Everand Logo

Welcome to Everand!

  • Discover millions of ebooks, audiobooks, and so much more with a free trial

    Only $9.99/month after trial. Cancel anytime.

    The Phenomenology of Pain
    The Phenomenology of Pain
    The Phenomenology of Pain
    Ebook420 pages6 hours

    The Phenomenology of Pain

    By Allan Franklin

    ()

    Read preview

    About this ebook

    The Phenomenology of Pain is the first book-length investigation of its topic to appear in English. Groundbreaking, systematic, and illuminating, it opens a dialogue between phenomenology and such disciplines as cognitive science and cultural anthropology to argue that science alone cannot clarify the nature of pain experience without incorporating a phenomenological approach. Building on this premise, Saulius Geniusas develops a novel conception of pain grounded in phenomenological principles: pain is an aversive bodily feeling with a distinct experiential quality, which can only be given in original first-hand experience, either as a feeling-sensation or as an emotion.

    Geniusas crystallizes the fundamental methodological principles that underlie phenomenological research. On the basis of those principles, he offers a phenomenological clarification of the fundamental structures of pain experience and contests the common conflation of phenomenology with introspectionism. Geniusas analyzes numerous pain dissociation syndromes, brings into focus the de-personalizing and re-personalizing nature of chronic pain experience, and demonstrates what role somatization and psychologization play in pain experience. In the process, he advances Husserlian phenomenology in a direction that is not explicitly worked out in Husserl’s own writings.

    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherOhio University Press
    Release dateAug 30, 2022
    ISBN9780821446942
    The Phenomenology of Pain

    Read more from Allan Franklin

    Related authors

    Related to The Phenomenology of Pain

    Titles in the series (21)

    View More
    View More

    Related ebooks

    Social Science For You

    View More
    View More

    Related podcast episodes

    Related articles

    • Article

      Unraveling Chronic Pain

      May 22, 2022

      Unraveling Chronic Pain
      10 min read

    • Article

      Head Space

      Nov 17, 2019

      Head Space
      5 min read

    • Article

      Why Does It Still Hurt?

      Aug 31, 2023

      Why Does It Still Hurt?
      4 min read

    • Article

      The Joys of Being a Stoic

      Nov 4, 2020

      In September, a writer for HBO’s Watchmen series, Cord Jefferson, was awarded an Emmy. I enjoyed the show’s first season, a sequel to arguably the best movie (and graphic novel) about superhero vigilantism. The plot involves the protagonists combatti

      9 min read

    • Article

      THE ART OF mindfulness

      Jul 28, 2019

      THE ART OF mindfulness
      5 min read

    • Article

      Even Worms Feel Pain

      Mar 2, 2022

      Even Worms Feel Pain
      8 min read

    • Article

      Brain-imaging Study Shows ‘Hot Spot’ That May Explain Why African Americans Feel Greater Pain

      Feb 3, 2020

      The more discrimination that African Americans reported having experienced in their lives, the more intensely they felt pain from the same amount of heat.

      3 min read

    • Article

      How The Brain Shapes Pain And Links Ouch With Emotion

      May 20, 2019

      Pain is more than an unpleasant sensation. When pain signals reach the brain, they interact with areas involved in thinking, memory and emotion.

      4 min read

    • Article

      Is Pain All In Your Head?

      Jul 1, 2020

      Is Pain All In Your Head?
      9 min read

    • Article

      Allinthemind

      May 22, 2022

      Renowned orthopedic surgeon David Hanscom came to the conclusion reached by many of his colleagues in their quiet moments: spinal surgery wasn’t helping his patients, but mostly making them worse. He then embarked on a radical way of treating his pat

      3 min read

    • Article

      Forgiveness The Cure

      May 22, 2022

      Forgiveness The Cure
      9 min read

    • Article

      Why Your Biology Runs on Feelings

      Jan 18, 2018

      I have long been interested in human affect—the world of emotions and feelings—and have spent many years investigating it: why and how we emote, feel, use feelings to construct ourselves; how feelings assist or undermine our best intentions; why and

      7 min read

    • Article

      Damage Control

      Jul 8, 2022

      Damage Control
      7 min read

    • Article

      Has Psychiatry Lost Touch With Individuals?

