The Psychology Of The Emotions By Th. Ribot

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Psychology of the Emotions, by Th Ribot

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.

Title: The Psychology of the Emotions

Author: Th Ribot

Release Date: March 8, 2022 [eBook #67585]

Language: English

Produced by: KD Weeks, Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE

EMOTIONS ***

                      Transcriber’s Note: This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.

Italics are delimited with the ‘’ character as _italic.

Footnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are referenced.

Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues.

              _THE CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE SERIES._

  ---------------------------------------------------------

                  EDITED BY HAVELOCK ELLIS.

                THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS.

                      THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

                          THE EMOTIONS

                              BY

                          TH. RIBOT

      PROFESSOR AT THE COLLEGE OF FRANCE, EDITOR OF THE

                    REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.

                            -------

                            LONDON

            WALTER SCOTT, LTD., PATERNOSTER SQUARE

                              1897

                            PREFACE.

                            -------

The psychology of states of feelings, it is generally recognised, is still in a confused and backward condition. Although it has benefited in some measure by the contemporary allurement of psychological research, it must be acknowledged that it has only exerted a moderate seduction upon workers; the preference has been given to other studies, such as those of perception, of memory, of images, of movement, of attention. If any proof is necessary we may find it in the bibliographies, now published in Germany, America, and France, which give the psychological inventory of each year; of the whole number of books, memoirs, and articles which appear, less than the twentieth part, on an average, relates to the feelings and emotions. It is a very small part compared to the part played by the emotions and passions in human life, and this region of psychology is not deserving of such neglect. It is true that in recent years W. James and Lange seem to have brought this state of stagnation to an end. Their thesis, paradoxical in appearance, has aroused, especially in America, many discussions, criticisms, defences, and, what is of more value, observations and researches.

It must be acknowledged that for those who have any care for precision and clearness the study of the feelings and emotions presents great difficulties. Internal observation, always an uncertain guide which leads us but a little way, is here especially questionable. Experiment has given some very useful results, but they are much less important and numerous than in other regions of psychology. Detailed researches and monographs are lacking, so that the subject abounds with questions on which little light has yet been thrown. Finally, the dominant prejudice which assimilates emotional states to intellectual states, considering them as analogous, or even treating the former as dependent oh the latter, can only lead to error.

We have, in fact, in every study of the psychology of feeling to choose between two radically distinct positions, and this choice involves a difference in method. Concerning the final and essential nature of states of feeling there are two contrary opinions. According to one, they are secondary and derived, the qualities, modes, or functions of knowledge; they only exist through it; they are confused intelligence: that is the intellectualist thesis. According to the other, they are primitive, autonomous, not reducible to intelligence, able to exist outside it and without it; they have a totally different origin: that is the thesis which under its present form may be called physiological.

These two doctrines exhibit variations which I ignore, as I am not writing their history, but they all come into one or the other of these two great currents.

The intellectualist theory, which is of considerable age, has found its most complete expression in Herbart and his school, for whom every state of feeling only exists through the reciprocal relation of representations; every emotion results from the co-existence in the mind of ideas which agree or disagree; it is the immediate consciousness of the momentary elevation or depression of psychic activity, of a free or impeded state of tension. But it does not exist by itself; it resembles musical harmonies and dissonances, which differ from elementary sounds though only existing through them. Suppress every intellectual state, and feeling vanishes; it only possesses a borrowed life, that of a parasite. The influence of Herbart still persists in Germany, and, with some exceptions (Horwicz, Schneider, etc.), complete or mitigated intellectualism predominates.

The doctrine which I have called physiological (Bain, Spencer, Maudsley, James, Lange[1]) connects all states of feeling with biological conditions, and considers them as the direct and immediate expression of the vegetative life. It is the thesis which has been adopted, without any restriction, in this work. From this standpoint feelings and emotions are no longer a superficial manifestation, a simple efflorescence; they plunge into the individual’s depths; they have their roots in the needs and instincts, that is to say, in movements.

Consciousness only delivers up a part of their secrets; it can never reveal them completely; we must descend beneath it. No doubt it is awkward to have to invoke an unconscious activity, to call in the intervention of an obscure and ill-determined factor; but to wish to reduce emotional states to clear and definite ideas, or to imagine that by this process we can fix them, is to misunderstand them completely and to condemn ourselves beforehand to failure.

Footnote 1:

It may be doubted whether all the English writers here mentioned can be strictly classed with the physiological school as understood by M.

Ribot. With regard to Mr. Spencer, for instance, this is indicated by a brief summary of his own position in a private letter to the Rev.

Angus Mackay, who had presented a statement of the confused intelligence theory, which I conceive to be a part of the truth,

wrote Mr. Spencer, adding that joined with the dimly aroused association of ideas derived from the experiences of the individual, I hold that the body of the emotion consists more largely of the inherited associations of experiences and still more vague states of consciousness which result from excitement of them. It is clear that the evolutionary view does not necessarily fall wholly into the physiological group.—ED.

