Value Judgement

The research was carried out to find out primary school teachers’ educational value judgement in regards to teaching process and to understand differences in their values and its effect on their teaching and on their school. The survey was a qualitative type and direct interview method was used to collecting the data. Interview form which built up by the researchers was used as data collection tool. During the development of the interview schedule, firstly literature was reviewed, expert advice and opinion were obtained, pilot study were administered, and the final form of the interview schedule was given following advisory consultations. The survey was carried out within 2007-2008 educational year, with the participation of 40 educationists. Data has been subjected to the content analysis.
The results of research demonstrated that teachers have different value judgements in terms of education processes and this diversity was caused conflicts between teachers at times. At the same time different value judgements in terms of discipline and evaluation of students was caused negative effects over students. Further research aimed at a more detailed evaluation of this data will be beneficial.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

NATURALIZM "Etyka jest pochodzenia naturalnego", "dobro i powinność są czymś naturalnym"tak mogłyby brzmieć najogólniejsze i zarazem najbardziej intuicyjne odpowiedzi osoby niewyszkolonej specjalnie filozoficznie na pytanie o to, czym może być naturalizm etyczny. W rzeczy samej, odpowiedzi te stanowią punkt wyjścia dociekań ściśle filozoficznych: teza bazowa naturalisty etycznego brzmi bowiem mniej więcej właśnie w ten sposób: "Naturalizm etyczny jest stanowiskiem mówiącym, że to, co etyczne, jest naturalne" 1 . Piszę «mniej więcej», bo jeśli naturalizmu nie traktujemy -jak to zwykle ma miejsce -jako terminu, który "nosi znaczenie wypisane na swoim czole" 2 , to zasadniczo każdy z elementów wchodzących w skład tej quasi-definicji wymaga odpowiedniego sprecyzowania czy krytyki, żeby w ogóle dało się tu mówić o definicji. Jak można się domyślać, obiektem szczególnej uwagi musi być to, co naturalne. W niniejszym rozdziale postaram się, po uprzednim wyróżnieniu najważniejszych płaszczyzn refleksji naturalistycznej, omówić metaetycznie istotne dystynkcje i płaszczyzny rozważań, które pomogą objaśnić akceptowalne pojęcie naturalizmu etycznego. Zanim przedsięwzięcie to zostanie zainaugurowane, warto jednak dokonać pewnego rozróżnienia. W literaturze poświęconej naturalizmowi w etyce spotkać można dwa różne określenia, które odsyłają do rozważanego zagadnienia: naturalizm etyczny i etyka naturalistyczna. Druga z tych nazw jest genetycznie pierwotna: w dyskursie metaetycznym zadomowiła się dzięki -tyleż wpływowej, co często krytykowanej -znanej pracy George'a E. Moore'a, Principia Ethica 3 . Drugi termin został wprowadzony do etyki głównie za sprawą recepcji dzieła Moore'a 4 . Moore pisał: 1 Moore, Principia Ethica, dz. cyt., rozdział II. 4 Określenie to pojawiło się w artykule C.L. Stevensona, poźniej -w najbardziej znanej książce Richarda Brandta, a także u E.M. Adamsa. Zob. C.L. Stevenson, Moore's Argument against Certain Forms of Ethical Naturalism, w: The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, ed. P. Schilpp, Evanston, Northwestern UP 1942, s. 71-90; R.B. Brandt, Etyka…, dz. cyt., (rozdz. VII); E.M. Adams, Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press 1960, passim.

There are certain 'hard cases' of weakness of will that seem to occur, indeed to be common, but are very difficult to give a non-paradoxical account of.  It is just not clear how they are possible.  This paper is largely an attempt to get them in focus.  What conditions must such weak-willed actions satisfy?  In what sense must they be intentional, for example?  And must the weak-willed agent thinks his action objectively worse than some alternative action open to him?  And must that alternative action actually be open to him?  The paper concludes by considering the condition that a clear case of weakness of will must be in certain sense non-procrastinatory and this turns out to be particularly difficult to satisfy.  Other explanations, ones that do not postulate weakness of will (though they may involve paradoxes of their own), always seem to be available.