      May 24, 2024

      Time is subjective, bound up with our psychological states. People who suffer from mania are often characterized as inhabiting a world in which time seems to have sprinted ahead. They are said to have a flight of ideas, racing thoughts, rapid speech.

      2 min read

    • Article

      Menopause OVER EASY

      Dec 17, 2019

      Menopause OVER EASY
      5 min read

    • Article

      Yoga Therapy For Chronic Pain

      Jan 28, 2022

      Yoga Therapy For Chronic Pain
      4 min read

    Related categories

    Reviews for The Phenomenology of Pain

    0 ratings

    0 ratings0 reviews

    What did you think?

    Tap to rate

    Review must be at least 10 words

      Book preview

      The Phenomenology of Pain - Allan Franklin

      The Phenomenology of Pain

      SERIES IN CONTINENTAL THOUGHT

      Editorial Board

      Ted Toadvine, Chairman, University of Oregon

      Michael Barber, Saint Louis University

      Elizabeth A. Behnke, Study Project in Phenomenology of the Body

      David Carr, Emory University (Emeritus), The New School

      James Dodd, New School University

      Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University†

      Sara Heinämaa, University of Jyväskylä, University of Helsinki

      José Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University†

      Joseph J. Kockelmans, Pennsylvania State University†

      William R. McKenna, Miami University

      Algis Mickunas, Ohio University

      J. N. Mohanty, Temple University

      Dermot Moran, University College Dublin

      Thomas Nenon, University of Memphis

      Rosemary Rizo-Patron de Lerner, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima

      Thomas M. Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg Universität, Mainz†

      Gail Soffer, Rome, Italy

      Elizabeth Ströker, Universität Köln†

      Nicolas de Warren, Penn State University

      Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University

      International Advisory Board

      Suzanne Bachelard, Université de Paris†

      Rudolf Boehm, Rijksuniversiteit Gent

      Albert Borgmann, University of Montana

      Amedeo Giorgi, Saybrook Institute

      Richard Grathoff, Universität Bielefeld

      Samuel Ijsseling, Husserl-Archief te Leuven†

      Alphonso Lingis, Pennsylvania State University

      Werner Marx, Albert-Ludwigs Universität, Freiburg†

      David Rasmussen, Boston College

      John Sallis, Boston College

      John Scanlon, Duquesne University

      Hugh J. Silverman, State University of New York, Stony Brook†

      Carlo Sini, Università di Milano

      Jacques Taminiaux, Louvain-la-Neuve†

      D. Lawrence Wieder†

      Dallas Willard, University of Southern California†

      The Phenomenology of Pain

      Saulius Geniusas

      OHIO UNIVERSITY PRESS

      ATHENS

      Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio 45701

      ohioswallow.com

      © 2020 by Ohio University Press

      All rights reserved

      To obtain permission to quote, reprint, or otherwise reproduce or distribute material from Ohio University Press publications, please contact our rights and permissions department at (740) 593-1154 or (740) 593-4536 (fax).

      Printed in the United States of America

      Ohio University Press books are printed on acid-free paper ™

      30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20      5 4 3 2 1

      Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-8214-2403-2

      Electronic ISBN: 978-0-8214-4694-2

      LCCN: 2019051766

      Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available upon request.

      For my father,

      Algis T. Geniušas

      CONTENTS

      Acknowledgments

      Introduction

      Pain as Experience

      The Phenomenological Approach

      The Structure of the Following Investigation

      1. Methodological Considerations

      Fundamental Methodological Commitments: Epoché, the Phenomenological Reduction, and Eidetic Variation