For the rest, this is neither the place to criticise the intellectualist thesis, nor to justify the other in passing; the whole work is devoted to this task.

The book consists of two parts. The first studies the more general manifestations of feeling: pleasure and pain, the characteristic signs of this form of psychic life, everywhere diffused under manifold aspects; then the nature of emotion, a complex state which in the order of feelings corresponds to perception in the order of knowledge.

The second deals with the special emotions. This detailed study is of great importance for reasons which will be explained later on, especially because we must not rest in generalities; it furnishes a means of control and verification. The nature of the emotional life cannot be understood unless we follow it in its incessant transformations—that is to say, in its history. To separate it from social, moral, and religious institutions, from the æsthetic and intellectual movements which translate it and incarnate it, is to reduce it to a dead and empty abstraction. Thus an attempt has been made to follow all the emotions one after the other in the progress of their development, noting the successive movements of their evolution or their retrogression.

The pathology of each emotion has been sketched to complete and throw light on the study. I have tried to show that beneath an appearance of confusion, incoherence, and promiscuity, there is, from the morbid to the normal, from the complex to the simple, a conducting thread which will always bring us back to the point of origin.

A work which has for its aim to set forth the present situation of the psychology of feeling and emotion might have been made very long. By eliminating every digression and all historical exposition, it has been made as short as possible.

                                                      TH. RIBOT.

                          CONTENTS.

                                                              PAGE

INTRODUCTION—THE EVOLUTION OF THE AFFECTIVE LIFE 1

In all affective manifestations there are two elements:      the motor states or impulses, which are primary; the      agreeable or painful states, which are      secondary—Unconscious (organic or protoplasmic)      sensibility; micro-organisms—Chemical interpretation;      psychological interpretation—Are there pure states of      feeling?—Affirmative facts—The period of needs, the      instinct of conservation-The period of primitive      emotions—How they may be determined; the genetic or      chronological method—Fear, anger, affection, the      self-feeling, sexual emotion—Are joy and grief      emotions?—The abstract emotions and their conditions—The      passions are the equivalent in feeling of an intellectual      obsession.

                _Part I._—GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY.

                          CHAPTER I.

PHYSICAL PAIN 25

Its anatomical and physiological conditions; pain nerves,      transmission to the centres—Modifications of the organism      accompanying physical pain: circulation, respiration,      nutrition, movements—Are they the effects of pain?—Pain is      only a sign—The analgesias: unconsciousness of pain and      intellectual consciousness—Retardation of pain after      sensation—Hyperalgesia—Nature of pain: theory that it is a      sensation; theory that it is a quality of sensation—Pain      may result from the quality or the intensity of the      stimulus—Hypotheses regarding its ultimate cause: it      depends on a form of movement, a chemical modification.

                          CHAPTER II.

MORAL PAIN 42

Identity of all the forms of pain—Evolution of moral pain:      (1) the pure result of memory; (2) connected with      representations; positive form, negative form; (3)      connected with concepts—Its external study; physical      signs—Therapeutics—Conclusions—A typical case of      hypochondriasis.

                        CHAPTER III.

PLEASURE 48

Subject little studied—Is Pleasure a sensation or a      quality?—Its physical concomitants: circulation,      respiration, movements—Pleasure, like pain, is separable:      physical and moral anhedonia—Identity of the different      forms of pleasure—The alleged transformation of pleasure      into pain—Common ground of the two states—Hypothesis of a      difference in kind and in degree—Simultaneity of two      opposite processes: what falls under consciousness is the      result of a difference—Physiological facts in support of      the above.

                          CHAPTER IV.

MORBID PLEASURES AND PAINS 61

Utility of the pathological method—Search for a criterion      of the morbid state; abnormal reaction through excess or      defect; apparent disproportion between cause and effect;      chronicity—I. Morbid pleasures, not peculiar to advanced      civilisation—Different attempts at explanation—This state      cannot be explained by normal psychology: it is the      rudimentary form of the suicidal

tendency—Classification—Semi-pathological pleasures: those      destructive of the individual, those destructive of the      social order—II. Abnormal pains—Melancholic type—Whence      does the painful state arise in its permanent form? from      an organic disposition? or from a fixed idea?—Examples of      the two cases.

                          CHAPTER V.

THE NEUTRAL STATES 73

Two methods of study—Affirmative thesis founded on      observation, deduction, and psycho-physics—Negative      thesis: the psychological trinity; confusion between      consciousness and introspection—Diversity of temperaments.

                          CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSIONS ON PLEASURE AND PAIN 80

The beginning of life—I. Conditions of existence of      pleasure and pain; lowering and heightening of vital      energy—Féré’s experiments—Meynert’s theory—II. Finality of      pleasure and pain—Exceptions: explicable cases;      irreducible cases.

                        CHAPTER VII.

