMS ........................ 134 FOREIGN MILITARY S A L E S ................................... 135 CONUS TRAINING ........................................... 136
    MONOPOLIZING P O L I T I C A L POWER THE WHITE REVOLUTION

    MIC 206/171 February 7 , 1966

    T h i s document c o n s i s t s o f 37 p a g e s , No. g o f 49 c o p i e s , S e r i e s A . f

    UNITED STATES MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL COMMITTEE SECURITY I N THE GOVERNMENT OB'IRAN Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y

    1.

    The a t t a c h e d r e p o r t was p r e p a r e d t o r e c o r d t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s

    o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M i l i t a r y I n f o r m a t i o n C o n t r o l Committee Team which examined t h e s e c u r i t y program i n t h e Government of I r a n d u r i n g thr. p e r i o d October 25 2.

    I
    ,

    November 3 , 1965.

    The U n i t e d S t a t e s M i l i t a r y I n f o r m t i o n C o n t r o l Committee

    approved t h e r e p o r t a t i t s m e e t i n g on December 15, 1965.

    3.

    T h i s document r e q u i r e s " S p e c i a l Handling."

    It i s "Not

    R e l e a s a b l e t o F o r e i g n Nnt,oaols."

    4.

    D i s t r i b u t i o n of t h i s document i s l i m i t e d t o t h o s e h a v i n g a n

    o f f i c i a l need-to-know.

    Donald S , H a r r i s Secretary

    SPECIAL HANDLIK REQUIRED N T RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN O NATIONALS

    GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC D W O N GRADING AND TYECLASSIFICATION.

    SECRET

    SECRET
    A REVIEW OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM OF IRAN
    I

    INTRODUCTION I n view of p r o p 0 s d l S by t h e U.S. Department o f Defense t h a t


    tile

    HAWK and BULLPUP m i s s i l e s y s t e m s be s u p p l i e d t o I r a n and because t h e

    s e c u r i t y system of I r a n had l a s t been e v a l u a t e d o f f i c i a l l y by a S t a t e Defense M i l i t a r y I n f o r m a t i o n C o n t r o l Committee Team which v i s i t e d I r a n i n August

    September 1960, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M i l i t a r y l n t o r m a t i o r i C o ~ l t r u l
    to

    Committee (USMICC) d e c i d e d t o d i s p a t c h a S e c u r i t y Survey Team t o review t h a t c o u n t r y ' s s e c u r i t y system.

    Iran

    The Team conducted i t s s u r v e \ D i s c u s s i o n s were h e l J h y

    i n I r a n from O c t o b e r 23 t o November 4, 1965.

    i t w i t h key I r a n i a n o f f i c i a l s and w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e American

    Embassy, ARMISH-MAAG a n d GENMISH. The s e c u r i t y e v a l u a t i o n r e f e r r e d t o above was documenteu i n MIC 2061129, d a t e d February 8 , 1961. This c u r r e n t r e p o r t i s intended

    p r i m a r i l y t o b r i n g up t o d a t e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n MIC 2061129 S t a t e m e n t s made i n i t a r e b a s e d p r i m a r i l y on o b s e r v a t i o n s o f t h e Team and o n i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d t o i t by I r a n i a n and American o f f i c i a l s . Annex A c o n t a i n s a l i s t o f Team mentbers; Annex B a l i s t of t h e p r i n c i p a l I r a n i a n o f f i c i a l s w i t h whom t h e Team c o n f e r r e d ; Annex C a l i s t of t h e p r i n c i p a l American O f f i c i a l s w i t h whom t h e Team h e l d d i s c u s s i o n s ; and Annex D a s c h e d u l e of t h e Team's m e e t i n g s .

    SECRET

    SECRET
    - 2 -

    I1

    BASIC SECURITY LEGISLATION T h e r e have been no changes i n t h e b a s i c s e c u r i t y l e g i s l a t ~ ~ ~ n

    of I r a n a s r e c o r d e d i n MIC 2061129.

    The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l laws of 1906,

    1907 and 1925 s t i l l form t h e l e g a l b a s e f o r t h e I r a n i a n Government and i t s d i v i s i o n i n t o s e p a r a t e e x e c u t i v e , l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l branches. D e s p i t e t h e n o m i n a l l y d e m o c r a t i c form of government, t h e

    Shah a p p e a r s t o be more t h a n e v e r a n a u t o c r a t i c r u l e r i n t h e long t r a d i t i o n of a b s o l u t e monarchy which h a s u s u a l l y p r e v a i l e d i n I r a n down t h r o u g h much o f i t s r e c o r d e d h i s t o r y . Thus t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e

    Shah toward s e c u r i t y and t h e f i r m n e s s of h i s p o s i t i o n remain e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t s t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n any s u r v e y o f I r a n ' s s e c u r i t y system C i v i l i a n s e c u r i t y laws a l s o remain unchanged; t h e s e b e i n g s t i l l based on A r t i c l e s 60-79 o f t h e 1925 I r a n i a n P u b l i c P e n a l Code w i t h r e v i s i o n s of 1945, and t h e 1931 Law o f Opponents t o t h e C o u n t r y ' s Independence and S e c u r i t y . M i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s c o n t i n u e t o be governed

    by t h e 1936 Army Laws of P r o c e d u r e and P e n a l Code ( a l s o known a s The M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e and P e n a l Law o f I r a n ) . I t may be n o t e d t h a t under

    t h e 1925 P e n a l Code r e f e r r e d t o above p r o v i s i o n s a r e made f o r c i v i l i a n s and members of t h e armed f o r c e s t o be t r i e d by m i l i t a r y c . > u r t s i n cases of espionage. V a r i o u s s e c t i o n s of t h e M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e and

    P e n a l Law o f I r a n a l s o p r o v i d e f o r t r i a l o f c i v i l i a n s by m i l i t a r y courts; e.g., Prince. f o r a t t e m p t s on t h e l i f e o f t h e Shah o r t h e Crown

    While t h e Team was i n I r o n a m i l i t a r y c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h e

    t r i a l o f a number o f c i v i l i a n 8 i n v o l v e d i n t h e A p r i l 1965 Marble

    SECRET

    SECRET
    - 3 Palace a t t e m p t on t h e l i f e o f t h e Shah. Among t h e a e n t e n c e s passed o u t , two were f o r d e a t h , one f o r l i f e imprironment, and n i n e were f o r impriaonmenc from 3 t o 8 year.. (Note: The a c t u a l a t t e m p t on t h e

    S h a h ' r l i f e war nude by a conscript member o f t h e I m p e r i a l Guard who d i d n o t a u r v i v e him u n a u c c e a s f u l a t t e m p t a t a a a a s s i n a t i o n . ) Attampta on t h e l i f e o f t h e Shah o r t h e Crovn P r i n c e a r e n o t t h e only crimes puniahable by t h e d e a t h a e n t e n c e under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e s e v e r a l laws r e f e r r e d t o above. There a r e numerous o t h e r crimes

    f o r which t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s mny r e c e i v e t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e and among theae i s espionage. Evidence t h a t t h i s p e n a l t y i s a p p l i e d f o r

    espionage was given i n e a r l y 1965 when t h r e e I r a n i a n O f f i c e r s were

    executed a f t e r c o n v i c t i o n by a m i l i t a r y c o u r t on c h a r g e s o f apying f o r the Soviets. (Note: The e r p i o n a g e f o r i h i c h t h e o f f i c e r s were The c a r e was broken by t h e Imperial'

    c o n v i c t e d was n o t r e c e n t .

    I r a n i a n Counter I n t e l l i g e n c e Corpr

    - IICIC.)

    SECRET

    SECRET
    I11 PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD SECllRITY T h e r e is no r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e I r a n i a n p u b l i c i s any more aware of t h e need f o r p r o t e c t i v e s e c u r i t y now t h a n waa t h e c a s e when t h e p r e v i o u s s e c u r i t y s u r v e y was made i n 1960. s o c i e t y a r e u n d e r way; e . g . , While changes
    LII

    i n t h e s l o w growth of a middle c l a s s

    and a s m a l l d e c l i n e i n t h e p e r c e n t a g e of i l l i t e r a c y , t h e s e a r e not s u f f i c i e n t t o overcome t h e l a c k o f a n a t i o n a l c o n c s i o u s n e s s a s known by Western n a t i o n s , t h e v e r y low s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g of t h e a v e r a g e I r a n i a n , t h e l a c k of formal e d u c a t i o n ( o v e r 80 p e r c e n t of I r a n i a n s a r e s t i l l i l l i t e r a t e ) , a n d t h e g e n e r a l l y backward c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g t h r o u g h o u t much of t h e c o u n t r y . However, assuming t h a t t h e Shah w i l l

    be s u c c e s s f u l i n h i s e f f o r t s t o r a i s e t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g , t o make d r a s t i c i n r o a d s i n t o t h e l e v e l o f i l l i t e r a c y , t o improve communicationt and t o d e v e l o p a n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u a n e s s , one may e x p e c t t h i s s i t u a t i o n t o improve


    In

    the next g e n e r a t i o n .

    SECRET

    SECRET
    - 5 IV

    .PTLONAL ORGANIZATION FOR SECmITI Sinca t h i r a u b j a c t war diecurred i n conriderable d e t a i l i n

    WC 2061129 and moat of t h e m a t e r i a l t h e r e i n i s s t i l l e r s e n t i a l l y

    c o r r e c t , Chi.

    r a c t i o n of t h i s r e p o r t w i l l concern i t s e l f primarily

    with updating and r e v i s i n g the previous r e p o r t where necessary o r derirable. The dominant f a c t o r t o be taken i n t o conrideration i n any

    e v a l u a t i o n of s e c u r i t y i n I r a n is the p o s i t i o n of the Shah, whose r o l e i n t h e government of I r a n har grown no l e s s c e n t r a l and a u t o c r a t i c than was the c a r e a t t h e cime of the previoucl s e c u r i t y survey i n 1960, and whose i n t e r e s t i n and control of r e c u r i t y has increased. The

    various s e c u r i t y organizations i n e f f e c t function a s appendages t o h i s one-man governwnt. Since resuming power a f t e r the f a l l of

    Mossadeq i n 1953, t h e Shrh has taken a deep and personal i n t e r e s t i n the day t o day operations of the various i n t e l l i g e n c e and s e c u r i t y
    organizations.

    A l l major, and many minor, decisions i n t h i s f i e l d

    a r e made by the Shah.

    After t h e nearly r u c c e s s f u l Marble Palace

    attempt on h i s l i f e i n April 1965, the Shah's i n t e r e s t i n s e c u r i t y became even more intense. The primary v b j e c t i v e of s e c u r i t y i n I r a n Other nuin o b j e c t i v e s a r e t o

    is preservation of the monarchy.

    counter t h e Soviet t h r e a t and t o counter the t h r e a t from other c o u n t r i e s i n the area; i.e., I r a q and t h e UAR.
    I t i r from t h e l a t t e r country,

    a s personified by Naraer, t h a t the Shah s e e r t h e b i g g e s t t h r e a t t o I r a n i n . t h i r decade. By c o n t r a r t . t h e I r a n i a n a t t i t u d e toward the

    Soviets is more relaxed than i t war i n 1960.

    SECRET

    SECRET
    - 6 So f a r as c a n be determined, t h e S h a h ' s i n f l u e n c e on s e c u r i t y i n I r a n i s , a t l e a s t from t h e United S t a t e s p o i n t of v i e w , a p o s i t i v e one. However, t h e u n i q u e r o l e which h e p l a y a n e c e s s a r i l y r a i s e s t h e

    q u e s t i o n o f what would happen i n t h e e v e n t o f h i s sudden demise. There does n o t a p p e a r a t t h i s time t o be any l i k e l i h o o d of t h e Shalt b e i n g deposed through o r g a n i z e d o p p o s i t i o n t o him, s i n c e no such e f f e c t i v e organization appears t o e x i s t . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s s a s s -

    i n a t i o n always e x i s t s and t h u s t h e s i t u a t i o n , i n t h e bords of f o r ~ n e r Ambassador Holmes remains " s t a b l e b u t b r t t t l e . " I n such a n e v e n t ,

    and i n view o f t h e l a c k of any o r g a n i z e d o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p r e s e n t regime, i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y c o u l d i n s u r e t h e c o n t i n u a n c e o i some form o f s t a b l e government whose p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s would c o n t i n u e t o run p a r a l l e l t o t h o s e of t h e United S t a t e s i n t h e a r e a . 1. N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Council The N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l (NSC) r e m a i n s , a t l e a s t i n t h e o r y , t h e t o p p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i n g body f o r t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e community. So f a r a s i s known t h e r e have b e e n no changes i n i t s o r g a n i z a t i u n . The subcommittees c r e a t e d a t t h e same time a s t h e NSC ( 1 9 5 6 ) , t h e I n t e r n a l P r o t e c t i o n C o o r d i n a t i n g Committee (IPCC) end t h e I n t e l l i ~ e r i c r C o o r d i n a t i n g Committee (ICC) c o n t i n u e t o f u n c t i o n a d j u n c t i v e l y w i t h t h e NSC. During t h e Team's m e t i n g w i t h SAVAX r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , i t was informed by B r i g . Cen. H a h o o t i a n (Chief o f S e c u r i t y f o r SAVAK) t h a t t h e two subcommittees met e a c h month, w i t h t h e IPCC mometimes meeting

    SECRET

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    - 7 t w l c e a month. According t o Gen. Mahootian, t h e ICC members c o n s l s t These
    primarily of t h e S e c u r i t y O f f i c e r s o f t h e v a r i o u s M i n i s t r i e s .

    O f f i c e r s r a n k a s s e n i o r o f f i c e r s o f t h e M i n i s t r i e s and a r e a p p o i n t e d by t h e i r M i n i s t e r s i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h SAVAK. p r e s r d e d o v e r by Gen. Mahootian. Gen. Mshootian made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e IPCC, which i s p r e s i d e d o v e r by t h e C h i e f o f SAVAK, i s t h e more i m p o r t a n t o f t h e two s u b c o m m ~ t ~ e t b .
    He s a i d t h a t

    ICC m e e t i n g s a r e normal 1,

    all M i n i s t r i e s

    a r e r e p r e s e n t e d on i t , a n d r n a d d i t i o n t h e

    N a t i o n a l I r a n i a n O i l Co.. Tehran Municipality.

    t h e N a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n and t h e

    An i n t e r e s t i n g s e c u r i t y a s p e c t of t h i s Committrc

    i s c h a t e a c h of i t s members is r e q u i r e d once a y e a r t o s u b m i t a r e p o r t l i s t i n g s e c u r i t y problems i n h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n and a n y r e l e v a n t i d e d s whlch h e may have. C h i e f of SAVAK. T h i s r e p o r t i s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Chairman, i . e . , the

    I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t b o t h t h e ICC and t h e IPCC

    r e g u l a r l y d i s c u s s s e c u r i t y problems o f t h e v a r i o u s M i n i s t r i e s , t h e l a t t e r Committee t a k i n g up t h o s e problems which t h e ICC h a s n o t b e e n a b l e t o resolve.


    2.

    N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e and S e c u r i t y (SAVAKZ At t h e t i m e o f t h e p r e v i o u s s u r v e y SAVAK was headed by t h e

    competent and powerful H a j . Gen. Teimur B a k h t i a r , who was removed from o f f i c e i n e a r l y 1961 by t h e S h a h , presumably b e c a u s e h e h a d grown t o o powerful. Gen. B a k h t i a r was s u c c e e d e d by Gen. Pskravan. who i n t u r n

    was removed from h i s p o s t s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f Prime M i n i s t e r Hasan A l l H a n r u r o n J a n u a r y 21, 1965. Unfortunately

    SECRET

    SECRET - 8 f o r P a k r a v a n , h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d no advance k ~ ~ o w l t - d go f L I I U ( , , ~ ~ s l > i r d c y e t o a s s a s s i n a t e t h e Prime M i n i s t e r . The p r e s e n t C h i e f of SAVAK,

    L t . Gen. Nematollah N a s i r i , e n j o y s t h e r e p u t a t i o n of b e i n g a r u t h l e s s an<? e f f i c i e n t o f f i c e r who i s l o y a l and d e v o t e d t o t h e Shah. The C l ~ i c i 6 1 1

    SAVAK a l s o s e r v e s a s a n A d v i s e r t o t h e NSC and a s a 1)eputy Prime f - ? i r ~ i s r e r . SAVAK c o n t i n u e s t o be a p o w e r f u l o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t n over211 s t : c ~ ~ r i t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e country.

    Its r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s include

    I I ~ ! ~ L L Un 2 i I

    ot

    p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s o f I r a n i a n s t u d e n t s a b r o a d , t h e i n v e s t i g a t i i ~ ~ ;l o espionage, sabotage, t r e a s o n , i n s u r r e c t i o n and o t h e r subversive * ~ t i v ~ ~ i r * : t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n on p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t l ~ > l i ; s u r v e i l l a n c e o f f o r e i g n e m b a s s i e s , o f f i c i a l d e l e g a t i o n s fro111ab1-.,.1~1 .II;.I r e s i d e n t a l i e n s ; f o r e i g n o p e r a t i o n s connected with i n t e l l i g e n c e dnd counterintelligence; o f f i c i a l l i a i s o n with friendly foreign i n ~ r l l i ~ e l i s r s e r v i c e s ( e s p e c i a l l y w i t h t h e I s r a e l i s ) ; and s e c u r i t y i n t h e c i v l l ~ a n Ministries. A c c o r d i n g t o Ransom H a i g , A t t a c h e , American Embassy, the

    Shah had s a i d , sometime d u r i n g t h e l a s t s i x months, t h a t he want* SAV.4K t o g e t o u t o f p o l i c e t y p e work a n d t o c o n c e n t r a t e on e s p i o n a g e and counterespionage. noticed so far. The Team was p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n SAVAK's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for security i n the c i v i l i a n Ministries. t h i s i n a number o f ways. SAVAK e x e r c i s e s c o n t r o l o v e r However, h e added t h a t n o t much change h a s been

    I n ' t h e f i r s t p l a c e , each M i n i s t r y has a He is a p p o i n t e d by

    S e c u r i t y O f f i c e r a s one of its s e n i o r o f f i c e r s .

    t h e M i n i s t e r i n c o n e u l t a t i o n w i t h SAVAK, which a p p r o v e s him and makes

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    - 9 -

    s u r e t h a t he i s a competent parron.

    S V K emphasizes t h a t these AA Their basic

    S e c u r i t y O f f i c e r s should n o t be changed l i g h t l y ,

    i n s t r u c t i o n i r given by SAVAK. (Mr. Haig t o l d the Team t h a t these O f f i c e r s a r e generally considered by the personnel of the various H i n i r t r i e s t o be mere rtoogss of SAVAK, and t h a t f o r t h i s reason they a r e generally avoided.) I n any case, the S e c u r i t y O f f i c e r s a r e

    obligated t o r e p o r t any s e c u r i t y problem within t h e i r M i n i s t r i e s t o SAVAK. I n a d d i t i o n these O f f i c e r s s i t i n on t h e r e g u l a r meetings of For

    t h e I C C , where t h e r e is a r e g u l a r a i r i n g of s e c u r i t y problems.

    these reasons, S V K does n o t f e e l i t necersary t o have any r e g u l a r l y AA scheduled s e c u r i t y inspection# of M i n i s t r i e s ; however, S V K has the AA r i g h t t o i n v e r t i g a t e any of the M i n i s t r i e r anytima i t thinks i t necessary o r d e s i r a b l e t o do so.
    M r . b i g judged t h a t SAVAK ha# made conriderable progress but

    t h a t by American rtandards it has a long way t o go. plus points f o r S V K a r e AA


    it8

    He f e l t t h a t

    keen awarenear of the Soviet t h r e a t and

    i t s competence i n t h e p o l i t i c a l f i e l d .
    3.
    5-2 Section. Supreme Corrmunder's S t a f f

    J-2 i n 1958, by order of the Shah, absorbed mvny of the


    functions previously c a r r l d o u t by G-2. It now d i r e c t s and coordinates

    I r a n ' s m i l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e e f f o r t and c o l l e c t s , c o l l a t e s and disseminates military intelligence.

    It a l r o has o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r

    the s e c u r i t y of m i l i t a r y perromml and i w t a l l a t i o n a ; m i l i t a r y counterespionage o p e r a t i o m ; r u p o r v b i o n of I r a n i a n m i l i t a r y a t t a c h e s abroad;

    SECRET

    SECRET - 10 and t h e activities of t h e N a t i o n a l R e s i s t a n c e Grganization ( w h ~ c h o r g a n i z a t i o n , s o f a r a s the team was a b l e t o a s c e r t a i n , appears never t o have g o t t e n o f f t h e ground). The head of J-2 s i n c e t h e S p r l n g o f 1961 His immediate p r e d e c e s s o r , Lt Gen.
    toe?

    has been Lt. Gen. A z i z o l l a h Kamcrl.

    Haj A l i Kia, was removed by t h e Shah because he appeared t o be growrng powerful, a not uncommon cause f o r d i s m i s s a l from power i n I r a n .

    LL. Len

    Kamal's t e c h n i c a l competence does n o t seem t o be very h i g h l y regarded, however, t h e r e i s general agreement t h a t he i s a wily o l d fox who always seems t o manage t o come o u t on top. There eeems, however, t o a l s o be a wlde

    measure of agreement i n t h e view, among Americans who have o f f l c l a l c o n t a c t with 5 - 2 , t h a t s e c u r i t y conaciouenesa and p r a c t i c e s w i t h i n 5 - 2 ( and hence wlchin the Armed Forces) have improved g r e a t l y w i t h i n the l a s t y e a r and e s p e c i a l l y w i t h i n t h e l a s t s i x months.

    --

    T h i s seems t o be t r a c e a b l e

    t o a number of reasons, t h e moat Lmportant being t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of I r a n W g e t t i n g s e n s i t i v e equipment (such a s t h e UK and t h e BULLPUP), the d e s x r r

    of the Shah t h a t s e c u r i t y p r a c t i c e s be improved, and t h e p s y c h o l o g l ~ d l e f f e c t ( r e l a t e d t o t h e two preceding p o i n t s ) of t h e v i s i t of the USMICC Team. The ARMISH-EWLG has worked c l o a e l y with 3-2 t o improve S e c u r i t y I n t h e r e s p e c t p a r t i c u l a r c r e d i t is due t o Maj. Robert

    and i n t e l l i g e n c e . Hand, U.S.

    Army, whose h e l p f u l c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e 5-2 appears t o have

    been a major f a c t o r i n improvina i t a s e c u r i t y consciousness and procedures

    4.

    6-2 S e c t i o n of t h e General S t a f f

    6-2 today p l a y r o n l y a minor r o l e i n a e c u r i t y mattera and was

    h t h e r e f o r e of no r p c i a l i n t a r a s t t o t.

    Teu.

    It i r concerned p r i m a r i l y

    with c o l l e c t i n g c a b a t i n t e l l i g a n c a and o r d e r of b a t t l e i n f o w t i o n .

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    - 11

    9.

    -hence

    Corps (CIC) 10 e o n r i d e r e d by most o b s e r v e r s w i t h whom t h e Tedm

    ltu CIC
    t11h.d

    t o be the e l i t e of t h e I r a n i a n i n t e l l i g e n c e and s e c u r i t y orbdnlZhlm war a l r o t h e Team's o b s e r v a t i o n .


    It i s a relatlvrly

    rbtlonr.

    r u l l o r & a n i z e t i o n (611 o f f i c e r s and men a t t h e time of t h e Tram's v l r l t ) b u t p o r r e s s e d of a h i g h degree of e f f i c i e n c y , d i s c i p l i n e all1 Alan.

    I t formerly c a w under 6-2 b u t i s now s u b o r d i n a t e t o 3 - 2 , w r t l ~

    i t r Chief f u n c t i o n i n g a s Deputy 5 - 2 ; i n p r a c t i c e i t seema t o enjoy


    c o n s i d e r a b l e autonomy. I t s prime r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s t o e n s u r e t h e

    l o y a l t y of t h e Armed Forces.

    It g r a n t s s e c u r i t y c l e a r a n c e s f o r m l l i t a l y

    personnel, i n v e s t i g a t e s foreign i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s d i r e c t e d a t the Iranian military establishment, investigates dissident a c t i v i L ~ r a which c o u l d be a t h r e a t t o t h e regime, and checks on p h y s i c a l and document s e c u r i t y i n t h e Armed Forces. One of i t s powers i s t h e r i g h t

    of a r r e s t o v e r m i l i t a r y p e r r o n n e l (and over c i v i l i a n s , provided t h e r e

    is a m i l i t a r y c o n n o t a t i o n ) ; i n t h e e x e r c i s e of which i t i s answerahle
    o n l y t o t h e Shah. The CIC Chief i e B r i g . Gen. A r d e s h i r Tadjbaktish.

    He was a p p o i n t e d Chief o f f i c i a l l y i n October 1963 b u t had been a c t i n g head of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n r i n c e 1958. He i s g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d t o

    be t h e most competent and e n e r g e t i c of r e n i o r I r a n i a n i n t e l l i g e n c e officers. The Country Team r e p o r t # t h e r e ha# been rome d i s c u s s i o n of r e o r g a n i z i n g t h e CIC; i . e . , b r e a k i n g i t up from i t 8 p r e s e n t form and

    a r r i g n i n g tho e l e m n t r t h e r e o f t o f u n c t i o n under r e p a r a t e connnands of t h e Army, Novy and A i r Force. The USMICC Team n o t e d t h a t r u b o r d i n a t i o n

    SECRET

    /
    I

    SECRET - 12 e l t h i s f u n c t i o n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s could handicap


    th.

