Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE A.

Similarities, Distinctions and Limitations Similarities: Police power, taxation, eminent domain 1. They are inherent in the State and may be exercised by it without the need of express constitutional grant. 2. They are not only necessary but indispensable. The State cannot continue or be effective unless it is able to exercise them. 3. They are methods by which the State interferes with private rights. Differences 1. The police power regulates both liberty and property. The power of imminent domain and the power of taxation affect only property rights. 2. The police power and the power of taxation may be exercised only by the government. The power of eminent domain may be exercised by some private entities. 3. The property taken in the exercise of the police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose. The property taken under the power of taxation and imminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore wholesome. 4. The compensation for the person subjected to the police power is the intangible altruistic feeling that he has contributed to the general welfare. The compensation involved in the other powers is more concrete, to wit, a full and fair equivalent of the property expropriated or protection and public improvement for the taxes paid. Police Power Definition: The power of the State to enact legislation which may interfere the rights of liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. (MMDA v. Garin). It is embraced in the public welfare which police power tries to promote are public morals, public safety, public health, general welfare, and economic security and prosperity.

Scope: This is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three powers of the state. (Ynot v. IAC) Characteristic: 1. Police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. (Ichong v. Hernandez) 2. Taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. Stated otherwise, police power may use the taxing power of the state to attain its purpose or objective. (Tio v. VTRB). 3. Eminent domain may also be used as implement of police power. (Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform) CASES: Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 1155 [Purpose: to promote the economic security of the people] Facts:

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed. The said law provides for a prospective prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated. Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. Syllabus: Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Limitation of Police Power: 1. Equal protection clause- The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. 2. Due process clause: The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. a. Requisites of Reasonableness i. The classification rests on substantial distinctions ii. It is germane to the purpose of the law. iii. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and iv. It applies equally to all members of the same class. Ortigas and Co. v. CA, GR 126102, 12/4/00- Retroactivty of law as exercise of police power Facts: On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot be used exclusively for residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential building will be constructed thereon. The BUYER shall not erectany sign or billboard on the rooffor advertising purpose. No single-family residential building shall be erecteduntil the building plans, specificationhave been approved by the SELLER. Restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate. In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region reclassifying as a

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located. On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and sought for demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. On June 29, 1995, Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied the motion. Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. The petition was granted and the order of the lower court is nullified. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: 1. WON the MMC ordinance shall be given retroactive effect. 2. WON the ordinance impairs a contract. Held: In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void. In the case at bar, when that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced.

PRC v. De Guzman, GR No. 144681, 6/21/04 [Police Power/Public Health; The right to practice profession] Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in BioChem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools, the results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation found that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions. On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July 21, 1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and recommended that the test results of the Fatima Examinees be nullified. On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC to allow the respondents to take the physicians oath and to register them as physicians. The same was appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which sustained the RTC decision. Hence, this petition. Held: It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine. The petition is therefore granted.

Who May Exercise Police Power General Rule: The legislature in general is the branch of the government that is charged with its exercise. Exception: Pursuant to a valid delegation, the following could exercise police power: 1. The President 2. Administrative bodies 3. Lawmaking bodies of the LGU 4. People at large through initiative

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 CASE: MMDA v. Garin, GR No. 130230, 4/15/05 [Not Valid exercise of Police Power] Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR: You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic Operations Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date of apprehension for disposition/appropriate action thereon. Criminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem license after 30 days. Valid as temporary DRIVER'S license for seven days from date of apprehension. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter2 to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court. Issue: WON Rep. Act no. 7924 vest MMDA police power/ Held: No, Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature. Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid. Syllabus: A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power. The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry and Oposa v. Factoran on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant. The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways. The MMDA is not vested with police power. Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself. Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 7742 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On December 29, 1981, petitioners instituted an action to the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to equal protection of the law, substantive due process, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Held: The administrative regulation is a valid police measure in consideration of the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".

Tests of Valid Exercise (Limitations) Lawful Subject: public interest

Police power could be exercised for the interests of the public in general, as distinct from the interests of a particular class or individual. This is based on the time-honored principle that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. CASES: Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. Board of Transportation, 119 SCRA 597 Facts: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208 [to protect movie industry] Facts: This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission. Issue: WON the tax imposed by the Decree is a valid exercise of police power. Held: The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. Dept of Education v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 Facts: MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 issued that: A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, DECS rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. He challenged the constitutionality of the rule invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. Hence, this action. Issue: WON the three-failure rule is a valid exercise of police power. Held: Yes. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. Rationale: While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. Sangalang v. IAC, 176 SCRA 719 Facts: As far back in 1977, Makati, Metro Manila has always been plagued by traffic. For this reason, during that time, Mayor Nemesio Yabut of Makati ordered that studies be made on ways on how to alleviate the traffic problem, particularly in the areas along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that the subdivision plan of Bel-Air was approved by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on the condition, among others, that its major thoroughfares connecting to public streets and highways shall be opened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit and Pasco de Roxas streets. As a result, the gates owned by BAVA at Jupiter and Orbit were ordered demolished. Mayor Yabut justified the opening of the streets on the following grounds: 1) Some time ago, Ayala Corporation donated Jupiter and Orbit Streets to Bel-Air on the condition that, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, the general public shall always be open to the general public. These conditions were evidenced by a deed of donation executed between Ayala and BelAir. 2) The opening of the streets was justified by public necessity and the exercise of the police power. 3) Bel-Air Village Associations (BAVA) articles of incorporation recognized Jupiter Street as a mere boundary to the southwest thus it cannot be said to be for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. 4) BAVA cannot hide behind the non-impairment clause on the ground that is constitutionally guaranteed. The reason is that it is