THE NATURE OF EMOTION 91

Analogy between perception and emotion—Constituent      elements of emotion—Summary of the theory of James and      Lange—Application of this theory to the higher emotions      (religious, moral, æsthetic, intellectual)—Illegitimate      confusion between the quality and intensity of      emotion—Examination of a typical case: musical emotion—The      most emotional of all the arts is the most dependent on      physiological conditions—Proofs: its action on animals, on      primitive man, on civilised man; its therapeutic      action—Why certain sensations, images, and ideas awaken      organic and motor states, and, consequently, emotion—They      are connected either with natural or social conditions of      existence—Differences and resemblances between the two      cases—Antecedents of the physiological theory of      emotion—Dualist position, or that of the relation between      cause and effect—Unitary position; its advantages.

                        CHAPTER VIII.

THE INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF EMOTION 113

Confused state of this question—Popular _versus_ Medical      Psychology—Part played by the brain, the centre of psychic      life—Hypotheses on the seat of the emotions—Part played      by the heart, the centre of vegetative life—Popular      metaphors and their physiological interpretation—Are the      internal sensations reducible to a single process?—Part      played by chemical action in the genesis of emotion—Cases      of the introduction of toxic

substances—Auto-intoxication—Modifications in the course      of mental maladies.

                          CHAPTER IX.

THE EXTERNAL CONDITIONS OF EMOTION 124

Empiric period—Pre-Darwinian period of scientific      research—Examination of Darwin’s three principles—Wundt      and his explanatory formulas: Innervation directly      modified, Association of analogous sensations, Relations      of motion with sensory representations.

                          CHAPTER X.

CLASSIFICATIONS 130

Their discrepancies—Reduced to three types: (1)      Classification of pleasures and pains—(2) Classification      of emotions: two forms, empiric and      analytico-comparative—(3) Classification of      representations, intellectualist form—Critical      remarks—Impossibility of any classification.

                          CHAPTER XI.

THE MEMORY OF FEELINGS 140

Can emotional images be revived, spontaneously or      voluntarily?—Summary of scattered facts relating to this      subject—Inquiry into this question, and method      followed—Emotional and gustative images—Internal      sensations (hunger, thirst, fatigue, disgust,      etc.)—Pleasures and pains; observations—Emotions: three      distinct forms of revivability according to      observations—Reduction of the images to three groups:      revivability, direct and easy, indirect and comparatively      easy, difficult and sometimes direct, sometimes      indirect—The revivability of a representation is in      proportion to its complexity and the motor elements      included in it—Reservations to be made on this last      point—Is there such a thing as a real emotional      memory?—Two cases: false or abstract, and true or concrete      memory—Peculiar characters and differences of each      case—Change of the emotional into an intellectual      recollection—Emotional amnesia: its practical      consequences—There exists a general emotional type and      partial emotional types—Confirmatory      observations—Comparative revivability of agreeable and      disagreeable states—To feel acutely and to recall an acute      impression of the feeling are two different operations.

                        CHAPTER XII.

THE FEELINGS AND THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS 172

The function of the feelings, as the cause of      association—The law of affective association, conceived as      general, and as local—I. Function of unconscious feeling:      ancestral or hereditary unconsciousness; personal      unconsciousness arising from cœnæsthesia; personal      unconsciousness arising from the events of our life—Law of      transference by contiguity, by resemblance: wide or      narrow—II. Function of the conscious feelings: accidental      cases, permanent cases, exceptional or rare cases.

                _Part II._—SPECIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION 187

Importance of the study of special feelings—Utility of      historical documents—Causes of the evolution of the      feelings: (1) intellectual development; (2) hereditary      influence, perhaps reducible to influences of      environment—Cases in which the evolution of ideas precedes      that of feelings—Inverse cases—The intellect swayed by the      principle of contradiction; feeling by that of      finality—Classification of primitive tendencies—Method to      be followed—Group I.: physiological (reception,      transformation, restitution)—Group II.:      psychophysiological—Group III.: psychological—Their      enumeration.

                          CHAPTER I.

THE INSTINCT OF CONSERVATION IN ITS PHYSIOLOGICAL FORM 199

Hypothesis regarding the relation between the nutritive      organs and the brain—Perversion of the instincts relating      to nutrition—Pathology of hunger and thirst—Proofs      furnished of the priority of these tendencies in relation      to pleasure and pain—Facts in support of this—Negative      tendency; disgust—Its biological value as a protective      instinct.

                          CHAPTER II.

FEAR 207

Fear the conservative instinct under its defensive      form—Physiology—Psychology—First stage: Instinctive      fear—Hypothesis of heredity—Second stage: Fear founded on      experience—Pathology—Morbid or pathological fears—Two      periods in their study—Attempts at classification—How are      they derived from normal fear? Two groups, connected      respectively with fear and disgust—Inquiry into the      immediate causes: events in life of which a recollection      has been retained; of which no recollection has been      retained—Occasional transformation of a vague state into a      precise form.

                        CHAPTER III.