      Three Allegations: Psychologism, Introspectionism, and Solipsism

      Revamping Eidetic Variation: From Pure to Dialogical Phenomenology

      The Genetic Method in Phenomenology

      2. Pain and Intentionality: A Stratified Conception of Pain Experience

      Pain and Intentionality

      Pain as a Feeling-Sensation

      Pain as an Intentional Feeling

      Apprehension–Content of Apprehension

      Husserl’s Analysis of Pain in the Logical Investigations

      Pain as a Stratified Phenomenon

      Sartre’s Phenomenology of Pain in Being and Nothingness

      3. The Phenomenology of Pain Dissociation Syndromes

      Congenital Insensitivity to Pain

      The Discovery of Pain

      Lobotomy, Cingulotomy, and Morphine

      Threat Hypersymbolia

      Asymbolia for Pain

      Pain Affect without Pain Sensation

      4. Pain and Temporality

      Objective Time and Subjective Temporality

      The Different Senses of Presence: The Fundamental Levels of Time-Constitution

      Implicit and Explicit Presence

      The Field of Presence as the Horizon of Pain Experience

      Memory and Pain

      Anticipation and Pain

      5. The Body in Pain: Leib and Körper

      Pain’s Indubitability and Bodily Localizability

      The Phenomenological Account

      The Lived-Body as the Subject of Pain

      Pain as Empfindnis

      Pain’s Twofold Localizability

      Pain and the Constitution of the Lived-Body

      The Structure of Pain Experience

      6. The Phenomenology of Embodied Personhood: Depersonalization and Repersonalization

      The Phenomenology of Embodied Personhood

      Chronic Pain as Depersonalization

      Chronic Pain as Repersonalization

      Implications for the Phenomenology of Medicine

      Pain as an Expressible Phenomenon: The Basic Elements of a Phenomenology of Listening

      7. Pain and the Life-World: Somatization and Psychologization

      Somatization and Psychologization

      Somatization, Psychologization, and Their Origins in Experience

      The Phenomenology of Somatization and Psychologization

      The Life-World as the Wherefrom, Wherein, and Whereto of Experience

      Between Homeliness and Homelessness: Discordance in the Life-World

      Masochism and Somatization

      Conclusion

      Notes

      Bibliography

      Index

      ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

      Some of the chapters of this book are heavily revised versions of earlier publications. Chapter 2 is a revised version of Pain and Intentionality (Geniusas 2017a). Chapter 5 includes material from an earlier study, The Subject of Pain: Husserl’s Discovery of the Lived-Body (Geniusas 2014b). Chapter 6 is a revised version of Phenomenology of Chronic Pain: De-Personalization and Re-Personalization (Geniusas 2017b).

      I would like to thank Agustín Serrano de Haro, Gary B. Madison, Simon van Rysewyk, Charles Rodger, and John Quintner, who have read through some chapters of this study. I also owe a word of thanks to Jagna Brudzinska, David Carr, Nicolas de Warren, Dalius Jonkus, Claudio Majolino, Dermot Moran, Luis Niel, Dieter Lohmar, Dmitri Nikulin, Witold Plotka, and Dan Zahavi. Finally, I am grateful to the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee in Hong Kong for the General Research Fund grant, which enabled me to devote the time needed to prepare this study for publication.

      INTRODUCTION

      PAIN AS EXPERIENCE

      We can say about pain what Augustine (2006, 242) has said about time: What is pain? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know. Concessions of this kind are common in pain research. For instance, Thomas Lewis begins his Pain with the following admission: I am so far from being able satisfactorily to define pain . . . that the attempt could serve no useful purpose (1942, v). So also, Johannes J. Degenaar remarks: I thought I knew what pain was until I was asked to say what the word ‘pain’ means. Then . . . I realized my ignorance (1979, 281).

      Such statements might take one by surprise, especially in light of the overabundance of literature on pain that we come across in various sciences. The available literature, however, consists largely of empirical research on various neurological mechanisms as well as other factors that elicit a painful reaction on the part of some organisms. We are flooded with intricate and fascinating details about pain mechanisms, although we know little about the nature of pain experience.