    CIC's a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t the regime from a m i l i t a r y coyp. 6. I r a n i a n National P o l i c e The I r a n i a n National P o l i c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y through i t s

    Information Bureau, ha8 long had a c l o s e connection with r e c u r i t y In modern I r a n . The formcr o r g a n i z a t i o n i r concerned p r i n c i p a l l y

    r l t h maintaining p u b l i c order i n c i t i e s and towns with more than 5000 Inhabitants where.48 t h e l a t t e r ha8 a r t r i c t l y c o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e oL#rion. Concurrently with SAVAK, t h e National P o l i c e has t h e of watching over t h e a c t i v i t i e s of f o r e i g n e r s i n the.e T o t a l s t r e n g t h of the National P o l i c e is approximately

    ra.ponsibllity c i t i e s and tow-.

    14,000; t h i s f i g u r e including o f f i c e r s , noncowissioned o f f i c e r s , e n l i s t e d men and c i v i l i a n employees. S i n c e January 30, 1965. the

    Chief of t h e National P o l i c e h a r been MaJ. Gen. Mohsen,Mobasser, a close f r i e n d of L t . Gen. N a s i r i (head of SAVAK) whom he succeeded

    s n Chief of P o l i c e .
    The Information Bureau i r headed by Brig. Gen. Samad Samadianpur.
    Nls organization'.

    primary d u t i e r c o n s i s t of investigation of i n d i v i d u a l s

    end groups engaged i n o r suspected o f rubversive a c t i v i t i e s and watching loreignera i n I r a n . To t h e s e andr, t h e p o l i c e have p e n e t r a t e d govern( l e g e l and i l l e g a l ) , t r a d e unions,

    r n t agencies, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e r

    1 a l i g i o u s group8 and i n f a c t . t h e whole framework of c i v i l l i f e i n Iran. Information from t h e s e informants and o t h e r r o u r c e s flows

    r e u u l a r l y t o t h e Information Buroru which d i l e r t r it and f i l e r i t

    . .

    In i t s C e n t r a l Rogimtry.

    T h i r l a t t e r o r g a n i r a t i o n among o t h e r items

    - 13 on eolnc 1,600,000 paraons.

    SECRET

    has on hand according t o Cen. Samadianpur, the f i n g e r p r i n t s of one f i f t h of the population of I r a n and f i l e s (not including criminal ones) Gen, Samadianpur added t h a t the organization on everyone i n I r a n .

    hoped e v e n t u a l l y t o have f i n g e r p r i n t s end file.

    b a n g o t h e r information contained i n t h e f i l e s a r e the biographier of


    a11 member# of a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e r (legal and i l l e g a l ) i n I r a n .
    7

    Imuerial I r a n i a n Gendarmerie

    b a g the eeveral s e c u r i t y organizations i n I r a n , the Gendarmerie

    is u s u ~ l l ygiven t h e poorest aurks.


    t h e present c-nder.

    Gen. h l i k , t h e predecessor of

    succeeded Cen. A r i z i (who was removed f o r

    corruption) and m a s a i d t o have spont 95 p e r cent of h i 8 time f i g h t i n g corruption and only 5 per cent on the day t o day business of t h e Gen&rwrie. The organization has a s t r e n g t h of some 36.000 Somewhere Pay i s

    o f f i c e r s and man, but i t is badly underatrength i n o f f i c e r s . between 40 and 60 p a r c e n t of the e n l i s t a d men a r e i l l i t e r a t e . vary low.

    Over 2000 Gendarmerie p o r t s a r e m a i n t a i ~ dthroughout I r a n . 1) t o provide law

    The main f u n c t i o w of t h e Gendarmerie a r e :

    enforcmnent i n c i t i e s and towns of la88 than 5000 population ( t h i n takes i n 75 t o 80 per c e n t of the country). 2) bordor control ( i n 1963 t h e Gendarmerie i n t e g r a t e d a o u 5,600 border guardsman who u n t i l then hed been a p a r t of the Army), 3) conocription, 4) c o n t r o l of smuggling. 5) t o p r w i d e i n t e l l i g e n c e on bordor a r e a a , 6) j u d i c i a r y ; e.g.. a d j u d i c a t i o n of v i l l a g e dlmputea and land reform, 7) t o provide

    e a r l y warning and i n i t k l r e a i r t a o c e i n care of e g n a a i o n , and 8) e u n n i l l a n c e (concurrently with SAVAK) i n t h e tonu and c i t i e s under its jurisdiction.

    14

    SECRET

    SECRET

    - 14

    There a r e hopeful aignr t h a t the effectiveness of the Gendarmerie m y improve. The nev (aince September 1965) c o m n d e r , M.j. Gen Ovesi. of the e l i t e Guarda Diviaion, has shown

    vho war previourly c-nder

    arch i n t e r e a t i n training, i n education and i n reorganization of Gen&rwrie Headquarter..


    A new pey rcale, similar t o t h a t of 'the

    Army, ha8 been approved; hovever, funds f o r i t have not yet been appropriated. h e United Statca i a reeking t o have an Officer Candidate

    School e 8 m b l i8h.d. The Chief of the U.S. Mirrion t o the Gendarmerie (GENWISH) feela t h a t the Genbrmerie derpfte
    it8

    vcakneares i a an e f f e c t i v e

    organization and t h a t i t playa an important r o l e i n maintaining r t a b i l i t v in r u r a l areaa. (The CEUMISH advirory function t o the Gendarmerie

    i s provided by t r e a t y , vhich prohibitr any other nation from providing the name function. According t o the Chief, GENMISH, renegotiation of

    thia t r e a t y f o r any n a r o n GENMISH t o W S H


    8.

    auch a8 f o r the purpore of r u b o r d i ~ t i n y

    could jeoperdiae t h i r monopoly.)

    S w c i a l I n t e l l i a e n c e Office N diacuraion of the Iranian r e c u r i t y and intelligence o

    comaunity would be complete vithout mention of the Special Intelligence Office. Thir i a a rmll u n i t of about 40 o f f i c e r 8 and men ertablished I t s purpore i r t o

    by the Shah within the Imperial Palace i n 1959.

    keep the Shah a b r u r t of a l l r$@nificant developments reported by member* of the int.lligence empowred t o conduct rp.ci.1 c-nity and other aervicer.

    It i s

    i n w r t i g a t i o r u and i n q u i r i e r .

    I t r head,

    SECRET

    SECRET
    M s j . Gen. Hosein Farduet i r a p r o f e s s i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c i a l

    S i n c e 1962 he has been t h e Deputy Chief o f SAVAK. e f f i c i e n t and completaly l o y a l t o t h e Shah.

    He in known to be

    SECRET

    SECRET.

    - 16 V

    INTERAGENCY REWTIONSHIPS A D COORnINqTION N Although it would be d i f f i c u l t t o p r e s e n t any g r e a t amaunt o t

    f a c t u a l d a t a t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e p o i n t , i t vould a p p e a r t h a t i n t e r agency r e l a t i o n s h i p s and c o o r d i n a t i s n e r e r a t h e r b e t a e r


    I

    time of t h e previous s u r v e y

    than a t t h e

    and perhaps s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r I r a n z a n Since t h e

    purposes even though n o t up t o i d e a l Araerican s t a n d a r d s .

    heads o f SAVAK. J-2, t h e N a t i o n a l P o l i c e and t h e Gendarmerie a l l r e p o r t d i r e c t l y t o t h e Shah, i t vould appear t h a t a c e r t a i n amount of c o o r d i n a t i o n must m a e s s a r i l y be e f f e c t e d by t h e Shah, i n s o f a r a s t h i s a p p e a r s t o be d e s i r a b l e and e x p a d i e n t t o him. A f u r t h e r inlormal

    c o o r d i n a t i o n and c o n t r o l would a p p e a r t o be e x e r t e d through t h e p o s i t i o r and person of Maj. Gen. F a r d u s t , who, a s p e r s o n a l f r i e n d of t h e Shah, Deputy Chief of SAVAK, and t h e man r e s p o n s i b l e f o r keeping t h e Shah a b r e a s t of i n t e l l i g e n c e and a e c u r i t y developments, must n e c e s s a r i l y a l s o c a r r y o u t some c o o r d i n a t i n g f u n c t i o n s . informal r e l a t i o n s h i p would S t i l l a n o t h e r c l o s e and

    e x i s t by v i r t u e of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e

    c l o s e f r i e n d o f t h e Chief of S V K h a s followed him a s Chief of t h e AA National Police.

    It i s h a r d l y n e c e s s a r y t o add t h a t t h e s e men would

    n o t be i n t h e p o s i t i o n s they now occupy i f they d i d not e n j o y t h e confidence o f t h e Shah. On a more formal l e v e l , t h e monthly meetings of t h e ICC bring together the S e c u r i t y O f f i c e r s of the aeveral M i n i s t r i e s . a h i g h e r l e v e l , t h e r e a r e t h e monthly o r \I-tdonthly On

    IPCC, on v h i c h a 1 1 M i n i s t r i e r a r e r e p r e r e n t e d
    o v e r by t h e Chief o f SAVAK.

    meetings of t h e

    and v h i c h is p r e s i d e d

    And a t a s t i l l h i w e r l e v e l , t h e r e a r e

    SECRET

    SECRET - 17 t h e meetingr of t h e NSC, preaided over by t h e P r i m M i n i r t e r and a t t e n d e d by t h e Supreme Chief o f S t a f f , a r w e l l a r by t h e Chiefs of

    J-2,

    t h e National Police. SAVAK, and t h e Gendarmerie.

    Can. Tadjbrkhrh

    t o l d t h e Team t h a t a t t h e lower l e w l r CIC and S V K have d a i l y AA c o o r d i m t i n g u e t i n g r and t h r t a t a mowwhat h i g h e r l e v e l CIC. S V K AA and National P o l i c e Repreaentativer have weekly meetingr f o r t h a t purpore. He added. c a n d i d l y t h r t t h e r e were no p r o b l e m on cooperat ton

    between CIC, SkVM and t h e National P o l i c e (Information Bureau) except a t t h e h i g h e r t l e v e l r , by which he maant t h e Generals commanding there organiaationr

    a t which l e v e l he r a i d t h e r e w r e t h e u r w l

    p e r s o n a l i t y p r o b l e m and t i v a l r i e r over a l l o c a t i o n r of money and perronnel

    SECRET

    SECRET
    18

    II
    1I
    1

    VI

    SECURITY I N COVEWMENT MPARTMENTS


    Sc f a r a r the c i v i l i a n r i d e of t h e t u t i o f u l government 18

    concerned, t h e Team d i d not nuke any obaemationr which vould i n d i c a t e any rubrt.ntia1 amount of progrerr beyond t h a t reported i n HIC 2061129, except i n the f i e l d of perronnel r e c u r i t y (dircurred l a t e r ) and that of t h e r e g u l a t i o n r c o n t r o l l i n g r e c u r i t y . At 80i n d e f i n i t e date

    (apparently not too long a f t e r t h e l a r t WCC rurvey) f a i r l y d e t a i l e d r e c u r i t y r e g u l a t i o n r f o r a11 of the c i v i l i a n m i n i s t r i e s w r e promulgated by SAVAK. There contain 97 s e p a r a t e a r t i c l e r and a s a r e c u r i t y

    puideline vould appear t o be e x c e l l e n t . I n t h e c a r e of t h e Armed Forces, nev and d e t a i l e d s e c u r i t y regulations have been promulgated w i t h i n t h e l a s t r i x months. was a p p r r e n t l y i n s p i r e d by the v i r i t of t h e USHICC Team.

    This

    The regulations

    themeelves were adapted by ARl4ISH-UUG from United S t a t e s A i r Force Security Regulationr and they a r e accordingly up t o t h e rtandardr which might be expected.

    It wa8 t h e Team1# view t h a t s e r i o u s e f f o r t s

    a r e baing made by the Atlad Force8 t o o b r e r w and implemant these regulationr. dirtributed. Initially
    rP ow

    200 copiea of t h e r e regulation. were

    A f u r t h e r 300 a r e nou being d i r t r i b u t e d and t h i n w i l l An encouraging

    bring the distribution down t o the B a t t a l i o n l e v e l .

    obrervation, which t h e Toam voitxd t o the IUFlCIC Conmanding O f f i c e r , var t h a t t h e new I U F recurit): r r g u l a t i o n r a n u n c l a a e i f i e d (they vere formerly c l a r r i f i e d ) , thereby f a c i l i t a t t n g wide dissemination and guidance.

    SECRET

    SECRET - 19

    VII

    J'HYSICAL SECURITY
    1.
    C i v i l b n Miniatriea

    As noted !hove, t h e r e is l i t t l e t o add e x c e p t f a r promulgatior~

    d f t h e aforementioned a e c u r i t y r e g u l a t i o n a . which provide i n a f a i r


    a w u n t o f d e t a i l f o r t h e p r a c t i c e o f good p h y a i e a l s e c u r i t y p r o c e d u r e s . How t h e s e a r e c a r r i e d o u t i n p r a c t i c e l a something t h e Team d i d n o t observe.

    I t m y be n o t e d , howaver, t h a t i n t h e o p i n i o n of most

    q u a l i f i e d American o b s e r v e r s , p h y a i w l s e c u r i t y p r a c t i c e s i n t h e v a r i o u s c i v i l i a n M i n i a t r i e s a r e v e r y poor a s compared t o t h o s e i n t h e Armed Forces.

    2.

    Armed Forces

    The Team had c o n s i d e r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e physical s e c u r i t y p r a c t i c e s a t 3-2 Headquartera, a t A i r Force H e a d q u a r t e r s , a t


    C I C Headquarters, and a t Mehrabad A i r b a s e .

    P l a n s f o r obaerving p r a c t i c

    a t Derful A i r b a s e and a t K h o r r a m h a h r Naval Base had t o be c a n c e l l e d w i n g t o t h e u n f a v o r a b l e f l y i n g weather. I n the places v i s i t e d ,

    p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y p r a c t i c e r obaerved w e r e e x c e l l e n t . e s p e c i a l l y a t Mehrabed A i r Baae. P r a c t i c e s obaervad included:

    24 hour g u a r d s , r o v i l

    f o o t and motorized p a t r o l a , c l a a e a x i t and e n t r y r u p e r v i s i o n procedure1 a d e q u a t e f e n c i n g , l i g h t i n g and document c o n t r o l procedures and a h i g h d e g r e e of s e c u r i t y consciousness and a l e r t n e s s among t h e personnel a t t h e i n s t a l l a t i o r u mentioned.

    SECRET

    SECRET - 20

    VIII

    CONTROL OF CUSSIFIED MATTER The Team d i d n o t have a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o survey document c o n t r o l

    procedures i n t h e c i v i l i a n M i n i s t r i e s and Agencies. r e a s o n a b l e t o assume t h a t procedure. l a s t survey.

    I t i s prohably

    have n o t changed much s i n c e t h e

    Howevet, s o f a r a a t h e Armed Forces a r e concerned, both

    t h e Teamb o b s e r v a t i o n s ahd t h o s e o f American o b s e r v e r s on t h e s c e n e were i n agreement t h a t document c o n t r o l procedures have improved tremendously. P r a c t i c e s i n t h i s r e g a r d were observed i n 3-2 Head-

    ~.

    q u a r t e r s , i n A i r Force Headquartera and a t Mehrabad A i r Base (which l a t t e r p l a c e has o n l y a r e l a t i v e l y few c l e s r i f i e d documents). In

    t h e two Headquarters mentioned, document c o n t r o l procedures were excellent. inttoduced. I n both u s e @ t h e improved procedures had been only r e c e n t l y Apart from a n i n c r e a s e d s e c u r i t y c o n s c i o u @ n e s s , t h e

    reason f o r t h e improved procedures l i e s mainly i n s t u d y of t h e new s e c u r i t y r e g u l a t i o n s , which n a u l t e d i n t h e w r i t i n g of some new SOP'S


    A f u r t h e r r e a s o n i s t h e p r o g r e s s o f t h e program t o make widespread

    d i s t r i b u t i o n o f new combination l o c k i n g s t e e l s a f e s ; o f v h i c t ~ 300 have been o r d e r e d and o v e r 80 a l r e a d y d i s t r i b u t e d . (Note: There were Each

    o n l y 2 4 s a f e s i n t h e e n t i r e Armrd Force0 f o u r yearn a g o ) .

    Heaequarters m a i n t a i n s a document c o n t r o l c e n t e r where a l l M P SECRET and SECRET documents must be k e p t . Such documents may be checked

    o u t by t h e d u l y a u t h o r i z e d p e r s o n n e l b u t must be r e t u r n e d a t t h e c l o a e o f each work day. hour. p e r day. The C e n t e r s have armed guards on duty 24

    During working h o u r s , t h e d o c u u n t c o n t r o l c e n t e r

    SECRET

    SECRET - 21 officer ir p n r e n t . T h i r o f f i c e r h a r r e r p o n s i b i l i t y among o t h e r thing8 f o r keeping c a r e f u l record8 t o l o p i n and o u t c l a r r i f i e d documents, and t o follow through on checked o u t documents t o s e e t h a t they a r e r e t u r n e d . He a l r o keepr on f i l e l i r t r of perrons a u t h o r i z e d I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e Team

    t o have a c c c r r t o t h e v a r i o u r documentr.

    underrtood t h a t a c c e r r t o SECRET and TOP SECRET documents is norn~ally l i m i t e d t o t h e man who needs t o know t h e i r c o n t e n t and t o a deputy. I n t h e r e Headquarterr, c l a r r i f i e d t r a r h and unclassified t r a s h i s c o l l e c t e d and burned a t t h e end o f each working day. The Document Control Center a t Hahrabad A i r Base i s i n a 8-11 b u i l d i n g which i t r h a r e r with t h e l o c a l CIC o f f i c e . The

    Center has barred windowr, a 24 hour armed guard and one of t h e new a a f e s r e f e r r e d t o previoualy.

    I t r procedures a r e r i m i l a r t o those i n

    t h e Headquarter8 p r e v i o u r l y d i r c u r r e d , with some l o c a l v a r i a t i o n s ; e . g . , t h e TOP SECRET and SECReT documents kept i n i t may be r t u d i e d only i n t h e Documant Control Center of t h e h a e S e c u r i t y O f f i c e r . I n t h e opinion of l o c a l Americen o b r e r v e r s f a m i l i a r with these ~ t t e r r ,I r a n i a n document c o n t r o l s e c u r i t y ha8 made c o n r i d e r a b l e a t r i d e r and i r s t i l l improving. One impetur t o t h L had been the u n l e r r they a r e under t h e personal c o n t r o l

    a r r i v a l o f CENT0 c l r r r i f i e d documentr; f o r which c a r e f u l r e c u r i t y p r o c e d u n s were introduced a n d , a r e r t i l l b e i n s c a r r i e d o u t .

    SECRET

    SECRET

    - 22

    IX

    PERSONNEL SECURITY
    The p a r a o n ~ lr e c u r i t y program a8 i t e x i a t a in I r a n ia what an

    American probably would consider t o be a r e c u r i t y

    &

    loyalty program.

    Ona well-qualified American obmerver termed the armed forcea aecurity program a s o m baaed l v i n l y on procedures i n the U . S . armed forces. but
    OM

    on which a loyalty program baa been auparimpoaed and whore The e n t i r e armed forcer r e c u r i t y program

    factor. may be determining. i s administered by the CIC.

    It i a i l l u r t r a t i v e t o conaider the procedures

    followed in the care of aomeone volunteering f o r the armed forces. Among other thing., he muat c m p l e t e
    l

    lengthy application giving h i s

    pcr801ml h i r t o r y , the m m s and eddreeaea of hia r e l a t i v e s t o the t h i r d degree, h i r place of reaideace (he muat accompany t h i s with a mrp showing location of hia residence), any job. he m y have had.

    any p r i o r rervice i n the armed forcer, hi8 citi;anship and any previous c i t i r e n r h i p he may have had, m u 8 of hi8 achool c l a r a u t e s , ~ n a of a any rel&tivea l i v i n g abroad, mmr of a i x perrona f o r r e f e n n c a s , rnmberahip i n any p o l i t i c a l , a t h l e t i c , charitable, r e l i g i o u s , or aociable o r g a n i u t i o n (he i a purposefully allowed only 15 minuter t o f i l l out t h i a section). i n f o r u t i o n aa t o any r e l a t i v e who may be a c t i v e i n any p o l i t i c a l party, h i r v h r aa t o which party candidates he thinks would be good f o r the country, any mployment f o r agencies of a foreign country, i n f o r u t i m about potroar who m y h a w introduced him i n t o m p l o y n n t f o r much a p n c i e a , and *ether t o any p a r t y whleh he ir ayapethetic The f i l l i n g

    ir i n m i t i e n

    te tbe #oven*mt.

    SECRET

    SECRET
    of t h i r document lust be vitnerred by CIC men and i t s truthfulness sworn t o by the a p p l i a n t . together He u r t a l e o rupply mix photographs from which they w r e m d e ( p r i n t r may be

    athe negative

    a l t e r e d ) and hi8 I D card (which i r then checked against the one on f i l e mtionally). Two f i n g e r p r i n t card8 a r e f i l l e d out. Local agency

    and national agency checks a r e then mede; i.8.. Gendarmerie, and C i v i l Courts. from 5 t o 7 monthr.

    with Police, SAVAK,

    Thir clearance procedure m y take

    I f 411 i r ruccarrful and the applicant otherwise

    qualified t o e n t e r the armed forcer he would be allowed ( i n cases where there war a need t o knw) accerr t o c l a a r i f i e d material throug1:h CONFIDENTIAL. Should he require accerr t o SECRET and TOP SECRET there Civilian8 seeking

    would have t o be more derailed invertigationr.

    employwnt with the armed forcer a r t go through the r a m procedures. With regard t o p 8 r 8 o n ~ laecurity i n the c i v i l i a n Minirtrics, an important control i r the requirement, l a i d down by Prime Ministerial decree, t h a t potential employeem muat be referred t o S V K f o r clearsnc AA before being hired. SAVAK'r principal concern i n much clearances i s

    the p o l i t i c a l background of the perronr concerned.

    I t claima t o

    have r o e f i l a r on r o e 100.000 p.rsonr, each f i l a containing derogator information. There i r general acknowledgement t h a t there f i l e 8 a r e

    w r y ccmprohemive and thorough.

    A11 p o r i t i o m i n a11 of .the Minimtrier a r e divided i n t o three catagorier:


    1) Mpulef. 2) S w u i t i v e and 3) Important and S e m i t i v e .

    24

    C a t c p ~ n r y 2 V , V I \ ~l , r o
    t ~ ~ ~ , t , p \ t .
    i

    ~ r c g o r v1 l o b s .\re l o w - r a n k i n g n o n - s e n s i t i v e t>nes: minor c l e r h s .

    1 1 ~ ~ 1 t 1 .C I~C.B ~ I I I I ~ : perst)111101, e t c , r
    , I (

    ILIL

    lrtdr p e r s o n s d e a l ilig

    WI

    t h codes.

    C a t e g o r y 3 wo11I d i11cl11dc.

    r f ! l , l s t e r s and 1 ) i r e c t o r s G e n e r a l .

    SAVAK h a s on<* torsi t o Itc uae,l

    M l n i s t r l c s a p p l y i n g f o r c l e a r a n c e s f o r p e r s o n s ill CaLepury I
    und

    a more d e t a i l e d one t o he u s e d f o r p e r s o n s i n Cett.gi3r1c.s 2 e~t'l 'I The form f o r ?otcp,or). 1

    These forms must be used h y a l l M i n i s t r i e s .

    r i v e s o n l y enough i n f o r m a t i o n t o e n a b l e SAVAK f i l e s t o be checked


    l o r p o l i t i c a l background.

    The o t h e r form c o n t a i n s s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r I

    m t i c m t o e n a b l e SAVAK t o c a r r y o u t a more d e t a i l e d hackgrounrl illve+t


    yr

    ~ l u n . Both forms show the p o s i t i o n a n a p p l i c a n t 2s b e i n g considere.1


    So f a r a s t h e Team c o u l d a s c e r t a i n , t h e background i n v e a t i -

    for.

    gations c a r r i e d o u t i n t h e c a s e s o f a p p l i c a n t s i n C a t e g o r i e s 2 and 3
    a r e e x t r e m e ] v thorough and d e t a i l e d .

    SECRET"'

    *.

    '

    SECRET
    X

    LNDUSTRIAL SECURIn
    Them doom not e x i s t what could r e a l l y be c e l l e d an industrial

    s e c u r i t y program i n I r a n , si,nce the need f o r i t has not existed i n any s i g n i f i c a n t degree. T h e n is i n f a c t the rudiments of such a program which e x i s t f o r workera i n a m n i t i o n and

    i n c l u r e n c e procedure.

    ordnance f a c t o r i e s end f o r workers who a r e t o be employed i n constructlo11 of a defense base.

    SECRET

    SECRET

    - 26

    I
    I

    1.

    Thera i a an adequate l e g e l baais f o r the I r a n i a n aecuriLy

    program and c l e a r avidence of a p p l i c a t i o n of s t r i n g e n t p e n a l t i e r where the a e c u r i t y of t h e S t a t e i a a t at.ke.


    2.

    Notvithatandiag some overlap i n function8 of t h e aacurity

    agenciea*, they operate e f f e c t i v e l y , a t the appropriata l e v e l of government with d i r e c t acceas t o and control by t h e Shah. Although

    both c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y agenciea have a8 t h e i r primary o b j e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n and preaarvation of t h e preaent regime, they a r e f u l l y aware of t h e Sino-Soviet t h r e a t . I n a p i t e of continued r i v a l r y

    among t h e a e c u r i t y agenciea, it doer not appear t o a f f e c t adveraelv coordination and cooparation a t operational l e v e l s .

    3.

    Government-wide s e c u r i t y regulationa, iaaued with the

    personal approval of t h e Shah, have been i n e f f e c t aince a h o r t l y a f t e r the l a a t USMICC survey. Theae r a g u l a t i o r u , which a r e e a r e n t i a l l y

    a statement of p r i n c i p l e # , have not been expanded i n t o d e t a i l e d regulationa except f o r t h e Armed Forces and the a e c u r i t y agencies.
    4.