ANGER 218

Anger the conservative instinct in its offensive      form—Physiology—Psychology—Anger passes through two      stages, one simple, the other mixed—Its evolution—Animal      form, or that of actual aggression—Emotional form, or that      of simulated aggression—Appearance of a pleasurable      element—Intellectualised form, or that of deferred      aggression—Pathology: Epileptic insanity, corresponding to      the animal form; the maniacal state, corresponding to the      affective form—Disintegrated forms of anger—Overpowering      tendencies to destructiveness—How do they arise and take a      definite direction?—Return to the reflex state—Essential      cause: temperament—Accidental causes.

                          CHAPTER IV.

SYMPATHY AND THE TENDER EMOTIONS 230

Sympathy is not an instinct, but a highly generalised      psycho-physiological property—Complete sense and      restricted sense—Physiological phase:      imitation—Psychological phase: first stage, psychological      unison; second stage, addition of tender emotion—Tender      emotion—Its physiological expression—Its relations with      touch—The smile—Tears: hypotheses as to their      causes—Tender emotion indecomposable.

                          CHAPTER V.

THE EGO AND ITS EMOTIONAL MANIFESTATIONS 239

Reducible to one primary fact: the feeling of strength or      weakness—Positive form: type, pride. Its physiological and      psychological characteristics. Its relation to joy and      anger. Its evolution—Negative form: humility. Its      semi-social character—Pathology, positive form: monomania      of power, megalomania—Extreme negative form: suicidal      tendency—Psychological problem of this practical negation      of the fundamental instinct.

                          CHAPTER VI.

THE SEXUAL INSTINCT 248

Its physiology—Its evolution: Instinctive period—Emotional      period (Individual choice)—Intellectual period (Platonic      love)—Its pathology—How can sexual instinct deviate from      the normal course?—Anatomical and social      causes—Psychological causes: (_a_) unconscious, (_b_)      conscious.

                        CHAPTER VII.

TRANSITION FROM THE SIMPLE TO THE COMPLEX EMOTIONS 260

The complex emotions are derived from the simple (1) by      way of complete evolution; in a homogeneous form:      Examples—In a heterogeneous form: Examples—(2) by arrest      of development—(3) by composition; two forms—Composition      by mixture; with convergent elements; with divergent      elements—Composition by combination (sublimity,      humour)—Modesty—Is it an instinct?—Hypotheses as to its      origin.

                        CHAPTER VIII.

THE SOCIAL AND MORAL FEELINGS 275

Origin of the Social Feelings—Animal societies—Nutritive      societies—The individual and society—Domestic      societies—Social instinct has its source neither in sexual      nor in maternal love—Gregarious societies—Attraction of      like for like—Origin of social tendencies—Accidental and      transitory unions, of variable duration, and voluntary—The      social tendencies arise from the conditions of      existence—Social life does not spring from domestic      life—The higher societies among animals: they exclude      family relations—Human societies—Two opposite theories of      their origin: the family, the horde—Evolution of the      family-Evolution of social life—The family and the clan      not similar institutions—The moral sense. Two views of its      origin: (_a_) the intellectual, (_b_) the emotional—They      correspond to two stages in its development—Its innateness      and its necessity belong to the motor, not the      intellectual order—Genesis of the benevolent feeling.

Psychological analysis of its generative elements. Facts      in support of this—Discoverers in morality—Genesis of the      sense of justice—Phases of its development—Conclusion:      complexity of the moral sense—Pathology. Elimination of      the questions of criminal anthropology. Moral      insensibility.

                          CHAPTER IX.

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT 304

Importance of the subject—Its Divisions. First Period:      origin of the religious feeling—Primitive notions of the      Infinite (Max Müller); Ancestor-worship (H.

Spencer)—Fetichism, animism; Predominance of      fear—Practical, utilitarian, social, but not moral      character—Second period: (1) Intellectual evolution;      Conception of a Cosmic Order first physical, then      moral—Function of increasing generalisation; its stages;      (2) Emotional evolution; Predominance of love; addition of      the moral sentiment—Third Period: Supremacy of the      rational element; Transformation into religious      philosophy; Effacement of the emotional element—Religious      emotion is a complete emotion—Manifold physiological      states accompanying it; ritual, a special form of the      expression of emotion—The religious sentiment as a      passion—Pathology—Depressive forms: religious melancholy,      demonomania—Exalted forms: ecstasy, theomania.

                          CHAPTER X.

THE ÆSTHETIC SENTIMENT 328

Its origin: the theory of play, and its variants—Æsthetic      activity is the play of the creative imagination in its      disinterested form. Its instinctive nature—Transition from      simple play to aesthetic play: primitive art of pantomimic      dancing—Derivation of the arts in motion; of the arts at      rest—Why was æsthetic activity evolved?—Art had, in the      beginning, a social utility—Evolution of the æsthetic      sentiment—Its sociological aspect: progression from the      strictly social character towards individualism in the      different arts—Its anthropological aspect: progress from      strictly human character towards beings and things as a      whole—The feeling for nature—The feeling for the sublime      only partially belongs to æsthetics—Its evolution: it is      not æsthetic in its origin, but becomes so—Why there are      not two æsthetic senses—The sense of the comic—Psychology      of laughter—It has more than one cause—Theory of      superiority. Theory of discord—These correspond to two      distinct stages, one of which is foreign to      æsthetics—Physiology of laughter. Theory of nervous      derivation—Theory of tickling—Pathology. Are there cases      of complete æsthetic insensibility? Difficulties and      transpositions of the subject—Pathological function of      emotion: pessimistic tendencies, megalomania, influence of      unconscious activity—Pathological aspects of the creative      imagination; its degrees—Reason why the intense image, in      artists, does not pass into action; ways in which it is      modified—Cause of this deviation; its advantages.