      In the phenomenology of medicine, it is common to draw a distinction between illness and disease and to maintain that while the nature of the disease is determined neurophysiologically, the nature of illness must be fixed phenomenologically (see, for instance, Toombs 1993). We come across no analogous distinction in pain research. Should we take this to mean that the concept of pain is equivocal, that insofar as we think of pain as a biological mechanism, it must be determined neurophysiologically, while insofar as we think of it as experience, it must be determined by some other means? We would avoid much confusion if we conceded that pain as such is not neurophysiological in any sense of the term. At its best, pain biology can clarify the neurophysiological causes that give rise to pain as well as provide effective means to minimize pain or even eliminate it. Pain biology, if successful, can shed light on the neurophysiological mechanisms that, presumably, accompany pain experience. However, irrespective of its practical utility, pain biology cannot clarify the nature of pain experience.

      Pain biology presupposes that we know from experience what pain as experience is. Presumably, what we do not know are the causes that trigger it or the influences that shape it. It thus appears that we are in need of knowledge about matters that lie beyond the boundaries of experience. It seems that we are in need of pain biology, not what one might call pain phenomenology. How legitimate is such a view? To be sure, experience by itself tells us little about the neurological mechanisms that trigger pain experience. For this reason alone, there can be no question about pain phenomenology replacing pain biology. Yet what exactly do we know about pain as experience from experience? As soon as we try to articulate what is entailed in this implicit understanding, we come to the realization that we are dupes of our own ignorance. What is pain as experience? For this, we appear to lack words.¹

      In 1979, with the aim of determining the concept of pain with precision and thereby resolving various ambiguities that have arisen in the science of pain, the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) offered the following definition of pain, which continues to be the guiding definition to this day: Pain is an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage (Merskey and Bogduk 1994, 209). Thus, according to the nowadays-dominant definition, pain is an experience.² Yet what kind of experience? To qualify it as unpleasant is hardly sufficient to grasp its nature, for, clearly, such a determination is too broad and does not serve to distinguish pain from various forms of psychological suffering. The further stipulation that pain is not just an emotional but also a sensory experience does not resolve the problem, since nausea, vertigo, heartburn, the sensations of excessive heat and cold, of hunger and thirst, even itches and pressure can also be qualified as unpleasant sensory and emotional experiences. The IASP definition qualifies pain as experience, yet it does not clarify what kind of experience it is. This definition places pain in the genus of sensory and emotional experience, yet it does not provide us with the differentia.³

      Although it is undeniable that at its core, pain is an experience, our current knowledge of pain is marked by the failure to understand pain as experience. This failure is not accidental. The dominant methodological standpoints in pain research do not provide us with a suitable methodological framework to conceptualize pain as experience. Broadly speaking, naturalism and social constructionism constitute the two dominant methodological standpoints in pain research (see Geniusas 2013). While the naturalist focuses on the specific neurological mechanisms that trigger pain experience, the social constructionist traces the social, cultural, and historical influences that shape the experience of pain. In different ways, both the naturalist and the social constructionist conceptualize pain experience as a psychological effect that is activated by different kinds of mechanisms. What both methodological standpoints are interested in is not pain experience as such (they both presuppose that we already know what pain as experience is), but the various neurological mechanisms that trigger it and the particular sociocultural influences that shape it. Yet clearly, if one claims that pain is triggered by these mechanisms and shaped by these influences, then one must have some kind of understanding of what pain as such is. We are thus forced to ask: What can we say about pain as experience, considered independently from the mechanisms that trigger it and the influences that shape it? Contemporary pain research does not have the methodological basis to answer this question.

      THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

      In light of these circumstances, the following study contends that phenomenology is indispensable for pain research. Neither pain biology nor pain sociology can clarify the nature of pain experience, and, therefore, they must be supplemented with pain phenomenology. In a general and preliminary way, we can conceive of phenomenology as a method designed to study experience and the different ways in which phenomena manifest themselves in experience. Thus, the often-cited phenomenological refrain, Zurück zu den Sachen selbst (Back to the things themselves), must be understood as a solicitation to return to the field of experience, conceived of as the fundamental field within which phenomena manifest themselves and their multifaceted meanings originate. According to one of the central phenomenological claims, in the natural course of life, as well as in the sciences, we misconstrue phenomena by transforming them into what they are not, and we do so precisely because we misunderstand how they manifest themselves in experience. Phenomenology’s chief ambition is to liberate us from falsifications, which consciousness itself gives rise to in virtue of its absorption in the world of things and its inherent self-forgetfulness, which manifests itself through its tendency to misunderstand itself as a thing among other things. The goal of phenomenology is to liberate consciousness from its self-opacity, to clarify the fundamental structures of experience and recover the lost world of concrete life. Phenomenology proves to be indispensable for pain research because it offers a highly useful methodology to determine the nature of pain experience, irrespective of the specific natural causes that might trigger it and the specific cultural influences that might shape it.⁴