    'ple I r a n i a n S e c u r i t y Program haa made marked general improve-

    ment aince the l a a t USHICC aurvey, r e f l e c t i n g development of a bigher l e v e l of s e c u r i t y conaciowneaa.


    5.

    Notwithatanding a lack of d e t a i l e d phyaical a e c u r i t y regu-

    l a t i o n ~and shortages of a e c u r i t y o q u i p m t . a high o r d e r of physical *Special I n t e l l i g e n c e Group of I m p r i a l C w r t J-2 CIC SVK AA National P o l i c e (including information Bureau)'

    SECRET

    SECRET

    27

    s e c u r i t y i s ac;higved w i t h i n t h e I r a n i a n Armed F o r c e s t h r o u g h . i n t e n s i v e u s e o f g u a r d p c ~ r o n n e l . E x c e p t f o r t h e s e c u r i t y a g e n c i e s , no e v i d e ~ a c r o f a p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y program o u t s i d e o f k t h e Armed F o r c e s was p r e s e o r e d .

    6.

    A t the i n s t a n c e . and w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e , o f ~ I S H I M A A G , a

    document c o n t r o l progrrm was i n s t i t u t e d i n t h e S p r i n g o f 1965 through t h e i s n u a n c e o f A m d F o r c e s n e c u r i t y r e g u l a t i o n s , b a s e d upon USAF AFR 205-1. P r a c t i c e s q b s e r v e d were i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e r e g u l a t i o n s .

    E f f e c t i v e implellulntation q f t h i s program w i l l depend d i r e c t l y upon t h e s u s t a i n e d e f f o r t s o f commsndern and o f t h e 3-2 (SCS). Except f o r

    t h e s e c u r i t y a g e n c i e s , , n o e v i d e n c e a f a document c o n t r o l program o u t s i d e o f t h e Armed F o r c e s was p r e s e n t e d .


    7.

    The p q r s o n n e l s e c u r i t y program o f t h e c i v i l i a n r e c u r i t y

    agencies focuses primarily on,loyalty (leek of opposition t o the p r e s e n t regime). The Arrmd F a r c e s o p e r a t e a more e f f e c t i v e personnel

    s e c u r i t y program,by a d d r e s s i n g b o t h l o y a l t y and s e c u r i t y f a c t o r s .

    8.

    The r e c e n t l y t n i t t . t e d

    s e c u r i t y t r a i n i n g program of t h e

    Armed F o r c e s needa f u r t h e r development.


    9.

    E f f e c t i v e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e I r a n i a n s e c u r i t y program

    c a n b e s t be a s s u r e d by e n g a g i n g t h e c o n t i n u e d . i n t e r e s t .and r e s p o n s i h i i i t y . o f t h e Shah. LO. I n t h e a b s e n c q o f a r e q u i r e m e n t , t h e r e i s no i n d u s t r i a l N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t is t h e p r a c t i c e of the

    s e c u r i t y program i n I r a n .

    Armed F o r c e s t o s c r e e n c i v i l i a n p e r s o n n e l employed on c o n s t r u c t i o n and manufacturing p r o j e c t s o f d e f e n r e i n t e r e s t .

    SECRET

    SECRET - 28 XI1

    RECOMMENA4TIONS I t i s recommanded t h a t : 1. The Ambassador a d v i s e t h e Shah o f t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of

    Lmsuing a n i n s t r u c t i o n e x p r e s s i n g t h e S h a h ' s i n t e r e s t i n a s s u r i n g t h e p r o t e c t i o n a t a l l l e v e l s of U n i t e d S t a t e s o r i g i n c l a s s i f i e d i n f o r m a t i o n and equipment. The p o s a i b l e u t i l i t y o f a s p e c i a l

    designator-procedure warrants consideration i n t h i s regard.

    2.

    ARHISHIMAAG s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o s t i m u l a t e and s u p p o r t t h e

    f u r t h e r development o f a l l a s p e c t s o f t h e A r w d F o r c e s s e c u r i t y program.

    3.
    I

    S e c u r i t y t r a i n i n g i n t h e Armed F o r c e s s h o u l d be pursued

    vigorously a s an e s s e n t i a l t o e f f e c t i v e implementation of t h e s e c u r i t y program.

    '

    4.

    ARMISH/MAAG s h o u l d a r r a n g e f o r p e r s o n s s e l e c t e d f o r t h e

    llAWK Program t o r e c e i v e s p e c i a l s e c u r i t y i n d o c t r i n a t i o n r e l e v a n t t o

    1
    1I

    the p r o t e c t i o n o f t h a t weapons s y s t e m .

    S i m i l a r a c t i o n s h o u l d be t a k e n

    c o n c e r n i n g a n y o t h e r c l a s s i f i e d equipment which may be r e l e a s e d . 5. ARMISIMAAG, o v e r t h e n e x t two y e a r s , forward t o USMICC a

    memi-annual p r o g r e s s r e p o r t o n t h e I r a n i a n s e c u r i t y program.

    SECRET

    SECRET - 29 XI11
    CONCLUSION While the s e c u r i t y program o f t h e I r a n i a n Armed Forces i s a d r q u u l t t o p r o t e c t United S t a t e s c l a s s i f i e d m i l i t a r y information and equip~neirt. i t i s d e s i r a b l e that a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n be taken t o implement tlre a h ( ? v e recomenda t ions.

    SECRET

    SECRET

    - 30 A NX A NE USMICC TEAM IRAN

    1965

    Hr

    Robert N. Margrave

    Chairman, USMICC; D i r e c t o r , O f f l c e o f Munitions Control ; Department of S t a t e , Chairman. C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency.

    Hr

    Eugene M . Winters

    1.p~. HI

    James A, Cavanaugh, U N S

    Navy Member, USMICC.

    Howard R . Boose

    Army A l t e r n a t e Member, USMICC. A i r Force A l t e r n a t e Member, USMICC.

    11 HI

    Col. Thomas H. Gunn, USAF 1)onald S . H a r r i s

    S e c r e t a r y , USMICC; Department of S t a t e ; S e c r e t a r y

    SECRET

    SECRET

    A NX B NE PRINCIPAL IRANIAN OFFICIALS WITH W O USMICC TEAM CONFERRED HM B e r e n d j i a n , Col. H . , IIAF CIC Commander and IIAF A-2

    Haskem, Mr., Dept. 4, S V K AA Kamal, L t . Gen. A z i z o l l a h , C h i e f , 3 - 2 Mahootian, B r i g . Gen., C h i e f , S e c u r i t y (Dept. 4 ) , S V K AA Moghadam, C o l . , Dept. 3 , S V K AA Mobasser, Maj. Gen. Mohsen, C h i e f , National P o l i c e M o t a h a r i , Col. M . , Deputy Base Commander, Mehrabad A i r Base

    AA Motazed, Maj. Gen., C h i e f , Foreign I n t e l l i g e n c e , S V K Samadianpur, B r i g . Gen. Samad, Chief of I n f o r m a t i o n Bureau, National Police Tadjbakhsh, Brig. Gen. A r d e s h i r . C h i e f , CIC

    SECRET

    SECRET
    32

    A NX C NE I'KINCIPAL ANERICAN OFFICIALS WITH WO USMICC T A CONFERRED HM EM Mryer, The Honorable Armin, American Ambassador AmIi, B r i g . Gen. Hughes L . , C h i e f , Army S e c t i o n , MAAG
    I

    mnnady, Col. P r e s t o n B., C h i e f , GENMISH Defense Attache and Army Attache

    ('avness, Col. William D . , (onway, Alan C . , Ihdnn, Leland M . , Attache

    Economic O f f i c e r

    Ilaig, Ransom S . , Attache (land, Maj. Robert D . ,


    5 - 2 , AMISH-MAAG

    Ilnrlan, Robert, Counselor f o r Economic A f f a i r s I l e l s e t h , William A., Political Officer

    llerz, M a r t i n F., Counselor f o r P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s lahlonsky, Maj. Gen. Harvey A., C h i e f , ARMISH-MAAG


    I ucke, B r i g . Gen..

    C h i e f , A i r Force Advisory S e c t i o n , M A AG

    Mudd, R . Clayton, S p e c i a l A s s i r t a n t t o t h e Ambassador

    tllson, Richard L., Regional S e c u r i t y O f f i c e r I'rim, Maj. B i l l y R . , A s r i s t a n t A i r A t t a c h e W a l l i s , Capt. F. H., C h i e f , Navy S e c t i o n , MAAG York, L t . Col. B. M., A i r A t t a c h e

    SECRET

    SECRET - 33 -

    ANNJiX D SCHEDULE USMICC VISIT IRAN Monday. October 25, 1965 1000 1300 1330

    - 1965

    1100

    Meeting w i t h Ambassador Meyer Meeting w i t h M a j . Gen. J a b l o n s k y , C h i e f ARMISH-MAAG Meeting w i t h Maj. Hand, AMISH-MAAG Meeting w i t h M r . Alan Conway, A t t a c h e

    - 1330
    1515 1700

    1530 -

    Tuesday, October 26, 1965 1000 1100 Meeting w i t h M r . Ransom S . Haig, A t t a c h e Meeting w i t h M r . W i l l i a m A. H e l s e t h , P o l l t i c a l S e c t i o n

    Wednesday. October 2 7 , 1965 0930 1245

    1230 1630

    Meeting w i t h Maj. Gen. Kamal, 3 - 2 , SCS, and B r i g Ta ibakhsh C h i e f , IICIC Lunch and Meeting w i t h Chief IICIC

    Gen.

    T h u r s d a y , October 28. 1965 0930

    1415 1530 1630 -

    1230 1530 1630 1730

    Col. B e r e n d j i a n , C h i e f , IIAF

    CIC, IIAF H e a d q u a r t e r s

    Col. Cannady, USA, C h i e f GENMISH Col. York, Maj. Prim, A i r A t t a c h e and A s s i s t a n t A i r A t t a c

    M r . Herz, C o u n s e l o r f o r P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s

    F r i d a y . O c t o b e r 29. 1965 0900 1000 1000

    M r . Olron. R e g i o n a l S e c u r i t y O f f i c e r . I r a n
    Col. C a v n e r s , USA, Dafense A t t a c h e

    - 1100 1100 - 1200

    M r . H a r l a n , C o u n r e l o r f o r Economic A f f a i r s , and M r . Dunn,


    Economic O f f i c e r

    SECRET

    ANNEX C ( c o n t ' d . )
    :,a turday, October 30.

    1965

    0930

    1415 1100

    1230 1830 1830

    Meeting w i t h S V K o f f i c i a l s AA V i s i t t o l O l s t F i g h t e r Wing, Mehrabad A i r Base, T e h r a ~ i , t a l k s w i t h Col. M. Motahari, Deputy Base Commander. T a l k s w i t h Maj. Gen. Mobasser, Chief o f National P o l i c e , and Brig. Gen. Samadianpur, Chief of I n f o m t i ( ~ n Bureau o f N a t i o n a l P o l i c e

    Mt!nday, November 1 , 1965 OH00


    1 0 )0

    T r a v e l t o Mehrabad A i n connection w i t h planned two-dav B t r i p t o Deeful, Abadan and Khorramshahr.

    1730

    M r . Ransom Haig, Attache

    Iuesday, November 2. 1965 0430


    i

    1130

    M j. Hand, ARMISH-WG a

    Wednesday, November 3 . 1965 11100 1400 1')30 B r i g . Gen. Ash, C h i e f , Army S e c t i o n , M M G Farewell c a l l on Gen. Kamal, 5-2 E x i t B r i e f i n g , Maj. Gen. Jablonsky E x i t B r i e f i n g , Ambassador Meyer

    1
    !

    1800

    Sllursday, November 4
    OHJO

    Depart f o r Rome

    SECRET

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    Summary The url>an, e d u c a t e d a c t i v i s t youill o f I r a n c o m p l - i s c s o n l y a s e ~ v ~ e l 0 1t' t h e 1 o 1 i t 1 y o ~ i 11 i l population. I l o w e v e r , i t is b e l i e v c d t h a t t h e f u t u r e managers o f I r a n i a n s o c i c t y will. b e drawn rrom t l r i s g r o u p . \!ore i r ~ ~ a i c c l ieall y , a s 54:; o f a l l I r a n i a n s a r e u n d e r t h e a.ge o f 2 4 , t i r e v i e w s o f t h i s C r o u p a r c inipo1.1a11l. A c o n s t a n t t a r g e t o f SA\'AK. u r b a n a c l i v i s t s h a v e xiuted t h e i r d i s s i d e n c e a n d c o n f i n e d t h e ~ n s e l v e sr e c e n t l y t o m i l d p r o i e s L a n d s s y m p a t l ~ ys t r i k e s . I r a n i a 1 1 you t 11 a1.c. r e s t r i c t e d t? Lhe ui.lian, e d u c a t e d a n d a c t i v i s t g l ' o u p , 7'11 g r o u p c o n s L i t u t e s o n l y a r e l a t i v e l y s 1 1 1 a l 1s c ~ n c ~ n t 1111: 01' youth populat'ion o f I r a n a c o u ~ ~ t rj11 w h i c h 5 ' 01' 1 y 11 t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n is u n d e r 2 4 y e a r s i f a g e but the v i of y o u n g f a r m e r s a n d y o u n g w o r l c e r s a r e n o t w e l l known a e v e n less w e l l a r t i c u l a t e d , T h e r e is g e n e r a l a g i q c e m e n t h o w e v c r , t h a t t h e s e y o u t h s hew m o r e c : l o s e l y t o t l i e 1 i ~ i c f o l l o w e d by t l i e l r e l d e r s , a n d t h e y d o n o t , t h e r e f o r e , c o n s i i t u t e a notable group i n themselves.
    Embassy c o n t a c t s w i t h a n d k n o w l e d g e o f

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    hluch c a l l 11e s a i d o f t h e u r b a n a c t i v i s t m i n o r i t y , Ilowcvc!~. T h e c a m p u s d e n ~ o nts r a t i o n s o f s e v e r a l y e a r s a g o w11it:h u s u a l l y g r o v o k e d a I r r u t a l r e s p o n s e I)y t l i c p o l i c c ant1 r e s u l t e d i n some l r l o o d l e t t i n ~ h a v e g i v e n way i n t l i e 7 0 ' s t o m i l d d e m c ) n s t r a i i o n s a n d sympatliy s t r i k e s . Some of t h e v i g o r s e e m s t o h a v e g o n e o u t 0 1 ' s t u d e n t p r o t e s t s . n T h e 2 5 t h C:cntennry C c l e b r a t i o ~ ~i s l a t e 1 9 7 1 , p r o v o k e t l a c e r t a i n a m o u n t o f s t u d e n t ol111osit i o n ; Iiowever. a r r e s t s w c r few and v i o l e n c e m i n i m a l . The more r c c c u t t r i a l s o f s u h v e r s i v c s a n d t e r r o r i s t s a l s o c a u s e d some s t u d e n t a n x i e t y b u t t h e r e s p o n s e w a s m i l d c o m p a r e d t o t l i a t 01 t h e p a s t .

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    t h e y o u n g t e c l ~ n o c r a t s l ) u r c a n c r ; ~u , l I r a n ' s educa led youth and academicians g e n e r a l l y v i e w t h e W h i t e Revolution's E d u c a t i o n a l Refoim a s a s t i l l b o r n f a i l u r e , Outside inler-

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    Group 3 Downgraded a t 1 2 - y e a r . i n t e r v a l s not automatically declassil'ied COWIDEyI'I:2Z,

    CO'HF -I D E ~ I A L

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    I c r e n c c , j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d i s p u t e s , s ~ i I ) s t a n d a l ~cl u i p m c t ~ t . tq ~cnd i n s tl.ilct i o n c o n t i n u o a s b e f o r e . IVhi 1e I I.OIII t i n r e I.o l ime d y n a n ~ i c , generally w c s t e r n - c d u c a t e d p r o l ' c s s o r s a n d i ~ d m i n i s t r a t o r s a p p e a r o n t h c s c e n c , t h e i r e l l'cc l i v e n e s s , t h e s t ~ ~ d c n t 'se c l , is v i t i a t e d l ~ yt l i c p r e s c t n c c o f SAVrlli. l At a 1 i111cwhen p r o t e s t h a s I ~ e c o n ~1nol.c rcs t 1.n i n c d , t t ~ r c ; i f : t i v i t i c s o f SA\'AK h a v e r e g o i ' l . e d l y Irecome less so. S t u d e n t s a n d y o u n g p e o p l e a r e less ~ v i l l i n g t o v o i c e t l ~ c i ~ ~ o p i n i o n s t o d a y t h a n t h e y w e r e s o m e y c a r s a g o ('then SAVAK. s<eemcd t o t h e m m o r e c a p r i c i o u s ) . a n d t h e e f f i c i e n t a n d methodical p e n e t r a t i o n o f any o p p o s i t i o n group h a s s e r v e d t o s t i l l much o f t h e d i s s e n t . S t u d e n t s seem t o h a v e l e a i r i l c d t h a t p r o t e s t t h a t g o c s beyond acatlcmic d i s s e n t on s p e c i l ' i c I s s u e s is u s u a l l y m e t w i t h a c r u s l i i n g r e s p o n s e . This r e s p o n s e i s b o l s t e r e d 11y t h e enlistment o f t h e m e d i g a n d l l ~ e r(:anization o f t h e Government's supporte1.s i n t o nal iono w itle p 1 . o t e s t s a g a i n s t t h e s t ~ l d c n t s . G r e a t e r c : o n i r o l nntl ~ ~ ~ ~ p r o e cc d o l o g y t h e r e f o r e , h a v e h e l p e d t o s t i f l e t v hn (1 i s s e n t . Young I r a n i a n s , n o t u n l i k e o l d e r o n c s , a r e c : i p a l ) l e o f ?;ul>merging r e l ' ) e l l i o o u a t t i t u d e s t o w o r k w i t h i n t h e s y s l c ~ n . ' I ' l ~ a t m o r e t h a n 15.000 I r a n i a n s e a c h y e a r w i s h t o e n t e r ~ i n i v e r s i t i e sb u t a r e u n a b l e t o f o r r e a s o n s 01' i ' i n a n c e s rt~itl l a c k o f s p a c e is t e s t i m o n y o f t h e a t t r a c t i v e n c s s o f til ~ h c e d u c a t i o n i n I r a n . r F o r many, u n i v e r s i t y and t h c (1 i p l o m a a r e p a s s p o r t s t o a g o o d l i f ' c i n I r a n . liowevcr, t h e c . o n s t i 3 a i n t s p l a c e d o n h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n may. t a k e a t o l l a s young 1 1 ' a l l i a n s t u d e n t s l e a r n t h a t t h e I r a n i a n E s t a b l i s h e i c n t ~ , c t q u i r c se v e n g r e a t e r c o n f o r m i t y t h n n m o s t a n d t h a t mcxnI ~ i ~ l ' u l s c u s s i o n s -- t h e k i n d s t i ~ d o n t sa l l o v e r t h e w o r l t l di t-njiagc i n a r c c l o s e d t o then^. Sports and s t u d c n l union b u i l d i n g s a r e s u b s t i t u t e d to a n i n c r e a s i n g d e g r e e l o r s t u d e n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a n e f f o r t to k e e p s t u d e n t ~ t ~ i ~ c~ r d psi e d . o : u T h i s s u l ~ s t i t uion ol' o t h e r t l i i n g s for t * t u d c n t p a r t i c ip:tl i o n h a s b e e n r e l a t i v e l y s u c c : c s s I u l i n ; h o e p i n - . t h e l i d 0 1 1 t h e c a m p u s e s t h e p a s t f e w years, b u t i t 111if:I1t v:cll h a v e t h c u n h a p p y b y - p r o d u c , t o f p r o d u c i n g I ~ ~ t e l l c c t u a l ls y e r i l e y o u n g p e o p l e . t

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    Alnong yoring I r a n i a n s . t h e Sliah a n d t l l c G o v e r n n l c n l a r c vic%wed w i t h f c c l i n g s r a n ~ i n gf r o m awe a n d r e s p e c t l o o u t r i g l i t cl i s t a s t c . W i t h o u t q u e s t i o n t h c younl: m i l i t a r y o f f icers l i r e d e v o t e d t o t h e S h a h a n d I r a n , a I ' c c l i n g w h i c h may IIC * . l i a r a d i n p a r t I)y t l ~ et h o u s a n d s 01' youn:: L i t e r a c y , Heal111 I I I I ~D e v c l o p n ~ e n t C o r p s m e m b e r s . T h e s c g r o u p s scem t o havc a <.r.nse ol' d e d i c a t i o n a n d e l i t i s m t h a t d o e s n o t e x t e n d t o I !.ani:in y o u t l ~a s a w h o l e . For reasons not e n t i r e l y clcal' - - I ) u t l > c l , h a p s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h b o t h t h e I r a n i a n s e n s e ol COhTII~EYI'IAL y a y 1972

    73

    i n d i v i d u a l i s m a n d t h e I r a n i a n f e e l i n g t h a t n o t h i n g is r e a l l y worth fightin:: f o r t h e r e s e e i n s t o 1)c no r e a l s e n s e o f p u r p o s e , n o n o t i o n o f "common g o o d " aillong I r a n i a n youth.

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    R i g h t l y or. w r o n g l y , y o u n g I r a n i a n s t j c l i e v e t h a t t h e S t a t e a p p a r a t u s l i a s n e v e r Ijeen m o r e t l g h t a n d i.es t 1.1~. l ivc. l tin11 a t present. A f t e r t h e c e l e b r a t i o n s t h e s e c u i ' i t y precaut i o n s which had been t a k e n throughout t h e c o u n t r y conli~!ul as t h e Government's e f f o r t s t o c r u s h t h e g u e r i l l a / t e r r o ~ . ~ - . groups continued. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , s t u d e n t / y o u t h g r o u l h s e e m m o r e i n l ~ l b i t e dt h a n e v e r , a n d p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n Rsiong s t u d e n t s e v e n m o r e r a r e . F o r t h e u r b a n , e d u c a t e d a c t i v i s t , n e i t h e r t h e muchp u b l i c i z c t l l ' e f o r m s n o r t h e d n i p r o v i n ~, j o l ) marlcet h o l d ~nucli interest o r attractiveness. T l ~ cu n i v c r s i t i e s h a v e h c c n s i g n i r i c a n t l y d e m o c r a t i z e d by t h e a d ~ r ~ i s s i oof l n r g , c n n u m b e r s of' e c o n o m i c a l l y d i s a d v a n t a g e d y o u n g s t c r s . h u t :'or s o m e , t h e c o u r s e o f s t u d y is a I ' a r c e , t h e u n i v e ~ ' s i l y a circus. T h e economy is d y n a n ~ i c : h u t r e a l u n c ~ l i l ~ l o v m c n l a11c1 m a r g i n a l c i ~ ~ p l o y m e nis h i g h among r e c e n t g r n d ~ ~ a l c s t who h a v e n o t h i n g more t o o f f e r t h a n a n I r a n i a n u n i v c l ' s i t y d c ~ l ' P d u c a t e d young p e o p l e a r e d i s i l l u s i o n e d a n d u n h a p p y . They w a n t t h e b e n e i i t s of t h e a f f l u e n t , b u t r e s e n t t h e t o t a l p r o h i b i t i o n on t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n I r a n ' s n a t i o n a l political life.

    hlay 1972

    REFOIIII PROGR

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    Launched r n 1962 w i t h g r e a t f a n f a r e , I r a n ' s H h l te R e v o l u t on h a s l o s t somcb o f i t s n~nalc.ntum rn recent years. T h e 1 3 - p o r n t r e i 01-~n p r o g r a m , designed t o bring the natron i n t o the 20th c e n t u r y , h a s h a d g r e a t s u c c e s s i n some a r c a s s u c h a s l a n d r e f o r m a n d a d u l t l i t e r a c y but i n o t h e r s , s u c h a s a d n ~ l l ~ r s t r a l i vrefor111 a n d e t h e educational revolutron, have accomplrshed l i t t l e o r nothing. The o v e r a l l Impact o f t h e r e f o i m program h a s h e l p e d t o change t h e image o f t h e Shah from t h a t o f a d l l l e t a n t e t o a concerned and c a p a b l c r u l e r h u t t h e l a c k of a d e q u a t e p o l l t i c a l r e f o r m s may p o s e p r s l ) l c n ~ s for the future. I f n d e r t h e momentum of' t h e S h a h ' s p e r s o n a l P I - c s t i g e ant1 r m p l e m e n t e d by I r a n ' s i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m p e t e n t - t e c h n o c l ' n t s t h e r e f o r m p r o g r a m h a s b e c o m e v e r y much a p a r t g f I r a n i a n life. S i n c e t h e announcement o f t h e o r i g i n a l s i x - p o i n t ])I-ogram i n 1 9 6 2 , r e f o r m h a s become a byword a n d e f f o 1 . t ~ a r e made t o a s s o c i a t e a l m o s t e v e r y p i e c e o f l e g i s l a t i o n -- n o m a t t e r how r e m o t e l y w i t h t h e r e f o n n progi-am. 'I'i~e r e f o r m c o n c e p t a p p e a r s t o h a v e l o s t s o m e o f i t s momentum i n t h e l a s t t w o y e a r s b u t w i l l p r o b a b l y come vei-y much a l i v e a g a i n i n t h e n e x t y e a r o r s o . I n t r u t h somc o f t h e bold i m a g i n a t i v e programs o f t h e K h i t e Revolution lrave c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o I r a n ' s p r o g y e s s o f r e c e n t y e a r s and t h e Shah c a n , and o f t e n d o e s , p o i n t w i t h p r i d e to h i s accomplishments. I n f a c t , some o f I r a n ' s r e f o i m I l r o g r a m s h a v e b c c o ~ i ~m o d e l s f o r o t l l e r u n d e r d c v e l o p e d e c,ountl.ies.