                          CHAPTER XI.

THE INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENT 368

Its origin: the craving for knowledge—Its      evolution—Utilitarian period: surprise, astonishment,      interrogation—Disinterested period: transition      forms—Classification according to intellectual      states—Classification according to emotional states:      dynamic forms, static forms—Period of passion: its      rarity—Pathology—Simple doubt—Dramatic doubt—_Folie du      doute_—Mysticism in science: deviation comes, not from the      object, but from the method of research.

                        CHAPTER XII.

NORMAL CHARACTERS 380

Necessity of the synthetic point of view in      psychology—Historical summary of theories of character:      physiological direction, psychological direction—Two marks      of the real character: unity, stability—Elimination of      acquired characters—Classificatory procedure: four      degrees—Genera: the sensitive, the active, the      apathetic—Species—Secondary function of the intellect: its      mode of action—Sensitives: the humble, the contemplative,      the analytical, the purely emotional—Active type: the      medium, the superior—Apathetic type: pure type,      intelligent type, calculators—Varieties: the      sensitive-active, the apathetic-active, the      apathetic-sensitive, the temperate—Substitutes for      character: partial characters; (_a_) intellectual form,      (_b_) emotional form.

                        CHAPTER XIII.

ABNORMAL AND MORBID CHARACTERS 405

Are all normal characters mutually equivalent?—Attempt at      classification according to their value-Marks of abnormal      character: absence of unity, impossibility of      prevision—Class I. Successive contradictory characters:      anomalies, conversions; their psychological mechanism.

Alternating characters—Second class: Contradictory      coexistent characters. Incomplete form: contradiction      between principles and tendencies. Complete form.

Contradiction between one tendency and another—Third      class: Unstable characters. Their physiological and      psychological characters—Psychological infantilism.

                        CHAPTER XIV.

THE DECAY OF THE AFFECTIVE LIFE 423

Law of Decay: its formula, and its general application in      psychology—Difficulties where the affective life is      concerned—Successive disappearance of the disinterested      emotions (the æsthetic and intellectual), of the      altruistic (moral and social), the ego-altruistic      (religious feeling, ambition, etc.), and lastly, the      egoistic—Converse proof: cases of arrested      development—Theory of degeneration—Its relation to decay.

CONCLUSION 438

The place of the feelings in psychic life—They come      first—Physiological proofs—Psychological proofs.

                        INTRODUCTION.

              THE EVOLUTION OF THE AFFECTIVE LIFE.

In all affective manifestations there are two elements: the motor states or impulses, which are primary; the agreeable or painful states, which are secondary—Unconscious organic protoplasmic sensibility; microorganisms—Chemical interpretation; psychological interpretation—Are there pure states of feeling?—Affirmative facts—The period of needs, the instinct of conservation—The period of primitive emotions—How they may be determined; the genetic or chronological method—Fear, anger, affection, the self-feeling, sexual emotion—Are joy and grief emotions?—The abstract emotions and their conditions—The passions are the equivalent in feeling of an intellectual obsession.

At the outset it may be useful to sketch in rough outline the general evolution of the life of feeling from its humble origin in organic sensibility to its highest and most complex forms.

Afterwards we shall present the corresponding and inverse picture, that of its dissolution.

If we take at random, in the form in which daily experience gives them to us, the states known under the vague names of sentiments,

emotions, passions: joy and sorrow, a toothache, a pleasurable perfume, love or anger, fear or ambition, æsthetic enjoyment or religious emotion, the rage of gambling or benevolence, the shudder of the sublime or the discomfort of disgust, and so on, for they are innumerable, one first observation is obvious even on a superficial examination: all these states, whatever they may be, offer a double aspect, objective or external, subjective or internal.

We note in the first place the motor manifestations: movements, gestures, and attitude of the body, a modification in the voice, blushing or pallor, tremors, changes in the secretions or excretions, and other bodily phenomena, varying in different cases.

We may observe them in ourselves, in our fellows, and in animals.

Although they may not always be motor in the strict sense, we may so call them, since they are all the result of a centrifugal action.

We note also, in ourselves directly and by the evidence of consciousness, in others indirectly and by induction, the existence of certain states which are agreeable, painful, or mixed, with their modes or shades, extremely variable in quality and in intensity.

Of these two groups—the motor manifestations on one side, the pleasures, pains, and their compounds on the other side—which is fundamental? Can we put them on the same level, and if we cannot, which is that which supports the other?