      Phenomenology is neither the first nor the only philosophical tradition to be qualified as a philosophy of experience. Various brands of empiricism and pragmatism also merit the same qualification. Are there any reasons to privilege phenomenology over these other philosophical traditions, as far as the philosophy of pain is concerned? Arguably, the reasons are methodological. First and foremost, the phenomenological method is designed to study experience from the first-person point of view. In this regard, it is exceptionally well-suited for pain research, since pain itself is conceivable only as firsthand experience (a pain that is not experienced could be qualified as a painless pain—an expression that is no less self-contradictory than a square triangle). The science of pain is thus in need of phenomenology, for with its help it can inquire into the compatibility in the findings obtained using the first-person and the third-person methodologies (see Price and Aydede 2005). Still, one might object that such a clarification does not fully answer the question, since it leaves the possibility open that introspectionist psychology might fit the bill. In this regard, one should stress that not any description of phenomena from the first-person point of view is to be qualified as phenomenological. There is no phenomenology without the epoché and the phenomenological reduction, conceived of as the two complementary methods designed to provide the researcher with access to experience that is purified of naturalistic misconceptions. These sophisticated methods, unique as they are to phenomenology, are designed to suspend the natural way of considering phenomena so as to let them appear without any bias, distortions, or manipulations. As far as pain research is concerned, these methods prove indispensable for any attempt to conceive of pain as pure experience, by which we are to understand the experience of pain, considered independently from pain biology and pain sociology.

      In light of my foregoing remarks, one cannot help but be surprised by the scarcity of phenomenologically oriented book-length studies of pain. All in all, one can single out just two studies. Christian Grüny’s Zerstörte Erfahrung: Eine Phänomenologie des Schmerzes was published in 2004. Abraham Olivier’s Being in Pain appeared in print a few years later, in 2007. Besides Olivier’s and Grüny’s studies, there are no other book-length investigations that have exclusively focused on the phenomenology of pain.⁵ Strangely, a philosophical tradition that prides itself on being attentive to lived-experience, on returning to the things themselves and thereby taking distance from meaningless abstractions that it finds at the heart of many other traditions of thought—this tradition has been remarkably silent as far as the nature of such embodied feelings as pain is concerned. It has certainly contributed less to our understanding of pain than other philosophical traditions, which never claimed that they were striving to offer a reliable account of the nature of experience.

      The central ambition of the following study is to break this regrettable silence and to show that phenomenology has an important contribution to make in the framework of pain research in general, and the philosophy of pain in particular. With this in mind, the following investigation will present a philosophical study of pain, which relies upon the phenomenological method. Besides delimiting a phenomenological approach to pain, this study also aims to open a dialogue between the phenomenology of pain and other types of pain research, which we come across in such fields as the analytically oriented philosophy of pain, cognitive science, cultural anthropology, cultural psychopathology, and psychoanalysis. Such a methodological commitment and dialogical orientation carries the demand to situate oneself within the phenomenological tradition, while at the same time being attentive to the developments in other fields of research.

      The fundamental goal of this study is thereby delineated: this study aims to demonstrate why phenomenology is indispensable for pain research. Admittedly, there are different kinds of phenomenology, and the complex relation between them continues to raise doubts about the unity and coherence of the phenomenological movement. In the framework of this study, it is not my goal to provide a detailed analysis of the reasons why, despite far-reaching disagreements, the phenomenological tradition as a whole retains its overarching unity.⁶ My goal, rather, is to focus on one particular phenomenological tradition, namely, the Husserlian tradition, and to demonstrate why it is of great importance for the philosophy of pain. In such a way, I will aim to complement Olivier’s and Grüny’s above-mentioned studies, which rely mainly on the resources of Martin Heidegger’s and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenologies. Unless otherwise stated, in this study the concept of phenomenology will be employed as synonymous with Husserlian phenomenology.