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    4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

    Workers P r o f i t S h a r l n y E l e c t i o n Law R e l o ~ ~ ~ t L i t e r a c y Coi'ps H e a l t h Col'ps Extension a n d D e v e l o p m e n t C o r p s H o u s e s o f E q u i t v a n d r \ r l ~ i i ~ ~ n t lCoon n c l l 5 u N a t iotl:ll l z a t l o t l i > I W a t e r l i c ~ ~ r ~ u l * c C s Reconstruction of t h e Counlrv A d m i n i s t a t i v e a n d E d u c a t i o n a l Revolution Religious Corps

    Of t h e s e , a b o u t h a l f h a v e h e l p e d t o ope11 t h e way t c i p i . o < : ~ , , i n Iran. L a n d R e f o l m , t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of t h e w110,lc rrl;,l.~,i program a n d by f a r t h e most s u c c e s s f u l , h a s f r e e d t h e p e a s a n t s from t h e a l m o s t f e u d a l a b s e n t e e l a n d l o r d systcll~ a n d h a s o p e n e d t h e \rsay f o r t h e m t o b e c u n o landholders. A s a r e s u l t o f t h e w o r k o f you~i: c o n s c . l . i j ) t s i n !,rovi III: i :r l a r e a s w i t h t h e L i t e r a c y C o r p s , tlic l i t c i - a c y r a t e h a s a1111er 1 d o u b l e d s i n c e 1 9 5 6 a n d t h e USIIP. w h i c h is i n v o l v c d i n ( I l c 1i t e r a c y p r o g r a m i n c e r t a i n a r e a s o f I r a n , h a s r e p o r t e t l t h a t t h e c o u l i t r y is o n t h e v c ~ < x o f a b ~ ~ c a k t l l r o ui~ h i hc. e n f i e l d of adul't l i t e r a c y . T h e H e a l t h C u 1 . p ~ . w h i c h provitlc,!; medical f a c i l i t i e s i n remote a r e a s , and t h e Uevelopme~~t Corps, which p r o v i d e s e x t e n s i o n - t y p e s e r v i c e s i n d i s t n t i 1 p r o v i n c e s , h a v e b o t h h a d g o o d r e s u l t s a n d c o n t i n u e t o ::.IW\~:. Houses o f E q u i t y have t a k e n j u s t i c e t o t h e v i l l a g e l e v c l f o r t h e f i r s t time. O t h e i - a s p e c t s o f t h e \V11ite R e v o l u t i o n d o n o t s t a n d u p s o w e l l under scrutiny. N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f Fol'ests and N a t i o n a l i z a L i o n o f \(a t e r R e s o u r c e s h a v e I ~ e e ni l n ! ~ l c m e t i i c t l s l o w l y a n d h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d l i t t l e t o I r a n ' s loi'\ilard novcS-meut though t h e y a r e e x p e c t e d t o have long-telm b e n e f i t s f o r t h e country. The s a l e o f Government F a c t o r i e s h a s g e n e r a t e d l i t t l e e n t h u s i a s m ant1 is reco;:nized a s a g:-ovc~.nm e n t e f f o r t t o u n l o a d u n p r o l i l a b l e enterprises. T h e Workers' P r o f i t S h a r i n g Program h a s h a r d l y g o t t e n o f f t h e g r o u n d a n d t h e E l e c t i o n Law r e f o r m h a s d o n e l i t t l e t o l e a d t o t h e development o f r e a l p o l i t i c a l c o n t e s t s (indecri. under t h e present p o l i t i c a l system i t could hardly do s o a n d t h u s w a s p r o b a b l y i n t e n d e d by t h e Slinh m o r e a s windoiv dressing than a s a t r u e reform). The H e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f tlte Country h a s produced a l m o s t a o t h i n g and t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Reform, still viewed w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e s c e p t i c i s m , has b e e n c r i t i c i z e d f o r f a i l u r e t o make ally m e a n i n g f u l c o n t r i b u t i o n to d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o r o v e r h a u l o f t h e m a s s i v e Thd E d u c a t i o n a l Reform, i n a u g u r a t e d Iranian bureaucracy. w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e f a n f a r e i n t h e summer o f 1 9 6 8 ( i n p a r t , blay 1 9 7 2

    CONFIDEKTIAL wc t h o u g h t , t o g i v e some s e m b l a n c e o f movement t o t h e rcform movement), h a s f a i l e d t o come t o grips thc ~ ) r o b l e n i so f I r a n ' s u n i v e r s i t i e s and s t u d e n t s and ~ ) v o f e s s o r s l i k e t e n d t o l o o k upon t h e L'ducationnl lleform a lndifferently.'The R e l i g i o u s Corps h a s been v i r t u a l l y illbo born due t o p r e s s u r e from t h e m u l l a s ivho r e g a r d t h e program ( p r o b a b l y c o r r e c t l y ) a s a govern!licni p l a n t o r e d u c e t h e i r i n f l u e n c e among t h e p e o p l e . 'I'he White R e v o l u t i o n h a s had i t s g r e a t e s t impact s o f a r i l l the r u r a l s e c t o r : t h e p e a s a n t s now own t h e i r l a n d and t t ~ i a i rl i v e s and v i l l a g e s a r e b e i n g n o t i c e a b l y improved. 'I'hey a r e e n j o y i n g o t h e r d e r i v a t i v e b e n e f i t s and tlic way is now o p e n i n g f o r them t o p a r t i c i p a t e t o a g r e a t e r d e g r e e i n the n a t i o n ' s progress. The u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n s h a r e s i n t h c p r o s p e r i t y g e n e r a t e d by t h e r e f o r m s b u t s t u d e n t s and l n t e l l e c t u n l s have not p a r t i c i p a t e d o r shared i n t h e rcfolml program, r e f u s i n g , t h e y s a y , t o a c c e p t t h e s u 1 ) s t i t u t i o n o f economic development f o r r e a l s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l t'cform. I'nrtly a s a i ' e s u l t o f h i s r e f o r m s , t h e S h a h ' s image h a s undergone a m a j o r c h a n g e i n t h e p a s t few y e a r s . P e a s a n t nwc o f f o r m e r y e a r s is b e i n g r e p l a c e d by a new r e s p e c t . With t h e h e l p o f Empress F a r a h ' s h u m a n i t a r i a n a c t i v i t i e s , t h e Shah now a p p e a r s l e s s t h e p l a y b o y k i n g and f a r more t h e s e r i o u s r u l e r o f men, c o n c c r n e d w i t h t h e wel'are o f h l s lund and p e o p l e . While t h i s e n t h u s i a s m i s n o t s h a r e d by a l l , I r a n i a n s i n g e n e r a l r e c o g n i z e and a d m i t t h a t o n l y t h e Shah c o u l d have pushed t h e r e f o r m program t h r o u g h i n s u c h r s h o r t time and, hecause of h i s p r f o r m a n c e , r e s p e c t f o r him h a s i n c r e a s e d . 'I'he S h a h ' s commitment t o r e f o r m and t h e i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t r c f o i m is h e r e t o s t a y may have p i t f a l l s however, s i n c e the promise of continued reform i n e v i t a b l y r a i s e s expectaLiolis. I'ressures f o r a d d i t i o n a l r e f o m , e x p e c i a l l y p o l i t i c a l 1.efo1-m may be e x p e c t e d t o i n c r e a v e a s t h e S h a h ' s p o l i t i c a l l~oneymoon comes t o a n a t u r a l en$. H e himself admits t h a t 111s p e o p l e s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d 201' t h e day when t h e y w i l l hnve t o p a r t i c i p a t e t o a g r e a t e r d e g r e e i n t h e i r Government, hut he h a s , o n t h e o t h e r hand, seemed r e l u c t a n t t o a l l o w 01cm t o p a r t i c i p a t e . How he r e c o n c i l e s t h e s e two p o s i t i o n s rind accomodates h i m s e l f t o t h e new and c h a n g i n g s i t u a t i o n s m a y w e l l h o l d t h e key t o I r a n ' s p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e s i n c e i t now seems l i k e l y t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f r e f o r m w i l l have t o ljc f a c e d a g a i n and a g a i n i n t h e coming y e a r s .

    SECRET 331 GSJCP

    lran
    M a y 1973

    NATlONtZL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

    SECRET

    78

    NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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    conwins ido,n*ltin o l f r t l n ~ t -ti-1 k dotd I h U n i t d Sat.% wimin th. 18, u t l 79l a d 7V4 Ik. US o . as o . & d. l*. In tmsn1ui.o or r.r.la~Ion d it. crnnnls to or r.uip1 h m u n o u l b d d r u n is *i* L Ib .d i br hw. lhll k u - I -"ins

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    CKNERAL SURVEY ClIAYTEHS

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    Summary Map. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fillrwb

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    SPI:HIX

    GiraA#G;E FROM THE TOP

    Obstacles to Change (c)

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    The Strong-Man Tradition (ulou)

    1
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    IIII~III~ ill\tilt~lion, an sl,l~rt,1~1 ~ t n l a ~ l i lor ~ r t ~ l ~ r ~ 11w ~ r . l ~ # ~ l i c r ~ l l t fay ;,way ;llld far uk>llvc Ixtuvr IIIVI~I, W l ~ i l c ~ ~ ~ i t s :IIIU~ ~ 111~ t n t IIO~ In, 'w~~scionh lit<, csf ~,atic~r~-rtutc,, arc falniliur with its rul1.r~. fur I I .. tllvy ~) L klll,w ul,otat thv glorious Ilirtory of thcir land, largr~ly 11nrottgI1 t~rtalo r writlvtl u~%lnainta!l'v with 111~. grvul l"".l\ 1 111~ " l * i . 0 ~
    llq~O1lll. 01 ; I

    (:yrt~slllc (:nut f0tnndc~11 thc firsl Ptvsian' ~ ~ m p i r v . 111,rtof tlw Arharmcnid dytrusty, ill Il~r \ixtll cclltury I i 1:. t,y <r,wltwring ~III M~.<lt.s itnd ntI1t.r kit~gdunls i u ~ l w r v rtlac M v c l i l v r r a ~ l t . ;n~:lal 1 1 Syria ~ ~~~ 8 111~ O L I IIlibvr it, (.c.r~trill A\iil. Ili\ g r i l l ~ d * o ~I)uritts ~ $ ~ I C ~ VS~\IVIIIc l i~ g~c ~ ~ intu ZO llav ~ ~ 01 ~ I i v~ l ~ l ~ vlt~pirt. ~ I I C i t \.llrap\ o r ~,r~tvit~uurr i m e c t e d a11r.xcr.llc~~l ~~ I,y ~lvtwe~rk at1 11111~.rial roilds. A1h.r (.011q111~51 y A~cxuII~<.~ b a1111 ~r.lnt~ariv\ (:r4.~k rulr u i m r tllv I ' a r l l i i u ~clynasty. (11 ~ l ~ ~ l l ~ ~ w tlw c It . ~~ II ~ ~ %~S I > ~111pirv.w l t i c l ~ rr16nlcrr1 Ir.t~li;,t~* rt,vvrv es rcvt~lwl<mly to 1I1t. Ac.huc~~t~c.nieIs. 'I'IIc Sasrallicls >tnmgthcn~d 111~ p1wc.r o f the central guv,:r111nt~111 rltrritlg Illvir 4OO-yuur rvign fr111n t h r I,c.&!illllillg 01 ~IIV t~ the ~ n i d d l c ~ fthe srv1.11th third ~. <.vlbtun.A.t). 'I'Iwy c;lrric.<l orlt adnli~lirtrativr r h ~ r ~ s s r , t ~ ~ d ~ r v c y 1 d a r w tllat is W ~~ 1v 1. , II I r a ~ l .W i t h thv c~vcrthrowof t11c last %l\ratli<l Shall Ily Arah invaden 111 fi51, I~;III cntrrcd a 1wri1nI ~dninr ~ ~ . l l t u r i c s during *Ilicll il war rult,d I,y a s ~ r m < . i \ i ~ ~ l ~~ t r r i g nrimof f ~IW.~IW\. Wit11 III~. 1111wwc.r c ~tllv Snluvidr i n 1501. risr f IIIIWCV<.I. I r a ~ t i i u ~ ~ r ~ \ itgait1 held sway. il ltiltivc dy ty 511~11 Al~l,ar. 1I1v grvatrst of thv Sutavids, was all

    ;,II~

    ----

    r II S ~ III\V~,I,I~,,O,, Ic.fr tlr. ~~.It~n~.trn~(.~~idr 11t~~trelryu~ Ily rntic.n ~ t rla r 1111. d ~ ~ ~ ~ r o a . ~ ~ ~ #r l . 12unan. A Ilwir trol,r .b Ila. uncl Ilwnr v~uli#~t@ .I\Arys I c , ~ ~.& J\ , grctg,.n~~l~mc tt,rmtn s i < ~ & ) c - lra~ntbArv:~, a n ~ ilt w n fornmall~ ~ I b ~ ~ lta r tlv~~ g . ~ l ~ m , ~ lmw, tx~~n~lr! i~ ~ I t t6 ~ ~ l ih l$l:Li V,~>OI$ : 1'wu cu~tmv 1 8 ~ 1 , . , ~ k m~rd l#rr,i,. whiein l,twtmt~ I?TW01ht.r K ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I N ~ ~ u 803 I.llllt~i~~~~\u ~ r d 'I'II(. WI.ISI inlt, ,\r.l)mv. wlni~,ln. k) tm lrllvr 1 *, 1 x l v ., ,,,,. .,tld 111.11 4% 1111. l,.n,, 1a. la,r,~.ttn III~.IIIU.IVI.\ IUU.kar 1111.1r 1a I.III~II.,Y( .,,"I .I I"",""'. "I Ill,.'.l4,,,ln

    1 1 . r r s ~ l l u ~ ~ icle.rir.v lrtwl tllcir o\l)orl , 1 d \ill,.IBI 11 t.r 11 t,lsnt\ empl~ay rn fc-wer worken Wh~lis $1 the governIrut~la~ar * t r r ~ l t , t t ~ ~a c t ~ ~anlootlt ot 111~ ~ 'I'IIV. ~ ul ~,n,til ir III~II~ would like 10 XCE pr~vntdy nperutrd wtellitr &~~I~~III~II<Y~ 1 y ~ ~ s t u l ~ l i s l ~artificiul fiircl priw t l ~ a t 1 ~ i~ig II I ~ ~ ~ ~ l t n t r ~ a x m w WI h r i c nncn us &&I und up urnund I& 1ru11r~~ivivcs i11v oil. S~IICY. t111, i11itit11 for ugrca-t~~t-~~t II~K~I~IIIICU~S, !In. p i v u t r ~ u * n ris held luck hy wit, %ig~~t,d it, tSh5I. 1 ~ ~ 1 t l1 v ~ ~ ~ r < ~ ~ profit g ~ I I ~ 1 ~~ of n t i t I v 1 4 0 ~ s t y t l r rntnl&. I ~ u ~ ~ l i c r r i a a1k.c.c tlr, wholt. of Ihut tlw liurl t~ricu. ;u 11vt.11 I ,v b riliwd ill Iriut'\ l:11.01 l111'11~1 t~~arlrrn~zat~onref an^ p q w n tho guvrrnrnrnt und Ilu, ~andcrtukc~~ 'l'hure is u .ilmmt~l(leof dcvclc~pment tlw tc.rlnr nf 1a.w i~grt.c*~~lrtlts 11;orr I>~.II that rigla-cl. 3 .11i ,1l 1 , urn1 thrrt. r l ~ r ~ pisyno* el~nugh hnicul nncl l ~IY lr411 c.111o.xlnvt to rtvi\,v S~III~ $14 l>illi8t11ill ~~~VVIIIIC~ ouiw.a~er~ul pcrn111114 uvudubk. tu wtltlsfy thr aourlr 1 1 1 cll~rillg1111. 1r.ritul I!lil,'i2' 11 IIYi.5 ' i ( i , htonrnc.r. ill 1 IH*IIIr t o nTho. plvrrnment h m utt~.s~ptnl wllvc \~ tu slid-1972 l r u l ~ ~.t~tvrrul ta~gt~tiutio~a rlill l ~ ~ r t l t r r Ar 3 l l b c f ~ n prnhicm by mukirr~ I~. t UI I fundr ~ v u ~ l u hto le atrraaug#,lnt,nts whiclt wtn~lolgive I~:III'> ~~i~liontal oil ~ t ~ v ~ \ ~ r Imnk\, und hus u l t r ~ n p t tul n-lirvc- tho. nent ~ *.I)III~)~III~ ~IIC~I~~IM.I~ ~ I I I I I \ nil h ~ 1111rrstrirt1~1 IIIIII of r *ills. ~1wrl.1gc &iiMp r r u m ~ ~ r l vttlng up o~~-the-jol, ill i ~ ~ t r r ~ ~ a ~ i ~ ~ s k 'rIt' r .l ~ r u114% of h) t ~~ar u l c ~ ~ aln, 11~11li1t~lt.cl 11111111ngI #U II > ~I The Iurgrr firm\. ut Ic*ust. un* 111n~rdti<111al c~111troI r c f i n i ~ ~ g nf f:~cilitios> anal ic~im~i~stxl IM f1tln.q f n ~ r n thtw N( IV I. I invthrllla~~lls tilt. ft,n.ig~~nnlllnj,ivr ill r c f i ~ l i ~ l g fro111 I>r\pltc thr fuct that pnvute n~unufx.cur~r~g hirv not and otl~vr ~ p r a t i o 1 1 ; .alt,vr to ~~rcsaa~n. oil ~ ~ ~I 1 r the. 011 v l o p d us rul)~dly s t h ~IIVI~~III~I~ a n Lrqnrl. tbt. ro%t i u ~ s ~ p uI I~ g n v his pntpcmuls, thc Slli111~ I I n ii ~ In I 23 4 llte ind~~rtriulw k b r g w ~ ~ tun1 g the f u e d & o h~ a Ja1181ar).1973 t h r ~ ~ ; t l r ~ ~ 1 i lubrnya~t. rurrralt 1c1 vro~wlr~gr t II~ p tln.~m~nnn~y devubp~nents. New .iud~ ,hgrv~.t~~<.~tt\: oliv.$~\\iot~\ N+III '~YIIIU~~~~IIIL) \ ~ . r t . 111t. 0- the governmrnt's plum t o esplult hrge-uculearpper ut~cIvr\%;~! t l 1 ~ 1 i ~ ~ Iw . ! ',.t\4,. tr.8~ \l.btnd\ t t, A 411~1sits newly dbrovemd imn urc Aelda. are Ilbcly and &silo V ) I . I I grt.itlcr .181u~llo~lr( n i l !I.%I.*II~I, i t i ~~ l l i v l l 111 v t fnlcl the cvnti~lual expunsion of ~nclustryi n i m n tt~ I~I~;$II<V, praqr;t~a~., Iloc SII:III', I date, hwrver, tho Shah hns been u h k tc~ I, carry ;run is u l u ~ l r v r k ~ p i ~ ~ g mhrw of ~L~VCDIIP. I t c othrr 6 4 1 . h ~ unrul und mwmmic mcdernimtk~n.in uddl\ IIPSmrlcl's third lurgrst r w r w c~f tkr natuml tlv. 114111 BI ~ w u t i n g ~ n c r k r urtny, lurgdy hmur c h ~ r u n J vc~ltill~o. wl1it.11is rru~n~rvutivo,ly II~ c.sli~~wttd Ir.o \ r r ta c t~utir~n's hnnn. Iran's CNP is currently the largest ~n dl 2UU trillion cubic ft.c.1. Its largcsstcuslu8nt.r $11 pre.rc.~~l ir 111~ M i d d k h t und mcm than d w b l c thut nf either the S ~ v i c Union, which purchused nearly t hillic~~~ I*ruel cu Faypt For the pert 7 yevn i t has been cubic feet of gas VU~III~ at $37 rnillidn.in 1971. Ira11 rrowlng at an nvrrngc annual rute of 11% The largest has u LxIntruLZ with M M I t 1 sell, ill time. W~IC5.000 ~ XW o ~o~atrthutcr the CNP and the one thing mort Irilliol~ cubic firt. Prcduction I I liqoefinl gas i\ n l a ~ ~ 18 ~HIII~IIIIC amtinut$ gnwth b the uil indurtry fin ~ t r undergi~i~~g nc,g~*iatio~ls: 1873 Iwut,. so.\r 11li111h as I.a~rthe fiscul ycur c n d i ~ ~ gMamh iH72, Iran eurncd In isvoiviny u total ~IIVI%~IIICII~ o~f$3 b i l l i u(.rt. 1111c1t.r ~~~~ In,n~ $2 2 hilli<tsa funqgn cam.sc~t*, the a t ~ w t c c~a~sidrrutiot~ Jspa~~rse other fc~rriynfirms. o111 n with and I a l r tla. carrcnt huul y~.ur h 1 7 h 1 1 1 1 r 1111 nrs R IIII . 11uvcnot IXYII FIIOII~II O i l n ~ i . ~ ~ altmr, of S In tlr, cliruclr f n ~ m IMl to 1971, lrun'r oil p r ~ d ~ ~ i 1 , l u y the way for 11 of the Shah's i ~ ~ l l h a i t ~ u s *1 11 rasfor~~~. 11#111 r < h ( . "1 all UVlVllgL.UII~UYI 5% NI~PUN!~ IU~l.llf14 ~ n o r l r r ~ ~ i r uand ~i~ ~ .d ~ ~ s t r i u l i p ru ~ig r~ ~ ~ ~ r . ti~ ~~ e tt ~ a~ * ~ l t 8% werklwiclr und 10% fur the r c ~of thc Middle l t li~)reig~~ cnbdib; I~owrvcr. u,ill f i ~ ~ i t ~ ~lrilrl! (IIIIIlcv I..e*t Tcduy lrun hus h w ~ m the wcnld's fourth lurgat e fiturth of Irun's i)rcjcr.ts during the n ~ r r5-ytur ~ t ~ ~ plun. .t~l,l,lirr III oil. hJk~wing t l c Llnitoxl States. h ~ . 1 1 Unitcxl Stutrr has l r - r r ~ major so~lriv h ~ i r . 1 1 u of I 1 S S.H., und Shndi Aruhiu. Itsoutpt~t 1971 W 1.7 in L I ; a\sirtanir., having prcrvidwl rillr~. iWi i;Iwt~t $1.1 l,lllio11 l~ilrro.l*.~~nc-tcnth the rw~rld'sh,tul. Wit11 o~f hillio~~ in gr;111ts anol credits for tlac ~ ~ ~ Y ~ I I ~ ~ IUINI I I ~ ~INNII 3 rl~~slatrcl nwrvcs of rllnt. 70 hillicln burrub-nhrut III il~illlamt 1 1 1l1t. 181il1litr\O l l ~ ( . ~ ~~ iI~ ~ c~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ B I I I ~ ~ I I I i ~~ ~. IIPA of thv w#,rld's btal-lrun'r i n l p r t u n r r us un tal c r ~ d i t llilvr nma. ~ ~ O I I IW ~ s (:~*~III~II).. I:r;~l~rc. r t tllr c~~~crnationul s~~pplio-r1oil is ussrnd. 1 1 ~1~1iIoxl K~II~~IIIII, ltal), :~II<I J~IXIII; i111ci tht, (:o~I>. Irun's oil nwt.nau. have not rt.wl~ rrk.ly hwuuw of IIIUII~S~ ~ r ~ e s l r i o ~ r 19% Iravr 1.~1c.111lt.dY ( ~ $1 rinw O ~ t~~c.n.uv.d ol~tput.I.'r,r wtnr t i ~ n r tho. Slrah and his l ~ i l l i t ~ r ~I~III<IIII~C it1 ~ crt~lits,IIIO~I* that) 11df of it i r t , ~ ~ ~ 1111. hnit.1 l ' a ~ i u t0aivl1IM.~\~'.I:I~ ~~. IOtii inolcl Ic);i .11,11 I , ~lr#,u.ntntivc.s huvo* no.gc*iutrd artuk.ly with brrigo c . 1 1 ~r,t~tllurlio% all i~~c.n.u.uxI for shuro. ttf 1 1 - pn,fils h w l 11 ~ . t ~ v ;$:>Li~ n~i I~+ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ i l 11,n 6.1tvi1158 8 0 ,IIII~I,DI\ l 1 IN

    I,,

    I;(+.

    As the Shah 60es, So 6oes Iran (c)

    ~~bpelation growing at more than a million a year. is fnm a total of 31 million in 1973, i t is estimated that thrrr will he 50 m i l l i ~ m Iranians by 1W9. Muehof this ~ntpulatic~n he ecorn~mically will unproductive. Nearly 57% of Iran's people are now under the age of 20, and the l n t ~ l i n ay~. l ~ will fall a\ the ~ n ~ p u l i l t i o n inereas<%. As the young arc er~tering r labor furur faster t . 1 h h 1 the ecwnnmy can ahsnrb them. lran is paradoxically ronfnrntc~dwith the problem of growing unemploytllrnt at the time of its great~st ec~~nomic surge. 1 1the 1 citio, where people from the countryside continue to kr,nlr i t 1 uarch of jobs, t~nemployment hus heen t.,tir~~atrcl high as 12% of the labor form. Fnr w)mr. ar lltr t~pportt~nities wrial mobility are i11rrrasi4 ar a for II.\III~ thr rcc,~~o~nic of cl~~vr~lc~pment, thrre is nn but p.tida,~~c~. the yup Irtrn.rw~the rich n ~ the d r t r tlrilt ~ p i u s l>rt.rl \uhstantially ~rarruwtd. Eeentially, lran IUII*~ \till Ir. <v,~fi\i<lc*rrul~ t t l ~ ~ r c l ~ ~ v t ~ l t , p ~of the ta Ixvuasr l lanw Iwr cal~ita (;NP (atnn11 $400 n ymr) of its 111hn11itn11t~. Nrverthelrss. the nruntry'\ stability and t%onornic ~ ~ a t l ~make its overall prospects gucd und its future xik ~pn~n~ising. ties with the Wcst are strong ones. Its \Ii,rm,ver, lran has manag~ulto remain relatively

    ~ l t ~ r m h r o i l t rill thv lliylily r.hilrgrcl Arab-Israeli l tl~~urr~4r its ollr sidr. wbilc. 11lIrt11ri11g rnpprwhb-. on n nlrnt with t l ~ r Soviet 1lnio11I~II othrr. the Thrrc is
    11c1

    effrc.tivr chullrngr to thr Shah's paC

    s y s t ~ ~ r ~ ~ - ~ n ~ l i l i c a ~ , I~YIIIII~I~C-is sn,ial, n11d that i t 1 1 1 ~ V I I i l ~ \ l i l ~ ~ t i ~ ~ ~ I~ lU'IS i ( . ( to d ~ l m d 11 t I.b I for ~ w ~ i t iinqx.ltlr. i ~ a p i r a t i antl1lirtr3i1,11upun h al ~~~~. nlonr. Althol~gh admir~istrutivr p p n r i l t ~ ~ h n an n has crwtrd am1 is vl~gngrcl n the daily owrutinn of th.. i varilnls pnJvt.ls 111% has latlt~rhcv~. dtvisin~isa n ' fiv llln111~ illl).lllll~ 1)llt 1111' Sllilll It!