My reply to this question is clear: it is the motor manifestations which are essential. In other words, what are called agreeable or painful states only constitute the superficial part of the life of feeling, of which the deep element consists in tendencies, appetites, needs, desires, translated into movements. Most classical treatises (and even some others) say that sensibility is the faculty of experiencing pleasure and pain. I should say, using the same terminology, that sensibility is the faculty of tending or desiring, and consequently of experiencing pleasure and pain. There is nothing mysterious in the tendency; it is a movement or an arrest of movement in the nascent stage. I employ this word tendency as synonymous with needs, appetites, instincts, inclinations, desires; it is the generic term of which the others are varieties; it has the advantage over them of embracing at the same time both the psychological and physiological aspects of the phenomenon. All the tendencies suppose a motor innervation; they translate the needs of the individual, whatever they may be, physical or mental; the basis, the root of the affective life is in them, not in the consciousness of pleasure and pain which accompanies them according as they are satisfied or opposed. These agreeable or painful states are only signs and indications; and just as symptoms reveal to us the existence of a disease, and not its essential nature, which must be sought in the hidden lesions of the tissues, organs, and functions, so pleasure and pain are only effects which must guide us in the search and determination of causes hidden in the region of the instincts. If the contrary opinion has generally prevailed, and priority been accorded to the study of agreeable and painful manifestations considered as the essential element in the emotional life and serving to define it, that is the result of a bad method, of an exclusive faith in the evidence of consciousness, of a common illusion which consists in believing that the conscious portion of an event is its principal portion, but especially the consequence of the radically false idea that the bodily phenomena which accompany all states of feeling are factors that are negligible and external, foreign to psychology, and without interest for it.

For the present what has just been said is only an affirmation; the proofs will come later, and will occupy the whole of this book; at the outset it is only necessary to indicate clearly the position taken up. We may now follow the evolution of the life of feeling in its chief stages, which are—pre-conscious sensibility, the appearance of the primitive emotions, their transformation either into complex and abstract emotions or into that stable and chronic state which constitutes the passions.

                              I.

The first period is that of protoplasmic, vital, organic pre-conscious sensibility. We know that the organism has its memory; it preserves certain impressions, certain normal or morbid modifications; it is capable of adaptation: this point has been well established by Bering (who had been preceded by Laycock and Jessen).

It is the outline of the superior form of psychic conscious memory.

In the same way there exists an inferior unconscious form—organic sensibility—which is the preparation and the outline of superior conscious emotional life. Vital sensibility is to conscious feeling what organic memory is to memory in the ordinary sense of the word.

This vital sensibility is the capacity to receive stimuli and to re-act to them. In a well-known memoir, now of ancient date,[2]

Claude Bernard wrote: Philosophers generally only know and admit conscious sensibility, that which their ego bears witness to. It is for them the psychic modification, pleasure or pain, determined by external modifications.... Physiologists necessarily place themselves at another point of view. They have to study the phenomenon objectively, under all the forms which it puts on. They observe that at the moment when a modifying agent acts on man, it not only provokes pleasure and pain, it not only affects the soul: it affects the body, it determines other re-actions besides the psychic re-actions, and these automatic re-actions, far from being an accessory part of the phenomenon, are on the contrary its essential element. Then he showed experimentally that the employment of anæsthetics, pushed to an extreme, first abolished conscious sensibility, then the unconscious sensibility of the intestines and glands, then muscular irritability, finally the lively movements of the epithelial tissue. In the same way among plants: under the influence of ether the sensitive plant loses its singular properties, seeds cease to germinate, yeast to ferment, etc. Whence follows the conclusion that sensibility resides, not in the organs or tissues, but in their anatomical elements.

Footnote 2:

La sensibilité dans le règne animal et le règne végétal, (1876, in Science expérimentale, pp. 218 et seq.).

Since then these investigations into protoplasmic sensibility have been pursued with much ardour among micro-organisms. These beings, sometimes animal, sometimes vegetable, are simple masses of protoplasm, generally monocellular, appearing homogeneous, without differentiation of tissues. Now very varied tendencies have been found among these organisms. Some seek light, others flee from it persistently. The protoplasmic mass of myxomycetes which live in the bark of the oak, if placed in a watch-glass full of water, remain there in repose; but if sawdust is placed around them they immediately emigrate towards it as if seized by home-sickness. The actynophrys acts in the same way with regard to starch. Bacteria can discover even the trillionth part of a milligram of oxygen in a neighbouring body. Certain sedentary ciliated creatures appear to choose their food. Some also have thought that they detected an elective tendency in the movement which draws the male ovule towards the female ovule. I have only recalled a few of the many facts which have been enumerated.