      Some readers might wonder, Would it not be more appropriate to proceed on a different phenomenological basis and rely on more existentially and less epistemologically oriented phenomenological resources? One of my goals is to show that such stereotypical rejections of Husserlian phenomenology are far from convincing. Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, Husserlian phenomenology provides a remarkably solid methodological basis for the philosophy of pain. One can single out eight fundamental reasons that make Husserlian phenomenology highly fitting for pain research. Only in Husserlian phenomenology do we encounter the full configuration of these reasons, although, admittedly, some of them can be also found in other philosophical frameworks:

      1. Phenomenology is a philosophy of experience, whose fundamental ambition is to clarify phenomena as configurations of meaning that are constituted in experience. As we will see, the methods employed in phenomenology are highly useful to study the nature of pain, conceived not only as a configuration of meaning but also as lived-experience.

      2. In contrast to other philosophies of experience, phenomenology provides the methodological basis to study the experience of pain by setting aside naturalistic preconceptions, including all the available theoretical accomplishments, which, for the reasons that will have to be clarified in due course, tacitly reconfigure the nature of experience. Here I am referring to the phenomenological methods of the epoché and the reduction, which enable phenomenology to conceptualize pain in the absence of naturalistic bias and manipulation.

      3. Phenomenology primarily relies upon a descriptive method, which is also of great importance for pain research: to this day, the phenomenal nature of pain remains unexplored and it can be surveyed only descriptively.

      4. Phenomenological descriptions are not focused on the idiosyncratic characteristics of personal experience. Rather, by virtue of the method of eidetic variation, phenomenology strives to offer accounts of the essence of pain experience. In this regard, too, phenomenology promises to fill a serious gap in pain research.

      5. Phenomenology has been celebrated for a long time for overcoming the subject/object dichotomy and for disclosing the centrality of the body in thinking, acting, and feeling. In this regard, too, it proves to be remarkably apt for pain research, since pain in its essence is a bodily phenomenon.

      6. Phenomenology provides us with some of the richest—if not the richest—analyses of the temporal nature of experience. In this regard, also, it promises to be of great significance for pain research in that it provides the means needed to clarify the temporal structures of pain experience.

      7. The groundbreaking distinction in phenomenology between the naturalistic and the personalistic attitudes is of fundamental importance, since pain as experience can be grasped only from the personalistic, and not from a naturalistic, standpoint.

      8. Finally, the phenomenological analyses of the life-world are also highly relevant for the philosophy of pain, since these analyses enable us to philosophically conceptualize different ways in which the experience of pain is rooted in cultural worlds.

      THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION

      This study will be concerned with three fundamental tasks: it will aim to (1) clarify the fundamental methodological principles that must underlie phenomenologically oriented pain research; (2) develop a new conception of pain on the basis of such methodological principles; and (3) clarify what contribution the phenomenology of pain can make to philosophical anthropology. It is highly important to carry out all these tasks, and for various reasons. As far as the first task is concerned, let us not overlook that in pain research we come across various studies that call themselves phenomenological, even though the exact meaning of this qualification remains unqualified. Various autobiographies, pain narratives, and empirically oriented studies, as well as introspectionist accounts, are passed off as though they are phenomenological studies of pain. So as to counteract this tendency and the deep confusions it gives rise to, one must stress that phenomenology is first and foremost a method, which means that only insofar as one subscribes to the distinctly phenomenological methodology can one qualify one’s study as phenomenological (in the above-mentioned sense).