    Chronology (ulou)
    599-330 B.C.
    'The first Peninn emplm, fmnded by Cyrus the C:wrt of the Achpcmnid dynnrty, rventually er(enda frost what ,I now AfUh.nistn? in thr east tu t M d i t r r r r m v ~ urvl h t Ae~can xu in the - . 1
    a

    1846 MOY USSR witlnle~w~ trmyn +roan 1r;m d t v r Lr.tnt.ua u u t t ttr pluinh lo t l r UN L.rnrily Ctnuril n.g.tr'lllmg Sal\ic.t hilurr iu wilhclnw ncapyiny trcx>ps afh, c,~dof \\'srltl War I . I lWU

    :xu)

    B.C.

    Alesslrlcr ti* (:rntt is rnnv#*.cf kiux uf I'n.r*ia itfl4.r cia.(eating Penisn hncw. ntsrkiltg brninniny d Creek n h , t. which luted until c. 9 0 B.C. 5
    1

    Fcb~uuy
    'I'udch (klttw-j l?trty. thv C ~ , n t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ tn ~ ~ ~ > ~wliti~,.tl i ~ 33, t Intn, ~ b ~ ~ l l ~ fc~cttllc~gv~l ~ ~ v c ~inl ;xtt ~ ~ ~ uI.,' ~ ~ ~ t twwl i ~ .~Ita~w~tt ~ .tv~awinwte tlw SIml#.

    250 B.C. Hevcdl ihynitwt (;reek rink M r h, rawblishthn~tc tlw d v~nerallvnnclbtitaulhd I'nrthiutt d y n w . which Llrt. f'r vlrnurt five mlturies

    IDS1
    Much BriIirb-~,w~cdoil indarlry ~~.tt~,~nali,rd. p n x h d ~ , l l vnl c*r.;r.v; tutti-British d r w t ck~rtmrtnttiott\ thw.ate~~ tlw n;tli~~&~:&l wrt~rity.

    me-851
    The Suunbiam den mrton. the Perriut~ eullpin. YW ~L I. I
    I*,

    plil IUI ~ ~ ~ ~ IL.LIBIIW ~ All &~swta~;t~r clanamiru trurtr. u,xlt.r Arab Man~li~ua ~w~atn~l. M ~ I I I u U~t~inde(t ~ ~ ~ Prnnnr Sl1111a1t.m. ~t~~trkiny nltrrat (UU-ycur pericrl '8 pdilical akdivn.. un lurl ,Ilnmily, uml clhumlrr oa~der the Amb. T u b . a~td Aulwc Monwls. h 4 a d q ~ u r t c 4 y wuy. 1 8 r l tin. Sh;tlt, x l w Ih.wl th.d lu la ISOI-17313 L'unyr after un nhwtivc attempt uguilrrt hl~rn~tltv~ 4 Under the Srfvvid dy~lvrtyinternal ot&r a d unlty uw few days eawlirr, ~c.turwcl Iran. tu d m r d m Shia Irhn, is estmblirhnl pr the data reli@on. d

    1855

    1705
    Lon8 dynuly of thr Turkic @ivn hyltrr.

    Nomkr Iran @ins HuLclid Part, which in 1 W Iwcaaa. t l ~ r


    O.nlrul Twatly C~yn~,ia+liuu (CYNTO).

    1 w

    Bilaterihl 1807

    hktlv

    ityrrrnrnt r i y i r d wilh I'88ilt,cl Stihlc. .

    omdm
    Supple~nnasy L.'u~t&~~an~ti~l pr*%l, i l , port ~d Laws a u the ~ ~ n s t i t t t l i c ~ ~ ~ . b'cbnury Sucnsful wug Inl uyvinrt Qrivr wui~n~s H ,x K~HII, hy e. t leader of sn 1rsni.n army C o ~ r u ~ k biyp<k. ard &yyicl Ziu ed-Din Tubatubai, who Iatrr kcante Ritne Minirhr. Trrnly of Frirrulship aiyn.d with th. Rurrkn &let Federal Swiulirt RrpuMic.

    July Irwn mrl the I1uitr.J Arzhb Hrpublic In...A tlipl<au,t.ttu. wl;tt&m~r it dispute uvrr r~.lntiot~r in w~tl!bnrl.

    lms
    lkambn Comnattnm cd ha Kltian. I w ~ ~ ~ f~~ Y ) WhIin H A # r t I CI Shah Pnhlavi.
    1M1 A"W.4 Unitcll Kira#<k~n r ~ th. LlSSH invlulc lrun Is <rn#ntvr s l IhmaI ~d t.xplll\in~ ( * m ) Y I b imfl~mt\.kplsmber

    IW
    Seplnnbr Unilateral drcl~rrticna by Iritth. law I Ir.llcth 111 1 1 ~ & IISSR, that lranintt vnil wiN nc* h u w l I>> plwrra . ftuciys for ~ s i u ih m . l

    IS-V Nntbnd rrfercsdu8t# Shah; sir-poial rrf,,nu pnnur.al, on nv~lk < ~ v ~ ~ w k . lvtw iin ~ y 81 l)n!gritt~b. it, n ~ ~ fsva~r 1

    ~ c r shah whdicut.xi n ) f;avor s Shah.

    ~d his wn. Mchrnnna'l H A WI

    Sdcmber
    Prrlist~rntluyr k i i c ~ n r L l fcn Plrt hl;tjlw. k

    1OM

    luly Imn, Psklrtan, and Turkey eshbUnh Regiood Csoperntion for Dcvelo-nl (RCD). Januw Prinls Minister Hasan-Ali MHILJUI. -~siknated by a member of s fanatical Mu.lim group; Amir A b h Haveyda appointed Rime Miniatm. Awil Altempt un Shvhh life by a ~uhwrlpt nnabrr of I#nprinl

    Febrvuy Shnh cancel trip to Srucl! Amhiv in clbpuk over status af Bahrotn ar eusnpetltrua nt tlw Pt.rsnnu (:"If o~nnttnlr
    scptcmbsr

    Shah visib; USSR


    Oaabn

    Municipal m n ~ U rhctlors M d in, Iawr cttl..


    o.', lw

    plxl

    Cusd.
    Jum

    Nmembr Shab vbibi Saudi Arab& and Kuw*at

    1880
    offkid visit lo USSR.
    April

    T e Shah &s h

    I*wur
    Iran and USSH sgrn h t USSH will build a r k l mill, develqr inn and mal, plod build n pipeline far Lanian m h m l gss to USSR.

    Lan b n a h dlplomalic relations with Lebanon uver Lbne.e refusal to e d t t e Lt. Gen. Tmur BahLtnor, wmIwl fm b d in La"
    Iran abrogate. 1837 a m m e n t wlth lnul uwr W e . B the Shstt PI Arab h u a e of ullugcrl Irwa vudationr

    1987
    Jmuuy Soviet military d i t of US$llO nlillian extended to Irlua.

    Oftobor Shnh vutta Unitrd S t l t s l

    Aupld Parliamentary election. held for 22nd Milis. Scpternbor Crmstihlrnt ummbly amends constitution to provide for N-inn to Shah; Empress named Regent.

    1810 July
    Gsnersl Tunw BrhLUu ~rrsrrlrwted m irrrr by lraulut
    agents.

    1811
    J ~ Y Psrltsmmntary ~ l a t l a n for e3rd MqUr r

    Ootaber
    Coronalion of Mobammad Heza Shah. Novombrr US smn,mir aid to Iran offiuirlly en&.
    1088

    Odobrr Celebration of 2,SUUth unnlverauy by Pe'enlan Monarchy.


    Navmbr

    Iranlnn fom p y Persian G l IJnndv o Alru Muw uf f and the Tunbs.

    v Brit'uh unnwnw tlaey will pull forers out of Penlaa Gulf ut md of 1871.

    l81S
    O a k Shah nzd Em-

    vktt USSH

    IS

    ECONOMY, (Continued) Aid Continued) Militw-$325 m U l h in lid extended by V.S.S.R. (1887-71); tot.] U.S. aid 18.18-72 mounted to $1.700 million (St M a e b y mmvcrsion rater 75.75 rials-US$I F i d reui 21 M d - a O March (1872)

    hm, Muhhad, and Tabrir; 307,500 telephmu (1871);' 3 million radio neeiven (1870) and 100.000 TV receivsrr (1872); 8.1 AM. 1 FM, nnd I 8 TV U i o w (Januul
    1873); rtellite gmund atation DEFENSE FORCES: MlUtw mmnpowsri Malu 154Q. 1.255.000; about 5 B I fit for military remica; about 317.IM w.ch military . p ($1) annually Pe"m"xel, 2 w m , 88 follow.: gmud f0mr. 1 m . m navy. 13.000 (including 3 . 0 9 nav;d infantry); sir f o w . 50,000 (461 pilots); gmdsrmsrir, 70.300 (S) Major -d units, 5 diviaionr (2 infantry, 3 armoradh I 1 m y avhtion command, 4 epnratc brig.de. 12 Infantry. 1 airborne Wantry. 1 rpedsl force) (S) Shipr 1 guhlnd-mieile datmyer. 2 W - m i s a i l s destroyer emrty. 12 p.t.01 craft, 6 mine warfare, 4 amphihiour croft, 21 service waft, 2 yttuhts; 10 hovercraft () S' h a f t s '508, including 320 (212 jet) in air force; nonjq in gemiarma3i.. 117 -id In gwund fom., and 18 nonjet in navy (S) supplyi ~mdueu l .mu md m u n i t i o n to 105ma; d bulk of equipment fmm U.S.. some antitank mirsilex f m n Francs. m l e surface-to-air missiles a d naval crdt fmm U.K.. heUmpten fmm Italy; since 1887 has rcceiwd sl&ie.nt qusntltiu of m o d vehicles, utillery (b. duding self-pmplbd A guns), nnd tmspmt vehid.l. A fmm the U.S.S.R.; recently A l u n s and UMA dated radar from Swiherland, and tanks fmm U.K.

    R.iln,.dsz 2,875 miles 4'8%" a g e . 57 miles 5'8" a g e


    Hi&w*r.ysr28,500 mile.; 7.100 miles wverl. 1P.B00 nliln grpvel d mushed dorm, 8,500 mile improved cuth

    Inlud r a t m a m i 585 miles, not Including Cupian Sea. Shntt sl Arab. and Lsks U.rmia
    Pipliaai Cruds oil, 3,300 mihs; refined pmducts, 2,785 miles; natural pu, 1.760 miles

    Pwtl: 7 tnajor. 6 minor


    M w h . a l m v i v t 15 ship (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 150,388 GRT, or 218,075 DWT; Lneluda I1 cargo, 4 tanker Civil air; 18 major tramport aircraft A U i i ! d ~118 die; 6 have ~ n w a y s m 12.000 ft.; 15 o have runrnyr 8,0Wll.S9! ft.; 48 have runways 4 . W 7 . M It.; 49 Held. have permanent-surfaced runways; 82 airfield sit-

    TekeommunluHoll:: Mvannd system of hi&ap.dC reo-relay links, apenuire Lines, cables, and tropospheric
    links; principal csntm Tehran; necondary centen. Erfa-

    (a

    MiHtary bud& For fiscal year d i n g 20 March 1875;' a t h a t e d at $1,471.2 million; about aO.396 of t d bud&

    ORICFIWG FOR TDY PERSONNEL

    slide
    lor0

    m1SII-Huo

    (u)

    GOOD (WR~IIHG)(AFTERNOON) GENTLEMEN.

    I AM

    SINCE YOUR STAY I N IRAN WILL BE BRIEF. W HAVE DESIGNED A E BRIEFING WHICH WILL GIVE Y W A BROAD OVERVIEW OF T H t SITUATION HERE, WITH THE HOPE THAT I T WILL ASSIST YOU I N PERFORMIllG YOUR MISSION.

    #
    INTRODUCTION: THIS RESUME BEGINS WITH A COIiSIDERATION I T COilTINUES WITH

    m n m OUTLIm

    (C)

    OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AT STAKE I N IRAN.

    A B I T OF STAGE SETTING BY WEIGHING THE IMPLICATIOHS OF IRAN'S GEOGRAPHIC LOCAT1014 I N THE MIDDLE EAST AND BY EXAMINING THE PRINCIPAL PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE COUNTRY, SINCE THEY HELP TO EXPLAIN IRAN'S DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AND DEFENSE POSTURE. W E

    WILL ALSO TAKE A LOOK AT IRAN'S SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, I T S PEOPLE AND THEIR RELIGTON, AN0 COMMENT BRIEFLY OiJ A FEW IMPORTANT CULTURAL FACTORS. THIS SERVES AS A PRELUDE TO A

    STATEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL THREAT AS I T I S PERCEIVED BY IRAN A#D THE STRATEGY THAT THE SHAH HAS OEVISED TO COUNTEWICT THIS THREAT. AN ANALYSIS OF IRAN'S DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING APPARATUS I S THEN INCLUDED AND FOLLOWED BY A SUMMARY OF THE STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, AND EXPANSION PLANS OF THE THREE MILITARY SERVICES. REVIEW OUTLINES THE U.S. NEXT. THE

    SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAH OPERATING

    I N SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN FORCES AND COVERS I N DETAIL I T S TWO PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS: ARMISH-MA4G, THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE

    ADVISORY GROUP, AND TAFT, THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FIELD TEAMS.

    SINCE JANUARY, 1972, II(AII HAS PURCHASED SOME 2-1/2 BILI.ION DOLLARS' WORTH OF U.S. MlLITARY EQUIPMENT, THEREBY MAKING THIS

    NATION THE LEADING FOREIGN BUYER OF MATERIEL PRODUCED BY AMERICAN DEFENSE INOUSlIIlCS. A BREAKDOWN OF FORtIGN MI1 ITARY

    SALES THAT HAVE BEEN CCJI~SUMMATEOI S PROVIDED, ALONG WITH A LIST11 OF SOME ADDITIONAL MAJOR CASES ON THE HORIZON. IMPRESSIVE THOUGH

    THEY ARE, THESE MAJOR MILITARY PURCHASES MUST BE COUPLED TO AN PMBITIOUS TRAINING PROGRAM I N ORDER TO TRANSLATE PROCURrllENT INTO COMBAT CAPABILITY. THERLFORE. A RECAPITULATION OF CURRLNT AND

    PROJECTED OUT-OF-COUNTRY MILITARY TRAINING FOR IRANIAN 1-OItCCS' PERSONNEL I S ALSO FURNISHED. FINALLY, THE REVIEW CONCLUDES WITH

    A SYNOPSIS OF FACTORS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE EXTERNAL THREAT THAT HELP SHAPE THE SHAH'S CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO ENLARGING AND

    MOOERNIZING

    IRAN'S
    U.S.

    ARMED F O R C E S , ~
    A REVIEW OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

    (U)

    INTERESTS:

    I 5 A USEFUL POINT OF DEPARTURE BECAUSE I T SERVES TO EXPLAIN WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS SO CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED IRAN SINCE WORLD WAR I 1 AND WHY THE LEVEL OF THIS SUPPORT HAS RISEtl DRAMATICALLY WITHIN THE LAST TWO YEARS. FLANKED AS I T I S BY THE

    VOLATILE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT TO THE WEST AND THE CONTIIJUING AN1FZ)SlTY BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA ON THE SUB-CONTINENT TO THE EAST. IRAN STANDS AS AN ISLAND OF STABILITY AND PROGRESS I N A PART OF THE MHILD WHERE THESE CONDITIONS ARE I N SHORT SUPPLY.@

    S l i d e #k CN Em

    (C)

    SECONDLY. THE U.S.

    I S LINKED TO IRAN BY A B1LAII:RAL THE U .S. AND IRAN ARE

    SECURITY AGREEMENT DATING BACK TO 1959.

    ALSO ALL'IEO WITHIN THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION I N WHICH IRAN I S A t U L L , AND THE U.S. THE PAST FEW YEARS, THE U.S. I S AN ASSOCIATE MEMBER. WITllIN

    MILITARY ALLIANCE STRUCTURE HAS

    BEEN DEVALUED I N SOME QUARTERS ALMOST AS RAPIDLY AS THE DOLLAR ITSELF. NONETHELESS, I T I S S T I L L REASSURING TO THE UNITED STATES THE

    TO HAVE IRAN CONTINUE TO SERVE AS A BUFFER...PREVENTING

    SOVIET UNION FROM GAINING DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE WATERS OF THE I N D I A N

    OCEAN.^

    Slide
    MAP

    AIR 80ul%8

    (C)

    THIRDLY, AT A TIME WHEN P O L I T I C A L BARRIERS ARE MORE OF

    AN OBSTACLE M A N TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIERS. IRAN PROVIDES AN IRREPLACEABLE A I R CORRIDOR FOR U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT. WHEN ONE

    CONSIDERS THAT OUR AIRCRAFT ARE PRESENTLY PROHIBITED FROM OVERFLYING THE MEDITERRANEAN'S SOUTHERN SHORE I N AN ARC STRETCHING FROM ALGERIA TO SYRIA, THE A I R ROUTE THROUGH TURKEY AND IRAN AFFORDS THE ONLY PRACTICAllLE L I N K BETWEEN EUROPE AND SEVI I<AL KEY DESTINATIONS I N THE I N D I A N OCEAN AREA. FOR EXAMPLE, STAGING

    THROUGH IRAN, THE MILITARY A I R L I F T COMMAND SERVES OUR COMMUNICAU~NS STATION I N ETHIOPIA, THE U.S. NAVY'S COMMANDER, MIDDLE EAST FORCE

    AND THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM I N SAUDI ARABIA.


    -0

    BALAIEE 01 PAmENTS

    1 6

    (U)

    FOURTH, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS HAS BEEN A CHiiONIC PROBLEM.

    FOR THE U.S. ECONW.

    N ADDITION I

    TO THE SALF QF MILITARY

    ,
    i

    m..

    ..

    EQUIPMCNT, IRAN I S A T I I R I V I M i MARKET FOR U.S. CAPITAL AND C M E R C I A L MODS. AT PRESENT, OVER 2 0 0 U.S. COMPANIES HAVC T H I S NMBER INCLUDES 2 0 AMERICAN

    RESIDENT OFFICES I N TEHRAN. O I L COMPANIES. U.S.

    IRAN EVEN SERVES AS AN IMPORTANT MARKET FOR

    AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES: OVER TWO M I L L I O N DOLLARS WORTH

    LAST YEAR.@
    (C) FIFTH, O I L I S A SUBJECT VERY MUCH ON EVERYONE'S MIND THE UNITEO STATES CURRENTLY CONSUMES 4 0 PERCENT OUR ENERGY NEEDS ARE R I S I N G I T IS

    THESE DAYS.

    OF THE WORLD'S PETROLEUM PRODUCTION.

    AT A TIME WHEN OUR DOMESTIC PRODUCTION I S DECLINING.

    APPARENT THAT THE UNITED STATES W I L L BE COMPELLED TO IMPORT GREATE AMOUNTS OF PETROLEUM AT LEAST THROUGH THE 1980's. AT PRESENT.

    LESS THAN 5 PERCENT OF IRAN'S O I L EXPORTS ARC SENT DIRECTLY TO THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, CONSIDERABLY LARGER AMOUNTS ARI

    EXPORTED TO OUR PRINCIPAL ASIAN ALLY. JAPAN. AND TO OUR NATO A L L I E I N WESTERN EUROPE. I N VIEW OF THE CELEBRATED ENERGY C R I S I S AND

    THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARAB THREATS TO USE O I L AS A WEAPON TO PRESSURE THE UNITED STATES I N T O MODERATING I T S SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, IRAN EMRGES AS A SECURE, WILLING. AND INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT 'SWRCE OF U.S. (C)

    011. IMPORTS.

    LASTLY, BECAUSE OF I T S GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION. IRAN PROVIDE

    THE S I T E FOR SEVERAL INSTALLATIONS WHICH HAKE A V I T A L CONTRIBUTIW TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY.

    ,
    I

    ? .

    ..
    J

    4 ,.'. * "
    -4

    \#' b,b>

    ...
    '

    r 1

    l4b.b.A

    sli~~ C8 UP-

    (U)

    PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:

    TO MAINTAIN A LORRI CT

    u.s.mAR

    FRAME OF REFERENCE, I T I S NECESSARY TO RENEWER THAT IRAN I S A LARGE COUNTRY. SOnE 636.000 SQUARE MILES. STATING I T S SIZE

    I N HORE MEANINGFUL TERMS, I F IRAN WERE SUPERIMPOSED ON A MAP OF THE UNITED STATES. I T WOULD COVER MOST OF OUR COUNTRY EAST

    HAP-

    -#9

    OF THE MISSISSIPPI

    .*SIMILARLY,

    IRAN WOULD BLANKET MOST OF

    WIIICW/IBU

    WESTERN EUROPE. EXTENDING ALONG ONE AXIS FROM SCOTLAND TO ROME AND ALONG THE OTHER FROM THE BALTIC SEA TO THE SPANISH BORDER.@ (U) IRAN BORDERS ON TWO MAJOR BODIES OF WATER: THE

    CASPIAN SEA TO THE NORTH. WHOSE WATERS FURNISH MOST OF I I i E WURCD'S CAVIAR, AND, TO THE SOUTH, THE PERSIAN GULF. SOURCE OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST O I L RESERVES. (U) IRAN I S BOUNDED BY IRAQ AND TURKEY ON THE WEST AND'
    IS LARGELY A SEMI-ARID

    AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ON THE EAST.QIT

    PLATEAU WITH HIGH MOUNTAIN RANGES AND A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF

    4id.

    a 2

    BARREN DESERT.*THE

    CASPIAN

    SEA IS SEMI-TROPICAL

    AND EXTREMELY

    CIISPIAn AREA

    FERTIL~WHILE THE PERSIAN GULF AREA I S VERY HOT AND A D R. I (U) IRAN HAS THREE SIGNIFICANT GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES. THE

    ALBORZ W N T A I I t RANGE EXTENDS FROM SOUTHEAST TURKEY ALONG A 1,200 N I L E FRONTIER U I T H RUSSIA TO THE AFGHANISTM BOHULR.

    ELEVATIONS RANGE F R W 86 FEET BELOU SEA LEVEL TO THE CASPIAN SEA,

    TO NEARLY 19,wo FEET ABOVE SEA LEVEL AT MOUNT D A E ~ A V A R D . ~

    (U) s l i d e U17 ROAD CROSSIW(YI SUde fl8 TEHERlVl s l i d * Y19

    THE ALBORZ MOUNTAIN RANGE I S EXTREMELY RUGGED ANU

    NORTH.?HE (U)

    CITIES

    OF TEHRAN

    ANDYESHAD ARE LOCATED IN

    rHIs

    AREA.^

    THE AREA FROM THE NORTHERN SLOPES OF THE ALBORZ

    MOUNTAINS TO THE CASPIAN SEA EXPERIENCES ABUNDANT R A I N AND

    MODERATE WEATHER

    THE YEAR

    ROUND.

    MOUNTAIN STREAMS AND WINDING

    RIVERS GIVE THE CASPIAN COASTAL AREA THE APPEARANCE OF A LUSH, RICH, FERTILE AND AGRICULTURAL LAND. THE AREA PRODUCES A WIDE

    VARIETY OF CROPS, INCLUDING RICE, SUGAR CANE, CORN, FLAX,

    c m s ITBns
    MANY CITRUS
    PRODUCTS WHICH ALSO COME FROM THIS

    Slide /21

    REGIONZI THE

    C I T Y OF TABRIZ I S LOCATED NEAR T H I S GENERAL REGION AND I S PRIMARILY FAMOUS FOR I T S MAGNIFICENT SHAH AND GOLESTAN GARDENS. THE MAIN PRODUCTS ARE CARPETS, BLANKETS AND SOME EXCELLENT
    SILVER

    ITEMS.@
    (U) THE SECOND MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF IRAN I S THE

    ZAGROS MOUNTAIN RANGE Wllt CH RUNS FROM THE KURDISTAN MOIJNTAINS I N TURKEY ALONG THE BORDER WITH IRAQ TO THE BALUCHISTAN MOUNTAINS

    slide 1 4 HUNT 3CBlO3

    I N PAKISTAN.

    eTHEY ARE AS RUGGED I N PLACES AS THE ALBORZ RANGE.

    AND HAVE FAR GREATER DEPTH. VARYING I N WIDTH FROM 2 0 0 TO 2 5 0 MILES I N CERTAIN AREAS. (U) THE C I T Y OF SHIRAZ I S LOCATED I N THE ZAGROS MOUNTAIN THE TOMBS OF SUCH

    RANGE AND I S CALLED IRAN'S MOST POETIC C I T Y .

