Abu Mohammed al-Julani surely never envisaged the rapidity with which the Assad regime would crumble under the assault he master-minded on November 27.
It must, however, have been clear to him that if he was ever to make a bid to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, this was the moment. It was a golden opportunity.
The two powers that had come to his aid time and again in the past were both preoccupied with their own problems. Russia has been bogged down in the quagmire of the war in Ukraine; Iran was shaken to the core by Israel’s success in neutering Hezbollah.
Assad could expect little comfort from either. Moreover, his own armed forces were weakened by years of war, and the regime’s economy was struggling under the burden of international sanctions.
So, seizing the moment, Julani ordered his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militia to break out of its stronghold in the Idlib area and storm Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city. The assault was unexpected, and government troops and security forces put up little resistance.
HTS capture Damascus
The next city south on the way to Damascus was Hama. Here, alerted to what was clearly a determined offensive operation, the government managed to muster some token support from Russian planes and Iranian troops, but they were no match for the resolute HTS attack. Hama fell to the rebels on December 5. The regime was visibly disintegrating under the HTS assault.
Two days later, HTS captured the city of Homs after only a day of fighting; early on Sunday, December 8, HTS-led rebels entered Damascus and began releasing detainees at the country’s most notorious military prison, Sednaya.
Later that day they announced: “The tyrant Bashar al-Assad has fled.”
At the end of the week, Julani declared that he was intent on restoring some form of stable governance in Syria and that he was communicating with Western embassies for assistance.
On December 14, he issued a statement claiming that his plans for the reconstruction and development of Syria were ready. In preparing them, he had drawn on his seven years’ experience of administering Idlib province. Since 2017, HTS has been operating what it called the Salvation Government, a civilian administrative body which, on the lines of ISIS in its heyday, set up and ran education, healthcare, and public services, funded by taxes, tolls, and fees.
“Based on our administrative experience in Idlib,” said Julani, “we will advance in the rest of the country’s governorates.”
He used the same statement to assure world opinion that he was not an extremist. On the contrary, he said he was moderate, peace-loving, and even-handed. “We are not going to get into a conflict with Israel,” he announced. He added – choosing his words with the utmost care – that he and his organization had “no hostility toward Iranian society.”
He is at one with Israel on that. It is the Iranian regime that is the rogue presence in the Middle East, dedicated to its declared objective of converting the whole world to Shi’ite Islam, and of destroying both the US and Israel, to say nothing of Sunni Islamic states, in the process.
Now the ayatollahs are writing off the billions of dollars they have wasted in supporting Assad. Moreover, Syria’s ever-open door has been slammed shut, and a major conduit for supplying arms to their main proxy – Hezbollah in Lebanon – has been removed. One of the pillars of their foreign policy has been kicked from beneath them. The Iranian regime has been severely, if not fatally, weakened.
MEANWHILE, JULANI is turning into something of an enigma. To show that he has moved from heading a militant organization to a possible future as a political leader, he has quietly dropped his nom-de-guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, and has asked to be referred to by his real name, Ahmed al-Shara. Some media outlets, including the BBC, are complying.
In a radio interview with the BBC on December 18, he was the epitome of quietly spoken moderation, discussing his plans to involve all of Syrian society in establishing its future governance. He had earlier reassured the minorities and non-Muslim sects in Syria that they would live in peace and security under his rule: “No one has the right to erase another sect or religion,” he said. “They have coexisted in the region for hundreds of years.”
He has also rejected the idea of autocratic rule, stressing that Syria deserves a system of government based on institutions.
How much of this represents his true intentions is hard to assess, given that he and his HTS are rooted in a jihadist past. Moreover, the extremist groups allied to his organization have little sympathy with the soft methods he is adopting to consolidate his position.
Julani’s honeyed words seem to have given new motivation to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Formed in 2012, at the very start of Syria’s civil war, it represented all the political opposition factions that came together with the goal of overthrowing the Assad regime and establishing a free and democratic country.
As HTS forces proclaimed the capture of Damascus, the coalition, although more or less moribund for years and much fractured, announced that it was committed to “completing the transfer of power to a transitional governing body with full executive powers, paving the way for a free, democratic, and pluralistic Syria.”
Its statement made no mention of Julani or the HTS, but its vice president, Dima Moussa, told the BBC that the “transition requires the coming together of all Syrian people, including those who are carrying arms.”
The coalition then proceeded to draw up and issue its proposals for Syria’s future. On December 12, Anas Abdah, a member of the coalition’s political committee, unveiled a comprehensive plan for managing the transitional phase in Syria.
Abdah explained that Julani’s government “is a caretaker administration until early March. During this period, preparations will be made to establish an inclusive transitional government to manage the transitional phase.”
Abdah stressed that maintaining the continuity of institutions is a key guarantee of stability and preventing the collapse of the state. He suggested that the post-March 2025 transitional governing body should prepare for a national, inclusive conference that would build a national consensus.
This conference, he proposed, would pave the way for a constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution that reflects the aspirations of the Syrian people. Based on the principle of equal citizenship without discrimination, this draft constitution would be the subject of a nationwide referendum.
So far, Julani hasn’t addressed these ambitious, possibly illusory, proposals. Whether they ever see the light of day depends on whether Julani sees himself as a more moderate version of Assad or as the political head of a democratically elected, representative government. His real intentions, for now, are shrouded in mystery.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.