If it is necessary to mention other examples, I may refer to the case studied in our own days under the name of phagocytosis. The struggle for life goes on, not only among individuals, but also among the anatomical elements which constitute the individual. Every tissue—muscular, connective, adipose, etc.—possesses phagocytes (devouring cells), of which the duty consists in devouring and destroying old or enfeebled cells of the same kind. Besides these special phagocytes there are general phagocytes, such as the white corpuscles of the blood, which come to the help of the others when they are not equal to their task. They stand against the pathogenic microbes, waging upon them an internal struggle, and opposing the invasion of infectious germs. This apparently teleological property seems at first very surprising. Later investigations have shown that the phagocytes are endowed with a sensibility (called chemiotaxic), owing to which they are able to distinguish the chemical composition of their environment and to approach it or leave it accordingly; deteriorated tissues attract certain of them which incorporate the feeble or dead cells, while the healthy and vigorous elements are perhaps able to defend themselves by secreting some substance which preserves them from phagocytosis.

These facts, taken from among many others to which I shall again have to refer when dealing with the sexual instinct, have been interpreted in two very different ways: one psychological, the other chemical.

For some there is in all these phenomena a rudiment of consciousness. Since the movements are adapted and appropriate, varying according to circumstances, there must be choice they say, and choice involves a psychic element; the mobility is the revelation of an obscure psyche endowed with attractive and repulsive tendencies.

For the others (whose opinion I adopt), the whole may be explained on physico-chemical grounds. No doubt there is affinity, attraction and repulsion, but only in the scientific sense; these words are metaphors derived from the language of consciousness which should be purged of all anthropomorphic elements. Several authors have shown by numerous observations and experiments the chemical conditions which determine or prevent this pretended choice (Sachs, Verworn, Löb, Maupas, Bastian, etc.).

On this point, as on all questions of origin, we must decide according to probabilities, and the probabilities appear to be all in favour of the chemical hypothesis. In any case, this matter has only a secondary interest for us here. If we admit conscious tendencies, then the origin of the emotional life coincides with the very origin of physiological life. If we eliminate all psychology, there still remains the physiological tendency, that is to say the motor element, which in some degree, from the lowest to the highest, is never quite wanting.

This excursion into the pre-conscious period—since we so regard it—puts us in possession of one result. At the end of this investigation we find two well-defined tendencies, physico-chemical and organic—the one of attraction, the other of repulsion; these are the two poles of the life of feeling. What is attraction in this sense? Simply assimilation; it blends with nutrition. With sexual attraction, however, we must note that we already reach a higher grade; the phenomenon is more complex, the monocellular being no longer acts to preserve itself but to maintain the species. As to repulsion, we may remark that it is manifested in two ways. On one side it is the opposite of assimilation: the cell or the tissue rejects what does not suit it. On another side, at a somewhat superior stage, it is in some degree already defensive.

We have thus gained a basis for our subject by finding that beneath the conscious life of feeling there exists a very low and obscure region, that of vital or organic sensibility, which is an embryonic form of conscious sensibility and supports it.

                              II.

We now pass from darkness to light, from the vital to the psychic.

But before entering into the conscious period of the life of feeling and following it in the progress of its evolution, this is perhaps the place to examine a sufficiently important question which has usually been wrongly answered in the negative: Are there pure

states of feeling—that is to say, states empty of any intellectual element, of every representative content, not connected either with perceptions or images or concepts, simply subjective, agreeable, disagreeable, or mixed? If we reply in the negative, it follows that without exception no kind of feeling can ever exist by itself; it always requires a support; it is never more than an accompaniment.

This proposition is held by the majority; it has naturally been adopted by the intellectualists, and Lehmann has recently maintained it in its most radical form; a state of emotional consciousness is never met with; pleasure and pain are always connected with intellectual states.[3] If we reply in the affirmative, then the state of feeling is considered as having at least sometimes an independent existence of its own and not as condemned to play for ever the part of acolyte or parasite.

Footnote 3:

Ein rein emotionneller Bewusstseinszustand kommt nicht vor; Lust und Unlust sind stets an intellektuelle Zustände geknüpft, Die Hauptgesetze der menschlichen Gefühlslebens (1892), p. 16.

This is a question of fact, and observation alone can settle it.

Although there are other reasons to give in favour of the autonomous and even primordial character of the life of feeling, I reserve them for the conclusion of this book, to remain at present in the region of pure and simple experience. There can be no doubt that, as a rule, emotional states accompany intellectual states, but I deny that it can never be otherwise, and that perceptions and representations are the necessary condition of existence, absolutely and without exception, of every manifestation of feeling.

There is a first class of facts which I only refer to in order not to ignore them. Although they have been invoked they seem to me to carry little weight. I refer to the emotions which suddenly break out in animals and are not explicable by any anterior experience.

Gratiolet having presented to a very young puppy a fragment of wolf’s skin so worn that it resembled parchment, the animal on smelling it was seized with extreme fright. Kröner, in his book on cœnæsthesia,[4] has collected similar facts. It is, however, so difficult to know what passes in the consciousness of an animal, and to ascertain the part of instinct and of hereditary transmission, that I do not insist. Moreover, in all these cases the emotion is excited by an external sensation which touches a spring and sets the mechanism of instinct at work; so that it might be argued that we are not here concerned with a pure and independent state of feeling. To remove all doubt, we require cases in which the state of feeling precedes the intellectual state, not being provoked by, but, on the contrary, provoking it.