    Slide 126 TCMB OF HAFEZ Slide 6127 PERSEPOLIS Slide #28 2500th

    FAMOUS POETS AS S M D I AND HAFEZ ARC LOCATED IiCRC.

    CI

    (3

    NEARIW I S

    THF VERY ANCIENT CITY, AND FORMCR CAPITAL OF THE PERSI 4 EMPIRE. PCRSCPOLIS, OR AS LOCALLY PREFERRED, "TAKHTE-JAMSHID,"

    SITE OF

    THE TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION7 111 1971. @THESE TWO RUGGED RANGES CRADLE A VAST, ARID,
    CENTRAL PLAIEAU

    UniIVERSARY
    a . d /29
    DESERT

    THAT I S LARGELY DEVOID OF VEGETATION, ANIMAL L I F E OR HUMAN HASITATION. (U) LOCATED I N EASTERN AND CENTRAL IRAN, THIS HUGE

    WASTELAND VARIES I N ELEVATION FROM 1,000 TO 8,000 FEET, AND


    BORDERS WITH

    AFGHANISTAIN

    AND PAKISTAN.

    THE GREAT PLATEAU

    CONTAINS THE DAsHT-E-uvIR AND THE DAsHT-E-LuT DEsERTs.CITfiE CITY OF ISFAHAN I S LOCATED ON THE EDGE OF THIS PLATEAU AND CONTAINS THE GREATEST COLLECTION OF BEAUTIFUL MOSQUES I N A SINGLE CITY OF IRAN, ALONG WITH THE LARGEST NUMBER OF TEXTILE

    MILLS.^

    Slide Y31 BRASS SHOP

    MOST OF THE BRASS AND OTHER EXQUISITE HANDICRAFT ITEMS COME


    FROM ISFAHANIS LARGE WORKING BAZAAR.~FROM A TOURIST
    POINT OF

    VIEW, ISFAHAN I S PROBABLY THE MOST REWARDING CITY OF IRAN WITH Slide 6132 nospm I T S BEAUTIFUL MOSQUES, ANCIENT BRIDGES AND UNUSUAL SIGHTS. (U)

    OL I

    A n G m n BRZD(P w* IYc

    sub n 3

    TRADITIONALLY, THE MOUNTAINS HAVE SERVED AS DEFENSIVE IRONICALLY, HOWEVER, IRAN'S FOREMOST

    RAMPARTS FOR THE NATION.

    STRATEGIC TARGETS--HER O I L PRODUCTION. REFINING AND EXPORT FACILITIES I N THE SOUTHWEST--ARE SITUATED ON AN ALLUVIAL PLAIN OUTS1DE THE W N T A I N DEFENSES.

    Slide #35 OIL TANKER

    q U )

    LAVAN AN0 KHARC ISLANDS I N THE PERSIAN GULF ARE PRIME

    STORAGE AN0 TRANSSHIPMENT SITES FOR IRAN'S O I L PRODUCTS.

    PLRSIA'S ANCIENT SPLENDORS ARC RAPIDLY BEING OVERTAKEN BY SUCH MODERN DEVELOPMENTS AS A GAS PIPELINE FROM THE PERSIAN GULF TO
    RUSSIA.

    (u)

    PEOPLE; RELIGION,

    CULTURE.

    IRANIS

    POPULATION

    IS

    ABOUT 3 0 MILLION, MOST OF WHOM ARE MOSLEMS. THAT I S . ADHERENTS OF ISLAM. IRAN'S MOSLEMS ARE MOSTLY OF THE SHIITE BRANCH, AS
    BRANCH, OF ISLAM. THERE ARE IN IRAN

    OPPOSED TO THE SUNNI

    ARADS, TURKS, AFGHANS, AN0 PAKISTANIS W O ARE ALSO MOSLEMS. H


    RELIGIOUS

    MINORITIES

    INCLUDE CHRISTIANS,

    JEWS, AND ZOROASTRIANS.

    THERE ARE ABOUT 80.000 JEWS I N IRAN TODAY, AND THEY FORM ONE OF THE OLDEST JEWISH COLONIES I N THE WORLD. (U) THE SEPARATION OF THE S H I I T E BRANCH OF ISLAM AND THE

    SUNNI BRANCH REVOLVES AROUND A QUARREL OVER SUCCESSION FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE PROPHET MOHAMMED. SHIITES BELIEVE THAT ALI, AND

    SUCCESSION PASSED FROM MOHAMED TO H I S SON-IN-LAW.

    FROM A L I TO A SUCCESSION OF IMAMS. THE TWELFTH IMAM BEING THE HIOOEN IMAM WHO DISAPPEARED BUT WILL ONE DAY RETURN. THE SUNNI

    SECT, TO WHICH VIRTUALLY EVERY ARAB BELONGS. BELIEVES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT THE PROPER SUCCESSION PASSED TO A L I N E OF ELECTED CALIPHS. M E SHJITES DO NOT BELIEVE THEY ARE STRICTLY THEIR M R E FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARD

    BOUND BY THE KORAN--THUS, ALCOHOL, FOR EXMPLE.


    8

    ,qqqrraqp--

    ; ; ?I

    fi
    k A

    JLL.L

    1
    b ~

    (U)

    RELIGION Ift'sS II AIIITIONALLY PLAYED A MORC IMPOIiTAiiT

    ROLE I N THE L I F E OF IRA! I A N S THAN I T HAS I N THE L I F E 01 MOST WESTERNERS. BECAUSF: f11{1rIOl.lAL AN0 IIITELLECTUAL RCACTIOI& TO

    THE MATERIAL ENVIROIIMLIII WERE OFTEN FORMULATED I N TERMS OF RELIGION, ALMOST ALL RCLIGIOUS MOVEMENTS I N IRAN HAVE HA0 STRONG SOCIAL AIiD P O L I T I C A L IMPLICATIONS. (U) TODAY. THE CLERGY I S BASICALLY A CONSERVATIVE FORCE I N IRAN THEY HAVE STRONGLY OPPOSED THE SHAH'S REFORM PROGRAM, EVEN

    PARTICULARLY LGNO REFORM AN0 THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN.

    MODERN LAW, SUCH AS THE RECENTLY ENACTED DIVORCE LAWS, ARE BASED AROUND THE TENETS OF THE KORAN. (U) THE LEGITIMACY OF THE RULING DYNASTY I S BASED ON THE

    THEORY THAT THE SHAH RULES H I S PEOPLE AS THE VICE-REGENT OF THE HIDDEN IMAM, ONE WHO. ACCORDING TO S H I I T E ISLAM, WILL RETURN I N THE LAST DAYS TO ESTABLISH A WORLD OF TRUTH. PEACE AND JUSTICE. (U)

    @
    ABOUT THREE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF IRAN

    CONSISTS OF TRIBAL PEOPLE AND NOMADS WHO, U N T I L RECENTLY, TWICE W YEARLY PACKED ALL THEIR BELOIiGINGS O CAMELS. MULES, AND DONKEYS TO MIGRATE TO BETTER PASTURES.

    AS PART OF RECENT REFORMS.

    MEASURES M V E BEEN TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT TO GET THESE PEOPLE SETTLED I N VILLAGES AND TOWNS AND ENGAGED I N ANIMAL HUSBANDRY, AGRICULTURE OR SMALL BUSINESS.

    P
    @(u)

    C"" \',, ;'

    "

    1,

    .,

    TllE MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPS ARE TllC KUItDS, TllE BAKIII IAIUS, THERE ARE ALSO

    THE 6H>HLHAI, THE BALUCHIS AND THE TURKONNS.

    llUMEROUS SMALLER TRIBES SUCH AS TtIE LURDS, SHAIISAVAIJS, AI SHARS AND OTHER MINOR TRIBAL ELEMENTS. OF THOSE MENTIONED. THF KURDS

    AND THC BAKHTIARIS ARE THE LARGEST, NUMBERING ABOUT TWO MILLION AN0 ONE MILLION RESPECTIVELY. EXCEPT FOR AN ABORTIVE RUSSIAN

    ATTEMPT AFTER WORLD WAR 11. THE KURDS HAVE NEVER BEEN A NATrON, BUT HAVE BEEN A DISTINCT ETHNIC GROUP FOR ABOUT 3,000 YEAIIS. THE IRANIAN KURDS L I V E I N THE NORTHWESTERN BOROER AREA. @ (U) JUST AS THE RELIGION OF IRAN I S DIFFERENT FhdM OUR OWN LJHILE SOME OF I T S ASPECTS CAN BE PERPLEX1 WITHOUT G O I M

    SO I S THEIR CULTURE.

    MERE ARE OTHER FACETS WHICH ARE MOST ENJOYABLE.

    INTO A COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION, LET ME JUST TOUCH ON A FLU POINTS. (U) MOST IRANIANS LOOK UPON WESTERNERS AS BEING COLD-BLO

    AND UNRESPONSIVE. CARING MORE ABOUT PRIVACY, ACCURACY AND RULES THAN ABOUT PERSONAL LOYALTY, WHILE SEEING THEMSELVES AS WARM. GENEROUS AND KIND. (U) YET. PROBABLY ONE OF THE THINGS WHICH "BUGS" MtRICAN.5

    MOST I S THIS WALLED SOCIETY WHICH I S DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE. IRANIAN FAMILY I S THE CENTER OF THIS SOCIETY, BEHIND THESE

    THEY L I V E I N L I T T L E OASES (IF SAFETY SURROUNDED BY THEIR RELATI AND FRIENDS, THOSE THEY KNOW THEY CAN TRUST, PEOPLE WHO ARE "KHODIn---OR "ONE OF US

    ."
    '0
    <
    I.

    i '7"'' *

    "

    """i

    Slide &2 PERSYNAL D I O l l I R

    O(U)

    JUST AS IRANIANS VALUE THEIR FAMILY AND FRIEI.III:, TtiOSf. WHO HAVL SERVED IRANIANS (ALL T l l I S

    IRANIANS ALSO VALUE THEIR SELF-RESPECT.

    I N THE ORIENT KNOW HOW IMPORTANT "FACE" I S . "AD-E-RU ,"---"THE WATCH OF H I S FACE."

    I F YOU G I V t SOMI ONE, A

    DRESSING DOWN I N FRONT OP OTHERS, YOUR MORDS CAEl IIURT l l l M MORE THAN I F Y W H I T HIM. INSULTS REALLY HURT HERE. AND SOML OF THL

    THINGS YOU MIGHT CALL t I I M CASUALLY, EVEN I N ENGLISH, REALLY H I T HOMC.


    I
    I

    YOU JUST HAVC NO WIW OF KNOWING HOW BEEPLY INFURIATING OR

    H I l R T N L A PARTICbLAR PHRASE MAY BE. (U) AN0 BY THE WAY, GESTURES HAVE A WHOLE NEW WORLD OF EVEN THE Hi\RMLESS "THUMBS UP" SIGN HAS A VERY 1I:ANIANS TALK WITH THEIR HANDS. LEARN THE

    MEANING HERE.

    INSULTING CONNOTATION.

    LANGUAGE BEFORE YOU TRY TO TALK WITH YOURS. (U)

    YOU CAN INSULT PCOPLE I N OTHER WAYS BESIDES CRITICISM.

    PEOPLE OF LOWER STATUS W I L L GREET YOU FIRST, BUT YOU SHOULD ALWAYS SAY "SALAM" BACK. I N IRAN, I T ' S P O L I T E TO R I S E WHEN AN EQUAL OR SOME WOMEN WILL ALSO

    SOMEONE OF HIGHER STATUS ENTERS THE ROOM.

    R I S E FOR OTHER WMEN OR FOR IMPORTANT OLDER MEN.

    AND WHEN A GUEST

    I S LEAVING YOUR HOUSE, ALWAYS SEE H I M OUT TO THE STREET OR AT LEAST ACCOMPANY HIM PART WAY. LOOK DOWN ON HIM. I F YOU DON'T, I T WILL SEEM YOU

    B)
    DID YOU KNOW

    sri& #W No WORD FCR


    110

    (U) CHARACTERISTIC WHICH WESTERNERS F I N D PUZZLING.

    THE I R A N I A N CONCERN FOR SELF-RESPECT LEADS TO ANOTHER

    THLRE I S NOT A GOOD STRONG WORD FOI< "NO" I N TllE PCRSIAN LANGUAGE? THEY DON'T WANT TO DISAPPOIliT YOU, ANlr TIILY'I L YOU MAY BE IHUSTRAT FROM

    TELL YOU WHAT TllEY THINK YOU WANT TO HEAR.

    AT NOT BEING ABLE TO GET CRITICISM OR AN "HOIlEST PEOPLE. (U) THEY M Y BE PROTECTING YOUR "AD-E-RU."

    I N IRAN YOU WILL ENCOUNTER AN ELADOHATE SYSTEM OF SOME OF THE POLITE PHRASES CAN SEEM

    COURTESY CALLED "TAAROF."

    VERY CHARMING TO NEWCOMERS. AND YOU CAN ENJOY LEARNING AIIOUT T JUST AS YOU LEARN ABOUT PERSIAN MUSIC OR HANDICRAFTS. tOR

    INSTANCE, I F YOU FIND YOU HAVE BEEN STANDING WITH YOUR BACK TO
    S~MCONEAND YOU APOLOGIZE,
    OACK NOR FRONT."

    HE MAY REPLY, "A FLOWER HAS N~ITHER'

    ANOTHER EXAMPLE I S THE PRACTICE OF ARGUING THERE I S A COIIRECT THE MOST IMPORTANT

    ABOUT WHO SHOULD GO FIRST THROUGH A DOOR. ORDER. AND I N THE END I T WILL BE FOLLOWED.

    OR SENIOR GETS THE PRIVILEGE AND USUALLY THE FOREIGN COLLEA HAS THIS HIGH STATUS--BUT DON'T TAKE I T FOR GRANTED. BE RUDE. (U) WOMEN DO GENERALLY PRECEDE. "TAAROF" FOR A FOREIGNER I S A LITTLE L I K E BARGAINING TIIIS

    YOU CAN HAVE A B I T OF FUN AND A L I l 7 L E MISCHIEF BECAUSE THERC I S A CERTAIN SPORT INVOLVED. BUT BEHIND TAAROF" I S A RLAL AN SO I T ' S WORTH TRYING TO

    PROFOUND GENEROSITY AND IiDSPITALITY. GET INTO THE S P I R I T OF I T .

    (U) IRANIANS SAY "THE WEST I S BELOVED OF GOD." AND EVE

    >" ,. .,

    ..

    12 ""

    '

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    1 ,

    ,.

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    .....-I

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    7

    STRANGER WHO COMES TO IRAN CAN OELIGllT I N IRANIAN HOSPIIALITY, WHICH APPROACHES A NATIONAL ART FORM. (U) WHOEVER GIVES AN I N V I T A T I O N OR SUGGESTS A TRIP I S THE "PAYING

    HOST, ONE OF THE PROUDEST ROLES AN IRANIAN CAN HAVE. GUEST:


    O "DUTCH TREAT" ARE UNKNOWN HERE. R

    A T R I P TO THL M I V I E S

    OR A RESTAURANT ENDS I N A VEHEMENT DEBATE OVER WHO WILL I'AY. BUT AS WITH THE DEBATE ABOUT GOING THROUGH DOORS, THE F I N A L SOLUTION I S MORE OR LESS DETERMINED. BACK SOCIAL DEBTS. Y W R COMPANY. DON'T WORRY ABOUT I'AYING

    IRANIANS ENJOY BEING HOST AN0 ARE HONORED BY

    HOSPITALITY I N IRAN I S SO STRONG AND IMPOI(TANT

    A TRADITION THAT A GUEST MUST BE EXTRA CAREFUL NOT TO IMPOSE. POOR PEOPLE WILL GO TO GREAT EXPENSE TO SERVE A GUEST, ESPECIALLY A FOREIGNER. DON'T ADMIRE YOUR HOST'S PROPERTY TOO MUCH--HE

    MAY I N S I S T ON G I V I N G I T TO YOU, WHICH YOU MUST THEN STRUGGlE TO REFUSE. (U)

    0
    MOST IRANIANS EAT THEIR MAIN MEAL AT NOON, FOLLOWED BY

    A NAP I N HOT WEATHER, WITH JUST A L I G H T SNACK I N THE EVENING-JUST BREAD. BERBS AND CHEESE. LARGE MEAL WILL BE SERVED. (U) I N TRADITIONAL CIRCLES, THE GUEST I S SERVED TEA IMMEDIATELI BUT WHEN YOU'RE I N V I T E D OUT A

    I N MODERN CIRCLES. COCKTAILS ARE L I K E L Y TO APPEAR, THOUGH MOST WOMEN WILL ASK FOR SOFT DRINKS. WHEN GIVEN A CHOICE. REMEMBER

    WHISKEY I S EXPENSIVE: VODKA AND BEER ARE NOT.

    (U)

    IRANIANS SAY IIIAT THE S1611T 0 ' A ti1 NLllOUS TAEI E I S 1 IN A

    IJHAT SATISFILS THEM--THE TABLE HAS "0ARAKAT"---BOUNTY. TRADITIONAL HOME, A CLOTH---"S0FRF:"---IS FLOOR WITH GUESTS SITTING AROUND I T .

    SPREAD ON Tlll CARPETED I N MORE MODERN IIOMES

    FOOD IS SERVED BUFFET STYLE AND GUESTS TAKE FWD ON TIILIR

    PLATE/

    All0 R E M I N CLUSTEREII AROUND THE TABLE, REACllING FOR WRE AS TH WANT I T . I N IRAN THE ENJOYMENT OF FOOD I S A SERIOUS ANU EATING I S RAPID AND ABSORDING, WITIl LITTLE

    IMPORTANT MATTEN. CONVERSATION.

    THE RULE TO FOLLOW IS--EAT AS SOON AS YOU HAVE LET I T GET COLD WHILE YOU WAIT FOR OTHEA

    FOOD--PITCH IN--DON'T

    BUT DON'T FEEL YOU HAVE TO EAT MORE THAN YOU WANT. EVEN THOUGH YOUR HOST URGES YOU STRONGLY. A COUPLE OF MORE TIPS--TEA MUST

    BE SIPPED BUT NEED NOT BE FINISHED--AND SWEETS AN0 FRUITS W\Y BE ACCEPTED AN0 LEFT UNTOUCHED. (U)

    INVITATIONS ARE CONFUSING SINCE IDEAS OF TIME DIFFER.

    THE IRANIAN "OAY" BEGINS AT SUNDOWN, SO "EVENING" M Y MEAN BETWEEN ONE DAY AND THE NEXT. FOR EXAMPLE. FRIDAY EVEIlING M Y BETTER CHECK.

    MEAN THE EVENING BETWEEN THURSDAY AND FRIDAY.

    Q) (U)

    THERE I S JUST ONE LAST POINT I WOULD L I K E TO EMPHASIZE THE IRANIANS ARE EXTREMELY

    WITH REGARD TO PERSIAN CULTURE.

    PROUD OF THEIR HERITAGE, THEY ARE VERY PROUD OF THEIR SHAH*AND THEY ARE PROUD OF THEIR FLAG. WHILE THEY M Y ACCORD THEM5

    THE PRIVILEGE OF CRITICISING THEIR GOVERNMENT AND THEIR INSTIT

    14

    TIICY ARE QUICK TO TAKI OI I I NSL SII0UI.D AlJYOlI1 L I SC 110 SO. I41 MARKS MAIX I N JLST MAY Ill. lAKLN S I IlIOUSI Y .

    LVCN

    MY AIJVICI 111 YOU

    WOULD BE TO BE VERY CIRCIII ',PCCT 114 T H I S AREA WllEFJ YOU AIU II THE COMPANY OF IRANIANS. AFTER ALL, WE GET MAD WHEN SOMlONE

    FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY POKES FUN AT THE UNITED STATES--WHY SHOULDN'T THEY 7
    (U)

    SOCIAL AND I#DUS_TRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

    TllOSE OF YOll WHO HAVE

    READ SOMETHING OF THE RECLIJT HISTORY OF IRAN KNOU THAT H I S IMPERIAL MAJESTY, THE SHAIIANSHAH, HAS HAD A LONG-STANDING PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT FOR IRAN. IIE F I R S T ANNOUNCED I T I N A BOOK CALLED
    LATER, HE ANNOUNCED A

    MIS~ION

    FOR MY COUNTRY, P~ALISHED IN 1962.

    "WHITE REVOLUTION" AN0 WROTE A SECOND BOOK BY THAT T I T L E WHICH OUTLINED TWELVE MAJOR PROGRAMS OF REFORM. THOSE PROGRAMS, NOW

    CALLED THE "REVOLUTION OF THE SHAH AND THE PEOPLE" FORM THE BASIS

    S l i d e #b9 U N D REFORM

    FOR SOCIAL REFORM I N T H I S COUNTRY.

    LET'S EXAMINE THOSE PROGRAMS

    RRIEFLY.'THE

    BACKBONE I S LAND REFORM, AND

    IN

    T H I S PROGRAM H I S

    MAJESTY SET THE EXAMPLE BY GIVING AWAY MOST OF THE ROYAL IANDS, AiJD HE REQUIRED ABSENTEE LANDLORDS TO TURN OVER THE LAND TO THOSE WHO ACTUALLY CULTIVATED I T . NOW OVER A DECADE OLD, T H I S PROGRAM

    HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE A SYSTEM OF FARM COOPERATIVES, LOAN PROGRAMS FOR PURCHASING TRACTORS AND FERTILIZER, AND A GENERAL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR AGRICULTURE. @ S l i d e #SO

    u c corn m f

    HEALrn c o r n R & D CORK)

    (U)

    THE NEXT THREE PROGRAMS ARE CLOSELY RELATED.

    AS YOU

    MAY KNOW. EACH YOUNG MAN AND WOMAW I N IRAN I S REQUIRED, 11 CALLED UPON, TO SERVE TWO YEARS OF NATIONAL SERVICE. I N ADDITION TO

    TIIRt r MILITARY SrRVI(.LS,

    MI N AN0 WOMLN. USllAl LY 111(~11S( IlOlll 01(

    COLI CGE GRI\I)UATCS, A H t DROUGHT I N 1 0 THI MILITARY, G I V I Id A I LW WLEKS OF BASIC TRAINING, AND THEN TURNED OVER TO THE C l V l l l A N MINiSTRIES FOR FURTHER TRAINIliG, AND THLN TllLY GO OUT TO 1111 V I l I A G E S TO PERFORM THE RIMAINUEH OF TllCFR SERVICE. I N '1111 CASE

    OF THC LITERACY CORPS, THEY SET UP SCHOOLS AND TEACH THE VILLAGE YOllNCSTERS AND ADULTS ALIKE TO READ, WRITE AND SO FORTH. Ill

    HEALlH CORPS SETS UP VILLAGE CLINICS, ADMINISTERS IMMUNIZAlIONS AN0 TEACHES SANITATION. THE RECOIJSTRUCTION AN0 DEVELOPMENl COUPS

    BUILDS STREETS, VILLAGE CENTERS AND ENGAGES I N OTHER PROJI I TS NEEDED BY THE VILLAGES.*
    S l i d e #51

    ELEmoruL
    REFOM

    (U)

    ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE WHITE REVOLUTION WAS l H A T OF I T WAS ONLY A B W T TEN YEARS AGO THAT WOMtN WE

    ELFCTORAL REFORMS.

    GIVEN THE RIGHT TO VOTE. BUT PERHAPS A MORE IMPORTANT ASPLIT OF lH1S REFORM PROGRAM WAS A SYSTEM OF REAPPORTIONMENT WHICH SPREAD THE RLPRESENTATION I N THE SENATE AND THE M A J L I S MORE EQUIlABLY AMONG VARIOUS GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS AND ETHNIC SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION.
    S l i d e #52 AMM iWDM ((I)

    PRIOR 1 0 THE INCEPTION OF THE WHITE REVOLUTION I R A N ' S

    GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WERE LETHARGIC AND I T WAS DIFFICULT TO GET ANYTHING ACCOMPLISHED. "BACK-SHISH" GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WERE POORLY PAID, AND

    THE PERSIAN WORD FOR G I F T

    WAS USUALLY REQUIRE0 TO

    GET ANYTHING DONE.

    H I S MAJESTY HAS NOT ONLY RAISED SALARICS OF

    GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. BUT THERE I S AN AGGRESSIVE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE

    15-A
    I
    id d . .

    .. a

    . . . a

    EFFICIENCY AND TO EI)IICATL COVERNMCNr WOItKI.ItS.

    ALt4O'~I LVCllY

    GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE YOU MEET I S ATTENDING SOME TYPL OF CLASS IN THE EVENING,* (U) UNTIL RECENTLY TllERE WAS NO OFFICIAL J U D I I I A L SYSTEM THE WHITE REVOLUTION ENVISIOII\ A SYSTtM OF

    AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL.

    EQUITY HOUSES, WITH APPOINTED JUDGES, TO SETTLE o I s P l r r E s THAT MAY ARISE. THE EIGHT THOUSANDTH EQUITY HOUSE WAS R l CENTLY OPENED PROGRESS I N A DECADE.
    @

    NEAR RASHT--CONSIDERABLE

    Slide ff% RmrSTRT

    (U)

    IRAN I S ALSO STRIVING TO BUILD AN INDUSTRIAL BASE [HAT TO GET VARIOUS

    WOULD RIVAL THAT OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

    INOUSTRIES STARTED, THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ORGAIiILCS THEM, OFTEN AS A JOINT VENTURE WITH A C A P I T A L I S T I C COIIPANY FROM SOME OTHER COUNTRY. AS THE INWSTRY PROSPERS, IRANIANS ARE ALLOWED

    TO PARTICIPATE THROUGH THE PURCHASE OF THE STATE'S SIIARCS I N THE INDUSTRY. I N ADDITION, THERE ARE PROFIT SHARING PROGRAMS If4 THE

    VARIOUS INOUSTRIES TO ENCOURAGE EFFICIENCY AND PROOUL [ION

    .)