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. BAVA, on the other hand, contended: 1) Rufino Santos, president of BAVA, never agreed to the opening of the said streets 2) BAVA has always kept the streets voluntarily open anyway Moreover, BAVA claims the demolition of the gates abovementioned was a deprivation of property without process of law or expropriation without just compensation. Issue: Who is correct: the Mayor or BAVA? Held: The Mayor is correct, for the reasons mentioned above. The opening of Jupiter St. was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. There is no merit in BAVAs claim that the demolition if the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets amount to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation. There is no taking of property involved here. The act of the mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of police power. The concept of police power is the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Police power, unlike the power of imminent domain, is exercised without provision for just compensation. Art. 436 of the Civil Code. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. It may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party. A nuisance could be legally abated by summary means. Del Rosario v. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521 Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and those in private practice on the other hand, in the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are allegedly required to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, the latter may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic name. The favored treatment of private doctors, dentists and veterinarians under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation. The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead. Issue: WON the Generic Act is constitutional.

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 Held: The Generic Act is not unconstitutional. It implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority. The objective is "to promote and require the use of generic drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand-name counter-parts" for "the therapeutic effect of a drug does not depend on its 'brand' but on the 'active ingredients' which it contains." The medicine that cures is the "active ingredient" of the drug, and not the brand name by which it has been baptized by the manufacturer. In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise. Penal sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed. They are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law would be toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on, for physicians, dentists and veterinarians may freely ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of suspension or cancellation of the physician's license is neither cruel, inhuman, or degrading. It is no different from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that this Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or violate the laws and the Codes of Professional and Judicial Conduct. Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 337 The law was a proper regulation by the State of the use of airwaives. Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broad casting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. Issue: Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation. Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that, as already noted, the government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media. To require the radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. Ople v. Torres, supra (293 SCRA 141) President Fidel V. Ramos issued A.O. No. 308 entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System on December 12, 1996. It was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the InterAgency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, the court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. The petition is based on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. The implementation of AO No. 308 insidiously lays the groundwork for a system which will violate the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution. Held: WON the A.O No. 308 has a lawful subject in the exercise of police power. Held: No. The President is vested by the constitution the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone. Lawful Means The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not duly oppressive on individuals. Additional Limitations when police power is exercised by virtue of valid delegation: o Express grant by law o Within the territorial limits of the enacting body o Must not be contrary to law. CASES: Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 [Not a valid exercise of police power: as he may see fit] Facts: President Marcos issued EO No. 626-A which amended EO. No. 626. It provides that: SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2 The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: WON EO 626-A is a valid exercise of police power. Held: No. EO 627-A as it amended EO 626 has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. There is no connection on how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional. Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 Facts: On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part: Sec. 2. Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it cameraready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from enforcing and implementing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives addressed to various print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Court also required the respondent to file a Comment on the Petition. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, he Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: 1. WON Section 2 of the said Resolution compels publishers to donate Comelec Space. 2. WON Comelec Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. Held: 1. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). 2. As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require prolonged consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power essentially a power of legislation has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State. B. Eminent Domain [Also Read Rule 67 (re Expropriation) of the Rules of Court] Definition and Scope Distinguished from destruction from necessity CASE: American Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590 Who May Exercise Elements Necessity of the Exercise CASES: Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, 1 SCRA 646 City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil 349 Private Property CASES: Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 PLDT v. NTC, 190 SCRA 717 Taking Requisites

Glenn Rey Anino Juris Doctor 1 CASE: Republic v. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 Examples CASES: U.S. v. Lynch, 188 U.S. 256 U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. Land Bank v. CA, 249 SCRA 149 (M.R. Resolution, 258 SCRA 404) time of assessing JC CASE: Eslaban v. De Onorio, supra Hda.Luisita v. PARC, Resolution, G.R. No. 171101. 11/ 22/2011 (see also the discussion on just compensation in the dissent of J. Sereno) entitlement of owner to interest CASE: Urtula v. Republic, 22 SCRA 477 right of landowner in case of non-payment of JC CASE: Republic v. CA, GR No. 146587, 7/2/2002 C. Taxation Definition, Nature and Scope Who exercises vested with the legislature constitutionally given to LGUs Related Concepts (requirements in the exercise) Due Process Equal Protection Double Taxation Public Purpose Tax Exemptions

445

NPC v. AguirrePaderanga, 464 SCRA 481 Taking under Police Power CASE: Richards v. Washington Terminal 233 U.S. 546 o invalid taking under the police power CASES: City of Quezon v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 Phil. Press Institute v. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272 Public Use CASE: Province of Camarines Sur v. CA, 222 SCRA 173 Just Compensation Definition CASE: Eslaban v. De Onorio, GR No. 146062, June 28, 2001 Who is the owner who shall receive the payment? CASE: Knecht v. CA, 297 SCRA 754 Determination of JC: Judicial Function CASES: NHA v. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245 EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987) (reversing NHA v. Reyes) form of JC CASES: Assn of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian, 175 SCRA 343