One of the most persistent problems in modern theory of value centers around the nature and significance of judgments of value. Controversy has raged over alternative accounts of the origin, analysis, and justification of such judgments. And indeed, the failure to achieve general agreement on answers to questions about value may, more than any other reason, account for the presence of widespread cynicism toward philosophy. It may help explain the feeling among many observers of philosophical activity that it is on the one hand mere sophistry and sterile scholasticism, and on the other vapid platitudinizing or profound vagueness. At a time when increasingly rapid advances are being made in science and technology, the philosopher remains behind in his study, musing over the same "insoluble" problems that have troubled his predecessors for countless generations. We must admit, however, that society rarely looks to him for answers; it has long since realized the futility of that. Men continue to make personal choices, determine public policy, wage wars, overthrow governments, get born, marry and die - all with little philosophical assistance in determining (as opposed to justifying) their actions!
It is with questions of value that such inconclusiveness is particularly hard to bear, for, in contrast with other regions of philosophical discussion more removed from the issues of human choice and action, value theory cannot confine itself to library carrels and seminar rooms. It reaches out into the streets and forums of society. Yet a hopeful thought occurs: Might not assistance be tendered in the other direction? Might not the impos¬sibility of being secluded work more to the advantage of the study of values than to its detriment? In fact, might it not provide direction for the discussion¬ of value, and even offer the hope of answers? Perhaps the conduct of men can instruct him who would understand it.

Ästhetische Urteilsbildung – im jeweiligen Einzelfall: die Kritik eines musikalischen Werks – setzt die Kritik der möglichen Betrachtungsweisen des Gegenstandes voraus. In über hundert Konzertberichten, die Carl Dahlhaus Anfang der 1960er Jahre als Musikredakteur der Stuttgarter Zeitung verfasst hat, wird ästhetische Erfahrung an klingender Musik vollzogen. Diese Textsorte bietet deshalb in ganz besonderer Weise die Möglichkeit, den Prozess musikalischer Urteilsbildung basierend auf folgenden Grundlagen zu studieren: 1. dem Vorgang der Verwandlung eines Werktextes in Klang, 2. den Grenzen und Möglichkeiten musikalischen Hörens, 3. der Auseinandersetzung mit der Partitur. Eine Kritik der musikalischen Ausführung, des musikalischen Hörens und der musikalischen Analyseverfahren auf Textbasis ist hierbei stets implizite und rekonstruierbare Voraussetzung. Inwiefern das Hören auf das Klingende bezogen werden muss, das Klingende nicht ohne Rekurs auf die Partitur reflektiert werden kann und die Kenntnis der Partitur wiederum das musikalische Hören nicht unberührt lässt, erweist sich die Gattung Konzertbericht auch für die Untersuchung der wechselseitigen Beziehungen von Analytiker-, Ausführenden- und Hörerperspektive im Hinblick auf ästhetische Urteilsbildung als fruchtbar.
In späteren musikwissenschaftlichen Arbeiten von Dahlhaus – beispielsweise in Analyse und Werturteil – wurden Aspekte aus diesem Themenkomplex erstmals in Texten mit theoretischem Anspruch abgehandelt. Dies geschieht allerdings um den Preis, dass die erhöhte Tragweite, die den diskutierten Analyse- und Urteilskriterien im Kontext von Musik als klingendem Phänomen zukommt, fast gänzlich unberücksichtigt bleibt.

In evaluating how creative a program or an artefact is, a key factor to consider is the value inherent in that program or artefact. Our research investigates the process by which cultural products may be accorded a form of specifically cultural value independent of market value, focusing in particular on how that process has been transformed through mediation by online networks. To do this, we are studying a specific artform, i.e. music, and evidence from a specific website, i.e. SoundCloud, making a case study of a specific genre with a special association with that website: electronic music. Quantitative analysis ranges across all genres of music represented on the website, with social network graphs being constructed from relational data and corpus analysis being carried out on textual data. Interviews and observational research are being carried out with electronic music performers in order both to explore what interaction on the site means to them on a qualitative level and to study how the production and circulation of value on the site relates to the production and circulation of value in offline environments. This project will make available a methodology and supporting software for measuring creative value through relevant network analysis.