    Slide ffSS
    COJNTPPRT

    (U)

    IRAN'S PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZATION NEEDS NO FURTHER COMMENT

    HODERNIZATICN

    ALL YOU HAVE TO DO I S LOOK AROUND. READ THE NEWSPAPEItS, AND YOU W I L L AGREE THAT THERE I S PROBABLY NO OTHCR COUNTRY I N THE WORLD TODAY THAT I S MAKING SO MUCH PROGRESS I N SO MANY AREAS.

    Slide 1 %

    NATIONALIZATION
    OF PS. AWmsTs*
    WATER

    (U)

    I T I S HARD TO BELIEVE, I F YOU FLY OVER T H I S GREAT, UARREN

    mil

    LAND, THAT NOT TOO MANY HUNDREDS OF YEARS AGO THERE WERE TREES HERE AND PASTURES I N ABUNDANCE. I N ORDER TO RETURN TO THOSE DAYS

    OF PLENTY, THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN HAS NATIONALIZED WATER. FOREST

    "

    '^"-

    - - '"

    ...

    AND PASTURE RESOURCES AND HAS AN AGCRCSSIVC PIiOGRN.( 01 REFORESTATION, FOREST MANAGCMEIiT. PASTURE IMPROVCMLNT, IRRIGATI DEVELOPMENT AND THE USE OF WATER TO PRODUCE ELECTRICAI POWER. (U) PEOPLE. THIS, THEN, I S THE REVOLUTION OF THE SHAH AI4D THE I T I S A VERY REAL REVOLUTION. AND THE GOVERIiMCNT I S PL

    EVERY DOLLAR OR R I A L THEY CAN INTO I T . * (U) YOU WILL RECALL THE TWO THOUSAND F I V E HUNDREIITH TIIC SHAHYAD

    ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION HELD AT PERSEPOLIS I N 1971.

    MONUMENT WHICH NOW FORMS THE GATEWAY TO THE CITY OF TEllUAN FROH THE AIRPORT AT MEHRABAD WAS ALSO B U I L T TO COMulEMORATE THE OCCASION. THAT CELEBRATION WAS THE SHAHANSHAH'S WAY OF

    ANNOUNCING TO THE WORLD THAT IRAN HAD COME OF AGE I N THE FAMILY OF MODERN NATIONS. H I S MAJESTY HAD MADE I T CLEAR THAT IRAN

    WILL ASSUME A S T A B I L I Z l N G ROLE I N T H I S PART OF THE WORLD.

    . I

    J LL. a.!:-.

    C-

    I .".

    (U)

    INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

    THROUGH A CONSTRUCTIVC USE

    OF. I T S RESOURCES, IRAN HAS ACHIEVED ONE OF THE HIGHEST M T E S OF ECONOMIC GROWTH I N THE WORLD, A RATE DOUBLE THAT OF THE UNITLD STATES. THE COST OF LIVING HAS RISEN STEADILY BUT I S

    STILL LESS THAN THE RATE EXPERIENCED I N THE UNITED STATES.

    @(u)

    THE REVENUE FROM IRAN'S VAST O I L RESOURCES HAS DOUBLE0

    OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS AND HAS BEEN EMPLOYED TO FINANCL

    65 PERCENT OF I RAN'S TOTAL IMPORTS, OF WHICH THREE-FOURTIIS WERE


    CAPITAL GOODS AND RAW MATERIALS TO FURTHER INCREASE THE LXPANSION OF IRAN'S INDUSTRY. SOME RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE RAPID INDUSTRIAL

    FXPANSION ARE THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF THE KHARG AND LAVAN PETROLEUM STORAGE AND SHIPPING FACILITIES FOR CRUDE O I L EXPORTS. ONE OF IRAN'S LARGEST INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, A GAS PIPELINE TO RUSSIA, COST AN ESTIMATED 550 MILLION DOLLARS. A SOVIET-ASSISTEL

    MACHINE CONSTRUCTION PLANT AT ARAK WAS RECENTLY DEDICATED ALONG WITH WORK ON A SIMILAR PRODUCTION FACILITY FOR WEAVING MACHINERY. ISFAHAN I S THE S I T E FOR A NEW STEEL FOUNDRY BUILT BY THE RUSSIANS WHICH COST AN ESTIMATED 3 0 0 MILLION DOLLARS. (U) OTHER PROJECTS INCLUDE A RUWNIAN TRACTOR PLANT WHICH AN EXCELLEIiT CREDIT

    I S TURIdING OUT 5,000 TRACTORS A YEAR.

    ARRANGEMENT WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL RESULT I N A GENERATOR MANUFACTURING PLANT, AITURBO-JET PLANT, A CEMENT PLANT AND A

    SUGAR REFINERY.

    THERE ARE W E CONCRETE FINANCIAL REASONS FOR

    - ,
    4

    a,

    0 . -

    THIS NON-WESTERN INCREASE OF BUSINESS.

    THL SOVIET BLOCK

    GENERALLY EXTE.NDS I T S CREDIT OVER TWELVE YEARS AT AN EXTREMELY LOW INTEREST RATE OF ONLY TWO AND ONE-HALF PERCLNT; THCSC ARE INCENTIVES WESTCRN GOVERNMENTS AND FIRMS DO NOT LHOOSE TO MATCH. (U) IRAN I S ALSO ABLE TO REPAY SOVIET BLOCK CREDITS BY WESTERN FIRMS

    SELLING GAS, WHICH USED TO BE FLARED, OR WASTED.

    ARE. HOUEVER, ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE RAPID INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION. AN AMERICAN MILL WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TURNING OUT MDST OF THE 42-INCH PIPE FMI THE GAS PIPELINE TO RUSSIA AND FOR SURVEYING AND LAYING I T .

    (u) OTHER ACTIVITIES


    PLAMS

    ARE THE LARGE-SCALE MINING

    OPER~TIONS

    NOW GOING ON AND THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF THREE PETRO-CHEMICAL

    I n m~om AND

    KHARG ISLAND.'

    SPANISH,

    GERMRN AND BRITISH

    INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED I N ELECTRICAL POWER. SHIP BUILDING AND MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS.

    9 (U)

    I N THE CONSUMER GOODS FIELD. IRAN NOW MANUFACTURES I T S

    OWN REFR~GERATORS~~TDYES, RADIO AND

    AND T L V O EE S N II

    SETS.

    IN

    THIS FIELD. THE EARTH SATELLITE STATION AT HAMADAN HAS ENABLED IRAN TO RECEIVE BROADCASTS O THE V I S I T OF THE SHAH TO THE UNITED F STATES, SMlE OF THE APOLLO MISSIONS, AND SELECTED SPORTS EVENTS AN0 TO BROADCAST HIGHLIGHTS OF THE IMPRESSIVE WNARCHY CELEBRATIONS I N 1971. OALSO WNUFACTURED I N IRAN ARE BEING BUSES, PAfSEffiER AUTOWOBILES ANO JEEPS, TRUCKS AND LOAD-CARRYING

    17

    r& nS f
    cmms
    VDA OKS

    TRANSPORTERS, ALOIlG WITH SOME FARM MACIIINERY.

    6 (U)
    slide Y64

    IRANIAN CRAFTSMEN ARE TURNING OUT DELICATE

    (31

    ASSWARE 0

    ALONG WITH THE WORLD-RENOWNED PERSIAN CARPETS STILL UIING WOVEN I N MOST PARTS OF THE COUNTRY BY COUNTLESS MEN A1iU W0MEN.Q

    slide 165

    A m

    ALSO BEING MANUFACTURED UNDER LICENSE ARE VODKAS AND OTtiLR ALCOHOLIC PRODUCTS. @ A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE PROGRESS WHICH

    WMBS
    B AS OT

    HAS BEEN MADE HERE I S THE FACT THAT ONE CAN BUY LOCALLY-MAilUFACTbIIED FIBERGLASS PLEASURE BOATS. (C) EXTERNAL THREAT:

    '

    0
    MUCH OF THE RATIONALE FOR IRAN'S

    MILITARY BUILDUP RESIDES I N THE EXTERNAL THREAT AS I T I S

    slide 167 S m TmUT D t

    PERCEIVED BY THE SHAH.

    TRADITIONALLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DURING WORLO


    OF

    CONSTITUTED THE PRINCIPAL THREAT CONFRONTING IRAN.

    WAR 11, THE SOVIETS'


    THE COUNTRY.

    INTERVENED AND OCCUPIED THE NORTHERN MF

    SIMULTAIdEOUSLY. BRITISH FORCES IllTERCEDED TO CONTROL BY THEIR ACTIONS, THE TWO PUWERS

    THE SOUTHERN HALF OF IRAN.

    SOUGHT TO INSURE A VITAL ALLIED SUPPLY ROUTE TO THE SOVIET UNION. THEY AGREED TO WITHDRAW FROM IRAN PROMPTLY AT TliE CONCLUSIbN OF THE WAR. THE BRITISH HONORED THIS AGREEMENT. BUT THE SOVIETS

    LINGERED ON I N THEIR SECTOR, ATTEMPTING TO SUBVERT THE LOCAL POPULACE AND TO ESTABLISH A PUPPET-STATE I N THE NORTHWESTERN PROVINCES. LARGELY DUE TO PRESSURE EXERTED BY THE UNITED STATES.

    THE SOVIETS WERE COMPELLED TO ABANDON THEIR TERRITORIAL OESIGt4S. I T I S IRORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT WITHIN RECENT MEMORV , ROUGHLY

    HALF OF IRAN WAS OCCUPIED AND CONTROLLED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

    SINCE THC M I D - 1 3 6 0 ' ~ , IRAN llAS MAUC A COI4CLRlt.U LFFOI<T 1 0 NORMALIZE I T S RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWER ON I T S NORTllCRN BORDER. THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE APPRCCIABLY INCRCASCD TIICIR AS

    LEVEL OF TECHNICAL. ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL COOPERATION. A RESULT, IRAN DOES NOT PRESENTLY FEAR AN INVASION BY TllC SOVIET UNION. NONETHELESS, THE SHAH REMAINS APPREHENSIVC

    ABOUT THE SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE REGION. a d 0 #68 IRAQI THREAT @(c) IRAQ I S IRAN'S MOST ACTIVE AIITAGONIST. THERE ARE A

    HOST OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO STATES: ARAB VERSUS AN ARYAN NATION: RELIGIOUS--SUNNI

    ETIINIC--AN MOSLEMS I N IHAQ LQUIP-

    AS OPPOSED TO S H I I T E MOSLEMS I N IRAN: MILITARY--SOVIET MENT AND ADVISORS I N IRAQ AS CONTRASTED WITH U.S. AND ADVISORS I N IRAN.

    EQUIPMCNT

    THERE ARE I R A Q I ACCUSATIONS OF I W N I A N

    ASSISTANCE TO DISSIDENT KURDISH TRIBES I N NORTHERN IRAQ AND IRANIAN COUNTERCLAIMS OF IRAQI-INSPIRED URBAN TCRRORISM I N IWN. FOR OVER A DECADE THERE HAVE BEEN FLARE-UPS AND FIRE-

    FIGHTS ALONG THE LENGTH OF M E 8 0 0 - M I L E IRAQ-IRAN BORDER. LASTLY, THERE I S AN ABIDING DIFFERENCE It4 THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE TWO STATES. IRAN EXEMPLIFIES STABLE, TRADITI(

    AN0 RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, WHEREAS THE W D I C A L ARAB REGIME I N BAGHDAD REMAINS FRAGMENTED AND UNPREDICTABLE.

    Slide 6 9 NcpylSTAIi

    (C)

    FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. THE SITUATION HAS BEEN QUIET RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN HAVE

    ALONG IRAN'S EASTERN FRONTIER.

    BEEN DISTANT BUT CORKtCT.

    DUI!ING T l l I S PAST SUMMER, IloWLVtR,

    A MILITARY COUP BY AFGHANISTAN'S SOVIET-TRAINCU ARMY IIIIJCD T l l E REIGN OF KING ZAHIR'S 400-YEAR-OLD DYNASTY. IRAN COII'>IDCRS

    THE NEW MILITARY GOVCIlIIM[Nr OF MOHAMMAD DAOUO TO BE IIASICALLY UNSTABLE AND THE END 01' ROYALIST RULE I N A NEIGHBORIIIl* COUNTRY AS AN UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT.

    0
    IRl\tt HAS
    POLITICAL

    ad Y70 is
    PMISTU

    (C)

    IRAN I S PAKISTAN'S FOREMOST REGIONAL ALLY.

    REPEATEDLY COMMITTED ITSELF TO INSURING V I A B I L I T Y OF PAKISTAN.

    THE CONTINUCU

    WEAKENED BY I T S 1971 WAR WITH INIIIA,

    PAKISTAN POSSESSES SEVI RAL ETHNIC MINORITIES TllAT MAKl I T SULjJCCT TO FURTHER SPLINTERING. IRAN DIRECTLY SHAKES ONE OF I'AKISTAN ' S IN THE SOUTHLASTERN PORTION OF IMN. TllE

    MAJOR PROBLEMS OF TRIDALISM.'

    THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF M I L L I O N BALUCHI TRIBLSMEN.

    RALUCHI TRIBE SPILLS OVER INTO WESTERN PAKISTAN AND PORTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN. STATE ARISES. PERIODICALLY, SENTIMENT FOR A SEPARATIST B A L U C l l l TllE THEORETICAL BALUCHISTAN WOULD BE CRCATEU O U T

    OF PARTS OF PRESENT IRAN. PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN, WOULD BORDER ON THE I N D I A N OCEAN. AND WOULD BE CONTIGUOUS WITH THC SOVICT UNION. FROM I R A N ' S PERSPECTIVE, THE BALUCHIS CONSTITUTE AN LATENT THWGH THE PROBLEM MAY BE.

    INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM.

    I T PARTIALLY EXPLAINS THE GRAWAL STRENGTHENING OF IRANIAN FORCES I N THE SOUTHEASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY.

    .,

    e(~)

    IRAN I S N S O CONCERNED ABOUT FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR

    THE TRADITIONAL ARAB STATES ARRAYED ALONG THE SOUTHERN SHOI([ THE PERSIAN G U F . BECAUSE OF THEIR RELATIVELY WEAK NATIONAL

    FOUNDATIONS AND GREAT O I L WEALTH, THE S M H CONSIDERS KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE VARIOUS SHIEKDOMS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMII-XTES TO BE TEMPTlhG TARGETS FC.? INTE~:IA;I;;L~;\~

    iiiu'l;;.'s1>;5.

    BASED UPON S I M I L A R FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, COMMON CONCERN FOR OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORT AND OTHER SHARED REGIONAL INTClIESTS.

    r n HAS ATTEMPTED TO w
    THE GULF.

    BUILD

    BRIDGES TO THE ARAB STATES ACROSS

    THE SHAH HAS SOUGHT TO HAVE THE ARABS ACCEPT IRAN'

    LEADERSHIP I N PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS. BUT THE ARAB STATES H A V t RtMAINED WARY OF T H I S CONCESSION. EARLIER T H I S SPRING, WHLN

    A BORDER DISPUTE BROKE OUT BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, IRAN PROMP OFFERED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO KUWAIT. THOUGH KUWAIT APPRLCIA

    I R A N ' S TIMELY MORAL SUPPORT, I T D I D NOT DEEM I T IIECESSARY TO ACCEPT THE IRANIAN OFFER. AT THE OTHER EN0 OF THC GULF, HOWEV FOR TEN YEA&

    THE SULTANATE OF W A N PROVED MORE RECEPTIVE.

    HAS BEEN FIGHTING A COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AGAINST RAulCAL GUERRILLA LLEMENTS WIIICH HAVE RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLES REPUDLIC OF CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION. AT PREStNT, A CONTINGE

    OF 3 0 0 I R A N I A N SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS, BACKED UP BY HELICOPTERS,

    ARE FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF THE SULTAN'S FORCES.

    21

    , , ,, ,,
    slide FI2

    (c) ' STRI\TEGY.

    QUICKLY RECAPPING THE SHAH'S STRATEGY,

    mai.

    I N THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION, IR4N DOES NOT ANTICIPATE A CROSS-BORDER INVASION. I F ONE SHOULD OCCUR. THERE I S NO

    FORESEEABLE WAY THAT IRAN COULD IIiDEPENDENTLY RESIST A CONCERTED ATTACK. NONETHELESS, IRANIAN FORCES WOULD CONDUCT' A DELAYING THIS

    ACTION AS THEY WITHDREW SOUTHWARD INTO THE INTERIOR.

    WWLD BE COUPLED WITH A SCORCHED EARTH POLICY I N ORDER TO DISCOURAGE THE AGGRESSOR AND BUY TIME TO ENABLE THE WESTERN POWERS EITHER TO I W O S E OR NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT.

    fi3
    8.1PLDm

    (C)
    k.q

    I N A CONFLICT WITH IRAQ, I T I S LIKELY THAT THE SHAH

    ENVISIONS A SHORT. PRE-EMPTIVE AND NON-CONSULTATIVE ENGAGEMENT. BORROWIN6 A LEAF FROM THE ISRAEL'S 1967 BOOK, THE AIR FORCE WOULD BE EMPLOYED I N A SWIFT STRIKE TO NEUTRALIZE IRAQI AIRFIELDS

    AND TO GAIN AIR'SUPERIORITY.

    GROUND FORCES* MANEUVERS

    nouLo BE DESIGNED TO SEIZE AND SECURE TERRITORY SO THAT CEASE-FIRE LINES WOULD BE DRAWN I N IRAQ. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE

    A I R FORCE AND NAVY WOULD BE CHARGED WITH DEFENDING IRAN'S CRITICAL O I L FACILITIES.

    STnATmT
    O W

    9ud. f f b

    (c) THOUGH ME IRANIAN

    NAVY HAS FORMERLY BEEN T A S K E ~WITH

    COASTAL DEFENSE AND ANTI-INFILTRATION OPERATIONS, I T I S NOW RECEIVING A MUCH MORE EXPANSIVE MISSION. I T APPEARS THAT THE

    SHAH HAS FORHULATED A SOUTHERN STRATEGY THAT WILL PROVIDE THE NATION WITH A M I T I M E DEFENSE I N DEPTH. MATERIAL PROCUREMENT. AND FE AS C T L I PLANNED UNIT RELOCAT/ONS,
    IN SOUTHEASTERN

    CONSTRUCTION

    IRAN SUPPORT T H I S VIEW.

    THE IRANIAN NAVY I S ACQUIRING A BLUE-WA

    CAPABILITY THAT WILL BE EXERCISED UNOER THE PROTECTIVE COVLR OF M E I I A F . THE SHAH I S DETERMINED TO PROTECT H I S LLI)NOMIC THROUGH THE STRAIT EACH DAY,

    JUGULAR AT THE STRAIT OF HORMOZ. 20,000,000

    BARRELS OF PLTROLLUM ARE EXPORTED TO THE IIIIIUSTRIAL ABOUT 25 PERCENT OF T H I S TOTAL OllIGINATES

    NATIONS OF THE WORLD. I N IRAN.

    MAINTENANCE OF T H I S L I F E - L I N E I S ESSENTIAL TO THE

    CONTINUATION OF I R A N ' S IMPRESSIVE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWIH. (C) L W K I N G TO THE FUTURE. THE SHAH FORESEES A DEt l l l I T E GRADUALLY, HE WILL USE THE

    ROLE FOR IRAN I N THE I N D I A N OCEAN.

    NAVY TO SHOW THE FLAG I h T H I S AREA AND TO SAFEGUARD, 114 AT LEAST A L I M I T E D SENSE, IRAN'S SEA L I N E S OF COMMUNICATIONS. A LEADER OF CONSIDERABLC VISION, THE SHAH SEEKS ULTIMATELY TO CONSTRUCT A "RECTANGULAR RELATIONSIIIP" BETWEEN IRAN, SOUTH AFRICA AUSTRALIA AND SINGAPORE THAT WILL SERVE I R A N ' S FUTURE INTERESTS I N THE REGION. (C)

    @
    AN ANPLYSIS OF THE IRANIAN

    DEFENSE ORGANIZATION.

    MILITAPY DECISION-MAKING APPARATUS REVEALS THAT THE SHAH ACTIVELY PERFORMS THE FUNCTION OF COMMANDER I N CHIEF AN0 EXERCISES UNQUESTIONED AUTHORITY. AT SUBORDINATE LEVELS, THERE ARE F I V E s ONE RESIDES WITH GENCRAL AZHARI

    PRINCIPAL MILITARY POWER POINTS.

    CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAIDCR'S STAFF, A BODY LOOSELY RESEMBLING OUR OWN JCS, AND THE HUB OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE. HOWEVER, THE

    SUPREME COMMANDER'S STAFF DIFFERS I N THAT I T I S CONCERNED ONLY

    23 ,.,. . .,,..I
    .d.,:.4

    Ld.-l

    *..-.

    # !

    WITII COORnIP1ATiON: I T CONTllOLS NO FORCLS AND llAS NO DII(LCT1VE AUTHORITY. THE THREE SERVICE CHIEFS, GElltRAL KHATAYI ( A I R FORCE),

    GENERAL O V E I S I (GROUND FORCES) AND REAR ADMIRAL ATTAII (IdAVY) CONSTITUTE OTHER POWER POINTS WHICH HAVE DIRECT CHAIN OF COMl4AWI) ACCESS TO H I S IMPERIAL M A J E S N . THE F I F T H MAJOR PLAYIII I S THC

    VICE MINISTER OF WAR, A I R FORCE GENERAL TOUFANIAN, WHO I S RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF ALL FOREIGN MILITAI(Y EQUlPMLlil AND FOR DOMESTIC MILITARY PROWCTION. TO THE SHAH. IIE, TOO, RLPORI5 DIIILCTLY

    HENCE. I T I S ONLY AT THE PALACE THAT THC SEVERAL

    lHREAOS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ARE WOVEN INTO WHOLE CLOTII. OBVIOUSLY. T H I S ARRANGEMENT SERVES WELL TO PERPETUATE THE SHAH'S CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY FORCES. (C) THE MINISTER OF WAR I S PRINCIPALLY CHARGED WITH THE LCGAL THE MINISTER OF

    AND BUDGETARY M T T E R S OF THE THREE SERVICES.

    INTERIOR HAS DIRECT SUPERVISION OVER TWO LARGE PARAMILITARY FORCES I N IRAN. THE NATIONAL POLICE AN0 THE GENOARMERIE. BOTH

    OF THESE FORCES MAY COME UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF T H t COPlMANDlNG GENERAL OF THE IMPERIAL IRANIAN GROUND FORCES I N THE EVtNT OF WAR. THC GENDARMERIE I S PRINCIPALLY CHARGED WITH INTERNAL StCUKITY, BORDER AND HIGHWAY CONTROL, ANTI-SMUGGLING AND ANTI-NARCOTICS AND CONSCRIPTION A C T I V I T I E S . THE NATIONAL POLICE PERFORMS

    a d e i76
    OROrmD FORCES

    NORMAL POLICE FUNCTIONS I N THE C I T I E S . ~ (C) FORCE

    DISPOSITION/DEVELOPMENT.

    GROUND FORCES:

    TURNING TO THE INDIVIDUAL SERVICES, WITH OVER 180,000 MEN,

    THE GROUND FORCES ACCWNT FOR THE BULK OF IRAN'S MILITARY MANPOWER. ORGANIZED UE DR ( I
    TWO CORPS HEADQUARTERS, THC MAJOR

    %BAT

    UNITS CONSIST OF THREE INFANTRY DIVISIONS, THREE ARM0

    BRIGADE AND A SPECIAL

    FORCES BRIGADE.

    HERE ARE MECHANIZED

    INFANTRY UNITS. A N D ~ H E NORMAL ARTILLERY SUPPORT ELEMENTS.

    8 THE c a w T SUPPORT---AND NORMAL


    %RING

    COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS--

    ARE ALSO I N EXISTENCE AND CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THESR DUTIES.

    THE ANNUAL OBSERVANCE OF THE sHAHis BIRTHDAY, VIEWER

    ARE TREATED TO AN IMPRESSIVE PRECISION MRRCHING UNIT OF THE GROUND FORCE, WHICH COULD COMPETE VERY WELL WITH ANY U.S. MARCHING UNIT. (C)

    HMJEVER, I T I S MORE INSTRUCTIVE TO COMPARE CURRENT

    LEVELS WITH THOSE PROJECTED FOR THE END OF THE CURRENT FIVE-Y PROGMM PLAN I N 1978 A 5 0 PERCENT PERSONNEL INCREASE. THE GROUND FORCES ANTICIPAT THIS WILL RESULT I N A

    RELATIVELY SMALL RISE I N DIVISIONAL COMBAT STRENGTH, THEREBY INDICATING THAT THE ADDITIONAL PEOPLE WILL BE USED TO FLESH EXISTING COMBAT UNITS. TO BUILD UP THE LOGISTICS SUPPORT
    I

    ORGANIZATION AND F I L L THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEW IMPERIAL I R ARMY AVIATION PROGRAM. THE .SEVEN-FOLD INCREASE I N THE HELICO

    INVENTORY I S THE LARGEST BUILDUP OF I T S TYPE I N THE WORLD. GROWTH O THE TANK INVENTORY I S ALSO NOTEWORTHY. F THE PLANNED

    $ in

    25
    "I...

    JUU-J

    b d L .1- ----L* i
    I

    TOTAL OF OVER 1,800 REFLECTS THE INCORPORATION,OF 750 CHIEFTA. H E D I W TANKS AN0 250 SCORPION COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE VCllICLLS WHICH IRAN HAS PURCHASED FRU4 THE U.K. THE ARTILLERY FIGURES

    I N THE TABLE REFER TO 1 5 5 W OR LARGER SELF-PROPELLED PIECES. (C) AIR FORCE. OUTFITTED ALWST EXCLUSIVELY WITH U.S.