      In chapter 1, my goal will be to lay out those methodological principles that are indispensable for any study that wishes to identify itself as phenomenological in the Husserlian sense of the term. I will contend that the methods of the epoché, the phenomenological reduction, and eidetic variation are the fundamental and indispensable principles of the phenomenological method. Besides clarifying the meaning of these principles, I will further argue that especially in the framework of pain research, these three fundamental methods call for a further twofold supplementation. First, the method of eidetic variation must be supplemented with a method of factual variation, conceived not so much as an independent method, but rather as an important extension of the method of eidetic variation. Second, static methodology in general must be supplemented with what in Husserlian phenomenology is identified as genetic methodology. Taking such a methodological orientation into account, I will maintain that phenomenology is not concerned with the idiosyncratic nature of any particular experience, and in this regard, it should be distinguished from the anthropologically and sociologically oriented pain research that we come across in the literature. In contrast to all empirical research on pain, phenomenology is concerned with essential structures of experience, that is, those structures without which experience as such could not be qualified as painful.⁷

      Having clarified the fundamental methodological principles of phenomenological research, we will proceed to the second fundamental task. Our guiding question runs as follows: What is pain, when conceived of as experience and when considered from the phenomenological point of view? Building on the basis of phenomenological descriptions, this manuscript will propose the following answer to this fundamental question: pain is an aversive bodily feeling with a distinct experiential quality, which can be given only in original firsthand experience, either as a feeling-sensation or as an emotion.

      I should stress that this conception of pain does not rely either on pain biology or on pain sociology. It does not subscribe to the fundamental methodological commitments of either naturalism or social constructionism. All the qualifications entailed in this definition rely upon phenomenologically oriented reflections on pain experience. This conception is meant to articulate the eidetic features of pain experience. I will maintain that the conception of pain proposed here captures the phenomenological essence of pain experience.

      To corroborate such a view, the following study will take seven major steps and answer seven central questions. What does it mean to claim (1) that pain is a bodily feeling; (2) that this feeling is aversive; (3) that it has a distinct experiential quality; (4) that it is an original experience; (5) that it can be given only in firsthand experience; (6) that it is originally lived through as a nonintentional feeling-sensation; and, finally (7), that it can also be given as an intentional feeling? Chapters 2–5 of this study deal with these questions explicitly. Chapter 2 conceptualizes pain both as a nonintentional feeling-sensation and as an emotion; it further shows what it means to claim that pain can be given only in firsthand experience. Chapter 3 supplements this conception by showing that pain must be conceived of as a fundamentally aversive feeling that has a unique experiential quality. Chapter 4 supplements the foregoing analysis with an investigation into what it means to qualify the experience of pain as an original experience. Finally, in chapter 5, I will bring this analysis to its end by inquiring into the fundamentally embodied nature of pain experience. By the end of chapter 5, it will have become clear what it means to claim that pain is an embodied and emotionally stamped bodily feeling, whose fundamentally aversive nature is of a distinct experiential quality.

      Phenomenology’s relevance for pain research is not reducible to the conceptual clarification of the nature of pain experience, no matter how important such a task might be. This will bring us to the third fundamental task of this study, which concerns the contribution that the phenomenology of pain could make to philosophical anthropology.⁸ What can the phenomenology of pain contribute to our philosophical understanding of human existence? This is the central question, to which the final two chapters of this study will aim to offer an answer. Put phenomenologically, what is at stake here are those essential features that make up the core of pain experience, conceived personalistically and not naturalistically. In this regard, it will prove necessary to clarify in detail what it means to claim that the phenomenological category of the person depicts the subject of pain and that the phenomenological concept of the life-world designates the fundamental horizon within which human pain is lived. The last two chapters will address these issues while focusing on chronic pain. Chapter 6 will focus on pain as a depersonalizing and a repersonalizing experience. Chapter 7 will supplement this investigation with a further analysis of the role that somatization and psychologization play in pain experience.

