Possible Worlds Semantics and Essentialism

The core of D. Lewis' many con tribution to philosophy, including his work in philosophical ontolo gy, intensional logic and semantics, probability and decision theory, and topics within philosophy of science as well as a distinguished philosophy of mind, dan ve understood as the development of a philosophical postion that is centered around his conception of Humean supervenience. If we accept the thesis that i t is physical science and not philosophical reasoning that will eventually arrive at the basic constituents of all matter pertaining in our world will supervene on the class of physical truht in the following sense: there are no truth in any compartment of our world that cannot be accounted for in terms of differences and similarities among those properties and external space-time relationsthat are fundamental to our world accordint to physical science.
Together the published essays challenge  aspects of Lewis' philosophy, posing new questions  and opening up new points of view in one of contemporary philosophy's most  ingenious and independent authors.

Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland.

https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742512009/Reality-and-Humean-Supervenience-Essays-on-the-Philosophy-of-David-Lewis

V súčasnej analytickej metafyzike je všeobecne prijímaný názor, že modálny realizmus nie je možné obohatiť o nemožné svety. Cieľom predkladanej práce je preukázať opak. V prvej kapitole predstavím problematiku modalít, predstavím modálny realizmus a motivujem diskurz nemožných svetov. V druhej kapitole sformulujem argument, podľa ktorého je modálny realizmus epistemicky prijateľná pozícia. Tretia kapitola ponúkne analýzu modálneho realizmu obohateného o nemožné svety. Nasledujúce tri kapitoly formulujú alternatívy k tzv. rozšírenému modálnemu realizmu. V štvrtej kapitole formulujem modálny dimenzionalizmus, piata kapitola sa venuje modálnemu štrukturalizmu a šiesta kapitola modálnemu fikcionalizmu.

Chaumont-Lévy Sébastien, agrégatif en philosophie, Université Bordeaux-Montaigne Résumé: Dans le format qui lui est ici imparti, le travail qui suit se veut une tentative d'élucidation des corrélations insoupçonnées qui unissent cardinalité d'une part et théorie contrefactualiste de l'autre. En effet : comme a pu le démontrer Anand Pillay (1983), toute théorie de catégoricité strictement supérieure au dénombrable est totalement transcendante,-ce qui implique l'impossibilité d'établir un ordre total sur un ensemble quelconque de la théorie en question. Or comme on le sait, la conception des contreparties développée par Robert Stalnaker (1968) et David Kellog Lewis (1973), en débouchant sur la notion de similitude comparative, semble impliquer de manière presque inéluctable une comparabilité généralisée sur l'ensemble des mondes – ce qui constitue en matière d'ordre la définition même de la totalité. En ce sens, c'est bien la possibilité même d'un usage régulier de la notion de contrefactuel qui devient de ce fait problématique. La question qui se posera dès lors consistera à se demander s'il existe une alternative viable à la notion de contrefactuel en question, susceptible de nous prémunir face à la possibilité de l'établissement d'un ordre total sur un ensemble de mondes modaux-réalistes. Abstract : The present work hopes to show unespected correlations between cardinalities on the one hand and counterfactuals theory on the other. In fact, what such a model-theoretic mathematician as Pillay (1983) has

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this work is threefold: First, to develop a textual model of literary genres based on generic categories, natural and elemental, capable of being applied to all literary texts, existing or imaginable; second, to attempt to explain the relation between literary genres and fictionality, to show that there are fictional and non-fictional literary genres; third, to build on the theory of possible worlds with a complementary theory of impossible worlds capable of explaining cases of rupture in fictional logic, or 'metalepsis'. The distinct possibilities of rupture in fictional logic will be exemplified, explaining their characteristics and representing them graphically through the proposed textual model of literary genres.
RESUMEN: El propósito de este trabajo es triple: en primer lugar, desarrollar un modelo textual de los géneros literarios, basado en categorías naturales y elementales, capaz de explicar la totalidad de los textos literarios existentes o imaginables; en segundo lugar, analizar la relación entre los géneros literarios y la ficcionalidad, de cara a distinguir los géneros literarios ficcionales de los no ficcionales; y, en tercer lugar, tomando como base la teoría de los mundos posibles, construir una teoría complementaria de los mundos imposibles, capaz de explicar los casos de ruptura de la lógica ficcional, o metalepsis. Las distintas posibilidades de ruptura de la lógica ficcional se explican y representan gráficamente a través del modelo textual de los géneros literarios.

Robert Stalnaker contrasts two interpretations, semantic and metase-mantic, of the two-dimensionalist framework. On the semantic interpretation, the primary intension or diagonal proposition associated with an utterance is a semantic value that the utterance has in virtue of the actual linguistic meaning of the corresponding sentence, and that primary intension is both what a competent speaker grasps and what determines different secondary intensions or horizontal propositions relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. The metasemantic interpretation reverses the order of explanation: an utterance has the primary intension it has because it yields the secondary intensions it yields relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. In these possible worlds, the semantic facts can be different: the metasemantic interpretation is metasemantic in the sense that the secondary intensions are determined relative to possible worlds considered as actual given the meanings the expressions have there. Stalnaker holds a causal picture of the reference of names, according to which names have no meaning over and above their unique referent, and therefore maintains that the semantic interpretation is not an option. He thus endorses the metasemantic interpretation , while insisting that this interpretation does not, contrary to what he originally thought, yield any account of a priori truth and knowledge. My double aim in this paper is to show (i) that the metasemantic interpretation, as sketched by Stalnaker, is not compatible with one natural understanding of the causal picture of reference, on which names are rigid because they have their original bearers essentially, and (ii) that a third kind of interpretation of the framework is available,

Using possible worlds some paradoxes might be avoided. As many paradoxes are a result of self-referentiality, the object/expression subject to self-referentiality can have two copies, exactly alike in all respects, with one in one possible world, and the other copy in the other world. Then observations can be made about both objects, or each expression can refer to the other, without falling into a contradiction since both are differentiated by the simple fact that they are in different worlds, yet they remain equal in all other aspects.