Ontological Priority and Dependence Relations

Priority and posteriority are about ordering: the prior comes before the posterior. In the 14th century, Latin scholastics discussed different types of ordering. They asked: what types of priority are there, and how should they be defined? I examine William Ockham's analysis of two kinds: (1) priority in time and place, and (2) natural priority. For Ockham, objects $x$ and $y$ are ordered by time or place when they correspond to sequential times or places $u$ and $v$. Crucially, in order for $x$ to be prior to $y$, $x$ must correspond to $u$ by itself, without $y$. Regarding natural priority, Ockham defines it like this: $x$ is naturally prior to $y$ iff $x$ can exist without $y$ but not vice versa. Ockham sharply distinguishes this from causal priority, and that has a number of consequences. (1) Things can be naturally ordered, even if there is no causal connection between them. (2) Necessary things cannot be naturally ordered. They must be naturally simultaneous. (3) Mutually separable items cannot be naturally ordered either. (4) Natural priority is not a type of dependence.

I use Plotinus to present absolute divine simplicity as the consequence of principles about metaphysical and explanatory priority to which most theists are already committed. I employ Phil Corkum's account of ontological independence as independent status to present a new interpretation of Plotinus on the dependence of everything on the One. On this reading, if something else (whether an internal part or something external) makes you what you are, then you are ontologically dependent on it. I show that this account supports Plotinus's claim that any entity with parts cannot be fully independent. In particular, I lay out Plotinus's case for thinking that even a divine self-­‐‑ understanding intellect cannot be fully independent. I then argue that a weaker version of simplicity is not enough for the theist since priority monism meets the conditions of a moderate version of ontological independence just as well as a transcendent but complex ultimate being.

"The thesis vindicates the common-sense intuition that touch is more objective than the other senses.  The reason why it is so, it is argued, is that touch is the only sense essential of the experience of physical effort, and that this experience constitutes our only acquaintance with the mind-independence of the physical world.
The thesis is divided in tree parts.
Part I argues that sensory modalities are individuated by they proper objects, realistically construed.
Part II argues that the proper objects of touch are pressures and tensions, defined as pairs of real an antagonist forces.
Part III argues that experiences of pressures are an essential part of the experience of physical effort and that the experience of physical effort (which amounts to the experience of resistance to our will), constitutes our only immediate access to the mind-independence of the physical world."

Brentano’s theory of continuity is based on his account of boundaries. The core idea of the theory is that boundaries and coincidences thereof belong to the essence of continua. Brentano is confident that he developed a full-fledged, boundary-based, theory of continuity ; and scholars often concur: whether or not they accept Brentano’s take on continua they consider it a clear contender. My impression, on the contrary, is that, although it is infused with invaluable insights, several aspects of Brentano’s account of continuity remain inchoate. To be clear, the theory of boundaries on which it relies, as well as the account of ontological dependence that Brentano develops alongside his theory of boundaries, constitute splendid achievements. However, the passage from the theory of boundaries to the account of continuity is rather sketchy. This paper pinpoints some chief problems raised by this transition, and proposes some solutions to them which, if not always faithful to the letter of Brentano’s account of continua, are I believe faithful to its spirit.
§1 presents Brentano’s critique of the mathematical account of the continuous. §2 introduces Brentano’s positive account of continua. §3 raises three worries about Brentano’s account of continuity. §4 proposes a Neo-Brentanian approach to continua that handles these worries.

"This thesis introduces and defends the Axiological Theory of Pleasure (ATP), according to which all pleasures are mental episodes which exemplify an hedonic value. According to the version of the ATP defended, hedonic goodness is not a primitive kind of value, but amounts to the final and personal value of mental episodes. Beside, it is argued that all mental episodes –and then all pleasures– are intentional. The definition of pleasures I arrived at is the following :

x is a pleasure of a person P =df x is an intentional episode of P which is finally good for P."