      CHAPTER 1

      METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

      Let us begin with the analysis of the fundamental methodological principles that must underlie phenomenologically oriented pain research. In the introduction, I have identified this task as one of the three fundamental goals of this study as a whole. Here I want to contend that the methods of the epoché, the phenomenological reduction, and eidetic variation constitute such fundamental methodological principles. These three principles are necessary: only insofar as one subscribes to them does one have the right to identify one’s investigation as phenomenological in the Husserlian sense of the term. Nonetheless, these principles are not sufficient; they need to be supplemented with other phenomenological methods. As far as the phenomenology of pain is concerned, these three methodological principles need to be supplemented with two further methodological procedures: what we will here identify as the method of factual variation and the genetic method of intentional implications.¹

      I will take four steps in my analysis. In the first section, I will present the methods of the epoché, the phenomenological reduction, and eidetic variation conceived of as the three principles that make up the methodological core of phenomenologically oriented pain research. In the second section, I will focus on three critiques that have been directed against phenomenology—the contentions that phenomenology is disguised psychologism, camouflaged introspectionism, and veiled solipsism. Responses to these three critiques will solidify the three methodological commitments mentioned above. In the third section, I will argue that the three fundamental phenomenological methods are necessary, yet not sufficient, and that the method of eidetic variation needs to be supplemented with the method of factual variation. We are in need of such a supplementation because in its absence, the method of eidetic variation is all too often understood as an excuse to engage in phenomenological reflections while dismissing (presumably, out of methodological considerations) all other scientific accomplishments that we come across in other fields of research. Phenomenology need not be the victim of its own purity: it must be open to the developments in other sciences—natural, social, and human—as well as to the advances in literature, poetry, cinema, and fine arts. Insofar as phenomenology is cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural, it merits being called dialogical. In the fourth section, I will qualify all the methods outlined above as the methodological commitments of static phenomenology, and I will further argue that they need to be supplemented with the methodological principles of genetic phenomenology. In such a way, we will obtain an answer to the first fundamental question of this study, which concerns the identification of the methodological principles of phenomenologically oriented pain research.

      Phenomenology has been practiced in a large variety of ways, and, therefore, one cannot exclude the possibility that the phenomenology of pain might rely on some other methodological principles. While admitting such a possibility, I would like to stress two interrelated points. First, phenomenology is a method, and, therefore, anyone who wishes to argue that the static and the genetic methods are expendable must show what other phenomenological methods could replace them. Second, the methods presented here are not only fundamental to phenomenology, but also exceptionally fruitful for pain research, which is in need of a reliable methodology to clarify pain experience independently from pain biology and pain sociology, yet without denigrating it to the empirical level of personal accounts of the idiosyncratic nature of one’s own experience.

      FUNDAMENTAL METHODOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS: EPOCHÉ, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION, AND EIDETIC VARIATION

      One commonly thinks of phenomenological analyses as reflections on experience, and things given in experience, from the first-person point of view. Such a general qualification all too easily leads to far-reaching ambiguities and confusions. These confusions are especially prevalent in such fields as pain research, where we come across investigations that are labeled as phenomenological simply because they provide a set of reflections on pain experience from the first-person point of view. One is thus left with the impression that any introspective, autobiographical, or even psychologistic set of reflections on pain experience can be characterized as phenomenological. Such a state of affairs has led to a misapprehension of the nature, goals, and function of phenomenology in pain research.

      Clearly, not any kind of reflection on experience from the first-person point of view is phenomenological. At least from a Husserlian standpoint, one would say: it is the commitment to specific methodological principles that distinguishes phenomenologically oriented investigations from other studies of lived-experience. Such a standpoint suggests that an investigation can be labeled as phenomenological if, and only if, it subscribes to the fundamental principles of phenomenological methodology. What exactly are those principles?

      It is not easy to answer this question. Ever since its emergence, the phenomenological method has been conceptualized in a number of ways, whose compatibility remains a contentious issue. On the one hand, there is the more apparent problem of methodological consistency that runs throughout the phenomenological movement. As Paul Ricoeur (1987, 9) has famously put it, the history of phenomenology is the history of Husserlian heresies. On the other hand, even if one limits oneself to classical phenomenology in general, and Husserlian phenomenology in particular, one nonetheless has to deal with questions concerning the compatibility of different methodological frameworks (say, those of static and genetic phenomenology), as well as of different accounts of the

      Enjoying the preview?
      Page 1 of 1