Write Up ON Turbine Trip System (TTS) : TAPP3/64110/5663/DN/R0 - 4-13300-00-483

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TAPP3/64110/5663/DN/R0---------------------------- -----4-13300-00-483----Rev.

01

WRITE UP ON TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ( TTS)

Reference Documents:
1. EPS and OTSS Logics Doc. No. 41330098502(TAPP3/64110/5539/ED) 2. OTSS & EPS system description Doc. No. 41330000479(TAPP3/64110/5660/DN)

NPC DOC. NO. 01 15.6.02 REVISED W.R.T PROCONTROL SYSTEM 00 REV 30.1.02 DATE FIRST ISSUE REMARKS BS RANA VK Sd. WORKED

TAPP3/64110/5663/DN/R0

BS RANA BSR Sd. CHECKED A. ALI Sd. APPROVED

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Table of Contents 1 2 2.1 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 2.1.5 2.2 3 3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.1.6 3.1.7 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 General Design and mode of operation Mechanical (hydraulic) turbine protection Tripping devices Manual mechanical emergency tripping devices Overspeed tripping devices Emergency trip solenoid valves Overspeed trip selection system Configuration

Page No. 3 3 3-4 4 4 4 4-5 5

Protection criteria for emergency tripping by turbine protection Essential protection criteria 6 Manual tripping 6 Electrical shaft position protection 6 Electrical low-vacuum protection 6-7 Lube oil pressure protection 7 Fire protection 7 Turbine trip by moisture separator drains system 7 Trip command initiated from ATRS 7 External protection criteria 7 Turbine trip by reactor protection 8 Mechanical generator protection 8 9

Fig-1: Functional Diagram - Turbine Trip System

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General The obligatory turbine protection covers the following functions: protection of the turboset from inadmissable operating conditions it prevents consequently damage in case of plant failure it restricts occurring failure to a minimum

If the protective equipment is tripped the steam supply to the turbine is shut off by closure of the main stop valves. Further steps follow indirectly; e.g. closure of the control valves by secondary oil pressure reduction, closure of the extraction swing check valves by steam flow reversal.

Design and mode of operation

The standard turbine protection consists of 2.1 the mechanical (hydraulic) turbine protection and the electrical turbine protection Mechanical (Hydraulic) turbine protection

The design of the mechanical (hydraulic) turbine protection equipment is in accordance with the hydraulic break current principle, and consists of two tripping devicesMAX51 AA005, MAX51 AA006 manual trip device MAX52 AA005 two speed monitors MAY10 AA001, MAY10 AA002 two solenoid valves for trip initiation (remote trip devices 1/2) MAX52 AA001, MAX52 AA002 solenoid valves for OTSS MAX52 AA011 to MAX52 AA016

2.1.1 Tripping devices The tripping devices are employed for rapid reduction of the fluid pressure in the emergency trip fluid system. Under operating conditions the tripping device connects the fluid circuit MAX52 with the emergency trip fluid circuit MAX51 and holds the emergency stop value open stop valve open. The tripping device is held in the operating position by means of the auxiliary trip fluid MAX52. If the pressure of the emergency trip fluid circuit (e. g. as a result of leakage) or of the emergency trip auxiliary fluid circuit (e. g. as a result of response of an emergency trip criteria) falls below a defined pressure value the tripping device is moved to the trip position by means of a
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spring. As a result the emergency trip fluid system is connected with the drain and the emergency tripping stop valves are closed by means of springs. For start-up the tripping devices are brought to the operating position by means of start-up auxiliary fluid MAX48. The function of the tripping devices can be tested by means of the automatic turbine tester. 2.1.2 Manual mechanical emergency tripping device The manual emergency tripping device permits manual emergency tripping of the turbo set by the operating staff in the event of faults or shutdown of the turbine. In addition to manual mechanical tripping remote electrical tripping from the control room is possible. Thus two mode of tripping are not associated with any defined protection criteria. On operation of a manual emergency tripping device on the turbine the emergency trip auxiliary fluid system is connected to the outflow and turbine emergency trip is initiated by means of the emergency trip device. 2.1.3 Overspeed tripping devices The overspeed tripping devices protect the turbine against overspeed which could cause the rotor to burst as a result of excessive centrifugal force. Two flybolts arranged eccentrically in the shaft are maintained in the rest position by means of a spring in spite of the centrifugal force. If, as a result of overspeed, the centrifugal force exceeds the spring force, the bolts move abruptly to the trip position and operate the tripping device by mean of a latch thus connecting the emergency trip auxiliary fluid system with the outflow. The function of the overspeed trip devices may be tested by means of the automatic turbine tester. 2.1.4 Emergency Trip Solenoid Valves These solenoid valves (MAX52,AA001, AA002) serve as interface between the mechanical-hydraulic and the electrically (hydraulic) turbine protection equipment. Proper operation of the trip value can be checked by the ATT. 2.1.5 Overspeed Trip Selection System (OTSS) In the event of a load rejection, turbine control valve should close properly in line with automatic controls. Otherwise there is a possibility for the steam from MSR to go to LP turbine and cause overspeeding of the turbine. The OTSS is responsible for detecting faults in the closed loop control system and initiating turbine trip when an overspeed limit of 106% is reached. The OTSS contains a system during operation and a system during test in 2out-of-3 logic each. In further details on OTSS refer system description for OTSS.
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2.2