There are several passages in the Metaphysics where Aristotle explains ontological priority in terms of ontological dependence, but there are others where he seems to adopt a teleological conception of ontological priority. It is sometimes maintained that the latter priority too must be construed in terms of the former, or that the priorities in question are not both endorsed (or simultaneously endorsed) by Aristotle. The goal of this paper is to show otherwise; I argue that what is at issue are two distinct priorities that Aristotle simultaneously endorses.

In the third chapter of his major work, the Controversy over the Existence of the World, Roman Ingarden discusses four varieties of dependence entities might exhibit. The aim of this essay is to explore these varieties and to put the claims Ingarden makes concerning them on a rigorous footing. 1 | INTRODUCTION Recent work in metaphysics is marked by a renewal of interest in relations of dependence, in particular ontological dependence. Thus, a set is taken to depend ontologically on its members (Fine, 1995); a whole is meant to be ontologically dependent on its parts (Cameron, 2014); a particularized property on its bearer (Mulligan, Simons, & Smith, 1984); a fictional character upon its creator (Thomasson, 1998); and so on. The writings of Husserl on this subject, in particular his remarks on foundation, essence, and the part-whole relation in the third of his Logical Investigations (Husserl, 1901, III) are recognized as an important source of insight to contemporary debates. Although remarkably less discussed, the notion of ontological dependence is also center stage in the writings of one of Husserl's pupils, Roman Ingarden. Building upon and extending the view of his mentor on this, Ingarden distinguished four main varieties of dependence and independence entities might exhibit. The aim of this essay is to explore these varieties and to put the claims Ingarden makes concerning them on a rigorous footing. Although part of the interest is of course historical, the adopted reading of Ingarden's texts is oriented towards making their content workable for modern purposes. Thus, sometimes faithfulness to the text is sacrificed in the interest of clarity and convenience of the resulting definitions; and while it is my intent to cover Ingarden's own examples, I present further ones which help illustrate the definition in each case. In fact, as I hope to make clear as we proceed, I think the interest in Ingarden goes beyond recognizing a historical source: not only does Ingarden notoriously anticipate concepts and views on them which are currently in play in metaphysics, but besides being interesting in their own right, the notions of dependence Ingarden sorts out, once properly defined, might be significant to present-day discussions related to the notion of fundamentality. 1 Ingarden is mostly known for his criticism of Husserl's idealism, the period of Husserl's philosophy established after the so-called transcendental turn (see e.g. Wallner, 1987 for discussion). As Ingarden understands it, this

(Synthese) The current interest in the notions of ontological dependence and metaphysical grounding is usually associated with a renewal of interest in Aristotelian metaphysics. Curiously, some authors have recently argued that the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers, is incoherent from a grounding perspective. In this paper I argue that such criticism is misleading. I shall examine their arguments and clarify the supposed incoherence.

Abstract: several conceptions of trope bundles have postulated mutual relations of ontological dependence to explain the unity of the bundle. The idea is that a bundle is a plurality of tropes such that each one of them is dependent on any other. A variant of this idea is that there is a ‘nucleus’ of tropes all of them mutually dependent, and there is also a ‘periphery’ or ‘halo’ of tropes that are dependent on the tropes of the nucleus, but the tropes of the nucleus are not dependent on them. There are several theoretical advantages that trope bundles conceived in this way have. A weakness of the position nevertheless is that it requires an equivalence relation of dependence. But it has been normally supposed that dependence is a strict order, i.e. it is relation irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive. Several recent works have put into question this traditional assumption. Those recent criticisms are discussed and it is argued that they are not convincing. Further arguments are presented for the irreflexivity and transitivity of dependence, from which asymmetry follows. Dependence, then, appears to be in fact a strict order. This implies that most forms of nuclear trope bundles are unintelligible. But not all of them, because nuclear tropes with a unique nuclear trope are coherent.

In this commentary piece, I argue that Asay's accounts of truth and truthmaking in A Theory of Truthmaking give no role to the idea that truth depends on being. In fact, some of the positions taken in the book are in tension with this idea that has been central to truthmaker theory. I consider how three aspects of Asay's account relate to the idea that truth depends on being.