    EQUIPMENT, THE I I A F WERGES AS THE MOST TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCE0 AND DYNAMIC IRA)(IAN SERVICE
    r

    THE AIR

    FORCE HAS W E VAST IWROVEMENTS FROM I T S VERY HUMBLE BEGINNING M I N 1929, A l I T S END OF WORLD WAR I1 STATUS OF HAVING TWO OBSOLI SQUADRONS. TODAY, UNDER THE L W E R S H I P OF GENERAL KHATAMI, THE

    I I A F I S EQUIPPED WITH THE LATEST I N AIRCRAFT. I S HIGHLY TRAINED AND MITIVATED

    AW

    I S CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVELY UTILIZING F-5's.

    I T S AIRCRAFT, WHICH INCLUDE F-4's, OF MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE AIRCRAFT. (C)

    C-1301s, AND A NUMBER

    MODERN AIRCRAFT FACILITIES HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED AN0 THE

    I I A r HAS OPERATIONAL BASES AND FACILITIES AT HEHRABAD. OOSHEN TAPPEH, DEZFUL. HAMADAN (VAHDATI) AN0 MASHED M OTHER LOOATION N G THE I I A F SPEAKS ONLY ENGLISH HN FLYING AND OPERATES A VERV E HIDERN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE INSTRUCTIONAL FACILITY I N TEHRAN. OF OUR DEPEWENT WIVES ASSIST I N TEACHING AT THIS FACILITY. THE I I A F ALSO OPERATES RADAR SITES. W Y OF WHICH MANY

    ARE

    LOCATE0 I N

    EXTREMELY RMOTE LOCATIONS AND ARE SUBJECTED TO EXTREMELY SEVERE WEATHER CONDITIONS. (C) AS WITH THE GROUND FORCES. THE I I A F PLANS TO ICREASE

    I T S PERSOllNEL STREIKTII BY KOUGHLY 5 0 PtRCL:IT WITHIN I H E 11 F I V E YEARS. THREE NI U MAIN OPERI\TINC BASTS WILL 111 I ONSTRI

    TO ACCOMMODATE A DOlllll.ING OF OPERATIONAL SQUADRONS. APPROXIMATELY 2 0 0 AIIV,INCLD AIRCRAFT W I L L UL AUULD T O I I I E INVENTORY ADDITIOiiS WILL INCLUDE SOMF OF THE M a 1 INDUSTRY. IltAN HA

    SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFr PRODUCED BY U.S.

    INDICATED I T S INTENT 10 PURCHASE 3 0 F-14 and 5 0 F-15 S I X P - 3 F MARITIME PAlI(0L AIRCRAFT, S I X 707-3J9C TANKIRS A UNDETERMINED NUMBER 01 A-10 GROUNU SUPPORT AIRCRAFT. lllE

    HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOIL IRAN'S ENTIRE A I R DEFENSE NETWORK. FAR, I T HAS BOUGHT SI,, BATTALIONS OF IMPROVE0 HAWK M I S S I L FROM THE UNITLD STATCS AND TWO BATTALIONS OF B R I T I S H RAP1 SAM'S TO PROVIIIE POINT DEFENSE FOR SUCH KEY TARGET COMPLE AS AIRFIELUS, MILITARY COMMI\ND CENTERS AND O I L INSTALLATI

    (L)

    ORGANIZATION

    nF it: IMPERIAL

    I RANI AN NAVY.

    ALTH

    THE I I N WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED I N WORLD WAR 1 1 , I T HAS GREAT STRIDES TOWARD BECOMING A MODERN NAVAL FORCE. COMMAND OF ADMIRAL ATTAIF,IT UNDE

    I S PRESENTLY ORGANIZED INTO

    I.IOHTIIERN AND SOUTHERN NAVAL DISTRICT, AN0 A HEADQUARILRS ESTABLISHMENT LOCATED HERE I N TEHRAN, WHICH ACTS AS A CEN C D H N D POST FOR THE CASPIAN AND PERSIAN GULF NAVAL ACTIY AND ALLOWS IMMEDIATE HIGH-LEVEL CDOROINATION BETWEEN THE AND OTHER SERVICES AS WELL AS WITH GO1 AGENCIES.

    6THC

    NOR

    NAVAL D I S T R I C T I S LOCATED AT BANDAR PAHLAYI AND W\S THE E


    ,

    ??%.
    a.. *,
    *"s..*.-J

    *,

    ,\.,,,-J

    Mi N ' S SCHOOL, TllC SI /\I""\PISIIIP SCIIOOL, AP4U OTlltR S1 11001 5 A L 0 l r c ~


    WITH SEVERAL SI4ALL CIb7FT. ALSO LOCATED ON THE CASPIAll AHE TllE

    I I N TRAINING LLNTLNL A 1 BANIJAR PAHLAVI, AS WtLL AS TIlL H t C R U l T TRAINING CENTER NCAR R,ASHT.
    Slide #96 33U'INERIf NAVN. IEADQUARTBBS Sliids #97 .- . SHIP S l i d s #98 Shi~

    '(c)

    THE IlCADQUAl<II.RS FOR THE SOUTHERII NAVAL DISTIIICT I S

    CURRENTLY BEING MOVCD rROM KIIORRAFISHAHR AT TllE HEAU OF THE PERSIA1 GULF TO BANDAR AUDAS. PRCSCNTLY T11lS SOUTHtRN NAVAL

    FDRCE CONSISTS OF DESTJIOYtRS, PATROL FRIGATES, I'ATROL GUi4 BOATS, MINE SWEEPERS, PLUS TANKERS AllD MISCELLANEOUS LOGISTIC SUPPORT >HIPS AND COAST GUARD PATROL CRATT. Q

    #lo1
    TABLE

    (~onfidentirl)

    - HIYI

    (C) THOUGH THE SMALLEST OF THE THREE SERVICES, THE IMPERIAL


    IRANIAN NAVY I S ALSO EXPERIENCING SIGNIFICANT GROWTH. ALSO ANTICIPATES A 50 PERCENT IIKREASE I N MANPOWER. IT THE I I N

    INTENUS TO CONSTRUCT A NEW BASE AT CHAH BAHAR WHICH FRONTS DIRECTLY ON THL I N D I A N OCEAN AND TO IMI'ROVE EXISTII4G I A C I L I T I L S AT BANOAR ABDAS AND BUSHEHR. NEW SHIPS J O I N I N G THE I I N ARE AND IRIGATCS

    HEADED BY MISSILE-ARMED DESTROYERS FROM THE U.S. FROM THE U.K.

    THE I I N . WHICH ALREADY POSSESSES THE LARGEST

    OPCRRTIDNAL HOVERCRAFT UNIT I N THE WORLU, INTENDS TO AUGMENT T H I S UNIQUE FORCE WITH FOUR ADDITIONAL MACHINES. THE NAVY'S

    A I R CAPABILITY WILL BE STRENGTHENED BY THE ACQUISITION OF HELICOPTERS EQUIPPED FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE. MINESWEEPING

    AND U T I L I T Y ROLES.

    S l j de P O 2

    MAP

    OF BASES (ConfiderI t i a l )

    DISPOSITJON

    (C)

    DISPOSITION OF FORCES.

    TllE LOCATIOli OF IRAN'S MAJ

    MILITARY BASES SHOWS A CURRENT COiiCENTRATION I N T I C WCSTLRN PORTION OF THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, FUTUHL CONSTRUCTIOll PLANS

    REVEAL A DCCIDCD EMPHASIS ON BUILDING UP A TRI-SERVICE BASE STRUCTURE I N SOUTHEASTERN IRAN. (U)

    HISTORY OF MILITARY ASSISTAIICE AND ARMILH-EIAAG.

    Slide #lo3
    HISTORY O F rnISH-UAM

    MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN HAS TAKEN NUMEROUS FORMS SINC INCEPTION I N SEPTEMBER 1 9 4 1 WHEN A U.S. MISSION WAS CKCA

    ASSIST I N THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM FOR THE SOVIET UNlON AN0 MIDDLE EAST DURING WORLD WAR 11.
    (U)

    A FORMAL CONTRACT WAS SIGNED I N EARLY NOYLRMBER 1

    AND REVISED I N OCTOBER 1 9 4 7 CREATING THE UNITED STATES ARM MISSION TO IRAN (ARMISH). I N MAY 1 9 5 0 THE MUTUAL DEFENSL.

    ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT, WHICH ESTABLISHED A MILITARY ASSISTA ADVISORY GROUP (MAAG) I N IRAN, WAS SIGNED. THE SEPAMTE

    ORGANIZATIONS OF ARMISH AND MAAG WERE COEISOLIDATEO INTO ARM1 I N 1958. I N 1 9 6 5 ARMISH-MAAG WAS REORGANIZED TO PROVIDE FUN&

    ARMY, A I R FORCE AND NAVY ADVISORY SECTIONS, A J O I N 1 AOVISOR AND NECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS, WHICH WE Slide ARMISH-UMO MISSIONS

    #la

    DISCUSS LATER. SLIDE.

    0THE

    ARMISH-MAAG MISSIONS ARE AS SllOWN ON T H I

    ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES, IRAN HAS BE

    SUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED TO BE ABLE TO PURCHASE HER OWN EQUIP AND SUPPLIES. CONGRESS I N 1 9 6 1 APPROVED A PROGRAM KNOWN AS THE FMS PROGRAM I S THE MAJ
    'm

    "FOREIGN MILITARY SALES" (FMS). , ..29


    1
    ),

    . .. .
    .

    - I Y . -

    SOURCE OF ACQUISITION OF U.S. SINCE 1964.

    M I L I l A R Y EQUIPMENT FOR IRAN

    0
    i.URRCNTLY A U M I S H - I W

    slide #lo5 DOD CREST

    (U)

    ORGANIZATION OF ARMISH-MI\&:

    I S COMMANDED BY MAJOR GENERAL DEVOL BRETT WHO, I N ADDITION TO H I S CHIEF. ARMISH-MAAQ DUTIES. ALSO FUNCTIONS AS TllE SENIOR DEPARW-NT OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE I N IRAN WITH COORDINATING AUTHORITY OVER A LARGE NUMBER OF DOD AGENCIES. (U) AFTER AMOASSADOR RICllARD HELMS AND DCPUTY CHIEF OF

    MISSION. DOUGLAS I. HECK, GENERAL BRETT I S THE THIRD-RANKING

    slide,n6 o
    ~ ~ - n A A n

    U .S. O F F I C I A L IN-COUNTRY. FORWARD ORGANIZATION.

    0 ARMISH-MAAG

    HAS A FAJRLY STRAIGIIT-

    ORMKIWTIOH

    THE J O I N T STAFF FUNCTIONS UNDER THE I N ADDITION TO PROVIDING J O I N T STAFF MEMBERS

    DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

    DIRECT STAFF SUPPORT TO CHIEF, ARMISH-WAG,

    ADVISE THEIR COUNTERPARTS DN THE IRANIAN SUPREME CWPVINDER'S STAFF.


    flO7

    @
    CURRENTLY. ARMISH-MAAG HAS SLIGHTLY UNDER 2 5 0 THOUGH T H I S NUMBER I S MRRKEOLY LESS THAV

    (U)

    msU-nM0

    n*IMnO

    AUTHORIZED POSITIONS.

    I N PREVIOUS YEARS. I T I S LARGELY THE PRODUCT OF A REORGANIZATION. I N SEPTEMBER 1972 THE ENTIRE SUPPORT SECTION WAS DETACllED FROM ARMISH-MAAG AND ASSlGdED TO USCINCEUR. THUS, THE SUPPORT

    A C T I V I T Y HERE I N TEHRAN I S NO LONGER CHARGEABLE TO ARMISH-MAG FOR PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY PURPOSES.

    0
    I S TEMPORARILY

    slide

    UaK CWST

    n8 o

    (U)

    e.ARMY ADVISORY HEAWJUARTERS THE

    L!)CATED I N AN OFFICE BUILDING NEAR THE GULF DISTRICT COMPOUND. THE I I G F HEADQUARTERS HAS RECENTLY MOVED TO A NEW BUILDING.

    ARSEC WILL COLLOCATE WITII I I G F I N ADOUT S I X MONTtIS.

    THL

    ARMY SECTION I S CURRENTLY HEADED BY B I ~ I G A O I E RGCNtRAL LEO E . SOUCEK WHO MAINTAINS A STAFF I N TEHRAN, ALTHOUGH A CONSIOERAB NUMBER OF H I S PEOPLE ARE ASSIGNED TO FIELD ADVISORY TEAMS, EA OF WHICH I S COMMANDED BY A COLONEL AND LOCATED WITll ONE OF T I TWO I R A N I A N CORPS HEADQUARTERS. FROM THESE, 114 TURN, SMALLER

    ELEMENTS OF ONE OR TWO MCN ARE EITtlCll PERMANENTLY 01t TIMPORAHE STATIONED WITH SPECIFIC IRANIAN UNITS, OR SCIIOOLS, IIASCU ON PRESENT REQUIREMENTS.

    0.

    slias #Lo9 AIR RRCB m S T

    (U)

    A .=

    THI A I R rOllCE SECTION I S COLLOCATI I1 WITll II

    A I R FORCE HEAOQUARTI I6 I N THE SOUTHEASTERN PART OF TOWN. CHIEF, AFSEC, I S BRIGADIER GENERAL WALTER 0 . DRUEN, JR., WllO

    ALSO HAS A SMALL STAFF ANU ADVISES TllE IMPERIAL IRANIAI4 A I R FORCE ON ALL ASPECTS OF I T S A C T I V I T I E S .

    0
    s.
    HARWA

    Si. a 0 ld NAVX aLeSf

    (U)

    e. THF SMALLEST ADVISORY ELEIIENT 0 1 APMISHIT IS HEADED BY CAPTAIN ROBERT

    IS n t E NAVY SECTION.

    WHfl, TOGETHER WITH fiN EXTREMELY SFALL S M F F , I S COLLOCATEU W I THE IRANIAN HEADQUARTCRS SHORE ESTABLISHMENT HERE I N TEHRAN. PART OF H I S ADVISORY STAFF I S SITUATED WITH T H t SOUTllERN NAVAL DISTRICT I N THE PERSIAN GULF AT KHORRAMSHAHR, KHARG ISLANtJ AND BANDAR ABBAS.
    (U)

    EUCOM SUPPORT ACTIVITY.

    U l l T I L LAST FALL, ARMISH-MAA

    SUPPORTED NOT ONLY ITSELF BUT ALL OTHER DO0 A C T I V I T I E S I N I R A A SMALL SUPPORT ELEMENT WITHIN ARMISH-MAAG WAS CHPRGED WITH PROVIDING T H I S SUPPORT. WllICH INCLUDED THE USUAL COMPTROLLER, PERSONNEL, AND TRANSPORTATION SECTIONS, SUPPLY AND SO FORTH.

    31

    I N SEPTEMBER 1972 THESE FUI4CTIONS WCRC SEPARATED FROM ARMISH-MAG AND A SMALL SUPPORT ACTIVITY WAS FORMCU LINDCR DIRECT CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES EUR0PEAI.I COMMAND. RESPONSIBILITY FOR T H I S ACTIVITY WILL BE TRAlVSFERRED TO USAREUR ON 1 JULY 1974.
    ad W i s 2 TAFT CHART

    0
    DURING THE

    (U)

    TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE F I E L D TEAMS.

    FORMULATION OF THE IRANIAN MILITARY EXPANSION PKOGRAEI, I T BECAME APPARCNT THAT IRAN WOULD REQUIRE H t L P FROM U.S. TECHNICIANS I N ORDER TO SUCCESSFULLY INCORPORATE MODLltli AMEflICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT INTO I T S FORCES. ULTIMATELY, THC U.S. AGKEED

    TO SUPPLY SOME 5 5 0 TECHNICIANS TO IRAN. PESTRICTIONS, THESE PERSONNEL COULD NOT ARMISII-MAAG.

    DUE TO CONGRESSIONAL

    UE ADDED TO I H E ROLLS OF

    CONSEQUENTLY, A NEW ORGANIZATION AND A HEW CONCEPT TECHRICAL ASSISTANCC F I E L D T E M .

    WAS CREATED---THE (U)

    ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE TAFT'S ARC StPARATC FROM ARMISII-MAAG CHIEF,

    AND REPORT DIRECTLY TO USCINCEUR COMPONENT COMIIAIIDCI(F ARMISH-MAAG,

    I S CHARGI I1 WITH MONITORING, COORDII.IATINb AND THE TAFT'S bIFFER I N S E V T M L WAYS CONCEPTUALLY,

    EVALUATING TAFT A C T I V I T I E S .

    FROM THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP.

    WHEREAS ARMISH-MAAG I S CONCERNED WITH STAFF FUNCTIONS OF A CONTINUING NATURE, THE TAFT'S WERE CONCCIVED TO BE SHORT-TtRM TEAMS FOCUSING ON THC J3TRM)UCTION OF NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND ATTENDANT LOGISTICS SYSTEMS. FURTHER. TIiOUGH THE UNITED

    STATES GOVERNMENT PAYS THE MAJOR SHARE OF ARMISH-MAAG COSTS,

    ALL EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH THC T A F l TLAtlS ARC. B D l ~ l l t E X L L U S l V t BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. T H I S INCLUIJIS UASC PAY All11 ALIOUiUi

    TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES, AND COMPLElE ADMINISTRATIVI. AND OVtlUl COSTS, AS WELL AS LESS OBVIOUS CXPEIISES SUCH AS T U I T I O N FOK DEPENDENT SCHOOLIliG AN0 CONTRIGUTIONS TO U.S. FUNDS. MILITARY KtTlHCWL

    e
    MOTIiCR DISTINCTIOEI BETWCLN AHMISII-WAG ANIJ TllC T A l T WHLKLAS MAAb MtMIILItS

    Sli& T-ll3
    MAP

    LOCATION Q TU"T PERSONNEL

    (C)

    I S THE S I T I N G OF PERSONNEL IN-COUNTKY.

    (Contidentid)

    ARE LOCATED ALMOST TOTALLY I N THE TtliRAN AREA, ROUGllLY IIALF OF THE TAFT PERSONNEL AR SPREAD ALONG AN A X I S PARALLCI L I N G TllL IRANIAN MILITARY BASE STRUCTURE FROM TABRIZ I N THE IIORTHWtST THROUGH KEREV\NStIAII A d 0 SHIRAZ TO BNfOAR ABBAS 1N T l l t SOUlHLAST I N EFFECT, ACTIVATION OF THE TAFT TEAMS HAS RESULTLU IE: A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE I N DISPERSION AN0 V I S I B I L I T Y OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNLL I N IRAN. COMBINING ARMISH-MAA6, TAFT AND

    THE EUROPEAN SUPPORT ACTIVITY, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 900 AUTHORIZED B I L L E T S 111 IRAN FOR PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH TllC SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. AT THE MOMENT, OVER 7 5 0 OF THCSE

    POSITIONS ARE FILLED. WITH THE BALANCE TO BE OCCUPIED BY TAFT TECHNICIANS W R I N G THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR. (C) F O R E I W MILITARY SALES.

    DURING PRESIOCNT NIXON'S

    DISCUSSIONS I N TEHRAN WITH H I S IMPERIAL MAJESTY I N MAY 1972, THE UNITED STATES AGREED TO M K E AVAILABLE TO IRAN THE FULL

    33

    . . . ,_..,

    I
    I

    Sid.#U.b
    ~0~~~

    SPECTRUM OF CONVLI\TIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT PRODUCED BY AMERICAN DEFENSE INOUSTRItS. WHICH THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE DRAMATIC DEGREE TO UP THE OPTIONS

    RAN

    HAS PICKED

    EXTENDED.

    (C)

    ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN HAS SON DIRECT COMPANIES. I T PREFERS TO MAKE THE MAJORITY I N THIS DEPARTRCN

    CONTRACTS WITH U.S.

    OF I T S PURCHASES THROUGH FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS). WAY, BY OBTAINING THE INTERMEDIARY SERVICES OF THE U.S.

    OF DEFENSE. THE SHA" SEEKS TO INSURE THAT IRAN I S TREATED FAIRLY I N I T S COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS. I N EARLIER YEARS. IRAN RECEIVED

    SOME GRANT A I D FROM THE UNITED STATES, BUT I T NOW PAYS I T S OWN WAY COMPLETELY. DOLLAR FIGURES INDICATE THAT I R M I A N MILITARY

    PROCUREMENT EXPENDITURES HAVE BEEN DEVOTCD PRIMARILY TO AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION. THE HAWK A I R DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEM ACCOUNTS FOR I N AODITION TO THE IMPRESSIVE

    pornmu
    (-M C& )

    -XIlS

    ANOTHER W O R INVESTMENT.

    FINANCIAL OUTLAYS LISTED. THE SOPHISTICATION OF SEVERAL OF THCSE WEAPON SYSTEMS c o m A N o s ATTENTIoNPFuRTHER, THE SHAHIS INTEREST I N PURCHASING ADDITIONAL ADVANCED WEAPONS REMAINS UNABATED. HEADING THE L I S T I S THE F-14/15 BUY. WHICH REPRESENTS A SALE I N EXCESS OF ONE BILLION DOLLARS. LEARNED FROM ANALYSES OF L E S S ~ S

    ACTlOW

    THE FOURTH ARAB/ISRAELI WAR ARE CERTAIN TO GENERATE FUTURE I R A N I M ORDERS FOR S T I L L MORE U.S. ARMAMENTS.
    "

    0
    PACING FACTOR IN THE

    sib

    mFatT

    ~116 cows T a r n m o

    (c)

    CONUS TRAINING.

    THE PRINCIPAL

    DEVELOPENT OF THE IRANIAN FORCES I S THE ACQUISITION OF TRAINED

    AND TRAINABLE PERSONNEL.

    ACCOMPANYING 1tlE CXTENSIVC MILITARY

    PROCUREMENT PROGRAM I S AN ACTIVE ARMISH-MMG ORCHESTllAlLU rRAINING EFFORT. IRANIAN DURING THE LAST FISCAL YEAR, ALMOST 1,400 TO r t l t UNITEU
    S T A T ~ STO A T T ~ N D

    STUDENTS WERE DISPATCHED

    OVER 2 0 0 DIFFERENT COURSES OF INSTRUCTION.

    DURIFlG f Y - 7 4

    THIS NUMBER WILL GROW EVEN

    LARGERPMUCH OF THE TRAINING

    PROVlDED TO IRANIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL I S I N HIGHLY 11 CHNICAL AREAS THAT W I L L LEAVE THE IMPRINT OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON IRAN'S FORCES FOR MANY YEARS TO COME. FOR EXAMPLE, TllE MAJOR

    PORTION OF THE A I R FORCE'S PILOTS WERE SCHOOLEO I N T t t t UNITED STATES. SIMILARLY, A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE FLAG OFFICERS

    I N THE THREE SERVICES HAVE AT SOME POINT I N T H L I R CARCtRS ATTENDED A COURSE I N THE U N I l E O STATES. (C)

    FINALLY, THE SALIENT QUESTION POSED BY VISITORS TO "WHY I S I M N CIIRRENTLY SPCNOING SUCH AN

    ARMISH-WG I S :

    ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF I T S NATIONAL

    WEALVH ON

    I T S MILITARY FORCES?'

    TO AN OUTSIDER, I T DOES NOT SEEM THAT T H I S QUESTION CAN BE ANSWERED SOLELY I N TERMS OF AN EXTERNAL THREAT. THEREFORE, TO

    PROMOTE A GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SHAH'S INTLNTIONS, I T I 7 NECESSARY TO CONSIOER SEVERAL OTHER FACTORS. FIRST, THE

    SHAH EQUATES H I S MILITARY EXPANSION PROGRAM WITH DETERRENCE. HE BELIEVES THAT LARGE, MODERNIZED, WELL-TRAINED FORCES WILL I N THEMSELVES BE SUFFICIENT TO DISSUADE ANY ATTACKERS. HE ALSO

    35
    ? .

    . .. "
    .
    L . " .

    LOOKS TO l t i S NEW FOI(CtS TO tNHANCE H I S NATION'S REClONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE. MAJOR INFLUENCE. ADDITIONALLY, l N f LA1 ION tXLHIS A

    STATED QUITE SIMPLY, I F IRAN I S COMMITTED

    TO BUILDING UP I T S MILITARY FORCES, I T I S CHEAPER TO SHOULDER THE INVESTMENT TODAY THAN I T WILL BE TOMORROW. THERE I S ALSO

    THE MATTER OF AVAILABILITY.

    AT PR~SENT, THE SHAH CAN TURN TO


    IN

    THE UNITED STATES AS A READY SOURCE OF MODERN ARMAMENTS.

    A COMPLEX AGE OF SHIFTING POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS, HE CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT THIS WILL ALWAYS BE SO. FURTHER, THE SHAH I S

    CONVINCED THAT IRAN'S FUTURE DEPENDS ON SUCCESSFULLY GRAFTING WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TO PERSIAN CULTURE I N ORDER TO CREATE WHAT HE HAS TERMED H I S "GREAT CIVILIZATION." HE ENVISIONS A

    SUBSTANTIAL SPIN-OFF FROM H I S MILITARY PROGRAMS THAT WILL SERVE AS AN AGENT OF MODERNIZATION THROUGHOUT IRANIAN SOCIETY. THERE IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL-HISTORICAL SHAH'S DECISIONS. LASTLY

    ELEMENT WHICH I~FLUENCES THE

    DURING WORLD WAR 11, THAT IS, I N H I S OWN

    LIFETIME, THE MONARCH WITNESSEQ FOREIGN POWERS OCCUPYING H I S COUNTRY AND DEPOSING H I S FATHER. HE I S RELYING ON HIS

    REVITALIZED MILITARY FORCES TO INSURE THAT NO INVADER HILL EVER AGRIN DICTATE CONDITIONS TO

    IRAN

    WITH IMPUNITY. 1) ARE MERE ANY QUESTIONS?

    CREST

    (U)

    THAT CONCLUDES THE BRIEFING.

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