Metaphysically Possible Worlds

V súčasnej analytickej metafyzike je všeobecne prijímaný názor, že modálny realizmus nie je možné obohatiť o nemožné svety. Cieľom predkladanej práce je preukázať opak. V prvej kapitole predstavím problematiku modalít, predstavím modálny realizmus a motivujem diskurz nemožných svetov. V druhej kapitole sformulujem argument, podľa ktorého je modálny realizmus epistemicky prijateľná pozícia. Tretia kapitola ponúkne analýzu modálneho realizmu obohateného o nemožné svety. Nasledujúce tri kapitoly formulujú alternatívy k tzv. rozšírenému modálnemu realizmu. V štvrtej kapitole formulujem modálny dimenzionalizmus, piata kapitola sa venuje modálnemu štrukturalizmu a šiesta kapitola modálnemu fikcionalizmu.

Using possible worlds some paradoxes might be avoided. As many paradoxes are a result of self-referentiality, the object/expression subject to self-referentiality can have two copies, exactly alike in all respects, with one in one possible world, and the other copy in the other world. Then observations can be made about both objects, or each expression can refer to the other, without falling into a contradiction since both are differentiated by the simple fact that they are in different worlds, yet they remain equal in all other aspects.

McCall (1984) offered a semantics of counterfactual conditionals based on "real possible worlds" that avoids using the vague notion of similarity between possible worlds. I will propose an interpretation of McCall's counterfactuals in a formal framework based on Baltag-Moss-Solecki events and protocols. Moreover, I will argue that using this interpretation one can avoid an objection raised by Otte (1987).

McCall (1984) offered a semantics of counterfactual conditionals based on "real possible worlds" that avoids using the vague notion of similarity between possible worlds. I will propose an interpretation of McCall's counterfactuals in a formal framework based on Baltag-Moss-Solecki events and protocols. Moreover, I will argue that using this interpretation one can avoid an objection raised by Otte (1987).