Configuration

Two trip solenoids MAX52AA001 & MAX52AA002 are provided in the hydraulic circuit, which get trip signals from the electrical system. Actuation of any one solenoid is sufficient to trip the turbine. The electrical system is configured as a 2-channel system. Each channel is realized in a local bus. Both the local buses are completely independent of each other and input modules, processor module and output modules reside on each. Each channel having two processors (PR05) with one processor in hot standby mode .Trip signals from sensors/field instruments are conditioned & distributed to both the channels (local buses ) via hardwired modules. Realisation of 2 out of 3 trip logic is carried out in the local bus. On detection of a fault in any one of the input signals to a channel, the configuration for that channel changes from 2 out of 3 to 1 out of 2 and is annunciated . Further failure in a channel changes the configuration to 1 out of 1. Trip signal from each of the local buses acts on 3 relays in 2 out of 3 combination realized in Protection relay cabinet . Both the channels are tested periodically even while the turbine is running through ATT program. Cyclic testing is done automatically at preset intervals and can be blocked from the ATT cabinet, if desired. The testing can also be initiated manually from the cabinet. Only one channel can be tested at a time. Online testing is done by simulating the trip signals and it determines faults in the input modules, processor modules, output modules or the trip relays. These faults can be acknowledged from the cabinet. Next cycle test can only be carried out after acknowledging of the fault. Once initiated, the trip signal keeps the trip solenoids and until the following conditions are fulfilled : i) Command signal from the individual trip initiating energized unless

circuit ceases.

ii) Both the ESVs are closed or trip fluid pressure (sensed by three pressure switches in 2 out of 3 logic) is less than 2 Kg/Cm or SGC ATT safety device Startup: ( Seal in turbine trip 1 ) or( Seal in turbine trip 2 ) is made OFF.

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3 Protection criteria for emergency tripping by turbine protection

The protection criteria can be subdivided into: essential protection criteria additional protection criteria other protection criteria.

3.1 Essential protection criteria Those protection criteria which are absolutely necessary to ensure safe operation of the turbo set and are specified by the turbine manufacturer are designated essential protection criteria. these are: Manual emergency trip (see 2.1.1) Overspeed tripping device (see 2.1.3) Electrical shaft position protection Electrical low vacuum protection Lube oil pressure protection Fire protection Protection from OTSS MSR drain level protection Trip command from ATRS

3.1.1 Manual emergency tripping Remote manual electrical (emergency) tripping allow shut down of the turboset by the operating personnel (see also Clause 2.1.2). 3.1.2 Electrical Shaft position protection A too big axial displacement of the turbine shaft may be caused by excessive wear or damage of thrust bearing pads. In the event the axial displacement exceeds the limits set during errection. The turbine will be tripped. The axial shift is measured in both the direction (+/-) using three inductive probes. These measured signals are fed to a protection cabinet in 2-out-of-3 logic for further realization. The protection system upto trip relays are checked by ATT. For further information see system description for Electronic protection system 2-out-of-3 and functional diagram YMAY20 Turbine Protection. 3.1.3 Electrical low Vacuum protection Electrical low vacuum protection is employed to protect the condenser and the low pressure blading against excessive condenser pressure. Excessive condenser pressure could occur in the condenser in case of loss of circulating water supply or excessive air leakage into the condenser.
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The projection system is 2-out-of-3 design so that the healthiness up to trip relays can be checked with ATT. 3.1.4 Lube oil pressure protection If the lubricating oil pressure decreases to 1.2 kg/cm2. oil supply to the bearing is endangered; for this reason the turbine is tripped in order to permit repair of the oil supply system after the turbine has run down. The lube oil pressure setpoint for electrical trip has been selected so that after actuation of protection bearing oil supply, by means of the emergency pump, is ensured during shutdown of the turboset. The lube oil pressure protection employs a 2-out of 3 logic. Refer functional diagram YMAY20 for further information. 3.1.5 Fire protection Within the framework of fire protection measures turbine emergency trip is initiated in order to interrupt supply of oil by the main oil pump, which is driven by the turbine shaft, as quickly as possible. Fire protection measures may be initiated by means of the special fire protection pushbuttons provided for the turbine of automatically by the "low level in oil tank" signal. The fire protection is of two channel design. In consequence emergency tripping is effected by means of two channels. Automatic initiation of fire protection occurs when two out of the three level switches in the oil tank respond. 3.1.6 Turbine trip by moisture separator drains system In the event of a turbine load rejection only a small quantity of drains and steam is permitted to remain in the moisture separator in order to prevent excessive overspeeding of the turbine. If the level of water in any MSR rise above a specified limit, the turbine is tripped automatically. For further details refer system description turbine trip by Moisture separator drains system. 3.1.7 Trip command initiated from ATRS Trip command signal initiated from SHUTDOWN program Step-3 of TURBINE SUBLOOP CONTROL in ATRS. 3.2 External protection criteria

"External protection criteria" are like the essential protection criteria absolutely necessary. These criteria, however, comprise faults external to the turbine and are employed for protection of plant components not directly associated with the turbine. These criteria are: reactor protection system
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mechanical generator protection

3.2.1 Rector protection system On actuation of reactor protection, tripping of the turbine system is initiated in order to prevent impermissible pressure reduction in steam system. In the absence of such an emergency tripping of the turbine, the turbine and primary/secondary steam systems are endangered as result of sudden change of temperature. The protection is built in 2-out-of-3 concept. 3.2.2 Mechanical generator protection In order to avoid damage to generator ancillaries and to the generator emergency tripping of the turbine is initiated on response of the mechanical generator protection. A 2-out-of-2 circuit is employed for signal processing; two channel tripping is employed utilizing a 1-out of-2 circuit. The protection circuit is tested periodically. On failure of a channel the actuation signal for the defective channel is simulated.

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