Footnote 4:

Das Körperliche Gefühl (1887), pp. 80, 81.

The child at the beginning can only possess a purely affective life.

During the intra-uterine period he neither hears nor sees nor touches; even after birth it is some weeks before he learns to localise his sensations. His psychic life, however rudimentary it may be, must consist in a vague state of pleasure and pain analogous to ours. He cannot connect them with perceptions, because he is still unable to perceive. It is a widely accredited opinion that the infant enters into life by pain; Preyer has questioned this; we shall see later on what grounds. At present we need not insist upon these facts, since we cannot interpret them except by induction.

Adults will furnish us with unquestionable and abundant evidence.

As a general rule, every deep change in the internal sensations is translated in an equivalent fashion into the cœnæsthesia and modifies the tone of feeling. Now the internal sensations are not representative, and this factor, of capital importance, has been forgotten by the intellectualists. Of this purely organic state, which afterwards becomes a state of feeling, and then an intellectual state, we shall later on find numerous examples in studying the genesis of the emotions; it is enough for the moment to note a few of them. Under the influence of haschisch, says Moreau (de Tours), who has studied it so well, the feeling which is experienced is one of happiness. I mean by this a state which has nothing in common with purely sensual pleasure. It is not the pleasure of the glutton or the drunkard, but is much more comparable to the joy of the miser or that caused by good news. I once knew well a man who for ten years constantly took haschisch in large doses; he withstood the drug better than might be expected, and finally died insane. I received his oral and written confidences, often to a greater extent than I desired. During this long period I have often noted his feeling of inexhaustible satisfaction, translated now and again into strange inventions or commonplace reflections, but in his opinion invaluable. At the epoch of puberty, when it follows its normal development, we know that there is a profound metamorphosis. Certain conditions, known or unknown, act on the organism and modify its state (first moment); translated into consciousness, these organic conditions give birth to a particular tone of feeling (second moment); this state of feeling produces corresponding representations (third moment). The representative element appears in the last place. Similar phenomena are produced under other conditions, in which the cœnæsthesia is modified by the state of the sexual organs (menstruation, pregnancy). The emotional state is produced first, the intellectual state afterwards. But the most abundant source from which we may draw examples at will is certainly the period of incubation which precedes the appearance of mental diseases. In most cases it is a state of vague sadness.

Sadness without a cause, it is commonly said, and rightly, if by that is meant that it is produced neither by an accident nor by bad news nor by ordinary causes; but not causeless, if we take into consideration the internal sensations which in such a case play a part which is unperceived but not the less effective. This inclination to melancholy is also the rule in the neuroses.

Sometimes it happens that the state of feeling, instead of being a slow incubation, is an aura of emotional character and short duration (a few minutes to at most a few hours). Some patients, by repeated experience, are aware of this; they know by the change that the attack is approaching. Féré (Les Epilepsies) gives several examples; among others, that of a young man who under these circumstances became totally changed in character, which he expressed in an original manner by saying, I feel that my heart changes. That is because in the last stage this state of feeling takes form and becomes fixed in an idea, as may best be seen in persecutional insanity.

Without insisting, as would be easy, on any further enumeration of facts, we may reduce these pure states of feeling to four principal types:

Agreeable state (pleasure, joy): that of haschisch and similar drugs, certain stages of general paralysis of the insane, the sense of well-being experienced by the consumptive and the dying; many people who have escaped a death which they considered certain have felt themselves overwhelmed on its approach by a feeling of beatitude, without further definition, which is perhaps only the absence of all suffering.[5]

Footnote 5:

For observations relative to this point see Revue Philosophique, March 1896.

Painful state (sadness, annoyance): the incubation period of most diseases, the melancholy of menstrual periods.

State of fear: without reason, without apparent causes, without justification, without object; fear of everything and of nothing: a fairly frequent state, which we shall examine in detail when we come to the phobias.

State of excitability: connected with anger, frequent in neurosis; it is an unstable and explosive state of being which, at first vague and undetermined, ends by taking form, attaching itself to a representation, and discharging itself on an object.

Finally, there are mixed states, formed by the co-existence or alternation of simple states.

From all which goes before it results that there is a pure and autonomous life of feeling, independent of the intellectual life and having its cause below, in the variations of the cœnæsthesia, which is itself the resultant and concert of vital actions. In the psychology of feeling the part played by external sensations is very scanty compared to that played by internal sensations, and certainly one must be unable to see beyond the first to set up as a rule that there is no emotional state unconnected with an intellectual state.

Having made this point clear, we may return to our general picture of the evolution.

Above organic sensibility we find the stage of needs—that is to say, of purely vital or physiological tendencies with consciousness added. In man this period only exists at the beginning of life, and is translated by internal sensations (hunger, thirst, need of sleep, fatigue, etc.). It is constituted by a bundle of tendencies essentially physiological in character, and these tendencies have nothing added or external; they are life in action. Each anatomical element, each tissue, each